Report

Ackee Solana Bootcamp

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Initial setup

Fuzzing: I've started by going through the code base and selecting every potential critical function to be tested:

- Initialize
- Withdraw
- Deposit
- SwapBaseInput
- SwapBaseOutput
- CollectFundFee

After selecting a first function or functions, I bring the target program function under close inspection to gather the collection of accounts and arguments that are expected by the given function.

With the list of expected accounts in hand, I go through each anchor constraint that will likely tell in what state the given account is expected to be passed in to function. Then I start populating the already initialized **trident-tests/fuzz-instructions.rs get_accounts()** function from the given Targets function I am testing at moment, what follows now is quick break down how I approached Accounts configuration in my test:

Following the bootcamp methodology I have abused of methods within the framework, as

- get_or_create_account(), which I have used in this case mostly not exclusively for Key Pairs.
- get account() for when there was a possibility of the account having already initialized.
- set_account_custom() mostly but not exclusively used for PDA account creation with custom data, although in a given instance facing a Mint supply check I have used this method to create a Mint that would pass the given check a specific test.
- Lastly, well known program Addresses.

Initialize function Context Accounts and its given constraints can be found at:

raydium-cp-swap/programs/cp-swap/instructions/initialize.rs

From here I shall take a brief tour in the little that has been made to adapt tests for very specific situations at times in which a potential bug/vulnerabilities could have been tested, instead of

going through the specifics of configuration in every test, as I believe I have mostly summarized it above.

Creating standalone PDA's state Accounts for specific tests:

Using the very powerful <u>set_account_custom()</u> method, I could meticulously craft an account to test edge cases, as example.

PoolState

```
let pool_state = raydium_cp_swap::states::pool::PoolState {
   amm_config: amm_config_pda,
let mut data = Vec::new();
data.extend from slice(&discriminator);
let ptr = &pool_state as *const _ as *const u8;
for i in 0..mem::size_of::<raydium_cp_swap::states::pool::PoolState>() {
       data.push(*ptr.add(i));
client.set account custom(
```

AmmConfig

Observation

```
let (observation_state,_)= Pubkey::find_program_address(
    &[
```

```
b"observation",
let observation_struct = raydium_cp_swap::states::oracle::Observation {
let obs = raydium_cp_swap::states::oracle::ObservationState{
   observations: [observation struct; 100],
let discriminator = raydium_cp_swap::states::oracle::ObservationState::discriminator();
data.extend_from_slice(&discriminator);
let ptr = &obs as *const _ as *const u8;
for i in 0..mem::size_of::<raydium_cp_swap::states::oracle::ObservationState>() {
       data.push(*ptr.add(i));
client.set_account_custom(
```

After fixing accounts to meet every potential test needs, I move onto $get_data()$ where much of the fuzzing was conducted as well.

There is not much to explain here, each instructions has its Data struct which is allow for easy fuzzing setup, using: self.data.arg we have moved a placeholder into place that will be used by the fuzzer to iterate over the specific data type and effect permutation in value.

In *FuzzAccounts* I've picked which account I would have the need to store or fuzz, by setting them up correctly I could make use of the very convenient methods such as: get or create account() and etc..

Testing

Having thoroughly fuzzed(guided) instructions both in their both happy and unhappy paths, with certain goals in place, such as not only running complete integration tests that could perhaps lead me to an edge case but also considering low hanging fruits.

Proceeded through Solana's most common vulnerabilities:

- Missing ownership checks
- Missing signer checks
- Signed invocation of unverified programs
- Solana account confusions
- Missing freeze authority checks
- Insufficient SPL account verification
- Arithmetic over and underflows
- Loss of precision

But only Low severity was found during the assessment, in which code review played a bigger part:

No freeze authority checks

Description: During Initialization, code makes a call to create_pool, where create the pool, note that initialization makes an almost complete set of checks, including:

- Decimal
- Authority
- Token_program
- Payer

It lacks freeze authority checks, while not much of an attack matter, but more of potential scam, where a malicious pool creator could retrieve its content and freeze them, although very unlikely.

Overflow on Initialization (edge case crash likely cause by adding lamports to an)

No Mint check on recipient token account:

Description: During analyses of both collect_fund_fee and collect_protocol_fund_fee, it is noted that while the function itself is well guarded and can be called by the owner or admin, both recipient_token_0_account and recipient_token_1_account are lacking mint checks, but in this very case that is not an issue since its check for a TokenAccount, and mint_to will accuse the incompatibilities of mint in the account without any losses.

No owner check on recipient token account:

Description:

Both collect_fund_fee and collect_protocol_fund_fee are supposed to Only be called by its admin or fund_owner can that will be collecting the fee.

Although very unlikely any account with the correct mint could be passed here, which means an account who is not intended to be the recipient of the fees.

Loss of precision:

Description: the program relies heavily on integer arithmetics which could have a degree of loss of precision, although this would potentially only show at very edge cases, and it would not incur in relevant losses, nonetheless I would recommend the use of fixed point arithmetics instead.

Fuzzing

Appropriate error handling:

Description:

During a run of fuzzing unhappy paths, I came across a crash which was caused by *unwrap()*, during improper data account creation.

Throughout the code there are multiple instances of *unwrap()* method being used, while it's well known that in instances where *unwrap()* over a None value will likely cause the program to panic.

```
-banks" one=1i message="panicked at 'called `Result::unwrap()` on an `Err`
```

and

thread 'solBankForksCli' panicked at /home/m4ud/.cargo/registry/src/index.crates.io-6f17d22bba15001f/anchor-lang-0.30.1/src/common.rs:10:61: called `Option::unwrap()` on a `None` value stack backtrace:

0: rust_begin_unwind

at /rustc/eeb90cda1069383f56a2637cbd3037bdf508841c/library/std/src/nanicking_rs:665-5

Note: as I the Raydium projects happened to find itself on a very good standing with good coding and security practices it lead me to not have any good finds with the fuzzing, so I moved onto a smaller Escrow project, which I will be sharing here some bugs found in edge case with the fuzzer help:

Overflow

When sending lamports back, it can be seen that the initialized_amout practically held the maximum value for an u64.

Unwrap

```
| 2024-09-10700:07:18.932773104Z DEBUG solana_runtime::message_processor::stable_log| | Program Tokenkeg0fcZy1NwAJbhBGKPFXCNUBYf95s623VQ5DA invoke [2] | 2024-09-10700:07:18.39380137Z DEBUG solana_runtime::message_processor::stable_log| | Program log: Instruction: InitializeEmutableCounter | 2024-09-10700:07:18.39380137Z DEBUG solana_runtime::message_processor::stable_log| Program log: Instruction: InitializeEmutableCounter | 2024-09-10700:07:18.39380137Z DEBUG solana_runtime::message_processor::stable_log| Program Tokenkeg0fcZy1NwAJbhBGKPFXCNuBUY595823VQ5DA consumed 1465 of 186377 computer | 2024-09-10700:07:18.39380738Z DEBUG solana_runtime::message_processor::stable_log| Program Tokenkeg0fcZy1NwAJbhBGKPFXCNuBUY595823VQ5DA invoke [2] | 2024-09-10700:07:18.39338738Z DEBUG solana_runtime::message_processor::stable_log| Program Tokenkeg0fcZy1NwAJbhBGKPFXCNuBUY595823VQ5DA consumed 4241 of 182493 computer | 2024-09-10700:07:18.393313902 DEBUG solana_runtime::message_processor::stable_log| Program Tokenkeg0fcZy1NwAJbhBGKPFXCNuBUY595823VQ5DA consumed 4241 of 182493 computer | 2024-09-10700:07:18.393378393Z DEBUG solana_runtime::message_processor::stable_log| Program Tokenkeg0fcZy1NwAJbhBGKPFXCNuBUY595823VQ5DA consumed 4241 of 182493 computer units | 2024-09-10700:07:18.393378393Z DEBUG solana_runtime::message_processor::stable_log| Program Tokenkeg0fcZy1NwAJbhBGKPFXCNuBUY595823VQ5DA invoke [1] | 2024-09-10700:07:18.393378355Z DEBUG solana_runtime::message_processor::stable_log| Program Tokenkeg0fcZy1NwAJbhBGKPFXCNuBUY595823VQ5DA invoke [1] | 2024-09-10700:07:18.393573DEBUG solana_runtime::message_processor::stable_log| Program Tokenkeg0fcZy1NwAJbhBGKPFXCNuBUY595823VQ5DA invoke [1] | 2024-09-10700:07:18.393573CBBUG solana_runtime::message_processor::stable_log| Program Tokenkeg0fcZy1NwAJbhBGKPFXCNuBUY595823VQ5DA invoke [1] | 2024-09-10700:07:18.393082304Z DEBUG solana_runtime::message_processor::stable_log| Program Tokenkeg0fcZy1NwAJbhBGKPFXCNuBUY595823VQ5DA invoke [1] | 2024-09-10700:07:18.393082304Z DEBUG solana_run
```

Potential unexpected behavior in trident causing panic:

Description: test a function that would call CloseAccount at the end would cause the account to not be in the correct state for account_snapshot descrialization.

```
2924-09-10711.18:37.54932472 DEBUS solana runtiae:::message processor::stable log)
Program Tokenkeg0fczylmAublboCRPXCNubUP595623V05DA consumed 1022 of 188317 common Tokenkeg0fczylmAublboCRPXCNubUP595623V05DA success 2024-09-10701.18:37.549701222 DEBUS solana runtiae:::message processor::stable log)
Program Tokenkeg0fczylmAublboCRPXCNubUP595623V05DA success 2024-09-10701.18:37.549701202 DEBUS solana runtiae:::message processor::stable log)
Program Tokenkeg0fczylmAublboCRPXCNubUP595623V05DA common Tokenkeg0fczylmAublboCRPXCNubUP595623V05DA common
```