Detection and Mitigation of Corrupted Information in Distributed Model Predictive Control Based on Resource Allocation

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https://git.io/JEFGW

Algorithm 1: Secure DMPC.

```
Detection Phase:
   h := 0
   repeat
        Coordinator sets random \theta_{i}^{(h+1)}
        Subsystems solve (??), and send \lambda_i^{\star}(\theta^{(h)})
        Coordinator estimates \widehat{P}_i(k)^{(h)} and \widehat{\mathbf{s}}_i(k)^{(h)}
        h := h + 1
   until ||n^h - n^{h-1}|| < \epsilon
   Coordinator computes d_i using (??)
Negotiation Phase:
   Coordinator initializes \theta^{(0)}
   p := 0
   repeat
        Subsystems solve (??), and send \lambda_i^{\star}(\theta^{(p)})
         Coordinator updates allocation (??) using adequate versions of \lambda_i for each
         agent: \lambda_i^*(\boldsymbol{\theta}^{(p)}), if d_i = 0 and \lambda_{irec}, if d_i = 1
       p := p + 1
   until \|\boldsymbol{\theta}^{(p)} - \boldsymbol{\theta}^{(p-1)}\| < \epsilon
```






Figure: Scheme of DMPC using a coordinator and M agents.



Algorithm 2: Quantity decomposition based DMPC.

```
Coordinator initializes \boldsymbol{\theta}^{(0)} p := 0 repeat Subsystems solve (??), and send \boldsymbol{\lambda}_i^{\star}(\boldsymbol{\theta}^{(p)}) Coordinator updates allocations (??) p := p + 1 until \|\boldsymbol{\theta}^{(p)} - \boldsymbol{\theta}^{(p-1)}\| \le \epsilon
```



Outline

Motivation

The Basic Problem That We Studied Previous Work

② Our Results/Contribution Main Results

Basic Ideas for Proofs/Implementation



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Make Titles Informative. Use Uppercase Letters. Subtitles are optional.

- Use itemize a lot.
- Use very short sentences or short phrases.



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- using the pause command:
 - First item.
 - Second item.
- using overlay specifications:
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 - Second item.
- using the general uncover command:
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 - Second item.



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- Resource allocation based DMPC is vulnerable to attacks.
- Sub-problems structure has time invariant parameters.
- Attack can be estimated using these parameters.

- Outlook
 - Inequality Constraints yield Hybrid behavior
 - Non-linear attack model



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For Further Reading I



J. M. Maestre, R. R. Negenborn et al. Distributed Model Predictive Control made easy. Springer, 2014, vol. 69.



P. Velarde, J. M. Maestre, H. Ishii, and R. R. Negenborn. "Scenario-based defense mechanism for distributed model predictive control." 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, Dec 2017. pp. 6171–6176.



S. Someone.

On this and that.

Journal of This and That, 2(1):50-100, 2000.



Questions?

Repository https://github.com/Accacio/SysTol-21



Contact rafael-accacio.nogueira@centralesupelec.fr

