Using the Software Analysis Workbench (SAW)

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Overview

The Software Analysis Workbench (SAW) is a tool for constructing mathematical models of the computational behavior of software, transforming these models, and proving properties about them.

SAW can currently construct models of a subset of programs written in Cryptol, LLVM (and therefore C), and JVM (and therefore Java). The models take the form of typed functional programs, so in a sense SAW can be considered a translator from imperative programs to their functional equivalents. Given a functional model in SAW, various external proof tools, including a variety of SAT and SMT solvers, can be used to prove properties about it. Models can be constructed from arbitrary Cryptol programs, and can typically be constructed from C and Java programs that have fixed-size inputs and outputs, and that terminate after a fixed number of iterations of any loop (or a fixed number of recursive calls).

The process of extracting models from programs, manipulating them, and sending them to external provers is orchestrated using a special purpose language called SAWScript. SAWScript is a typed functional language with support for sequencing of imperative commands.

The rest of this document first describes how SAW can be invoked and outlines the structure of the SAWScript language and its relationship with Cryptol. It then follows up with a description of the commands in SAWScript that can transform functional models (Term values) and prove properties about them. Finally, it describes the specific commands available for constructing models from imperative programs in a variety of languages.

Invoking SAW

The primary mechanism for interacting with SAW is through the saw executable included as part of the standard binary distribution. With no arguments, saw starts a read-evaluate-print loop (REPL) which allows the user to interactively evaluate commands in the SAWScript language, described in more detail in the following section. With one file name argument, it executes the specified file as a SAWScript program.

In addition to a file name, the saw executable accepts several command-line options:

- -h, -?, --help Print a help message.
- -V, --version Show the version of the SAWScript interpreter.
- -c path, --classpath=path Specify a colon-delimited list of paths to search for Java classes.
- -i path, --import-path=path Specify a colon-delimited list of paths to search for imports.
- -t, --extra-type-checking Perform extra type checking of intermediate values.
- -I, --interactive Run interactively (with a REPL).
- -j path, --jars=path Specify a colon-delimited list of paths to .jar files to search for Java classes.
- -d num, --sim-verbose=num Set the verbosity level of the Java and LLVM simulators.
- -v num, --verbose=num Set verbosity level of the SAWScript interpreter.

It also uses several environment variables for configuration:



CRYPTOLPATH Specify a colon-delimited list of paths to search for Cryptol imports (including the Cryptol prelude).

SAW_IMPORT_PATH Specify a colon-delimited list of paths to search for imports.

SAW_JDK_JAR Specify the path of the .jar file containing the core Java libraries.

All of the command-line options and environment variables that accept colon-delimited lists use semicolon-delimited lists on Windows.

Structure of SAWScript

A SAWScript program consists, at the top level, of a sequence of commands to be executed in order. Each command is terminated with a semicolon. For example, the print command displays a textual representation of its argument. Suppose the following text is stored in the file print.saw:

```
print 3;
```

Then the command saw print.saw will yield output similar to the following:

```
Loading module Cryptol
Loading file "print.saw"
3
```

Similarly, the same code can be run from the interactive REPL:

```
sawscript> print 3;
```

At the REPL, terminating semicolons can be omitted:

```
sawscript> print 3
3
```

To make common use cases simpler, bare values at the REPL are treated as if they were arguments to print:

```
sawscript> 3
3
```

One SAWScript file can be included in another using the include command, which takes the name of the file to be included as an argument:

```
include : String -> TopLevel ()
```

Basic Types and Values

All values in SAWScript have types, and these types are determined and checked before a program runs (that is, SAWScript is statically typed). The basic types available are similar to those in many other languages.

- The Int type represents unbounded mathematical integers. Integer constants can be written in decimal notation (e.g., 42), hexadecimal notation (0x2a), and binary (0b00101010). However, unlike many languages, integers in SAWScript are used primarily as constants. Arithmetic is usually encoded in Cryptol, as discussed in the next section.
- The Boolean type, Bool, contains the values true and false, like in many other languages. As with integers, computations on Boolean values usually occur in Cryptol.
- Values of any type can be aggregated into tuples. For example, the value (true, 10) has the type (Bool, Int).



- Values of any type can also be aggregated into records, which are exactly like tuples except that their components have names. For example, the value { b = true, n = 10 } has the type { b : Bool, n : Int }.
- A sequence of values of the same type can be stored in a list. For example, the value [true, false, true] has the type [Bool].
- Strings of textual characters can be represented in the String type. For example, the value "example" has type String.
- The "unit" type, written () is essentially a placeholder. It has only one value, also written (). Values of type () convey no information. We will show in later sections several cases where this is useful.

SAWScript also includes some more specialized types which do not have a straightforward counterpart in most other languages. These will appear in later sections.

Basic Expression Forms

One of the key forms of top-level command in SAWScript is a *binding*, introduced with the let keyword, which gives a name to a value. For example:

```
sawscript> let x = 5
sawscript> x
```

Bindings can have parameters, in which case they define functions. For instance, the following function takes one parameter and constructs a list containing that parameter as its single element.

```
sawscript> let f x = [x]
sawscript> f "text"
["text"]
```

Functions themselves are values, and have types. The type of a function that takes an argument of type a and returns a result of type b is $a \rightarrow b$.

Typically, the types of functions are inferred. As in the example f above. In this case, because f only creates a list with the given argument, and it's possible to create a list of any element type, f can be applied to an argument of any type. We say, therefore, that it's *polymorphic*. Concretely, we write the type of f as $a \rightarrow a$, meaning it takes a value of any type and returns a list containing elements of that same type. This means we can also apply it to 10:

```
sawscript > f 10
[10]
```

However, we may want to specify that a function operates at a more specific type than the most general type possible. In this case, we could restrict f to operate only on Int parameters.

```
sawscript > let f(x : Int) = [x]
```

This will work identically to the original f on an Int parameter:

```
sawscript> f 10
[10]
```

But it will fail for a String parameter.

```
sawscript> f "text"

type mismatch: String -> t.0 and Int -> [Int]
```



```
at "_" (REPL)
mismatched type constructors: String and Int
```

Type annotations can be applied to any expression. The notation (e:t) indicates that the expression e is expected to have type t, and that it is an error for it to have a different type. Most types in SAWScript are inferred automatically, but it can sometimes be valuable for readability to specify them explicitly.

Because functions are values, functions can return other functions. We make use of this feature for writing functions of multiple arguments. Consider the function g, similar to f but with two arguments:

```
sawscript > let g x y = [x, y]
```

Like f, g is polymorphic. Its type is {a} a -> a -> [a]. This means it takes an argument of type a and returns a function that takes an argument of the same type a and returns a list of a values. We can therefore apply g to any two arguments of the same type:

```
sawscript > g 2 3
[2,3]
sawscript > g true false
[true,false]
```

But type checking will fail if we apply it to two values of different types:

```
sawscript> g 2 false

type mismatch: Bool -> t.0 and Int -> [Int]
  at "_" (REPL)
mismatched type constructors: Bool and Int
```

In the text so far, we have used the terms function and command, and we take these to mean slightly different things. A function is any value with a function type (e.g., Int -> [Int]). A command is a function in which the result type is one of a specific set of parameterized types, or types that take other types as parameters. We have seen one of these so far: the list type, such as the type [Bool] indicating lists of Boolean values, though this type is not used to construct commands.

TODO: don't use lists as an example of parameterized types, since they work somewhat differently?

The most important parameterized type is the TopLevel type, indicating a command that can run at the top level (directly at the REPL, or as one of the top level commands listed in a script file). The print command has the type {a} a -> TopLevel (), where TopLevel () means that it is a command that runs in the TopLevel context and returns a value of type () (that is, no useful information). In other words, it has a side effect (printing some text to the screen), but doesn't produce any information to use in the rest of the SAWScript program. This is the primary place where you'll see the () type used.

It can sometimes be useful to bind together a sequence of commands in a unit. This can be accomplished with the $do \{ \ldots \}$ construct. For example:

```
sawscript> let print_two = do { print "first"; print "second"; }
sawscript> print_two
first
second
```

The bound value, print two, has type TopLevel (), since that is the type of its last command.

Note that in the previous example the printing doesn't occur until print_two directly appears at the REPL. The let expression does not cause those commands to run.

TODO: binding the results of commands, and the distinction between let and <-



```
TODO: return
return : {m, a} a -> m a
```

Other Basic Functions

Besides the functions we have listed so far, a number of other operations exist for working with basic data structures and interacting with the operating system.

The following functions work on lists:

```
concat : {a} [a] -> [a] -> [a]

for : {m, a, b} [a] -> (a -> m b) -> m [b]

head : {a} [a] -> a

length : {a} [a] -> Int

nth : {a} [a] -> Int -> a

null : {a} [a] -> Bool

tail : {a} [a] -> [a]
```

The concat function takes two lists and returns the concatenation of the two. The head function returns the first element of a list, and the tail function returns everything except the first element. The length function counts the number of elements in a list, and the null function indicates whether a list is empty (has zero elements). The nth function returns the element at the given position, with nth 1 0 being equivalent to head 1.

For interacting with the operating system, we have:

```
get_opt : Int -> String
exec : String -> [String] -> String -> TopLevel String
exit : Int -> TopLevel ()
```

The get_opt function returns the command-line argument to saw at the given index. Argument 0 will always be the name of the saw executable itself, and higher indices represent later arguments. The exec command runs an external program given, respectively, an executable name, a list of arguments, and a string to send to the standard input of the program. The exec command returns the standard output from the program it executes and prints standard error to the screen. Finally, the exit command stops execution of the current script and returns the given exit code to the operating system.

Finally, a few miscellaneous functions and commands exist. The **show** function computes the textual representation of its argument in the same way as **print**, but instead of displaying the value it returns it as a **String** value for later use in the program. This can be useful for constructing more detailed messages later. The **str_concat** function, which concatenates two **String** values, can also be useful in this case.

The time command runs any other TopLevel command and prints out the time it took to execute. If you want to use the time value later in the program, the with_time function returns both the original result of the timed command and the time taken to execute it (in milliseconds), without printing anything in the process.

```
show : {a} a -> String
```



```
str_concat : String -> String -> String
time : {a} TopLevel a -> TopLevel a
with_time : {a} TopLevel a -> TopLevel (Int, a)
```

The Term Type

Perhaps the most important type in SAWScript, and the one most unlike the built-in types of most other languages, is the Term type. Essentially, a value of type Term precisely describes all of the possible computations performed by some program. And, in particular, if two Term values are *equivalent*, then the programs that they represent perform equivalent computations. We will say more later about what exactly it means for two terms to be equivalent, and how to determine whether two terms are equivalent.

Before we dig into the Term type more deeply, it will be useful to describe the role of the Cryptol language in SAW.

Cryptol and its Role in SAW

Cyptol is a domain-specific language originally designed for the high-level specification of cryptographic algorithms. It is general enough, however, to describe a wider variety of programs, and is particularly applicable to describing computations that operate on data of some fixed size.

Because Cryptol is a stand-alone language in addition to being integrated into SAW, it has its own manual, which you can find here:

• http://cryptol.net/files/ProgrammingCryptol.pdf

SAW includes deep support for Cryptol, and in fact requires the use of Cryptol for most non-trivial tasks. The primary use of Cryptol is to construct values of type Term. Although Term values can be constructed from various sources, inline Cryptol expressions are the most direct and convenient way to create them.

Specifically, a Cryptol expression can be placed inside double curly braces ({{ and }}), resulting in a value of type Term. As a very simple example, there is no built-in integer addition operation in SAWScript, but there is in Cryptol, and we can use it as follows:

```
sawscript > let t = \{\{ 0x22 + 0x33 \}\}
sawscript > print t
85
```

Note, however, that although it printed out in the same way as an Int, t actually has type Term. We can see how this term is represented internally, before being evaluated, with the print_term function.

```
sawscript> print_term t
Cryptol.ecPlus
  (Prelude.Vec 8 Prelude.Bool)
  (Cryptol.OpsSeq
          (Cryptol.TCNum 8)
      Prelude.Bool
      Cryptol.OpsBit)
  (Prelude.bvNat 8 34)
  (Prelude.bvNat 8 51)
```

For the moment, don't try to understand what this output means. We show it simply to clarify that Term values have their own internal structure that goes beyond what exists in SAWScript.



A Term that represents an integer can be translated into a SAWScript Int using the eval_int function, of type Term -> Int. This function will return an Int if the Term can be represented as one, and will fail at runtime otherwise.

```
sawscript> print (eval_int t)
85
sawscript> print (eval_int {{ True }})

"eval_int" (<stdin>:1:1):
eval_int: argument is not a finite bitvector
sawscript> print (eval_int {{ [True] }})
1
```

Similarly, values of type Bit in Cryptol can be translated into values of type Bool in SAWScript using the eval_bool function:

```
sawscript> let b = {{ True }}
sawscript> print_term b
Prelude.True
sawscript> print (eval_bool b)
true

TODO: talk about displaying terms in general
```

```
print_term : Term -> TopLevel ()
show_term : Term -> String
set_ascii : Bool -> TopLevel ()
set_base : Int -> TopLevel ()
```

In addition to being able to extract integer and Boolean values from Cryptol expressions, Term values can be injected into Cryptol expressions. When SAWScript evaluates a Cryptol expression between {{ and }} delimiters, it does so with several extra bindings in scope:

- Any value in scope of SAWScript type Bool is visible in Cryptol expressions as a value of type Bit.
- Any value in scope of SAWScript type Int is visible in Cryptol expressions as type variable. Type variables can be demoted to numeric bit vector values using the backtick ("') operator.
- Any value in scope of SAWScript type Term is visible in Cryptol expressions as a value with the Cryptol type corresponding to the internal type of the term. The power of this conversion is that the Term does not need to have originally been derived from a Cryptol expression.

To make these rules more concrete, consider the following examples.

TODO: examples

```
sawscript> let n = 8
sawscript> let {{ f (x : [n]) = x + 1 }}
sawscript> print {{ f 2 }}
3
sawscript> print (f 2)
TODO: error
```

TODO: talk about values bound inside Cryptol context



```
sawscript> let b = true
sawscript> let t {{ [b, b] }}
sawscript> let t1 = {{ ... }}
sawscript> let t2 = {{ ... }}
```

So far, we have talked about using Cryptol *value* expressions. However, SAWScript can also work with Cryptol *types*. The most direct way to refer to a Cryptol type is to use type brackets: {| and |}. Any Cryptol type written between these brackets becomes a Type value in SAWScript. Some types in Cryptol are *size* types, and isomorphic to integers. These can be translated into SAWScript integers with the eval_size function. For example:

```
sawscript> let {{ type n = 16 }}
sawscript> eval_size {| n |}
16
sawscript> eval_size {| 16 |}
16
```

For non-size types, eval_size fails at runtime:

```
sawscript> eval_size {| [16] |}
"eval_size" (<stdin>:1:1):
eval_size: not a numeric type
```

In addition to the use of brackets to write Cryptol expressions inline, several built-in functions can extract Term values from Cryptol files in other ways. The import command at the top level imports all top-level definitions from a Cryptol file and places them in scope within later bracketed expressions. The cryptol_load command behaves similarly, but returns a CryptolModule instead. If any CryptolModule is in scope, its contents are available qualified with the name of the CryptolModule variable. TODO: example

Alternatively, a specific definition can be extracted from a CryptolModule more explicitly using the cryptol_extract command:

```
cryptol_extract : CryptolModule -> String -> TopLevel Term
```

Finally, the cryptol_prims function returns a built-in module containing a collection of useful Cryptol definitions that are not available in the standard Cryptol Prelude.

```
cryptol_prims : () -> CryptolModule
```

The definitions in this module include (in Cryptol syntax):

```
trunc : {m, n} (fin m, fin n) => [m + n] -> [n]

uext : {m, n} (fin m, fin n) => [n] -> [m + n]

sgt : {n} (fin n) => [n] -> [n] -> Bit

sge : {n} (fin n) => [n] -> [n] -> Bit

slt : {n} (fin n) => [n] -> [n] -> Bit
sle : {n} (fin n) => [n] -> [n] -> Bit
```

These perform bit-vector operations of truncation (trunc), unsigned extension (uext), and signed comparison (sgt, sge, slt, and sle).



Transforming Term Values

The three primary functions of SAW are *extracting* models (Term values) from programs, *transforming* those models, and *proving* properties about models using external provers. So far, we've shown how to construct Term values from Cryptol programs (and later sections will describe how to extract them from other programs). Now we show how to use the various term transformation features available in SAW.

Rewriting

Rewriting a Term consists of applying one or more rewrite rules to it, resulting in a new Term. A rewrite rule in SAW can be specified in multiple ways, the third due to the dependent type system used in SAWCore:

- as the definition of functions that can be unfolded,
- as a term of boolean type (or a function returning a boolean) that is an equality statement, and
- as a term of equality type whose body encodes a proof that the equality in the type is valid.

Each of these forms is a Term of a diffent shape. And in each case the term logically consists of two parts, each of which which may contain variables (bound by enclosing lambda expressions). By thinking of the variables as holes which may match any sub-term, the two parts of each term can both be seen as *patterns*. The left-hand pattern describes a term to match (which may be a sub-term of the full term being rewritten), and the right-hand pattern describes a term to replace it with. Any variable in the right-hand pattern must also appear in the left-hand pattern and will be instantiated with whatever sub-term matched that variable in the original term.

The general philosophy of rewriting is that the left and right patterns, while syntactically different, should be semantically equivalent. Therefore, applying a set of rewrite rules should not change the fundamental meaning of the term being rewritten. SAW is particularly focused on the task of proving that some logical statement, expressed as a Term is always true. If that is in fact the case, then the entire term can be replace by the term True without changing its meaning. The rewriting process can in some cases, by repeatedly applying rules that themselves are known to be valid, reduce a complex term entirely to True, which constitutes a proof of the original statement. In other cases, rewriting can simplify terms before sending them to external, automated provers, which can then finish the job. Sometimes this simplification can help the automated provers run more quickly, and sometimes it can help them prove things they would otherwise be unable to prove, by applying reasoning steps (rewrite rules) that are not available to the automated provers.

To use rewrite rules in practice, they can be aggregated into Simpset values in SAWCore. A few pre-defined Simpset values exist:

```
empty_ss : Simpset
basic_ss : Simpset
cryptol_ss : () -> Simpset
```

The first is the empty set of rules. Rewriting with it should have no effect, but it is useful as an argument to some of the functions that construct larger Simpset values. The basic_ss constant is a collection of rules that will be useful in most proof scripts. The cryptol_ss value includes a collection of Cryptol-specific rules, including rules to simplify away the abstractions introduced in the translation from Cryptol to SAWCore, which can be useful when proving equivalence between Cryptol and non-Cryptol code. When comparing Cryptol to Cryptol code, leaving these abstractions in place can be most appropriate, however, so cryptol_ss is not included in basic_ss.

To make this more concrete, consider the following example term:

- TODO: show the term before for 0x22 + 0x33, explain it
- TODO: introduce the rewrite command
- TODO: show how simplifying it with cryptol_ss affects it



The next set of functions add either a single rule or a list of rules to an existing Simpset.

```
addsimp : Theorem -> Simpset -> Simpset
addsimp' : Term -> Simpset -> Simpset
addsimps : [Theorem] -> Simpset -> Simpset
addsimps' : [Term] -> Simpset -> Simpset
```

The functions that take a **Theorem** type work with rewrite rules that are proved to be correct. The **prove_print** function returns a **Theorem** when successful, and any such theorem that is an equality statement can be used as a rewrite rule. The behavior is that any instance of the left-hand side of this equality in the goal is replaced with the right-hand side of the equality.

The functions above that take Term arguments work with terms of the same shape, but which haven't been proven to be correct. When using these functions, the soundness of the proof process depends on the correctness of these rules as a side condition.

• TODO: show another example of rewriting with a Cryptol lemma and addsimp'

Finally, there are some built-in rules that are not included in either basic_ss and cryptol_ss because they are not always beneficial, but can sometimes be helpful or essential.

```
add_cryptol_eqs : [String] -> Simpset -> Simpset
add_prelude_defs : [String] -> Simpset -> Simpset
add_prelude_eqs : [String] -> Simpset -> Simpset
```

TODO: transition

The cryptol_ss simpset includes rewrite rules to unfold all definitions in the Cryptol SAWCore module, but does not include any of the terms of equality type. The add_cryptol_eqs function adds the terms of equality type with the given names to the given Simpset. The add_prelude_defs and add_prelude_eqs functions add definition unfolding rules and equality-typed terms, respectively, from the SAWCore Prelude module.

TODO: talk about this command

```
core_axiom : String -> Theorem
```

Folding and Unfolding

```
define : String -> Term -> TopLevel Term
unfold_term : [String] -> Term -> Term
```

Other Built-in Transformation and Inspection Functions

TODO: talk about hoist_ifs, beta_reduce_term, replace
 beta_reduce_term : Term -> Term

```
hoist_ifs : Term -> TopLevel Term
```

replace : Term -> Term -> TopLevel Term



```
• TODO: talk about inspecting terms
  term size : Term -> Int
  term_tree_size : Term -> Int
  • TODO: talk about type-checking terms
  check_convertible : Term -> Term -> TopLevel ()
  check_term : Term -> TopLevel ()
  type : Term -> Type
Loading and Storing Terms
TODO: Obtaining terms: ~ parse_core : String -> Term
read aig: String -> TopLevel Term
{\tt read\_bytes: String -> TopLevel\ Term}
read_core : String -> TopLevel Term
read sbv: String -> [Uninterp] -> TopLevel Term ~~
TODO: Exporting terms: ~ write_aig : String -> Term -> TopLevel ()
write_cnf : String -> Term -> TopLevel ()
write_core : String -> Term -> TopLevel ()
write_saig : String -> Term -> TopLevel ()
write_saig': String -> Term -> Int -> TopLevel ()
write_smtlib2 : String -> Term -> TopLevel () ~~
Proofs about Terms
TODO: what are proof scripts
TODO: prove, sat, and related commands
TODO: ProofResult and SatResult types
TODO: Inspecting proof results: ~ caseProofResult : {b} ProofResult -> b -> (Term -> b) -> b
caseSatResult : {b} SatResult -> b -> (Term -> b) -> b \sim
```

Automated Tactics

The simplest proof scripts just indicate which automated prover to use. The ProofScript values abc and z3 select the ABC and Z3 theorem provers, respectively, and are typically good choices. In addition to these, the boolector, cvc4, mathsat, and yices provers are available. The internal decision procedure rme, short for Reed-Muller Expansion, is an automated prover that works particularly well on TODO.

In more complex cases, some pre-processing can be helpful or necessary before handing the problem off to an automated prover. The pre-processing can involve rewriting, beta reduction, unfolding, the use of provers that require slightly more configuration, or the use of provers that do very little real work.



Rewriting in Proof Scripts

The simplify command works just like the rewrite command, except that it works in a ProofScript context and implicitly transforms the current (unnamed) goal rather than taking a Term as a parameter.

```
simplify : Simpset -> ProofScript ()
```

TODO: example

Other Transformations

Some useful transformations are not easily specified using equality statements, and instead have special tactics.

```
beta_reduce_goal : ProofScript ()
unfolding : [String] -> ProofScript ()
```

The beta_reduce_goal tactic takes any sub-expression of the form $(\x -> t)v$ and replaces it with a transformed version of t in which all instances of x are replaced by v.

The unfolding tactic works with "opaque constants". Each of these is a named subterm in a SAWCore term that can be treated as "folded", in which case it is just an opaque name (essentially an uninterpreted function), or "unfolded", in which case it looks just like any other subterm. The unfolding tactic unfolds any instances of opaque constants with the any of the given names.

Using unfolding is mostly useful for proofs based entirely on rewriting, since default behavior for automated provers is to unfold all opaque constants before sending a goal to a prover. However, with Z3 and CVC4, it is possible to indicate that specific constants should be left folded (uninterpreted).

```
unint_cvc4 : [String] -> ProofScript SatResult
unint_yices : [String] -> ProofScript SatResult
unint_z3 : [String] -> ProofScript SatResult
```

The list of String arguments in these two cases indicates the names of the constants to leave folded, and therefore present as uninterpreted functions to the prover. To determine which folded constants appear in a goal, use the print_goal_consts function described below.

Ultimately, we plan to implement a more generic tactic that leaves certain constants uninterpreted in whatever prover is ultimately used (provided that uninterpreted functions are expressible in the prover).

Other External Provers

In addition to the built-in automated provers already discussed, SAW supports more generic interfaces to other arbitrary theorem provers supporting specific interfaces.

```
external_aig_solver : String -> [String] -> ProofScript SatResult
external_cnf_solver : String -> [String] -> ProofScript SatResult
```

The external_aig_solver function supports theorem provers that can take input as a single-output AIGER file. The first argument is the name of the executable to run. The second argument is the list of parameters to pass to that executable. Within this list, any element that consists simply of %f is replaced with the name of the temporary AIGER file generated for the proof goal. The output from the solver is expected to be in DIMACS solution format.

The external cnf solver function works similarly but for SAT solvers that take input in DIMACS CNF



format and produce output in DIMACS solution format.

Offline Provers

For provers that must be invoked in more complex ways, or to defer proof until a later time, there are functions to write the current goal to a file in various formats, and then assume that the goal is valid through the rest of the script.

```
offline_aig : String -> ProofScript SatResult

offline_cnf : String -> ProofScript SatResult

offline_extcore : String -> ProofScript SatResult

offline_smtlib2 : String -> ProofScript SatResult

offline_unint_smtlib2 : [String] -> String -> ProofScript SatResult
```

These support the AIGER, DIMACS CNF, shared SAWCore, and SMT-Lib v2 formats, respectively. The shared representation for SAWCore is described in the saw-script repository.

Proof Script Diagnostics

During development of a proof, it can be useful to print various information about the current goal. The following tactics are useful in that context.

```
print_goal : ProofScript ()
print_goal_consts : ProofScript ()
print_goal_depth : Int -> ProofScript ()
print_goal_size : ProofScript ()
```

The print_goal tactic prints the entire goal in SAWCore syntax. The print_goal_depth is intended for especially large goals. It takes an integer argument, n, and prints the goal up to depth n. Any elided subterms are printed with a ... notation. The print_goal_consts tactic prints a list of the opaque constants that are folded in the current goal, and print_goal_size prints the number of nodes in the DAG representation of the goal.

Miscellaneous Tactics

Some proofs can be completed using unsound placeholders, or using techniques that do not require significant computation.

```
assume_unsat : ProofScript SatResult
assume_valid : ProofScript ProofResult
quickcheck : Int -> ProofScript SatResult
trivial : ProofScript SatResult
```

The assume_unsat and assume_valid tactics indicate that the current goal should be considered unsatisfiable or valid, depending on whether the proof script is checking satisfiability or validity. At the moment, java_verify and llvm_verify run their proofs in the a satisfiability-checking context, so assume_unsat is currently the appropriate tactic. This is likely to change in the future.



The quickcheck tactic runs the goal on the given number of random inputs, and succeeds if the result of evaluation is always True. This is unsound, but can be helpful during proof development, or as a way to provide some evidence for the validity of a specification believed to be true but difficult or infeasible to prove.

The trivial tactic states that the current goal should be trivially true (i.e., the constant True or a function that immediately returns True). It fails if that is not the case.

AIG Values and Proofs

TODO: talk about AIG values

AIG operations:

```
bitblast : Term -> TopLevel AIG

cec : AIG -> AIG -> TopLevel ProofResult

load_aig : String -> TopLevel AIG

save_aig : String -> AIG -> TopLevel ()

save_aig_as_cnf : String -> AIG -> TopLevel ()
```

Symbolic Execution

Analysis of Java and LLVM within SAWScript builds heavily on *symbolic execution*, so some background on how this process works can help with understanding the behavior of the available built-in functions.

At the most abstract level, symbolic execution works like normal program execution except that the values of all variables within the program can be arbitrary *expressions*, rather than concrete values, potentially containing free variables. Therefore, each symbolic execution corresponds to some set of possible concrete executions.

As a concrete example, consider the following C program, which returns the maximum of two values:

```
unsigned int max(unsigned int x, unsigned int y) {
   if (y > x) {
      return y;
   } else {
      return x;
   }
}
```

If you call this function with two concrete inputs, like this:

```
int r = max(5, 4);
```

then it will assign the value 5 to r. However, we can consider what it will do for *arbitrary* inputs, as well. Consider the following example:

```
int r = max(a, b);
```

where a and b are variables with unknown values. It is still possible to describe the result of the max function in terms of a and b. The following expression describes the value of r:

```
ite (b > a) b a
```

where ite is the "if-then-else" mathematical function that, based on the value of its first argument returns either the second or third. One subtlety of constructing this expression, however, is the treatment of



conditionals in the original program. For any concrete values of a and b, only one branch of the if statement will execute. During symbolic execution, on the other hand, it is necessary to execute both branches, track two different program states (each composed of symbolic values), and then to merge those states after executing the if statement. This merging process takes into account the original branch condition and introduces the ite expression.

A symbolic execution system, then, is very similar to an interpreter with a different notion of what constitutes a value, and which executes *all* paths through the program instead of just one. Therefore, the execution process follows a similar process to that of a normal interpreter, and the process of generating a model for a piece of code is similar to building a test harness for that same code.

More specifically, the setup process for a test harness typically takes the following form:

- Initialize or allocate any resources needed by the code. For Java and LLVM code, this typically means allocating memory and setting the initial values of variables.
- Execute the code.
- Check the desired properties of the system state after the code completes.

Accordingly, three pieces of information are particularly relevant to the symbolic execution process, and therefore needed as input to the symbolic execution system:

- The initial (potentially symbolic) state of the system.
- The code to execute.
- The final state of the system, and which parts of it are relevant to the properties being tested.

In the following sections, we describe how the Java and LLVM analysis primitives work in the context of these key concepts. We start with the simplest situation, in which the structure of the initial and final states can be directly inferred, and move on to more complex cases that require more information from the user.

Symbolic Termination

In the previous section we described the process of executing multiple branches and merging the results when encountering a conditional statement in the program. When a program contains loops, the branch that chooses to continue or terminate a loop could go either way. Therefore, without a bit more information, the most obvious implementation of symbolic execution would never terminate when executing programs that contain loops.

The solution to this problem is to analyze the branch condition whenever considering multiple branches. If the condition for one branch can never be true in the context of the current symbolic state, there is no reason to execute that branch, and skipping it can make it possible for symbolic execution to terminate.

Directly comparing the branch condition to a constant can sometimes be enough to ensure termination. For example, in simple, bounded loops like the following, comparison with a constant is sufficient.

```
for (int i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
    // do something
}</pre>
```

In this case, the value of i is always concrete, and will eventually reach the value 10, at which point the branch corresponding to continuing the loop will be infeasible.

As a more complex example, consider the following function:

```
uint8_t f(uint8_t i) {
  int done = 0;
  while (!done){
```



```
if (i % 8 == 0) done = 1;
i += 5;
}
return i;
}
```

The loop in this function can only be determined to symbolically terminate if the analysis takes into account algebraic rules about common multiples. Similarly, it can be difficult to prove that a base case is eventually reached for all inputs to a recursive program.

In this particular case, however, the code is guaranteed to terminate after a fixed number of iterations (where the number of possible iterations is a function of the number of bits in the integers being used). To show that the last iteration is in fact the last possible, it's necessary to do more than just compare the branch condition with a constant. Instead, we can use the same proof tools that we use to ultimately analyze the generated models to, early in the process, prove that certain branch conditions can never be true (i.e., are unsatisfiable).

Normally, most of the Java and LLVM analysis commands simply compare branch conditions to the constant True or False to determine whether a branch may be feasible. However, each form of analysis allows branch satisfiability checking to be turned on if needed, in which case functions like f above will terminate.

Now let's get into the details of the specific commands available to analyze JVM and LLVM programs.

Loading Code

The first step in analyzing any code is to load it into the system.

To load LLVM code, simply provide the location of a valid bitcode file to the llvm_load_module function.

```
llvm_load_module : String -> TopLevel LLVMModule
```

The resulting LLVMModule can be passed into the various functions described below to perform analysis of specific LLVM functions.

Loading Java code is slightly more complex, because of the more structured nature of Java packages. First, when running saw, two flags control where to look for classes. The -j flag takes the name of a JAR file as an argument, and adds the contents of that file to the class database. The -c flag takes the name of a directory as an argument, and adds all class files found in that directory (and its subdirectories) to the class database. By default, the current directory is included in the class path. However, the Java runtime and standard library (usually called rt.jar) is generally required for any non-trivial Java code, and is installed in a wide variety of different locations. Therefore, for most Java analysis, you must provide a -j argument specifying where to find this file.

Once the class path is configured, you can pass the name of a class to the java_load_class function.

```
java_load_class : String -> TopLevel JavaClass
```

The resulting JavaClass can be passed into the various functions described below to perform analysis of specific Java methods.

Direct Extraction

In the case of the max function described earlier, the relevant inputs and outputs are directly apparent. The function takes two integer arguments, always uses both of them, and returns a single integer value, making no other changes to the program state.

In cases like this, a direct translation is possible, given only an identification of which code to execute. Two functions exist to handle such simple code:

```
java_extract : JavaClass -> String -> JavaSetup () -> TopLevel Term
```



```
llvm_extract : LLVMModule -> String -> LLVMSetup () -> TopLevel Term
```

The structure of these two functions is essentially identical. The first argument describes where to look for code (in either a Java class or an LLVM module, loaded as described in the previous section). The second argument is the name of the function or method to extract.

The third argument provides the ability to configure other aspects of the symbolic execution process. At the moment, only one option possible: pass in <code>java_pure</code> or <code>llvm_pure</code>, for Java and LLVM respectively, and the default extraction process is simply to set both arguments to fresh symbolic variables.

When the ..._extract functions complete, they return a Term corresponding to the value returned by the function or method.

These functions currently work only for code that takes some fixed number of integral parameters, returns an integral result, and does not access any dynamically-allocated memory (although temporary memory allocated during execution and not visible afterward is allowed).

TODO: note safety conditions

Creating Symbolic Variables

The direct extraction process just discussed automatically introduces symbolic variables and then abstracts over them, yielding a function in the intermediate language of SAW that reflects the semantics of the original Java or LLVM code. For simple functions, this is often the most convenient interface. For more complex code, however, it can be necessary (or more natural) to specifically introduce fresh variables and indicate what portions of the program state they correspond to.

The function fresh_symbolic is responsible for creating new variables in this context.

```
fresh_symbolic : String -> Type -> TopLevel Term
```

The first argument is a name used for pretty-printing of terms and counter-examples. In many cases it makes sense for this to be the same as the name used within SAWScript, as in the following:

```
x <- fresh_symbolic "x" ty;</pre>
```

However, using the same name is not required.

The second argument to fresh_symbolic is the type of the fresh variable. Ultimately, this will be a SAWCore type, however it it usually convenient to specify it using Cryptol syntax using the type quoting brackets {| and |}. So, for example, creating a 32-bit integer, as might be used to represent a Java int or an LLVM i32, can be done as follows:

```
x <- fresh_symbolic "x" {| [32] |};
TODO: talk about abstract_symbolic and its ilk.
abstract_symbolic : Term -> Term
lambda : Term -> Term -> Term
lambdas : [Term] -> Term -> Term
```

Monolithic Symbolic Execution

In many cases, the inputs and outputs of a function are more complex than supported by the direct extraction process just described. In that case, it's necessary to provide more information. In particular, following the structure described earlier, we need:



- For every pointer or object reference, how much storage space it refers to.
- A list of (potentially symbolic) values for some elements of the initial program state.
- A list of elements of the final program state to treat as outputs.

This capability is provided by the following built-in functions:

For both functions, the first two arguments are the same as for the direct extraction functions from the previous section, identifying what code to execute. The final argument for both indicates whether or not to do branch satisfiability checking.

The remaining arguments are slightly different for the two functions, due to the differences between JVM and LLVM programs.

For java_symexec, the third argument, of type [(String, Term)], provides information to configure the initial state of the program. Each String is an expression describing a component of the state, such as the name of a parameter, or a field of an object. Each Term provides the initial value of that component (which may include symbolic variables returned by fresh_symbolic).

The syntax of these expressions is as follows:

- Arguments to the method being analyzed can be referred to by name (if the .class file contains debugging information, as it will be if compiled with javac -g). The expression referring to the value of the argument x in the max example is simply x. For Java methods that do not have debugging information, arguments can be named positionally with args[0], args[1] and so on. The name this refers to the same implicit parameter as the keyword in Java.
- The expression form pkg.C.f refers to the static field f of class C in package pkg (and deeper nesting of packages is allowed).
- The expression return refers to the return value of the method under analysis.
- For an expression e of object type, e.f refers to the instance field f of the object described by e.
- The value of an expression of array type is the entire contents of the array. At the moment, there is no way to refer to individual elements of an array.

The fourth argument of <code>java_symexec</code> is a list of expressions describing the elements of the state to return as outputs. The returned <code>Term</code> will be of tuple type if this list contains more than one element, or simply the value of the one state element if the list contains only one.

The llvm_symexec command uses an expression syntax similar to that for java_symexec, but not identical. The syntax is as follows:

• Arguments to the function being analyzed can be referred to by name (if the name is reflected in the



LLVM code, as it is with code generated by some versions of Clang). The expression referring to the value of the argument x in the max example is simply x. For LLVM functions that do not have named arguments (such as those generated by the Rust compiler, for instance), arguments can be named positionally with args[0], args[1] and so on.

- Global variables can be referred to directly by name.
- The expression return refers to the return value of the function under analysis.
- For any valid expression e referring to something with pointer type, the expression *e refers to the value pointed to. There are some differences between this and the equivalent expression in C, however. If, for instance, e has type int *, then *e will have type int. If e referred to a pointer to an array, the C expression *e would refer to the first element of that array. In SAWScript, it refers to the entire contents of the array, and there is no way to refer to individual elements of an array.
- For any valid expression e referring to a pointer to a struct, the expression e->n, for some natural number n, refers to the nth field of that struct. Unlike the struct type in C, the LLVM struct type does not have named fields, so fields are described positionally.
- For any valid expression e referring to a struct (directly, not via pointer), the expression e.n, for some natural number n, refers to the nth field of that struct. This is particularly useful for fields of nested structs, even if the outer struct is passed by pointer.

In addition to the different expression language, the arguments are similar but not identical. The third argument, of type [(String, Int)], indicates for each pointer how many elements it points to. Before execution, SAW will allocate the given number of elements of the static type of the given expression. The strings given here should be expressions identifying *pointers* rather than the values of those pointers.

The fourth argument, of type [(String, Term, Int)] indicates the initial values to write to the program state before execution. The elements of this list should include *value* expressions. For example, if a function has an argument named p of type int *, the allocation list might contain the element ("p", 1), whereas the initial values list might contain the element ("*p", v, 1), for some value v. The Int portion of each tuple indicates how large the term is: for a term with Cryptol type [n]a, the Int argument should be n. In the future we expect this value to be inferred.

Finally, the fifth argument, of type [(String, Int)] indicates the elements to read from the final state. For each entry, the String should be a value expression, and the Int parameter indicates how many elements to read. The number of elements does not need to be the same as the number of elements allocated or written in the initial state. However, reading past the end of an object or reading a location that has not been initialized will lead to an error.

TODO: note safety variables

Examples

The following code is a complete example of using the java_symexec function.

TODO: add safety variable to the following

```
// show that add(x,y) == add(y,x) for all x and y
cadd <- java_load_class "Add";
x <- fresh_symbolic "x" {| [32] |};
y <- fresh_symbolic "y" {| [32] |};
ja <- java_symexec cadd "add" [("x", x), ("y", y)] ["return"] true;
print_term ja;
ja' <- abstract_symbolic ja;
prove_print abc {{ \a b -> ja' a b == ja' b a }};
print "Done.";
```



It first loads the Add class and creates two 32-bit symbolic variables, x and y. It then symbolically execute the add method with the symbolic variables just created passed in as its two arguments, and returns the symbolic expression denoting the method's return value.

Once the script has a Term in hand (the variable ja), it prints it out and then translates the version containing symbolic variables into a function that takes concrete values for those variables as arguments. Finally, it proves that the resulting function is commutative.

Running this script through saw gives the following output:

TODO: update output

Limitations

Although the symexec functions are more flexible than the extract functions, they also have some limitations and assumptions.

- When allocating memory for objects or arrays, each allocation is done independently. Therefore, there is currently no way to create data structures that share sub-structures. No aliasing is possible. Therefore, it is important to take into account that any proofs performed on the results of symbolic execution will not necessarily reflect the behavior of the code being analyzed if it is called in a context where its inputs involve aliasing or overlapping memory regions.
- The sizes and pointer relationships between objects in the heap must be specified before doing symbolic execution. Therefore, the results may not reflect the behavior of the code when called with, for example, arrays of different sizes.
- In Java, any variables of class type are initialized to refer to an object of that specific, statically-declared type, while in general they may refer to objects of subtypes of that type. Therefore, the code under analysis may behave differently when given parameters of more specific types.

Specification-Based Verification

The built-in functions described so far work by extracting models of code which can then be used for a variety of purposes, including proofs about the properties of the code.

When the goal is to prove equivalence between some Java or LLVM code and a specification, however, sometimes a more declarative approach is convenient. The following two functions allow for combined model extraction and verification.



```
[LLVMMethodSpec] ->
LLVMSetup () ->
TopLevel LLVMMethodSpec
```

Like all of the functions for Java and LLVM analysis, the first two parameters indicate what code to analyze. The third parameter is used for compositional verification, as described in the next section. For now, the empty list works fine. The final parameter describes the specification of the code to be analyzed, built out of commands of type JavaSetup or LLVMSetup. In most cases, this parameter will be a do block containing a sequence of commands of this type. Specifications are slightly different between Java and LLVM, but make use of largely the same set of concepts.

- Several commands are available to configure the contents of the initial state, before symbolic execution.
- Several commands are available to describe what to check of the final state, after symbolic execution.
- One final command describes how to prove that the code under analysis matches the specification.

The following sections describe the details of configuring initial states, stating the expected properties of the final state, and proving that the final state actually satisfies those properties.

Configuring the Initial State

The first step in configuring the initial state is to specify which program variables are important, and to specify their types more precisely. The symbolic execution system currently expects the layout of memory before symbolic execution to be completely specified. As in <code>llvm_symexec</code>, SAW needs information about how much space every pointer or reference variable points to. And, with one exception, SAW assumes that every pointer points to a distinct region of memory.

Because of this structure, the are separate functions used to describe variables with values of base types versus variables of pointer type.

For simple integer values, use java_var or llvm_var.

```
java_var : String -> JavaType -> JavaSetup Term
llvm_var : String -> LLVMType -> LLVMSetup Term
```

These functions both take a variable name and a type. The variable names use the same syntax described earlier for <code>java_symexec</code> and <code>llvm_symexec</code>. The types are built up using the following functions:

```
java_bool : JavaType
java_byte : JavaType
java_char : JavaType
java_short : JavaType
java_int : JavaType
java_long : JavaType
java_float : JavaType
java_double : JavaType
java_class : String -> JavaType
java_array : Int -> JavaType -> JavaType
llvm_int : Int -> LLVMType
llvm_array : Int -> LLVMType
llvm_struct : String -> LLVMType
llvm_float : LLVMType
llvm_double : LLVMType
```



Most of these types are straightforward mappings to the standard Java and LLVM types. The one key difference is that arrays must have a fixed, concrete size. Therefore, all analysis results are under the assumption that any arrays have the specific size indicated, and may not hold for other sizes. The <code>llvm_int</code> function also takes an <code>Int</code> parameter indicating the variable's bit width.

```
TODO \sim llvm_type : String -> LLVMType \sim
```

The Term returned by java_var and llvm_var is a representation of the *initial value* of the variable being declared. It can be used in any later expression.

While java_var and llvm_var declare elements of the program state that have values representable in the logic of SAW, pointers and references exist only inside the simulator: they are not representable before or after symbolic execution. Because of this, different functions are available to declare variables of pointer or reference type.

```
java_class_var : String -> JavaType -> JavaSetup ()
llvm_ptr : String -> LLVMType -> LLVMSetup ()
```

For both functions, the first argument is the name of the state element that they refer to. For <code>java_class_var</code>, the second argument is the type of the object, which should always be the result of the <code>java_class</code> function called with an appropriate class name. Arrays in Java are treated as if they were values, rather than references, since their values are directly representable in SAWCore. For <code>llvm_ptr</code>, the second argument is the type of the value pointed to. Both functions return no useful value (the unit type ()), since the values of pointers are not meaningful in SAWCore. In LLVM, arrays are represented as pointers, and therefore the pointer and the value pointed to must be declared separately:

```
llvm_ptr "a" (llvm_array 10 (llvm_int 32));
a <- llvm_var "*a" (llvm_array 10 (llvm_int 32));</pre>
```

The java_assert and llvm_assert functions take a Term of boolean type as an argument which states a condition that must be true in the initial state, before the function under analysis executes. The term can refer to the initial values of any declared program variables.

When the condition required of an initial state is that a variable always has a specific, concrete value, optimized forms of these functions are available. The <code>java_assert_eq</code> and <code>llvm_assert_eq</code> functions take two arguments: an expression naming a location in the program state, and a <code>Term</code> representing an initial value. These functions work as destructive updates in the state of the symbolic simulator, and can make branch conditions more likely to reduce to constants. This means that, although <code>..._assert_eq</code> functions can be used to make semantically-equivalent statements, using the latter can make symbolic termination more likely.

Finally, although the default configuration of the symbolic simulators in SAW is to make every pointer or reference refer to a fresh region of memory separate from all other pointers, it is possible to override this behavior for Java programs by declaring that a set references can alias each other.

```
java_may_alias : [String] -> JavaSetup ()
```

This function takes a list of names referring to references, and declares that any element of this set may (or may not) alias any other. Because this is a may-alias relationship, the verification process involves a separate proof for each possible aliasing configuration. At the moment, LLVM heaps must be completely disjoint.

```
TODO ~_ java_requires_class : String -> JavaSetup () ~_
TODO ~_ llvm allocates : String -> LLVMSetup () llvm assert null : String -> LLVMSetup () ~_
```



Checking the Final State

The simplest statement about the expected final state of the method or function under analysis is to declare what value it should return (generally as a function of the variables declared as part of the initial state).

```
java_return : Term -> JavaSetup ()
llvm_return : Term -> LLVMSetup ()
llvm_return_arbitrary : LLVMSetup ()
```

The llvm_return_arbitrary command indicates that the function does return a value, but that we don't want to specify what value it returns.

For side effects, the following two functions allow declaration of the final expected value of that the program state should contain when execution finishes.

```
java_ensure_eq : String -> Term -> JavaSetup ()
llvm_ensure_eq : String -> Term -> LLVMSetup ()
```

For the most part, these two functions may refer to the same set of variables used to set up the initial state. However, for functions that return pointers or objects, the special name return is also available. It can be used in <code>java_class_var</code> and <code>llvm_ptr</code> calls, to declare the more specific object or array type of a return value, and in the ..._ensure_eq function to declare the associated values. For LLVM arrays, typical use is like this:

```
llvm_ensure_eq "*return" v;
```

The return expression is also useful for fields of returned objects or structs:

```
java_ensure_eq "return.f" v;
llvm_ensure_eq "return->0" v;
```

Running Proofs

Once the constraints on the initial and final states have been declared, what remains is to prove that the code under analysis actually meets these specifications. The goal of SAW is to automate this proof as much as possible, but some degree of input into the proof process is sometimes necessary, and can be provided with the following functions:

```
java_verify_tactic : ProofScript SatResult -> JavaSetup ()
llvm_verify_tactic : ProofScript SatResult -> LLVMSetup ()
```

Both of these take a proof script as an argument, which specifies how to perform the proof. If the setup block does not call one of these functions, SAW will print a warning message and skip the proof (which can sometimes be a useful behavior during debugging, or in compositional verification as described later).

Compositional Verification

The primary advantage of the specification-based approach to verification is that it allows for compositional reasoning. That is, when proving something about a given method or function, we can make use of things we have already proved about its callees, rather than analyzing them afresh. This enables us to reason about much larger and more complex systems than otherwise possible.



The java_verify and llvm_verify functions returns values of type JavaMethodSpec and LLVMMethodSpec, respectively. These values are opaque objects that internally contain all of the information provided in the associated JavaSetup or LLVMSetup blocks, along with the results of the verification process.

Any of these MethodSpec objects can be passed in via the third argument of the ..._verify functions. For any function or method specified by one of these parameters, the simulator will not follow calls to the associated target. Instead, it will perform the following steps:

- Check that all ..._assert and ..._assert_eq statements in the specification are satisfied.
- Check that any aliasing is compatible with the aliasing restricted stated with java_may_alias, for Java programs.
- Check that all classes required by the target method have already been initialized, for Java programs.
- Update the simulator state as described in the specification.

Normally, a MethodSpec comes as the result of both simulation and proof of the target code. However, in some cases, it can be useful to use it to specify some code that either doesn't exist or is hard to prove. In those cases, the <code>java_no_simulate</code> or <code>llvm_no_simulate</code> functions can be used to indicate not to even try to simulate the code being specified, and instead return a <code>MethodSpec</code> that is assumed to be correct.

The default behavior of <code>java_verify</code> disallows allocation within the method being analyzed. This restriction makes it possible to reason about all possible effects of a method, since only effects specified with <code>java_ensure_eq</code> or <code>java_modify</code> are allowed. For many cryptographic applications, this behavior is ideal, because it is important to know whether, for instance, temporary variables storing key material have been cleared after use. Garbage on the heap that has been collected but not cleared could let confidential information leak.

If allocation is not a concern in a particular application, the <code>java_allow_alloc</code> function makes allocation within legal within the method being specified.

Controlling Symbolic Execution

One other set of commands is available to control the symbolic execution process. These control the use of satisfiability checking to determine whether both paths are feasible when encountering branches in the program, which is particularly relevant for branches controlling the iteration of loops.

```
java_sat_branches : Bool -> JavaSetup ()
llvm_sat_branches : Bool -> LLVMSetup ()
```

The Bool parameter has the same effect as the Bool parameter passed to java_symexec and llvm_symexec.

```
TODO: explain \sim llvm_simplify_addrs : Bool -> LLVMSetup () \sim
```