
Security Testing

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Software Problem



vulnerabilities Reported by CERT/CC


 More than half of the vulnerabilities are due to buffer overruns.

 Others such as race conditions, design flaws are equally prevalent.

Trinity of trouble

- Three trends
 - Connectivity
 - Inter networked
 - Include SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition systems)
 - Automated attacks, botnets
 - Extensibility
 - Mobile code functionality evolves incrementally
 - Web/OS Extensibility
 - Complexity
 - XP is at least 40 M lines of code
 - Add to that use of unsafe languages (C/C++)

Bigger problem today .. And growing



Software security

- It is about
 - Understanding software-induced security risks and how to manage them
 - Leveraging software engineering practice,
 - thinking security early in the software lifecycle
 - Knowing and understanding common problems
 - Designing for security
 - Subjecting all software artifacts to thorough objective risk analyses and testing
- It is a knowledge intensive field

Software Security

- Renewed interest
 - "idea of engineering software so that it continues to function correctly under malicious attack"
 - Existing software is riddled with design flaws and implementation bugs
 - "any program, no matter how innocuous it seems, can harbor security holes"

Security Testing

- Security is a protection system that is needed to assure the customers that their data will be protected.
 - For example, internet users feel that their personal data/ information is not secure, the system loses its accountability.
- Security may include controlling access to data, encrypting data in communication, ensuring secrecy of stored data, auditing security events, etc.
 - Security breaches can result in loss of information, privacy violations, denial of service, etc.

Types of Security Requirements

- While performing security testing, the following security requirements must be considered:
 - Security requirements should be associated with each fundamental requirement.
 - Each functional requirement, most likely, has a specific set of related security issues to be addressed in the software implementation.
 - For example, the log on requirement in a client server system must specify the number of retries allowed, the action to be taken if the log-on fails, and so on.

Example of Security Concerns

- In addition to the security concerns that are directly related to particular requirements, a software project has security issues that are global in nature, and are therefore, related to the application's architecture and overall implementation.
 - For example, a web application may have a global requirement that all private customer data of any kind is stored in encrypted form in the database.
 - In another example, a system wide security requirement is to use SSL to encrypt the data sent between the client browser and the web server² the testing team should verify the correctness of SSL.

Security Concerns

 The problem with security testing is that security-related bugs are not as obvious as other types of bugs.

cont...

- It may be possible that the security system has failed and caused the loss of information without the knowledge of loss.
- Thus, the tester should perform security testing with the goals to identify the bugs that are very difficult to identify.

Software Vulnerability

- Vulnerability is an error that an attacker can exploit.
- Security vulnerabilities are of the following types:
 - Bugs at the implementation level, such as local implementation errors or inter-procedural interface errors.
 - Design level mistakes.
- Design level vulnerabilities are the hardest defect category to handle, but they are also the most prevalent and critical.

Software Vulnerability cont...

- Unfortunately, ascertaining whether a program has design level vulnerabilities requires great expertise
 - Which makes finding not only difficult but particularly hard to automate.
- Examples include, problem in error handling, unprotected data channels, incorrect or missing access control mechanisms, and timing errors especially in multithreaded systems.



- Testers must use a risk based approach, grounded in both the system's architectural reality and the attacker's mindset,
 - to gauge software security adequately.
- By identifying risks and potential loss associated with those risks in the system and creating tests driven by those risks
 - The tester can focus on areas of code in which an attack is likely to succeed.
- Therefore, risk analysis can help in identifying potential security problems.
 - Once identified and ranked, can help in security testing.

Risk Management

- Risk management and security testing
 - Software security practitioners perform many different tasks to manage software risks, including:
 - Creating security abuse/misuse cases
 - Listing normative security requirements
 - Performing architectural risk analysis
 - Building risk based security test plans
 - Wielding static analysis tools
 - Performing security tests.


Risk Management cont...

- Three tasks, i.e. architectural risk analysis, risk-based security test planning, and security testing, are closely linked because a critical aspect of security testing relies on probing security risks.
- Based on design-level risk analysis and ranking of security related risks, security test plans are prepared which guide the security testing.
- Thus, security testing must necessarily involve two diverse approaches:

Elements of Security Testing

- Authentication
 - To establish the validity of a transmission, message, or originator
- Authorization
 - It is the process of determining that a requester is allowed to receive a service or perform an operation.
- Availability
 - It assures that the information and communication services will be ready for use when expected.
- Non-repudiation
 - A measure intended to prevent the later denial that an action happened, or a communication took place, etc.

- Bug
 - An implementation level software problem
- Flaw
 - A problem at a deeper level
- Bugs + Flaws
 - leads to Risk



Solution ... Three pillars of security



Pillar I: Applied Risk management

- Architectural risk analysis
 - Sometimes called threat modeling or security design analysis
 - Is a best practice and is a touchpoint
- Risk management framework
 - Considers risk analysis and mitigation as a full life cycle activity


Pillar II: Software Security Touchpoints

- "Software security is not security software"
 - Software security
 - is system-wide issues (security mechanisms and design security)
 - Emergent property
- Touchpoints in order of effectiveness (based on experience)
 - Code review (bugs)
 - Architectural risk analysis (flaws)
 - These two can be swapped
 - Penetration testing
 - Risk-based security tests
 - Abuse cases
 - Security requirements
 - Security operations


Pillar II: (contd.)

- Many organization
 - Penetration first
 - Is a reactive approach
- Code Review and Architecture Risk Analysis can be switched however skipping one solves only half of the problem
- Big organizations may adopt these touchpoints simultaneously

Pillar II: (contd.)



Pillar II: (contd.) Microsoft's move ...




Pillar III: Knowledge

- Involves
 - Gathering, encapsulating, and sharing security knowledge
- Software security knowledge catalogs
 - Principles
 - Guidelines
 - Rules
 - Vulnerabilities
 - Exploits
 - Attack patterns
 - Historical risks

Can be put into three categories


Prescriptive knowledge Diagnostic knowledge Historical knowledge

Pillar III: Knowledge catalogs to s/w artifacts



Risk management framework: Five Stages

RMF occurs in parallel with SDLC activities



Stage 1: Understand Business Context

- Risk management
 - Occurs in a business context
 - Affected by business motivation
- Key activity of an analyst
 - Extract and describe business goals clearly
 - Increasing revenue; reducing dev cost; meeting SLAs; generating high return on investment (ROI)
 - Set priorities
 - Understand circumstances

Stage 2: Identify the business & technical risks

- Business risks have several impacts
 - Direct financial loss; loss of reputation; violation of customer or regulatory requirements; increase in development cost
- Severity of risks
 - Should be captured in financial or project management terms
- Key is
 - tie technical risks to business context

Stage 3: Synthesize and rank the risks

- Prioritize the risks alongside the business goals
- Assign risks appropriate weights for resolution
- Risk metrics
 - Risk likelihood
 - Risk impact
 - Number of risks mitigated over time

Stage 4: Risk Mitigation Strategy

- Develop a coherent strategy
 - For mitigating risks
 - In cost effective manner; account for

Cost Implementation time

Completeness Impact

Likelihood of success

- A mitigation strategy should
 - Be developed within the business context
 - Be based on what the organization can afford, integrate and understand
 - Must directly identify validation techniques


Stage 5: Carry out Fixes and Validate

- Execute the chosen mitigation strategy
 - Rectify the artifacts
 - Measure completeness
 - Estimate
 - Progress, residual risks
- Validate that risks have been mitigated
 - Testing can be used to demonstrate
 - Develop confidence that unacceptable risk does not remain


Risk Mitigation Framework - A Multi-loop

- Risk management is a continuous process
 - Five stages may need to be applied many times
 - Ordering may be interleaved in different ways
 - Risk can emerge at any time in SDLC
 - One way apply in each phase of SDLC
 - Risk can be found between stages
- Level of application
 - Primary project level
 - Each stage must capture complete project
 - SDLC phase level
 - Artifact level
- It is important to know that Risk Mitigation is
 - Cumulative
 - At times arbitrary and difficult to predict

Seven Touchpoints



Cost of fixing defect at each stage



Code review

- Focus is on implementation bugs
 - Essentially those that static analysis can find
 - Security bugs are real problems but architectural flaws are just as big a problem
 - Code review can capture only half of the problems
 - E.g.
 - Buffer overflow bug in a particular line of code
 - Architectural problems are very difficult to find by looking at the code
 - Specially true for today's large software

Code review

- Taxonomy of coding errors
 - Input validation and representation
 - Some sources of problems
 - Metacharacters, alternate encodings, numeric representations
 - Forgetting input validation
 - Trusting input too much
 - Example: buffer overflow; integer overflow
 - API abuse
 - API represents contract between caller and callee
 - e.g., failure to enforce principle of least privilege
 - Security features
 - Getting right security features is difficult
 - e.g., insecure randomness, password management, authentication, access control, cryptography, privilege management, etc.

Code review

- Taxonomy of coding errors
 - Time and state
 - Typical race condition issues
 - E.g. deadlock
 - Error handling
 - Security defects related to error handling are very common
 - Two ways
 - Forget to handle errors or handling them roughly
 - Produce errors that either give out way too much information or so radioactive no one wants to handle them
 - E.g., unchecked error value; empty catch block


Code review

- Taxonomy of coding errors
 - Code quality
 - Poor code quality leads to unpredictable behavior
 - Poor usability
 - Allows attacker to stress the system in unexpected ways
 - E.g., Double free; memory leak
 - Encapsulation
 - Object-oriented approach
 - Includes boundaries
 - e.g., comparing classes by name
 - Environment
 - Everything outside of the code but is important for the security of the software
 - e.g., password in configuration file (hardwired)

Code review

- Static analysis tools
 - False negative (wrong sense of security)
 - A sound tool does not generate false negatives
 - False positives
 - Some Tools for Code Review (Static Analysis)
 - ITS4 (It's The Software Stupid Security Scanner);
 - RATS
 - Flawfinder


Rules overlap



Architectural risk analysis

- Design flaws
 - about 50% of security problem
 - Can't be found by looking at code
 - A higher level of understanding required
- Risk analysis
 - Track risk over time
 - Quantify impact
 - Link system-level concerns to probability and impact measures
 - Fits with the RMF

ARA within RMF



ARA process

- Attack resistance analysis
 - Steps
 - Identify general flaws using secure design literature and checklists
 - Knowledge base of historical risks useful
 - Map attack patterns using either the results of abuse case or a list of attack patterns
 - Identify risk based on checklist
 - Understand and demonstrate the viability of these known attacks
 - Use exploit graph or attack graph
 - Note: particularly good for finding known problems

ARA process

- Ambiguity analysis
 - Discover new risks creativity requried
 - A group of analyst and experience helps use multiple points of view
 - Unify understanding after independent analysis
 - Uncover ambiguity and inconsistencies
- Weakness analysis
 - Assess the impact of external software dependencies
 - Modern software
 - is built on top of middleware such as .NET and J2EE
 - Use DLLs or common libraries
 - Need to consider
 - COTS
 - Framework
 - Network topology
 - Platform
 - Physical environment
 - Build environment

Software penetration testing

- Most commonly used today
- Currently
 - Outside->in approach
 - Better to do after code review and ARA
 - As part of final preparation acceptance regimen
 - One major limitation
 - Almost always a too-little-too-late attempt at the end of a development cycle
 - Fixing things at this stage
 - May be very expensive
 - Reactive and defensive

Software penetration testing

- A better approach
 - Penetration testing from the beginning and throughout the life cycle
 - Penetration test should be driven by perceived risk
 - Best suited for finding configuration problems and other environmental factors
 - Make use of tools
 - Takes care of majority of grunt work
 - Tool output lends itself to metrics
 - Tools for penetration testing
 - fault injection tools;
 - attacker's toolkit: disassemblers and decompilers; coverage tools monitors

Risk based security testing

- Testing must be
 - Risk-based
 - grounded in both the system's architectural reality and the attacker's mindset
 - Better than classical black box testing
 - Different from penetration testing
 - Level of approach
 - Timing of testing
 - Penetration testing is primarily on completed software in operating environment; outside->in

Risk based security testing

- Security testing
 - Should start at feature or component/unit level testing
 - Must involve two diverse approaches
 - Functional security testing
 - Testing security mechanisms to ensure that their functionality is properly implemented
 - Adversarial security testing
 - Performing risk-based security testing motivated by understanding and simulating the attacker's approach

Abuse cases

- Creating anti-requirements
 - Important to think about
 - Things that you don't want your software to do
 - Requires: security analysis + requirement analysis
 - Anti-requirements
 - Provide insight into how a malicious user, attacker, thrill seeker, competitor can abuse your system
 - Considered throughout the lifecyle
 - indicate what happens when a required security function is not included

Abuse cases

- Creating an attack model
 - Based on known attacks and attack types
 - Do the following
 - Select attack patterns relevant to your system –
 build abuse case around the attack patterns
 - Include anyone who can gain access to the system because threats must encompass all potential sources
 - Also need to model attacker

Security requirements and operations

- Security requirements
 - Difficult tasks
 - Should cover both over functional security and emergent characteristics
 - Use requirements engineering approach
- Security operations
 - Integrate the security operations
 - e.g. software security should be integrated with network security

Research Motivations

- Absence of Data-set: So we are in need of an efficient data-set for analyzing Intrusion Detection Systems.
- Machine-Learning Techniques will improve the security by around 200%.
- Marking threats according to their effect on vulnerability is needed to draw architecture for software security.
- All Viruses, Trojans and Malwares should be studied and handled carefully to make our system strong enough against these, in real- time.



THANK YOU