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Contents

SPECIAL ISSUE: Can National Identity Ever Have "Fundamental Values"?

GUEST EDITORS: Ian Stronach and Alan Hodkinson

Editorial
Qualitative Inquiry in an International Space 3
Norman K. Denzin

Introduction
Can National Identity Ever Have "Fundamental Values"? 5
Ian Stronach and Alan Hodkinson

Articles
"Fundamental British Values": What's Fundamental? What's Value? and What's (Now) British? 9
Ian Stronach and Jo Frankham

Fundamental British Values: Radicalising British Children Into a Manufactured Them and Us Narrative Concept of Britishness? 23
Alan Hodkinson

Muslim Home Educators in the Time of Prevent 41
Harriet Pattison

Taking a Feminist Disability Studies Approach to Fundamental British Values: Do "Fundamental" "British" Values Encourage the Appreciation of Marginalised Identity Groups, or Lead to the Performance of Inclusion? 64
Ella Houston

Fundamental British and "The Other" Values—An Analytical Reflection on Implications for Home Education 81
Harriet Pattison

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- Discussing critical qualitative research methodologies and practices
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- Furthering our understanding of issues, and advocating in policy arenas
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Qualitative Inquiry in an International Space

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Norman K. Denzin[1]

With this issue the *International Review of Qualitative Research* moves to its new home with Sage Publications. We thank the University of California Press making this move go so smoothly, and for providing *IRQR* a nourishing home for the last five years.

From day one *International Review of Qualitative Research* has encouraged the use of critical, experimental and traditional forms of qualitative inquiry in the interests of social justice. We seek works that are both academically sound and partisan, works that offer knowledge-based radical critiques of social settings and institutions while promoting human dignity, human rights, and just societies around the globe. Submissions to the journal, which is open peer review, are judged by the effective use of critical qualitative research methodologies and practices for understanding and advocacy in policy arenas, as well as clarity of writing and willingness to experiment with new and traditional forms of presentation. Linked to the annual International Congress for Qualitative Inquiry, much of the journal's content is drawn from presentations and themes developed from these international meetings. Attendees at the Annual Congresses will receive an annual subscription as part of their registration fees.

This journal reflects the exponential growth in interest in critical, qualitative research, and in the use, development, and application of this type of research for social action purposes. We highlight the work of scholars who wrestle with problems associated with the application and use of qualitative research in and for empowerment purposes. It explicitly takes qualitative research in a more applied, participatory action direction. We will actively solicit the work of international scholars in the applied social science, business, health care and educational fields, and less the work generated in traditional scholarship. The theme of social justice is central to the mission of the *IRQR*.

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The move of *IRQR to Sage* signals the growing global presence of qualitative inquiry. Scholars from around the world, in a host of differing disciplines, from a wide array of traditional and nontraditional settings, believe that qualitative research must have a greater voice in social policy arenas. *IRQR* addresses this need. We seek works which relentlessly interrogate the issues surrounding qualitative inquiry in a time of global uncertainty. We seek works which focus on these and related themes as they confront social justice issues: empowerment ethics, the politics of evidence, critical, indigenous methodologies, human subject review boards in the new millennium, decolonizing performances, moral activism, queering the empirical, critical pedagogy, indigenous epistemology, performance ethics, ethnodrama, autoethnography, narrative poetics, visual culture, postcolonial methodology, rethinking collaboration, justice as healing, human rights and intellectual property rights.

Can National Identity Ever Have "Fundamental Values"?

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Ian Stronach[1] and Alan Hodkinson[2]

Abstract

This brief article acts as an introduction to this special edition on Fundamental British Values (FBV). From the outset, it is important to state that we as a group of contributors believe it is fundamental to value Britain and all of its peoples in different and differing ways to those espoused in the Government Prevent Agenda, FBV, and the "media's moral panics" about the terrorist within.

Keywords

Fundamental British Values, prevent agenda, education

Introduction

The U.K. government is currently asserting the need for the curriculum in England and Wales to promote "Fundamental British Values" (FBV), in response to perceived threats from various radicalization and globalization. The prime mover has been seen as Islamic, but there are further underminings in nationalisms within the United Kingdom such as the Scottish referendum of 2014, as well as anti-EU expressions of nationality. "Brexit" was a demand for a return of "political sovereignty": "we want our country back," as well as a demonization of immigrants. More generally, there have been other assertions of nationality, as in Hungary, Russia, and to some extent the USA, as well as a growing sense of disillusion with neo-liberal globalization (Economist Special Report, 2016).

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In the broadest sense, "Fundamental British Values," as the U.K. government promotes it (the upper case is a significant reification), raise issues of interpretation that include the tensions between revolution and restoration and indeed reaction (Arendt, 1977). We, though, like Holman Jones (2019) believe,

> that when we gather together in "sanctioned" and "official" public spaces such as a conference SIG gathering, or a university classroom, (and we would add in school classrooms and curricular) or in the pages of indexed and ranked journals, as well as when we assemble in "unsanctioned" and "unofficial" spaces such as "unranked" journals and hallways, public squares and street corners, and other spaces in which human equality or relational freedom is not readily manifest if not impossible—our gathering must, to borrow (Bulter, 2015) phrase, make a "call for justice".

Our gathering, our call for justice, began with presentations that we made in a symposium at the International Congress of Qualitative Inquiry held at Urbana-Champaign May 2017. The symposium was entitled: Can national identity ever have "fundamental values"? In this symposium, we explored aspects of the historical, philosophical, political, and educational aspects of national identity and its translation into curricular and educational arenas. What emerged from this symposium was a radical re-examination and exploration of FBV which included issues around historical and contemporary definitions of British Values (Stronach & Frankham, 2020; Hodkinson, 2020), the implications of FBV for Muslim home educators (Pattison, 2020a, Pattison, 2020b), how FBV may be understood as a token attempt toward societal inclusion and empowerment of all citizens (Houston, 2020) and, finally, a paper which reflects analytically on FBV and its wider implications for alternative education through expressions of Foucauldian governmentality of self-surveillance and management (Pattison, 2020a).

In this special edition, then, our treatments of national identity and values are various, but if there is a commonality about them then it lies in epistemological and ontological approaches that emphasize the dispersion of meanings rather than the somewhat pointless attempts at definition and specification. An addition to this kind of agonistic dispersion can be seen most vividly in Oppenheimer (2007) where questions of origin and identity are upended. The "historical" sequences of Celtic/Roman/Anglo-Saxon/Viking are radically and permanently changed by a careful analysis of DNA gene sequences, and the tracing of "British" origins to a much more ancient post-Ice Age recolonization from the "refuges" of the Ukraine, Moldavia, and especially the French-Spanish Ice Age Refuge—it seems that we owe more to the Basques than the Brits!

Thus, the contributions traverse wide substantive and disciplinary areas including children's rights, education, home education, disability studies, and history. While these contributions differ in substantive foci and approaches employed, what they all have in common is an interest in the usefulness, or otherwise, of state sanctioned measures of identity. As well as an overt and sustained interest in, and a commitment to attempting to further social justice, inclusion and human rights within the vitriolic rhetoric of FBV. Through this special edition, we continue a conversation by asking whether there are such things as "British Values,"

fundamental or otherwise, and why do government feel a need for such a "Britain" to exist? The papers that follow capture a commitment to justice and speak from each author's experiences and worlds. The diversity of those experiences and worlds creates what we hope is a multiperspectival and rich tapestry of thoughts and reflections on the question that formed the title of our symposium and provided the organizing construct for the five papers to follow. Each of the papers here, while bearing some resemblance to the papers presented at Illinois, have been extensively revised and improved by input from reviewers. Titles have changed slightly to catch the nuances and shifts that emerged in the revision process. What has emerged is a series of papers that collectively provide a lens through which we can continue to explore crucial questions about identity formulation, community, and the controlling influence of state sanctioned values imposed in state schools and sites of alternative education. It is hoped that they make a contribution to the ongoing conversation and scrutiny of FBV.

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Article

"Fundamental British Values": What's Fundamental? What's Value? and What's (Now) British?

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Abstract

Here we give shallow answers to the 'deep' questions raised in the title of this piece. We slight the question of 'value' as mainly 'interested commodities' and throw darkness rather than light on the now increasingly troubled question of 'British' identity. Our approach is not to define "Fundamental British Values" (FBV) (as we will show, that proved impossible) but to represent the multiplicity of contradictory contents that invest its form. In such a "performative agonistics", we anticipate a dissemination rather than an insemination of meaning in contrast with the ongoing neoliberal "rage for certainty". "Fundamental British Values," in Badiou's terms, is a polysemous "event," whose performances and contexts should be regarded within a series of theatrical metaphors—an "amphitheatre" of meanings, perhaps, in a "post-truth" world. Thus, these deconstructions should be seen as part of a more generic critique of neoliberal enclosures that seek for definitions, essences, identities, and quantifications.

Keywords

Deconstruction, identity, British values, 'post-truth' world

JEL Classification: Education, Research Institutions, Teachers

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> It is not doubt but certainty that drives you mad (Nietzsche, on Hamlet, cited in Zizek, 2015, p. 90)
>
> We're never suspicious enough of words.. (Celine, 2006, p. 256)

Agon 1

There are a minimum of three questions to consider, as our title suggests. Each can be interrogated as a critical departure. The "first" conflict indicates how mere grammar can influence meaning through an unconsidered back door. The expression "Fundamental British Values" comprises two adjectives and a noun. Therefore, a minimum of three questions to consider, as our title suggests. Each can be interrogated as a critical excursion. "Fundamental British Values," capitalized as such, offers a singularity, a "noun phrase," a considerable reification: it offers a singularity. Three becomes One. The question "What *are* Fundamental British Values?" becomes "What *is* Fundamental British Values?" The notion, represented in this form, is a *thing* to be taught and learned. The form is the content, and the content is the form.

"Fundamental British Values" is also reductive. The potentially critical becomes technical. Indeed, in some curriculum talk, the notion is referred to by its initials as FBV, an operative deployment that is part of a moral and educational curriculum which can be taken more or less for granted, like its curricular cousins, Personal and Social Education (PSE), Personal, Health and Social Education (PHSE), and so forth. As such, it becomes a curricular commodity that can be defined, assessed, and marked in the sense that migrants can pass or fail that status. Currently, the threshold is policed by "Life in the UK Test: the essential study guide for the British citizenship test" (2016, first published 2006). The cover boasts "Over 500,000 copies sold." Such a successful commodification of FBV is a "win-win" situation for a government making a profit (test fee in 2019 is £50) from people who it may want to keep out. And the idea that "migrants" might pay to be *excluded* from the UK must warm the coldest of Brexit hearts.

What does *agon 1* tell us about "Fundamental British Values"? One answer lies in the sequence "critical-technical-operative." It expresses an increasingly definitive UK relation between policy, professionalism, and practice whereby British teachers are operatives in a considerably deprofessionalized field. That is their "value." They move from critique and pedagogy to "deliverology" (Bower, 2016, p. 368). Teachers are not even the vendors of FBV. They are reduced to the status of couriers, (deliveroology?), mediating the transaction between the makers and retailers (the Government, assisted by the media) and the consumer/child/family household.

Agon 2

In *agon 1,* we began to scratch the surfaces of "Fundamental British Values" from a grammatical/ideological perspective. But what could the expression *perform*, as

opposed to define? Here, we want to put the term into a number of discursive contexts, treating it somewhat in the manner of Zizek as ".. inconsistent space traversed by a multitude of practices" Zizek (2015). First, as Bower points out, political discourse in the UK (and elsewhere) has been reduced to a "discipline of vacuity," mere sloganized injunctions. He draws on Blair, in particular: "the future not the past," "the many not the few" (one of Corbyn's few debts to Blair), "Britain deserves better," and "secure borders, safe haven" (2016, p. 249). It is fun to take apart that last slogan. It says "secure" [in!] "borders" [out!] "safe" [in!]. In, out, shake it all about: this is political hokey-cokey. The content is risible, but again it is the form that performs in the populist theater of educational politics. And the in/out of Brexit was a hell of a way for Boris & Co to end that particular dance. As Gary Younge concluded at the time: "The standard of our political discourse has fallen more precipitously than the pound and cannot be revived as easily" (*Guardian*, June 30, 2016), although we doubt any easy revival of the pound. So, of course, we will have to get "fit for purpose" and start "punching above our weight" while, of course, "going forward" (Ledwidge, 2012; Thompson, 2016; Boltansky & Esquerre, 2016 provide many other examples). It should be noted that this hypersimplification in the UK 2017 election back-fired—"the magical money tree" versus "strong" and "stable" "leadership" was perceived to be insultingly vague. According to Davies (2019, p. 9), such discourse offers "a new frontier in the marketization of politics." Parry also notes the reduction to "tabloid-style slogans" (Parry, 2019), while Meek reflects on the "mythic simplification" of such discourse, particularly in relation to the "dreamscape" rhetorics surrounding Brexit (an abbreviation for "British exit," referring to the U.K.'s decision in a June 23, 2016 referendum to leave the European Union). Brown's summary seems apposite: the Conservatives 'constructed a consummate political narrative ("the government can't spend money it hasn't got") to the politics of blame ("cleaning up the mess made by Labour") to the politics of fear ("the Greek bogey") to grand economic strategy ("reducing the deficit is a necessary condition for sustained recovery") (Brown, 2018, p. 356).

A second estrangement takes a different course. In analyzing World Bank reports, Moratti and Pestre note "semantic transformations," such as moves from the concrete to the abstract, from events to frameworks, industry to finance, and so on. They conclude there has been over time a "bureaucratisation" of the discourse that "self-organises around a few elements" in such a way that World Bank Reports read as "strangely metaphysical documents" (Morati & Pestre, 2013, pp. 76, 88, 91). Freedland offers a similar but apparently unconnected account of the different registers deployed by Conservative and Labour publications around the 2015 election. Labour also loves abstract nouns, like equality, fairness, aspiration, and opportunity, also reflected in Democrat-speak in the USA. The Tories, in contrast, speak a much more vernacular narrative—mending the roof/mess left by Labour/maxing out Britain's credit/driving the car into the ditch/ balancing the books/living within our means (see also Stronach et al., 2014 on "metaphors of the meltdown," where the global capitalist crisis is proleptically reduced (Thompson, 2016) to the tale of the Improvident Father in a strangely

efficacious argument-by-Old-Testament-parable). Freedland regards this as Labour losing the "war of metaphor," although we would rather call it a war of narratives, the one abstract and disembodied, the other a homely and family-oriented story of recovery by "hard-working families" as opposed to "benefit scroungers." A leading Conservative, Iain Duncan Smith, called this "strivers" versus "skivers"—a poetic labor that must have left him exhausted. Freedland concludes that Labour must "learn to speak human" (Freedland, 2015, July 15). There is an interesting paradox here: the American and French revolutions of the 18th century were full of powerful and polarized abstractions whose oppositions were historically productive (Arendt, 1977). The retreat from abstract reasoning to bed-time stories reflects the infantilization of political debate, via a highly strategic process. As ever, the form is much more sophisticated and performative than the banal content.

These stultifying tendencies are reflected in both precautionary (e.g., "Prevent") and celebratory (e.g., "British Weeks") versions of FBV (see Hodkinson, 2020). The former looks suspiciously for signs of radicalization in relation to Muslim youth in particular, but its warning symptoms seem to include a more universal teenage-hood—character changes, losing interest in the previous activities, and secretive behavior (see Pattison, 2020a). More specific danger signs include "[s]howing a mistrust of mainstream media reports" and "[a]ppearing angry about government policies, especially foreign policy" (*Independent*, September 4, 2015, p. 4). (We refuse to state the obvious at this point.) Zuboff's account of "surveillance capitalism" is relevant (Zuboff, 2019), whereby increasing state/corporate power is extended via " instrumentarian power."

The latter FBV tendency celebrates a Britishness as an all-encompassing way of life, as in one school's fairly typical "British Week" (an FBV-sponsored ritual, May 2015). Furthermore, much is signified in this vein by the setting in which the anthem is performed. In the aforementioned school's British Week, the "climax was the children's performance of 'The National Anthem' – the children were dressed in red, white and blue for the occasion. Mrs Strickland said, 'I was really pleased with the respectful way in which the children sang the National Anthem'." If we pause to examine this off-the-cuff remark, most striking is the passive tense notion that the children "were dressed" in red, white, and blue, as if the colors were imposed on them. They sing the anthem and literally "flag" their engagement. Similar "celebrations" are common, as an online search revealed.

Agon 3

If thus far we have disrupted the FBV term itself and given it a contextual location as part of an impoverished political discourse, in *agon 3,* we can draw on the practices of Badiou (2005, 2013) and Zizek (2013, 2014, 2015) to deconstruct it further.

The most commonly invoked aspect of FBV (for brevity's sake, and perhaps levity's as well) is a cluster of concepts around the portmanteau notion of "freedom" (democracy, equality, liberty, fairness, etc.). Zizek links that notion of "freedom" to what he calls "wordless" capitalism (Zizek, 2015, p. 7). Such wordlessness

represents, without Representation of course, the "Real of the global market" Zizek (2015, p. 8). This "Real" is a Lacanian notion, or as Badiou might put it, a manifestation of the "void of being," an inevitable yet constitutive ontological lack (2005, p. 327). With a satiric nod to Donald Rumsfeld (but not to the unacknowledged antiquary of the "Johari window"), Zizek suggests we focus on a neglected quadrant of Rumsfeld's inventories of the "known" and the "unknown," the "unknown known" (Zizek, 2014, p. 12). So, we need to interrogate "Fundamental British Values" both in terms of what they claim to be (surface 1, see later), what they suppress (surface 2), and what they nevertheless enable through that expression-suppression (surface 3). Surfaces 1 and 2 are intentional, but surface 3 is consequential and somewhat unpredictable.

Zizek opens his argument with the couplet Greek/Barbarian, pointing out that in this juxtaposition, all the differences of the world become the Other, a catch-all of discrepant identities that need to be *fought* rather than *thought*. Arendt comments, ".nationalist concepts of citizenship depend to a very large extent upon the presence of the common enemy from abroad" (Arendt, 1977, p. 69; Arendt, 2013). Zizek calls this ".. an empty container for all such unfitting elements" (Zizek, 2014, p. 34). It is easy to see how this Othering might translate into the couplet British/unBritish, and even easier to see how it might explain American/unAmerican. This is difference as war, a violent semantics of "us" and "them." So far, so obvious.

Zizek then turns to the notion of "freedom." Our empirical exploration of the FBV phenomenon yielded "free market," "free choice," "free world," and even "entrepreneurs – of – the – self" (see also Zizek, 2015). This is the "dogmatic slumber of false freedom" (p. 60), and Zizek offers a striking contemporary illustration: "Whistleblowers […] render public the unfreedom that underlies the very situation in which we experience ourselves as free" (p. 59). Such governmentality, as Allen aptly puts it, reflects a reality where "government has finally learned to rule us through our freedoms" (Allen, 2014, p. 282). But behind all such "freedoms" and "flexibilities" lies the ghost of Marx's "reserve army of labour," differently mobilized in the form of "zero-hours" contracts and the like. British Values are serviced, indeed, by the precariat, whose values do not include freedom, fairness, justice, and equality. *Agon 3* illustrates the slipperiness of the notion of "freedom" as part of FBV. Fundamental British Values is officially defined as comprising "democracy, personal liberty, rule of law, and tolerance and mutual respect" (Home Office, 2015, p. 2). Obama seems to agree, characterizing British Values as "democracy, rule of law, open markets," although it is interesting to see capitalism as overt and positive "value" (Ash, *Guardian*, April 29, 2016).

On the other hand, Runciman is skeptical, arguing that financial values [implicit in "market capitalism"] are subject to "Gresham's Law" whereby "bad practices drive out good":

> A gun-slinging ethos can all too easily spread in which greed is good, nice guys finish last, and if you want loyalty go get yourself a cocker spaniel. (Runciman, 2016, p. 43)

But BBC Radio 4 remained upbeat: British Values aim to "uphold global democracy (December 4, 2015, 4.30 p.m.)." According to Arendt, such originary myths originate in an "unmastered past" (2013, p. 42), as for example, in Germany and in Israel. Devine offers examples from Scottish clans, including the "dreamscape" of the Campbells tracing themselves back to King Arthur (Meek, 2018). These notions of an "unmastered past" express FBV as a reflection of a "zombie imperialism" (Meek, 2018).

Each of these "value" couplets could be deconstructed in similar processes of scrutiny, looking in particular at "surface 3" effects created by "..a vicious cycle of two poles generating and presupposing each other" (Zizek, 2015), a consequential chaos. A final illustration of the oppositional couplet missing-in-action was supplied by then PM David Cameron. He posited the centenary of the Battle of Jutland as a fine expression of British Values, "They fought in defence of British Values" (*Press & Journal*, May 26, 2016). Cameron's account is historically nonsense but structurally perfect sense. British Values/extremism is the FBV couplet. It posits virtue against terror, friend against enemy, and good against bad. Thus, "Jutland" can offer "value" very well as an "interested commodity" expressive of friend/enemy, democracy/tyranny and can even be hailed as a victory/defeat narrative (although the Germans inconveniently won that battle).

It is significant that war should dominate metaphors hereabouts not least because "Jutland" was about imperial domination. Its "British Values" concerned "empire," with its inherent racism and exploitation, and rapacious global capitalism. Perhaps, the choice of metaphor had its own Unconscious. After all, Negri defines "empire" as "the ontological fabric in which all relations of power are woven together" (Negri, 2003, p. 18) and where ".. the whole of social life, production and reproduction and cooperation is subsumed by capital" (Negri, 2003, p. 13). "Jutland," then, can be seen as a confrontation of Capital by the capital ships of the British and German navies; a sort of FBV, all at sea.

Finally, Slavoj Zizek offers this conclusion: "Reference to traditional values enables individuals to justify their ruthless engagement in market competition in ethical terms" (Zizek, 2015, p. 170). Zuboff's recent analysis of "surveillance capitalism" (Zuboff, 2019) would presumably concur.

Agon 4

Here, we turn from "values" to their "Britishness." It was the Romans who made the "British," through "enslavement" according to Tacitus (1999, p. 17), certainly through colonization (see Hodkinson, 2020). And it may well be the anti-Romans (cf., Treaty of Rome) that will unmake it. In addition, the Brexit call for Britain to regain its political sovereignty ("we want our country back," "the will of the people," etc.) may not stop at the UK. Scotland has returned to that issue with calls for a second referendum by 2021. Northern Ireland is also unhappy. Powell's conclusion still stands: "Paradoxically, it is the Little Englanders who will have brought about the end of the

United Kingdom" (*Guardian*, June 30, Powell, 2016). As Blair noted: "Euroscepticism is a form of British nationalism, mostly confined to the most 'British' island nation, the English." (cited in Bower, 2016, p. 878). In which case, we can see invocations of "Fundamental British Values" as an oblique and tiny epitaph of imploded "empire."

An almost universal effect of that dynamic of past/present/future is a subordination of the "present" and the promotion of the Collective Individual (Douglas, 1980). The collectivity is reduced to an individual whose qualities define the nation or people, in what might be called a "manic tribalism" (Mishra, *Guardian*, July 25, Mishra, 2015). O'Toole sees this tribalism, with its determination to demonize "Europe," as a "weird need to dream England into a state of awful oppression" (*Guardian*, November 16, 2018, p. 11).

This manic tribalism has different aspects. Partly, it is the growing populist desire for national reclamation—wanting to get your country back (Farage, Trump, le Pen, Sturgeon, Putin). But national identity turns out to be an incoherence circling a perceived state of permanent loss, an enduring yet threatened presence as national essence, and a future promise that is never realized. Thus, essence, lack, and promise jostle in "heritage mania" (Boltansky & Esquerre, 2016, p. 34; Carter, 2019, for an extended narrative account), and in the proliferation of a "loose conglomeration" (Boltansky & Esquerre, 2016; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983) of spectacles, commemorations, and public competitions—the burgeoning of "Poppy" Commemorations being the latest example.

The allusory Present summons the illusory Past. It seems that the less we are, the more we need to be. So, there is a "British" claim to be fair, free, and friendly down the ages from time immemorial, and yet at the same time, a "Sleeping Beauty" who has been dormant for a hundred years, but is now ready to re-awaken. The theme is well encapsulated as "a loss of some primordial unity and harmony which never existed, which is just a retroactive illusion" (Davis, 2015; Zizek, 2014, pp. 49–50; Nabulsi, 2017).

More prosaically, there are inventories of particular values that seem to itemize this identity. Thus, official UK accounts of FBV portray "Britishness" as expressing the Individual-as-Citizen committed to "democracy, personal liberty, rule of law, and tolerance and mutual respect" (2015, p. 2), although it may be significant that PM Theresa May in interview substituted "enterprise" for "tolerance and mutual respect" (Radio 4, November 12, 2016). The Casey report also trumpets the "British Values of tolerance, inclusion and equality" (Casey, *Guardian*, December 5, Casey, 2016a).

As Fox points out, there is a futility in such inventories. Her anthropology of Englishness prefers to regard it as a dynamic, circling around notions of a competitive, arrogant "one downmanship" and more centrally "dis-ease" (Fox, 2014, p. 539, 557). Alan Bennett would certainly see them as constitutive of a founding English hypocrisy, although he is either smart enough or English enough to personally plead guilty ("What we do best is lip service," Bennett, 2016, p. 349).

Nor have such invocations of national essence or identity ever been stable over time. As Shapiro points out, Shakespeare had a Tudor identity that was clearly

"English" and celebratory ("This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England") (Shakespeare, 1993, p. 388; Shapiro, 2015, p. 206). And then came a Stuart sponsorship that emphasized Britishness rather than Englishness following the Union of the English and Scottish Crowns in 1603. Thus, the Fool, in *King Lear*, is licensed to opine: "Then shall the realm of Albion/Come to great confusion" (Shapiro, 2015, p. 34). But the conventional British originary myth reverses that with the component parts united (more or less) with the accession of James VI and Ist, when Shakespeare slyly rewrote "English" history in British terms, including even "fee fi fo fum I smell the blood of a *British* man" (Shakespeare, 1993, our emphasis). It is a current irony that James even proposed a new currency for his new "Great Britain": it was to be called the "Unite."

National identity, then, is a political contingent, a circumstantial artifact rather than an essence. Its various inventories are largely mythic and contradictory (Bower, 2016, p. 885; Ebbutt, 1910; Fox, 2014; Tombs, 2015, p. 761). Graham Greene in "England made me," cites Musgrave (1583) "on a lawless people" who "will be Scottish when they will, and English at their pleasure" (Greene, 1982, p. 132). Robb is also excellent in dealing with the "debatable land" where identities emerge from "the black hole of border history" (2018, p. 91). Blair's list reflects the confusion of identities rather well: "both conformity and eccentricity, bluntness and reticence, deference and assertiveness, honesty and hypocrisy, community spirit and privacy" (cited in Bower, 2016, p. 885).

Agon 5

We turn now to look more specifically at "Britishness" and its other national components. Our strategy here is not to promote essences of national identity, whether British, Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish, or English but to assert hybridity and fluidity: most nations, after all, are imperial bastards.

The necessary "moral mythology" (Fox, 2014, p. 555) of this new post-Tudor Great British unity was invested with metaphors of "marriage and fraternity" (p. 50). As James VI/I put it: "Had not God first united these two kingdoms both in language, religion and similitude of manners?" (Shapiro, 2015, p. 40). It is telling that the Conservative Party and the Union (in the face of calls for a united Ireland) is now propped up by the Democratic Unionist Party, whose British Values, very different now to the ones that are mainstream on the British mainland, stake a reactionary conservative position in relation to gay marriage, abortion, and women's rights, not to mention creationism. It seems that some forms of religious extremism are ineligible for the "Prevent" treatment.

As we have seen, the more uncertain the essence of identity, the more certain the compulsion for icons and myth. As Meek notes, myth is "an instrument by which people simplify, rationalize, and retell social complexities" (Meek, 2016, p. 3). Our approach here is to illustrate various constructions of national identity by looking at the "national" branding of three iconic poets: Dylan Thomas (Wales), Hugh

MacDiarmid (Scotland), and Seamus Heaney (Northern Ireland). Poets tend to "stand for" the country with unusual intensity, especially when they receive a national recognition. Think of England's "Poet Laureate," or Scotland's "makar," or the Welsh "bardd."

Davies' account of Dylan Thomas notes that his parents, despite being Welsh-speakers, did not want him to speak Welsh. Nor did they want him to even sound Welsh, sending him for elocution lessons (Davies, 2014). And Thomas himself had ambivalence about Wales—"Land of my fathers/my fathers can keep it." But Davies claims him as an "institutional Welshman" (p. 33), whose "creative strength depended on the very ground of Wales" (p. 114). Thomas had a "national authenticity of style" and a "bardic element" (p. 83) that resisted English nationalist kidnapping by the likes of Saunders Lewis's: "He belongs to the English" (1938, cited p. 103). In this way, Davies burnishes a "right" Dylan Thomas reminiscent of the Mr Right that Mae hankered after, in *Under Milk Wood*. Mae, "raw as an onion," was waiting for "Mr Right to leap up the burning tall hollow splashes like a brilliantined trout" (Davies, 2014, p. 136; Thomas, 1995, p. 340). Dylan Thomas emerges as Davies's "brilliantined trout," glistening in his Welshness. Our purpose here, though, is not to adjudicate Welshness, but to trace the insistency and contingency of its construction, as well as to note its uneasy relation to "Britishness" or "Englishness."

If Dylan Thomas was claimed for Wales, then it might be said that Hugh MacDiarmid claimed Scotland for himself. In his epic poem *A drunk man looks at the thistle,* MacDiarmid pulls together (but apart) a heterogeneous collection of cultural, linguistic, psychological, and philosophical traits that he calls a "gallimaufry" of Scottishness (MacDiarmid, 1987, ed. Buthlay, p. li). Each register carries with it some version of polar opposites that characterize the contradictions of the culture, in a "jostling of contraries" (p. xxiii). He sees Scotland peculiarly torn by Apollonian manifestations of form, rationality, and restraint, as well as by Dionysian energy, life, and idiosyncracy. Thus, MacDiarmid invokes what he calls a "Caledonian Antisyzygy." MacDiarmid has no time for compromise in his "gallimaufry" of past, present, and future Scottish identities. His hope, as Buthlay saw it, was that "through the violent destruction of traditional values, a new mystical vision would become feasible.." (Buthlay, 1987, p. xxxii). So, the identity strategy is very different from Davies in respect to Dylan Thomas. Davies looked back in order to connect Dylan Thomas to Welsh traditions. MacDiarmid looks forward to a new "Caledonian" future, sharing a Nietzschean scorn for the "anti-education" of the past (Nietzsche, 2016):

> I'll ha'e nae hauf-way hoose, but aye be whaur/Extremes meet. (MacDiarmid, p. 14) [I'll have no half-way house, but always be where/Extremes meet]

Again, as with Dylan Thomas, we do not wish to subscribe to any particular version of Welshness or Scottishness, but rather to trace some of the disparate ways the various "'surfaces" of identity and difference are mobilized.

> [Apologies to Heaney for raising the question of UK-ness or Britishness. Learning that his work was to appear in the *Penguin Anthology of British Poetry,* he famously asserted his Irishness: 'Be advised my passport's green. No glass of ours was ever raised to toast the Queen' (*Independent*, October 5, 1995)]. Nice one, Seamus!

Conclusion

> 'Let there be Licht,' said God, and there was
>
> A little' (MacDiarmid op cit., p. xxvii) [Licht = Light]

Thus far, we have deconstructed "Traditional British Values" as a grammatical / ideological term, located in a reflection of an impoverished political discourse, and as a political conceit concerning a range of values and virtues connected to "freedom." Fundamental British Values constructs are contradictory even where they are not deliberate deceit. We argued that the term presented a series of "surfaces" which obscured an underlying repression. Its "positive" surfaces suppressed a much darker history. The results (which we called "surface 3") are a set of contradictions where positive expression and negative suppression encounter each other in an inevitable incoherence. Hence, Blair's antinomies are not so much foolish as they are true, especially perhaps as an inadvertent, personal confession.

Earlier, we invoked the notion of this paper as an "evental space," drawing on the work of Badiou (2013) and Zizek (2014). It follows that our ambition is performative rather than descriptive, seeking to mobilize meaning in a number of different ways (Blyth et al., 2016). The first of these is a desingularized approach to "identity." We have already cast doubt on national identity claims, whether British, German, or whatever other manifestation of the "collective individual." Even more so, however, we note that antagonistic definitions singularize in even more insistent ways—"the Taliban," "al-Queda," "boko haram," and so on, such a "surface 3" expression/repression has consequences: "A sizeable percentage of Britain's population now live without freedoms enjoyed by the majority. But the majority don't see this. They only see an individual black, brown or Muslim Brit – alone, bearded, on the Tube, taking his seat on a plane, waiting for the bus with bulky shopping between his feet" (Nabulsi, 2017, p. 28). Nabulsi gives an example of extremist "othering": "One despondent [Asian] man discussed the possible causes of his insomnia with his GP: 'It makes me so angry what is happening in Iraq, and Syria, and it makes me so depressed'. Instead of treatment, he got a visit from the police" (p. 28).

Boltanski and Esquerre offer a key question which we might deploy to link nationalisms to globalisms:

> What is the link between de-industrialization, the increased demand for "exceptional" products, and the heritage mania? (2016, p. 34)

First of all, it is clear that populist politics in England and Wales has given voice to classes made precarious by de-industrialization and the emergent "gig economy." Similar phenomena are clearly involved in the Trump election and in Macron's France In both cases, the problem was real, the solution illusory, investing Brexit with the "ghosts of industry and empire" (Hazeldine, 2017, pp. 53–54). What is now emerging is a political scenario which make moderate progressive journalism sound radical. Will Hutton of the *Guardian* (November 3, 2016) writes:

> Britain faces its biggest peacetime crisis since 1945. Prolonged economic stagnation, perhaps depression seem inevitable. A liberal, tolerant, outward-looking country is being transmuted into an illiberal, intolerant, inward-looking one. A battle is being joined for our soul, yet many are strangely mute.

If true in 2016, how much more so now?

A sudden inversion of FBV? As Alan Bennett recently observed, you only have to stand still these days in order to move to the left. Bennett was also more skeptical about "British Values." As we saw, he took hypocrisy to be foremost. The distinguished journalist, Ascherson, would presumably agree: "Nothing in British history resembles this [Brexit] spectacle of men and women ramming through policies everyone knows they don't believe in" ("England prepares to leave the world" *LRB*, November 17, 2016). Ascherson reports Nigel Farage, ex-leader of UKIP, as declaring June 23, 2016 as "England's independence day," a declaration that may become true in a manner he did not anticipate. [We note the characteristic elision of Britain/England.]

Finally, we leave FBV, in all its confusion, with one more observation. When peoples perceive external threats (Islamophobia, immigration, global competition, etc.), they invent "magical" cures so tiny as to be positively homeopathic (and with the same efficacy). They do so as a universal relief from uncertainty. So, what kind of mantra is FBV in the end? We are reminded of Che Guevara's account of Congolese struggles where rebels believed that bullets could be turned into water by appropriate rituals. He called it "dawa." (For a more general account, Guevara, 2001). Such belief was common in Southern and Central Africa (Mozambique, and South Africa in the Xhosa Risings of the 19th century). It helped insulate the local from more global fears. So, FBV ends up as a homeopathic delusion, except in so far as it offers a gestural politics to politicians and policy-makers—"we are doing something about this." How much longer will we listen to our "witch-doctors"?

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Fundamental British Values: Radicalizing British Children Into a Manufactured Them and Us Narrative Concept of Britishness?

Alan Hodkinson[1]

Abstract

In 2014, the United Kingdom Coalition Government, after the now infamous Trojan Horse incident, insisted that all children learn Fundamental British Values. Cameron, as Prime Minister, argued that such values, coupled with "muscular liberalism" would "challenge extremist ideology, exposing it for the lie that it is." This article exists at the place of the apostrophe—as the scare mark (' ') becomes an enclosure, enclosing a manufactured possession.

"Is Britishness just a made up concept? Who determines what is or is not fundamental?

I want to problematize what they include and exclude in their concept of "British Values." What is this "British" they talk about and why do they feel a need for this "Britain" to exist? Within the enclosures provided by 'ten scare marks', I present research into historical and contemporary formulations of Britishness taken from academic texts, school textbooks, and websites. In addition, by invoking the work of Serres, Bhabba, and Billig, I seek to confront Cameron's challenging discourse. Within this article, I do not though attempt to detail an authentic Britishness but rather from the outset argue that there is, and

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This analysis is disturbing. It disturbs my thoughts but also my personal history- it is troubling.

never was any authenticity in this concept. What I seek to argue here is that their "British-ness" is nothing more than a portable, lean-to concept of violence. A "manufactured concept" (Nationalism and the origins of prejudice, *International Journal of Historical Teaching, Learning and Research*) which locates an inclusion but by default formulates an exclusion whose antecedents lie more in the government counter terrorists' strategies than any substantial historical fact

If it is manufactured where does this leave my schooling – which told me Britain was great?

(Britishness from a linguistic perspective in school textbooks). The paper concludes by suggesting that their "Britain" is a rhetorical trope. It is itself a Trojan horse—which through flagging and banal nationalism (Banal nationalism) indoctrinates and radicalizes our children into an invented—pererted nationalism that the political elite employs to deal with a perceived/conceived/contrived threat of an internal other to our geographical, historical, and ideological borders.

Keywords
Fundamental British Values Education Values

> I don't drink coffee I take tea my dear. I like my toast done on one side. I can feel it in my accent when I talk I'm a . . . i

Introduction

> During the last week at St. Paul's Junior School the children have had a British week. They have looked at all things 'British'… the culture, landmarks, traditions, monarchs and British Values. The week culminated with the children wearing red, white and blue… [and performing] the National Anthem… [school website]
>
> At St. Peter's [school] we will actively challenge children, staff or parents expressing opinions contrary to fundamental British Values… including those expressing extremist views. [school website]
>
> O Lord our God arise, Scatter her enemies,[1]And make them fail. Confound their politics. Frustrate their Knavish tricks. On Thee Our hope we fix. God save us all. [verse of the 'British' National Anthem]

The Trojan horse incident relates to an apparent plot by Muslim hardliners in 2014 to infiltrate the management and the teaching staff of 21 schools in Birmingham. See https:// en.wikipedia. org/ wiki/ Operation_ Trojan_ Horse

Many people shorten Fundamental British Values to FBV but I refuse to do so. This is because a search of this terms on the internet reveals some horrific definitions of this not least in the Urban Slang dictionary. For myself, the definition of it as a Facebook Virus is interesting in which we are informed "begins a chain of idiocy which continues to grow, further making the Facebook Virus a global pandemic." Let's hope that the idiocy of British Values does not become such a pandemic!

After the Trojan Horse incident in Birmingham, the Coalition Government insisted that all children must learn about Fundamental British Values (An example of such learning is offered above as well as what might happen if these values are not taught). David Cameron, the then Prime Minister, argued that such an approach coupled with what he named as "muscular liberalism" would "systematically confront and challenge extremist ideology, exposing it for the lie that it is… and thwart its destructive consequences" (*oh those Knavish tricks*) (cited in Dodd & Travis, 2015). Through the employment of research into historical and contemporary discourse contained in such things as school textbooks, websites, and academic texts, I seek to confront Cameron's challenge and for myself, challenging discourse. Through the enclosures of ten 'scare marks' I wish as a "stranger within" (Lander, 2016, p. 275) to this rhetoric, challenge these "British" values and to invert his/their/these ideological habits and expose these/their/his lies. I argue that their "British-ness" is a "portable"—(McMahon, 2010, p. 157) "lean too" concept (Stronach, 2010, p. 175) of violence—a mechanism whose machinations over code with an internal colonialism which militates against the cohesive liberal society it professes to manufacture. To paraphrase a recent British (who was Scottish) Prime Minister, an understanding of British citizenship and shared British Values should lead to a shared sense of belonging and a celebration of British identity "which is bigger than the sum of its parts" (Maylor, 2016, p. 320).

The article exists, then, at the moment of the apostrophe, where the conglomeration of the scare mark, marks an enclosure containing an ideologically mediated possession—a punctuated boundary line now policed by a political elite. Their British and their determination of what are fundamental values "embraces a complex set of themes about 'us', our 'homeland' duty and honor …. Moreover, these themes are widely diffused as common sense." (Billig, 1995, p. 4). British presence, though, within these scare marks, marks an absence. That is, *their* inside is not *my* outside as *their* inclusion marks a boundary for exclusion. I employ scare marks here therefore with the intention to scare—to present and presence a challenge to Cameron's challenging discourse. By challenging their dominant and dominating narrative, I seek to cross their exclusion zone and reclaim their enclosure, of an inclusion of British and Britain which I do not recognize.[2,3]

> I have always valued the multiplicity of cultures that exist within Britain- for me this is what makes Britain Great.

'Scare mark one: As a country/society/insular island I agree with Brown we have always been "more than a sum of our parts." It is interesting to note that Black people

guarded our borders during Roman times. Indeed, recent research into 'Cheddar Gorge man' has demonstrated that Britons originally had 'dark to black skin'.[4] Diversity of race, religion, ethnicity, ability, and culture were deemed to be 'British' by the Romans, but such attributes now—since the 'War on Terror' though seem to construct the subaltern, internal other (Taras, 2013), an enemy within, an enemy to be feared, an enemy to be othered (see Houston, 2020).

I want to problematize what they include and exclude in their concept of "British Values."[5] What is this "British" they discuss and does this "Britain" exist? I argue therefore that "British" is an artificial concept (Cullingford, 2003) one that has no authenticity. It is a concept that locates an inclusion and by default formulates exclusion as "British" and its values move values from an illusion to verbal confusion (after Pocock, 1995). This Britain's antecedents, I suggest, lie more in government counter terrorism strategies than any substantial historical fact (Kostyuk, 2007). Giddens (1985, p. 215) relates that national sentiments rise up when the "sense of ontological security is put in jeopardy by the disruption of routines." Perhaps, their values only have fundamental value in their ability to enable us to enter Toni Morrison's[6] "not there space." A space of colonialization where an act of "rememoration . . . turns the present of narrative enunciation into the haunting memorial of what has been excluded, evicted and for that very reason becomes the unheimlich space for the negotiation of identity and history" (see Bhabha, 2004, p. 284). I suggest here then that their "Britain" is no more than a rhetorical trope—perhaps of warm beer, plowshares,[7] and cricket games. It is of itself and in its self a Trojan horse. A frame which through flagging and banal nationalism (Billig, 1995) indoctrinates and radicalizes our children into an invented/perverted nationalism that the political elite employs to deal with the perceived/conceived threat of an internal other to our geographical, historical, and ideological borders. In this form, their "British Values" become nothing more than a "conventional carnival of surplus emotion" (Billig, 1995, p. 45) as the "voices of the system… show how to transform [the system] in order to reinforce it" (Serres, 2007, p. 69).

As "our" national anthem states:
Scatter their enemies, And make them fail…
There is now an enemy within…
God- save us all

Challenging Arrival Points: Departing From False Beginnings…

What is this "Britain" we talk about?

Let us start with some facts, or at least what we are given to be facts, about the term British. Collingwood, the notable historian, tells us that the origin of the word Britain is itself the result of a blunder (Collingwood & Myres, 1936). Belgic tribes inhabiting the continental shores of the straits of Dover at the time of Julias Ceaser were the ones Plinny called Britanni. From his text they lived immediately south of Boulogne in France.

This line of analysis stems from my work as an History undergraduate – an education that corrected many of the ideas given by my state schooling.

'Scare mark two: Britain as the Romans employed it comes from the Britannic territory—but this is where Julius Caesar left from… not where he arrived. The departure point was not the end/ arrival point but was incorrectly labeled as such. Before this, the country had no uniform name. The actual people, as Collingwood tells us, were called the Pretani or Priteni, so should we actually be called Pretanis, Pretania—do we actually live in a United Kingdom of Great Pretani and Northern Ireland?**'** (Collingwood & Myres, 1936).

Think here dodgy dossiers and the Iraq War.

'Scare mark three: The Romans back dated documents to employ the name Britannic/Briton. Even then, they never meant that this included all of what we now call Britain—but only the southern half. This brings a completely new meaning to the North South Divide.[8] In great Monty Python fashion, *What have the Romans ever done for us*? So—as well as the aqueduct they gave us the North/ South divide.**'**

So, their (the political elite) scare marks mark out their Britain as an inclusion that excludes. Politicians, of all parties, project their nationalism onto "'others'; "our" is overlooked, forgotten, even theoretically denied" (Billig, 1995, p. 7). They scratch out the 'our' in our history, as they share an unshared history with all of our children. Here, in this imagined community (Anderson, 2006; Stronach & Frankham, 2020), they over write our histories with a British and Britain that mean distinct, distinctive and differing things to distinct, distinctive, and differing peoples. The embarkation point to my analysis, then, like Julius Caesar, was once well known but they have scratched it out as a departure point for teachers. In revisiting and refocusing this discourse, I seek to move away from the faux depart (Derrida, 1972/1988) and the "invented permanencies" (Billig, 1995, p. 29) of the rhetorical devices of these politicians. It becomes interesting here at the beginning of my analysis to note therefore that British/ Britain cannot actually be conceived as a "monolithic identity" (Ward, 2004, p. 31). Such authenticity is in fact inauthentic. In reality, it is an identity formed by the ebb and flow of historical epochs (Kostyuk, 2007) and of a Britain as a dialectical nationalism (2mediated among other things by power, a geographical insular place, class, religion, race, and gender (Kostyuk, 2007; Ward, 2004).

I do this too - the writing of the paper has troubled the very core of my thinking about my homeland.

'Scare mark four: People refer to England, Great Britain, and the UK interchangeably; although legally they mean completely different things (Hunt, 2016). In legal terms, we are the British Isle, which refers to this Island and some 6000 smaller island

that are under our (their) control. However, as the British ***Island*** we bring in, among others, the Crown Dependencies such as the Isle of Man and the Bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey. Britain—just Britain—has no legal status at all—it only did for the Ancient Romans (Hunt, 2016).'

> I had to look up the term Bailiwick – I do not define such here so as to leave such a pleasure to you!
>
> Why is it, as (Billig, 1995, p. 78) informs us do we not call ourselves "United Kingdonians" but continually calls ourselves English?

So how did our Britain come about? Colley (1994) cogently argues that British/Britain cannot be anachronistically applied before the Act of Union (1707) of England and Scotland. Like many other European countries, contemporary understanding of Britain began in the 18th and 19th century as a product of political ideology. As Anderson (2006, p. 11) notes this was the, "the dawn of the age of nationalism." Great Britain, and pride in this idea, was therefore manufactured in response to internal (national) and external (international) events. What became needed was an ideal form of Britishness (the best of British Britishness) that enabled people to unite in a pride of Britishness and stand to defend the belief that Britain was indeed great.

The manufacture of a modern Great Britain was also as a result of external pressure which during the late 18th century, but especially the 19th century, led to states constructing national histories and identities as a justification of their territorial and political boundaries in the face of complex and competing nation states (Andrews et al., 2010). From this point forward what we witness is a "fuzzy notion of Britishness" (Kostyuk, 2007, p. 61) that from the 1870s to the 1960s rested on monarchy and imperialism (Ward, 2004). Unrelenting "ideological imperialist propaganda" left "no escape" for populations both here and abroad (Mac Kenzie in Ward, 2004, p. 15) as generation after generation were inculcated into this Great Britain. The signifier Britain became formed and malformed as part of a civilizing colonial mission both here and abroad. As we shall observe later, when we examine history textbooks, the Britain they manufacture today does not appear to rest upon a shared journey through a shared history and traditions. Sherwood (2003) and Marshall (2008) concur with this view relating that British is indeed a manufactured concept. One constructed in superior terms in relation to the other. It has always been thus. Such constructions of Britain and its greatness have the nation state to legitimize the expropriation of lands from "inferior" and "uncivilized" people. Sherwood details this has been Britain's civilizing mission. It is interesting to note here that in 1988 the Education Secretary Kenneth Baker (1988, Samuel, n.d.) stated in relation to the first national curriculum for history that, "I want our children to know about the main events in our history, Britain has given a great many things to the world. That's been our civilizing mission."[9]

Britain's history, though, as Marshall accounts, was in the 18th century an imperial fantasy as illusory and ephemeral as its dramatic renderings. Even if that fantasy has

had real effects on the world stage. The question that I ask about modern Britain is: Is it the fantasy of the terrorist within, an uncivilized and inferior identity that has led to a fantasy of British Values? Is not the mandating of the teaching of such manufactured values within schools a form of fundamentalism itself as British Values become radicalized and weaponised within a "War on Terror"?

> *This is an asinine example- but in this paper, I had the power to decide and thus manufacture the concept of British*. I could not resist such an opportunity – but wonder what values, fundamental or otherwise, you would associate with this definition?

'Scare mark five: For myself I like this definition of British—stay with me on this one… from the Urban dictionary of slang.[10] Yes, there is such a thing…

> **Bri**- A girl to cute- to perfect, too unique, and petite. She's a definite good choice in being with. She's a beauty inside and out without a doubt.
>
> **Tish**- meaning to look good (fabulous, hot, sexy scandalous, beautiful).

So British is a hot scandalous, small girl who is too good to look at!

So where does this take us? Well… not very far, so I wish now to move forward and trace the concepts of Britishness and its values through exemplars extracted from history textbooks that date back to the 1920s. What is it that children were taught in the past that British and Britishness meant and what values were they inculcated into? Taking a lead from Bhabha (2004, p. 4), I seek here to "re-historicize" the emergence of their sign and their discursive manufacturing of this social reality. My departure point, therefore, is grounded in a critique of British Values at the level of the signifier because Britain/British has a meaning that has been codified through mediation and power? As Bhabha (2004, p. 3) argues,

> The 'right' to signify from the periphery of authorized power and privilege does not depend on the persistence of tradition; it is resourced by power of tradition to reinscribe through the conditions of contingency and contradictoriness that attend upon the lives of those who are in the minority.

Questioning End Points—Problematizing the Manufactured History Taught in Our Schools

For now, though I wish to move forward in my journey of exploration to question: What are British Values? I seek here to problematize the evidence that formulated an arrival point that necessitated the end point of the mandated teaching of British Values.

I wish to demonstrate that a concept such as Britain, and the values associated to it, do follow old traditions. Though not the traditions of historical reality but the traditions which traditionally observe governments responding to internal and external events by creating moral panics that scare people into believing that something must be done (see Pattison, 2020a,b).

So, I know that there are lists of values[11] taught to children. For myself though these are nothing more than values cloaked by a "syntax of deferral" (Bhabha, 2004, p. 93) a "technical means for 're-presenting' the kind of imagined community that is the nation" (Anderson, 2006, p. 25) as their "prosaic routine words… offer constant, but barely conscious, reminders of the homeland, making 'our' national identity unforgettable" (Bhabha, 2004, p. 135). Let us though test such values—what historical traction do they have? Many politicians have linked British Values to our shared history. Indeed, Cameron defined British Values as "a belief in freedom, tolerance of others, accepting personal and social responsibility, respecting and upholding the rule of law." These, he argues, are not exclusive but "rooted in our traditions and history.[12]" I continue here, then, on a journey of undermining their values. I seek to, scratch out their history and so uncreate their history and recreate a history (a rememoration in Toni Morrison's terms) that once was, but is now, through the imposition of British Values, in danger of becoming just a dim and distant memory a "fading identity and faint inscription" in school pedagogy (Bhabha, 2004, p. 80). I will unpick their syntax of deferral, through detailing three exemplars, which reveal British Values as a normalizing colonization, a discursive splitting of a containment of cultural ambivalence in which their values of British render the other as valueless and provide fertile ground for creating the fantasy of the terrorist within.

Exemplar 1

If we go back into the midst of history (back to those Romans again), we may observe that,

Cassius Dio (V.32.3.) tells us that…

> Britain, the men there were rumoured to be even more debased, who slay and eat their fathers, and sleep with their mothers and sisters.

And of British Values we are informed that…

> They dwell in tents, naked and unshod, possess their women in common, and in common rear all the offspring. Their form of rule is democratic for the most part, and they are very fond of plundering; consequently they choose their boldest men as rulers… They can endure hunger and cold and any kind of hardship; for they plunge into the swamps and exist there for many days with only their heads above water.

He also tells us that…

> …they mostly have a democratic government, and are much dedicated to robbery (think here perhaps politicians expense scandal as a fundamental value) (Webb, 2009).

Exemplar 2

To play about with British Values further—what lens do we place on this? According to research from the Ukraine and research from India in the 1920s, British Values are:

> We like our tea and always wear a coat and have an umbrella and we look like gentleman. We are calm, concentrated and reserved. We are very tall and strong . . . (Kostyuk, 2007, p. 98)
>
> …the British like vegetables and tin goods but the women are independent and strong. (Sinha, 2003, p. 153)

The question I ask is why is it that recognition of strong independent women is not part of the list of British Values taught in schools?

Exemplar 3—History Textbooks

> This quote is from a professor who introduced me to textbook research. I cite it here as a continuation of the process of confounding their politics and frustrating their knavish tricks but also as a mark of respect to one who opened my eyes to such deceits.

'Scare mark six: In writing and re-writing their pasts nations rarely tell the truth about themselves and, therefore, in the manner in which they present national stories history textbooks are intentional, maybe even tendentious, literature… Politicians of all persuasions have long recognised that controlling the present and shaping the future relies significantly upon controlling the manner in which the past is presented[13] (Crawford, 2009, p. 54).

As Billig (1995, p. 52) also accounts,

> …textbooks are often good sources for discovering a social science's common sense. Textbooks, in seeking to transmit the disciplinary vision to a new generation of disciples, tend to package the approved views in a handy form.[14]

By examining this "handy form" of nationalism, this phase of the research analyzed the representation of Britain, Britishness and its values in history textbooks that have been given to children and which are included in the Munckton Collection[15] and those owned personally by the author. In total 20 British History textbook books, published between the 1920s and 1970s, were subject to examination. In uncovering the history textbooks subcutaneous (Johnsen, 1993) layer, the aim was to examine the conscious and unconscious British Values these media promoted as well as their prejudices and stereotypical ideas (Fritzsche, 1992). This phase of the research built on the tradition of historical archeology (Hodkinson, 2013) coupled with proto-text analysis to develop an alternate means of examining, and ironizing the master narratives (Funari et al., 1999) of Britain and its values. Application of these techniques, then, provided a theoretical framework, which built an analysis of the active formulation of British identity which focused surveillance back onto the, "dominant groups [changing] sense of self'" (Chapman et al., 1989, p. 19).

Before I begin, to reveal the data, it is interesting to note that history teaching in Britain was originally formulated in the 19th century to foster a sense of loyalty in the country (Gosden & Sylvester, 1968) within an educational system where " …the teacher merely operates on the tongue of the pupil and teaches him how to wag it in a particular way" (cited in Parker, 1925, p. 1). However, as the quote below denotes, by the 1960s perhaps a different view of what history teaching was for was being taken:

> An imaginative reconstruction of a person's point of view, capture another person's feelings his thought to interpret his motives. This is a fundamental element of historical thought; this ability to understand another person is fundamental to social life. To be able to appreciate how another person is likely to feel, to react and to act in a given situation, to be aware of other people in the sense, to have a concern for them and a willingness to allow for differences in a point of view… (Gosden & Sylvester, 1968, p. 4)

Valuing Fundamental Reoccurring British themes?

An analysis of the textbooks revealed reoccurring themes that related to Britain/ British and their associate values. I wish here to refer to two of these themes.

Britain as confusion and illusion…

A reoccurring theme within the textbooks is the confusion and the interchangeability of the usage of the terms [Great] Britain/ British/ English and England. In a section relating to events of 1734, we observe "While the nations of Europe were fighting one another, he [Prime Minister] kept England out of war for 18 years, so that England was able to store up wealth while other nations wasted theirs." Another example, York et al. (1941, p. 117) relates that, "In Great Britain to-day, that is in England, Scotland and Wales there are about 45 million people." The authors define Great Britain here correctly to include the Welsh but Great Britain from 1922 onward should be referenced as Great Britain and Northern Ireland and therefore perhaps the text should have included the Irish. Later in the same text though the authors state, "After the death of

Queen Anne in 1714, a new family of sovereigns ruled Great Britain and Ireland" (p. 55). The question that might be asked here is what do the British have against the Irish- as they are included here but not later in the textbook[16]?

Of further interest, perhaps, is that York et al. (1941, p. 63) include a map of India in which distance is referenced to "English Miles." Personally, I was not aware that English miles were different from Great British miles or indeed verses miles employed elsewhere in the world. At the edge of this map, then the legend showed us how to read it (Serres, 2015). A reading steeped in a legend of the rhetorical empire spirit. In another textbook (Hounsell & Airne, 1962, p. 170), it states, "You have read in Tudor times how British colonies were founded." The British here though is incorrect as there was no Britain during the reign of James 1st. This then is a scratching out and renaming as Britain only came into being in 1707 with the Act of Union. This incorrect employment of Great Britain before 1707 is common within many of the textbooks up until the 1960s.

Of real interest across the range of textbooks is that when "great battles" were won, they were invariably won by Englishmen (and in the textbooks it was always men rather than the British women). Note for example this quote from York et al. (1941, p. 25) in relation to Indian campaign of 1800s. "Yet this vast country, nearly as large as Europe, was won by a handful of Englishmen to form the greatest empire in the world." Or, this from Firth and Nunn (1931, p. 96, 99) "Two columns of English ships under the command of Lord Nelson" and that "Nowadays England has the Royal Navy to protect her shores." Perhaps here, it is as Said (2007) believes that the English pronoun is employed to give the weight of a distinguished powerful nation. Interestingly, though, these texts are not themselves distinguished because they are nought but a rehistoricization of the events. For example, archive evidence[17] from the Indian campaign states that the army in India actually consisted of, "five hundred European soldiers, two thousand sepoys and six hundred seamen." Nelson's famous signal at the Battle of Trafalgar, "England expects every man should do his best" is problematic. It should have included the line and we also expect the West Indies, Africa, France… Nelson's ship actually contained 441 "English"—64 Scots, 63 Irish, 18 Welsh, three Shetlanders, two Channel Islanders, one Manxman, 21 Americans, seven Dutch, six Swedes, four Italians, four Maltese, three Norwegians, three Germans, two Swiss, two Portuguese, two Danes, two Indians, one Russian, one Brazilian, one African, nine West Indians, and interestingly three French volunteers.[18] This, therefore, really was a British ship that was more than a sum of its parts. It seems that we perhaps were closer to Europe then than we are now after. What these texts seemingly show though is a vindication of western imperialism and the "triumph of English knowledge and power" (Said, 1978, p. 35).

The British as Brave…

brave.

Adjective: ready to face and endure danger or pain, showing signs of courage

Synonyms; courageous, plucky, fearless, valiant, valorous, intrepid, heroes, lionhearted, manful, macho, bold, daring, daredevil, adventurous, audacious, death- or-glory…

Verb: endure or face (unpleasant conditions or behaviours) without showing fear.

What becomes clear through a reading of the textbooks is the prevalence given to the value of bravery. That is within the pages of the textbooks, it is demonstrable that a key foundation stone of the British character is not only must we show bravery but that in the face of danger, we must not take a step backward. There does appear to be some historical fact in this claim. Back to those Romans again, Tacitus informs us that the Britons have "boldness in challenging danger, and when near they have the same timidity in shrinking from it" (Churchill, 1956, p. 19). The demonstration of this value in one of the most famous school history textbooks of the mid-1900s, "Our Island Nation" is replete. From the first few pages, bravery is specifically highlighted, for example, "Julius Caser was told [that Britons] were very big, brave and fierce." Bravery is often coupled synonymously with Britain, note for instance, "Brave Britons… fought well and bravely." Another example also makes clear it is not just males who are brave but "many of the women of Britain were as brave and as wise as the men and quite difficult to conquer" (p. 17).

Within the textbooks, such bravery reveals itself by British armies winning battles despite our troops being massively outnumbered. In the York et al. text (1941, p. 62) it is recounted, in relation to the colonization of India that "…this vast country, nearly as large as Europe, was won by a handful of Englishmen to form the greatest Empire in the World." In Firth and Nunn (1931, p. 88) it states, "Although the English army was so small it stood firm." In addition, Anon (1930) constantly reinforces this form of bravery:

> Although the British only had half as many ships as their enemies they beat them. (p. 109)
>
> The British were still fewer than their enemies but at once they went against them. (p. 16)
>
> Major Vincent Eyre a British Officer who had a few men at hand, broke through the rebels and saved the brave men of Arah. So, after all seventy beat the ten thousand.

The texts are though also very quick to ensure that such bravery is not attributed to our colonial rivals especially, but not only, the French. To be specific, whether an English/British army wins or loses, the textbooks always detail that they fought with bravery. In the case, "God forbid," that our army should lose, the textbooks, invariably account that they were hopelessly outnumbered and despite fighting bravely they were "slowly driven away" (Firth & Nunn, 1931). However, when our enemies are beaten, they do not retreat with honor but, " …the French attacked in vain. They became frightened and at last ran away." A final, but important point to note here is that in many of the textbooks bravery is fundamental. Especially, when as British we make a "stand against the odds" and do so in a cool and calm manner (perhaps this is the British stiff upper lip often referred to in relation to British culture). This value is made explicitly clear below,

> In the British ranks, not a trigger was pulled- do not fire until you see the whites of their eyes was the order, calm and cool the British waited. (York et al., 1941, p. 75)

'Scare mark seven: Why is bravery not one of the current British Values? Now that we have lost Empire do the British not need to instill this value into our children?'

Conclusion

'Scare mark eight: Are British Values, then, just a form of cultural programming—a form that we have seen before which create the Other in times of need. As Sir Peter Fahy has said through such narratives do we risk ending up with "stereotyping and that population alienated, and end up with a 'them and us' narrative." Perhaps as Smith (1995) believes our national past has always been stated in mythic terms. So perhaps British Values "contain kernels of historical fact, around which there has grown up accretions of exaggeration, idealisation, distortion and allegory ... stories told, and widely believed, about the heroic past, which serve some collective need in the present and future" (Smith, in Low-Beer, 2003). It is this collective need in the present that I think is fundamental to British Values.'

> *As part of a collective re-remembering- I invite you to research Arthur Roberts- 'Britain's Black Scottish Tommy' during World War One – it is people like this- not British Values that makes Britain Great*.

'Scare mark nine: Does creating British Values juxtapose the other, the not British, traditionally used as justification for subservience??**'** Invoking Benedict Anderson, the question that perhaps should be asked is: is the Britain of fundamental values, just an "imagined community" and is it the case, as Yeandle (2002, p. 1) states, "as an imagined community [we] urgently need to reimage [our]self."

For now, though, let us try to draw this Britishness thing together. Given the analysis above it appears that Britishness may be conditionally considered as a frame to which many kinds of information are attached (Kostyuk, 2007). These recently incarnated British Values are not fundamental but rather are a modern incarnation of old imperial logic. Perhaps they are nothing more than just a form of cultural programming in which Smith (2013, p. 1) might argue that, "homogeneity is overtly valued through an overarching assimilationist agenda." To further this point it is useful to consider Brown's take on one of the British Values that of tolerance. She relates that:

> Tolerated individuals will always be those who deviate from the norm, never those who uphold it, but they will also be further articulated as deviant individuals through the very discourse of tolerance. (Brown, 2009, p. 44)

Possibly, then, British Values are about forcing out the subaltern internal Other, the stranger within. They perhaps will serve only to promote a stratification of citizenship into those who really belong, namely the indigenous majority, "those who can belong, namely those of minority ethnic heritage who have assimilated or integrated and those who really do not quite belong, or those we tolerate up to a point, namely the Muslim 'Other'" (Taras, 2013, p. 410).

'Scare mark ten: Should we be doing this to our children?'

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Notes

1. One verse of the original National Anthem specifically referred to crushing the rebellious Scots. This fifth verse and the linkage to the Scots was dropped in the early 1800s.
2. This is very jingoistic language reminiscent of the Falklands War of the 1980s. However, we need to attack this "War on Terror" rhetoric—we must reclaim, civilize, and disrupt it territorialization.
3. Throughout the abstract and the article itself I have opened up intermittent spaces, with the help of the copy editor between the lines. This is perhaps a space where the real analysis of these manufactured terms can take place. I will try an exploit such places to emplace a thought or a statement or my underlying worries about this concept they call British and the apparently fundamental nature of such. I realise, though, that such a technique may make the article difficult to read. This point should not be lost as I find Fundamental British Values hard to read.
4. See https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018/feb/10/cheddar-man-changed-way-we-think-about-ancestors
5. I am reminded here of Benedict Anderson's word, " …nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time." "Nationalism, are cultural artefacts … To understand them properly we need to consider carefully how they have come into historical being, in what ways their meanings have changed over time, and why, today they command such profound emotional legitimacy" (2006, p. 3, 4).
6. See for, example, Evans (2013). Programmed space, themed space, and the ethics of home in Toni Morrison's "Paradise", *African American Review*, *46*(2/3), 381–396.
7. I am minded here of Serres notion of the plowshare "The blade of the plough is a sacrificial blade, killing all the plants to make a clean space. Everything that grows here is excluded.

Not only weeds but everything. The plowshare is a sacrificial knife frenetically manipulated at the height of murdering fury."

8. North South divide—see, for example, http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/north-south-divide-uk-british-education-economy-gender-pay-gap-difference-a7484046.html
9. Britain as part of its civilizing mission has also given the world; slavery, the slave trade, violent colonization among other things. We tend to forget this aspect of our civilizing mission.
10. See http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=british%20slang
11. I could cite their list here but I am loathed to publicize their nonsense any further than is necessary. However, here in the footnotes, I exemplify my aversion to one of their words—tolerance, offered by them as a Fundamental British Value, by invoking Billig (1995, p. 82), "In Western democracies, 'our' tole rance is much praised by 'ourselves'. Journalists and politicians, especially when arguing for immigration restrictions, cite 'our' tolerance, and 'their' tolerance, as a reason for excluding 'them' – the foreigners. . ." "….The rhetoric denies 'our' prejudice and it condenses an argumentative structure, which attributes intolerance to 'them'; 'our' tolerance is threatened by 'their' presence; 'they' are wither intolerant or cause intolerance; thus, 'we' seek to exclude 'them', not because 'we' are intolerant but, wrote the reverse, because, 'we' are tolerant." I spoke, in 2000, to a German Professor, who was also a survivor of Auschwitz who informed me that tolerance was a word often employed by the Nazi's towards people of the Jewish faith. Such tolerance it seems ended with the 'Final solution'.
12. David Cameron, *The Mail on Sunday*, June 15, 2014
13. For a very recent example of this practice in China, see https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/jan/13/china-rewrites-history-books-to-extend-sino-japanese-war-by-six-years?CMP=oth_b-aplnews_d-2
14. I am very mindful here that teacher's pervert the cultural message of textbooks and that children do not necessarily absorb the message. See Beigi and Hodkinson (2018).
15. I am profoundly grateful to access to this material and the time you spent scanning in the images.
16. Perhaps after the intervention of the Democratic Unionists during Brexit, this question gains even more traction.
17. See https://archive.org/stream/bengalin175657se03hilluoft/bengalin175657se03hilluoft_djvu.txt
18. See the black heroes of Trafalgar. Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-black-heroes-of-trafalgar-320576.html

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Article

Muslim Home Educators in the Time of Prevent

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Abstract

Following the implementation of the Prevent strategy in the United Kingdom and the public linking of Muslim home education with radicalization, this research explores the perspectives of Muslim home educators. Using the concept of moral panics, this paper synthesizes work on Muslim identity with that of folk devil reactions to stigmatization. Data are drawn from three case study families via questionnaires and interviews and analyzed thematically within a symbolic interactionist framework, using an adaptation of Griffiths "folk devil reaction model" as an interpretative guide. Following an exploration of participants' reflective self-appraisals, two categories of response are identified: retreat and resistance. Both of these are further subdivided, respectively, into reactions of blending in and withdrawing and reactions of drawing on resources and contestation. The paper argues that a legal and increasingly popular educational choice has been co-opted from being an individual family decision into a political narrative of danger, radicalization, and security implications. In a climate where prejudice about home education and Islam already abundantly exist, such a narrative may contribute to an increasingly intolerant society. Recognition of the situation of Muslim home educators may go some way toward tempering this.

Keywords

home education, radicalization, moral panic, Muslim identity, folk devils

Introduction

This paper considers the impact of the Prevent strategy, including the introduction of Fundamental British Values (FBV) to the school curriculum, for Muslim home

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educators in the United Kingdom. "Prevent" is a strand of the U.K. government counter terrorism strategy and was launched in its current form in 2007, specifically aimed at thwarting "home grown terror" by preventing radicalization and the recruitment of terrorists from within the U.K. population. Part of the Prevent strategy includes the promulgation in schools of "Fundamental British Values" named specifically as, "democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs" (Department for Education and Lord Nash, 2014). From 2014, State sponsored schools and early years provision in the United Kingdom have a duty not only to promote, but also to demonstrably embed within their teaching and practice, these four values. Success in achieving this is now part of the English inspection and grading regime for educational establishments (details of evaluation vary in other parts of the United Kingdom) and is carried out by the inspection unit OFSTED (2018a, 2018b). However, not all educational provision is subject to OFSTED inspection or obliged to follow the statutory curriculum. Among the exceptions in this area is home education, a growing phenomenon in the United Kingdom (Issimdar, 2018).

In one sense, home education can be considered as circumventing state initiatives, such as Prevent, in ways that threaten the potential success of such enterprises. In another way, and the way which I explore here, such initiatives can lead to an unexpected inversion of consequences as particular sectors of the community find themselves cut off and compromised by initiatives which, at face value, do not appear to affect them. This paper explores the borders of protection and persecution, the transposal of intent and consequence within the arena of home education. To do so, I draw on the work of Cohen (2002) and others on moral panics and in particular, consider the creation and situation of "folk devils" within the framework of moral panic.

Background—Home Education as a Site of Moral Panic

Despite the rise in home education now being a worldwide phenomenon (Kunzman, 2016), national histories of home education appear to be more driven by local circumstance than global considerations. Among the many factors shaping differing trajectories of emergence and practice are the nature and motivations of those adopting this form of education and the degree of regulation and conformity which different countries demand. Unlike the United States, where the subset of religiously motivated home educators is a large and politically important force (Kunzman & Gaither, 2013), the United Kingdom does not have a politically visible religious home education community. This means that while the United States has been grappling with the relationships between religion, fundamentalism, and home education for some time (Kunzman, 2010), it is a debate only just beginning to emerge in the United Kingdom. Both countries, however, share in a dearth of demographic information about home education. While regulatory requirements vary from state to state in the United States (Kunzman & Gaither, 2013), statutory regulation in the United Kingdom is nonexistent although Local Authorities do have remit to intervene where there are doubts over the suitability

of a child's education. The result is that, in both countries, there is no comprehensive knowledge of who is home educating and this lack of accurate statistical knowledge has, certainly in the United Kingdom, played into concerns about home education since the modern phenomenon first came to public light.

British home education has grown exponentially since the 1970s but absolute numbers remained low through the early years of the 1970s and 1980s (Fortune-Wood, 2009; Meighan, 1997). By the 1990s, however, it was beginning to come to more general attention and to provide fodder for media interest. This first wave of interest signified the beginning of a series of popular and political misgivings which have marked home education history in the United Kingdom. Such has been the nature of the contentions around home education that it is possible to view repeated responses to it as a series of moral panics.

At first, the danger seemed to lurk in children's educational and social lives—parents could not possibly do an equivalent, let alone a better, job of educating their children than trained professionals. Children not in school would not be learning adequately and were also likely to lack proper opportunities for socialization, to be isolated from mainstream society, and to have their worldviews curtailed by eccentric parents. Such assessments made eye-catching news headlines (e.g., Hastings, 1998), and the perception of misfits and tree huggers has continued to linger in the public imagination (Morton, 2010). By the 2000s, however, worries about home education were moving, along with prevailing policy concerns, toward safeguarding.

In child protection terms, the millennium turned on ground altering events. Victoria Climbie, an 8-year-old immigrant from the Ivory Coast living in London, was brutally tortured to death by her guardians. The early months of 2000 saw waves of horror shock the public and State alike as the awful details of the case unfolded. The subsequent inquiry made wide reaching recommendations for alterations to child protection services (Laming, 2003). Additionally, in the aftermath, a new government policy aimed at children and children's services, Every Child Matters, was launched. This was followed by the Children Act, 2004 which brought in important reforms for the safeguarding services. The mantra of the British government became, and in 2018 continues to be (HM Government, 2018), that safeguarding is the concern of all who have contact with children.

In 2008, and still in this atmosphere of heightened concern, another appalling case of child cruelty hits the headlines. Khyra Ishaq, a 7-year-old girl from Birmingham died of starvation in the care of her mother and mother's partner. She had been badly neglected and subjected to abusive treatment (Radford, 2010). Six months before her death, Kyhra had been withdrawn from school, and while she was known to social services and on the "at risk" register, this was seen by many to be a warning about home education (Rothermel, 2015). In 2009, Baroness Morgan, then Parliamentary under Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families, expressed her concerns that "Home education could be used as a cover for abuse" (Morgan cited in Rothermel, 2015, p. 194); abuse that might include physical violence, neglect, sexual abuse, forced marriage, slavery, and human trafficking. This kind of speculation led to the

Labor government review of home education commonly known as the Badman Review (Badman, 2009). Graham Badman, a former Director of Children's Services for Kent County Council and the author of the report, made far reaching recommendations concerning the monitoring and regulation of home education which, although accepted by the Labour party, were never put into action due to the 2010 General Election and subsequent change of government.

Much criticized in terms of both methodology and conclusions (Stafford, 2012) and seen by many as simply unworkable, the Badman recommendations were nevertheless highly popular in some quarters. Despite the House of Commons Children's, Schools and Families Committee (2009) themselves assessing Badman's findings as "unsafe", the Review remains surprisingly quoted as relevant research (e.g., Bhopal & Myers, 2016). But perhaps the most pertinent lesson to take forward in the present climate is the judgment issued on it by Professor James Conway of the University of Glasgow. In a memorandum submitted to the Children's Schools and Families Committee in which he condemned the report as "slap dash, panic driven, and nakedly and naively populist," Conway pointed out that "Of course anything could be a shelter for anything else – to say so is to say nothing." What is needed, he went on, is substantial empirical evidence rather than "hearsay and vague generalisation" (Conway, 2009, no pagination). These are words we might do well to remember as the "dangers" of home education take on a new shape in the 2010s. Unfortunately, however, the short history of home education seems to provide an example of the "historical amnesia" which Pickering (2001, p. 186) associates with moral panics. Certainly, the current wave of anxiety appears to be immune from the experiences of the past. Any lessons which might have been taken forward from the Badman Review are conspicuous in the present situation only by their absence.

In 2014, before FBV were named and displayed on the policy agenda, Labour MP Barry Sheerman was already hinting at the perceived dangers of mixing home education and religion. He told the House of Commons:

> I am really worried about home schooling. … the ease with which people can say a child is being home schooled is dangerous territory. When it was confined to a small number of middle-class families who thought their child might be bullied at school and needed that home support, it was perhaps something we could tolerate …
>
> I am also worried that people from a strong faith background are choosing to use home schooling. I see it going on in my own community and know it is going on in other communities.
>
> Sheerman (2014)

Sheerman's words, outlining a particular sector of the population, fulfill Pantazis and Pemberton's criteria for the defining of a "suspect" community as a subgroup singled out for state attention as being "problematic" (Pantazis and Pemberton cited by Awan, 2012, p. 1166). This identification is not by virtue of any wrong doing; Sheerman

(2014) does not cite his evidence, even when challenged to do so but simply by membership of a group located at the intersection of class, faith, and educational choice.

By 2017, Sheerman was far from alone in his concerns as increasing connections went on to be made, solidifying the nature of the suspect community. In September 2017, under the title "Home schooling is blamed for rise of extremist Islam," *The Times* on-line (and many other media outlets) reported on a statement made by Metropolitan Police deputy assistant commissioner, Neil Basu, at a police superintendents' conference in Stratford-upon-Avon.

> Unregulated education including home schooling and the segregation of some communities are helping to create extremists and future terrorists, the national police counterterrorism co-ordinator warned.
>
> Neil Basu, a deputy assistant commissioner at the Metropolitan Police, said that some "disenfranchised" members of society feel that the government fails to understand their religion and see "no future in the West". He added: "Segregated, isolated communities, unregulated education and home schooling are a breeding ground for extremists and future terrorists."
>
> (Simpson, 2017)

Shortly afterward, the same cited dangers became the basis for a Private Members Bill, tabled by Lord Soley, which proposed the registration and monitoring of home educated children. Addressing the House of Lords, Soley put his case:

> Children are now known to have disappeared and been abused, radicalised or put into extremist situations. We have to deal with that. We cannot ignore it, for the sake of both the child and society as a whole. ….
>
> On radicalisation alone, I would simply say that as more cases come to light, as they are, media interest in and public pressure on this issue will grow.
>
> (Soley, 2017)

Remembering Conroy's words of 2009, it is pertinent to ask what substantial empirical evidence supports these assertions and calls for action. Unfortunately, and despite the force with which the arguments are put and despite the certainty of the rhetoric, precisely what is being talked about here is not clear. In the only attempt that appears to have been seriously made to unravel the postulated connection between home education and radicalization, Charles-Warner (2017) cites a letter sent by Sir Michael Wilshaw, then Chief Inspector of Schools in England and head of Ofsted, to Nicky Morgan MP, then Secretary of State for Education, about possible abuse and radicalization of children attending illegal and unregulated faith schools. Among his concerns, Wilshaw stated that these schools might be using the freedoms afforded to home educators to cover their activities. This concern was then reported by the BBC as a

clear connection between such schools and home education. Thus, the fire was stoked and, as in the case of home education and safeguarding a decade earlier, the rhetorical panic has quickly been able to engulf the lack of substance.

In fact, and still in the only current research on the issue, of all 152 English Local Authorities approached through Freedom of Information requests by Charles-Warner, 146 filed nil returns when asked to submit any recorded case in which a home educated child had been radicalized (Charles-Warner, 2017). The remaining six Authorities refused to respond. Nor was Charles-Warner able to extract any evidential basis for subsequent remarks made by Nicky Morgan about the connection between home education and radicalization. A Freedom of Information request submitted by Katarzyna Sinclair in 2018 requesting the evidence on which Basu's comments had been based was refused on grounds of cost, although the reply contained an excerpt from a letter in which Basu claimed that his quoted words had been taken out of context (What Do They Know, 2018). In short, no evidence to support the link between home education and radicalization is forthcoming. Yet if Soley, as he suggests in his statement above, does consider media interest and public pressure suitable vehicles to drive the issue forward, then the lack of substantiation and a deficiency of careful consideration are as unlikely to be impediments to either oration or action, as they were during the course of the Badman Review (Stafford, 2012).

Home Education, Radicalization, and the Creation of a Moral Panic

Cohen (2002), writing about the creation of folk devils and moral panics in the 1970s, argued that such exaggerated panics ensue from socially credentialed experts, supported by the media and backed by the police, becoming involved in labeling certain individuals and/or behaviors as problematically deviant. The cited deviance is presented as sufficiently troubling to constitute a "perceived threat to social order" (Krinsky, 2013 quoted by Hindess, 2015, p. 50) both in terms of its immediate consequences and as a symptom of deeper malaise within society. As outlined above, home education has a history of being treated as deviant. The immediate concern is generally voiced as being the potential harm to children who do not receive adequate state oversight in terms of their education, socialization, and physical wellbeing. The deeper malaise is perhaps not so obvious. While it may feel right that children should be in school (Pattison, 2014), what does it really say about society if they are not? One attempt to flush out the underlying disquiet has been articulated as a breakdown of the principles of social democracy in which neo-liberal individualism trumps the collective aims and goods of education for all (e.g., Lubienski & Brewer, 2015). The argument is an ideological one that pertains not just to home education but to any deliberately sought educational advantage and perhaps its pursuit signifies too deep and potentially painful an excursion into society's soul. Certainly, it has not gained much public traction in debating the rights and wrongs of home education. However,

in the case of the current panic, the postulated deeper issue is much plainer to see and feeds on much more immediate relevance and much more imminent fear.

As Hindess (2015) argues the anxiety over radicalization and home grown terror now typifies a period in Western political history. Since the London bombings of 2005, master minded by home grown terrorists, the fear of a "fifth column" attacking from within has flourished (Croft & Moore, 2010). With security levels consistently standing at severe or critical over recent years (Security Service MI5, 2019a), the threat of home-grown Jihadist terror remains a primary concern of the security services with "several thousand individuals in the United Kingdom who support violent extremism or are engaged in Islamist extremist activity" (Security Service MI5, 2019b, online, no pagination). Of all the possible guises of terrorism, home grown terror might be said to occupy a position in which the greatest fear is intertwined with the greatest possibility for successful intervention. There is perhaps very little that can effectively or easily be done to close the terror training camps of Afghanistan and Pakistan, but surely we can take more decisive action toward those who grow up and live in the midst of our own society?

The Prevent strategy is precisely aimed at this window of opportunity with its program of combating radicalization through rooting out the earliest indications of extremism. Introduced in 2003 and revised several times since, Prevent identifies the young as particularly vulnerable and education is one of the crucial sectors with which it engages (Home Office HM Government, 2011). There are two key aspects to this which have particular saliency for the impact on Muslim home educators. The first is that engaging with the young about issues to do with terrorism and radicalization is entirely focused on schooling. Prevent deems schools to be "the best environment in which to discuss terrorism" (Home Office HM Government, 2011, p. 70), an opinion backed by a 2008 U.K. Youth Parliament survey which showed 94% of young people to agree with this. Perhaps the other 6% were home educated, or perhaps the existence of the tens of thousands of children who do not go to school in the United Kingdom was simply ignored (Pattison, 2018). The decision that schools are the right place to carry out the work of Prevent, bears with it the inevitable division of normalcy and deviance which allows home educated children to automatically be considered "disadvantaged," "out of reach," or "at risk."

The second factor is that Prevent and the promulgation of FBVs which form part of it can be seen itself to be instrumental in creating the categories through which radicalization is understood and approached (Heath-Kelly, 2013). The promotion of FBV, since 2014, has become a statutory part of both school and preschool curriculums (OFSTED, 2018a, 2018b). This means that children from the age of 2 through to young adults of 18 come under the remit of Prevent, with the inference that any member of this population may fall foul to radicalization. At the same time, and without further clarification, "extremism" is designated as dangerous and unacceptable; "The Government is clear that there is no place for extremists in any school" (Home Office HM Government, 2011, p. 70). However, and despite calls within the document for proportionality, there is no accompanying definition of extremism. Indeed, there is a

general vagueness surrounding Prevent and FBV and the language and ideas which it employs (Dudenhoefer, 2018; Ramsay, 2017). This ambiguity makes Prevent's aim of identifying extremism an imprecise and subjective enterprise at best (Richards, 2011).

Given this, it is clear that the identification of extremism in any particular case cannot, by itself, be endowed with a linear relationship to an individual's development as a terrorist. Not only may interpretations of extremism vary, but, as Fischbacher-Smith and O'Neill (2013) argue, the processes of terrorism are complex; motivation, radicalization, know-how, training, and opportunity need to come together to ultimately produce a "successful" act of terror. Broadly, capability and visibility proceed together in terrorist biographies. The optimal intervention point, as calculated by Fischbacher-Smith and O'Neill, lies well up the capability/visibility curve. By contrast, Prevent pitches itself at an unknown starting position, well below the calculated precision of Fischbacher-Smith and O'Neill's intervention point, where potential or actual extremism must be extrapolated without other confirmatory coordinates.

So, Prevent presides as a top down program, seeking to identify a fuzzy concept in a population determined simply by its age bracket. In order to make practical sense for those seeking to implement Prevent, some kind of sorting process within this population and of the target concept must take place. Indeed, Prevent has been categorized as a program of risk management and, as such, categories of risk must begin to emerge as a means of coming to know and ordering degrees of danger (Heath-Kelly, 2013). In this ordering, the language of "Fundamental British Values," promoted as a key tool to resisting extremism, underlines that certain parts of the school population (i.e., those perceived as non-British) may be deemed as a higher risk category than others. Given the lack of direction within Prevent and the broader environment in which Islamic radicalization is recognized as the primary security threat (Security Service MI5, 2019b), it is then unsurprising that there is a disproportionate concentration on Muslim children (Dudenhoefer, 2018).

So the Prevent program marginalizes home educators on the one hand, while abetting in the creation of "Muslim" as a suspect community on the other. The combination creates a new and narrower focus of suspicion. Without the need for any supporting evidence but purely from the intersection of categories, a folk devil position can be seen to emerge as a logical inevitability. Muslim home education is drawn into the spotlight with, as in the case of previous home education alarms, both the fate of the children and the motivations of the families fueling the rising panic.

As Cohen (2002) points out, the objects of moral panics are not necessarily illusory. The demons of our times; the specters of radicalization and home grown terror, the consequences and carnage of terrorist attacks are real fears and real shapers of real lives and real pain. But moral panics, while they may seem to offer simple ways to confront complex problems, also work in the other direction as well, creating more victims, more costs. Behind the folk devils painted by Soley, Basu, Sheerman, and their ilk, the popular portrayal of the terrorist-parent using their own children for their hateful and destructive ends, exist real people or "all too human individuals who conduct themselves in ways that can be represented as deviant" (Hindess, 2015, p. 50).

This is the current position of Muslim home educators as they experience the media interest and public pressure Soley talks of and indeed as they experience the political rhetoric of Soley and his supporters; as they find themselves positioned as the folk devils at the new heart of the latest wave of home education panic.

Griffiths (2010) points out that there has not been much exploration of moral panics from the perspective of the folk devils which they create; Hayle (2013) regards the concept of the folk devil as under theorized. The starting point offered by Cohen (2002) is the construction of the folk devil through a soft target, "easily denounced, with little power" (Cohen, 2002, p. xii). The Muslim home educator at the intersection of two suspicious minorities is easy prey to becoming a public image of misgiving and mistrust and on which to concentrate the fear and apprehension of home grown terror.

Methodology

The aim of this paper is to explore the experiences of Muslim home educators in the current U.K. security environment. The data for this paper are drawn from three case studies involving questionnaires and interviews with three Muslim home educating mothers. A larger sample had been hoped for yet despite a plethora of anecdote and interest, finding participants for this study proved difficult. Even using a number of home educating contacts, including minority home educators, and despite trawling widely through home educating groups and forums, very few Muslim home educators volunteered to take part in the research, and of these, a number dropped out following initial contact. Home educators are a traditionally "hard to reach" research group (Kunzman & Gaither, 2013) and the low number attracted to participation here may simply reflect this. On the other hand, it is also possible that the current situation is one in which people see remaining silent as a safer option than speaking out.

The three mothers identified as British Muslims. Their home educated children were between the ages of 4 and 13 with a total of 5 children (3 girls and 2 boys) over the three families. One family had further children in school. Pseudonyms are used when referring to participants as part of an assurance of anonymity.

Initial questionnaires provided background knowledge about the family situation and the educational histories of the home educated children. Participants were asked about reasons for home educating and about current experiences. Questionnaires were followed up by telephone interviews which were then transcribed. These transcribed copies were returned to participants for approval and adjustment. The interviews extended the themes raised by the questionnaires and aimed to give participants the opportunity to speak freely about how they understood, and were experiencing, their current situation.

Data were subjected to a thematic analysis influenced by the "folk devil reaction model" through which Griffiths (2010) analyzes the response of Goths to vilification of Goth subculture following the Columbine High School massacre in 1999. Griffith divides Goth reactions into private and public categories; private being reactions that

Goths made to one another within the confines of the Goth community and public being outward facing reactions which Goths presented to the rest of the world. In this analysis, I have drawn on Griffith's ideas but have categorized the nature of the reactions rather than their orientation.

The current analysis begins with the investigation of identity awareness among the Muslim home educators and their understandings of their current position. This is followed by the analysis of reactions to this understanding, divided into two main categories: retreat and resistance. Retreat is further broken down into acts of blending in and acts of withdrawing; resistance into drawing on resources and contesting folk devil positioning.

The Construction of Muslim Home Educator as a Problematic Identity

The contextual exploration above shows how two legitimate categories of identity (Muslim and home educator) have been brought together in the public imagination through political rhetoric, the media and socially credited sources, to create a problematic identity of Muslim home educator marked by "negative symbolic value" (Pickering, 2001, p. 183). Symbolic interactionist theories suggest stigmatized individuals will react by interpreting and responding to, as well as possibly refuting, the imposed identity (Kaufman & Johnson, 2004). This process begins through "reflected appraisals" in which individuals explore their perceptions of how others perceive them.

The dissonance between the mothers' own understanding of themselves as home educators and their reflected appraisal of how they were seen by, and depicted in, wider society showed an uncomfortably large gap. The three mothers cited their reasons for home educating in terms familiar and common to other studies of home education (e.g., Thomas, 1998; Thomas & Pattison, 2007): dissatisfaction with the philosophy, practices and lived experiences of school, the attractions of a home educating lifestyle, and the chance to do something they saw as being different and better for their child.

> Tabinda: The main reason I favour home education is because I can provide a tailor made and relevant curriculum for my children. I find that the way schools are structured do not bring out the best in every child.
>
> Sarah: Home education as a lifestyle also suits us and enables us to spend more time with our children.
>
> Aisha: Basically we were having some issues with the school. … How could we send our children to a place that we don't trust?

However, the mothers were also aware that their educational choice was likely to be interpreted differently by those outside their immediate circle.

> Sarah: I am very aware that people see my headscarf and when they find you home educate they do sort of assume that you want to either insulate your kids from mixing with people of other faiths, which couldn't be further from the truth.
>
> Aisha: When they look at someone and see that they are covered and stuff like that; then they make assumptions about them – assumptions about their education level and what they do with their children and things like that.
>
> Tabinda: When I was visited by the local education officer one of them, the first thing he asked me was 'do you follow a faith based curriculum?' And I said, 'no I don't actually'. … I think there might be this assumption that we home educate because we want to ostracise ourselves off from the rest of society and you know and there might be some kind of suspicion that we are like this fifth column of people

This general feeling of hostility and mistrust became much more concentrated in specific encounters with authority figures through whom Prevent is enacted.

> Aisha: Like when you go to the doctors, stuff like that, that's when it comes up and you feel that you have to explain yourself. .. Because people do think about it obviously because that's what's been in the media – stuff about radicalisation and people home educating so their children don't have to learn about values and things like that.
>
> Sarah: The Prevent policy is fundamentally flawed and makes me wary in dealings with public services generally (when the Health Visitor came to visit I scanned through my bookshelf trying to imagine if any of the titles might cause an ignorant or prejudiced person to perceive us as at risk of 'radicalising' our kids!).

This kind of reflective appraisal led to considerable anxiety:

> Sarah: The idea of these people with no training and their own potentially Daily Mail reading prejudices coming into my home and assessing us and having us on their radar; "let's see if these guys are radicalising their kids" just scares the heck out of me.
>
> Tabinda: I have two who are at home and two who are in school and I think that's been more of a worry for me, just worrying that my kids might say something out of turn particularly with the whole thing about questioning children and the Prevent Strategy…

In turn, this anxiety over their problematic identity led to particular responses and coping strategies. Individuals who face stigmatization may deploy a range of such strategies (Kunst et al., 2011) which may include elements of incorporation, negotiation, and contestation (Chapman, 2016). The coping strategies discussed here fall into two categories demonstrating the mixed nature of responses to which Chapman refers. These categories are described as responses of retreat and responses of resistance.

Retreat

Reactions categorized as retreat took two forms. First, the mothers described attempts to blend into mainstream society by supressing the markers of their difference and adopting what they perceived to be mainstream characteristics (Kaufman & Johnson, 2004). Second, a physical withdrawal in which they elected to stay within the safety and acceptance of their own communities; again a noted tactic of stigmatized individuals (Kaufman & Johnson, 2004). These are now discussed in turn.

Blending In

Goffman (1963) argues that the main issue confronting the stigmatized individual is that of finding social acceptance. He sees the spoiled identity of the stigmatized individual as emanating from two categories: that which is not immediately noticeable or discreditable and that which is immediately noticeable or discredited. As Muslims, the mothers found their identity to be obviously recognizable through their dress and all commented on this. Tabinda described an incident of hostile discrimination based on her attire that would fall into Goffman's discredited category.

> We were at the park and sitting on the swings and [this girl] her friend needed a swing as well and I was sitting with my two year old son swinging and she told her friend, 'tell her to get off the swing because this is a British park for British people'. So we just ignored her but she kept going on and on and eventually once we had had our swing we walked past and she spat at my son who was only 2 at the time and obviously I thought that was going too far and so I said, 'what's the problem?' and she said, 'you shouldn't be here, this is a British park for British people' and she started making comments about my head scarf and so I said 'what's that got to do with being British? Whether you wear a headscarf hasn't got anything to do with whether you are British or not.'

By contrast, the mothers were able to handle the discreditable aspects of their identity differently by not drawing attention to or even deliberately hiding aspects of their identities. This is a tactic described as "passing" by Kaufman and Johnson (2004) and which consists of tempering behavior in order to blend into the wider population. Sarah described how she had curtailed the expression of her opinions in order to comply with perceived expectations. Her daughter's nursery school had celebrated Armistice Day, and while her own reaction had been one of discomfort, Sarah decided not to say anything:

> I remember thinking in my head, should I say, well it is really nice that you have talked about this but it would be good to acknowledge that actually some people wear white poppies because they don't like war being promoted and some people are pretty uncomfortable about the way that the mainstream poppy campaign seems to kind of glorify

> recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and a huge proportion of the Muslim community are hugely opposed to that.

However, despite these thoughts and the legitimacy of her position, she decided not to speak out.

> But then actually no, with this in the current climate of Prevent and everyone having to go through Prevent training and much as I trust the people at nursery school and they are nice people, but I don't want to have that conversation. It is not worth it.

Tabinda advised her children to follow the blending in strategy; to be very careful in choosing their words and subjects matters in front of "outsiders," specifically authority figures who could be seen as threats to the family security.

> My boys like to joke around a lot and sometimes they might joke about something that everybody else is joking about too but because they are Muslim they might be perceived as saying something inappropriate and that could be seen as a problem because you know sometimes they do hear about things like current affairs, so obviously when they do hear about things like current affairs and when they do hear things they are young and they hear other people joking about it so they might repeat it and then that might be a bit inappropriate and I say, 'I hope you are not saying that in school. If the teachers hear you they might think it's not appropriate.'

In this description, Tabinda is illustrating Goffman (1963); that what is acceptable for the "normal" will not be tolerated or will be understood differently if a member of the stigmatized population enacts it. Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2009) also refer to this as they explore British media reporting on radicalization. As a result, the stigmatized identity needs to be self-consciously managed in a way which is not demanded of the normal citizen (Goffman, 1963).

Ostensibly, blending in tactics work to bring together the minority and majority populations by smoothing over the differences between them. Thus in a situation which could highlight difference, the reaction of the stigmatized group works to play down difference (Kunst et al., 2011). However, because it involves the repression rather than the acceptance of difference, the tolerance achieved is restricted to surface appearances. Rather, blending in tactics can be seen as a way of deepening separation by dividing the population into who it is acceptable to "be oneself" in front of and who must be presented with a tailored account of identity.

Withdrawing

Given the stress associated with managing speech, behavior, and identity in the "outside" world, it is unsurprising that the other strategy of retreat comprised a physical

withdrawal into the safe and supportive community of fellow Muslim home educators.

> Aisha: Home education is accepted and common in the Muslim community …. many of the people that I socialise with will be other people, other Muslims who are home educating, because it is quite common amongst the community and not seen as something odd.
>
> Sarah: Now we have this kind of retreat inwards where again I think a lot of Muslims feel nervous about stepping outside their own circles and feeling quite misunderstood.

Withdrawal has been noted among other examples of stigmatization, including home educators (Pattison, 2018), and, as well as offering a social haven, can also be seen to enhance group identity (Kaufman & Johnson, 2004). This in turn plays into Cohen's argument (2002) that the conferring of folk devil identity may intensify the perceived deviant behavior. While retreat is taken as a self-defence measure, it also has the effect of reinforcing separation, deepening the impression of a group increasingly isolated and therefore increasingly deviant. Pickering (2001) calls this a spiral of amplification, and in this way, Prevent and mainstream reactions to Muslim home education can be understood as contributors to Muslim alienation and therefore to be adding to the problem which it was designed to address (Richards, 2011).

Sarah, offering an inside view on the situation, reversed the common conception. She described how withdrawal opened up rather than constricted her life. While the media and popular image is of a closed off, narrow-minded community; the kind of segregated, isolated world described by Neil Basu, Sarah portrayed her home educating and religious community as offering a diversity and openness that wider society with its censure and judgment no longer afforded.

> I feel like I live in two weirdly incompatible worlds because we are lucky in that both our local community and our home ed especially is incredibly diverse and vibrant, open and yet we are in this enormously divided post-Brexit country where there is this whole other world out there which doesn't accept us and does want to restrict us and you turn on the media and see what's going on there and you become aware of that, so it is almost kind of bizarre – you don't know what Britain you are living in and what part of it you are going to have to face.

This kind of reversal of understanding is one which Chapman (2016) notes in her work on the stigmatization of veiling. Among the Muslim women she spoke to the veil, far from being a symbol of oppression and passivity as is commonly represented, was regarded by its wearers as a liberating political tool which they could use in framing their social identity in opposition to the prevailing mainstream discourse about them. Here, a similar kind of opportunity can be seen to exist as the mainstream world is cast as the repressive environment in which words and actions have to be carefully

calculated against the prevailing intolerances, as opposed to the freedoms of expression offered by the Muslim and home education communities.

As Sarah points out, this dichotomy is echoed by the context of Brexit; widely seen as both reflecting and creating a society sharply divided by economic, social, and political (if not moral) issues. In the fault lines around the Brexit debate, the usual overriding concern of economics has been displaced to cultural issues, particularly where these relate to immigration and multi-ethnic, multireligious societies and their divisions (Goodhart, 2016). It is a context in which a niche issue, such as Muslim home education, may easily take on a saliency and symbolism which stretches well beyond the immediate questions.

Resistance

In addition to retreating, the Muslim mothers also resisted their folk devil stigmatization. While behaviors of retreat suggest a powerlessness of the stigmatized group, resistance illustrates the opposite (Bueker, 2017). In acts of resistance, not only are negative stereotypes being rejected but a constructive restructuring of identity is taking place (Breakwell, 2010); such as that which Griffiths (2010) describes among the Goth community as they fought off the post-Columbine negative image imposed on them. Resistance appeared in two strategies. First, the mothers drew on forms of cultural capital to reassert their identities. Second, they contested stepping into the space assigned to them through authoritative political gesturing in the wake of terrorist atrocities.

Drawing on Resources

Bueker (2017) argues that resistance demonstrates an agentic deployment of power, whether economic, political, or cultural. The mothers showed how they drew on all these forms to combat and manage their stigmatized position. For example, Sarah states:

> I feel like an exception for being a qualified teacher and having an education but also knowing that we can afford a lawyer.

She thereby notes the cultural capital of education and qualifications; symbolic possessions that underlie a particular approved status in society. That she is a teacher signifies not just her professional status but has particular bearing on perceptions of home education. Such cultural capital has been noted before as a strategy of legitimating home educators against public disapproval (Pattison, 2014). Sarah points to the dominant status of such capital by remarking simultaneously on its unequal spread and indicating that unequal possession of cultural capital may lead to unequal treatment.

The invocation of cultural capital opens up the issues of social class (Bourdieu, 1986), linking legitimacy of home education to institutionalized networks of

recognition and "credit" (Bhopal & Myers, 2016; Myers & Bhopal, 2018). Sarah's words point to the significance of this capital as its capacity to override the stigma of Muslim home education. While such capital may color views on home education, home grown terrorism is more complicated with, as Modood (2006) points out, it is being well noted that those joining international terrorist networks are as likely to be students, graduates, or professionals as they are to come from a Muslim underclass. Mohammed Siddiqui Khan, mastermind of the London 7/7 bombings, was just such an example. Once again, it is the appearances, rather than the realities of the situation which seem to dictate attitudes.

Sarah's final assertion of economic capital, being able to afford a lawyer, is a further demonstration that she can resist what is happening to her through the channels of the dominant culture. Economic capital allows access to resources, such as defence in law, through which her family's educational choices can be legitimated.

In a different display of resources, Tabinda illustrated how her superior knowledge of home education law gave her a means of resistance:

> I have just had you know like Health Visitors you know asking, 'why aren't your kids in school?' and I said, 'they are home educated' and they look surprised and said 'does school know about this?' and I said, 'well it's not really the schools decision. In this country the law says that it is parents who are responsible for educating their children so it is not really a school decision; it's a parental decision'.

Here, the resource of her legal knowledge is a form of dominant cultural capital which can defend her choices and reverse the authority of the health visitor in a way which repositions Tabinda as a powerful agent in this particular encounter.

Displays of resistance such as these align home educators with the dominant culture through economic, cultural, and political resources. The danger, however, is the implication that those in possession of such capital may be legitimated in their choice to home educate while others, as Sarah notes, are less able to resist. This is the line of argument taken up by Barry Sheerman MP, quoted earlier, in which he argues that middle class home education might be considered tolerable. Cultural capital is presented as forming a seal of legitimacy over a choice which is legally open to all parents. The same argument of membership of the dominant culture expressed through cultural capital may, at least potentially, be similarly invoked as a determining factor in who should be placed under the radicalization spotlight.

Contestation

One of the hallmarks of moral panics noted by Cohen (2002) is the disproportionality of responses to the perceived threat. Thus, it has been possible for accusations against Muslim home educators to gain high level traction even in the absence of evidence. When media and politicians turn to scapegoat a particular group upon whom public suspicion can easily be directed, an obvious form of resistance is for the stigmatized

group to contest the image being foisted on them through public denial. McRobbie and Thornton (1995) argue that such denunciations form a way of resisting folk devil labels and that others may also come to the defence—they cite the example of unmarried mothers in the 1980s whose defenders found media outlets for counter opinions to the government line of welfare liabilities.

In the case of Muslim distancing from terrorist atrocities, the calls for public refutation can now be seen as an integral part of the handling of events. Following terrorist activity, publicly expressed abhorrence has been invited (if not demanded) from Muslims by political figures, perhaps most notably when, following the Trojan Horse affair in Birmingham, in which schools in Birmingham were believed to have been taken over by groups of extremists, Prime Minister David Cameron announced that it was "time for the Muslim 'silent majority' to stand up and tackle Islamist extremism in *their* communities" (Whitehead, 2015, n.p., emphasis added). Despite the work of a 19-year-old girl in compiling a 712-page Google document listing such condemnations (Mahdawi, 2017), the message that British Muslims should be more vocal in their rejection of radicalization and terrorism and more forthright in distancing themselves from it is oft repeated. Yet these calls themselves carry a message.

Cameron's telling use of the word "their" rather than "our" society speaks of an important distinction that divides Muslims from the mainstream. Paul Collier, writing in the Spectator plays further on this vital demarcation arguing that "Only Muslims can stop more terror attacks." He goes on to outline a particular responsibility linked to a particular failure and all enclosed by the idea of a distinct and separate community; "Europe's Muslim communities have manifestly failed to build sufficiently powerful cultural restraints … By failing to act unprompted with sufficient vigour to suppress the norms and narratives of violence that circulate on the fringes, Muslims have allowed their culture to be twisted." and have thus allowed terrorism to flourish (Collier, 2015, no pagination). Muslims, all Muslims, are thereby positioned as being implicated in terrorism and having a responsibility in counter-terrorist action. Yet as Tabinda points out, the argument is an insidious one with far reaching and hurtful implications:

> This whole thing about ISIS and terrorism is for them you know, completely foreign to us because it is so far removed from anything that we have experienced or that we have learned and to have that kind of behaviour associated with our religion and ourselves is awful because it is just not something that we have grown up with and that to have it, you know to be accused that this is what your religion stands for is just horrifying.

Sarah contested not just the implications of the argument but also the line it threads from religion to community to failure to responsibility and thereon to guilt:

> You have to prove that you are mixing your kids with people from all different backgrounds. You have to prove that you are not teaching them prejudice about people outside their own religion , you have to prove that and right back to you have to prove that

> you are not telling them that it is a good thing to go out and murder people. It is like the whole atmosphere and a few years ago you had Cameron making that speech about too many Muslims are silently condoning ISIS and that seems to be the point. Unless you are shouting from the roof tops, waving your 'not in my name' flag then no one demands that other people, no one assumes that the guy whose taken his van and murdered someone in Finsbury Park. No one has said to white people or asked a white person, 'do you condemn what he did?' And I find it offensive to question whether I do or not.

Murray (2018) argues that one of the hallmarks of contemporary Europe is an obsession with guilt. Similarly, Blatz et al. (2009) note that government apologies for past transgressions have been a growing feature of Western and other governments over recent decades; in the United Kingdom, apologies include for the Slave trade and the seizure of Maori lands. Present day governments and, by implication national populations, have apologized, and therefore taken on a level of responsibility, for events and ideologies long passed and in which they cannot be personally implicated. Asking Muslims who have not committed atrocities and who have nothing to do with such atrocities can be seen as a continuation of this trend yet one which has removed the volition of the apology.

Asking Muslims to condemn and distance themselves from terrorism may feel to be asking little when Muslims are as appalled as anyone else by such acts. Yet if the argument of Muslim implication is not accepted, then Muslim apology may do more to hurt the givers than stop the offenders. Murray charting the causes and consequences of national apologies for historical wrongs points out that constant apology may finally manifest as "a special cause for guilt" (Murray, 2018, p. 165). Shadowing Murray's argument, the Muslim duty to continually condemn terrorism to gain a legitimate political space in society rests on taking up a demeanor of "perpetual remorse" (p. 166). The danger is that this remorse goes on to become an integral part of British Muslim identity and even self-identity. Both Sarah and Tabinda are contesting this by refusing to allow themselves to be positioned as apologists. Their act of resistance can also be seen as a more creative response to reframing their identity and moving toward greater mutual understanding:

Tabinda: It is hard to know where to begin a conversation and try to deconstruct that [the association between Islam and terrorism]. I know that people are fearful and you just want to reassure people but at the same time you don't want to be too apologetic for things because then I think that something is blatantly wrong, I think it should be corrected so it is hard to know, especially for people who you don't know.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that the history of home education in the United Kingdom can be seen as a series of moral panics. In this environment, it may not be the factual accuracy of specific statements which gives them their political saliency but rather their integration into an existing world view which makes them plausible (Musolff, 2017).

While home education is consistently portrayed as a dubious practice the nature of suspicion surrounding it is malleable, a vehicle for society's wider fears and emotions. In such an environment, it does not matter that every example of British home grown terror to date has been to school and that we can lay our hands on no examples of home educated radicalization.

The effect of the fear, as Critcher (2011) points out, is that the real problem is misrecognized in favor of a simple solution which, while providing an emotional outlet, may ultimately worsen the situation. In this case, a perfectly legal and increasingly popular educational choice has been co-opted from being an individual family doing their best for their child into a political narrative of danger, radicalization, and security implications (Hoskins & O'Loughlin, 2009). Such a narrative draws with it a simple solution—the regulation of (Muslim) home education, tangentially through Prevent and later perhaps through changes to the law, as Lord Soley hopes to achieve. While attention is thus focused, the bigger questions and the more complex understanding go unaddressed:

> We don't know—nor, it appears, are we ever likely to know—why some young men resort to violent extremism and others do not. Nor, it seems, has there been any consistent notion of what is meant by 'radicalization', with the last five years providing a legacy of confusion as to what forms of 'radicalization' should be the focus of a counterterrorism strategy. (Richards, 2011, p. 143)

Those situated as the folk devil in this current panic have to come to terms with a new social identity. The management of this may invoke responses of retreat and resistance as explored here. The personal costs of this may be great, but it has social and political implications as well. In the panic surrounding Muslim home education, instead of seeking solutions to extremism and radicalization, and instead of saving children and young people from real risk, we may be inadvertently stoking divisions, adding new grievances to old ones, muddling up the actual issues with those of our imaginings, and increasing tensions rather than dispelling them. And the consequences may yet spill wider, a rejection from both sides of the divide and an increasingly riven and intolerant society where, as Sarah puts it, what is really demanded "is a kind of conformity rather than a mutual respect."

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Taking a Feminist Disability Studies Approach to Fundamental British Values: Do "Fundamental" "British" Values Encourage the Appreciation of Marginalized Identity Groups, or Lead to the Performance of Inclusion?

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Abstract

In this article, Fundamental British Values (FBV) are understood as a token attempt toward societal inclusion and empowerment of all citizens. Rather than providing meaningful routes for all individuals to be included in British citizenship, FBV are built on foundations of "inclusionism"—the inclusion of marginalized identity groups in society, on the premise that existing social structures are not threatened. Disabled women's responses to sociocultural stereotypes surrounding disability and gender are interpreted through a feminist disability studies lens. Empirical data, gathered within a larger research project which examined disabled women's responses to the representation of disabled women in Anglo-American advertising, are drawn on and connections are made between the growing trend of promoting diversity in advertising, and superficial approaches to diversity and empowerment of all citizens, enacted in FBV. Two key themes underpin this critical discussion: participant resistance to "pity" narratives surrounding the portrayal of disabled women in advertising and disabled women's navigation of "belonging" in exclusionary environments.

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Introduction

> Inclusionism obscures at least as much as it reveals. (Mitchell & Snyder, 2015, p. 4)

The research presented in this article examines Fundamental British Values (FBV) as a performative approach to the inclusion of marginalized identity groups, such as disabled women, in society. Fundamental British Values were originally introduced by the United Kingdom (U.K.) government in their Prevent strategy (HM Government, 2011), which was designed to challenge acts of terrorism and extremism. Previously, FBV been examined as insufficiently providing clear and meaningful directives for social cohesion (Healy, 2018). Additionally, FBV have been examined as a defensive mechanism used to eliminate perceived challenges to "white privilege" and the normalization of state control over society (Winter & Mills, 2020, p. 2).

Building on critical understandings of FBV as sustaining, rather than challenging, unequal power relations in society, the research presented in this article examines two components of FBV: "tolerance" and "individual liberty" from a feminist disability studies perspective. These values are understood as performative gestures toward empowerment of citizens. It is argued that FBV encourage "inclusionism"—the superficial inclusion of marginalized identity groups, such as disabled people (Mitchell & Snyder, 2015). In this critical exploration, disabled women's embodied experiences are drawn on as a means of dismantling harmful attitudes toward women with impairments, and in order to explore how FBV and citizenship discourses can provide meaningful routes toward societal inclusion (Hall, 2011). Taking a feminist disability studies approach to disabled women's narratives does not mean that personal experience is treated as an exact reflection of individual realities or phenomena. Rather, embodied experience provides insight into the complex ways in which individuals navigate their surrounding worlds, contribute to and resist their social positioning (Jung, 2011).

In enacting a feminist disability studies approach, empirical data—collected via semi-structured interviews with a small sample of disabled women—are drawn on in this article. The data were originally gathered as part of a larger research project examining the representation of disabled women in Anglo-American advertising, post-2000. A key conclusion from the original research project indicated that although the makers of advertisements are more enthusiastically supporting diversity, for example, through featuring disabled women in advertising campaigns that aim to be "risky" and challenge traditional beauty standards (Houston, 2019), the disabled women I interviewed frequently perceived the advertisements as superficially approaching diversity. Similar to existing criticisms of FBV's performative approach to social inclusion and cohesion, participants critically questioned the extent to which "diversity" was

appreciated in advertising portrayals of disabled women. In challenging tokenistic portrayals of bodily diversity in advertising, participants drew on their subjective experiences, sense of self and personal beliefs regarding meaningful sociocultural inclusion of disabled women.

Tokenistic inclusion and "tolerance" of marginalized identity groups, such as disabled people, is understood as a way in which diversity is obscured, rather than encouraged and celebrated (Mitchell & Snyder, 2015, p. 14). Fundamental British Values are critically interpreted as diluting diversity through enforcing master-narratives of how citizens should be valued and value themselves. The enforcement of FBV as a tool of "totalisation" that seeks to tie individuals to an exclusionary and illusory construct of citizenship is examined (Hodkinson & Ghajarieh, 2014, p. 2). Fundamental British Values, then, are critiqued as a gestural attempt on behalf of the British government to bolster an attitude of unification and resilience in British society. Moreover, drawing on the words of Blyth et al. (2016, p. 298). FBV are critiqued as a rhetorical framework that "starts from the outside and seeks to redress a deficit in engagement: to bring something 'in' that was previously 'out'." It is argued, then, that FBV constitute a political attempt to construct "belonging" to British society in a fixed and narrow way.

In the first section of this article, the constructed boundary between those who "tolerate" and those who are "tolerated" is examined as a vital component in sustaining the exclusion of those who are oppressed in society (Yuval-Davis, 2007). Disability studies critiques of traditional citizenship discourses, particularly the understanding of citizenship as something to be earned, rather than bestowed as a human right, are explored. Moreover, problematic understandings of disabled people as "dependent" and passive recipients of social care are examined as contributing to a culture of tolerating, rather than appreciating, disabled people. Moving from a macro-focus on exclusionary citizenship discourses and their impact on attitudes toward disabled people, the notion of "individual liberty" is then considered. Specifically, the issue of whether individuals can truly exercise autonomy and embrace their liberty in a nation that extols tolerance as opposed to appreciation of diverse communities is addressed. Here, Mitchell and Snyder's (2015) concept of inclusionism is drawn on, in order to discuss how performative approaches to inclusion serve as a mechanism of cultural homogenization and, ultimately, devalue diversity.

Moving forward, the qualitative methodological approach taken to this research is outlined. In particular, the capacity qualitative research provides in recognizing how singular narratives contain threads of universal experience is recognized (Denzin, 2017; Sartre, 1981). In other words, while it is recognized that the subjective narratives of individual disabled women are not representative of *all* disabled women, the micro-experiences and stories of a small-sample of disabled women—which are portrayed in this article—illuminate broader, macro issues involved in the universal oppression of women with impairments. Following discussion of the methodological approach taken in this research, analysis of the empirical data is presented. In relation to FBV, two key themes from participant narratives emerge. The first theme relates to disabled women's frustration and rejection of "pitiable" portrayals of women with

impairments in advertising. The second theme presented explores participant navigation of belonging. In particular, connections between data and critiques of political discourses of "belonging" are made. Yuval-Davis articulates how political approaches to "belonging" often sustain exclusionary narratives of "us"—those who supposedly belong—and "them"—those perceived as not belonging, often on the basis of national, religious, race, or cultural identity (Yuval-Davis, 2007, p. 197).

"Tolerance": A Deficit-Based Approach to Diversity

The term "citizenship" is frequently used in political rhetoric that aims to convey support of democratic values. Indeed, the political popularity of citizenship discourses are due to the growth of nationalism and patriotic inclination (Barton, 1993). However, writing from a disability studies perspective, Barton suggests that the complex issues facing many people in marginalized communities (e.g., disabled people) are frequently avoided in such rhetoric. Often, governmental discussions of citizenship tend to focus on the "obligations" citizens hold to society, for example, being in paid employment. Thus, the consideration of how individuals may partake in "meaningful citizenship," for example, experiencing solidarity with fellow citizens as part of a community is avoided (Barton, 1993, abstract). Barton's critique of the typically superficial way in which political rhetoric gives the *impression* of democratic and unifying values strongly links with Yuval-Davis (2007) "politics of belonging" in which she critiques political attempts to construct social belonging in a narrow and fixed manner. Considering that Barton's foundational disability studies critique of the nationalistic nature of citizenship discourses was published in 1993, it is interesting that over 20 years later, the U.K. government is extolling patriotism through requiring FBV to be embedded in the national curriculum (Department for Education, 2014, p. 5).

From a disability studies perspective, the contention is not that disabled people are absent in governmental discussions surrounding citizenship. Rather, it is argued that construction of tolerance, as opposed to appreciation, of disabled people frequently manifests (Mitchell & Snyder, 2015). For Lewis (2005, p. 540), the practice of obscuring diversity sustains the oppression of marginalized identity groups and maintains the boundary between those who "tolerate" and the "tolerated." Here, Favell's description of the politicization of "belonging" as "boundary maintenance" is recalled (Favell, 1999, in Yuval-Davis, 2007).

Garland-Thomson (2019) critically suggests that dominant constructs of citizenship understand impairment as "deficit" and fail to recognize disabled embodiment as belonging in the spectrum of human variation. Garland-Thomson's argument helps to explain political structures aiming to tolerate, rather than embrace diverse identity groups, such as disabled people. Mobilizing Garland-Thomson's argument, I suggest that the disabled form—when understood from a deficit-based approach—is viewed as a threat to "productive" citizenship. Similarly, Meekosha and Dowse (1997)—who draw on Australian politics as an example—highlight reliance on normative imagery and language in citizenship discourses. In their words, "we speak of upright and

upstanding citizens, we stand to attention to the playing of the national anthem. The good citizen is embodied as male, white, active, fit and able…" (Meekosha & Dowse, 1997). Moreover, they highlight how people with impairments, especially those who are women, are often perceived as passive members of society. Disabled women are frequently viewed as not able to contribute in both public and private spheres and, as such, they suggest that disabled women are pejoratively cast in contrast to the idealized citizen (Meekosha & Dowse, 1997).

Illustrative examples of deficit-based approaches to disabled people's citizenship are found in a 2005 report produced by Tony Blair's then Labour government: *Improving the life chances of disabled people* (Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, 2005). By 2025, the report projected disabled people "will be respected and included as equal members of society… [disabled people] should have full opportunities and choices to improve their quality of life (6)." According to the report, it was time to "end the culture of dependency and low expectations (10)" and give "them [disabled people] the opportunity to exercise their responsibilities as citizens (9)." An overall aim of the 2005 report was to "support disabled people to help themselves (7)."

The peremptory tone of the report is problematic from a disability-rights approach. In suggesting that the "culture of dependency" needs to be ended, the authors of the report work from the problematic assumption that accessing welfare benefits is an act of dependency, rather an aspect of being part of society. The notion that disabled people need to "help themselves" sustains the oppressive response of pity and patronisation, as opposed to recognition, which is commonly experienced by disabled people in society (Serlin, 2010). Moreover, the emphasis on citizenship "responsibilities" (the term is used 33 times in the report) further impacts the notion of citizenship as something a person receives when they prove themselves as "worthy" to society. When disability is anchored to deficit-based discourses, disabled people will continue to be perceived as deviating from "normal" life (Mitchell & Snyder, 2015). As such, the boundary between those considered "able" and those perceived as "disabled" is maintained (Mitchell & Snyder, 2015).

"Individual Liberty": Valuing the Freedom of All*, *With Limitations Applied

Substantially, research in the area of disability and citizenship provides a macro-focus on the exclusionary agenda of citizenship discourses in neoliberal contexts (Brown & Baker, 2012; Hughes, 2015; Mitchell & Snyder, 2015; Owen et al., 2012; Soldatic & Meekosha, 2011; Parker Harris et al., 2012; Soldatic & Chapman, 2010; Garland-Thomson, 2019). A considerable portion of research focuses on the relationship between employment and access to citizenship. For example, Soldatic and Meekosha (2011) research problematizes how disabled people are often coerced into taking part in employment regimes in order to continue accessing welfare benefits. Adding to the argument, Parker Harris et al. (2012) echo Barton's (1993) critique of citizenship discourses by suggesting that employment policies in the United Kingdom, United States,

and Australia (all of which have high unemployment rates for disabled people) are preoccupied with the notion that citizens have a "responsibility" to work, rather than exploring how the state may help individuals to partake in meaningful work.

Characteristically, the existing body of literature also emphasizes oppressive and rigid attitudes infiltrating citizenship discourses in neoliberal societies. In particular, Hughes (2015), Mitchell and Snyder (2015), and Garland-Thomson (2019) examine how dominant ideas surrounding citizenship and associated values sustain the binary of "us" and "them." For Hughes (2015, p. 993), many disabled people are viewed "counterfeit citizens." In other words, societies dominated by neoliberal ideologies work on the premise of scapegoating marginalized groups of people, for example, on the basis of disability, sexuality, cultural, or religious identity, as a means of validating the position of those who are viewed as "deserving" citizens (p. 993).

It is fair to describe the U.K. context as influenced by neoliberal ideologies, in part largely due to the increasing marketization of public services that are pumped with private finance and face increasing competition from private services (Tyler, 2013). Neoliberal values, such as, the privitisation and deregularisation of public services, hinder the progress of disability rights (Parker Harris et al., 2012). Davis (2013, p. 10) describes how neoliberalism claims to provide individuals with increased choice, freedom to embrace diversity, and express "selfhood." However, as he points out, "diversity" is naively approached in neoliberal contexts. Explaining his point further, Davis (2013) suggests that only manifestations of diversity that do not threaten the status quo are permitted. For example, the disabled person who works a nine-to-five job and does not take welfare benefits may be applauded and featured as part of an "inspirational" news story. Or, the conventionally beautiful woman who wears a prosthetic limb may feature in a "pro-diversity" fashion advertisement. However, bodies and minds that refuse to be "compliant" to neoliberal governance will continue to be relegated to the outskirts of society (p. 5).

While existing literature emphasizes macro-barriers impacting disabled people's access to citizenship, it is also important to consider micro-impacts of exclusionary citizenship discourses on disabled people. The prevalence of disabling discourses in political rhetoric, as explored in the previous section, can be considered as a direct example of oppression facing disabled people. However, "indirect" manifestations of disablism, such as the personal and emotional impact arising from barriers to accessing citizenship, are more difficult to measure (Reeve, 2014). In taking a feminist disability studies approach to the examination of FBV as a device which obscures rather than embraces diversity, it is necessary to recognize the impact of oppression on a person's sense of self and individual liberty. Similar to Kitchin's (Reeve, 2014) suggestion that inaccessible buildings and environments signal to disabled people, "'you are out of place', 'you are different', I propose that the emphasis on tolerating diversity in FBV leads to people from oppressed minority groups being relegated in spaces of "counterfeit citizenship" (Hughes, 2015, p. 992). Individuals who are part of identity groups in society that are "tolerated," rather than appreciated, face restrictions when exercising their liberty because the knowledge they have—connected to their

embodiment—is devalued and curtailed by those who hold power and "tolerate" (Tóth, 2018).

Mitchell et al. (2014) research on the reinforcement of supposed normativity in educational strategies which are designed to purportedly support diversity is crucial to my argument here. Drawing on mainstream educational contexts in the United States, Mitchell, Snyder, and Ware suggest that the reproduction of normalization is often a central aspect of educational policy that seeks to supposedly promote diversity. Through the assumption that species-typical ways of being are most desirable, "cripistemologies"—knowledge arising as a direct result of disabled embodiment—are shunned (p. 304). Within their concept of inclusionism, Mitchell and Snyder (2015) examine how governmental strategies purportedly aiming to support citizenship for all are frequently ostentatious:

> By inclusionism we mean to identify a term specifically associated with disabled bodies operative in the policy world of neoliberalism. Most significantly, inclusionism has found its most robust rhetorical home within the myriad diversity missions advanced by public education. Inclusionism has come to mean an embrace of diversity-based practices by which we include those who look, act, function, and feel different; yet our contention here is that inclusionism obscures at least as much as it reveals.

Mitchell and Snyder's (2015) concept of inclusionism is instrumental to the focus on disability and citizenship values, which is presented in this article. Mitchell and Snyder (p. 13) suggest that normative expectations, for example, maintaining an appearance that does not challenge expected social aesthetics and participating in paid employment, are treated as tantamount with the "privileges of citizenship." An essential aspect within the feminist disability studies approach employed in this article is unpicking dominant values and expectations associated with citizenship, in the U.K. context. Paying attention to disabled women's lived experiences is an essential aspect of this process process as embodied knowledge is recognized as a powerful tool in revaluing, resisting, and "restructuring" hegemonic control (Jung, 2011).

This article emphasizes how the embodied values and experiences of disabled women can be used to create manifestos for revaluating understandings of citizenship. As Goodley (2011, p. 716) highlights, thinking about the relationship between the self and social oppression creates better understanding of how societal marginalization is, "… felt physically, subjectively and emotionally but is always socially, culturally, politically and economically produced."

Methodology

A qualitative methodological approach, influenced by the recognition of disabled people's lived knowledge as a tool that can be used to destabilize seemingly "neutral" knowledge and practices in society (Lester & Nusbaum, 2018), was taken in this research. Qualitative approaches to research are characteristically identified by a

desire to gather rich interpretations of the world and social phenomena (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). Indeed, a defining feature of feminist research is commitment to working with and for women, in order to produce research that interprets women's complex experiences of their positioning in society (Abrams, 2018). In both feminist and disability studies circles, the capacity of qualitative research to recognize multiple interpretations of phenomena fits well with an understanding of gender and disability as socially constructed (O'Day & Killeen, 2002). Moreover, researchers undertaking critical qualitative inquiry operate from an ethical and activist foundation and seek to cultivate research focusing on "human beings as universal singulars, individuals, and groups universalising in their singularity the transformative life experiences of their historical moment" (Denzin, 2017, p. 9).

The research design in the original research project consisted of two main phases. In both phases, a small sample of multimedia (print and television) advertisements (n.9) featuring women with either mobility impairment, mental health issues, or visual impairment was featured. The impairment categories were selected as they were the most recurrent when searches for "disab* women/woman/female advert UK US*" and "women/female with impairments advert UK US*" were conducted via worldwide internet search engines. However, it is noted that the chosen impairment categories are rudimentary and are not inclusive of a rich spectrum of impairment identities. Advertisements were only selected if they featured a disabled woman as the sole or main character and if they were produced in the UK or US post-2000. The final sample was selected on the basis that the advertisements were produced by a variety of different organizations, for example, fashion companies, television broadcasters, charitable organizations, and pharmaceutical companies. The first phase was based on my analyses of advertisements, via application of textual, critical, and multimodal discourse analyses. Data from the first phase are not included in this article. Instead, focus is given to participant responses to advertising representations (n.4) of disabled women and approaches to the promotion of "diversity" and "inclusion," in order to draw parallels between the performative nature of "inclusion" in FBV.

The second phase focused on the collection of empirical data through individual and one-off semi-structured interviews with a purposively selected sample (n.15) of disabled women. A small participant sample was used in order to enable close and detailed analysis of disabled women's beliefs and stories. Participants were recruited via mailing lists relating to advertising, media, disability studies, and women's studies. A potential limitation relating to the recruitment strategy is that participants were substantially more likely to be familiar with critical approaches to advertising representations of disabled women, due to their participation in such mailing lists. However, the only criterion for participation in the research was that participants were 18+ and self-identified as disabled women. Participants reported different social backgrounds, levels of education, and career pathways. During interviews, participants were shown advertisements featuring women with the same impairment they identify with and were asked six open-ended questions. The questions were designed to prompt participant analyses of key themes in advertisements, whether or not they believed the

advertisements provided a useful or problematic representation of disability and gender, and whether they could relate any of the own personal experience to the advertising content.

Each interview was transcribed and narrative analysis was applied to transcripts, in order to outline dominant and reoccurring narratives for each participant. A sociological-based approach to narrative analysis was undertaken, as opposed to enacting a linguistics-based approach. In other words, attention was paid to the way in which participants interpreted, internalized, and resisted societal ideologies and practices, in the stories that they shared—as opposed to closely examining exact words, terms, and linguistic features of participant stories. In accessing the narratives of disabled women, it is not suggested that the opportunity to uncover the "psyches" of participants is realized (Silverman, 2013, p. 325). Instead, direct participant narratives are appreciated as a means of deepening understanding of disabled women's experiences of oppression and responses to sociocultural stereotypes. As Silverman (2013) cautions, qualitative researchers must be careful not to assume that participant data reflect unfiltered human experience. Rather, when individuals recount past experiences, their words are always socially and culturally mediated, and impacted by the presence of a researcher.

Moving forward, the following sections present discussion of the research findings. Two overarching themes, centered on participant resistance of sociocultural stereotypes of disabled women as "passive" and "dependent," and participant navigation of "belonging," are examined.

Discussion of Findings

"If You're Disabled, You Have to Be Grateful, You Have to Be Passive, and You Have to Be Brave"

Participants' resistance to stereotypes of disabled women as passive and dependent in advertisements emerges as a key theme across the data. Significantly, participant criticisms of advertising portrayals of disabled women as "dependent" and "passive" connect with problematic citizenship discourses, such as those supported in Labour's (2005) Improving life chances for disabled people report*,* depicting disabled people as less-powerful and part of "the culture of dependency and low expectations (10)." Filtering through participants' problematization of portrayals of disabled women as "pitiable" was the concern that nondisabled audiences may engage with the advertisements and feel sympathetic toward disabled people.

Exploring advertising representations of disabled women prompted one participant, Joanna (pseudonyms used for all participants)—who has completed a PhD and has mobility impairment—to reflect on disability stereotypes traditionally reflected in culture: "…because of my age - I'm middle-aged - I would have grown up on all those awful childhood books which teach you, when you are a child, that if you're disabled, you have to be grateful, you have to be passive, and you have to be brave…" Here,

Joanna outlines the prevalence of cultural portrayals featuring disabled people as those who inherently "receive," rather can "contribute." Such approaches to disabled people, embedded in culture, cannot be ignored when considering how those who are disabled continue to be viewed as a potential "risk" in socioeconomic contexts (Waldschmidt & Sépulchre, 2019).

Annie, who is a university student and has visual impairment, was frustrated by an advertisement produced by *The Guide Dogs Association*. The television advertisement depicts a woman—Emma—who has visual impairment and is joined by her two young children and guide dog, who is named Jazz. In the advertisement, references are made to Jazz as "special" and "clever." Emma's young son (who narrates a section of the advertisement) talks about going to the park and shopping with his mother and suggests that, without Jazz, she would be unable to do so. Annie suggested that the advertisement's portrayal of visual impairment led to her feeling patronized:

> I think *Guide Dogs'* representation of visually impaired people is absolutely dreadful. It's patronising and… it makes me cringe. I'm thinking of, again, "normal" [quotes signed] people watching those advertisements and thinking, 'oh, those poor blind people'. I think that's what *Guide Dogs'* are going for though – the sympathy… "these poor blind people, they can't do anything without their dogs" [sarcastic tone].

Finklestein (1998) suggests that a problematic binary, positioning disabled people as needy and supposedly nondisabled people as self-sufficient is often reinforced in society. Annie expresses her frustration at the way in which the makers of the advertisement reinforce disabled people as belonging in a "culture of dependency." In highlighting how "normal" people may respond to the advertisement's depiction of a disabled woman as dependent on her guide-dog, Annie demonstrates how disabled people may internalize dominant citizenship discourses that reinforce notions of the "able" citizen—who is "fit and able" (Meekosha & Dowse, 1997), and can contribute contribute, rather than "depend" on society (Hughes, 2015).

Another participant, Fran—who has completed postgraduate studies and has visual impairment—similarly described the advertisement's portrayal of a disabled woman as "patronising" and "disempowering." Fran was skeptical of the approach taken by the makers of the advertisement to fundraising. In her words, "look how cute the [guide dog] puppies are: give us some money." Here, Fran identifies how the guide dogs are being used in the commodification of sympathy. At the same time as they are being encouraged to experience sympathy for those who have visual impairment and are assumedly unable to take their children to the park or shopping, the audience are being persuaded to donate to *The Guide Dogs Association*, so that they are able to "supposedly alleviate" the circumstances of people with visual impairment. Representations of disabled people as receivers of "good-will" gestures and charitable donations provide a background for common assumptions in citizenship discourses that disabled people are less able to economically contribute to society and, as such, are relegated to spaces of "counterfeit citizenship" (Hughes, 2015, p. 992).

Despite identifying advertising representations that problematically portray disabled women as passive, and discussing cultural attitudes that equate disability with dependency, participants took opportunities to reassert themselves as self-empowered. For instance, J.K.—who works in education and has visual impairment—articulated how she has brought about her own success in life:

> I was declared legally blind before I went to university and got a bachelor's degree… And I got my masters and that also included a lot of reading and fieldwork, so getting out and going places… I want to live my life – I don't just want to sit around and wait for something to happen…

Furthermore, when engaging with *The Guide Dogs Association* advertisement, J.K. appreciated the portrayal of a woman with visual impairment being able to enjoy more activities with her children, with assistance from her guide dog. During our interview, J.K. referred positively to assistive technology on a few occasions and said that she favored advertisements which portray disabled people as able to be more independent, with assistance from technology. In the below excerpt, J.K. appears eager for myths surrounding disabled people as dependent to be dispelled:

> It's helpful to show the situations of, "hey, this person is completely blind but by using this technology, you know, she can still earn a living and support herself." I think that's also important - I think some prejudices of some people are, "my taxes are affording you to live in this area or do something," which isn't really true, you know? We have our own technology, we can work, we can do anything you can do.

As explored in an earlier section of this article, in order to be recognized as citizens, many disabled people face processes which they must "prove" that they are responsible and contributing citizens—a key focus of which rests on the capacity of disabled individuals to partake in paid employment (Soldatic & Meekosha, 2011). As such, a punitive and assessment-based approach to citizenship is enacted. This results in pressures on disabled people to demonstrate why and how they are worthy of value, rather than directing attention to sociocultural structures and attitudes that sustain disabled people's oppression in society. In the above excerpt, J.K. highlights her academic achievements in order to counteract the assumption that disabled people cannot be self-sufficient. By highlighting her educational successes, J.K. defends her position as a "worthy" member of society. Here, J.K. is keen to disrupt the deficit and pity-based attitudes often targeted toward people with impairments. In declaring her identity as a disabled woman, and then bringing attention to her educational achievements, J.K. destabilizes the equation often made between disabled people and dependency.

Disabled Women's Navigation of "Belonging"

A core theme emerging from the data surrounds participant suspicion of tokenistic approaches to disability in advertising and society more broadly. Tokenistic representations of disabled people—which can be interpreted as the integration of disability in a minor way that does not substantially alter standard practices—strongly resonates with the critique of FBV as evoking performative inclusion of marginalized groups in society. This form of superficial integration of marginalized groups, such as disabled people, is a key premise of inclusionism (Mitchell & Snyder, 2015).

A key way in which participants resisted superficial attempts in advertisements to supposedly include and support disabled women was by defining their disabled embodiment as a "normal" part of their lives. A core feature of this theme is participant sharing of "cripistemologies"—the subjective knowledge they hold regarding their disabled embodiment (Mitchell et al., 2014). Participants did not reflect the idea that a certain type of person, for example, a white, middle-class, university educated male should represent a "normal" standard that individuals are required to meet (Davis, 1995). Rather, instead of adhering to a "manufactured" notion of normality and belonging, participants illustrated their embodiment and subjective experiences as worthy of recognition in themselves, rather than falling into the realms of "inspirational" and "exceptional."

One participant, Penelope, who is in her 30s, has mobility impairment and is a university graduate, suggested that bodily impairment is often appropriated as a symbol of diversity and "difference" in advertising. In Penelope's words, "What I find interesting is when you look at adverts the thing that they're picking out are impairments that are not normative, everything else is very normative. So, they have to draw the attention to that impairment…" Here, Penelope articulates how impairment is used by the makers of ads as a "sign" of diversity to present the impression that their brand is forward-thinking, inclusive, and one that will enable consumers, if they buy into the brand, to profit from association with a "progressive" approach. This process is reminiscent of FBV, in particular, the way in which certain values are posited as a means to "support" societal cohesion and inclusion of marginalized identity groups. By "buying into" FBV, citizens are given the illusion that they have the opportunity to be part of an inclusive and progressive society.

Moreover, Helen—who is a postgraduate student and has mobility impairment—addressed how disabled women are often included in advertising campaigns supposedly supporting diversity, only if they largely subscribe to traditional notions of "beauty." Helen's critical exploration of advertisements that capitalize on themes of nonconformance and diversity, yet feature models who mostly meet normative bodily expectations and beauty standards, connects strongly to tolerance of diversity:

> [In response to Kenneth Cole's advertisement, featuring Mullins]…You have to look at it very closely to even realise she is wearing prosthetic legs… people might not sometimes notice that she is wearing prosthetics. I would say often she has the ability to appear as

> normal, or as without impairment… We're [disabled women] only included in advertisements if we subscribe to certain, very narrow, beauty standards… I understand why some people would want to pass as normal sometimes and I don't judge them for it. But trying to create an advertisement that embraces diversity and making it seem like there is no diversity, is almost contradictory… [Referring to the advertisement's key message] "We're all normal and we're all different." Which isn't a very, at least for me, revolutionary message at all. Yes, we all walk in different shoes [quoting advertising tagline] - it's true - but barriers aren't put into everyone's way…

Here, Helen identifies the process of bringing something (disabled embodiment) "in" that was previously "out" (of advertising campaigns). She articulates how disabled women are only featured in advertisements if they emulate nondisabled embodiment. Helen's argument connects strongly with Hodkinson and Ghajarieh (2014, p. 54) discussion of totalization, whereby the body with impairments is featured in "smoothed out" images that "constrain individualisation." Moreover, Helen's analysis demonstrates how tolerance of diversity that results in markers of diversity being imperceptible, is interpreted as "contradictory." Invoked here is Mitchell and Snyder (2015) suggestion that neoliberal "inclusion" of disabled people is founded upon a process of making disabled bodies appear "unapparent."

It is not to say that Helen does not view her life as belonging in the realms of normality: "impairment is the mundane for me, it's not the extraordinary. I see how other people don't view it as the ordinary but in my everyday life, it's my normality." Similarly presenting "normality" as subjective experience, Alice, a woman who works for a charity organization and has visual impairment, described how disabled women are often tied to inspirational narratives, despite leading "normal" lives. In her words, "We [women with visual impairment] have normal lives… we just do normal things. I think it's that thing that you have to be inspirational in order to be validated… 'Inspirational' is actually quite an alienating term." Here, Alice aims to break down the boundary between nondisabled/uninspiring and disabled/inspirational. Alice recognizes how the process of casting disabled people as inspirational supports the separation of people with impairments from "normal" life and citizenship.

When analyzing an advertisement produced by *The Dame Kelly Holmes Trust*, featuring Haleemah, who is a young woman who has visual impairment and has recently organized a fashion show, with support from the Trust—Alice contextualizes her point that women with visual impairment lead "normal" lives:

> I think it's [the advertisement's portrayal of a disabled woman] fairly positive actually… there isn't really a lot of tendency for disabled women, especially blind women, to be associated with the fashion industry and stuff like that. This perspective of Haleemah being part of that was quite normalised really – it wasn't really made into anything special. It is just showing how someone has got their confidence back… she isn't really portrayed as some "poor blind girl". She's just a regular individual. I kind of liked that.

Alice's message that visual impairment is part of her normality echoes Helen's description of impairment as a "mundane" part of her life. Both women keenly described their disabled embodiment as an unexceptional part of their everyday experience. For Alice, when disabled women are tied into "inspirational" narratives, prejudice is negatively doubled. Not only is the individual perceived as a "poor blind girl," but the suggestion that the individual is inspirational because they are supposedly defeating their embodiment inherently separates the person from being a "regular individual" who does not have to do so. Here, Alice and Helen position their lives and disabled embodiment as part of regular experience. In doing so, both women resist the boundary between those who are supposedly "able" and those who are "disabled." In defending their life experiences as "mundane" and "normal," Alice and Helen seek to define their selfhoods on their own terms, rather than being cast into the position of disabled "other." Alice and Helen's revaluation of their disabled embodiment as an affirmative feature of their lives is helpful when resisting governmental rhetoric, such as FBV, that understand equality through a lens of "sameness," rather than paying respect to the knowledge of marginalized identity groups, such as disabled women.

Conclusion

In conclusion, in this article FBV have been investigated as indicative of a culture of conformity, rather than a tool which can be used to include a wide spectrum of identity groups in society. In particular, Mitchell and Snyder's (2015) concept of "inclusionism" has been used to investigate how the value of "tolerance" sustains unequal power relations between those who "tolerate" and those who are "tolerated." By drawing on the narratives of disabled women and their responses to disabling and gendered stereotypes present in advertising representations of women with impairments, the notion of marginalized identity groups, such as disabled women, as "counterfeit citizens" (Hughes, 2015, p. 993) has been critically challenged. Moreover, in identifying and challenging sociocultural stereotypes surrounding disabled women that are present in "pro-diversity" advertisements, participants have resisted superficial approaches to inclusion and redefined disabled embodiment as a "normal" part of life, and valuable on its own terms.

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Article

Fundamental British and "The Other" Values—An Analytical Reflection on Implications for Home Education

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Abstract

This paper reflects on the question of whether, and how, Fundamental British Values (FBVs) may affect the practice of home education in the UK. Fundamental British Values were introduced into the national curriculum in 2014, for state administered schools and preschools which have since been required to demonstrate that FBVs are embedded in the practice of the setting. Home educators, on the other hand, are not obliged to follow the national curriculum meaning that the effect of FBVs on such alternative education is not obvious. However, this paper draws attention to the wider environment of home education by considering FBVs as the product of three particular spheres of contemporary discourse as they interrelate and influence each other. These are the affordances of identity in a postinternational era, expressions of Foucauldian governmentality in terms of self-surveillance and management, and the developmental paradigm. Fundamental British Values, alongside the concept of parenting and the materialization of a particular social morality, are considered as the inescapably emergent products of the un/reason created by the overlapping of these discourses. Their convergence, in turn, creates a weight of logic from which FBVs exert influence over the practice and judgment of alternative forms of education.

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Fundamental British Values (FBV), home education, alternative education, discourse, Foucault

Introduction

Talk of shared values that would serve as both the mark and obligation of the British citizen began in the aftermath of the London bombings of 2005 (generally known as the 7/7 attacks). The idea of cross-cultural values that held together the diversity of British citizenry became part of the political rhetoric which followed the attacks and addressed the fears of segregation, crime, and religious conflict to which they gave rise (Beck, 2008). These values, referred to by then Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair, were "belief in democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all, respect for this country and its shared heritage" (Blair, 2006 quoted by Woodward, 2006). Eight years later, and in the wake of reported plots that Islamists were taking over state schools in Birmingham (generally known as the Trojan Horse affair), another prime minister, this time Conservative David Cameron, referred to much the same set of ideals as being FBVs (Cameron, 2014). As before, these values were put forward as the common ground which could cut across ethnic, religious, and cultural difference to underlie and mark out British identity. Both Blair's call to heritage and Cameron's invocation of the "fundamental" can be read as a political/historical reaching back to some kind of basic and binding authenticity about "Britishness."

Following David Cameron's reiteration, FBVs were swiftly taken up by the Department of Education (2014, p. 5) who cited them as "democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths". By 2015, OFSTED had incorporated the active promotion of these values in both schools (OFSTED, 2016, p. 42) and early years settings (HM Govt , 2015) as being requisite to gaining an "outstanding" assessment in its inspections.

While eyebrows and more have been raised at the designation of these values as particularly British, there is widespread acceptance that schools are good places in which to impart values to children. The position of "spiritual, moral, social and cultural development" (OFSTED, 2016, p. 35) is firmly established on the UK educational agenda. Fundamental British Values fall under the social heading of this quartet, with OFSTED criteria requiring that pupils demonstrate:

> acceptance and engagement with the fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs; they develop and demonstrate skills and attitudes that will allow them to participate fully in and contribute positively to life in modern Britain.
>
> (OFSTED, 2016, p. 35)

While the national curriculum covers all state maintained preschool, primary and secondary schools, it does not apply to independent schools, academies, or children being educated at home (Gov.uk, 2017). That home education is not State regulated in the UK is the subject of frequent government consultations and reviews and is often criticized politically, academically, and popularly (e.g., Badman, 2009; Monk, 2009; Soley, 2017). However, a lack of regulation does not necessarily imply a lack of influence. This paper considers the potential impact of FBV on understandings of, and attitudes toward, home education and reflects on how and why FBV may affect the practice of home education.

In what follows, I examine three interwoven and mutually influencing spheres of prominent discourse with the intention of exploring the emergence of FBV and their place in our thinking about education, including home education. The spheres of thought under consideration are the following: first, affordances of political identity in a postinternational world; second, understandings of self-regulation and discipline through Foucault's notion of governmentality; and third, the developmental paradigm as a means for understanding the political place of childhood in society. In doing so, I draw on the model proposed by Jakubowicz (2011) in which three master concepts (in his case, cosmopolitanism, social and cultural capital) create a triangle of interconnecting, and sometimes competing, explanatory purchase through which he is able to consider the "space" of democratic inclusion. In this paper, I argue that the three prominent discourses examined produce between them a "repertoire of values" in the Bourdieuen mold which in turn give rise to further entailments of thinking. These I explore, within this context, as being FBV, parenting and a particular turn of social morality. From this combination, again, emerges a particular perspective on home education which holds the potential to impact on both its (un)popular image and its practice.

Figure 1 illustrates the three master discourses under discussion and the emergence of particular lines of thinking created through their intersections. Jakubowicz (2011) identifies a competition of understanding in the intersections of his master concepts. Here, however, the overlapping of accepted ideas is seen to create a mutual propping up of thought; the production of an apparent logic through which further entailments emerge. Although the representation infers spatiality, and "spaces" is the term used by Jakubowicz, through my interpretation "space" is something of a misnomer. Instead, these intersections are already packed with a weight of meaning which drive toward inevitable conclusions. Home education in the center emerges, necessarily, as a site of suspicion and mistrust; a place of potential or actual disruption in which the dominant discourses cited need to be re-asserted for order to be regained. The schematic presentation is used not to belie the complexities of argument in this area but to highlight how the appraisal of home education through this prism of values (rather than, for example, through an evaluation of evidence) leaves little room for reasonable maneuver. As discourses interconnect, there emerges an inevitability of un/reason that powerfully acts to direct the argument and confer its conclusions.



Figure 1. Intersecting discourses and their emerging repertoires of value.

Postinternational Identity

We live, as the Chinese curse would have it, in interesting times; times of change and unpredictability, marked by political upheavals and riven with uncertainties, and we live these times at unprecedented speed and reach. Events happen fast and news of them travels almost simultaneously; goods and people are not far behind; actions have far reaching consequences and we are constantly, as individuals and as collectives, being urged to form opinions, take up stances, and commit to actions. The emphasis on speed and reaction lies in accordance with ideas of progress; the direction of travel being in "opening up" as opposed to "closing down"/"regressing" to slower, more inward looking perspectives (Stronach, 2010). In this fast paced, global world, who we are, what we should do, where our interests lie, and where our loyalties belong seem to be continually open questions. Uncertainties of identity and belonging centered around the question of "where do *we* end and *they* begin?" (Booth, 2007, p. 134) are slippery, continual, and charged.

For centuries, international relations have been understood as the interaction of nation states through the medium of global politics. However, as Ferguson and Mansbach (2004) argue, such a picture is fast becoming inadequate. The nation state arose as a deployment of power through dimensions of time and space, history, and geography (Boyarin, 1994). The national claim to unity has been staked to a common

past and a shared territory; avowals, possibly illusory and certainly employed to political ends, yet strongly enough felt to create "imagined communities." From these communities, shared affinity and loyalty has been raised, often with great conviction, even within populations who might have very little depth to their mutual political or social interest on the local or individual level (Anderson, 1983). However, through the strength of these intertwining forces, it has been possible for the world to operate as if the nation state and its citizenry represents "an effective boundary against time and space" (Boyarin, 1994, p. 14) rather than being itself an artifact of that same time and space.

In the 21st century however, the once straightforward combination of territory and heritage directing a lifelong identity (or at least the rhetorics of such) has, as argued by Ferguson and Mansbach (2004), been exposed in all its over simplifications. Technological and political changes mean that information exchange has proliferated, geographical boundaries have become more porous, populations less static; connections at every level of social and political life have multiplied. The impact of time and space has shifted, and with these changes, the terms of belonging have altered too. Rather than preordained allegiance to a lifelong national identity, Ferguson and Mansbach (2004) describe ongoing processes of fission and fusion which bind together and divide populations and groups within populations without regard to the borders of nations. Boundaries are no longer pregiven but are instead constantly being eroded, pulled down, renegotiated, and redrawn (Beck, 2002). Technology abetted globalization pulls together the geographically distant through networks of economic advantage, political interest, and shared cultural and religious affinity. Simultaneously, processes of fission divide units of self-identification into smaller and smaller groupings, specializing authority and concentrating loyalty. The result is a web of interests and allegiances, often conflicting, operating through the dynamics of multiple identities founded on citizenship, history, culture, religion, locality, politics, economic interest, and social advantage, as well as nationality. Opposing forces of localization and globalization compete with each other to block straightforward solutions to matters of differently configured collective interests; interests which nation states continue to attempt to hold together. Such fluctuating allegiances mark the erosion of both the bonding capital that holds factions together and the bridging capital that allows groups to connect with one another (Putnam, 2007). The result is depressed levels of social cohesion such that states which might once have felt assured of the identity of their populace are now "forced to bargain over and share citizens' loyalties with other authorities" (Ferguson & Mansbach, 2004, p. 22).

So, identity has become inherently less stable, more uncertain; a shifting factor in a maze of reality and fear where interconnected, transnational calamities play out whether in the form of financial meltdown, political upheaval, military action, mass migration, displaced populations, or terrorist atrocity. The idea that a nation can steer its course "as if all it had to control were the people inside it" (Boyarin, 1994, p. 14) is no longer tenable. Instead, issues of affinity, interest, loyalty, and identity, whether collective or individual, need to be constantly reframed and reconsidered. The result is that, in any given situation,

there are no convenient delineations to show who is "inside" and who is "outside," no certainties of prejudgment based on a static configuration of identity. Shifting loyalties and fluid identities mean that political positioning "comes to depend on the issue at hand and the identity hierarchies in place" at any given moment of crisis (Ferguson & Mansbach, 2004, p. 22).

Perhaps, the starkest and most disturbing illustration of the confusion over who is on the inside and who on the outside comes from examples of "home grown terror." As Croft and Moore argue, there is a particularly chilling element "to British citizens acting as a 'fifth column' in 'our' midst" (Croft & Moore, 2010, p. 828), and cite the example of Mohammed Siddique Khan, one of the leaders of the 7/7 attacks in London in 2005. Khan, of Pakistani parentage, grew up in Leeds, went to school and university in the UK, worked as a classroom assistant, was married with a child, a devout Muslim and respected member of the community, but also a terrorist recruit, a jihadist, and ultimately a suicide bomber. In his martyr's testimony, found after the attacks he helped mastermind had killed 56 people including himself, he railed against the British government and declared his extremist loyalties in a broad Yorkshire accent. In such an example, loyalty, affinity, and personal interest seem to disorder each other with violent unpredictability so that identity makes little sense even if it can, in some way, be conferred.

The straightforward adjunct to know your enemy seems to be slipping from our grasp but it is not just our enemies that we need to know but also our friends and ourselves. The invocation of "we" has become a matter of not just personal identification but also of political importance precisely as it has become a matter of increasing complexity.

Governmentality

In considering how discipline and control operate within modern societies, Foucault (1995) stretches out the understanding of power beyond the overt and coercive measures which the state demands through the rule of law. Contemporary power is cast as a collective asset that operates around and through a population in the form of common understanding, in the sway of ideas, and in the demarcations of the normal and the deviant in our own minds. Power operates through people, through the acquiescence to, and upholding of, culture, society, and social grouping (Guibernau, 2013). The regulation of society relies not so much on the coercive and deliberate forces of the state but on the compliance gained through the shaping of individuals and through their self-maintenance as "the good citizen, good family member, good worker, and good student" (Popkewitz, 2000, p. 159).

Here, "good" is defined by the mutually shaping needs of both individual and state. Foucault's "governmentality" encapsulates the fusion of interests between state and individual; a process in which the techniques of self dovetail with the techniques of domination so that "the modern sovereign state and the modern autonomous individual codetermine each other's emergence" (Lemke, 2002, p. 50, 51). The citizen thus produced is one who obeys the law, participates in society's enterprises (the labor market, consumerism, formal education, and party politics), conducts a responsible lifestyle in

terms of caring for themselves and their families in socially acceptable ways, including taking responsibility for their own health, living, and future.

The ideals of this "normal" are reflected through social policy; matters of child care, parenting, family life, and education being particularly pertinent here, but run further into the production of normativity as "common sense" and "obvious" (Garwood, 2016). Furthermore, participation in "normal" life takes place on a voluntary basis so that the good citizen is self-organized, self-disciplined, and self-motivated in her or his civic participation. The ease and effectiveness of this merger is achieved through the control of reason which produces the image of the "reasonable citizen"; a persona to which all parties can refer and aspire and around which are shaped the desirable characteristics, life histories, and "needs" of individuals.

In this merging of the free-thinking individual's capacity for self-control and the economic and political needs of the state, the school plays a special role. State education historically intertwines the purposes of social administration and pedagogy in the desire to create common political destinies for its rising citizens. The promulgation of the "good" citizen is therefore deeply embedded in formal education; school a prime site, pedagogy a main tool, for this work (Popkewitz, 2000). In terms of Foucault's governmentality, the school functions to embed in both its pupils and the populace at large, particular values that, in the merry-go-round of reason, will uphold the state and steer society in the ways of self-regulating righteousness.

Viewed from this perspective, the problem posed by the alternative of home education is not that some children may underachieve academically or be denied a certain kind of social life nor that there might be unknown threats to their welfare if they are not educated or routinely monitored by the State (although these are all frequently deployed arguments). Rather, the problem is that school represents a chief means of social administration and those who do not spend their early years in schools may be formed, socially and politically, by other forces and in other ways to become adults who are "other" than the reasonable and regulated citizens whose lives are mutually intertwined with the machineries of the state.

Whether home education really does transgress the politically sanctioned model of the reasonable is open to debate (Pattison, 2017). Similarly, there are no guarantees that those who have been subject to a school education will hold that shape on either a temporary or permanent basis as examples like that of Mohammed Siddique Khan make clear (Croft & Moore, 2010). However, if the position of the school within Popkewitz's argument is accepted, then there is a threat of transgression which needs to be recognized. This is precisely the view put forward in statements such as the following from Neil Basu, a deputy assistant commissioner at the Metropolitan Police as reported for *The Times*:

> Segregated, isolated communities, unregulated education and home schooling are a breeding ground for extremists and future terrorists.
>
> (Simpson, 2017)

While there is no evidential support for Basu's claim (Charles-Warner, 2017; Pattison, 2020), alternative education, by its very designation, stands outside or at least perilously close to the border of social acceptability when it comes to the creation of common political purpose. However, to assume that school can only influence those that pass through its gates is to miss the depths of Foucault's governmentality. The real power of this form of control lies in its ability to regulate from a distance through techniques of socially enforced and self-motivated discipline. Governmentality does not rely on the immediacy of coercive measures or on direct techniques of persuasion. Instead, it exerts its power through the control of reason, the establishment of what is seen as right, moral, and "good." The absence of some children from the classroom therefore in no way automatically places those children beyond the regulation of society. Well clear of the tangible boundaries of the school, the long arm of social judgment continues to extend its reach, not only to the rising generation but also to those who care for them. Included in these are those parents who have already attempted to extricate their off-spring from the immediacy of the state's grasp by educating them outside school.

The Developmental Paradigm

I now turn to the third master discourse of consideration, the developmental paradigm. Developmental psychology and the developmental paradigm it underpins has become the principal (and for a lot of the time, the only) lens through which the Western world views childhood and children. Developmental psychology has made "the child" an object of scientific study and, in doing so, has both created and legitimized the understanding of children through the scientifically sanctioned means of classification, measurement, and experiment (Prout, 2008).

By way of developmental psychology and its privileged scientific status, childhood has been normalized into a trajectory that takes the new born baby into adult maturity in a passage which is standardized and quantifiable and from which deviance can be recognized (Burman, 2008). It is a form of understanding not restricted to the physical and cognitive aspects of childhood, but one which has also made its mark on the development of children as social and emotional beings (Rogers & Rogers, 1998). By virtue of its application to multiple aspects of children's lives, the developmental paradigm is the organizing principle of everyday and common sense theorizing about children as much as it is the framework for scientific theory.

This privileging of the developmental paradigm is so entrenched in our understanding that it is almost unquestionable; for most of us, most of the time, it simply does not make sense to think of children in terms other than as developing beings journeying along a preordained path toward the goal of adult maturity. As such, the developmental paradigm makes a pertinent example of Foucault's control of reason; its framing of childhood presents as a "natural" given rather than a cultural interpretation. The political and social implications of its perspective fall from common view making society's response to children appear to be instigated by childhood alone (Burman, 2008). The

evoking of the natural as the foundational force in child development universalizes the state of childhood, allowing for generalization across populations and histories. In turn, particular affordances of childhood can be raised to the status of "needs"; things that children must have in order to follow the "natural" trajectory of their development. From this stance of apparent objectivity, the developmental paradigm exerts its formidable influence over what is best for children; an influence threaded through social and educational reasoning and directly into prescribing how families (particularly mothers) need to provide for and behave toward their children (Burman, 2008).

Such is the strength of its influence that the developmental paradigm cuts across apparently different stances on childhood; its authority is as much employed in arguments supporting alternative provision as it is in their mainstream counterparts (Pattison, 2016). For example, Gray (2013), an unschooling advocate, has argued that children "need" a particular level of autonomy and freedom in order to develop as "natural" learners. The claim underpins his arguments in favor of a particular style of child rearing and education. While competing stances may postulate different childhood practices, their source remains common. The natural child is a universal child who is, and always will be, in need of certain conditions, certain affordances. Thus, the claims of developmental psychology, the invocation of the scientific and the natural, carry with them enormous political portent as they thread their way through thinking about children (Pattison, 2017).

The reach and influence of developmental psychology has firmly established that children are at least as much "becomings" as they are "beings" and are to be understood in terms of what they will be, as well as, or even more than, what they currently are. This stance foregrounds the importance of early experience and education for later life, and emphasizes optimal "outcomes" to the state of childhood. It justifies childhood as a definable period devoted to the shaping of the future adult, citizen, worker (Cannella, 1999). In turn, this makes possible a model of investment in children. Just as in economics, an investment signifies that money spent now will yield some greater return in the future so investing in children with the "right" kind of early experiences is seen as paying dividends, to both themselves and wider society, later. For example, investment in early learning experiences will pay dividends in later schooling success, in health, in social inclusion, in gender equality, and in crime reduction (Dahlberg & Moss, 2004). This kind of thinking presents a model of social and educational investment in children which equally lends itself to the political; early political investment in children will pay dividends, to both themselves and society, through their later political conformity.

Having laid out these three major areas of discourse, I now want to argue that their intersections create and legitimate other ideas which we currently see flourishing in society. First, I examine FBV as a reasonable extension and logical entailment of the interweaving of ideas about political identity and child development. I then look at the further extensions of "parenting" and social morality as similarly being augmentations of these metadiscourses. Finally, I draw these three ideas together to consider their impact on home education and home educators in the UK.

Fundamental British Values

Where the developmental paradigm and the political importances of postinternational identity intersect, it is an inevitability of logic that a responding political pedagogy should enter the school curriculum. This is a move with considerable precedent. It is generally and widely accepted that schools have a right, if not a duty, to impart certain values to the young and this acceptance finds practical articulation through the National Curriculum and in particular through personal, social, health, and economic education. Prompted by the perceived needs of society, subjects ranging from the environment to personal health are commonly addressed in this way, linking knowledge, social concern, and values (Bigger & Brown, 2012). Examples are the need to recycle or to alter dietary habits or to reduce smoking. In such cases, the promulgation of morality and values is as pertinent (if not more so) than that of knowledge (Reiss, 1996 in Halstead & Taylor, 1996). The current crises of postinternational identity manifests as such a social concern and a question of values. Thus, the anxieties of the state and its need to create and secure new forms of solidarity (Healy, 2016) find outlet through education; particularly, the powerful role of the state in curriculum decision making.

One potential approach here is to focus on the radicalization of youth, as demonstrated through the Prevent program. This tactic concentrates on the individual and on intervention with those deemed to be vulnerable to radicalization. Sieckelink, with over 10 years' experience in the field, describes this vulnerability as a "deranged quest for identity" driven by familiar questions associated with youth; "what is my role in life, where do I belong, what does really matter to me?" (Sieckelinck, 2016, p. 5). This existentialist crisis, he identifies as a precondition of radicalization. It is an approach which fits the arguments of fission, fusion, and multiple identities put forward by Ferguson and Mansbach (2004) as well as, since the work of Eriksson (1968), accepted theories of Western adolescence. Uncertainty of identity constitutes a vulnerability; that vulnerability is an opening for radicalization to take place. It is also a moment of possible pedagogical intervention, where other answers to these questions might be supplied.

However, a logical entailment of the intersection of the search for identity and the developmental paradigm is to preempt the point of crises. To inculcate, or at least begin to cultivate, a strong sense of self and collective identity in the young can be seen as a political investment akin to the other investments, educational, social, and personal that drive the narrative of education (Dahlberg & Moss, 2004). Just as investing in the science education of the young will defend society against oncoming scientific disaster (global warming, environmental devastation, shortages of medical skills), investing in the political identity of the young will assuage the crises of terrorist recruitment and home grown enlistment into radical causes. Beginning with the very young is a common sense of the developmental paradigm and one which, from within its own terms, maximizes the chances of success.

Overtly, FBVs are an attempt to outline and produce a common political solidarity; a solidarity which nationality can no longer confer with certainty (Goodhart, 2017) yet

the need for which, in these times of threat, is pressing. Fundamental British Values make explicit the identifying features of citizenry—no longer a passport or birth certificate but a way of life and values marked by allegiance to the law and democracy, to personal autonomy, and to maintaining the collective peace through prescribed mechanisms of toleration. On a less explicit agenda, these values play into the control of knowledge and reason through constructions of what is rational and right and it is these same structures of rationality that give FBVs a logic and credence such that they may be seen as a duty of education, rather than an overt political choice.

Parenting

In the intersection of the developmental paradigm and the powerful dissemination of common sense through the mechanisms of governmentality lies fertile ground for the notion of parenting to take hold. "Parenting" is a term with a spectacular rise in importance across popular and political agendas over the last 20 years or so (Furedi, 2008). Its ascendancy as a key concept in the lives of children highlights an important shift in thinking from being to doing. To be a parent is a tie of kinship whose meaning is found within that relational connection. To parent as a verb is an activity, a series of things which parents do (Suissa, 2006). Positioned between governmentality and developmental psychology, "parenting" demonstrates an operation of power exerted through ideas about what it means "to grow up normal."

Viewed through the developmental paradigm, parents are incredibly important people, not just for the here and now of their children's lives, but critically also for their futures. Through the developmental lens, parents and what they do or do not do for their children are the most important and determining feature of children's lives. This is so to the extent that "parents are now understood by policy makers, parenting experts, and parents themselves – as 'God-like', and wholly deterministic in an individual child's development and future" (Lee et al., 2014, p. 26). This belief in the importance of parents has given rise to parents as a policy concern and "parenting" as an area of important professional expertise. Parents need to get their role right; they need to take responsibility for the "outcomes" of their children's childhood; they will be judged through the choices they make on behalf of their children within a neoliberal framework in which the cost and benefit of actions is calculated as a rationale for choice (Jensen, 2018).

As the "being" of parenthood is replaced by a technological model of "doing," how well a parent performs in their task can be judged, according to set criteria, by an expert in the field who understands the rights and wrongs of parenting. So, what might have been primarily understood as a personal relationship judged, if it is to be judged at all, by the parties involved, is now an instrumental one which can be assessed and deemed satisfactory or unsatisfactory, not by those who are party to it, but by others who have the expertise to survey and evaluate it.

In this model, "good" parents can be recognized by the way they do certain things; how they feed, educate, play with, talk to, protect, and discipline their children. The

establishment of the responsibility of parenting, through the developmental paradigm, is an essential part of building up the notion of good and bad, successful and unsuccessful parenting. This responsibility is made clear through the simple exposition that parents are first and essential educators of their children (Desforges & Abouchaar, 2003). This seemingly innocuous statement underpins the construction that within the paradigm of progressive development parents are the agents of state administration. The assumption that good parenting will lead to the desired outcomes for children completes the cycle in which parents are held deterministically responsible for both their children's successes and their transgressions.

An agenda of aims set by the state and its instruments controls the terms of reason by which the meaning of "good" is established. Just as Popkewitz describes the political shaping of the self-regulating, self-motivated citizen harnessed to the work of the state, "parenting" is linked to children's successful outcomes in terms of particular social and political aims. Good parenting is that which leads to successful schooling, conformity of behavior and to the demonstration of approved beliefs and ambitions (Chambers, 2012). To Popkewitz's list of "the good citizen, good family member, good worker, and good student" (Popkewitz, 2000, p. 159) can be added "the good parent."

The importance of "parenting" is an idea that is heavily and overtly leaned on in social policy, indeed it is the subject of policy itself. In 2011, the coalition government trialed parenting classes for all parents under the justification that:

> Parenting classes … give parents the skills to manage challenging situations, give their children clear and firm boundaries and help them learn the consequences of their actions. This strengthens families and means children are better behaved, more respectful and can achieve more at school.
>
> (Department for Education and Sarah Teather, 2011, online)

The reference to school achievement is an important one, signifying as it does the overlap perceived between care and education, home life and school. The responsibility of parents for their children's educational achievement is part of this. A feature of the parental role is to ensure that the education that their children receive in school is successful; a message often repeated not only in policy but also in popular formats. Books such as Dr Dominic Wyse's "essential guide" to helping your child succeed in school (Wyse, 2007) and headlines such as The Mail's "Good parenting is more important than good schooling in determining your child's academic results, says new research" (Clark, 2012) drum home the accepted message.

This control of reason around the parent/child relationship ensures that concerns of culture, society or economy, and expressive or personal considerations such as emotions, health, religion, and personality are removed from importance in understanding family life. Instead, the practices and behavior of parents regarding all manner of routine aspects of child rearing from feeding and sleeping to playing and educating are

judged as matters of individual efficacy (MacVarish, 2016). Parents are accountable for their children and therefore, by extension, for the society those children will go on to build.

Morality

Dean (2010), in his exposition of Foucauldian governmentality, argues that the duality of governance, as both the government of the state and the government of the self, fuse into an "intensely moral activity" Dean (2010, p. 19). Morality of the self is that which makes individuals answerable for their actions, while the morality of the state lies in the presumption of knowledge on how its citizens should behave; of "what constitutes good, virtuous, appropriate, responsible conduct of individuals and collectives" (Dean, 2010, p. 19). This presumption of knowledge endows on the state a mandate both to effectively guard its citizenry and to provide an education appropriate to the masses. Not only does this signify an immense moral burden, it also signifies an immense licence to shape morality—a license not granted to other institutions in our society which also purvey values: families, religious communities, children's organizations, friendship groups, or any of the other informal or voluntary organizations which play a part in children's lives. The state names its citizens life goals and tells them how to accomplish these within state provided means; of the citizen is merely asked compliance. .

Good parents, therefore, are those who succeed, or appear to be succeeding, in securing their children's success in state defined education and engineering their smooth transition into responsible citizenship through the inculcation of state led values. "Good parenting" casts the role of the parent as the conduit of state requisites, creating a kind of intragovernmentality in which the mandates of the state diffuse through personal relationships, shaping them as successful or unsuccessful, good or bad, according to state criteria and measurement. The fusing of political aspirations with the means of pursuing them as an ethical enterprise means, as Lee et al. (2014) argue, that "good" is not confined to the rights or wrongs of decisions regarding children, as judged by some ostensibly objective criteria. Instead, "good" is also imbued with a moral correctness. It is a matter of morality that parents conform to the prevailing conception of what is "good" in child rearing through their compliance to the edicts of the state.

The prevailing beliefs, which have already harnessed parents to the role of preparing children for the needs of formal schooling and citizenship, can now easily absorb the further understanding that "good" parents are those who inculcate in their children and who make it easy for schools to inculcate in their children, FBV. Part of the judgment of successful parenting thereby becomes tied to the promulgation of these particular values with the "good" parent made complicit in the political shaping of their own children as the "right" kind of national citizens.

Where parents have eschewed the intervention of the state as the administrator of morality, their own individual burden of responsibility must be augmented in

compensation. Parents who chose to home educate must be sensible of the tremendous moral as well as pedagogical burden which they take on. This burden is a frequently drawn upon narrative of media and other sources whose portrayal of home education is frequently couched in terms of "let-down children" as the victims of poor parental choices (e.g., Hill, 2015 and others). The recent report on home education from the Children's Commissioner similarly uses moralistic and alarmist language as the "problem" of home education is described and the greater oversight of children who "end up being home educated" (Longfield, 2019, p. 18) is recommended.

Longfield distinguishes between parents who are home educating for "for all the right reasons" Longfield (2019, p. 16) and those who are not. The efficacy of home educating parents is bound up with the morality of what constitutes good and poor motivation for the choice. Thus, parents will be assessed by criteria to which they may not be party or their own "good" reasons may be evaluated as poor ones; their failure in any such assessment is a moral condemnation as well as an educational one. In such a context, FBVs become a(nother) criteria by which pursuers of the alternative can be judged through their adherence to, or transgression from, the statutes of the reasonable, the righteous, and the "good."

Common Sense and Crisis in Home Education

This analysis of the emergence, practice, and the implications of FBVs has sought to uncover the elements of thought that have contributed to their inception and to the consequences they may have on home education. Moving in from metaframeworks of thought concerning developmental psychology, relations between individuals, communities, and the state and the postinternational search for identity has led to the location of FBV, parenting, and morality at the intersections of these paradigms. The final drawing together now falls on the consequences of this playing out of common sense and current crises for home educators.

While there is no requirement for home educators to refer to or use the national curriculum, there is a requirement (perhaps even more so than other parents) to demonstrate that they are "good" parents, morally committed to criteria of social righteousness as well as being capable of the technological job of bringing up and educating children. Home educating parents have long been perceived, at least in some circles, as "poor" parents who actively deny their children some of the educational and social goods of childhood (Rothermel, 2015). Recent inputs from public figures like Longfield and Basu fuel the evaluation of home education as a moral choice whether this be linked to radicalization and the inculcation of unsuitable minority beliefs or to the potential abuse, isolation and neglect of "invisible" children. The implications of this moral stance have made "risk" a pertinent prism through which to evaluate all examples of home education (Myers & Bhopal, 2018). As these researchers point out, such risk assessments are made in conjunction with issues like class, lifestyle, and religion. Minority home educators are perceived as higher risk, with the position of Muslim

home educators being particularly sensitive through the postulated links with radicalization.

The "common sense" unsuitability of many parents to educate their own children has been echoed in both chambers of parliament. The example of Barry Sheerman MP, speaking in the House of Commons in 2014, illustrates the power of the normal in assessing categories of risk:

> I am really worried about home schooling. In my constituency and others, I find a lax attitude to home schooling, and the ease with which people can say a child is being home schooled is dangerous territory. When it was confined to a small number of middle-class families who thought their child might be bullied at school and needed that home support, it was perhaps something we could tolerate, but I always thought that we ought to know where every child is in this country …
>
> I am also worried that people from a strong faith background are choosing to use home schooling. …I believe that we should know what children are being taught and how they are being taught.
>
> (Sheerman, 2014)

Sheerman's reference to "middle class" acceptability and the dangers of "strong faith" play into models of parenting based on idealized mainstream families—adjectives to which we might add white, nuclear, quasi-Christian, conventionally educated, and regularly employed; the "good" families of Popkewitz's examination of governmentality. Not only do these form the ideals of acceptable families, we actually know very little in research terms about other parenting models or ethnic minority parents (Chambers, 2012). In the absence of knowledge, populist doubts continue to prevail over minority groups where "distinctions are often interpreted as shortcomings or deviations from a white nuclear-family norm" (Chambers, 2012, p. 69). Such deviations lead directly to speculation over how parents from such groups may be linked to poor educational, social, and now political, outcomes.

As FBVs become incorporated into school education, so they are likely to become part of what is understood as "good parenting"; a common sense view of the normal and moral presented by political and popular forces. "Poor" parenting gives a common sense, politically sanctioned and popularly encouraged reason to intervene in families and to condemn the education children may be receiving at home. Indeed, the invocation of morality means that such intervention and condemnation must take place—it would be unethical to do otherwise. It is interesting that the kind of tolerance promoted by FBV itself is unlikely to stand in the way of such forces. As Catherine Ross, professor of Law at George Washington University, put the argument against fundamentalist Christian home educators in the United States:

> Respect for difference should not be confused with approval for approaches that would splinter us into countless warring groups. Hence an argument that tolerance for diverse

> views and values is a foundational principle does not conflict with the notion that the state can and should limit the ability of intolerant homeschoolers to inculcate hostility to difference in their children—at least during the portion of the day they claim to devote to satisfying the compulsory schooling requirement.
>
> (Ross, 2010, p. 14)

Intolerance of home education need not interfere with the self-appointed goal of embracing diversity; instead, the shield of morality and the dictates of common sense can override the hard work of understanding each other in an age of difficult uncertainty.

The UK has struggled with the growing popularity of home education; the media, politicians, and popular sources drawing attention to the internal composition of the movement rather than the external forces which might have fed and be continuing to fuel its rise. From hippies to extremists, home education is a problem to do with those who practice it rather than an expression of the ideas and educational realities of its context. Insinuations of home education as a terrorist breeding ground play into the notion of a "dangerous territory" internal yet separate, a fifth column, that must be policed through regulation, monitoring, and public awareness; the vital discourses of good citizenry and appropriate parenting. Fundamental British Values are part of these discourses, building the case against home education.

Between the differences we say we tolerate and the ones we say we cannot (must not, should not), there lies a pyramid of reason built from paradigms of thought readily at each other's disposal: developmental science, the nation state, the delineation of the normal, the marking out of responsibility, the righteous, and the moral. Fundamental British Values are not just the deployment of State politics through education but a much larger playing out of power, one in which the other is constructed bit by bit from the day to day deployment of common sense and common morality. In chasing the demons of the 21st century, word must somewhere be turned to flesh, decisions must be made, and accusations laid. We pass down through layers of reason and the concomitant deployment of judgment that logic brings, yet the weight of our own thinking may be doing no more than setting down the rules for the next systems of violence (Foucault, 1995).

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