

TLS VISIBILITY

CS 361S


Spring 2020

Seth James Nielson


The background of the slide is a dark, high-contrast image. On the left side, there is a close-up of a combination lock with several dials showing numbers. To the right and below the lock, there is a blurred image of a circuit board with various electronic components and traces. The overall tone is dark and technical.

TLS VISIBILITY































- TLS is designed to provide END-TO-END “security”
- MITM should NOT be able to read/modify/forgo data
- TLS Visibility “breaks” this for “authorized” purposes




TLS 1.2 HANDSHAKE




TLS 1.2 HANDSHAKE REVIEW

Step	Client	Direction	Message	Direction	Server
1			Client Hello		
2			Server Hello		
3			Certificate		
4			Server Key Exchange		
5			Server Hello Done		
6			Client Key Exchange		
7			Change Cipher Spec		
8			Finished		
9			Change Cipher Spec		
10			Finished		

END-TO-END HANDSHAKE VISUALIZATION #2



AUTHENTICATION



The “Certificate” message includes ONE OR MORE certificates.

CERTIFICATE VERIFICATION

WEB
BROWSER

Verify “amazon.com” is the URL
Verify the validity period
(Other Verification)
Who issued the cert?

CERTIFICATE

Subject CN: amazon.com
Not Valid Before: 2001
Not Valid After: 2030
Issued By: amazon CA
Signature Blob: <sig>

CERTIFICATE CHAINS

The certificate for the Host may be signed by an INTERMEDIATE Certificate Authority

Because the web browser probably doesn't have this intermediate cert, the TLS handshake includes both certificates.

Subject CN: amazon CA
...
Issued By: GlobalSign
Signature Blob: <sig>

Subject CN: amazon.com
...
Issued By: amazon CA
Signature Blob: <sig>

ROOT CA CERTIFICATES

Certificate chains MUST
have a ROOT



A Root Certificate is SELF
SIGNED



Browsers trust a set of root
certificates
AXIOMATICALLY



Certificate chains must have
a trust chain to one of these
roots.

TRUSTING DIFFIE HELLMAN

Recall that DH keys are EPHEMERAL

The Server's cert includes a long-term public key

The Server's DH key is signed by this key pair

IF the client trusts the cert, THEN it can validate the DH key

TLS BULK TRANSPORT

Both Client
and Server
derive keys

Encryption
keys AND
MAC keys

MAC's ensure
continuous
authentication

WHEN A TLS
MESSAGE IS
RECEIVED:

The sender is “proved” by
the MAC

The MAC is “proved” via
MAC key derived from DH

Server’s DH key “proved”
authentic by cert signature

Certificate “proved”
authentic by chain to trusted
root

IT ALL DEPENDS ON THE CERT

IF a browser trusts
MY certificate to be
Amazon's certificate

- THEN the browser
will trust my DH
public key

IF the browser trusts
my DH public key

- THEN the browser
will derive the same
MAC key I do


IF the browser
derives the same
MAC key I do

- THEN the browser
will believe my
messages are from
Amazon

TLS VISIBILITY

- Typically, a browser/client **MUST** have a new root CA installed
- This root CA is a self-signed certificate from the Visibility appliance
- The appliance can now generate **ANY** cert and the browser believes it!
- We will discuss the huge security concerns in a later lecture

TLS VISIBILITY HANDSHAKE VISUALIZATION



YOUR LAB:

