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Secure Internet Of Things Sensor Platform

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Abstract

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Secure Internet Of Things Sensor Platform

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This report aims to explain how to build a sensor platform that can transmit data securely across an unsecure network and to show that security on low powered microcontrollers is possible and easy. It introduces a light weight cryptographic library and demonstrates it's effectiveness on a low powered system and provides considerations on the level of security it provides.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The Internet of Things or IoT is the concept of a huge network of physical objects connected together and communicating between themselves and to the world wide web. Devices can include domestic appliances, cars and even buildings. It is a rapidly growing field with over 50 million devices expected to be connected to the web by 2020[1]. As such the security of the transmissions of these devices is becoming a more and more pressing issue. IoT's main benefits are the remote control of devices and appliances, the ability of the device to send information about it's state, such as a vending machine reporting that it has run out of a certain item, and to allow the machines to be more automated and to work with other machines, like a home hub device that can turn on the lights and central heating when an occupant is arriving home, with the lights and heating not being connected to each other but to the central hub.

However IoT benefits will be severely limited if it is insecure. IoT is an emerging field but there have already been some high profile security disasters. Ranging from relatively less serious problems such as some attackers being able to glean WiFi network information from internet connected lights[2] to the very concerning and potentially fatal security breaches like someone gaining unauthorised access to your car and assuming control. There have been three examples of this in the last few years with a Jeep Cherokee[3], a Toyota Prius[4] and a Tesla Model S[5] being the cars effected. The hackers were able to control the accelerator, door locks and brakes, among other things. In the Jeep Cherokee the attackers remotely disabled the engine of the car as it was driving up a freeway at 70 MPH. This highlights a very real problem that will only become more important as the field grows. Too often security is an afterthought but it really needs to be built into products from the offset.

The challenge is to provide a cryptographic solution that is similar in strength of security to solutions that are implemented on more powerful servers and computers but on much smaller and less powerful devices. A solution that performs at an acceptable speed and provides good security with reduced power consumption.

Google and British Gas have recently released Nest and Hive respectively. Nest was released in 2014 and Hive in 2013. These both involve controlling your central heating remotely and programming in days when you won't be at home and therefore have no need of heating. However, it was two whole years later upon independent investigators discovering that information, such as the dates when the heating was on or off, was being sent unencrypted that

British Gas decided to encrypt their product Hive's transmissions. This plain-text data could be used to work out when the occupants were away as the central heating was likely to be off in that case. With the release of Hive 2 they patched the problems found but they should never have been there in the first place. Found in the same investigation, Google had a lesser fault with Nest which was sending the post code of the user unencrypted, which has since been patched. It is only when caught or there is a high profile breach that companies take the steps to fully secure their customers information [6].

Security on IoT devices is a new implementation of an old problem, developers and companies sometimes don't employ effective security on the private data they store, moving to smaller internet connected devices doesn't change this fundamental problem. There are studies about and examples of cryptographic systems for microcontrollers, it is not something that cannot be done. However, perhaps it is too difficult at present for smaller development teams or has too much of a foot print in terms of computational resources, power or time that it gets pushed to the side. Data security is a fundamentally important concept and one that is necessary for the implementation of all applications, especially those that involve user's private data otherwise there is the potential for loss of money, intellectual property, goods, reputation and health. These problems affect both companies and the consumer.

This project will look into creating a solution for the transmission of secure, authenticated and encrypted data across an unsecure network that can be easily implemented, has a small code size and acceptable performance and security considering the code is run on a low powered device. As it is low powered the power consumption will be monitored as that would be a consideration if the device was to be powered by batteries. The example used to work with is the secure transmission of a user's private temperature data. If they have a system that monitors the temperature of rooms, that data can be used to figure out when they are likely to be home or not. So, using a base platform in the user network that has access to the temperature sensors throughout the house, it takes the sensor data, signs then authenticate encrypts it before sending it to a remote server.

Chapter 2

Background

2.1 Cryptography

Cryptography is the practise of and study of techniques for secure communication in the presence of attackers. To do so, one can use encryption where by messages are encoded in such a way that only authorised parties, or at least parties in possession of the keys, can view them. Hashing, usually packaged within functions, is used to provide message integrity. Digital signatures can be used to provide authentication. There are two main ways of encryption Symmetric Key encryption and Asymmetric Key encryption. In Symmetric Key encryption both parties have the same key which can encrypt and decrypt messages that are sent between them. The problem is that if Bob wants to send an encrypted message to Alice, he must get the secret key to her. The key distribution problem is a well known problem in cryptography and is explained further in section 2.7. Currently the most secure way for the transmission of secret keys is to hand them over in person, in private. This project uses asymmetric key securely encryption and digital signatures.

2.1.1 Asymmetric Key Encryption

To get round the key distribution problem, one can use Asymmetric Key encryption, a visual depiction can be seen in figure 2.1. Asymmetric key encryption involves a private key and a public key, the private key is generally random or pseudo random data and is used to generate a corresponding public key. The public key is mathematically linked to the private key but it is computationally infeasible to calculate the private key back from the public key. This public key can be given out freely and is not a secret. So if Bob sends a message to Alice he encrypts the message with her public key and she can decrypt it with her private key. Anyone can encrypt with the public key but only the private key can decrypt. This type of key encryption gets past the sharing key problem but encryption only stops attackers from reading the message. The receiver cannot know who sent him the message as encryption does not prove who the message was sent by. The image shown in figure 2.1 is taken from the book, Network Security [7].




FIGURE 2.1: Asymmetric Key Encryption

2.1.2 Authenticated Encryption

Authenticated Encryption, AE, differs from encryption in that it offers authenticity and integrity in addition to confidentiality. A solely AE public key function would require the plaintext message, the private key of the sender and the public key of the recipient to encrypt. The recipient uses a function that would require the ciphertext message, the recipient's private key and the sender's public key in order to decrypt, authenticated and check for integrity. During the encryption process a MAC is produced from the encrypted cipher text and sent with the cipher text. The recipient creates the MAC again from the ciphertext and compares this generated MAC to the received MAC. If they are the same then the message is authentic and integrity is sound.

2.1.3 Digital Signature

This is a mathematical scheme for proving message authenticity, integrity and message non-repudiation. Similarly to asymmetric key encryption a random secret key is created with a corresponding public key. The algorithm takes in a message and a secret key and creates a hash from them. It then appends that signature to the message. If Alice signs a message in this way, Bob can use another algorithm to verify the message with the Alice's public key and signature. It is important to note that the data is not hidden at this point, it is still in plain text.

2.1.4 Nonce

A cryptographic nonce is some arbitrary data that is used in the encryption process so that the process doesn't produce the same cipher text for the same plain text if repeated. Therefore a nonce can only be used once. It will most likely be random or psuedo random data and it is incorporated into cryptographic systems in some way such that old communications that an attacker

may have captured can't be sent again and accepted as normal. The same nonce used to encrypt the message is needed to decrypt the message so the synchronisation of nonces is very important. Some systems use counters as nonces or the nonces on each side are dependent on the same calculation but nonces created in those ways aren't as secure as generating a new nonce randomly as they can easily be predicted.

2.1.5 Message Authentication Code

A MAC is a small piece of information that is used to authenticate a message and prove its integrity. The MAC algorithm takes in a message and a key and produces a MAC, then the MAC is sent with the message and the receiver runs the algorithm like the sender, with the same message and key, and if the resulting MAC is the same as the received MAC then the message integrity and authentication can be proved. MACs differ from digital signatures in that it does not provide message repudiation.

2.1.6 Stream Cipher

A stream cipher is a symmetric key cipher where the plain text message is combined with a cipher digit stream so that each digit of the data is encrypted individually. The combining operation is an XOR. This can be useful for applications that are constantly sending data, for example streaming encrypted video.

2.2 TweetNaCl

NaCl or "Salt" is a simple to use high-speed library for authenticated encryption. It provides both Asymmetric and Symmetric encryption, authentication and message integrity with SHA-512. The authors are Daniel J. Bernstein, Tanja Lange and Peter Schwabe but at points it does rely on some third party implementations. The API is simple, having only a handful of methods but provides good, high performance security.

It provides everything needed for secure data transmission but unfortunately the library is relatively quite large, the Arduino Due has at its disposal 512KB flash memory but the full NaCl library is 3MB. Fortunately the same creators along with Bernard van Gastel, Wesley Janssen and Sjaak Smetsers made TweetNaCl. Which is a tiny implementation of NaCl, still providing good performance and good security but with a significantly smaller code size of 40KB. It retains the same protections against timing attacks, cache-timing attacks, has no branches depending on secret data and no array indices depending on secret data. In addition it is thread-safe and has no dynamic memory allocation[8]. It is portable and easy to integrate, the library is easily added as it consists of two files, there is no complicated configuration to be set up or any dependencies on external libraries. Because of this compactness it is

easy to read and understand it's operation. Although not as fast as NaCl it is still fast enough for most applications. The authors of the library feel that the performance is acceptable as "Most applications can tolerate the 4.2 million cycles that OpenSSL uses on an Ivy Bridge CPU for RSA-2048 decryption, for example, so they can certainly tolerate the 2.5 million cycles that TweetNaCl uses for higher-security decryption (Curve25519)." [9].

TweetNaCl is still small after compilation at 11KB thus reducing instruction cache misses. It is a full library and not a set of isolated functions, for this TweetNaCl application, only six functions are needed. For public-key authenticated keypairs *crypto_box_keypair*, *crypto_box* to authenticated encrypt and *crypto_box_open* for authenticated decryption. Similarly for signature keypairs *crypto_sign_keypair*, to sign messages *crypto_sign* and to verify signatures *crypto_sign_open*. A keypair is a mathematically paired public key and private key. TweetNaCl is open source and the developers encourage it to be used as much as possible.

Unfortunately the library won't compile as is on a Arduino, one problem is that there is no `/dev/random` and therefore no `randombytes()` which means that it can't create random secret keys and therefore good keypairs. The Arduinos can generate pseudorandom numbers by generating a seed from an analogue pin which will provide fairly random numbers but it is considered insecure for cryptographic applications to use pseudorandom numbers like that[10]. It is possible to create true random numbers by utilising the truly random nature of atmospheric noise or background radiation but this requires extra components and is outside the scope of this project. Also, as mentioned in the implementation section the Arduino can't use the C library as is, one approach to resolving this is to convert it into a C++ header file and cpp file relationship.

For public key authenticated encryption, TweetNaCl uses three components: Curve25519 Diffie-Hellman key-exchange function, Salsa20 stream cipher for message encryption and Poly1305 for message authentication and integrity. Curve25519 Diffie-Hellman key-exchange function is used to compute the shared secret between sender and receiver using the sender's secret key and receiver's public key. Curve25519 is an elliptic curve, which is an approach to public key cryptography that is based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields, used in conjunction with the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman anonymous key agreement protocol[11]. For message encryption the Salsa20 stream cipher encrypts a message using the shared secret. Salsa20 uses a pseudorandom function based on add-rotate-xor, bitwise additions and rotation operations. The cipher uses XOR operations, 32-bit addition, mod 2^{32} and constant-distance rotation operations on an internal state of sixteen 32-bit words[12]. The library uses Poly1305 as its MAC function[13].

For key signature, TweetNaCl has a fourth component, Ed25519 public key signature system. Edwards curve digital signature algorithm is a variant of Schnorr signature based on Twisted Edwards curves. It is faster than existing schemes but does not reduce strength of security[14]. TweetNaCl gets its name

because the developers tweeted all of the source code in a 100 tweets to prove how small it was.

2.3 Types of attacks

2.3.1 Replay Attack

When this attack occurs the attacker replays a valid message attempting to cause a legitimate action to be repeated. If Bob wants Alice to provide authentication and she duly provides some encrypted signature to prove her identity. Eve can capture that signature, she does not need to know what the signature is but she knows that it is a signature. She can then connect to Bob and when Bob asks for identification she can use this captured signature to pretend she is Alice. To prevent this attack Alice might use an identifier that is only valid for one use, this could be session tokens or one-time passwords. These attacks are also known as playback attacks.

2.3.2 Man in the Middle Attack

Also known as MITM. In this attack there is an attacker between two parties, Bob and Alice, who wish to communicate. The man in the middle, Eve, changes messages as they are in transit to either pretend that she is the person that the other thinks they are talking to, change the contents of the message or something else. An example is if Alice asks for Bob's public key, Eve can capture that public key, replace it with her own and send that and because Alice has no way to prove that it is Bob's key or not she accepts it. So when Alice sends a message that has been encrypted with what she thinks is Bob's key, Eve can take it, decrypt it with her key, read or change the message before encrypting it with Bob's real public key and sending it to Bob. Alice thought she had encrypted a message with Bob's key and that only Bob would be able to read it but this was not the case.

2.3.3 Bit-Flipping Attack

This is where the attacker can change the cipher text, that was produced by a simple encryption function, in some way that causes a predictable change in the plain text. Eve does not need to know exactly what the plain text is, just some of it or just the format. For example if Alice was to send a message to Bob saying that she owes him £100 and Eve knows at least some of the message format, she can change the number at the end into £900.

2.3.4 Stream Cipher Attack

If the same key is reused in a stream cipher then it becomes vulnerable. If Alice were to encrypt two messages of the same length with the same key, Eve

can take the two encrypted messages and XOR them to produce the message. If one message was longer than the other then Eve could only find out the section of the longer message that was the same length as the shorter.

2.4 Timing Attack

In this type of attack strategy, an attacker measures the time that the system takes to perform some action that depends on the secret data. If the execution time differs because the system is taking different execution paths depending on secret data then it is possible to deduce information about said data. For example the login program in early versions of Unix executed the crypt function only when the login name was recognised. By this, an attacker was able to find out if a login name was correct even if the password wasn't.

2.5 Machine to Machine

M2M refers to the direct communication between two or more devices using any sort of channel. This is a component of IoT and when connected in this way small, low power sensors can transmit their data to another device which can collate, perform analysis or some extra computation or pass the data along again before it reaches a human user. Present day applications include monitoring the health of machinery, digital billboards or sensory networks. An application may possess multiple sensors in a network that pass sensor data to multiple nodes which do some computation, such as adjust machines to correct errors, replenish stock or manage a system and possibly sending information, such as state across the Internet to a human user.

2.6 Technologies used

In this project the Arduino was programmed using C++. The C++ was developed in the Arduino IDE. An Arduino Due, Arduino Uno, DS18S20 temperature sensor, resistor and two Ethernet Shield R2 boards were used. On the server side there is an SQL server, PHP scripts that accept that Arduino data and put it in the SQL database. And a Java web application that uses Java Database Connectivity, JBCD, to access the SQL server and output dynamic HTML when accessed. The Java code was developed using Eclipse Jee Mars. Bitbucket, using Git, was used to remotely store all the software.

2.6.1 XAMPP Server

XAMPP, Apache, MySQL, PHP and Perl come together to form XAMPP which is a free, open source, cross platform, web server stack package for the creation and testing of local server systems that can then be moved easily live systems. This XAMPP used in this project also contains Tomcat.

2.6.2 PHP

PHP is a server-side scripting language used in web development. It is especially suited to server-side applications as it is very portable. PHP code is contained in a file and when the server receives a request, the code is executed by the PHP runtime. It can be used with many OS's, web servers and relational database management systems. It is very common for web hosting providers to support PHP use by their clients.

2.6.3 SQL

Standard Query Language is a special purpose programming language for managing data stored in relational databases. SQL organises data into databases and tables and has operations for inserting, updating, deleting, altering and querying data. The vast majority of the databases in businesses use SQL.

2.6.4 Apache Tomcat

Tomcat is an open source implementation of the Java servlet, JavaServer Pages, Java Expression Language and Java Websocket technologies. It provides the ability to produce dynamic HTML in a pure Java environment. It accepts web application archives, WAR files, for easy updating of web apps.

2.6.5 Hypertext Transfer Protocol

HTTP is a protocol for the distribution of information across the world wide web. It is the foundation of internet data communication. Clients send HTTP requests in a certain format to servers in order to perform certain actions such as sending data or retrieving it. In this project HTTP/1.1, which is a revision of the original, HTTP/1.0 is utilised. POST and GET requests are used in this project but there are many other request methods.

2.7 Secure Transmission of Keys

In symmetric key encryption the same secret key is used to encrypt and decrypt messages. If two parties want to create a secure channel, how do they make sure they are using the same secret key. How do they share the secret key securely without anyone else having access to it. This problem is known as the key distribution problem. One solution is to meet in person and in private with the person you plan to communicate with and exchange the key there. If the communication is of a diplomatic nature, the bag used to transport the keys can have special legal protection against being opened and this is called a diplomatic bag[15]. Another solution is to send the key over another secure channel that you trust but how can a secure channel be created without first having a shared secret key which you can't be created without

first having a shared secret key. Later, public key encryption was developed to solve the problem of passing out shared secret keys. Public keys could now be passed around so parties could encrypt messages and there was little fear that others parties could decrypt those messages unless they were had access to the private key. The private key did not have to be sent anywhere so the risk of it being leaked out was reduced. However the problem wasn't completely solved. How can Alice send her public key to Bob and make sure that Bob received the correct public key. It is possible a MITM attack could occur and Charlie might have interrupted the valid transmission and sent his own public key instead so he could decrypt the messages that Bob had meant only for Alice to see. A solution to this is public key certificates, an electronic document that is used to prove ownership of a public key. When a user has created a public-private key pair they generate a Certificate Signing Request, CSR, and send it to a Certificate Authority, CA. The CA checks the integrity of the CSR and the users identity. If all is well the CA signs the certificate and sends it back. Now when the user can provide a certificate as proof that the public key is indeed theirs. The recipient of the public key trusts in the CA and the certificate so therefore trusts the public key they have received. The CA is a trusted third party that can be used to verify public keys.

Chapter 3

Design

3.1 Aims

The aims of this project are to design and implement a basic protocol for the transmission of DS18S20 temperature sensor data to a web server from an Arduino Due. This protocol will have security such that the messages are protected from modification and spoofing, can be authenticated and can't be read in transit. There is to be a server application that allows the user to view the data being sent to the server. Following on, the needs of machine to machine communication will be considered and the protocol will be expanded to include direct communication and transmission of keys to an Arduino Uno. Finally, as this will be on a low powered device, the power usage is to be measured to establish power overhead of security. The diagram, figure 3.1, below shows the relationship between the components.




FIGURE 3.1: Prototype

3.2 Microcontroller

The first step in this application is the acquisition of data. For example data, a variable that is monitored for important applications in the real world was chosen, this being temperature. There are a range of temperature sensors out there but one that is compact, cheap, freely available, has a large temperature range, high precision and can derive power directly from the data line, so called parasite power, is Maxim's DS18S20. It returns a 9-bit byte array so is ready to encrypt straight away. The image shown is taken from fluuuz.de [16].




FIGURE 3.2: DS18S20 Temperature Sensor

The Arduino Due is a large Arduino, it is the first one with a 32-bit ARM core microcontroller, has 54 digital I/O pins, 512KB flash memory, 96KB SRAM and a 84MHz clock speed. A lot of microcontrollers are 8-bit which means that they are limited in their cryptographic options. With a 32-bit architecture and a large amount of flash memory it is possible to have a light weight cryptographic library for our application but the Due is still low cost and low powered that it can be used for an IoT sensor application. Because it is an Arduino it benefits from the large community, wide range of compatible components and large set of open source libraries. The image shown is taken from arduino.cc [17]. Another reason to use an Arduino is that there is no operating system for this project's code to run on, meaning that the code on the device is solely developed by one party. This makes the device easier to secure and there can be no OS specific security flaws such as kernel exploits [18].




FIGURE 3.3: Arduino Due Microcontroller

Once the temperature data is on the microcontroller there needs to be a way to transmit the data. As the data is being sent over a network the natural choice is an Ethernet or WiFi shield. The Ethernet Shield was chosen as it is much cheaper than the WiFi Shield but completes the same job. The first revision of the shield is no longer made so the second revision, R2, will be utilised. It allows for easy connection of the Arduino to the Internet, it uses the Wiznet W5500 Ethernet chip, supports up to 8 different socket connections at a speed of 10/100Mb and has a MicroSD card slot to store network settings. It needs an different library than the first revision[19]. Fortunately the two libraries share the same API so software that was built for the first revision is compatible with the second. Simply swap out the older shield and library and replace with the newer one. The image shown is taken from arduino.cc [20].




FIGURE 3.4: Arduino Ethernet Shield

3.3 Security

There are a lot of security options for desktop programs and communications like AES, WEP and SSL. In this more ubiquitous field the implementations have been around for a while but for microcontrollers only in recent times have they become powerful enough at a cheap enough price and therefore popular enough for developers to write or adapt cryptographic libraries suited for microcontroller communications. The library in this application had to have acceptable security, really as close as possible to encryption systems in more powerful computers but still have acceptable performance, have a small enough code size in order to be stored on the microcontroller and be easy to use. Of course, it needs to prevent attackers from reading or altering the data and prove who sent the data. Some microcontroller applications have extra chips that are solely for encryption but that comes at extra cost.

TweetNaCl was chosen for this project. It is a public-domain, auditable and tiny implementation of NaCl, a high-speed cryptographic library. NaCl aims for absolute performance with good security at the expense of portability whereas the aim of TweetNaCl is portability, small code size and auditability. The developers claim it is first auditable high-security cryptographic library. It is a recently created library, released in 2014 and it provides public-key cryptography, secret-key cryptography, hashing and string comparison. TweetNaCl is a full cryptography library but has only two files, needs little to no memory to be stored, has similar performance to NaCl and is easy to use. It has a set of high level methods that require a few variables and produce the encrypted or signed message. It doesn't provide many options, you call the method with the message and keys and the software does the rest. This reduction in customisability reduces the likelihood of a mistake by a developer using the library and makes it simpler to use.

3.4 Server

3.4.1 Web Server

The web server is needed to be able to complete the relatively difficult jobs of decryption, checking signature and integrity in addition to pulling data from the SQL database and displaying the data. For this reason and the fact that there is a Java implementation of TweetNaCl from a developer named Ian Preston, a Java Server Pages web application was set up running on Apache Tomcat. JSP is a tool to dynamically create web pages using Java code. JSP could be joined with the Java implementation of the C library, TweetNaCl, to retrieve the encrypted values from a database, decrypt and display them. SQL was chosen to manage the data held in the relational database. When an external device is sending data to or receiving data from the web server it needs to be sent in a particular way. Data is passed into and taken from servers using POST and GET requests. And it is possible to send a GET or POST request to a file and that file then executes. When the Arduino is sending data to the database it was decided the script it sent a POST request to would be a PHP file as taking the signed and encrypted data and storing it in the SQL database could be handled by a simple PHP script.

3.4.2 Arduino Server

If it is desired that the temperature be taken from more than one location then there will need to be multiple nodes on the network. Or if there needs to be extra microcontrollers on the network for some other task. If there are to be other temperature taking microcontrollers then they would need the server's public key and if the server is to update it's public key, say as part of a regular update schedule to provide good security or if a key is known to be comprised then it will need a way to pass on the key. The Due can request a new key or the server can indicate to the Due that a new key has been made available and the Due will make a request for that key then make a connection to the other Arduinos in the network and send them that key. An extra Arduino Uno was chosen as an extra node for testing. The Arduino Uno isn't powerful enough to use the TweetNaCl library but it used as an example, it could be swapped out by another Due easily. It is just to highlight a microcontroller could be set up as a server and utilised in this manner. The Arduino Uno will use an Ethernet shield and be an extension of the Arduino Due to web server relationship. As the Arduino Due is a client to the web server the other nodes will need to be servers if information is to be passed between them. The setup described in figure 3.1 is desired.

Chapter 4

Implementation

4.1 Overview

The Arduino Due asks for the server's new public key and for a new nonce that it should use for the following temperature data transmission. It does this by sending a GET request to a JSP page on the server. The public key and nonce are newly generated by the server and the nonce is sent securely. The Due is connected to the DS18S20 temperature sensor and it receives the temperature data over the OneWire protocol. This data is signed using the Arduino's private signature key and then encrypted using the Arduino's private key, the Server's new public key and the new nonce. The encrypted data is sent as a POST request to the `add.php` file on the apache server which executes the file and the first thing `add.php` does is call `connect.php` which has the SQL database details and makes a connection to the database. Following that `add.php` builds up a SQL query that inserts the values sent in the post request into the appropriate table entries and then the connection is closed. When a user want to view the files, they use a browser to send a GET request to the Java web app. The app builds up a SQL query to take out all the values from the database, decrypts them and verifies the signature before printing out in a table. When it comes to public key transmission the Due sends a POST request to the Arduino Uno that is set up as a web server. The Uno recognises that it is receiving a POST request and stores the key. A visual representation of these steps can be seen in figure 4.1.




FIGURE 4.1: System sequence diagram

4.1.1 Temperature reading

The DS18S20 temperature sensor is wired up with a 4.7Ω pull up resistor, between the orange wires, on the bread board shown in figure 4.2. A pull up resistor is a resistor between the sensor and the positive power supply so that the signal will be a valid logic level if external devices are disconnected or a high impedance is introduced. It is connected to digital pin 9, yellow wire, because it can't be on pins 10, 11, 12, 13 as they will be used by the Ethernet Shield. When looking at the temperature sensor the furthest left pin is V_{dd} and normally this would be connected to the Arduino's 3.5v or 5v output but the DS18S20 is in parasite power mode which scavenges power off the middle data line, DQ. When the DQ pin is high some of the charge is stored in a capacitor that will be used to power the device when the data is being read. In parasite power mode both the GND and V_{dd} are connected together, by the blue wire, and then to ground. The circuit diagram shown was created with Fritzing [21].




FIGURE 4.2: DS18S20 in parasitic power mode connected to Arduino

The DS18S20's scratchpad memory is divided up into 9 bytes as shown in figure 4.3. The first two bytes are the ones of most interest as they store the actual temperature value. Bytes 2 and 3 are the high and low trigger registers, these can be used to trigger some action when the temperature goes above or below a certain threshold. Bytes 4 and 5 are only for internal use and cannot be overwritten. Bytes 6 and 7 can be used to calculate the extended resolution. Byte 8 holds the cyclic redundancy check which is an error detecting technique. The bytes with asterisks are values which stored in non volatile EEPROM, the rest are stored on volatile SRAM. The shown table was taken from the DS18S20 datasheet [22].

SCRATCHPAD (POWER-UP STATE)	
Byte 0	Temperature LSB (50h) } (85°C)
Byte 1	Temperature MSB (05h) }
Byte 2	T _H Register or User Byte 1*
Byte 3	T _L Register or User Byte 2*
Byte 4	Configuration Register*
Byte 5	Reserved (FFh)
Byte 6	Reserved
Byte 7	Reserved (10h)
Byte 8	CRC*

FIGURE 4.3: DS18S20's memory organisation

The library used to read the DS18S20 is OneWire, which is a proprietary library from Maxim that performs half-duplex bidirectional communications between a host/master controller and one or more slaves. As seen in the following code snippet, figure 4.4. The command `ds.write(0x44, 1)` starts the internal A-D conversion operation. Once this process is finished the data is copied to the Scratchpad registers. A delay is needed to charge the capacitor and to ensure conversion is complete before reading the data. Which is done with `ds.write(0xBE)` and then the data is read out using `ds.read()` and put into an array.

```

1      OneWire ds(9);
2      ...
3      ds.write(0x44, 1);
4      delay(1000);
5
6      present = ds.reset();
7      ds.select(addr);
8      ds.write(0xBE)
9
10     Serial.print(" Data = ");
11     Serial.print(present, HEX);
12     Serial.print(" ");
13     for ( i = 0; i < 9; i++) {
14         data[i] = ds.read();
15         Serial.print(data[i], HEX);
16         Serial.print(" ");
17     }

```

FIGURE 4.4: DS18S20 temperature sensor Arduino Code

4.2 Security

Before the data can be signed and authenticated encrypted the new nonce and server public key have to be requested. The Due sends, to the server, a GET request in a very similar manner to the POST request shown in figure 4.8 and the server returns, byte by byte, the information. The POST request is sent to a JSP page called Secret Key. So called because it updates the Server's authenticated encryption key pair and not because it sends the private key anywhere. It's implementation is described in section 4.6. The Arduino takes the char arrays and converts them into two different byte arrays, one for the nonce and one for the public key. The public key is sent unencrypted but as a proof of concept the nonce is sent authenticated encrypted and signed. This is to show that with pre-installed keys it possible to update the keys and other data securely and then use the updated information to facilitate further information updates. Generally the nonce and public keys are sent unencrypted when it is a first transmission as there is no other way. Shown in figure 4.6 is the code to decrypt the nonce, if this is the first transmission then the nonce will have been encrypted with the pre-installed keys and nonce, else the server public key and nonce generated by the server for the previous secure temperature data transfer are used. The decision process is shown in figure 4.5.

The way the Arduino Due knows if this is the first transmission is if the byte array *serverpkold* is empty, as after the temperature data is encrypted with this new nonce and server public key they become the old nonce and server public key. After becoming the old nonce and server public key they are stored in different arrays so they can be used to decrypt the next nonce as the next nonce from the server will be encrypted using the private key that is mathetically linked to this "old" server public key and nonce.

The keys used for the signature process and the set used for the authenticated encryption process are not the same. There are four key pairs used in this prototype. A key pair is a set of one public key and one private key. The Arduino Due has a signature key pair and an authenticated encryption key pair. The web server, also, has a signature key pair and an authenticated encryption key pair. The signature key pairs stay the same through out the application, so does the Arduino Due's authenticated encryption key pair. Of the keys, it is only the Server's authenticated encryption key pair that is updated. The Due decrypts the nonce using the relevant keys and removes the 32 bytes of leading zeros that needed to be placed by the server for successful encryption before verifying the signature in line 19 of figure 4.6. Nonces are 24 bytes in length and a signature is 64 bytes in length.

It is a bit unusual to update the server's public key so regularly. Normally there would be huge gaps of time between key updates because if the cryptographic library being used is good then it should take a long time to break. However sometimes keys become compromised and need to be changed so to highlight and demonstrate how keys could be updated, the server's keys were updated for each message.




FIGURE 4.5: Nonce Decision Tree

```

1 #include <TweetNaCl.h>
2 TweetNaCl2 tnacl;
3 int Suc_Decrypt;
4 int Suc_SignVerify;
5 int scnlenwz = crypto_box_NONCEBYTES + crypto_sign_BYTES +
    crypto_box_ZEROBYTES;
6 byte sconcenewtemp[scnlenwz]; //signed encrypted nonce with
    zeros
7 byte snoncewz[scnlenwz]; // signed nonce with zeros
8 int snlenwoz = crypto_box_NONCEBYTES + crypto_sign_BYTES;
9 byte snoncewoz[snlenwoz]; //signed nonce without zeros
10 int snlen = crypto_box_NONCEBYTES;
11 byte nonce[snlen];
12 ...
13 if(serverpkold[0]==NULL){
14     Suc_Decrypt = tuit.crypto_box_open(snoncewz,
        sconcenewtemp, scnlenwz, preinstallnonce,
        preinstallserverpk, arduinosk);
15 }else{
16     Suc_Decrypt = tuit.crypto_box_open(snoncewz,
        sconcenewtemp, scnlenwz, nonceold, serverpkold,
        arduinosk);
17 }
18
19 Suc_SignVerify =
    tuit.crypto_sign_open(nonce,&nlen,snoncewoz,snlenwoz,serverpksign);

```

FIGURE 4.6: Decrypting the next nonce

Now that the server public key and nonce have been found the secure temperature data transmission can take place. Much like the server, when the Arduino is encrypting a signature and message it must have padded out the data with 32 bytes of leading zeros specified in the NaCl website. Take special care that exactly 32 bytes are placed in front because if there isn't the correct number the encryption process will still complete without errors. However the decryption will fail and it isn't apparent that that error occurred when data was encrypted. The code used to sign and encrypt the data is shown in figure 4.7.

It is a little unusual to employ both authenticated encryption and a signature process. This was done to show off more of the capabilities of the TweetNaCl library and to provide an extra layer of authenticity as an attacker would need another key pair to fully exploit the message.

```
1 #include <TweetNaCl.h>
2 TweetNaCl2 tnacl;
3
4 byte arduinosk[crypto_box_SECRETKEYBYTES] = {...};
5 byte arduinosksign[crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES] = {...};
6 byte serverpk[crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES] = {...};
7 byte nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES] = {...};
8
9 int const messageLength = crypto_sign_BYTES + 9;
10 byte message[messageLength] = {...};
11 unsigned long long signedMessageLength=0;
12 byte signedCipher[signedMessageLength];
13 unsigned char signedMessage[messageLength+crypto_sign_BYTES];
14
15 tnacl.crypto_sign(signedMessage, &signedMessageLength,
    message, messageLength, arduinosksign);
16 tnacl.crypto_box(signedCipher, signedMessage,
    signedMessageLength, nonce, serverpk, arduinosk);
```

FIGURE 4.7: TweetNaCl Arduino Signature and Encryption Code

The C TweetNaCl library has been converted into an Arduino library. It therefore needs an instance of TweetNaCl created which in the sketch is called *tnacl*. With this instance the methods needed can be accessed. In this prototype some keys are preinstalled, the Arduino's authenticated encryption key pair, it's signature key pair, the server's signature key pair and the first nonce and first server authenticated encryption key pair that will only be used once to decrypt the first nonce. With each transmission the server's authenticated encryption key pair is updated and the Due will get a new nonce and server public key.

Lines 4-13 set up the message byte arrays that are to be passed between the methods. *message* is initialised as a byte array of size *messageLength* which is *crypto_box_ZEROBYTES*, 32 bytes, plus the length of the message. The first byte of the message contains the Arduino's unique identifier to prove the Arduino was the original sender and the second byte contains the server's unique identifier to prove that the message was meant for the server. *signedMessage* and *signedMessageLength* are passed in by reference so after *crypto_sign()* is complete the message with the signature and the size of that array will be in those variables, respectively. The resulting signed message needs to have 32 bytes of leading zeros added to it before encryption. The function *crypto_box* completes the authenticated encryption and places the cipher into *signedCipher* which is passed in by reference.

4.3 Data transmission

Once the data has been encrypted it is to be packaged up and sent across the network.

```

1 #include<Ethernet2.h> //Ethernet Shield R2 library
2 #include<SPI.h>
3
4 byte mac[] = {
5 0x90, 0xA2, 0xDA, 0x10, 0x2D, 0xD6 }; //MAC address of the
   Ethernet Shield
6 char server[] = "192.168.0.6"; //IP of apache web server
7 EthernetClient client;
8 IPAddress clientIP(192, 168, 0, 30);
9
10 if(Ethernet.begin(mac)==0){
11     Serial.println("Failed to assign IP");
12     Ethernet.begin(mac, clientIP);
13 }else{
14     Serial.println("Assigned IP");
15 }
16 if(client.connect(server,80)){
17     String data = "temperatureHex=";
18     int contentLength = data.length()+final.length();
19     Serial.println("Connected");
20     client.println("POST /tempLog/add.php HTTP/1.1");
21     client.println("HOST: 192.168.0.6");
22     client.println("Content-Type:
   application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
23     client.print("Content-Length: ");
24     client.println(contentLength);
25     client.println();
26     client.print("temperatureHex=");
27     client.print(final);
28 }else{
29     Serial.println("Failed to Connect");
30 }
31 client.stop();

```

FIGURE 4.8: Ethernet interfacing and transmission Code

Just before the cipher is sent the byte array is converted into a String so that it can be passed around easily as one parameter. This is completed simply by cycling through the byte array and adding each entry together. Care has to be taken when there are hexadecimals that are 0x0F or lower. The leading zero is lost during the conversion to String which means that when the cipher reconverted into a byte array, it is incorrect and cannot be decrypted. This is solved by explicitly adding an extra "0" String if the byte is less than

or equal to 0x0F. The Arduino Due needs to know the MAC address of the Ethernet shield if it is to make contact with the server. A media access control address, MAC is a unique identifier assigned to network interfaces. It allows the router to know what device the data is being sent from and where to send the replies. It is not dynamic. The device now needs an IP address which is completed through the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol, DHCP, by the router. The router running DHCP dynamically allocates network configuration parameters such as IP addresses to devices so that they automatically get one that isn't in use. This is completed with the line *Ethernet.begin(mac)* on line 10 in figure 4.8 which returns a 1 on successful IP allocation or 0 on failure. If it fails then a static IP can be assigned manually by *Ethernet.Begin(mac, clientIP)*. A connection to the server is attempted using the IP and the port number, 80 in this case. It is worth mentioning here, if the server is running on a Windows OS then make an exception for the IP address of the Arduino Due otherwise Windows firewall will block it. If it successful the information is transmitted as a POST request, a POST request is a request method in the HTTP protocol. When a server receives a POST request it knows to take the data and complete an action with it. The request makes it known that it wants *add.php* to be executed upon receiving the data. Once the data is sent the connection can be closed and other actions performed on the Arduino.

4.4 Server Side

For the prototype, an Apache and Tomcat server with SQL was set up using XAMPP on a desktop. The Arduino Due causes the *add.php* to be run and the first thing that *add* does is call *connect.php* that creates a connection to the relational database using SQL's IP address, username, password and the name of the database. If it can't connect it abandons the task and returns an error message. On successful connect it returns the connection variable.

```

1 <?php
2     include("connect.php");
3
4     $link=Connection();
5
6     $temp=$_POST["temperatureHex"];
7
8     $query = "INSERT INTO tempLog (tempHex)
9         VALUE ('".$temp."')";
10
11     mysql_query($query,$link);
12     mysql_close($link);
13
14     header("Location: index.php");
15 ?>

```

FIGURE 4.9: Arduino to SQL interfacing code

After connecting, control is handed back to the add file where the data to be stored is extracted out of the POST request and placed in a variable. Then an SQL query to insert the variable into the correct table is built up before being sent to the SQL server and the connection terminated. The SQL table contains an ID, the time at which the temperature data was received and the data and is created using the command shown in figure 4.10. Note between the database creation code and the PHP file the corresponding variables, tempLog, the table name and tempHex, the data.

```

CREATE TABLE `iotplatform`.`tempLog` ( `id` INT(255) NOT NULL
    AUTO_INCREMENT , `timeStamp` TIMESTAMP on update
    CURRENT_TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP ,
    `tempHex` VARCHAR(100) NOT NULL , PRIMARY KEY (`id`))
ENGINE = InnoDB;

```

FIGURE 4.10: SQL database creation code

4.4.1 Decryption and Temperature Data Display

The data stored in the database is still encrypted, now a way is needed to decrypt it and display it to the user. A Java web app, using Java server pages, JSP, was created as there are Java implementations of the TweetNaCl library, among other variations, available[23]. Eclipse JEE Mars was used to create a dynamic web project which extends HttpServlet for the creation of dynamic web pages. In this you override at least one of the following methods, doGet, doPost, doPut and doDelete. Therefore depending on the type of HTTP request received a different action will occur. This application has the code in the doGet as the server will receive a get request when it is accessed by a user.

```
1 protected void doGet (HttpServletRequest request,
    HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException,
    IOException {
2 response.setContentType ("text/html");
3 PrintWriter printWriter = response.getWriter();
4 printWriter.println("<html>");
5 }
```

FIGURE 4.11: Prepping the client printer in JSP

Using the code shown in figure 4.11 the headers and tags you would need and expect in a HTML page can now be printed dynamically much like printing to a console. The keys are defined similarly to the code on the Arduino except the server has it's own secret key and the Arduino's public key.

```
1 final String DB_URL="jdbc:mysql://localhost/iotplatform";
2 String user = "root";
3 String password = "";
4 try
5 {
6     // Register JDBC driver
7     Class.forName ("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver").newInstance();
8
9     // Open a connection
10    Connection conn =
11        DriverManager.getConnection(DB_URL, user,
12            password);
13
14    // Execute SQL query
15    Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();
16    String sql;
17    sql = "SELECT id, timeStamp, tempHex FROM tempLog";
18    ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(sql);
19    // Extract data from result set
20    while(rs.next()){
21        //Retrieve by column name
22        int id = rs.getInt("id");
23        String tempHex = rs.getString("tempHex");
24        Timestamp timeStamp =
25            rs.getTimestamp("timeStamp");
26    }
27 }
```

FIGURE 4.12: Accessing the SQL database in JSP

In figure 4.12 is a section of code running on the Apache Tomcat server. The Java application was exported as a WAR file from Eclipse before being stored

in the tomcat directory. The app is given the SQL details before entering a try catch that prints whatever the error message is to the client. Java database connectivity, JDBC, is an API for client access to a database. Before the Java app is exported as a WAR file it must have the JDBC bin jar in the lib folder in WEB-INF for the eclipse project otherwise it can't connect to the database[24]. The app gets a new instance of JDBC and then opens a connection to the server before building up a query to pull out the contents of the table. The variables are put into a result set which can be used to access each individual variable with the string name as a parameter. The encrypted message is still in it's String format and needs to be converted back into a byte array. This implementation used for String to byte array conversion was found externally[25]. During the conversion to a String on the Arduino half of the leading zeros are lost but they are added again before the conversion to byte array. The Java implementation of TweetNaCl provides an extra layer of abstraction but with a slight modification to the Java file it can use the same method names as the C library.

```

1 TweetNaCl.crypto_box_open(signedMessage, cipher,
    messageLength, nonceCollection[sqlentry],
    arduinoPublicKey, keyCollection[sqlentry]);
2 byte[] javaPlainTextMessage =
    TweetNaCl.crypto_sign_open(signedCipherArray,
    ArduinoPublicKeySignatureKey);

```

FIGURE 4.13: Decryption of message and verification of signature in JSP

The security needs to be taken off in the reverse order as to how it was put on. The nonces and server secrets keys used have been stored in the order they were created. Which corresponds with the order of the data in the SQL database. As each entry from the table is removed the corresponding private key and nonce, from the 2D arrays, is used. *TweetNaCl.crypto_box_open* passes the decrypted message out by reference but for *TweetNaCl.crypto_sign_open* the message without the signature is returned. This is an example of the top layer of abstraction in Ian Preston's implementation of TweetNaCl. The *TweetNaCl.crypto_box_open* method is the exact same as the the C library but *TweetNaCl.crypto_sign_open* is a slightly built upon method that has fewer parameters, completes more work behind the scenes and returns the byte message. The two unique identifiers can now be accessed and checked to show the Arduino sent the message and that it was meant for the Server. The variable *javaPlainTextMessage* is the temperature in plain hexadecimal but it still needs conversion to integer so it can be read by the average user. The code is taken from the DS18S20 example from Arduino[26]. To access the page in this project, the url *192.168.0.6:8080/loTPlatform/DecryptTemp* should be used. If the IP address isn't suffixed with the port number the browser will access the wrong part of the server.

4.5 Encrypted Nonce transmission

A new nonce needs to be created for each new communication. This is done using Java's psuedo random number generator from the class `Random`. This new random nonce is stored in an array in the web application so that the application can decrypted and display the data later. Then the nonce is signed with the server's signature, which doesn't change in this application. If this is the first transmission and therefore the first public key and nonce to be produced, the nonce with signature is encrypted using the pre-installed keys otherwise it will use the secret key and nonce created in the previous transmission. The encrypted nonce is printed out to the Due with two terminating characters either side, "()" . This process is to show how information might be updated in the Arduino Due securely.

4.6 Public Key Transmission

For a secure connection public keys must first be sent. At the start of the Arduino due's code it sends a GET request, very similar to the POST request shown in figure 4.8. The request is sent to a Java page called `Secret Key`. This page is similar in set up to the temperature data display page. When accessed the page calls `TweetNaCl.crypto_box_keypair()` to create the server's private key and corresponding public key. It stores the private key in an array and prints out the public key to the Due with two terminating characters either side. Along with the next nonce, this process is explain in section 4.5. During debugging the state of the web application can be printed out as it is being run. The code used to extract the public key is very similar to the code shown in figure 9.4 expect it watches for the character `<` to signify that the next word will be the key. Afterwards the key needs to be converted back into a byte array from a string before it can be used. The code used to convert into a byte array was adapted from external source[27]. The key is then used to encrypt the next temperature data transmission before being copied over into a second array so that it can be used to decrypt the nonce that will be sent encrypted from the server for the secure temperature data transmission after the next one.

For the creation of other nodes on the network that are connected onto the Due, an Arduino Uno was set up as a host and example node. As two clients can't directly connect together with the Ethernet protocol and since the Arduino Due is a client to a web server, the Uno must be a server. The Due sends a POST request to the Uno, very similar to the one it sends to the XAMPP web server, in figure 4.8 however the key is under the content header. The method that the Due uses earlier isn't quite appropriate here as there is no PHP file on the Uno to run. Instead the key can be sent under an extra header in the POST, "*Content: key*".

```
1 String incomingWord = " ", key = "";
2 int saveNextWord = 0, takeData = 0;
3 if (client.available()) {
4     char c = client.read();
5     Serial.write(c);
6     if(c == ' '){
7         key = incomingWord;
8         incomingWord=" ";
9     }else{
10        incomingWord = incomingWord + c;
11    }
12    if((incomingWord=="Content") && (takeData)){
13        saveNextWord = 1;
14    }
15    if(incomingWord=="POST"){
16        takeData=1;
17    }
18 }
```

FIGURE 4.14: Handling POST requests in Arduino

When setting up the Uno server, explicitly define what gateway and subnet the router being used has as the defaults *Ethernet.begin(mac)* uses aren't always correct. The server sits open on a certain port, 8081 in this case, and waits for clients to make a connection. Once they have, the server sends an acknowledgement that it has received a connection and starts reading in the request. As shown as in figure 9.4 the Uno watches out for the word POST so that it knows to store the content and, of course, for the content so it knows what to store. The request from the client is read out a byte at a time so it is necessary for those bytes to be made into full words so specific keywords can be searched for. If the byte is not a space then it is part of a word so it is added to the subsequent bytes until another space is reached then it is considered a word and compared against. Once the key is taken it is in String format and needs to be turn back into hex and stored as the key to be used in further encryptions.

4.7 TweetNaCl Library

The TweetNaCl library as it stands in it's original form is not compatible with Arduinos. The C library compiles without errors but the compiler warns that the TweetNaCl method names are undefined and as a result do not perform their tasks. When the methods are accessed they simply return random numbers. To get the libraries to work they were converted into C++ syntax. With a header file that has the main methods used in the project and the #defines and a cpp file with the TweetNaCl code. This is added as a library to Arduino IDE and in the code an instance of the class is created and methods are accessed

with the dot operator. In this application not every function in the TweetNaCl library will be used so any methods that weren't going to be utilised were not copied over into the converted library.

Chapter 5

Strength Of Security

s

5.1 Naive Sign & Encrypt

There are problems with naive implementations of Signatures and Encryption. Both encrypting and then signing and vice versa. If a plaintext message is signed by Alice and sent to Bob encrypted with his public key. Bob can decrypt the ciphertext and re-encrypt with Charlie's public key before sending it to Charlie. When Charlie decrypts the message using his private key and verifies the signature with Alice's public key he finds that Alice sent the message. Charlie has been tricked by Bob into thinking Alice has sent him a message. This is known as surreptitious forwarding. If the opposite were to happen, if Alice sent a message to Bob that she encrypted before signing. Charlie can capture the message, strip off Alice's signature, replace with his own and take credit for the message. One assumes that Charlie knows what the message will contain. Also, by signing a cipher text it can no longer be proved that the owner of the signature was aware of the message contents. These are fairly rare edge cases but they should still be considered. It could be argued that Alice should not have trusted her first message with Bob or that an individual should never sign a cipher text because they don't know what the message contains. Signatures do not prove that the message received was intended for the recipient but if Charlie receives a message most likely he will assume it is for him. Nor do they prove ownership but parties will assume. In these examples the humans have made mistakes but the implementation can be made slightly more robust to help prevent them[28].

This application addresses those problems by using TweetNaCl's authenticated encryption as well as a signature and prepending the messages before encryption and signature with the Arduino Due's own unique identifier and the unique identifier of who it sent the message to, the server. When the server received a message it can use authenticated decryption to validate the message was sent by the Arduino Due, had not been altered in transit nor viewed by another party. After decryption the server is still able to re-encrypt the message and Due's signature with another party's public key and send it to them and still prove that the message was originally sent by the Arduino Due. With the addition of signature another layer of security is provided as the server can

prove again that the message sent by the Arduino Due is the same as received because the signature calculates a hash from the plaintext message. Also, the two identifiers can be used to prove that the Arduino Due sent the message and that it meant to send it to the server. In addition the server can't surreptitiously forward the message because the plaintext message contains the sender's unique identifier and a unique identifier of the recipient. To change these identifiers the plaintext message would need to be altered and therefore invalidating the signature.

5.2 Storing data in plaintext

Storing vital data such as passwords and usernames in plain text in a database is generally considered quite a bad idea. This provides one point of failure that if broken means that every password stored is now useless and the accounts are wide open. In some circumstances that initial break might not seem so severe, say if that is for a forum site where the worst action that could be taken was writing an inappropriate message but users sometimes use the same password for many different sites. Although in this application the information being stored is temperature data and not passwords the security implications are still there. This application would have that single point of failure. It is necessary to provide as many layers of security as possible rather than have one hard outer layer. That being the security of the database. As such this application stores all the temperature data as it arrives, in its encrypted form. This way if an attacker gains access to the database they will need to know all the keys as well in order to gain the data.

5.3 Public Key Transmission

If the keys are preinstalled they can be used to sign and encrypt new public keys before they are sent. So that the receiver can use the preinstalled keys to prove integrity and authenticity of the new keys. If there are no preinstalled keys then there is no way to prove that the public key being received is indeed the public key sent. At least for a computer. The most secure and safe method to make sure the keys are the same is to have a human user manually inspected the key before sending and after sending and carefully ascertain that the one sent is correct. If there has been a man in the middle, MITM, and either the key has been altered or replaced entirely then the human user can see the difference.

5.4 Bit Flipping

Bit flipping is the process of changing parts of the encrypted message so that it says something else. This is especially potent when the format of the message is known to the attacker. As the format of the message is known to us, a

test can be set that if it succeeds would change a number. In this project a test was set up to demonstrate how TweetNaCl detected that the message had been altered in transit. After a message was encrypted it was altered with random hexadecimal numbers and it each time the decryption process would fail. The encryption process adds a hash of the message and the decryption process would find a different hash and would fail each time. The encrypted temperature data will not decrypt if the encrypted message has been altered and therefore won't be displayed.

5.5 Timing Attacks

TweetNaCl is an example of constant time software, which means that the time of execution does not depend on secret data and is therefore not vulnerable to timing attacks. To have this quality TweetNaCl avoids all loads from addresses and all branch conditions that depend on secret data and thus it is inherently protected against cache timing attacks.

5.6 Replay Attacks

This attack is the act of resending captured valid messages to repeat a valid action, like sending money or authentication. The potential for serious damage by a replay attack here is limited. If an attacker resends some data to the server, say a malicious set of temperature data, when the server would go to decrypt that message it would try to use the incorrect nonce and public key and the message would be ignored, thus protecting the application from replay attacks.

5.7 Cipher Text Characteristics

It is possible to find out the length of the message when it is encrypted with TweetNaCl. For example if the message is a very long message in contrast to a short message there are noticeable differences. It is a vulnerability that exists in the cryptography chosen but it is a common weakness. Although the attacker might not know if the message was signed first and there for increases the size of the ciphertext but not of the message, it still provides only two options for the length. If the length can be found from the cipher text is it possible for any other details to be leaked out. If the message is of a really high number, does that mean that more of the byte values are higher or conversely if it is a very low number. To test this and look at the output for different messages, the messages were YES, NO, 0, 1 and 99999 were encrypted.

Plaintext Message	Encrypted Message
YES	0xAE, 0x43, 0xCD, 0xA5, 0x8E, 0x54, 0xE9, 0x30, 0x59, 0xB1, 0xD5, 0xA5, 0xBF, 0x24, 0x9D, 0xEE, 0x69, 0xDB, 0x37
NO	0x2E, 0xBC, 0xCC, 0x6B, 0x9E, 0xDB, 0x29, 0x64, 0xF6, 0x26, 0x49, 0xEF, 0xE9, 0xFA, 0xBD, 0x9C, 0x7E, 0xD1

TABLE 5.1: Resulting ciphers for encrypting words

From these messages it is possible to tell the number of bytes sent if you know that the encryption method adds 16 extra bytes but other than that this test shows there isn't a discernible difference between encrypting YES and NO.

Plaintext Message	Encrypted Message
0	0x5B, 0x74, 0x76, 0x4C, 0xF4, 0x19, 0x65, 0x37, 0xC4, 0x53, 0xAF, 0xB0, 0xCE, 0x18, 0x01, 0x01, 0x30, 0x9E
1	0x49, 0x1B, 0x1E, 0x52, 0x10, 0x38, 0xD7, 0x38, 0x30, 0x65, 0x71, 0xBC, 0xEE, 0x65, 0x3D, 0x6, 0x31, 0x9E
99999	0x0C, 0x0C, 0x29, 0xE2, 0x4E, 0x81, 0x67, 0x05, 0x78, 0x49, 0x8C, 0xA1, 0x4F, 0x69, 0x08, 0xBB, 0x09, 0xA7, 0x5D, 0x63, 0x4D

TABLE 5.2: Resulting ciphers for encrypting numbers

Again, the bytes returned from encrypting the test case of numbers doesn't indicate that the integer contained in the message is increasing in magnitude but it does show that the number is increasing in length. If the numbers were 111 and 554 the message length would be no indicator and no information would be leaked. One solution to this is to pad out the message so that it will always be a set length. With a set message length a message's length would need to be the set message length or shorter. If the message was shorter then extra characters are put in to mask the true length of the message, thus messages of variable length could be sent without altering the length of the cipher text, this wasn't included to the project due to time constraints.

Chapter 6

Results

6.1 Basic Objectives

The basic objectives were to sign and encrypt a message in order to stop an attacker from reading the messages, to protect against them being altered in transit, to authenticate them, to send that message to a web server and have that data be accessible by a user. It can be seen that the DS18S20 temperature successfully found the temperature of the room. That that data was given a signature and then encrypted. It was then packaged up and sent as a POST request across the network to a web server that stored the data in a database. The user could access that database and view the temperature data. The temperature data messages could not be read or altered as it was encrypted nor would any message that wasn't signed by an authorised user be displayed in the web app.

6.2 Power Consumption

As this is to be a low power system that might run on batteries for a good amount of time, it is important to analyse the power consumption of the device. Although, saving power wasn't a top priority in the creation of the application. The device used to record the power consumption was the PortaPow Premium USB + DC power monitor [29]. It has a error of +/- 0.2% up to 2A and less than 1% up to 5A. There are ways to save power such as completely shutting down modules on the Arduino Due that are never used. The temperature won't be taken every second so between bursts of activity the Due could be put into a sleep mode and be woken up on an interrupt rather than the busy wait implemented in this prototype.




FIGURE 6.1: Asymmetric Key Encryption

To start, the power was recorded as the temperature was being taken with the DS18S20 temperature sensor, in both parasite power mode and regular power mode. It was found that during both operations the power consumption was the exact same at 0.123A and 0.613W. This result was not surprising as the power consumption of the temperature sensor is so small compared to the Due that when the consumption of regular power mode and parasite mode are compared, there is little to no difference.

To isolate the the power consumed when the Due was only signing and encrypting, the Ethernet shield was left unplugged. This way the effect of the encryption would be seen without the effects of powering an Ethernet shield throughout. The readings upon start up were 0.123A and 0.613W, when the data was being given a signature the readings were 0.177A and 0.970W and when the message was encrypted it rose to 0.200A and 1W.

In addition the power consumption when the Ethernet shield was attached but had no cable plugged was recorded. The power consumed during the signature and encryption process was the same as above but during DHCP the readings were 0.199A and 0.990W as it tried to gain an IP address from the router. Once the loop iteration was complete, the code went straight into a busy loop which was a tiny drop in power at 0.198A and 0.980W. A busy wait is a waste of power and resources so at this point the Arduino Due should go into a sleep mode and be woken up by an interrupt when it was to record the temperature again.

The next test was with the shield plugged in and connected to the router with the Ethernet cable. The power consumption shot up to 0.265A and 1.30W during DHCP at the start of the sketch and there it remained even during the encryption process. Evidently the shield requires such a significant of the power that by comparison the cryptographic library is as good as unnoticeable. There are versions of the Ethernet Shield with an extra module that

allows power over Ethernet. This extra module doesn't add a significant increase to the overall cost to the shield but can alleviate battery problems and extend the life of batteries by extracting power from the Ethernet cable that is connected to the router

The final test was to find out if there was a difference in power consumption depending on the length of message sent. Messages of size 20 and size 250 were sent with no appreciable difference in power consumption found.

The voltage through the experiments was the exact same, a steady 4.96V which makes sense as this is round about what USB 2.0 can give out and is well within normal limits for the Arduino Due.

6.3 Additional Objectives

6.3.1 Transmission of public keys

Expansion of the network was considered with multiple devices communicating directly. This objective was reached by adding an Arduino Uno with another Ethernet shield as a webserver and the Due could pass on data, such as new server public keys, to it. If more nodes were desired then more Uno web-servers could be added, the Due would simply go through the list of servers and send a POST request to each one to update their keys. At present the Due passes on the server's public key that it receives when it receives it.

6.3.2 Secure Transmission of Nonces

Instead of using nonces that can be predicted, say counters, this application encrypts and sends the nonce to be used in the next temperature data transmission using the nonce from the previous data transmission or in the initial case a preinstalled nonce, which is never used again. The nonces are created randomly on the server and then sent securely, this ensuring that the nonces for the secure temperature data transmission can never be guessed and are protected against replay attacks.

Chapter 7

Critical Evaluation

The XAMPP server, the PHP files and the JSP application that displays the temperature data are accessible through a browser by anyone on the network. To protect against this it is possible to set up passwords for the server and database to restrict access to the files. Realms or IP filtering could be set up to restrict users from accessing the update server secret key and nonce page. A realm is a database of usernames and passwords that identify valid users of a web app and can be used to provided levels of access.

The way the Arduino accesses the new server public key at the moment is simply by sending a GET request to the server for it. But an attacker could easily send the same get request and get a public key and the encrypted nonce because the nonce is encrypted the attacker wouldn't be able to send a valid message to the server without also having the keys but it would cause the Arduino and server to be out of sync, they would both be using a different set of keys and nonces and no more temperature data could be sent without a server and Arduino restart.

The preinstalled initial public and private key of the server and the public key of the arduino and the signature keys are stored as plaintext in the web application and it might be possible to read them from the WAR files. If the attacker is fast and captures the initial messages and has the keys from the WAR file then the resulting messages will be compromised. Although, if the attacker has access to the files on the server then there has already been a much larger security breach.

The Arduino doesn't have access to `/dev/random` and can't provide good enough random data to make good key pairs. Which means that it can't update it's own secret key, for example if the key has been compromised or it is part of a regular renewal service to key security tight.

When the public keys are transmitted for the first time, it is best to have a human user to manually inspect the keys and ensure they are the same before they can be used for data transmission.

The PHP files that the Arduino Due sends a POST request to do not authenticate the requests and as such anyone who knows the IP address of the server could send data into the SQL database. However when the Java web app retrieves the data out of the database if it is not encrypted or was encrypted with the wrong keys or nonce then the decryption will fail and the data won't be displayed to the user.

The JSP page that sends a new public key and encrypted nonce to the Arduino Due does not have any restrictions on its access. Therefore if a malicious connection is made to the server then that connection will receive the data. This public key and nonce could then be used by the attacker to add in their own data or to simply interfere with the normal operation of the application. This could be solved in a similar manner to securing the PHP files with IP filtering or setting up a realm.

If the new public key and encrypted nonce do not make it to the Arduino or the encrypted temperature message doesn't make it, then the key and nonce synchronisation between the server and Arduino is lost. This could be solved with acknowledgements whereby the server and Arduino send a small message at the end of a communication to let each other know that they have indeed received the information.

This prototype has used the Ethernet Shield as it was much cheaper than a WiFi shield. If an implementation similar to the one described in this report was to be implemented then it would be convenient for the user to provide connection over WiFi. The product also risks not being adopted as more and more products have wireless capabilities and users see it as the norm and resent cables. This will be especially important if the device uses batteries to power itself.

If the server is shut down for any reason during normal operation the keys and nonces used to decrypt the data stored in the SQL database would be lost forever. A way is needed to securely write the keys and nonces to disk.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

This report has shown that it is possible to provide low power, not overly complicated encryption and authentication on a microcontroller based IoT system. TweetNaCl is an excellent library that can be added to any project easily, has tiny code size but still provides acceptably strong encryption at a quick speed. It is a full library and can produce asymmetric and symmetric encryptions plus a SHA-512 hashing function and a string comparison function which any system can implement to cover its encryption needs.

Any computer application which handles information that is private, that could be used to do damage such as a person's credit card details meaning that person loses money needs good encryption. As more and more devices are connected to the internet such as smartphones, smart televisions, smart domestic appliances and anything else an IoT engineer thinks might benefit from an internet connection. As the entire planet shifts more and more into the digital world, this need grows ever larger. When data, such as credit card details, are lost this may be a huge problem but it is not fatal. However with the advent of heavy machinery such as cars becoming part of the internet of things, and other examples no doubt soon to follow, security should be at the forefront of everyone's minds. This project has aimed to show that acceptable encryption can be implemented easily, even on low power systems. In this prototype, the user's private temperature data is safe from attackers.

The Arduino was a good choice as Arduinos have been used for fast prototyping and for teaching people who might not have a background in electronics or computing how to create projects, such as IoT projects. There are a multitude of internet connected projects for the Arduino, many connect to benign objects such as the LEDs on the board but they can be connected to many more things, some which can be troublesome if compromised. Security is generally an afterthought, for experienced and novice developers alike. Even massive companies with millions of pounds worth of revenue make security blunders or plain just don't bother. It is hoped that this project will add to the list of secure, internet connected Arduino projects available so that one of the first things of everyone's mind when starting a project is security. The powerful but low cost Arduino devices prove that it is possible to have good quality security in any IoT system and more security options will pop up as the price to performance ratio continues to improve. Which is very beneficial to the IoT industry as a whole.

Security measures will never be fully secure. Given infinite computer resources and infinite time any security algorithm can be hacked and there might be bugs, backdoors or employees willing to leak secret keys. However if the algorithms make it unfeasible to attack or simply not worth the attackers effort required then that is as good as fully secure. At the moment there are so many devices that simply have no protection that there is an open source project google powered search engine that shows all the devices that are vulnerable[30]. These devices lack even rudimentary security features and even a casual attacker with not too much knowledge or experience could gain access and control. By having even the minimal amount of protection, obviously the more protection the better, you can dissuade would be attackers because they have plenty of easier targets. Or make it so that the reward of breaking into your system simply is not worth the effort.

The TweetNaCl library satisfies all the requirements of a good microcontroller cryptolibrary. It is open source and the developers encourage it's use where ever possible. It was used with success in this project as the users private data could not be read in transit nor altered in transit and the receiver could prove that a certain person sent the message.

Chapter 9

Appendix: Source Code

9.1 Server Side Code

9.1.1 Java Server Pages

DecryptTemp.java

```
package tempLog;

import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.PrintWriter;
import java.sql.Connection;
import java.sql.DriverManager;
import java.sql.ResultSet;
import java.sql.Statement;
import java.sql.Timestamp;

import javax.servlet.ServletException;
import javax.servlet.annotation.WebServlet;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;

import tweetNaCl.TweetNaCl;
import updateKey.SecretKey;

/**
 * Servlet implementation class DecryptTemp
 */
@WebServlet("/DecryptTemp")
public class DecryptTemp extends HttpServlet {
    private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L;
    public static byte[][] keyCollection = new byte[50][];
        //Server private key storage
    public static byte[][] nonceCollection = new byte[50][]; //
        Nonce storage
    private int sqlentry;
    /**
```

```
* @see HttpServlet#HttpServlet()
*/
public DecryptTemp() {
    super();
    // TODO Auto-generated constructor stub
}

protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest request,
    HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException,
    IOException {
    response.setContentType("text/html");
    PrintWriter printWriter = response.getWriter();
    printWriter.println("<html>");
    printWriter.println("<head>");
    printWriter.println("<title>Sensor Data</title>");
    printWriter.println("</head>");
    printWriter.println("<body>");
    printWriter.println("<h1>Temperature Sensor
        Readings</h1>");
    printWriter.println("<table border=1 cellspacing=1
        cellpadding=1>"); //work with ' instead of "?"
    printWriter.println("<tr>");
    printWriter.println("<td>&nbsp;ID&nbsp;</td>");
    printWriter.println("<td>&nbsp;Timestamp&nbsp;</td>");
    printWriter.println("<td>&nbsp;Temperature
        (Hexadecimal)&nbsp;</td>");
    printWriter.println("<td>&nbsp;Temperature
        (Integer)&nbsp;</td>");
    printWriter.println("</tr>");

    //JDBC driver name and database URL
    //final String JDBC_DRIVER="com.mysql.jdbc.Driver";
    final String
        DB_URL="jdbc:mysql://localhost/iotplatform";
    String user = "root"; //SQL password and username
    String password = "";

    try
    {
        // Register JDBC driver
        Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver").newInstance();

        // Open a connection
        Connection conn =
            DriverManager.getConnection(DB_URL, user,
                password);

        // Execute SQL query
        Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();
```

```
String sql;
sql = "SELECT id, timeStamp, tempHex FROM tempLog";
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(sql);
// Extract data from result set
sqlentry=0;
while(rs.next()){
    //Retrieve by column name
    int id = rs.getInt("id");
    String tempHex = rs.getString("tempHex"); //get
    encrypted data
    Timestamp timeStamp =
        rs.getTimestamp("timeStamp");

    tempHex="0000000000000000"+tempHex; //adding
    lost zeros

    byte[] signedcipher =
        hexStringToByteArray(tempHex);
    long signedMessageLength = signedcipher.length;
    byte[] signedMessage = new byte[(int)
        signedMessageLength];

    int Suc_decrypt = 20;

    try{
        byte[] ServerSecretKey =
            keyCollection[sqlentry];
        byte[] nonce = nonceCollection[sqlentry];

        Suc_decrypt =
            TweetNaCl.crypto_box_open(signedMessage,
            signedcipher, signedMessageLength,
            nonce,
            SecretKey.arduinoFirstpkArray, ServerSecretKey);
        printWriter.println("ServerSecretKey Used:
            ");

    }catch(Exception e){
        e.printStackTrace(printWriter);
    }

    byte[] signedMessageWithoutZeros = new byte[105];
    for(int i=0;i<105;i++){
        signedMessageWithoutZeros[i] =
            signedMessage[i+32]; //removing the 32
            bytes worth of zeros
    }
}
```

```

        byte[] message = new byte[41];

        try{
            message =
                TweetNaCl.crypto_sign_open(signedMessageWithoutZeros,
                SecretKey.publicArduinoFirstSigningKey);
        }catch(Exception e){
            e.printStackTrace(printWriter);
        }

        float celcius = convertHextoInt(message,
            printWriter); //converting hex into more
                           readable integers

        //Display values
        printWriter.println("<tr><td>" + id + "</td>");
        printWriter.println("<td>" + timeStamp + "</td>");
        printWriter.println("<td>" + celcius + "</td>");
        printWriter.println("<td>" + tempHex + "</td></tr>");

        sqlentry++;
    }
    printWriter.println("</body></html>");

    // Clean-up environment
    rs.close();
    stmt.close();
    conn.close();
}
catch(Exception e){
    e.printStackTrace(printWriter);
}

}

private float convertHextoInt(byte[] message,PrintWriter
    printWriter){
    float celsius=0;
    try{
        byte[] data = new byte[9];
        for(int i=32;i<message.length;i++){
            data[i-32]=message[i];
        }
        boolean type_s = true; //for DS18S20
        int raw = (data[1] << 8) | data[0];
        if (type_s) {

```

```

        raw = raw << 3; // 9 bit resolution default
        if (data[7] == 0x10) {
            // "count remain" gives full 12 bit resolution
            raw = (raw & 0xFFF0) + 12 - data[6];
        }
    } else {
        byte cfg = (byte) (data[4] & 0x60);
        // at lower res, the low bits are undefined, so let's
        // zero them
        if (cfg == 0x00) raw = raw & ~7; // 9 bit resolution,
            93.75 ms
        else if (cfg == 0x20) raw = raw & ~3; // 10 bit res,
            187.5 ms
        else if (cfg == 0x40) raw = raw & ~1; // 11 bit res,
            375 ms
        //// default is 12 bit resolution, 750 ms conversion
        // time
    }
    celsius = (float) (raw / 16.0);

    } catch (Exception e) {
        e.printStackTrace(printWriter);
    }
    return celsius;
}

public static byte[] hexStringToByteArray(String s) {
    int len = s.length();
    byte[] data = new byte[len / 2];
    for (int i = 0; i < len; i += 2) {
        data[i / 2] = (byte) ((Character.digit(s.charAt(i),
            16) << 4)
            + Character.digit(s.charAt(i+1), 16));
    }
    return data;
}
}

```

SecretKey.java

```

package updateKey;

import java.io.IOException;

```

```
import java.io.PrintWriter;
import java.util.Random;

import javax.servlet.ServletException;
import javax.servlet.annotation.WebServlet;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;

import tweetNaCl.TweetNaCl;
import tempLog.DecryptTemp;

/**
 * Servlet implementation class SecretKey
 */
@WebServlet("/SecretKey")
public class SecretKey extends HttpServlet {
    private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L;
    private static byte[] ServerPublicKey;
    private byte[] ServerSecretKey;
    private byte[] ArduinoPublicKey;
    private byte[] ArduinoSecretKey;
    private byte[] ArduinoSignPublicKey;
    private byte[] ArduinoSignSecretKey;
    private byte[] ServerSignPublicKey;
    private byte[] ServerSignSecretKey;
    public static int keySetNumber = 0;
    public static int nonceSetNumber = 0;

    private static Random prng = new Random(0);
    private PrintWriter pw = null;

    public int getKeySetNumber() {
        return keySetNumber;
    }

    public static byte[] serverFirstskArray = {
        0x5d, (byte) 0xab, 0x08, 0x7e, 0x62, 0x4a, (byte) 0x8a, 0x4b
        , 0x79, (byte) 0xe1, 0x7f, (byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x83, (byte)
        0x80, 0x0e, (byte) 0xe6
        , 0x6f, 0x3b, (byte) 0xb1, 0x29, 0x26, 0x18, (byte)
        0xb6, (byte) 0xfd
        , 0x1c, 0x2f, (byte) 0x8b, 0x27, (byte) 0xff, (byte)
        0x88, (byte) 0xe0, (byte) 0xeb
    };

    public static byte[] arduinoFirstpkArray = {
```

```

        (byte) 0x85, 0x20, (byte) 0xf0, 0x09, (byte)
            0x89, 0x30, (byte) 0xa7, 0x54
    , 0x74, (byte) 0x8b, 0x7d, (byte) 0xdc, (byte)
        0xb4, 0x3e, (byte) 0xf7, 0x5a
    , 0x0d, (byte) 0xbf, 0x3a, 0x0d, 0x26, 0x38, 0x1a, (byte) 0xf4
    , (byte) 0xeb, (byte) 0xa4, (byte) 0xa9, (byte) 0x8e, (byte)
        0xaa, (byte) 0x9b, 0x4e, 0x6a
    } ;

public static byte[] nonceFirstArray = {
    0x69, 0x69, 0x6e, (byte) 0xe9, 0x55, (byte) 0xb6, 0x2b, 0x73
    , (byte) 0xcd, 0x62, (byte) 0xbd, (byte) 0xa8, 0x75, (byte)
        0xfc, 0x73, (byte) 0xd6
    , (byte) 0x82, 0x19, (byte) 0xe0, 0x03, 0x6b, 0x7a, 0x0b, 0x37
    } ;

public static byte[] publicArduinoFirstSigningKey =
    { (byte) 0xb6, (byte) 0xa6, (byte) 0x83, (byte)
    0x9a, 0x41, 0x03, 0x25, (byte) 0xb1
    , (byte) 0xc8, 0x04, 0x33, (byte) 0xc1, 0x19, 0x50, (byte)
        0xdd, 0x26
    , (byte) 0x96, 0x62, (byte) 0xb1, 0x67, (byte)
        0xe9, 0x0b, (byte) 0xa5, 0x46
    , (byte) 0xe7, 0x48, 0x5f, (byte)
        0xa9, 0x15, 0x10, 0x2e, 0x51 };

public static byte[] secretServerFirstSigningKey = {
    (byte) 0xfd, 0x3c, 0x13, (byte) 0xe0, 0x1e, 0x4b, 0x79, 0x06
    , 0x3a, (byte) 0xa1, (byte) 0xbe, (byte) 0xf6, (byte)
        0xd0, 0x3d, (byte) 0x80, (byte) 0xe3
    , (byte) 0x8d, 0x7c, 0x3c, 0x7d, (byte)
        0xa2, 0x76, 0x65, (byte) 0xfe
    , 0x72, 0x42, 0x3f, 0x5a, 0x55, (byte) 0xdf, 0x1f, (byte) 0xef
    , (byte) 0xf2, (byte) 0xaf, (byte) 0xdb, 0x38, 0x2a, (byte)
        0xcc, 0x24, 0x57
    , (byte) 0x90, 0x4e, (byte) 0xb8, 0x77, (byte)
        0xcb, 0x24, 0x72, 0x1a
    , (byte) 0xd2, (byte) 0xb2, 0x2e, (byte) 0x8b, (byte)
        0xe9, 0x72, 0x7c, (byte) 0xfb
    , 0x10, (byte) 0x93, (byte) 0x81, 0x7e, 0x5b, (byte)
        0x83, 0x35, (byte) 0xe0
    };

byte[] serverpk
    = { (byte) 0xde, (byte) 0x9e, (byte) 0xdb, 0x7d,
        0x7b, 0x7d, (byte) 0xc1, (byte) 0xb4,
        (byte) 0xd3, 0x5b, 0x61, (byte) 0xc2, (byte)
        0xec, (byte) 0xe4, 0x35, 0x37,

```

```
        0x3f, (byte) 0x83, 0x43, (byte) 0xc8, 0x5b, 0x78,
        0x67, 0x4d,
        (byte) 0xad, (byte) 0xfc, 0x7e, 0x14, 0x6f,
        (byte) 0x88, 0x2b, 0x4f };

public String getServerPublicKey(){
    String key="";
    try{
        ServerPublicKey = new
            byte[TweetNaCl.BOX_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES];
        ServerSecretKey = new
            byte[TweetNaCl.BOX_SECRET_KEY_BYTES];
        TweetNaCl.crypto_box_keypair(ServerPublicKey,
            ServerSecretKey, false);

        DecryptTemp.keyCollection[keySetNumber] =
            ServerSecretKey; //place secret key in storage
        keySetNumber++;

        key = DecryptTemp.bytesToHex(ServerPublicKey); //convert
            into string

    }catch(Exception e){
        e.printStackTrace(pw);
    }

    return key;
}

private byte[] getRandomNonce() {
    byte[] randomNonce = new byte[24];
    prng.nextBytes(randomNonce); //get randomNonce
    DecryptTemp.nonceCollection[nonceSetNumber] =
        randomNonce; //place nonce in storage
    nonceSetNumber++;
    return randomNonce;
}

private byte[] getSignedNonce(byte[] nonce){

    int nlen = nonce.length;
    int snlen=nlen+TweetNaCl.SIGNATURE_SIZE_BYTES;
    byte[] sntemp = new byte[snlen];
    sntemp = TweetNaCl.crypto_sign(nonce,
        secretServerFirstSigningKey);
```



```
//put on the extra zeros
int snlenZeros = nlen+TweetNaCl.SIGNATURE_SIZE_BYTES+32;
byte[] sn = new byte[snlenZeros];
for(int i=0;i<32;i++){
    sn[i]=0;
}
for(int i=0;i<snlen;i++){
    sn[32+i]=sntemp[i];
}
return sn;
}

private String getEncryptedNonce(byte[] sn){
    int suc_encrypt = 20;
    byte[] sc = new
        byte[24+TweetNaCl.SIGNATURE_SIZE_BYTES+32];

    pw.println("SecretKeySetNumber "+keySetNumber);

    if(keySetNumber==1){ // new public key has just been sent
        but we need to use preinstalled keys to encrypt nonce
        suc_encrypt = TweetNaCl.crypto_box(sc, sn,
            24+TweetNaCl.SIGNATURE_SIZE_BYTES+32 ,
            nonceFirstArray, arduinoFirstpkArray,
            serverFirstskArray);

    }else{
        //can use previous keys and nonce to encrypt next nonce
        byte[] nonce =
            DecryptTemp.nonceCollection[keySetNumber-2];
        byte[] secretKey =
            DecryptTemp.keyCollection[keySetNumber-2];
        suc_encrypt = TweetNaCl.crypto_box(sc, sn,
            24+TweetNaCl.SIGNATURE_SIZE_BYTES+32 , nonce ,
            arduinoFirstpkArray, secretKey);

    }

    String sconce = DecryptTemp.bytesToHex(sc);
    return sconce;
}

/**
 * @see HttpServlet#doGet(HttpServletRequest request,
 *     HttpServletResponse response)
 */
```

```
protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest request,
    HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException,
    IOException {

    response.setContentType("text/html");
    pw = response.getWriter();
    try{

        pw.println("<" + getServerPublicKey() + ">");
        pw.println("(" + getEncryptedNonce(getSignedNonce(getRandomNonce())) +
        ")");
    } catch (Exception e) {
        e.printStackTrace(pw);
    }

}

}
```

9.1.2 PHP

connect.php

```
<?php

function Connection(){
    $server="127.0.0.1";
    $user="root";
    $pass="";
    $db="iotplatform";

    $connection = mysql_connect($server, $user, $pass);

    if (!$connection) {
        die('MySQL ERROR: ' . mysql_error());
    }

    mysql_select_db($db) or die( 'MySQL ERROR: ' .
        mysql_error() );

    return $connection;
}

?>
```

add.php

```
<?php
    include("connect.php");

    $link=Connection();

    $temp=$_POST["temperatureHex"];

    $query = "INSERT INTO tempLog (tempHex)
        VALUE ('".$temp."')";

    mysql_query($query,$link);
    mysql_close($link);

    header("Location: index.php");
?>
```

9.2 Microcontroller

9.2.1 Arduino Due

FIGURE 9.1: Handling POST requests in Arduino

9.2.2 Arduino Uno

FIGURE 9.2: Handling POST requests in Arduino

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