


Blackpaper

Verge Currency
5th edition



Official Verge Blackpaper 5th edition
Published January 2019
Authored by CryptoRekt
Designed by waveon3
Coverimage by Joske



Introduction

Since its inception in 2009, Bitcoin [1] and the concept of a blockchain, was developed in response to an inherent flaw in the way transactions were processed on the Internet. In his whitepaper [2], Nakamoto explains that

Commerce on the Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on financial institutions serving as trusted third parties to process electronic payments. While the system works well enough for most transactions, it still suffers from the inherent weaknesses of the trust based model (Nakamoto, 2007)

Bitcoin has been rapidly adopted into today's modern marketplaces. A primary issue with Bitcoin's rapid adoption is the increase of demand on the original blockchain to handle varying degrees of large transactions. With increased demand comes increased transactional waiting periods, and this has resulted in higher transactional fees in attempts to try and speed-up transaction confirmation times.

Table of contents

Introduction	2
1.0 Overview	4
1.1 Multi-Algo PoW	4
1.2 Tailored transactional applications	4
1.3 Simple transactions	4
1.4 Stealth transactions	5
1.5 Anon transactions	5
2.0 The Verge Network	6
2.1 TOR Integration	6
2.2 I2P Integration	7
2.3 Electrum	7
2.4 TOR Android	9
3.0 Encrypted Messaging	10
3.1 Message Propagation	11
4.0 Dual-Key Stealth Addressing	12
4.1 Dual-Key Stealth Address Protocol	13
4.2 Key Agreements	14
4.3 The Diffie-Hellman algorithm	14
4.4 Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)	15
4.5 Key Take-aways	17
5.0 Atomic Swaps	18
5.1 What is a Hash Time-Locked Contract (HTLC)?	18
5.2 How do Hash Time-Locked Contracts work?	18
5.3 What are the benefits of HTLC's?	19
5.4 What are the benefits of Atomic Swaps?	19
5.5 What are the limitations of on-chain Atomic Swaps?	19
5.6 What is the Lightning Network?	19
6.0 Rootstock (RSK)	21
7.0 Ring confidential transactions	24
7.1 Ring Signatures	25
7.2 Pedersen Commitment	25
7.3 Range Proofs	26
Conclusion	26
References	28
Personal Note	30

1.0 Overview

The core innovation behind Bitcoin is its decentralized structure. Unlike traditional fiat currencies, Bitcoin has no central control, no central repository of information, no central management, and no central point of failure. To this point, Verge was created to bring tailored transactional applications and inherent privacy implementations to strengthen user obfuscation while maintaining Nakamoto's vision of a decentralized electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of third-party trust.

1.1 Multi-Algo PoW

Verge is a multi-algorithm enabled proof-of-work based cryptocurrency that is designed to enable people with different types of mining devices to have equal access to earning coins. It is one of the few cryptocurrencies to support 5 hash functions combined on one blockchain. This results in increased security due to a wider range of people and devices that can mine Verge. The 5 algorithms supported on the Verge network are: Scrypt, X17, Lyra2rev2, myr-groestl and blake2s. All 5 algorithms have a 30-second block target time and the difficulty is influenced only by the algorithms hash rate.

1.2 Tailored transactional applications

Verge (XVG) was originally created based on the idea of providing end-user identity obfuscation suited for everyday use. We believe that every human deserves the right to privacy and with that idea in mind we pride ourselves on being able to provide several different available methods of transacting across the Verge network. Each method provides our users with a base level of obfuscation through the TOR network as well as different obfuscation options tailored for everyone's specific needs.

1.3 Simple transactions

Much like Bitcoin, the Verge network operates on a publicly facing blockchain. It is important to understand that all transactions are stored publicly and permanently on the blockchain. This means that anyone can see the balance and transactions of any Verge address. However, Verge addresses are not themselves linked to a person or entity and users remain pseudo-anonymous so long as different addresses are used per transaction and or until information is revealed during a purchase or other transactional circumstance [REF]. These styles of transactions are best suited for general everyday use.

1.4 Stealth transactions

Stealth transactions are primarily comprised of dual-key stealth addresses. As you will read later in this paper, stealth addresses are a method by which additional obfuscation can be implemented to further protect the **receiving party** when transacting with Verge. This is done by requiring the payers to generate random one-time addresses for a given transaction. When multiple users send funds to a stealth address, rather than these transactions appearing on the blockchain as multiple payments to the same address, they instead appear as multiple payments going to different addresses. This (in theory) makes it near-impossible to link transactions to the recipient's published address or one-time generated addresses.

*It is important to note that this type of transaction is designed such that the **recipient** of a payment can maintain their privacy, Stealth addresses do not provide 100% anonymity and do not protect the sender.*

1.5 Anon transactions

Anon transactions use a combination of dual-key stealth addresses and RingCT (Ring Signatures and confidential transactions) to preserve the anonymity of both the sending and receiving parties. These concepts will be explained later in this paper; however, the short version is that Ring Signatures make it harder to trace transactions by obscuring the output of the true sender in a set of other outputs on the blockchain, confidential transactions hide the actual amounts being sent, and TOR hides both parties true IP addresses i.e. IP obfuscation.


This style of transaction is best suited for those who are fully looking to maintain their personal privacy.

2.0 The Verge Network

The following segments are to discuss key integrations that are supported on the Verge network.

2.1 TOR Integration

TOR [16], derived from an acronym for the original software project name “The Onion Router”, is an IP obfuscation service which enables anonymous communication across a layered circuit-based network. TOR directs internet traffic through a free worldwide volunteer overlay network consisting of more than seven thousand relays to conceal a user’s location and usage from anyone conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis.




The layers of encrypted address information used to anonymize data packets sent through TOR are reminiscent of an onion, hence the name. That way, a data packet's path through the TOR network cannot be fully traced. TOR's use is intended to protect the personal privacy of users, as well as their freedom and ability to conduct confidential communication by keeping their Internet activities from being monitored.

Onion routing is implemented by encryption in the application layer of a communication protocol stack, nested like the layers of an onion. TOR encrypts the data, including the next node destination IP, multiple times and sends it through a virtual circuit comprising successive, randomly selected TOR relays. Each relay decrypts only enough of the data packet wrapper to know which relay the data came from, and which relay to send it to next. The relay then rewraps the package in a new wrapper and sends it on. The Final relay decrypts the innermost layer of encryption and sends the original data to its destination without revealing, or even knowing, the source IP address.

In short, when a user connects into the TOR network, their internet traffic is then routed through a number of global servers, each of which removes information of the previous server such that the last exit node server ends up being clueless as to where the network originated from.

2.2 I2P Integration


I2P [10, 11] was originally built to provide hidden services which allow people to host servers at unknown locations. I2P provides many of the same benefits that TOR does. Both allow anonymous access to online content, make use of a P2P-style routing structure, and both operate using layered encryption.



However, I2P was designed to be a “network within the internet”, (see figure 1.1) with traffic staying contained in its borders. I2P performs packet-based routing as opposed to TOR’s circuit-based routing. This provides the benefit of permitting I2P to dynamically route around congestion and service interruptions in a manner like the internet’s IP routing. This provides a higher level of reliability and redundancy to the network itself.

The first time a client wants to contact another client, they make a query against the fully distributed "network database" - a custom structured distributed hash table (DHT) based off the Kademlia algorithm. This is done to find the other client's inbound tunnels efficiently, but subsequent data between them usually includes that information so no further network database lookups are required.

Figure 1.1
How an i2p Transaction Occurs



TO NOTE : An i2p node hop occurs every 14 seconds.

2.3 Electrum

Electrum's [21] strength is speed and simplicity, with low resource usage. It uses secure remote servers that handle the most complicated parts of the Verge network and allows users to recover their wallets with a secret seed phrase.

Additionally, Electrum offers a simple and easy to use cold storage solution. This allows users to store all, or part of their coins, in an offline manner. Moreover, Electrum is one of the only wallets to provide native TOR and I2P support. By integrating Electrum with TOR and I2P, one can achieve anonymity while using the desktop/mobile wallet. Both IP address and transaction information is secured and does not leak to the connecting servers; increasing user privacy.




Electrum enables multi-signature support, which requires more than one key to authorize an Electrum transaction. Standard transactions on the Verge network could be called Single-signature transactions, because transfers require only one signature - from the owner of the private key associated with the Verge address. An Electrum transaction, with multi-signature support, requires the signatures of multiple people before the coins can be transferred. Verge then requires multiple different party addresses to be provided to do anything with them.

One Electrum wallet is on your primary computer, the other on your smart phone - the coins cannot be spent **without a signature from both devices**. Thus, an attacker must gain access to both devices to steal your coins.

2.4 TOR Android

The Verge TOR [16, 10] wallet was designed to bring IP obfuscation services to your personal mobile devices when transacting with Verge. This wallet, by default, does not have the ability to connect to or broadcast user information over Clearnet which helps to ensure that no user data is unintentionally leaked.



All transactions are completed over TOR via Simple Payment Verification (SPV). SPV is a technique described in Satoshi Nakamoto's paper that allows for the wallet to verify transactions through proof of inclusion; a method for verifying if a transaction is included in a block without downloading the entire block (similar to how an Electrum wallet functions).

SPV allows for nearly instant payment confirmations because it acts as a thin client that only needs to download the block headers, which are drastically smaller than full blocks. The Verge TOR wallet also houses standard security features such as a 4-digit pin code and biometric locking options for an added layer of physical security.

Additionally, the Verge TOR wallet can handle P2P QR code scan transactions with instant verification. Clients can also import QR codes from paper wallets to pull balances from cold storage if required.

3.0 Encrypted Messaging

Encrypted messaging is a P2P (peer-to-Peer) Instant messaging system utilizing state-of-the-art encryption technology to keep your communications private. All messages are encrypted by the proven AES-256-CBC algorithm, and distributed between nodes in such a way as to prevent the recipients of messages from being inferred by assailants utilizing sophisticated traffic analysis.

Encrypted messaging utilizes the elliptic curve digital Signature algorithm, which is a variant of the digital signature algorithm used in elliptic curve cryptography. ECDSA is used to give you the confidence of knowing messages you receive come from the original recipient and remain untouched in propagation.

As with stealth address transactions, the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange method allows a secret key for encryption to be shared between the sender and the recipient using the data embedded in the message along with the private keys of Verge dual-key stealth addresses held by the sender and recipient, thus allowing for the distribution of messages of whom nobody knows the recipient of. In order to send an encrypted message, much like sending Verge, you must possess the public key of the intended recipient.

Verge uses curve secp256k1[27] for all elliptic curve functions. This is the same curve used by Bitcoin along with most altcoins. With such widespread use and underpinning systems of immense value, it is extremely unlikely that curve secp256k1 is not secure. Messages are signed by the keys they were sent with. This allows you to be confident of the origin of the messages you receive and allows the public key of the sender to be extracted from the message, providing you all the information needed to send a reply.

Additionally, our implementation of encrypted messaging takes full advantage of both LZ4 and xxHash algorithms. LZ4 is a lossless data compression algorithm that is focused on compression and decompression speed while simultaneously utilizing very little compute resource. LZ4 is the primary compression algorithm used in many modern-day applications such as ZFS on Linux, FreeBSD, Illumos, and many others which can be found [here](#). xxHash is an extremely fast non-cryptographic hashing algorithm with working speeds close to RAM limitations. Combining xxhash with LZ4 compression enables the Verge network to very quickly send and receive messages over the blockchain with very limited impact on compute & network resources.

3.1 Message Propagation

Encrypted Messages are duplicated on every participating node in the Verge network – this prevents adversaries from uncovering the recipient of an encrypted message by using network traffic analysis.

The messages are stored on each node for a maximum period of 48 hours, after which the message is deleted. If the recipient is absent from the network for 48 hours or more the possibility exists that they may not receive messages sent to them. It is recommended to connect to the network each day in order to prevent such an occurrence.

Stored messages are grouped by time in divisions of 1 hour. The system operates on the grouped buckets of messages to save bandwidth.

4.0 Dual-Key Stealth Addressing

Stealth Addressing allows senders to create an unlimited number of one-time destinations addresses on behalf of the recipient without any interaction between the parties. Stealth addresses are a method by which additional obfuscation can be implemented to further protect the **receiving party** when transacting with Verge.



When multiple users send funds to a stealth address, rather than these transactions appearing on the blockchain as multiple payments to the same address, they instead appear as multiple payments going to different addresses. This (in theory) makes it near-impossible to link transactions to the recipient's published address or one-time generated addresses. This is achieved through a system of cryptography known as Elliptic Curve, or more specifically in this case – Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH for short). ECDH works by allowing any two individuals who know each other's public keys to be able to calculate a shared secret that nobody else can either duplicate or link to either party's public keys. Due to the unique cryptographic properties of the ECDH algorithm, the shared key cannot be reverse engineered to arrive at either the sender or receiver addresses.

To understand how a stealth address functions let's look at some of the key fundamental components that are involved in the process.

4.1 Dual-Key Stealth Address Protocol

This protocol was designed to eliminate the continuous usage of the private spending key. This design flaw in the original stealth addressing protocol significantly increased the risk of said key being compromised. In order to eliminate private spending key over use, Dual-Key Stealth Address Protocol (DKSAP) was introduced. This protocol introduces two pairs of cryptographic keys, a scan and a spend key and computes a one-time payment address per transaction.

In order to better understand how this works let's review how this style of transaction takes place:

- Marvin (the receiver) has two private/public key pairs (s, S) and (b, B) , where $S = s \cdot G$ and $B = b \cdot G$ are 'scan public key' and 'spend public key', respectively. Here G is the base point of an elliptic curve group.
- Swen (the sender) generates an ephemeral key pair (r, R) , where $R = r \cdot G$ and transmits it with the transaction.
- Both Swen and Marvin can compute a shared secret c using the ECDH: $c = H(r \cdot s \cdot G) = H(r \cdot S) = H(s \cdot R)$, where $H(\cdot)$ is a cryptographic hash function.
- Swen uses $c \cdot G + B$ as the ephemeral destination address for sending the payment.
- Marvin actively monitors the blockchain and checks whether some transaction has been sent to the purported destination address $c \cdot G + B$. Depending on whether the wallet is encrypted, the receiver can compute the same destination address in two different ways, i.e., $c \cdot G + B = (c + b) \cdot G$. If there is a match, the payment can be spent using the corresponding private key $c + b$. Note that the ephemeral private key $c + b$ can only be computed by Marvin.

In DKSAP, if an auditor or a proxy server exists in the system, the receiver can share the 'scan private key' s and the 'spend public key' B with the auditor/proxy server so that those entities can scan the blockchain transaction on behalf of the receiver. However, they are not able to compute the ephemeral private key $c + b$ and spend the payment.

4.2 Key Agreements

A Key agreement scheme is a procedure by which two or more parties agree upon a value from which they can subsequently derive one or more keys for use in symmetric encryption. Neither party completely determines the key value on their own. Instead, they both contribute to the final key value and most important, anyone who observes the exchanges between the two parties cannot tell what the result will be. It is important to note that in their basic form, key-agreement schemes are anonymous, they do not tell either party the identity of the other party.

4.3 The Diffie-Hellman algorithm

The original Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme is based on multiplication of integers modulo a large prime number, specifically numbers greater than one and less than p , where p is a large prime. ECDH is an analogous scheme based on addition of points on an elliptic curve. In both schemes, the basic operations are combined to create a primitive function known as a keyed one-way function. A Keyed one-way function is a function that takes two inputs, one of which is private (e.g., the key), and produces one output. Given the two inputs, it must be straightforward to calculate the output but, it must be computationally infeasible to calculate the key, using only the other input and the output. In this way each party can use their private key without revealing it to anyone else, either the other party or an eavesdropper (Man-in-the-middle).

4.4 Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)

ECDH is a variant of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm for elliptic curves. It is a Key-agreement protocol which means that ECDH defines how keys should be generated and exchanged between parties. How to encrypt data using these keys is up to us. ECDH is implemented to solve the following problem:

Two parties (Marvin and Swen) want to exchange information securely such that a third party (Man-in-the-middle) may intercept them but may not decode them.

Here's how it works:

1. First, Marvin and Swen generate their own private and public keys. We have the private key d_A and the public key $H_A = d_A G$ for Marvin, and the keys d_B and $H_B = d_B G$ for Swen. Note that Marvin and Swen are using the same base point of G on the same elliptic curve on the same finite field.
2. Marvin and Swen exchange their public keys H_A and H_B over an insecure channel. The man in the middle would intercept H_A and H_B , but won't be able to find out neither d_A nor d_B without solving the discrete logarithm problem.
3. Marvin calculates $S = d_A H_B$ (using his own private key and Swen's public key), and Swen calculates $S = d_B H_A$ (using his own private key and Marvin's public key). Note that S is the same for both Marvin and Swen, in fact:

$$S = d_A H_B = d_A (d_B G) = d_B (d_A G) = d_B H_A$$


The man in the middle, however, only knows H_A and H_B (together with the other domain parameters) and would not be able to find out the shared secret S .

Before the transaction can begin, both Marvin and Swen must agree to transactional parameters, a , b , p and G . (see figure 3). Each party then generates a random integer to use as its private key. For Marvin this is m , and for Swen this is n . Each then multiplies the base-point, G , by their private key to form a new point that represents their public key. In terms of an elliptic curve remember that each point comprises an x coordinate and a y coordinate.

Marvin and Swen then exchange their public keys and multiply the other's public key by their own private key. This produces a new point which is the same for each party. It remains only to convert this point to a bit string suitable for use as a key.

Note: An eavesdropper may be able to observe the agreed parameters and may see the exchange of public keys, but he will not be able to determine what either private key is, nor the key that the two parties have agreed upon.

Figure 3: ECDH



A Verge Currency Stealth Address is a 95-character string that consists of a public view key and a public spend key. When Marvin sent Verge to Swen, Marvin will use Swen's public view key and public spend key as well as some random data to generate a unique one-time public key (Stealth Address) for Swen's new output. Everyone can see the one-time public key on the blockchain but only Marvin and Swen know that Marvin sent Verge to Swen. The output is created in such a way that Swen can locate the output destined for him by scanning the blockchain with his wallet's private view key. Once detected and retrieved by Swen's wallet he would be able to calculate a one-time private key that corresponds with the one-time public key and spend the relevant output with his wallets private spend key. This whole process occurs without ever having Swen's wallet address publicly linked to any transaction.

4.5 Key Take-aways

1. it is publicly unlinkable to the original public address;
2. it is publicly unlinkable to any other one-time address;
3. only the recipient can link all their payments together
4. only the recipient can derive the secret key associated with the one-time address

Stealth addresses enhance user privacy in every transaction by allowing the user to generate a one-time public key which automatically generates and records who can spend an output in a later transaction. Stealth addresses prevent outputs from being associated with wallet addresses by effectively allowing users to transact outside of the publicly viewable blockchain. An outside observer has no way to tell if funds have been moved from one user to another nor do they can link wallet addresses together simply by looking up a transaction on the blockchain. When Marvin sends Verge to Swen, the output Swen receives will not be associated with his public wallet address. Stealth addressing has built in methods of ensuring funds have been sent by allowing the sender, in this case, Marvin, to be able to verify that payment was sent by checking the transactional confirmation within his wallet. Swen can rest assured that no one else can see when or if any Verge was sent to him so long as appropriate precautions were taken when transacting with multiple parties.

5.0 Atomic Swaps

Atomic Swaps [24, 25, 26], aka atomic cross-chain trading, are cryptographically powered Smart Contracts that allow for interoperability between Verge and other crypto(s) on a peer-to-peer (on-chain) basis without the need of a trusted third party.



An Atomic swap works in the same way users would send funds to one another by allowing users to cross-trade different cryptocurrencies without relying on centralized parties. At their core, Atomic Swaps rely on Check Lock Time Verify (CLTV) otherwise known as Hash Time-Locked Contract. (HTLC).

5.1 What is a Hash Time-Locked Contract (HTLC)?

A hash time-locked contract is a type of payment in which two people agree to a financial arrangement where one party will pay the other party a pre-determined amount of crypto. These contracts are “time-locked” which basically means that the receiving party has a certain amount of time to accept the payment, otherwise, the money is returned to the sender.

These styles of payments can help to eliminate the need for third party contracts via contracts that are established between two parties. Third parties that are often involved in contracts are lawyers, banks, etc. Lawyers are often required to draw up contracts, and banks are often required to help store money that is then transferred to the receiving party as stated in the contract.

With HTLC's, two parties can setup contracts and transfer money without the need for third party involvement.

5.2 How do Hash Time-Locked Contracts work?

The best way to describe this is the following example:

Marvin wants to pay Swen for 'X' via HTLC. Marvin sets up a specific hash which represents the amount of money that will be paid and an allotted time window in which Swen will be able to receive his funds. In order for Swen to receive the payment he will have to create cryptographic proof of payment, within the pre-defined time limit.

If Swen meets the deadline and procures the necessary proof required to release the funds, Swen is paid. However, if Swen fails to meet the deadline the money is returned to Marvin.

5.3 What are the benefits of HTLC's?

1. As previously mentioned, HTLC's eliminate the need for third party involvement when implementing a contract between two parties which in-turn also eliminates the need for third party trust.
2. Since these contracts are time sensitive, it prevents the person who is making the payment from having to wait indefinitely to find out whether or not his or her payment goes through. Also, it prevents money being wasted since if cryptographic acknowledgment is not obtained, funds are simply returned back to the sender.
3. Because cryptographic proof of payment is required, the recipient automatically helps validate the payment on the blockchain.
4. Since hash time-locked contracts are based on hashes, they are easily added to blockchains.
5. Each party is protected from counter-party risk due to the structure of these contracts. The parties involved in sending and receiving the payments do not have to trust each other or even know each other to make sure that the contract will be executed correctly.

5.4 What are the benefits of Atomic Swaps?

The primary benefit for users is the ability exchange/trade crypto(s) between involved parties in a trustless manner without depending on a third party or an escrow service thereby reducing default risk to zero.

Additionally, Atomic Swaps make the entire cryptocurrency ecosystem currency agnostic, effectively simplifying the process of switching between different crypto depending on said crypto(s) use case. For instance, if you wanted to switch from Digibyte (DGB) to Verge (XVG) (or vice-versa) to utilize the available features on our network (or another crypto(s) network) – the process would be instant and painless.

5.5 What are the limitations of on-chain Atomic Swaps?

With every implementation, there are certain limitations that come into play, for Atomic Swaps those limitations are as follows:

- Both currencies that are being exchanged must have the same hash algorithm.
- Since Verge supports Multiple algorithms, we are less limited than other currencies in this regard.
- Both currencies should support HTLC.
- Individuals need a certain level of programming capability to be able to use Atomic Swaps.
- Cross-chain Atomic Swaps are not possible for fiat currencies

Furthermore, this implementation not only allows for cross-chain transactions, but it also paves the way for future implementations such as the Lightning Network**.

***It is important to note that while we do not have plans to implement Lightning Network (LN) onto the Verge blockchain, understanding the concept of LN helps spread educational insights to interested parties. As such, the below segment about LN is strictly for educational content only.*

5.6 What is the Lightning Network?

The Lightning Network can be briefly described as:

1. A network of user-generated channels that send payments back and forth.
2. Secured by Smart Contract functionality.
3. Privatized in a trust-less fashion (trust-less means you don't need to trust or even know your counter-party).

Rather than transacting in a trusted fashion as you would normally do in a standard transaction, the Lightning Network transactions are completely trust-less. What this means is that since these styles of transactions operate on top of a multi-signature-based platform, participants remain anonymous and transactions are ensured to be secure due to Smart Contract capabilities.

6.0 Rootstock (RSK)

To understand the foundation of Rootstock [12] we must first understand what a Smart Contract is. A Smart Contract is a software application that operates on top of a blockchain that contains a set of mailable rules for which the participating parties to the Smart Contract agree to interact with each other. Smart Contracts facilitate, verify, and enforce the pre-defined rules to execute decentralized and autonomous transactions.

These contracts allow for more complex transactions to take place rather than simply exchanging digital tokens for a product or service. This means that the “buyer” and “seller” are both held accountable for the terms outlined in the Smart Contract and must uphold their respective ends of the deal to successfully transact between themselves.


The predefined transactional ruleset is formalized in a digital form which is then enforced and automatically executed by a computer or network of computers as soon as the parties have come to an agreement and met the conditions of the agreement which effectively removes third-party trust entirely.

In short:

Smart Contracts are self-verifying, self-executing, and tamper resistant and can turn legal obligations into automated processes while simultaneously reducing transactional cost and greatly increasing transactional security.



HOW A SMART CONTRACT WORKS



The above-mentioned Smart Contract functionality is currently present and functional on the Ethereum blockchain network and does not allow for interoperability on the Bitcoin or Bitcoin based networks. That being said let's look at Rootstock Smart Contracts and their benefits to the Verge (Bitcoin based) network.

Rootstock (RSK), is a two-way pegged sidechain that enables Ethereum style Turing-complete Virtual Machine infrastructure (i.e. Smart Contract functionality) onto Bitcoin based blockchains. A sidechain is an independent blockchain that is attached to the main chain using a two-way peg. The two-way peg allows for interchangeability of assets, in this case "SmartVerge" (SXVG) and Verge (XVG), at a predetermined rate between the main blockchain and the sidechain. With the addition of the RSK sidechain also comes the implementation of merged mining to support it. Merged mining allows a miner to mine for more than one blockchain at the same time effectively utilizing the hashing calculations they already contribute to fuel both chains. The RSK sidechain can be merged-mined with Verge, meaning that machines mining Verge don't have to use any additional power or resources to participate in securing and maintaining the RSK network. Miners are rewarded with transaction fees from the RSK network on top of the Verge that they already mine so long as they are participating in merged-mining. Merged-mining inherits the same security features of Verge in terms of double-spend prevention and settlement finality.

For a user to obtain SXVG they must first send their XVG coins to an output address where the coins become locked such that the user is unable to spend them elsewhere. Once the transaction has completed and confirmation has been obtained, the sidechain releases the equivalent number of SXVG coins to the user, allowing them to access and spend them on the sidechain.

It is important to note that during the interchange process, no new coins are minted, 1 SXVG will always equal 1 XVG and vice-versa.

Another added benefit of RSK is its ability to scale. RSK currently achieves 300 payment transactions per second, which is a huge progressive leap when compared to our current standing transaction rate; around 100 per second. The RSK development team has stated that the eventual goal is to push the bar even higher with future goals to support 20,000 transactions per second using a second layer technology called Lumino. As stated in the LCTP [whitepaper](#), the Lumino Network is an off-chain payment system that relies on a protocol known as the Lumino Transaction Compression Protocol. The LTCP can be compared to the Lightning Network, a scaling solution originally designed for Bitcoin that is currently being tested on Litecoin.

RSK functionality is going to enable developers outside of the Verge core development team to build exciting platforms and services on top of our network.

Some examples of those platforms could be:

- dApps (Decentralized Applications)
- Retail Payment Systems
- Escrow Services
- Asset Securitization
- Decentralized Remittances
- Micro-Lending Platforms
- Voting Systems

Additional use cases and information can be found in RSK's [whitepaper](#).

Disclaimer: *A "Smart Contract" is commonly defined in such legislation as an event-driven program or computerized transaction protocol that runs on a distributed, decentralized, shared and replicated ledger that executes a contract or any provision(s) of a contract by taking custody over and instructing transfer of assets on the ledger. As such, VERGE, the developers & core team members of VERGE cannot nor have the ability to modify or regain custody of funds that are placed into a Smart Contract.*

7.0 Ring confidential transactions

IMPORTANT NOTE: Ring Confidential transactions are still under development, the information contained in this segment is for the purpose of education. This document will be edited later to include more information as required regarding ring confidential transactions.

Before we can begin to dissect and understand the complex nature of Ring Confidential Transactions [3, 4, 5] we must first understand the fundamentals behind what a transaction is and the differences between each mechanical component.

The root of each Verge transaction is based on a sequence of immutable python objects, in list format, which cannot be changed; otherwise known as a nth-tuple. In this case the basic nth-tuple of a transaction is as follows:

$(\{a_i\}, \{b_i\}, \{v_i\})$ where $\{a_i\}$ are the input addresses, $\{b_i\}$ are the output addresses, and $\{v_i\}$ are the amounts that go to each output.

Every basic transaction made on the Verge blockchain comes across as unencrypted data for the entire world to see on our public ledger. While this is a good for merchant service platform integration, it is not ideal for people concerned about their privacy as these transactions are easy to trace regardless of how many times the coins change owners.

The Primary goal for confidential transactions is to ensure that only the participants of a transaction are privy to the values being sent back and forth while simultaneously hiding the values from the sight of the rest of the world. At the same time, however, we want non-participants to be able to tell when a transaction is bogus.

There are several core cryptographic concepts that need to be covered to be better able to understand how anonymity is maintained via confidential transaction while simultaneously being able to verify that the sum of outputs doesn't exceed the sum of the account contents of the input addresses.

7.1 Ring Signatures

To preface this segment, Ring Signatures are comprised by a series of complex mathematical equations and can easily be described as a dry and hard to comprehend topic. For the sake of keeping the pace of this paper on par, if you are interested in seeing the mathematical equations that are associated with Ring Signatures as well as a further deep dive into those materials, I will be listing those materials in the references segment of this paper [see references 4, 5, 14 & 28-31]. Otherwise the following is going to be a brief and to the point introduction to Ring Signatures and their benefit to Verge Currency.

In cryptography, a ring signature is a group based digital signature, like threshold signatures. Ring Signatures can be performed by any member of a group of users that each have keys. Therefore, a message signed with a ring signature is endorsed by someone in a group of people. A standard cryptographic signature proves the authenticity and integrity of a transaction from a single signer, think of this as the same way you might sign a check, identifying that you approve an expenditure. For group signatures, instead of showing that a transaction is approved by a single signer, Ring Signatures allow anyone in a fixed group to sign a transaction. It is worth noting that while it only takes one person out of a fixed group of participants to sign a transaction, this scheme does not expose which member of the group signed. The exact number of participants in a ring signature group is determined by the ring size. Ring size effectively determines the anonymity set for a signature. The larger the ring size (number of participants) the harder it is for someone to de-anonymize the transaction.

To give an example of Ring Signatures and ring size:

Marvin wants to send a transaction to Swen with a ring signature size of 4. This means that there is a total of 4 participants in that group, of which Marvin and Swen make up half of the possible participants. While this transaction is in fact anonymized, the small number of participants weakens the anonymity guarantees of the network. Conversely, Marvin wants to send another transaction to Swen but instead of having a ring size of 4, the ring size is now 30. This would indicate that there are 28 other group members there by vastly increasing the anonymity guarantee associated with initializing a ring signature-based transaction.

To summarize, Ring Signatures obscure the linkage between sender and recipient but do not obscure the amount sent during the transactions. Even though values are not obscured there is no way an outside observer can differentiate which of the members in a signature group is the original signer of a transaction, therefore one of the primary security properties of a ring signature is that it should be computationally infeasible to determine which of the group members' keys was used to produce a signature.

7.2 Pedersen Commitment

One of the basic tools that confidential transactions based upon is something called a Pedersen commitment which is a cryptographic algorithm that allows a prover to commit a certain value without revealing it or being able to change it. As explained by Gregory Maxwell [5], Pedersen commitments are a commitment scheme that allows you to keep a piece of data secret (value of the transaction) but commit to it so that you cannot change it later.

For Example:

Marvin has an output value of 30 XVG and wants to send 15 to Swen, since outputs can't be spent twice Marvin needs to spend the output in its entirety and return the 'change' to himself. Marvin's transaction has one input of 30 XVG and two outputs, 15 XVG for the actual transaction designated for Swen and 15 XVG returned to Marvin as 'change' from the transaction.

To prove that the Verge has not been fraudulently fabricated in the transaction, the sum of a transaction's inputs must equal the sum of the transaction's outputs. Pedersen commitments enable you to send Verge without publicly disclosing the amount sent by sending a specific data segment to the network which makes it possible for miners to verify that transaction. It is worth noting that the information segment that is broadcast across the network is a long chain of random numbers with no significant data points that would lead an outsider to be able to determine the value of how much Verge was sent during the transaction.

7.3 Range Proofs

Before we can understand what a Range Proof [28, 29, 30, 31] is, let's briefly review the concept of a zero-knowledge proof. A zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) is a method by which person A can prove to person B that they know a value X, without revealing or stating any information except for the fact that they know the value X.

To simplify, A Range Proof is a zero-knowledge proof that serves as a form of commitment validation that allows anyone to verify that a commitment represents an amount within a specified range, without revealing anything else about its value (known as a secret value).

For example, when Marvin sends Swen an amount of Verge ranging between 10,000 to 100,000, a simple range proof can be used to validate the amount sent without revealing the actual amount publicly.

This concept has important ramifications for the validation of confidential transactions as it is used to verify that a payment amount is positive without revealing the amount transferred in a transaction. Furthermore, in a transaction output-based system, it proves that the committed inputs are greater than the sum of the committed outputs without revealing either the committed inputs or outputs.

It's important to note that all modern implementations of confidential transactions use range proofs over committed values, where the proof size is linear in n . Additionally, note that this technology is not specific to Verge.

Conclusion

Verge was created to bring tailored transactional applications and inherent privacy implementations to strengthen user obfuscation while maintaining Nakamoto's vision of a decentralized electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of third-party trust.

Whether simple, stealth, or anon, all transactions are cryptographically secured and proven on our publicly facing blockchain. Verge is completely User-controlled and decentralized which insures that at no point in time is your transactional meta-data going to be shared or sold to independent 3rd party corporations. When you make a purchase with Verge, your personal privacy is kept safe.

One of the key points behind Satoshi Nakamoto's original vision was to provide a solution that defied the standard convention: a cryptographically secure digital currency that can be trusted because it is trustless, a pure P2P version of e-currency that allows online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Through an unfortunate series of events as well as progressive financial institution adoption, the core values of Bitcoin are slowly dissipating as the currency becomes more centralized and controlled. One of the primary factors that influence the centralization of Bitcoin is its limited circulating supply. Bitcoin has a predefined cap of 21MM coins that will ever be in circulation with today's circulating supply being around 17.5MM coins.

Limited supply as well as a progressively increasing demand from mainstream channels such as financial institutions like JPMorgan and various other forms of large-scale investors ultimately contribute to the centralization of something that was meant to be decentralized. Verge solves this issue by having an overall supply cap of 16.555B coins. Our large

We seldom realize the value of something until it has been lost. We want our lives to be our own and to determine for ourselves what we want to do with them, the desire to pursue personal interest without compromise. What most people don't realize is that the pursuit of these external interests opens us up to vulnerabilities in the public space.

-CR

endgame circulating supply and widespread distribution will keep Verge decentralized. As the overall value of Verge increases over time there will be a further distribution of wealth amongst token holders further increasing the overall level of decentralization; Nakamoto's original vision.



References

- [1] Bitcoin - Open Source P2P Money [online] Available at: <https://bitcoin.org/>
- [2] Nakamoto, S. (2009). Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System. [online] Available at: <https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf>
- [3] Adam Bender, Jonathan Katz, & Ruggero Morselli, (2005). Ring Signatures: Stronger Definitions, and Constructions without Random Oracles. [online] Available at: <https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/304.pdf>
- [4] Gregory Maxwell, Andrew Poelstra. (2015). Borromean Ring Signatures. [online] Available at: https://github.com/Blockstream/borromean_paper/blob/master/borromean_draft_0.01_9ade1e49.pdf
- [5] Gregory Maxwell. (2016). Confidential Transaction, the Initial Investigation. [online] Available at: <https://elementsproject.org/elements/confidential-transactions/investigation.html>
- [6] Anonymity and the Block Chain • IHB News™. (2014, November 18). [online] Available at: <https://ihb.io/2014-11-17/news/anonymity-block-chain-13570>
- [7] Distributed hash table. (n.d.). [online] Available at: http://infoanarchy.org/Distributed_hash_table
- [8] Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E., & Halderman, J. (2013). ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications[online] Available at: <https://zmap.io/paper.pdf>
- [9] Gribble, S., Brewer, E., Hellerstein, J., & Culler, D. (2000, October 23). Scalable, Distributed Data Structures for Internet Service Construction. [online] Available at: https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/osdi2000/full_papers/gribble/gribble_html/index.html
- [10] Holden, E. (2017, July 18). An Introduction to Tor vs I2P. [online] Available at: <https://www.ipvpn.net/privacy-guides/an-introduction-to-tor-vs-i2p>
- [11] I2P: A scalable framework for anonymous communication - I2P. (n.d.). [online] Available at: [online] Available at: <https://geti2p.net/en/docs/how/tech-intro>
- [12] Lerner, S. (2015) RSK White paper overview – [online] Available at: https://docs.rsk.co/RSK_White_Paper-Overview.pdf
- [13] Masayuki Abe, Miyako Ohkubo, & Koutarou Suzuki. (2002) 1-out-of-n Signatures from a Variety of Keys. [online] Available at: <https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=717163>
- [14] Michael Rosenberg, (2017). Confidential Transactions from Basic Principles. [online] Available at: <https://cryptoservices.github.io/cryptography/2017/07/21/Sigs.html>

- [15] Multisignature - Bitcoin Wiki. (n.d.). [online] Available at: <https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Multisignature>
- [16] Scharr, J. (2013, October 23). What Is Tor - How Does Tor Work - How to Use Tor. [online] Available at: <https://www.tomsguide.com/us/what-is-tor-faq,news-17754.html>
- [17] Shoup, V. (2000). Practical Threshold Signatures. [online] Available at: <https://www.iacr.org/archive/eurocrypt2000/1807/18070209-new.pdf>
- [18] Sompolinsky, Y., Zohar, A. Secure High-Rate Transaction Processing in Bitcoin. [online] Available at: <https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/881.pdf>
- [19] SPV, Simplified Payment Verification - Bitcoin Glossary. [online] Available at: <https://bitcoin.org/en/glossary/simplified-payment-verification>
- [20] Voegtlin, T. (2015). Simple Payment Verification — Electrum 2.5 documentation. Retrieved from <http://docs.electrum.org/en/latest/spv.html>
- [21] Voegtlin, T. (n.d.). Welcome to the Electrum Documentation! — Electrum 2.5 documentation. Retrieved August 8, 2017, from <http://docs.electrum.org/en/latest/>
- [22] Bitcoin.org. Some things you need to know - Bitcoin. [online] Available at: <https://bitcoin.org/en/you-need-to-know>
- [23] Elementsproject.org. Confidential Transactions. [online] Available at: <https://elementsproject.org/features/confidential-transactions>
- [24] Khatwani, S. (2018). What Is Atomic Swap and Why It Matters? [Must Know]. [online] CoinSutra - Bitcoin Community. Available at: <https://coinsutra.com/atomic-swap/>
- [25] Blockonomi. What Are Atomic Swaps? Our Guide to a Revolution in Decentralization. [online] Available at: <https://blockonomi.com/atomic-swaps/>
- [26] Van Der Hoeff, M. (2018). Atomic Swaps Simply Explained: How to Swap Cryptocurrencies without a Middleman. [online] Hacker Noon. Available at: <https://hackernoon.com/atomic-swaps-simply-explained-how-to-swap-cryptocurrencies-without-a-middleman-6cd29680c32e>
- [27] Secp256k1 -[online] Available at: <https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Secp256k1>
- [28] Curran, B. "What Are Bullet Proofs? Guide to Confidential Cryptocurrency Transactions." *Blockonomi*, 28 June 2018, https://blockonomi.com/bullet-proofs/#Range_Proofs

[29] Chaabouni, R., Lipmaa, H., Shelat, A.: Additive combinatorics and discrete logarithm based range protocols. In: Steinfeld, R., Hawkes, P. (eds.) ACISP 2010. LNCS, vol. 6168, pp. 336–351. Springer, Heidelberg (2010). [online] Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14081-5_21

[30] Bender, A., Katz, J., Morselli, R.: Ring Signatures: stronger definitions, and constructions without random oracles. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/304 (2005). [online] Available at: <http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/304>

[31] Boudot, F.: Efficient proofs that a committed number lies in an interval. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 431–444. Springer, Heidelberg (2000). [online] Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45539-6_31

Personal Note

Dear Reader,

I wanted to take a moment to say thank you for reading this document. It is important to note that this document is ever-changing and evolving based on the specifications of our project. With that in mind this document is to serve as educational materials in hopes to help everyone understand a little bit more about how Verge & Crypto functions. I do genuinely hope this has helped you learn something new and I appreciate you taking the time out of your life to read something I take great pride in working on.

I really hope you've all enjoyed reading the revisions that have come out thus far, I look forward to bringing you more content in the future.

Thanks for reading,

C.R