

Security of distributed Model Predictive Control under False Data Injection

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Seminar

École Centrale de Lyon / Laboratoire Ampère

26/05/2023 @ Écully



<https://bit.ly/3g3S6X4>

Rafael Accácio Nogueira

Postdoctoral researcher at LAAS/CNRS

*Garanteed relative localisation and anticollision
scenario for autonomous vehicles*

Project AutOCampus (GIS neOCampus)

Advised by Soheib Fergani



Bachelor Thesis at Escola Politécnica/UFRJ



Identification of DES for fault-diagnosis

Advised by Marcos Vicente de Brito Moreira


Politécnica
UFRJ



UFRJ
UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL
DO RIO DE JANEIRO



Doctoral Thesis at CentraleSupélec/IETR
Security of dMPC under False Data Injection
Advised by Hervé Guéguen and Romain Bourdais



Multiple systems interacting



Context

Smart(er) Cities

Multiple systems interacting



Multiple systems interacting



- Distribution:

Multiple systems interacting



- Distribution:
 - Electricity

Multiple systems interacting



- Distribution:
 - Electricity
 - Heat
 - Water

Multiple systems interacting



- Distribution:
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 - Heat
 - Water
- Traffic

Multiple systems interacting



- Distribution:
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- ...

Multiple systems interacting under



- Technical/Comfort Constraints

Context

Smart(er) Cities

Multiple systems interacting under



- Technical/Comfort Constraints
- We also want

Multiple systems interacting under



- Technical/Comfort Constraints
- We also want
 - Minimize consumption

Multiple systems interacting under



- Technical/Comfort Constraints
- We also want
 - Minimize consumption
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 - Follow a trajectory

Multiple systems interacting under



- Technical/Comfort Constraints
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- Solution \rightarrow MPC

Model-based Predictive Control

Brief recap

Model-based Predictive Control

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Find best control sequence using predictions based on a model.

Model-based Predictive Control

Brief recap

Find **best** control sequence using predictions based on a model.

Model-based Predictive Control

Brief recap

Find optimal control sequence using predictions based on a model.

Model-based Predictive Control

Brief recap

Find optimal control sequence using predictions based on a model.

- We need an optimization problem

minimize
 $\mathbf{u}[0:N-1|k]$

$$J(\mathbf{x}[0|k], \mathbf{u}[0 : N - 1|k])$$

Model-based Predictive Control

Brief recap

Find optimal control sequence using predictions based on a model.

- We need an optimization problem
 - Decision variable is the control sequence

minimize
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$$J(\mathbf{x}[0|k], \mathbf{u}[0 : N - 1|k])$$

Model-based Predictive Control

Brief recap

Find optimal control sequence using predictions based on a model.

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 - Decision variable is the control sequence calculated over horizon N

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Model-based Predictive Control

Brief recap

Find optimal control sequence using predictions based on a model.

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 - Decision variable is the control sequence calculated over horizon N
 - Objective function to optimize

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Model-based Predictive Control

Brief recap

Find optimal control sequence using predictions based on a model.

- We need an optimization problem
 - Decision variable is the control sequence calculated over horizon N
 - Objective function to optimize
 - System's Model

$$\begin{array}{ll} \underset{\mathbf{u}[0:N-1|k]}{\text{minimize}} & J(\mathbf{x}[0|k], \mathbf{u}[0 : N - 1|k]) \\ \text{subject to} & \left. \begin{array}{l} \mathbf{x}[\xi|k] = f(\mathbf{x}[\xi - 1|k], \mathbf{u}[\xi - 1|k]) \end{array} \right\} \forall \xi \in \{1, \dots, N\} \end{array}$$

Model-based Predictive Control

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Model-based Predictive Control

Brief recap



Find optimal control sequence using predictions based on a model.

- We need an optimization problem
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 - Other constraints to respect (QoS, technical restrictions, ...)

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Model Predictive Control



In a nutshell



Model Predictive Control

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
Find optimal control sequence



Model Predictive Control

In a nutshell


Find optimal control sequence, apply first element



Model Predictive Control

In a nutshell


Find optimal control sequence, apply first element, rinse repeat



Model Predictive Control

In a nutshell


Find optimal control sequence, apply first element, rinse repeat → Receding Horizon



Model Predictive Control

In a nutshell

Find optimal control sequence, apply first element, rinse repeat → Receding Horizon



Model Predictive Control

Nothing is perfect

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- Problems

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 - Topology (Geographical distribution)

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 - Privacy (RGPD)

Model Predictive Control

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 - Privacy (RGPD)
- Solution: Divide and Conquer (distributed MPC)

① Decomposing the MPC

Outline

- ① Decomposing the MPC
- ② Attacks on the dMPC

- ① Decomposing the MPC
- ② Attacks on the dMPC
- ③ Securing the dMPC

Outline

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- ④ Conclusion

Outline

① Decomposing the MPC

Distributed Model Predictive Control

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In other words

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In other words

- Agents solve local problems

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Remark

If agents exchange same variable \rightarrow consensus problem

Distributed Model Predictive Control

Optimization Frameworks

Usually based on optimization decomposition methods¹:


¹  Boyd et al., “Notes on Decomposition Methods”

Distributed Model Predictive Control

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- Local problems with auxiliary variables


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Distributed Model Predictive Control


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Basically 2 choices²:

- Modify based on dual problem³ (Solve with dual and send primal)

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Distributed Model Predictive Control


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Security/privacy properties

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Distributed Model Predictive Control

It is about communication

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Distributed Model Predictive Control

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- We break the MPC optimization problem
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Distributed Model Predictive Control


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

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


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




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



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Distributed Model Predictive Control

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



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José M Maestre, Negenborn, et al., Distributed Model Predictive Control made easy

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Distributed Model Predictive Control

Optimization Decomposition



MPC


Distributed Model Predictive Control

Optimization Decomposition




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
Optimization Decomposition



- Coordinator
 - Enforce global constraints

Distributed Model Predictive Control


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Distributed Model Predictive Control


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Distributed Model Predictive Control


Optimization Decomposition



- Coordinator → Hierarchical
 - Enforce global constraints
- Bidirectional
- No delay → Synchronous


Primal Decomposition

or Quantity Decomposition | or Resource Allocation




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


Allocation θ_i



Primal Decomposition

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


Allocation θ_i
Dissatisfaction λ_i



Primal Decomposition

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
Allocation θ_i
Dissatisfaction λ_i



Update $\theta_i^+ = f_i(\theta_i, \lambda_i)$

Primal Decomposition

or Quantity Decomposition | or Resource Allocation




Allocation θ_i
Dissatisfaction λ_i



Update $\theta_i^+ = f_i(\theta_i, \lambda_i)$

Primal Decomposition

or Quantity Decomposition | or Resource Allocation



Allocation θ_i
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Update $\theta_i^+ = f_i(\theta_i, \lambda_i)$

Primal Decomposition

In detail

$$\begin{array}{ll} \underset{\mathbf{u}_1, \dots, \mathbf{u}_M}{\text{minimize}} & \sum_{i \in \mathcal{M}} J_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{u}_i) \\ \text{s.t.} & \sum_{i \in \mathcal{M}} \mathbf{h}_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{u}_i) \leq \mathbf{u}_{\text{total}} \end{array}$$

Primal Decomposition

In detail

- Objective is sum of local ones

$$\begin{array}{ll} \underset{\mathbf{u}_1, \dots, \mathbf{u}_M}{\text{minimize}} & \sum_{i \in \mathcal{M}} J_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{u}_i) \\ \text{s.t.} & \sum_{i \in \mathcal{M}} \mathbf{h}_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{u}_i) \leq \mathbf{u}_{\text{total}} \end{array}$$

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In detail

- Objective is sum of local ones
- Constraints couple variables

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In detail

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$$\begin{aligned}
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 & \text{s.t.} && \sum_{i \in \mathcal{M}} \mathbf{h}_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{u}_i) \leq \mathbf{u}_{\text{total}}
 \end{aligned}$$

\downarrow For each $i \in \mathcal{M}$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \underset{\mathbf{u}_i}{\text{minimize}} && J_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{u}_i) \\
 & \text{s. t.} && \mathbf{h}_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{u}_i) \leq \boldsymbol{\theta}_i
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Primal Decomposition

In detail

- Objective is sum of local ones
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① Allocate θ_i for each agent

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Primal Decomposition

In detail

- Objective is sum of local ones
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- ② They solve local problems and

$$\begin{array}{ll} \underset{\mathbf{u}_i}{\text{minimize}} & J_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{u}_i) \\ \text{s. t.} & \mathbf{h}_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{u}_i) \leq \theta_i \end{array}$$

Primal Decomposition

In detail

- Objective is sum of local ones
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- 1 Allocate θ_i for each agent
- 2 They solve local problems and
- 3 Send dual variable λ_i

$$\begin{array}{ll} \underset{u_i}{\text{minimize}} & J_i(x_i, u_i) \\ \text{s. t.} & h_i(x_i, u_i) \leq \theta_i : \lambda_i \end{array}$$

Primal Decomposition

In detail

- Objective is sum of local ones
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- 1 Allocate θ_i for each agent
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- 3 Send dual variable λ_i
- 4 Allocation is updated

$$\begin{array}{ll} \underset{\mathbf{u}_i}{\text{minimize}} & J_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{u}_i) \\ \text{s. t.} & \mathbf{h}_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{u}_i) \leq \boldsymbol{\theta}_i : \boldsymbol{\lambda}_i \end{array}$$

$$\boldsymbol{\theta}[k]^{(p+1)} = \boldsymbol{\theta}[k]^{(p)} + \rho^{(p)} \boldsymbol{\lambda}[k]^{(p)}$$

Primal Decomposition

In detail

- Objective is sum of local ones
- Constraints couple variables



- 1 Allocate θ_i for each agent
- 2 They solve local problems and
- 3 Send dual variable λ_i
- 4 Allocation is updated
(respect global constraint)

$$\begin{array}{ll} \underset{\mathbf{u}_i}{\text{minimize}} & J_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{u}_i) \\ \text{s. t.} & \mathbf{h}_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{u}_i) \leq \boldsymbol{\theta}_i : \boldsymbol{\lambda}_i \end{array}$$

$$\boldsymbol{\theta}[k]^{(p+1)} = \text{Proj}^{\mathcal{S}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}[k]^{(p)} + \rho^{(p)} \boldsymbol{\lambda}[k]^{(p)})$$

Example

Until everybody is evenly⁵ dissatisfied



⁵For inequality constraints dynamics are more complex

Distributed Model Predictive Control

Negotiation works if agents comply.

Distributed Model Predictive Control

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But what if some agents are ill-intentioned and attack the system?

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Problem recent in dMPC literature⁶ (First article from 2017⁷)

⁶<30 documents in scopus

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- CentraleSupélec Rennes - Expertise in MPC for Smart Buildings
- Incentive Brittany Region (Sustainable Energy + cybersecurity)
- How can an agent attack?
- What are the consequences of an attack?
- Can we mitigate the effects? How?

⁶<30 documents in scopus


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Outline

② Attacks on the dMPC


How can a non-cooperative agent attack?

Literature



How can a non-cooperative agent attack?

Literature




- Common attacks⁸

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


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


- Common attacks⁸
 - Fake objective function
 - Fake constraints
 - Use different control

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


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- } Deception Attacks

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Our approach⁹




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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


- λ_i is the only interface
- λ_i obfuscate params. (+ Privacy)

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


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How can a non-cooperative agent attack?

Our approach⁹



- λ_i is the only interface
- λ_i obfuscate params. (+ Privacy)
- Malicious agent modifies λ_i

$$\tilde{\lambda}_i = \gamma_i(\lambda_i)$$

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Attack model

Liar, Liar, Pants of fire

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- $\lambda \geq 0$ means dissatisfaction

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Attack model

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-
- Attack is invertible $\rightarrow \exists T_i[k]^{-1}$


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
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
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
Example

Example

4 distinct agents

- Agent 1 is non-cooperative
- It uses $\tilde{\lambda}_1 = \gamma_1(\lambda_1) = \tau_1 I \lambda_1$
- Simulate for different τ_1 get J_i


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
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- We can observe 3 things


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 - Global minimum when $\tau_1 = 1$


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 - Agent 1 benefits if τ_1 increases (inverse otherwise)

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- Simulate for different τ_1 get J_i
- We can observe 3 things
 - Global minimum when $\tau_1 = 1$
 - Agent 1 benefits if τ_1 increases (inverse otherwise)
 - All collapses if too greedy

- But can we mitigate these effects?

- But can we mitigate these effects?
- Yes! (At least in some cases)

Outline

- ③ Securing the dMPC
 - Classification
 - State of Art
 - Proposed Methods

Classification of mitigation techniques

Passive (Robust)

Active (Resilient)

Classification of mitigation techniques

Passive (Robust)

- 1 mode

Active (Resilient)

- 2 modes

Classification of mitigation techniques

Passive (Robust)

- 1 mode

Active (Resilient)

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 - ① Attack free
 - ② When attack is detected

Classification of mitigation techniques

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Active (Resilient)

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 - Detection/Isolation
 - Mitigation

Classification of mitigation techniques

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State of art

Security dMPC

	Decomposition	Resilient/Robust	Detection	Mitigation
¹⁰	Dual	Robust (Scenario)	NA	NA
¹¹	Dual	Robust (f-robust)	NA	NA
¹²	Jacobi-Gauß	–	–	–
¹³	Dual	Resilient	Analyt./Learn.	Disconnect (Robustness)

¹⁰José M. Maestre et al., “Scenario-Based Defense Mechanism Against Vulnerabilities in Lagrange-Based Dmpc”.

¹¹Velarde, José M. Maestre, et al., “Vulnerabilities in Lagrange-Based Distributed Model Predictive Control”.

¹²Chanfreut, J. M. Maestre, and H. Ishii, “Vulnerabilities in Distributed Model Predictive Control based on Jacobi-Gauss Decomposition”.

¹³Ananduta et al., “Resilient Distributed Model Predictive Control for Energy Management of Interconnected Microgrids”.

Our Approach

Explore Scarcity

- Resilient
- Analytical/Learning
- Data reconstruction

Our Approach

Explore Scarcity

- Resilient
- Analytical/Learning } Parameter
- Data reconstruction } Estimation

Our Approach

Explore Scarcity

- Resilient
- Analytical/Learning } Parameter
- Data reconstruction } Estimation
- Explore Scarcity

Outline

③ Securing the dMPC

Proposed Methods

- Resilient Primal Decomposition-based dMPC for deprived systems

- Resilient Primal Decomposition-based dMPC using Artificial Scarcity


What are deprived systems?

What are deprived systems?

Systems whose optimal solution has all constraints active

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Systems whose optimal solution has all constraints active




$$\begin{aligned}
 &\underset{\mathbf{U}_i[k]}{\text{minimize}} && \frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{U}_i[k]\|_{H_i}^2 + \mathbf{f}_i[k]^T \mathbf{U}_i[k] \\
 &\text{subject to} && \bar{\Gamma}_i \mathbf{U}_i[k] \leq \boldsymbol{\theta}_i[k] : \boldsymbol{\lambda}_i[k]
 \end{aligned}$$

What are deprived systems?

Systems whose optimal solution has all constraints active

- Unconstrained Solution $\dot{U}_i^*[k]$




$$\begin{aligned}
 &\underset{U_i[k]}{\text{minimize}} && \frac{1}{2} \|U_i[k]\|_{H_i}^2 + f_i[k]^T U_i[k] \\
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


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


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 - Same as with equality constraints¹⁴



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\rightarrow

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¹⁴If system can have all constraints active simultaneously

Analyzing Deprived Systems

Assumptions

Analyzing Deprived Systems

Assumptions

- *Quadratic local problems*

Analyzing Deprived Systems

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- *Quadratic local problems*
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Analyzing Deprived Systems

Assumptions

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$$(\text{local parameters unknown by coordinator}) \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \bullet P_i \text{ is time invariant} \\ \bullet \mathbf{s}_i[k] \text{ is time variant} \end{array} \right.$$

Deprived Systems

Under attack!

- Normal behavior

Deprived Systems

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- But wait! P_i is not supposed to change!
- Change \rightarrow Probably an Attack! Let's take advantage of this!

Detection Mechanism

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- We estimate¹⁵ $\hat{P}_i[k]$ and $\hat{\mathbf{s}}_i[k]$ such as:

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- Ok, but how can we estimate $\hat{P}_i[k]$?

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Estimating $\hat{P}_i[k]$

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
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Classification of mitigation techniques

- Active (Resilient)
 - ① Detection/Isolation ✓
 - ② Mitigation

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Reconstructing λ_i

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
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
- Choose adequate version for coordination

$$\lambda_i^{\text{mod}} = \begin{cases} \lambda_i^{\text{rec}}, & \text{if attack detected} \\ \tilde{\lambda}_i, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Complete Mechanism




Complete Mechanism




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Complete Mechanism



- Supervise exchanges by inquiring the agents
- Estimate how they will behave


Complete Mechanism



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Two Phases

Complete Mechanism




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Two Phases

- 1 Detect which agents are non-cooperative

Complete Mechanism




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Two Phases

- 1 Detect which agents are non-cooperative
- 2 Reconstruct λ_i and use in negotiation


Complete algorithm

RPdMPC-DS




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
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
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
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
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
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


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


Example



District Heating Network (4 Houses)


Example



District Heating Network (4 Houses)

- Houses modeled using 3R-2C (monozone)


Example



District Heating Network (4 Houses)

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
Example



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
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
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
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
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Example




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Results

Temporal




Temperature in house I.

Error $E_I(k)$.

(N) Nominal, **(S)** Selfish, **(C)** Corrected

Results

Temporal




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Results

Temporal



- Agent starts cheating in $k = 6$


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(N) Nominal, **(S)** Selfish, **(C)** Corrected

Results

Temporal



Temperature in house I.


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(N) Nominal, **(S)** Selfish, **(C)** Corrected

- Agent starts cheating in $k = 6$
- (S)** Agent increases its comfort

Results

Temporal



Temperature in house I.

Error $E_I(k)$.

N Nominal, **S** Selfish, **C** Corrected

- Agent starts cheating in $k = 6$
- S** Agent increases its comfort
- C** Restablish behavior close to **N**



Results

Costs

Objective functions J_i (Normalized error %)

Agent	Selfish	Corrected
I	-36.3	0.5
II	21.67	-0.55
III	17.39	-0.0
IV	17.63	-0.09
Global	3.53	0.02

Results

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Outline

③ Securing the dMPC

Proposed Methods

Resilient Primal Decomposition-based dMPC using Artificial Scarcity

Relaxing scarcity assumption

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- Systems are not completely deprived

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- Systems are not completely deprived
 - We can't change our constraints to equality ones anymore

$$\begin{array}{ll} \underset{\mathbf{U}_i[k]}{\text{minimize}} & \frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{U}_i[k]\|_{H_i}^2 + \mathbf{f}_i[k]^T \mathbf{U}_i[k] \\ \text{subject to} & \bar{\Gamma}_i \mathbf{U}_i[k] \leq \boldsymbol{\theta}_i[k] : \boldsymbol{\lambda}_i[k] \end{array}$$

Relaxing scarcity assumption

- Systems are not completely deprived
 - We can't change our constraints to equality ones anymore
 - Nor use the simpler update equation

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{\mathbf{U}_i[k]}{\text{minimize}} && \frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{U}_i[k]\|_{H_i}^2 + \mathbf{f}_i[k]^T \mathbf{U}_i[k] \\ & \text{subject to} && \bar{\Gamma}_i \mathbf{U}_i[k] \leq \boldsymbol{\theta}_i[k] : \boldsymbol{\lambda}_i[k] \end{aligned}$$

$$\boldsymbol{\theta}[k]^{(p+1)} = \text{Proj}^{\mathcal{S}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}[k]^{(p)} + \rho^{(p)} \boldsymbol{\lambda}[k]^{(p)})$$

Analyzing System

Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$

Instead of having one single affine solution

$$\lambda_i[k] = -P_i \theta_i[k] - s_i[k]$$

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Now, we may have multiple (Piecewise affine function)

$$\lambda_i[k] = \begin{cases} -P_i^{(0)} \theta_i[k] - s_i^{(0)}[k], & \text{if } \theta_i[k] \in \mathcal{R}_{\lambda_i}^0 \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ -P_i^{(Z)} \theta_i[k] - s_i^{(Z)}[k], & \text{if } \theta_i[k] \in \mathcal{R}_{\lambda_i}^Z \end{cases}$$

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
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Still the $P_i^{(z)}$ are time independent


Analyzing System

Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$ (Continued)



Analyzing System


Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$ (Continued)



Separation surfaces depend on state and local parameters.

Analyzing System


Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$ (Continued)



Separation surfaces depend on state and local parameters.
Unknown by the coordinator.

Analyzing System


Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$ (Continued)



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
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
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
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Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$ (Continued) Still?

$$\lambda_i[k] = \begin{cases} -P_i^{(0)}\theta_i[k] - s_i^{(0)}[k], & \text{if } \theta_i[k] \in \mathcal{R}_{\lambda_i}^0 \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ -P_i^{(Z)}\theta_i[k] - s_i^{(Z)}[k], & \text{if } \theta_i[k] \in \mathcal{R}_{\lambda_i}^Z \end{cases}$$

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All constraints active $-P_i^{(0)}\theta_i[k] - s_i^{(0)}[k] \rightarrow -P_i\theta_i[k] - s_i[k]$

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Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$ (Continued) Still?

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Analyzing System

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Assumptions

The region $\mathcal{R}_{\lambda_i}^0 \neq \emptyset$ and we known a point $\theta_i^{\emptyset} \in \mathcal{R}_{\lambda_i}^0$

Analyzing System

Under attack!

Analyzing System

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$$\tilde{\lambda}_i[k] = T_i[k]\lambda_k$$

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Parameters are modified.

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Parameters are modified. But not the regions' limits

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- If we can estimate $\tilde{P}_i^{(0)}$ we can use same strategy than before

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- If we can estimate $\tilde{P}_i^{(0)}$ we can use same strategy than before
- Problem: We don't know in which region θ_i is
- Solution: Let's force it using Artificial Scarcity

Artificial Scarcity

What you thought was way too much is not enough

Artificial Scarcity

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- We use the point θ_i^\emptyset , which activates all constraints

Artificial Scarcity

What you thought was way too much is not enough


- We use the point θ_i^\emptyset , which activates all constraints¹⁷

¹⁷If we have local constraints, we suppose this point respects them.

Artificial Scarcity

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


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


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
- Generate points close to θ_i^\emptyset

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
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
- Generate points close to $\overset{\varnothing}{\theta}_i$
- Estimate $\hat{P}_i^{(0)}[k]$

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
- Generate points close to θ_i^\emptyset
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- How do we know the radius?

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Artificial Scarcity

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
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
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 - Expectation Maximization

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Expectation Maximization

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- Iterative method to estimate parameters of multimodal models

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¹⁸Such as our PWA function after using some tricks

Expectation Maximization

- Iterative method to estimate parameters of multimodal models¹⁸
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Expectation Maximization

- Iterative method to estimate parameters of multimodal models¹⁸
- We give multiple observations $\theta_i^o[k]$ and $\tilde{\lambda}_i^o[k]$
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 - Ⓜ new estimates $(\hat{P}_i^{(z)}[k], \hat{\mathbf{s}}_i^{(z)}[k])$ based on the probabilities

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Expectation Maximization

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 - **M** new estimates $(\hat{P}_i^{(z)}[k], \hat{\mathbf{s}}_i^{(z)}[k])$ based on the probabilities
- At the end we have

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 - ① Parameters with associated region index

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- At the end we have
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 - Ⓜ Observations with associated region index
- We consult the index associated to θ_i^\emptyset
- We recover the associated parameter, i.e., $\hat{P}_i^{(0)}[k]$

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Detection and Mitigation

Same same, but different

Detection and Mitigation

Same same, but different

Assumption

We estimate nominal $\bar{P}_i^{(0)}$ from attack free negotiation

Detection and Mitigation

Same same, but different

Assumption

We estimate nominal $\bar{P}_i^{(0)}$ from attack free negotiation

- Detection

$$\left\| \hat{\bar{P}}_i^{(0)}[k] - \bar{P}_i^{(0)} \right\|_F \geq \epsilon_{P_i^{(0)}}$$

Detection and Mitigation

Same same, but different

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
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$$\lambda_i^{\text{rec}} = \widehat{T_i[k]^{-1}} \tilde{\lambda}_i.$$


Complete algorithm

RPdMPC-AS




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
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
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


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
Example



District Heating Network (4 Houses)

- Houses modeled using 3R-2C
- Not enough power
- Period of 5h ($T_s = 0.25h \rightarrow k = \{1 : 20\}$)
- Prediction horizon ($N = 4$)
- 3 scenarios
 - Ⓝ Nominal
 - Ⓒ Agent I cheats (dMPC)
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Example




District Heating Network (4 Houses)

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- Prediction horizon ($N = 4$)
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Results

Temporal




Temperature in house I.

Error $E_I(k)$.

N Nominal, **S** Selfish **C** Corrected

Results

Temporal



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Error $E_I(k)$.

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Results

Costs

Objective functions J_i (Normalized error %)

Agent	Selfish	Corrected
I	-36.49	$-4.12e - 05$
II	35.81	$1.74e - 05$
III	29.22	$2.14e - 05$
IV	37.54	$1.73e - 05$
Global	10.69	$-6e - 07$

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 - Associate with other methods of the same family

For Further Reading I

-  Åström, K.J. and B. Wittenmark. Adaptive Control. Addison-Wesley series in electrical and computer engineering: Control engineering. Addison-Wesley, 1989. ISBN: 9780201097207. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-08546-2_24.
-  Maestre, José M, Rudy R Negenborn, et al. Distributed Model Predictive Control made easy. Vol. 69. Springer, 2014. ISBN: 978-94-007-7005-8.
-  Nogueira, Rafael Accácio. "Security of DMPC under False Data Injection". 2022CSUP0006. PhD thesis. CentraleSupélec, 2022. URL: <http://www.theses.fr/2022CSUP0006>.