
BORDER SECURITY

EN.600.444/644

Fall 2019


Dr. Seth James Nielson

"SPACES"



"Space" is not a technical term.

I use it to represent the concept of separation



MACRO PHYSICAL SPACES





MICRO PHYSICAL SPACES



WHY DO WE SEPARATE PHYSICAL THINGS?

CONTEXT

- Countries have different
 - Social Models
 - Legal Frameworks
 - Rights and Responsibilities
- Binders, bins, and office "spaces"
 - Importance
 - Meaning

ACCESS



Most physical spaces try to control the flow from one space to another


CYBER SPACES

- Often tied to a physical space and/or organization
 - All the people, equipment, data, etc. belonging to an entity
 - For example, a corporate network
- But there are far more conceptual spaces
 - Media piracy
 - Hacking communities
- Everything inbetween

LAN'S AS NATURAL SPACES

- LAN's have historically creates cyber spaces very naturally
- Typically tied to an entity, the LAN is
 - Hosted by the entity in physical space
 - Provides resources on behalf of the entity in cyber space
- Access is typically limited to individuals with physical relationships to the entity
 - Insiders typically have increased access to resources across the LAN
 - Outsiders typically have limited access to published resources on specific servers


LAN'S CREATE "BORDERS" ON THE INTERNET




GATEWAYS: NATURAL BARRIERS

- Data can only get into a LAN via router
- We call the routers at the "edges" of a LAN gateways
- Gateways are, therefore, natural chokepoints for data

GATEWAYS: SPACE TRANSITION





CONTEXT IS EVERYTHING

- Security is all about <u>context</u> (REPEAT AFTER ME!)
- Security has no meaning without context
- What is secure within one context may not be within another
- Data on different networks is assumed to have a different contexts.
- It is reasonable and natural to examine data transitioning context

GATEWAYS: CONTEXT CHANGE



FIREWALL: GATEWAY SECURITY

- What is a "firewall"?
- Informally, it's security within a network connector, such as a gateway

FIREWALL MARKETING

- If you read marketing, it's Super Man.
 - Juniper: "control over applications, users, and content to stop advanced cyber-threats"
 - PAN: "Instantly find and stop attacks with a fully automated platform"
 - Cisco: "Prevent breaches, get deep visibility to detect and stop threats fast"

IGNORE MARKETING. THINK ENGINEERING

Ross Anderson proposed a framework for <u>Security Engineering</u>

Policy: <u>WHAT</u> you're supposed to achieve

Mechanism: <u>HOW</u> you're supposed to achieve it

• Assurance: **RELIABILITY** of the mechanism

• Incentives: **MOTIVES** of defenders and attackers

CORE CONCEPTS: POLICY AND MECHANISM

- This is not a security engineering class
- But we will use it to help us frame how we look at security
- PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO POLICY vs. MECHANISM
 - Policy is WHAT you want
 - Mechanism is HOW you do it
- Most "Policy" you see elsewhere, including CISSP, certifications, is different

EXAMPLE: TLS

- What is the <u>POLICY?</u>
 - Authentication: a party can claim an identity ONLY if they're authorized to do so
 - Confidentiality: only authorized parties can READ the communications
- What is the <u>MECHANISM?</u>
 - Authentication is enforced by certificates, signatures, and trusted authorities
 - Confidentiality is enforced by encryption
- ENCRYPTION IS MECHANISM NOT POLICY

FIREWALLS: POLICY AND MECHANISM

- Firewalls are MECHANISMS for enforcing certain network security POLICIES
 - Borders are natural places to want a policy
 - Borders are also, conveniently, an easy place to enforce some policies
 - BUT DON'T CONFUSE THE TWO!

"SECURITY" IS A MEANINGLESS WORD

- Firewalls, like every other mechanism, don't "create security"
- Consider the marketing descriptions
 - What is a "threat"?
 - What does it mean to "block"?
 - What is an "attack"?
- As a security professional, how would you even evaluate these claims?

ENFORCING POLICY

- Firewalls are ONLY useful to the extent they can enforce a policy
- Corollary: Policies come BEFORE firewalls
- What security policies might you like to have?
 - Example 1: No malware can enter the network
 - Example 2: No unauthorized external network services
 - Example 3: External network services accessible only by authorized users
- Once you have a policy, you can start looking for enforcement mechanisms.


COMMON POLICIES: ACCESS CONTROL

- Policy #I: Only authorized LAN services are accessible outside the LAN
- Policy #2: Only authorized users from outside the LAN can access LAN resources
- Policy #3: Only authorized users on the LAN can access authorized services outside the LAN

EARLY FIREWALLS: LAYER-3 MECHANISMS

- The first firewalls were LAYER 3 (IP level)
- Layer-3 filtering can partially enforce all three policies:
 - Policy #I by blocking access to computers without authorized services
 - Policy #2 by blocking access from computers without authorized IP's
 - Policy #3 by blocking outbound requests to unauthorized IP's

HOW DOES LAYER-3 ENFORCEMENT WORK?



LAYER-4 FIREWALL (PACKET FILTER ONLY)


- Firewall developers quickly realized that IP-layer info was insufficient
- Examining TCP packets made it policy enforcement better
 - TCP ports typically represented a specific service
- Policy enforcement mechanism improvements:
 - Policy #1 by blocking access to ports not related to required services
 - Policy #3 by blocking outbound requests to unauthorized IP's or ports.

LAYER-4 FIREWALL (STATEFUL)

- In addition to examining ports, layer-4 packets also reveal connection state
- Some malicious packets violate TCP session rules, for example
- Layer-4 firewalls could also keep track of TCP sessions
- Better enforcement mechanism improvements:
 - Out-of-session packets almost certainly represent a violation of all three policies
 - Servers should not START an out-bound connection


LAYER-4 STILL LAYER-3 ROUTING

- Important.
- Just because a router is doing L3 routing doesn't mean it cant look at L4 data



Router/Firewall can examine <u>any</u> data, not just data used for routing

YOU CAN ALSO HAVE AN L2 FIREWALL



Firewalls can go here too!

In this case, L2 refers to the routing, not the inspection!

LAYER 2 FIREWALLS

- Might be better for enforcing different policies
 - Insider threat policies
 - Different types of devices on the same LAN (e.g., wireless, wired)
- Have some neat defensive properties
 - If only a switch, HAS NO IP ADDRESS!!! HARDER TO ATTACK!!!
 - Called "bump in the wire"

L7 FIREWALLS

- Probably to confuse you personally, L7 refers to the inspection, not the routing
- L7 firewalls examine application data
- Even more "stateful"

EARLY MOTIVATIONS FOR L7

- Application firewalls go back to 1991!!
- The idea was simple: Firewalls should understand application traffic.
- Example: FTP
 - FTP has a control channel and a bulk data channel
 - To transfer a file, a new port is opened dynamically, and communicated over control
 - Even if FTP's control channel port is open, how do you open the dynamic port?

NON FTP AWARE FIREWALL



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Connect to FTP Server on port 21





Connect to 9210




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FTP AWARE FIREWALL



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TRACKING USERS

- Since the early 90's, many firewalls also supported their own services
- Users could connect to the firewall as a server and, for example, log-in
- The logging-in process could map a
 - user-name to an IP address
 - Or even a point-to-point protocol with encryption (or VPN)
- Combined with application scanning, far more granular policies enforced

L7+USER POLICY ENFORCEMENT

- Policy #2: Only authorized users from outside the LAN can access LAN resources
- Policy #3: Only authorized users on the LAN can access authorized services outside the LAN
- LAN resources can now be application specific!
 - User X can only download on FTP
 - User Y can upload or download on FTP

MORE MOTIVATION FOR L7

- In the past decade, need for L7 scanning has increased
- Consider policy #I controlling which services are available
- Without L7, this can only be enforced by monitoring ports.
- What stops a bad person from using an unconventional port number?
- With L7 scanning, can verify the type of traffic

TUNNELS

- In the arms race, bad actors wrap one kind of traffic in another
- Unsurprisingly, HTTP is popular
- Modern firewalls can unpack the tunnel to see what's inside.
- One exception: encrypted tunnels (TLS/SSH)
- Can't see inside without "visibility" (we'll discuss later)

IDS: MITIGATION AND FUTURE PREVENTION

- IDS stands for Intrusion Detection System
- IPS is Intrusion Prevention System
- IDS is far more common because IPS is just too hard (false positive and false negatives)
- IDS assumes the attacker has already won
 - The attacker has already succeeded in his objective and left (forensics)
 - The attacker is in the system, but still moving toward a higher target (mitigation)

SIGNS OF BAD BEHAVIOR

- Anomalies: unusual network traffic
 - Port scanning (recon)
 - Unusually large data transmissions (buffer overflow, etc)
 - Unexpected traffic between machines
- Surprisingly, this is still very much signature based
- Various products have attempted to do statistics modeling but usually too noisy

IDS TYPES

- Network Based IDS (NIDS)
 - Monitor traffic on the network (often using the gateways/routers)
- Host Based IDS (HIDS)
 - Monitor traffic received at a host, and the effect thereof
 - Sometimes helpful in simply monitoring the encrypted traffic
- Hybrid systems
 - Deploy host components and network componets
 - Report all data back to a central server/dashboard

HONEYPOTS

- An interesting IDS component
- Create a fake system to draw attacker attention
- Introduces components whose entire operation is an anomaly

TYPES OF HONEYPOTS

- Low Interaction port only, record traffic
 - Purpose: logging
- Medium Interaction simulated/emulated service
 - Purpose: delay/confuse
- High Interaction real services on real computers with real operating systems
 - Purpose: maximum analysis of attacker behavior
- Honeynet multiple honeypots working together
- Specialized variants:
 - Malware Honeypots
 - Spam Honeypots


DEPLOYING HONEYPOTS

- Now part of larger "Enterprise Deception Operations" initiatives
- Which type of honeypot makes the most sense?
 - Perhaps counter-intuitively, "low interaction" for corporate
 - "high interaction" for research
 - In the corporate world, may be related to SLA (reaction time, not detail matters)
- But all of this should come back to the security policy, should it not?

IDS AND SECURITY POLICY

- What policy does IDS (including honeypot) enforce?
- For many (all?) ideal policies, none. The attacker has already violated a policy.
- Perhaps you could think of it as a meta-level policy (policies about policies)
- Or, you could think about it as "enforcement-after-the-fact"
 - That is, how quickly can we get back to compliance?

NETWORK ARCHITECTURE: DMZ



POLICY ENFORCEMENT

THE FUTURE

- Later, we'll talk about ZERO TRUST NETWORKS
- Many believe that the "Firewall is Dead", "DMZ's are Dead", etc
- I doubt that they die, but we'll talk later about how they're no longer enough