The Great Escape? A Quantitative Evaluation of the Fed's Liquidity Facilities

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1 Background

Approach of Kiyotaki and Moore (KM2001): Real business cycles model + limited commitment

present goods

resell \(\scirc \claim \) claim to future goods

new lenders

How much can the original lender enforce the borrower to repay? → borrowing constraint

How much can new lenders enforce the borrower to repay? \rightarrow resaleability constraint

KM (2008): Run on shadow banking \approx Fall in resaleability of private papers

flight to liquidity

interest-rate spread between liquid and illiquid papers expands

central bank should buy partially illiquid private papers, or lend against them


Presented KM revised at NY Fed in May 2008 \rightarrow "That is what we are doing!"

Del Negro, Eggertssson and Ferrero (DEF) start calibrating KM $2008 \rightarrow Does not work quite$

Crisis deepened after Lehman collapse in September 2008

Federal Fund rate collapsed to zero in December 2008

"Reduce the spreads!": Fed purchased and lend against private papers



Joined DEF in summer 2009

introduce wage and price stickiness \rightarrow consumption and investment move together

liquid asset is treasury securities instead of money \rightarrow can adjust interest rate

nominal interest rate on treasury cannot be negative

2 Model

homogeneous output Y_t , capital K_t and treasury bills B_t with nominal gross interest rate $R_t \geq 1$ in each period

each household consists of [0,1] continuum of members, each member receives iid draw to become an entrepreneur with probability \varkappa , or a worker $wp.~1-\varkappa$

$$E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} eta^{s-t} \left[rac{C_s^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} - rac{\omega}{1+
u} \int_{arkappa}^1 H_s\left(j
ight)^{1+
u} dj
ight],$$

investing member issues equity to finance investment

At the beginning of period

balance sheet at the start of period		
nominal bond: B_t/P_t	own equity issued: $q_t N_t^I$	
equity of others: $q_t N_t^O$		
own capital stock: $q_t K_t$	net worth: $q_t N_t + B_t/P_t$	

Net equity

$$N_t = N_t^O + K_t - N_t^I$$

During the period flow-of-funds of each household member j

$$C_{t}(j) + p_{t}^{I}I_{t}(j) + q_{t}\left[N_{t+1}(j) - I_{t}(j)\right] + \frac{B_{t+1}(j)}{P_{t}}$$

$$= \left[r_{t}^{k} + (1-\delta)q_{t}\right]N_{t} + \frac{R_{t-1}B_{t}}{P_{t}} + \frac{W_{t}(j)}{P_{t}}H_{t}(j) + D_{t} + D_{t}^{I} - \tau_{t}$$

Borrowing Constraint: an investing member can issue new equity at most θ fraction of his investment

Resaleability Constraint: in each period, an agent can resell at most ϕ_t fraction of his equity holdings

$$N_{t+1}(j) \geq (1- heta)I_t(j) + (1-\phi_t)(1-\delta)N_t$$
 $B_{t+1}(j) \geq 0$

If Tobin's q is larger than 1, $q_t > p_t^I$, entrepreneurs use all the liquidity to invest

$$I_t = \varkappa rac{\left[r_t^k + (1 - \delta)\phi_t q_t\right] N_t + rac{R_{t-1}B_t}{P_t} + D_t + D_t^I - au_t}{p_t^I - \theta q_t}$$

Each worker supplies differentiated labor according to the demand, buys consumption goods and chooses portfolio

$$C_{t}^{-\sigma}$$

$$= \beta E_{t} C_{t+1}^{-\sigma} \left[\frac{R_{t}}{\pi_{t+1}} + \frac{\varkappa(q_{t+1} - p_{t+1}^{I})}{p_{t+1}^{I} - \theta q_{t+1}} \cdot \frac{R_{t}}{\pi_{t+1}} \right]$$

$$= \beta E_{t} C_{t+1}^{-\sigma} \cdot \left[\frac{r_{t+1}^{k} + (1-\delta)q_{t+1}}{q_{t}} + \frac{\varkappa(q_{t+1} - p_{t+1}^{I})}{p_{t+1}^{I} - \theta q_{t+1}} \cdot \frac{r_{t+1}^{k} + (1-\delta)\phi_{t+1}q_{t+1}}{q_{t}} \right]$$

At the end of period, all member get together to consume and shares the assets $C_t = \int_{\varkappa}^1 C_t(j) \, dj$.

Final goods are produced from intermediate goods

$$Y_t = \left(\int_0^1 Y_{it}^{rac{1}{1+\lambda_f}} di
ight)^{1+\lambda_f}$$

Intermediate goods producer sets the price of its product according to Calvo rule and uses capital and labor to accommodate the demand under monopolistic competition

$$Y_{it} = A_t K_{it}^{\gamma} H_{it}^{1-\gamma}, \ Y_{it} = \left(\frac{P_{it}}{P_t}\right)^{-\frac{1+\lambda_f}{\lambda_f}} Y_t$$

Labor union sets the wage of its differentiated labor according to Calvo rule and accommodates the demand

Capital goods producer choose its output under perfect competition

Gov't sets interest rate, purchases private paper and taxes

$$R_t = \max\left\{R\pi_t^{\psi_\pi}, \mathbf{1}\right\}$$

$$\frac{N_{t+1}^g}{K} = \psi_k \frac{\phi_t - \phi}{\phi}, \text{ where } \psi_k < \mathbf{0}$$

$$q_{t}N_{t+1}^{g} + \frac{R_{t-1}B_{t}}{P_{t}} = \tau_{t} + \left[r_{t}^{k} + (1-\delta)q_{t}\right]N_{t}^{g} + \frac{B_{t+1}}{P_{t}}$$

$$\tau_{t} - \tau = \psi_{\tau} \left[\frac{R_{t-1}B_{t}}{P_{t}} - \frac{RB}{P} - q_{t}N_{t}^{g}\right]$$

Market clears

$$Y_t = C_t + \left[1 + S\left(\frac{I_t}{I}\right)\right] I_t$$

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta) K_t + I_t$$

$$= N_{t+1} + N_{t+1}^g$$




Table 1: Calibration

		1a	DIC 1. Campration
β	= 0.99		Discount factor
σ	= 1		Relative risk aversion
δ	= 0.025		Depreciation rate
γ	= 0.40		Capital share
S''(1)	= 1		Adjustment cost parameter
ν	= 1		Inverse Frisch elasticity
ψ	= 1.5		Taylor rule coefficient
$\zeta_p = \zeta_w$	= 0.75		Price/wage Calvo probability
$\lambda_p = \lambda_p$	= 0.1		Price/wage steady-state markup
\varkappa	= 0.05		Probability of investment opportunity
ϕ	= 0.19		Resaleability constraint
θ	= 0.19		Borrowing constraint
L	= 0.40		Steady-state liquidity/GDP $$
$\xi_{ au}$	= 0.1		Transfer rule coefficient
	Baseline G	reat Escape	
$\hat{\phi}_L$	= -0.600	-0.295	Size of the liquidity shock
ζ_{ZB}	= 0.167	0.100	Probability of exiting the crisis state
ξ_k	= -0.063	-0.127	Government intervention coefficient

