

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

LOGIC WEEKS 14 AND 15

Artificial Intelligence, Weeks 14 and 15

Based on "Artificial Intelligence — A Modern Approach" by Stuart Russel and Peter Norvig, Chapters 7 – 9


See also: "Artificial Intelligence in the 21st Century" by Steven Lucci and Danny Kopec, Chapter 5

Slides edited by Benjamin Inden based on slides by Stuart Russel,

<http://aima.cs.berkeley.edu>

Outline Part 1

- ◇ Knowledge-based agents
- ◇ The Wumpus world
- ◇ Logic in general—models and entailment
- ◇ Propositional (Boolean) logic
- ◇ Equivalence, validity, satisfiability
- ◇ Inference rules and theorem proving
 - forward chaining
 - backward chaining
 - resolution



Knowledge base = set of sentences in a **formal** language

Declarative approach to building an agent (or other system):

TELL it what it needs to know

Then it can **ASK** itself what to do—answers should follow from the KB

Agents can be viewed at the **knowledge level**

i.e., **what they know**, regardless of how implemented

Or at the **implementation level**

i.e., data structures in KB and algorithms that manipulate them

A simple knowledge-based agent

```
function KB-AGENT(percept) returns an action
  static: KB, a knowledge base
          t, a counter, initially 0, indicating time

  TELL(KB, MAKE-PERCEPT-SENTENCE(percept, t))
  action ← ASK(KB, MAKE-ACTION-QUERY(t))
  TELL(KB, MAKE-ACTION-SENTENCE(action, t))
  t ← t + 1
  return action
```

The agent must be able to:

- Represent states, actions, etc.
- Incorporate new percepts
- Update internal representations of the world
- Deduce hidden properties of the world
- Deduce appropriate actions

Wumpus World PEAS description

Performance measure

gold +1000, death -1000

-1 per step, -10 for using the arrow

Environment

Squares adjacent to wumpus are smelly

Squares adjacent to pit are breezy


Glitter iff gold is in the same square

Shooting kills wumpus if you are facing it

Shooting uses up the only arrow

Grabbing picks up gold if in same square

Releasing drops the gold in same square



Actuators Left turn, Right turn,


Forward, Grab, Release, Shoot

Sensors Breeze, Glitter, Smell


Exploring a wumpus world

OK			
OK <div>A</div>	OK		


Exploring a wumpus world




Exploring a wumpus world




Exploring a wumpus world




Exploring a wumpus world




Exploring a wumpus world



Exploring a wumpus world



Exploring a wumpus world



Logic in general

Logics are formal languages for representing information
such that conclusions can be drawn

Syntax defines the sentences in the language

Semantics define the “meaning” of sentences;
i.e., define **truth** of a sentence in a world

E.g., the language of arithmetic

$x + 2 \geq y$ is a sentence; $x^2 + y >$ is not a sentence

$x + 2 \geq y$ is true iff the number $x + 2$ is no less than the number y

$x + 2 \geq y$ is true in a world where $x = 7$, $y = 1$

$x + 2 \geq y$ is false in a world where $x = 0$, $y = 6$

Entailment

Entailment means that one thing **follows from** another:

$$KB \models \alpha$$

Knowledge base KB entails sentence α

if and only if

α is true in all worlds where KB is true

E.g., the KB containing “Manchester United won” and “Manchester City won”

entails “Either Manchester United won or Manchester City won”

E.g., $x + y = 4$ entails $4 = x + y$

Models


Logicians typically think in terms of **models**, which are formally structured worlds with respect to which truth can be evaluated

We say m is a model of a sentence α if α is true in m

$M(\alpha)$ is the set of all models of α

Then $KB \models \alpha$ if and only if $M(KB) \subseteq M(\alpha)$

E.g. KB = Manchester United won
and Manchester City won
 α = Manchester United won



Inference

$KB \vdash_i \alpha$ = sentence α can be derived from KB by procedure i

Soundness: i is sound if

whenever $KB \vdash_i \alpha$, it is also true that $KB \models \alpha$

Completeness: i is complete if

whenever $KB \models \alpha$, it is also true that $KB \vdash_i \alpha$

Preview: we will define a logic (first-order logic) which is expressive enough to say almost anything of interest, and for which there exists a sound and complete inference procedure.

That is, the procedure will answer any question whose answer follows from what is known by the KB .

Propositional logic: Syntax

Propositional logic is the simplest logic—illustrates basic ideas

The proposition symbols P_1, P_2 etc are sentences

If S is a sentence, $\neg S$ is a sentence (negation)

If S_1 and S_2 are sentences, $S_1 \wedge S_2$ is a sentence (conjunction)

If S_1 and S_2 are sentences, $S_1 \vee S_2$ is a sentence (disjunction)

If S_1 and S_2 are sentences, $S_1 \Rightarrow S_2$ is a sentence (implication)

If S_1 and S_2 are sentences, $S_1 \Leftrightarrow S_2$ is a sentence (biconditional)

Propositional logic: Semantics

Each model specifies true/false for each proposition symbol

E.g. $P_{1,2}$ $P_{2,2}$ $P_{3,1}$
true true false

(With these symbols, 8 possible models, can be enumerated automatically.)

Rules for evaluating truth with respect to a model m :

$\neg S$ is true iff	S is false
$S_1 \wedge S_2$ is true iff	S_1 is true and S_2 is true
$S_1 \vee S_2$ is true iff	S_1 is true or S_2 is true
$S_1 \Rightarrow S_2$ is true iff	S_1 is false or S_2 is true
i.e., is false iff	S_1 is true and S_2 is false
$S_1 \Leftrightarrow S_2$ is true iff	$S_1 \Rightarrow S_2$ is true and $S_2 \Rightarrow S_1$ is true

Simple recursive process evaluates an arbitrary sentence, e.g.,

$\neg P_{1,2} \wedge (P_{2,2} \vee P_{3,1}) = \textit{true} \wedge (\textit{false} \vee \textit{true}) = \textit{true} \wedge \textit{true} = \textit{true}$

Truth tables for connectives

P	Q	$\neg P$	$P \wedge Q$	$P \vee Q$	$P \Rightarrow Q$	$P \Leftrightarrow Q$
<i>false</i>	<i>false</i>	<i>true</i>	<i>false</i>	<i>false</i>	<i>true</i>	<i>true</i>
<i>false</i>	<i>true</i>	<i>true</i>	<i>false</i>	<i>true</i>	<i>true</i>	<i>false</i>
<i>true</i>	<i>false</i>	<i>false</i>	<i>false</i>	<i>true</i>	<i>false</i>	<i>false</i>
<i>true</i>	<i>true</i>	<i>false</i>	<i>true</i>	<i>true</i>	<i>true</i>	<i>true</i>

Wumpus world sentences

Let $P_{i,j}$ be true if there is a pit in $[i, j]$.

Let $B_{i,j}$ be true if there is a breeze in $[i, j]$.

$$\neg P_{1,1}$$

$$\neg B_{1,1}$$

$$B_{2,1}$$

“Pits cause breezes in adjacent squares”

$$B_{1,1} \Leftrightarrow (P_{1,2} \vee P_{2,1})$$

$$B_{2,1} \Leftrightarrow (P_{1,1} \vee P_{2,2} \vee P_{3,1})$$

“A square is breezy **if and only if** there is an adjacent pit”

Logical equivalence

Two sentences are **logically equivalent** iff true in same models:

$\alpha \equiv \beta$ if and only if $\alpha \models \beta$ and $\beta \models \alpha$

$$(\alpha \wedge \beta) \equiv (\beta \wedge \alpha) \quad \text{commutativity of } \wedge$$

$$(\alpha \vee \beta) \equiv (\beta \vee \alpha) \quad \text{commutativity of } \vee$$

$$((\alpha \wedge \beta) \wedge \gamma) \equiv (\alpha \wedge (\beta \wedge \gamma)) \quad \text{associativity of } \wedge$$

$$((\alpha \vee \beta) \vee \gamma) \equiv (\alpha \vee (\beta \vee \gamma)) \quad \text{associativity of } \vee$$

$$\neg(\neg\alpha) \equiv \alpha \quad \text{double-negation elimination}$$

$$(\alpha \Rightarrow \beta) \equiv (\neg\beta \Rightarrow \neg\alpha) \quad \text{contraposition}$$

$$(\alpha \Rightarrow \beta) \equiv (\neg\alpha \vee \beta) \quad \text{implication elimination}$$

$$(\alpha \Leftrightarrow \beta) \equiv ((\alpha \Rightarrow \beta) \wedge (\beta \Rightarrow \alpha)) \quad \text{biconditional elimination}$$

$$\neg(\alpha \wedge \beta) \equiv (\neg\alpha \vee \neg\beta) \quad \text{De Morgan}$$

$$\neg(\alpha \vee \beta) \equiv (\neg\alpha \wedge \neg\beta) \quad \text{De Morgan}$$

$$(\alpha \wedge (\beta \vee \gamma)) \equiv ((\alpha \wedge \beta) \vee (\alpha \wedge \gamma)) \quad \text{distributivity of } \wedge \text{ over } \vee$$

$$(\alpha \vee (\beta \wedge \gamma)) \equiv ((\alpha \vee \beta) \wedge (\alpha \vee \gamma)) \quad \text{distributivity of } \vee \text{ over } \wedge$$

Validity and satisfiability

A sentence is **valid** if it is true in **all** models,

e.g., *True*, $A \vee \neg A$, $A \Rightarrow A$, $(A \wedge (A \Rightarrow B)) \Rightarrow B$

Validity is connected to inference via the **Deduction Theorem**:

$KB \models \alpha$ if and only if $(KB \Rightarrow \alpha)$ is valid

A sentence is **satisfiable** if it is true in **some** model

e.g., $A \vee B$, C

A sentence is **unsatisfiable** if it is true in **no** models

e.g., $A \wedge \neg A$

Satisfiability is connected to inference via the following:

$KB \models \alpha$ if and only if $(KB \wedge \neg \alpha)$ is unsatisfiable

i.e., prove α by *reductio ad absurdum*

Proof methods

Proof methods divide into (roughly) two kinds:

Application of inference rules

- Legitimate (sound) generation of new sentences from old
- **Proof** = a sequence of inference rule applications
 - Can use inference rules as operators in a standard search alg.
- Typically require translation of sentences into a **normal form**

Model checking

truth table enumeration (sound and complete, but always exponential in n)

improved backtracking, e.g., Davis–Putnam–Logemann–Loveland
heuristic search in model space (sound but incomplete)
e.g., min-conflicts-like hill-climbing algorithms

Study Note

When studying the material on proof techniques, focus on three questions:

- ◇ What are Horn Clauses?
- ◇ How can an arbitrary proposition be converted into conjunctive normal form (CNF)?
- ◇ What inference algorithms for propositional logic exist?

It is not necessary to memorize the individual algorithms.

Forward and backward chaining

Horn Form (restricted)

KB = **conjunction** of **Horn clauses**

Horn clause =

◇ proposition symbol; or

◇ (conjunction of symbols) \Rightarrow symbol

E.g., $C \wedge (B \Rightarrow A) \wedge (C \wedge D \Rightarrow B)$

Modus Ponens (for Horn Form): complete for Horn KBs

$$\frac{\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n, \quad \alpha_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \alpha_n \Rightarrow \beta}{\beta}$$

Can be used with **forward chaining** or **backward chaining**.

These algorithms are very natural and run in **linear** time

Forward chaining

Idea: fire any rule whose premises are satisfied in the *KB*,
add its conclusion to the *KB*, until query is found

$$P \Rightarrow Q$$

$$L \wedge M \Rightarrow P$$


$$B \wedge L \Rightarrow M$$

$$A \wedge P \Rightarrow L$$

$$A \wedge B \Rightarrow L$$

A

B




Forward chaining algorithm


```
function PL-FC-ENTAILS?(KB, q) returns true or false
  inputs: KB, the knowledge base, a set of propositional Horn clauses
         q, the query, a proposition symbol
  local variables: count, a table, indexed by clause, initially the number of premises
                  inferred, a table, indexed by symbol, each entry initially false
                  agenda, a list of symbols, initially the symbols known in KB

  while agenda is not empty do
    p ← POP(agenda)
    unless inferred[p] do
      inferred[p] ← true
      for each Horn clause c in whose premise p appears do
        decrement count[c]
        if count[c] = 0 then do
          if HEAD[c] = q then return true
          PUSH(HEAD[c], agenda)
  return false
```


Forward chaining example




Forward chaining example




Forward chaining example




Forward chaining example




Forward chaining example




Forward chaining example



Forward chaining example



Forward chaining example



Backward chaining

Idea: work backwards from the query q :

- to prove q by BC,

- check if q is known already, or


- prove by BC all premises of some rule concluding q

Avoid loops: check if new subgoal is already on the goal stack


Avoid repeated work: check if new subgoal

- 1) has already been proved true, or
- 2) has already failed


Backward chaining example




Backward chaining example




Backward chaining example




Backward chaining example




Backward chaining example




Backward chaining example




Backward chaining example




Backward chaining example




Backward chaining example



Backward chaining example



Backward chaining example



Forward vs. backward chaining

FC is **data-driven**, cf. automatic, unconscious processing,
e.g., object recognition, routine decisions

May do lots of work that is irrelevant to the goal

BC is **goal-driven**, appropriate for problem-solving,
e.g., Where are my keys? How do I get into a PhD program?

Complexity of BC can be **much less** than linear in size of KB

Resolution

Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF—universal)

conjunction of **disjunctions** of **literals**
clauses

E.g., $(A \vee \neg B) \wedge (B \vee \neg C \vee \neg D)$


Resolution inference rule (for CNF): complete for propositional logic

$$\frac{\ell_1 \vee \dots \vee \ell_k, \quad m_1 \vee \dots \vee m_n}{\ell_1 \vee \dots \vee \ell_{i-1} \vee \ell_{i+1} \vee \dots \vee \ell_k \vee m_1 \vee \dots \vee m_{j-1} \vee m_{j+1} \vee \dots \vee m_n}$$

where ℓ_i and m_j are complementary literals. E.g.,

$$\frac{P_{1,3} \vee P_{2,2}, \quad \neg P_{2,2}}{P_{1,3}}$$

Resolution is sound and complete for propositional logic



Conversion to CNF

$$B_{1,1} \Leftrightarrow (P_{1,2} \vee P_{2,1})$$

1. Eliminate \Leftrightarrow , replacing $\alpha \Leftrightarrow \beta$ with $(\alpha \Rightarrow \beta) \wedge (\beta \Rightarrow \alpha)$.

$$(B_{1,1} \Rightarrow (P_{1,2} \vee P_{2,1})) \wedge ((P_{1,2} \vee P_{2,1}) \Rightarrow B_{1,1})$$

2. Eliminate \Rightarrow , replacing $\alpha \Rightarrow \beta$ with $\neg\alpha \vee \beta$.

$$(\neg B_{1,1} \vee P_{1,2} \vee P_{2,1}) \wedge (\neg(P_{1,2} \vee P_{2,1}) \vee B_{1,1})$$

3. Move \neg inwards using de Morgan's rules and double-negation:

$$(\neg B_{1,1} \vee P_{1,2} \vee P_{2,1}) \wedge ((\neg P_{1,2} \wedge \neg P_{2,1}) \vee B_{1,1})$$

4. Apply distributivity law (\vee over \wedge) and flatten:

$$(\neg B_{1,1} \vee P_{1,2} \vee P_{2,1}) \wedge (\neg P_{1,2} \vee B_{1,1}) \wedge (\neg P_{2,1} \vee B_{1,1})$$

Resolution algorithm

Proof by contradiction, i.e., show $KB \wedge \neg\alpha$ unsatisfiable

```
function PL-RESOLUTION( $KB, \alpha$ ) returns true or false
  inputs:  $KB$ , the knowledge base, a sentence in propositional logic
            $\alpha$ , the query, a sentence in propositional logic

   $clauses \leftarrow$  the set of clauses in the CNF representation of  $KB \wedge \neg\alpha$ 
   $new \leftarrow \{ \}$ 
  loop do
    for each  $C_i, C_j$  in  $clauses$  do
       $resolvents \leftarrow$  PL-RESOLVE( $C_i, C_j$ )
      if  $resolvents$  contains the empty clause then return true
       $new \leftarrow new \cup resolvents$ 
  if  $new \subseteq clauses$  then return false
   $clauses \leftarrow clauses \cup new$ 
```

Summary Part 1

Logical agents apply **inference** to a **knowledge base** to derive new information and make decisions

Basic concepts of logic:

- **syntax**: formal structure of **sentences**
- **semantics**: **truth** of sentences wrt **models**
- **entailment**: necessary truth of one sentence given another
- **inference**: deriving sentences from other sentences
- **soundness**: derivations produce only entailed sentences
- **completeness**: derivations can produce all entailed sentences

Forward, backward chaining are linear-time, complete for Horn clauses

Resolution is complete for propositional logic

Propositional logic lacks expressive power

Outline Part 2

- ◇ Why First Order Logic (FOL)?
- ◇ Syntax and semantics of FOL
- ◇ Inference in FOL

First-order logic

Propositional logic has very limited expressive power (unlike natural language)

E.g., cannot say “pits cause breezes in adjacent squares” except by writing one sentence for each square

Whereas propositional logic assumes world contains **facts**, first-order logic (like natural language) assumes the world contains

- **Objects**: people, houses, numbers, theories, Ronald McDonald, colors, baseball games, wars, centuries ...
- **Relations**: red, round, bogus, prime, multistoried ..., brother of, bigger than, inside, part of, has color, occurred after, owns, comes between, ...
- **Functions**: father of, best friend, third inning of, one more than, end of ...

Syntax of FOL: Basic elements

Constants *KingJohn, 2, NTU,...*

Predicates *Brother, >,...*

Functions *Sqrt, LeftLegOf,...*

Variables *x, y, a, b,...*

Connectives $\wedge \vee \neg \Rightarrow \Leftrightarrow$

Equality $=$

Quantifiers $\forall \exists$

Atomic sentences

Atomic sentence = $\text{predicate}(\text{term}_1, \dots, \text{term}_n)$
or $\text{term}_1 = \text{term}_2$

Term = $\text{function}(\text{term}_1, \dots, \text{term}_n)$
or *constant* or *variable*

E.g., $\text{Brother}(\text{KingJohn}, \text{RichardTheLionheart})$
 $> (\text{Length}(\text{LeftLegOf}(\text{Richard})), \text{Length}(\text{LeftLegOf}(\text{KingJohn})))$

Complex sentences

Complex sentences are made from atomic sentences using connectives

$$\neg S, \quad S_1 \wedge S_2, \quad S_1 \vee S_2, \quad S_1 \Rightarrow S_2, \quad S_1 \Leftrightarrow S_2$$

E.g. $Sibling(KingJohn, Richard) \Rightarrow Sibling(Richard, KingJohn)$

$$>(1, 2) \vee \leq(1, 2)$$

$$>(1, 2) \wedge \neg >(1, 2)$$

Truth in first-order logic

Sentences are true with respect to a **model** and an **interpretation**

Model contains ≥ 1 objects (**domain elements**) and relations among them

Interpretation specifies referents for

constant symbols \rightarrow **objects**

predicate symbols \rightarrow **relations**

function symbols \rightarrow **functional relations**

An atomic sentence $\textit{predicate}(\textit{term}_1, \dots, \textit{term}_n)$ is true
iff the **objects** referred to by $\textit{term}_1, \dots, \textit{term}_n$
are in the **relation** referred to by $\textit{predicate}$

Universal quantification

$\forall \langle variables \rangle \langle sentence \rangle$

Everyone at Berkeley is smart:

$\forall x \text{ } At(x, Berkeley) \Rightarrow Smart(x)$

$\forall x \text{ } P$ is true in a model m iff P is true with x being **each** possible object in the model

Roughly speaking, equivalent to the **conjunction** of **instantiations** of P

$(At(KingJohn, Berkeley) \Rightarrow Smart(KingJohn))$
 $\wedge (At(Richard, Berkeley) \Rightarrow Smart(Richard))$
 $\wedge (At(Berkeley, Berkeley) \Rightarrow Smart(Berkeley))$
 $\wedge \dots$

A common mistake to avoid

Typically, \Rightarrow is the main connective with \forall

Common mistake: using \wedge as the main connective with \forall :

$$\forall x \text{ } At(x, Berkeley) \wedge Smart(x)$$

means “Everyone is at Berkeley and everyone is smart”

Existential quantification

$\exists \langle variables \rangle \langle sentence \rangle$

Someone at Stanford is smart:

$\exists x \text{ } At(x, Stanford) \wedge Smart(x)$

$\exists x \text{ } P$ is true in a model m iff P is true with x being **some** possible object in the model

Roughly speaking, equivalent to the **disjunction** of instantiations of P

$(At(KingJohn, Stanford) \wedge Smart(KingJohn))$
 $\vee (At(Richard, Stanford) \wedge Smart(Richard))$
 $\vee (At(Stanford, Stanford) \wedge Smart(Stanford))$
 $\vee \dots$

Properties of quantifiers

$\forall x \forall y$ is the same as $\forall y \forall x$

$\exists x \exists y$ is the same as $\exists y \exists x$

$\exists x \forall y$ is **not** the same as $\forall y \exists x$

$\exists x \forall y \text{ Loves}(x, y)$

“There is a person who loves everyone in the world”

$\forall y \exists x \text{ Loves}(x, y)$

“Everyone in the world is loved by at least one person”

Quantifier duality: each can be expressed using the other

$\forall x \text{ Likes}(x, \text{IceCream}) \quad \neg \exists x \neg \text{Likes}(x, \text{IceCream})$

$\exists x \text{ Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli}) \quad \neg \forall x \neg \text{Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli})$

Interacting with FOL KBs

Suppose a wumpus-world agent is using an FOL KB and perceives a smell and a breeze (but no glitter) at $t = 5$:

$Tell(KB, Percept([Smell, Breeze, None], 5))$

$Ask(KB, \exists a \text{ Action}(a, 5))$

I.e., does KB entail any particular actions at $t = 5$?

Answer: $Yes, \{a/Shoot\} \leftarrow \text{substitution (binding list)}$

Given a sentence S and a substitution σ ,

$S\sigma$ denotes the result of plugging σ into S ; e.g.,

$S = Smarter(x, y)$

$\sigma = \{x/Hillary, y/Bill\}$

$S\sigma = Smarter(Hillary, Bill)$

$Ask(KB, S)$ returns some/all σ such that $KB \models S\sigma$

Knowledge base for the wumpus world

“Perception”

$\forall b, g, t \text{ Percept}([Smell, b, g], t) \Rightarrow Smelt(t)$

$\forall s, b, t \text{ Percept}([s, b, Glitter], t) \Rightarrow AtGold(t)$

Reflex: $\forall t \text{ AtGold}(t) \Rightarrow \text{Action}(Grab, t)$

Reflex with internal state: do we have the gold already?

$\forall t \text{ AtGold}(t) \wedge \neg Holding(Gold, t) \Rightarrow \text{Action}(Grab, t)$

$Holding(Gold, t)$ cannot be observed

\Rightarrow keeping track of change is essential

Deducing hidden properties

Properties of locations:

$$\forall x, t \text{ } At(Agent, x, t) \wedge Smelt(t) \Rightarrow Smelly(x)$$

$$\forall x, t \text{ } At(Agent, x, t) \wedge Breeze(t) \Rightarrow Breezy(x)$$

Squares are breezy near a pit:

Diagnostic rule—infer cause from effect

$$\forall y \text{ } Breezy(y) \Rightarrow \exists x \text{ } Pit(x) \wedge Adjacent(x, y)$$

Causal rule—infer effect from cause

$$\forall x, y \text{ } Pit(x) \wedge Adjacent(x, y) \Rightarrow Breezy(y)$$

Neither of these is complete—e.g., the causal rule doesn't say whether squares far away from pits can be breezy

Definition for the *Breezy* predicate:

$$\forall y \text{ } Breezy(y) \Leftrightarrow [\exists x \text{ } Pit(x) \wedge Adjacent(x, y)]$$

Keeping track of change

Facts hold in **situations**, rather than eternally

E.g., *Holding(Gold, Now)* rather than just *Holding(Gold)*


Situation calculus is one way to represent change in FOL:

Adds a situation argument to each non-eternal predicate

E.g., *Now* in *Holding(Gold, Now)* denotes a situation

Situations are connected by the *Result* function

Result(a, s) is the situation that results from doing *a* in *s*



Reduction to propositional inference

Suppose the KB contains just the following:

$$\forall x \text{ King}(x) \wedge \text{Greedy}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Evil}(x)$$

King(John)

Greedy(John)

Brother(Richard, John)

Instantiating the universal sentence in **all possible** ways, we have

$$\text{King}(\text{John}) \wedge \text{Greedy}(\text{John}) \Rightarrow \text{Evil}(\text{John})$$

$$\text{King}(\text{Richard}) \wedge \text{Greedy}(\text{Richard}) \Rightarrow \text{Evil}(\text{Richard})$$

King(John)

Greedy(John)

Brother(Richard, John)

The new KB is **propositionalized**: proposition symbols are

King(John), Greedy(John), Evil(John), King(Richard) etc.

Propositionalization

In general, statements in first order logic can be propositionalized, i.e., all universal and existential quantors are removed.

Inference algorithms for propositional logic can then be applied.

Problem: with function symbols, there are infinitely many ground terms,
e.g., *Father(Father(Father(John)))*

Theorem: Herbrand (1930). If a sentence α is entailed by an FOL KB,
it is entailed by a **finite** subset of the propositional KB

Idea: For $n = 0$ to ∞ do
 create a propositional KB by instantiating with depth- n terms
 see if α is entailed by this KB

Problem: works if α is entailed, loops if α is not entailed

Theorem: Turing (1936), Church (1936), entailment in FOL is **semidecidable**

Problems with propositionalization

Propositionalization seems to generate lots of irrelevant sentences.

E.g., from

$$\forall x \text{ King}(x) \wedge \text{Greedy}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Evil}(x)$$

$$\text{King}(\text{John})$$

$$\forall y \text{ Greedy}(y)$$

$$\text{Brother}(\text{Richard}, \text{John})$$

it seems obvious that $\text{Evil}(\text{John})$, but propositionalization produces lots of facts such as $\text{Greedy}(\text{Richard})$ that are irrelevant

Better inference procedures for first order logic

We can get the inference immediately if we can find a substitution θ such that $King(x)$ and $Greedy(x)$ match $King(John)$ and $Greedy(y)$

$\theta = \{x/John, y/John\}$ works

Based on this procedure, called unification, and an inference rule called generalized modus ponens, more efficient inference algorithms (forward chaining and backward chaining) can be implemented.

However, these algorithms still may not terminate if a statement is not entailed.

Logic programming with Prolog systems

Basis: backward chaining with Horn clauses

Program = set of clauses = `head :- literal1, ... literaln.`

`criminal(X) :- american(X), weapon(Y), sells(X,Y,Z), hostile(Z).`

Depth-first, left-to-right backward chaining

Built-in predicates for arithmetic etc., e.g., `X is Y*Z+3`

Unique-names assumption: every constant symbol refers to a distinct object

Closed-world assumption: sentences not known are assumed to be false

e.g., given `alive(X) :- not dead(X).`

`alive(joe)` succeeds if `dead(joe)` fails

Domain closure: each model contain no more elements than those names by the constant symbols

Summary Part 2

First-order logic:

- objects and relations are semantic primitives
- syntax: constants, functions, predicates, equality, quantifiers

Increased expressive power: sufficient to define wumpus world

Inference algorithms:

- Propositionalization
- Forward-chaining
- Backward-chaining

Logic programming