

# Managing Risk

## Security

Otago Polytechnic  
Dunedin, New Zealand

# HOW SECURE CAN WE BE?

Last time we said that perfect security is not possible. Given that, we need a way to talk about how secure we are or can be.

# SECURITY TRADE OFFS

You don't get security for free. You always have to trade away something to get it.

- ▶ Money
- ▶ Time
- ▶ Convenience
- ▶ Capability

Often we give up some combination of all of these.

# ARE WE GETTING A GOOD DEAL?

- ▶ Once we recognise that security has a cost, the question isn't really, "How secure can we be?"
- ▶ Instead, the question is, "How much are we willing to trade away in return for some security?"
- ▶ The thing is, people are not very good at assessing their security trade-offs.

# RISK

- ▶ In our daily lives we may be able to tolerate our less than ideal decision making.
- ▶ In a business setting we need to do better.
- ▶ The name for this thing we need to measure is *risk*.
- ▶ Risk has a standard unit of measure. It's dollars per year.

# QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS

- ▶ One way to assess risk is to perform *quantitative risk analysis*.
- ▶ Full risk analysis is the work of specialists, but we can perform some basic analysis on our own.

# ELEMENTS OF RISK ANALYSIS

To analyse our risk, we consider

- ▶ Assets - We assign a dollar value to them.
- ▶ Threats to those assets and the probability that the threatened harm will occur.
- ▶ Countermeasures that guard against the threatened harm or that reduce the amount of harm. These have a cost that we measure in dollars.

## AM EXAMPLE

Suppose our business has a warehouse/shipping facility that ships orders to our customers at a rate of \$1000 of revenue per hour.

- ▶ Asset: There is a computer system that the staff use to process orders.
- ▶ Threat: A power cut would take the system down.
- ▶ Countermeasure: We could get a UPS and backup generator.



## DOING THE NUMBERS

- ▶ The value of the asset is \$1000 per hour.
- ▶ Suppose we can expect 2 hours of power cuts in a typical year.
- ▶ Our risk (cost per hour of downtime) \* (expected downtime per year) or  $\$1000 * 2 = \$2000$
- ▶ This is called our *annual loss expectancy*, or ALE.

## DOING THE NUMBERS

- ▶ Now suppose we can install and operate a backup power system for \$6000.
- ▶ The system is expected to last for 5 years.
- ▶ Our annual cost is  $\$6000/5 = \$1200$
- ▶ We call this the *annual cost of control*, or ACC

# DOING THE NUMBERS

- ▶ Now we can look at the cost/benefit.
- ▶  $(\text{ALE without backup}) - (\text{ALE with backup}) - (\text{Cost of backup})$
- ▶  $\$2000 - 0 - \$1200 = \$800$
- ▶ In other words, backup power reduces a \$2000 risk to an \$800 risk. It's a good trade off.

## ANOTHER EXAMPLE

Suppose that your boss comes in on Monday morning after having heard about cryptolocker-like malware attacks, in which an attacker encrypts all your files and then demands a ransom, say \$25,000 in return for the encryption key. Your boss is in a near panic and insists on strong protective measures.

# DETERMINE THE RISK

- ▶ Your research shows that the probability of this malware intrusion event is only 0.0001 per week.
- ▶ This means that your risk exposure, or ALE is (cost of intrusion event) \* (probability per week) \* (52 weeks)
- ▶  $ALE = \$25,000 * 0.0001 * 52 = \$130$
- ▶ In other words the risk is very low.

## HOWEVER...

Control measures for this risk include anti-malware software and backup/recovery systems. So, the \$130 of risk exposure in this case can be added to a larger risk exposure suite when determining the budget for malware protection and backup.