A model of COVID-19 transmission and control on university campuses

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# Authors

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# Abstract

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, institutions of higher education in almost every nation closed in the first half of 2020. University administrators are now facing decisions about how to safely return students, staff and faculty to campus. To provide a framework to evaluate various strategies, we developed a susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered (SEIR) type deterministic compartmental transmission model of SARS-CoV-2 among students, staff and faculty. Our goals were to support the immediate pandemic planning at our own universities, and to provide a flexible modeling framework to inform the planning efforts at similar academic institutions. We parameterized the model for our institutions, Emory University, a medium-size private university in Atlanta, Georgia, and the University of Georgia (UGA), a large public university in Athens, Georgia. Control strategies of isolation and quarantine are initiated by screening (regardless of symptoms) or testing (of symptomatic individuals). We explore a range of screening and testing frequencies and perform a probabilistic sensitivity analysis of input parameters.

FIX: We find that monthly and weekly screening can reduce cumulative incidence by 38% and 73% in students, respectively, while testing with a 2-, 4- and 7-day delay results in an 83%, 76% and 67% reduction in cumulative incidence in students over the semester, respectively. Similar reductions are observed among staff and faculty.

UPDATE AS NEEDED: A testing strategy requires far fewer diagnostic assays to be implemented than a screening assay. Our intervention model is conservative in that we assume a fairly high reproductive number that is not reduced through social distancing measures. We find that community-introduction of SARS-CoV-2 infection onto campus can be controlled with effective testing, isolation, contract tracing and quarantine, but that cases, hospitalization, and (in some scenarios) deaths may still occur. In addition to estimating health impacts, this model can help to predict the resource requirements in terms of diagnostic capacity and isolation/quarantine facilities associated with different strategies.

# Background

In an unprecedented response to the COVID-19 pandemic, schools (including institutions of higher education) in almost every nation closed in the first half of 2020.(1) For boarding institutions like universities, this involved both transitioning classes into online teaching as well as closing dormitories by sending students off-campus. School closure as a non-pharmaceutical intervention has been aimed at reducing contact among students, family members, teachers, and school staff.(2) It is thought to be an effective means of reducing disease transmission based on the understanding that younger people are important in transmission of respiratory viruses, like influenza. Closure of schools early in a pandemic is thought to be more impactful than delayed closing.(2) According to UNESCO, approximately 70% of the global student population has been affected, with closures of pre-school, primary, secondary, and higher education institutions.(1) Since SARS-CoV-2 infections are particularity severe among older adults while younger people still get infected and transmit,(3) university populations are unique in these degree of mixing across these age groups. Prior to the emergence of SARS-CoV-2, contact data on transmission of influenza, and other respiratory virus, provided the basis of current recommendations. Universities are important and unique in that they are frequently residential, involve students traveling long distances to attend, and are assets to their regional economies.

University administrators are now facing decisions about how to safely return students, staff and faculty to campus. As of the end of May 2020, approximately two-thirds of US universities are planning for in-person instruction for Fall 2020.(4) Universities considering campus re-opening need to estimate the resources necessary to interrupt and mitigate on-campus transmission by projecting the number of possible cases, needs for screening and testing, and boarding requirements for persons needing isolation and quarantine. To provide a framework to evaluate these questions, we developed a susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered (SEIR) type of deterministic compartmental model. This model captures the transmission process and can therefore estimate the direct and indirect (transmission-mediated) effects of control strategies. For example, through model simulations, we estimated how testing and identifying SARS-CoV-2 infected students results in them being isolated, their contacts being quarantined, as well as all the infections averted by preventing the chains of transmission that would have otherwise occurred. Our goals were to support the immediate pandemic planning at our universities, and to provide a flexible modeling framework to inform the efforts at similar academic institutions.

# Methods

We developed a dynamic model of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 among students, staff and faculty. We parameterized the model for our institutions, Emory University, a medium-size private university in Atlanta, Georgia, and the University of Georgia (UGA), a large public university in Athens, Georgia (numbers are for the main campus of each institution only). We expect the model could be applicable to other colleges and universities and therefore provide a public web-interface where key initial conditions and model parameters, such as student and staff population sizes can be varied (<https://epimodel.shinyapps.io/covid-university/>). The main features and assumptions are described in the following sections. Table 1 provides a full list of all parameter values, the model equations are shown in the appendix.

## Population Structure and Transmission

We modeled three distinct population groups with different degrees of interactions among them: students living on campus; students living off campus; and staff and faculty. We assume that staff/faculty can be infected by students and can infect other staff/faculty, with a reproduction number (before NPI) of 1. Student-to-student interactions leads to transmission at a higher rate, we assume a reproduction number (before NPI) of 2.5.

We assume that students living on campus have a further increased transmission potential to other on-campus students, because congregate living is typical on most college campuses. We therefore assume those students infect on average 1 additional on-campus students.

We do not track transmission in the wider community, aside from incorporating a daily rate of introduction of virus onto campus from the community. To capture external infection from non-university sources, we modeled a constant daily rate of infection being introduced on campus. In our model, this is based on confirmed COVID-19 cases in the counties that surround our institution. For Emory, we chose the average of Fulton and Dekalb, for UGA the average of Clarke and Oconee (9). We assume that infection incidence is ten-times that of reported cases.(7)

Universities are planning an array of measures to limit transmission on campus. These may include mask-wearing; other personal protective equipment; smaller class sizes; staggered class times; enhanced cleaning protocols; enhanced hygiene; canceling large social gatherings; fewer students living in dorms and restricting off-campus movements. We lack data on the efficacy of all these interventions, especially in this specific population, but we assume that they will have an effect on transmission. We parameterize these non-pharmaceutical controls based on a systematic review of the effect of social distancing and face coverings (5), which found around 80% efficacy. Assuming 50% compliance, we estimate the impact of NPI in reducing transmission by 40%, but we evaluate the model for different values of this parameter.

Staff and faculty had a higher risk of severe illness and death (given infection) than students, based on accumulating evidence of age-differences in the case-fatality rate (6), Table 1.

We further assume that a fraction of cases is asymptomatic and that the probability of symptoms is greater for staff/faculty given their older age distribution than students. We assumed that asymptomatic infected persons are as infectious as those with symptoms; this assumption may overestimate the true transmission rate in this group.(7) We assume that infectiousness begins on the third day after infection; this latent period is shorter than the incubation period(8) to represent pre-symptomatic transmission.

Since both Emory and UGA’s semester are almost 120 days long (August 26 - December 19 for Emory and August 20 - December 18 for UGA), we run the model for each school for 120 days. We did not assume reduced transmission over traditional Fall or Thanksgiving breaks or consider alternative schedules.

## Intervention Design

In the model, control is initiated by SARS-CoV-2 diagnostics. Infected persons can be identified by reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) through either testing or screening, defined as follows. Screening is a strategy in which students, staff, and faculty are tested at a given frequency ranging from weekly to once per semester regardless of the presence of symptoms. Testing is a strategy whereby symptomatic students, staff, and faculty present for clinical care and are tested using RT-PCR. We assume a background level of persons with influenza-like symptoms caused by infections other than SARS-CoV-2 ,(10,11) who will test negative. Those with COVID-19 who test positive are immediately isolated. However, we assume that the diagnostic has imperfect sensitivity that varies based on what date of illness the test is performed.(12) There is evidence that PCR sensitivity varies over the course of infection, reaching a peak around day 7 of infection (or day 4 of infectiousness), then declines again. Therefore, we examined the impact of variation in the testing interval, defined as the average lag time between symptom onset and quarantine. Because infectiousness begins one day before symptom onset in the model, we simulated testing intervals ranging from a two -day to a one-week test delay. These testing scenarios are in the absence of any screening to isolate the causal effects of this more intensive intervention.

Following both screening and testing, those testing positive for COVID-19 were immediately isolated. Case isolation in the model mechanistically involved a complete reduction in their contact rate for the duration of infection. Positive test results also lead to contact tracing. Contact tracing is conducted by assuming public health authorities could elicit NA contacts per case detected with 75% of those successfully traced and quarantined. Quarantine, like isolation, was modeled as a complete reduction in the contact rate for the duration of infection. Some of those quarantined contacts might have been incubating but are now no longer able to infect since they are under quarantine.



Figure 1: Schematic of A) Disease Structure and B) Student and Staff/Faculty Transmission Pathways.

## Parameterization and Analysis

In our base models, we simulated SARS-CoV-2 transmission and interventions for the Fall 2020 semester. Our main base model assumed NPI interventions but no screening or testing based-control. Counterfactual scenarios then varied the screening and testing rates, and the completeness of contact tracing. Our primary outcomes were daily and cumulative number of infections among students and staff/faculty, as well as severe cases and COVID-related mortality.

Given uncertainty in model parameters, we performed a probabilistic sensitivity analysis to determine the range of credible outcomes, given uncertainty in model parameters. In the probabilistic sensitivity analysis, we take 1,000 parameter draws using Latin Hypercube Sampling from the distributions in Table 1 and report the 2.5th and 97.5th centile of those runs (Appendix II). We use partial rank correlation coefficient to determine how much the modeled variation in cumulative incidence among students and faculty/staff depends on specific random parameters.

The model was built and simulated in the R statistical computing platform (13); the LHS package was used to perform Latin Hypercube Sampling. We also built an interactive web app for model exploration using the R Shiny framework. It can be accessed at <https://epimodel.shinyapps.io/covid-university/>.

Table 1: Model parameters and ranges.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Parameter | Value | Lower | Upper | Distribution |
| Emory Population | NA | NA | NA |  |
| Students living on campus | 4.5000e+03 | 4.5000e+03 | 4.5000e+03 |  |
| Students living off campus | 1.0500e+04 | 1.0500e+04 | 1.0500e+04 |  |
| Staff and faculty | 1.5266e+04 | 1.5266e+04 | 1.5266e+04 |  |
| UGA Population | NA | NA | NA |  |
| Students living on campus | 8.4000e+03 | 8.4000e+03 | 8.4000e+03 |  |
| Students living off campus | 3.0520e+04 | 3.0520e+04 | 3.0520e+04 |  |
| Staff and faculty | 1.0856e+04 | 1.0856e+04 | 1.0856e+04 |  |
| Natural history and clinical | NA | NA | NA |  |
| Latent period (days) | 3.0000e+00 | 2.0000e+00 | 4.0000e+00 | Gamma |
| Infectious period (days) | 7.0000e+00 | 6.0000e+00 | 8.0000e+00 | Gamma |
| Proportion severe infections - students | 2.2400e-02 | 1.3300e-02 | 4.5600e-02 | Beta |
| Proportion severe infections - staff/faculty | 5.5000e-02 | 3.2700e-02 | 1.1220e-01 | Beta |
| Proportion fatal infections - students | 6.0000e-04 | 3.0000e-04 | 1.4000e-03 | Beta |
| Proportion fatal infections - staff/faculty | 5.2000e-03 | 2.9000e-03 | 1.0500e-02 | Beta |
| Proportion symptomatic infections - students | 3.5000e-01 | 2.7000e-01 | 4.3000e-01 | Beta |
| Proportion symptomatic infections - staff/faculty | 5.1000e-01 | 4.1000e-01 | 5.9000e-01 | Beta |
| Transmission | NA | NA | NA |  |
| average new infections among students | 2.5000e+00 | 1.5000e+00 | 3.5000e+00 | Uniform |
| extra infections among on-campus students | 1.0000e+00 | 5.0000e-01 | 2.0000e+00 | Uniform |
| infections among staff/faculty and to/from students | 1.0000e+00 | 5.0000e-01 | 1.5000e+00 | Uniform |
| Daily rate of community introduction - Atlanta | 5.0000e-04 | 2.5000e-04 | 1.0000e-03 | Beta |
| Daily rate of community introduction - Athens | 5.0000e-04 | 2.5000e-04 | 1.0000e-03 | Beta |
| Efficacy of NPIs | 4.0000e-01 | 2.0000e-01 | 6.0000e-01 | Beta |
| Testing and quarantine | NA | NA | NA |  |
| Time from onset of infectiousness to testing (days) | 2.0000e+00 | 1.0000e+00 | 7.0000e+00 | Uniform |
| Screening frequency (days) | 3.0000e+01 | 1.0000e+00 | 1.2000e+02 | Uniform |
| Duration of quarantine (days) | 1.4000e+01 | NA | NA |  |
| Number of contacts per case | 1.4000e+01 | 1.2000e+01 | 1.6000e+01 | Uniform |
| Proportion of contacts reached | 7.5000e-01 | 5.0000e-01 | 1.0000e+00 | Uniform |
| Proportion experiencing ILI symptoms per day | 3.3300e-03 | 3.0000e-03 | 3.6670e-03 | Beta |
| PCR Sensitivity | NA | NA | NA |  |
| Day 2 of infectiousness | 7.5000e-01 | 6.0000e-01 | 8.3000e-01 | Beta |
| Day 4 of infectiousness | 8.0000e-01 | 7.0000e-01 | 8.5000e-01 | Beta |
| Day 7 of infectiousness | 7.5000e-01 | 6.5000e-01 | 8.0000e-01 | Beta |
| Simulation time (days) | 1.2000e+02 | 1.2000e+02 | 1.2000e+02 |  |

# Results

We start by simulating transmission on campus in which no diagnostic control measures are in place (no testing, isolation, contact tracing, or quarantine). Figure 2 shows total number of infections among students and staff for different assumed strengths of general non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI), with other parameter values at their base values. Table 2 shows the distribution of outcomes when sampling over distributions for each parameter.




Figure 2: Effect of non-pharmaceutical interventions (with no testing and screening) on COVID-19 cases among students and faculty. Top: Emory, Bottom: UGA.

Table 2: Cumulative outcomes at end of the semester. Values are medians and 2.5 and 97.5th percentiles of 1,000 model runs, sampled over parameter model ranges.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| variable | mean | lower | upper | School |
| Cum\_Saf\_Death | 0 | 0 | 2 | Emory |
| Cum\_Saf\_Hosp | 0 | 0 | 492 | Emory |
| Cum\_Saf\_Inf | 363 | 2 | 8371 | Emory |
| Cum\_Saf\_Iso | 0 | 0 | 0 | Emory |
| Cum\_Saf\_Q | 0 | 0 | 0 | Emory |
| Cum\_Stu\_Death | 0 | 0 | 9 | Emory |
| Cum\_Stu\_Hosp | 0 | 0 | 1179 | Emory |
| Cum\_Stu\_Inf | 1333 | 7 | 13540 | Emory |
| Cum\_Stu\_Iso | 0 | 0 | 0 | Emory |
| Cum\_Stu\_Q | 0 | 0 | 0 | Emory |
| N\_Test | 0 | 0 | 0 | Emory |
| Peak\_Saf\_Inf | 75 | 1 | 1643 | Emory |
| Peak\_Stu\_Inf | 268 | 2 | 2987 | Emory |
| Cum\_Saf\_Death | 0 | 0 | 1 | UGA |
| Cum\_Saf\_Hosp | 0 | 0 | 388 | UGA |
| Cum\_Saf\_Inf | 221 | 1 | 6557 | UGA |
| Cum\_Saf\_Iso | 0 | 0 | 0 | UGA |
| Cum\_Saf\_Q | 0 | 0 | 0 | UGA |
| Cum\_Stu\_Death | 0 | 0 | 15 | UGA |
| Cum\_Stu\_Hosp | 0 | 0 | 3034 | UGA |
| Cum\_Stu\_Inf | 2011 | 10 | 35422 | UGA |
| Cum\_Stu\_Iso | 0 | 0 | 0 | UGA |
| Cum\_Stu\_Q | 0 | 0 | 0 | UGA |
| N\_Test | 0 | 0 | 0 | UGA |
| Peak\_Saf\_Inf | 50 | 1 | 1404 | UGA |
| Peak\_Stu\_Inf | 431 | 2 | 8293 | UGA |

We next explored a wide range of screening intervals, from weekly to once during the semester. Figure 3 shows total number of infections among students and staff for different screening intervals, with other parameter values at their base values. Table 3 shows the distribution of outcomes for a 30-day screening interval when sampling over distributions of the parameters.




Figure 3: Impact of Screening Frequency on Projected Covid-19 incidence.

Table 3: Cumulative outcomes at end of the semester. Monlthy screening frequency. Values are medians and 2.5 and 97.5th percentiles of 1,000 model runs, sampled over parameter model ranges.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| variable | mean | lower | upper | School |
| Cum\_Saf\_Death | 0 | 0 | 0 | Emory |
| Cum\_Saf\_Hosp | 0 | 0 | 294 | Emory |
| Cum\_Saf\_Inf | 62 | 1 | 4970 | Emory |
| Cum\_Saf\_Iso | 7 | 0 | 1352 | Emory |
| Cum\_Saf\_Q | 0 | 0 | 0 | Emory |
| Cum\_Stu\_Death | 0 | 0 | 1 | Emory |
| Cum\_Stu\_Hosp | 0 | 0 | 618 | Emory |
| Cum\_Stu\_Inf | 110 | 3 | 10171 | Emory |
| Cum\_Stu\_Iso | 22 | 1 | 2805 | Emory |
| Cum\_Stu\_Q | 0 | 0 | 0 | Emory |
| N\_Test | 0 | 0 | 0 | Emory |
| Peak\_Saf\_Inf | 7 | 1 | 732 | Emory |
| Peak\_Stu\_Inf | 13 | 2 | 1552 | Emory |
| Cum\_Saf\_Death | 0 | 0 | 0 | UGA |
| Cum\_Saf\_Hosp | 0 | 0 | 245 | UGA |
| Cum\_Saf\_Inf | 40 | 0 | 4198 | UGA |
| Cum\_Saf\_Iso | 4 | 0 | 1145 | UGA |
| Cum\_Saf\_Q | 0 | 0 | 0 | UGA |
| Cum\_Stu\_Death | 0 | 0 | 1 | UGA |
| Cum\_Stu\_Hosp | 0 | 0 | 1591 | UGA |
| Cum\_Stu\_Inf | 226 | 4 | 27078 | UGA |
| Cum\_Stu\_Iso | 34 | 1 | 7456 | UGA |
| Cum\_Stu\_Q | 0 | 0 | 0 | UGA |
| N\_Test | 0 | 0 | 0 | UGA |
| Peak\_Saf\_Inf | 6 | 1 | 676 | UGA |
| Peak\_Stu\_Inf | 31 | 2 | 4485 | UGA |

Next, we consider a testing-only strategy, wich also includes contact tracing and quarantine as measures. Assuming different delays between receiving the test and receiving the results, results are shown Figure 4. We again plot the total number of infections among students and staff, with other parameter values at their base values. Table 4 shows the distribution of outcomes for a 4-day testing delay when sampling over distributions of the parameters.



Figure 4: Impact of testing, contact tracing and quarantine at a range of testing delay intervals.

Table 4: Cumulative outcomes at end of the semester. Testing delay of 4 days. Values are medians and 2.5 and 97.5th percentiles of 1,000 model runs, sampled over parameter model ranges.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| variable | mean | lower | upper | School |
| Cum\_Saf\_Death | 0 | 0 | 0 | Emory |
| Cum\_Saf\_Hosp | 0 | 0 | 30 | Emory |
| Cum\_Saf\_Inf | 16 | 0 | 387 | Emory |
| Cum\_Saf\_Iso | 1 | 0 | 91 | Emory |
| Cum\_Saf\_Q | 10 | 1 | 709 | Emory |
| Cum\_Stu\_Death | 0 | 0 | 1 | Emory |
| Cum\_Stu\_Hosp | 0 | 0 | 124 | Emory |
| Cum\_Stu\_Inf | 70 | 2 | 1026 | Emory |
| Cum\_Stu\_Iso | 3 | 1 | 231 | Emory |
| Cum\_Stu\_Q | 34 | 4 | 1849 | Emory |
| N\_Test | 0 | 0 | 0 | Emory |
| Peak\_Saf\_Inf | 2 | 1 | 62 | Emory |
| Peak\_Stu\_Inf | 7 | 2 | 159 | Emory |
| Cum\_Saf\_Death | 0 | 0 | 0 | UGA |
| Cum\_Saf\_Hosp | 0 | 0 | 28 | UGA |
| Cum\_Saf\_Inf | 9 | 0 | 361 | UGA |
| Cum\_Saf\_Iso | 1 | 0 | 84 | UGA |
| Cum\_Saf\_Q | 5 | 0 | 656 | UGA |
| Cum\_Stu\_Death | 0 | 0 | 1 | UGA |
| Cum\_Stu\_Hosp | 0 | 0 | 268 | UGA |
| Cum\_Stu\_Inf | 105 | 2 | 2721 | UGA |
| Cum\_Stu\_Iso | 4 | 1 | 621 | UGA |
| Cum\_Stu\_Q | 45 | 4 | 4901 | UGA |
| N\_Test | 0 | 0 | 0 | UGA |
| Peak\_Saf\_Inf | 1 | 1 | 67 | UGA |
| Peak\_Stu\_Inf | 11 | 2 | 481 | UGA |

The impact of testing is highly sensitive to the success of contact tracing, which can overwhelm the impact of quarantine of the tested and isolation of the cases themselves. Figure 5 shows the relationship between “contact tracing” success and cumulative incidence assuming a 4-day delay in testing/quarantine following symptoms. Although the testing interval can reduce the cumulative incidence, the greater impact of this testing scenario is achieved by the number of contacts reached.




Figure 5: Impact of testing, contact tracing and quarantine for different levels of contacts reached.

NOT DONE YET:

In the final scenarios, we combined the testing and screening rates under different assumptions of contact tracing related to testing (Figure 5). Our model scenarios below varied the interval for screening between 1 week (7 days) and 1 semester (120 days) and testing at2-, 4- and 7-day delay, with the efficacy of contact tracing ranging from 0, 50% and 100%. These figure panels show cumulative incidence at the end of the semester for students only. When combined with testing, screening generally has little effect unless it is performed at least monthly.



Figure 6: Impact of combined screening and testing of covid-19 cases among students. Vertical lines represent weekly and monthly screening.

# Discussion

NOT YET UPDATED

We find that unmitigated transmission of Covid-19 in a population of 30,000 staff, faculty and students would lead to thousands of illnesses, many hospitalizations and likely deaths in this population, which is clearly an unacceptable outcome by administrators and the university community. Combined with measures to reduce transmission, a testing strategy whereby symptomatic students, staff and faculty are identified, administered viral testing, and isolated is largely effective at controlling transmission. We find that the success of this strategy relies on contact tracing and quarantining most contacts of infected individuals. Screening would have to be performed at least monthly to have much of an impact on the course of the outbreak on campus and increases the sample collection and assay requirements considerably. However, because we assume the campus community is not a closed population and that there is an ongoing risk of importation of virus, there are considerable numbers of cases even under the most optimistic scenario, which therefore requires substantial resources. Overall, we recommend that these results be interpreted qualitatively, since there is considerable uncertainty in these projections stemming from lack of precision of parameter inputs (e.g. true R0 in this population).

There are a number of limitations to this modeling analysis, which we outline here. First, we lack empirical data about the efficacy of any prevention and control measures aside from testing that are implemented on campus. Smaller class sizes, staggered class times, use of face coverings, use of other protective equipment and general behavior change are not separately accommodated in this model.(5) If such data become available in campus population or ones that can serve as a good proxy, model parameters can be refined. Moving more students to off-campus housing has little effect on our projections because we make the assumption that transmission on-campus (R0 = 3.5) is only moderately higher than off campus (R0 = 2.5). This assumption is based on risk factor data on influenza-like illness among students during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, but if more data become available, we could revisit this assumption.(17) In our model, the campus outbreak cannot go extinct because we assume a constant rate of introduction from the community. Depending on levels of student, staff and faculty behavior off-campus and the general prevalence in the surrounding community (Atlanta metro area in our model), this could be an under- or overestimate of risk. We have not explicitly included a scenario in which all or a subset of students (e.g., those residing on campus) are screened upon return to campus. Given our assumptions that student prevalence is the same as among the general population, screening on return would have limited effect, but would increase requirements by ~4,500 to 15,000 tests, depending on the breadth of testing of the student body. Finally, we have not included seasonal effects whereby virus becomes more transmissible in Fall or alternative semester dates (e.g.., end of classes at Thanksgiving break) whereby the period of campus transmission is reduced.

In conclusion, we present a model of SARS-CoV-2 transmission and control to assist universities in planning potential impacts and resource needs. Our model is conservative in that we assume a high reproductive number that is not reduced through non-pharmaceutical interventions. Despite this, we find that community-introduction of SARS-CoV-2 infection onto campus can be controlled with effective testing, isolation, contract tracing and quarantine, consistent with observations that this strategy has been successful in the general population where implemented properly (e.g. South Korea).(18) The results of this model simulation approach have been influential in Emory University’s decision to open in Fall 2020. The University will implement a comprehensive testing strategy and will shorten the semester with an early start, with no breaks in order to end by Thanksgiving, amongst a number of other strategies to suppress transmission.(19)

# Appendix I. Model equations

# Appendix II. Estimated active and cumulative cases under intervention scenarios with 25th and 75th centile range



Figure 7: Estimated active and cumulative cases under intervention scenarios with 25th and 75th centile range.

# Appendix III. Partial rank correlation coefficient of key model inputs.



Figure 8: Partial rank correlation coefficient of key model inputs.

# References