

# 🚨 Incident Response and Handling

## Report



## **Executive Summary**

This report documents the implementation of a complete Incident Response and Handling process based on a 5-step Incident Response Plan (IRP) framework. It includes practical application of digital forensics tools for data collection, evidence documentation with chain of custody, incident triage with severity categorization, and a post-incident analysis summarizing outcomes and lessons learned. Mock data is used where appropriate to simulate a real-world incident environment.

## 1. Incident Response Plan (IRP)

The organization follows a structured **5-step Incident Response Framework**:

### Step 1: Preparation

- Security Policies: Updated Acceptable Use Policies (AUP) for employees.
- Tools Ready: Installed Wireshark, Volatility, and OSSEC for monitoring and forensic analysis.
- Training Conducted: Annual cybersecurity awareness training completed by 95% of staff (mock data).

## Step 2: Identification

- Trigger Event: OSSEC generated alerts indicating suspicious SSH login attempts from external IP 185.243.12.90.
- Initial Detection Timestamp: 2025-04-26 10:15:47
- Alert Sample (Mock from OSSEC Log):

log

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\*\* Alert 1682533347.1234: - sshd, authentication\_failures,

2025 Apr 26 10:15:47 (parrot) 10.138.16.109->/var/log/auth.log

Rule: 5715 (level 10) -> 'Multiple SSHD authentication failures.'

Src IP: 185.243.12.90

User: root

Screenshot attached: OSSEC Dashboard showing triggered alert.

### Step 3: Containment

Immediate Action Taken:

Blocked source IP using iptables:

bash

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sudo iptables -A INPUT -s 185.243.12.90 -j DROP

0

• Disabled suspicious accounts temporarily pending further investigation.

### Step 4: Eradication

- Root Cause Analysis:
  - Password spraying attack detected.
- Fixes Applied:
  - Forced password resets across all user accounts.
  - Implemented SSH key-based authentication and disabled password-based SSH login.

#### **SSH Config (Post-Mitigation):**

text

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PasswordAuthentication no

PermitRootLogin no

### Step 5: Recovery

- Restoration Measures:
  - Verified integrity of critical systems via checksum comparison.
  - o Monitored for abnormal activities for 72 hours no further anomalies detected.

Systems declared back to normal operations on 2025-04-29 12:00:00.

## 2. / Digital Forensics: Tool Demonstration

### Forensic Tool Used: Volatility Framework

**Scenario**: Memory capture and analysis for possible malware traces.

#### Steps:

Captured memory image from suspected machine:

bash

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sudo dd if=/dev/mem of=/evidence/mem\_dump.img bs=1M

1.

Analyzed memory with Volatility:

bash

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volatility -f /evidence/mem\_dump.img --profile=LinuxUbuntu\_20\_04x64
pslist

2.

#### Sample Output (Mock Data):

#### text

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Offset(V)	Name	PID	PPID	DTB	Start
Exit					
0x1234abcd	sshd	1276	1	0x5678abcd	
2025-04-26	10:15:00				
0x2234abcd	netcat	1337	1	0x6678abcd	
2025-04-26	10:18:30				

Suspicious process netcat found — possible reverse shell.

## 3. Evidence Collection and Documentation

### **Evidence Forms Collected:**

- 1. OSSEC Log Files
- 2. Screenshot of blocked IP in Firewall (iptables -L output)

## 

Time	Handler	Action	Location
2025-04-26 10:30	John Doe (IR Lead)	Collected OSSEC logs	Secured in /evidence/incident-0426/
2025-04-26 10:45	Jane Smith (Forensic Analyst)	Captured Memory Dump	External encrypted drive, sealed evidence bag

Chain of custody form signed digitally using internal case management system.

## 4. Incident Triage and Prioritization

## **Categorized Incidents:**

Incident	Severit y	Business Impact	Priority
Unauthorized SSH Access Attempt	High	Risk of full system compromise	1
Website Defacement Attempt	Medium	Damage to public image	2
Phishing Email Detected	Low	Risk mitigated by awareness training	3

Each incident triaged based on immediate impact, potential damage, and system criticality.

## 5. Post-Incident Analysis

### **Incident Outcome Summary:**

- Attack attempt was detected and neutralized before any breach or data loss occurred.
- SSH hardening and user education were reinforced immediately.
- No financial or operational loss reported.

#### **Lessons Learned:**

- 1. Need for Proactive Monitoring:
  - o Continuous monitoring with alert thresholds improves early detection capabilities.
- 2. Strengthening Access Controls:
  - Default password-based authentication exposed unnecessary risk; moving to SSH key-based authentication significantly reduces attack surface.

# Final Notes:

This Incident Response and Handling exercise demonstrates comprehensive preparation, quick detection and response, detailed evidence handling, logical triage, and practical post-incident reflection based on professional cybersecurity standards.