

I. Main Content

A. Main Questions

1. (Q1) When may an ethical company profit from the use of personal data?
2. (Q2) What responsibility should a company bear for harms that result from the use of personal data?

B. Background

1. Data
2. Personal data
 - a. Natural persons
 - b. Linkability
3. Algorithms
 - a. Adam's attendance algorithm
4. Databases
5. Data mining

C. Q1 Answer 1: When they own it

1. Intro
2. Ownership and rights to profit
 - a. Necessary condition
 - b. Sufficient condition
 - c. Weakened version
3. Ownership of what
4. Property / ownership
 - a. Property as a bundle of rights
Bundle of rights
 - b. Transfers
 - c. Locke
 - i. Account of property
 - ii. Right of use
 - iii. Application to Q1
 - d. Kirzner

- i. Kirzner's view
- ii. Justification
- iii. Application to Q1
- iv. Is this necessary?

5. Problems for Q1 A1

- a. Divisibility Problem(s)
 - i. What's divided
 - ii. Technical problems
 - iii. Metaphysical problems
 - 1. Floridi's ontological interpretation
- b. Conception of justice presupposed
- c. Other sources of concern
 - i. Acquisition of data
 - ii. Public vs. private information
 - iii. Uses the results are put to

D. Q1 Answer 2: When we let them

- 1. Intro
- 2. Notice and Consent
 - a. Consent intro
 - i. Political obligation and consent
 - 1. Early days
 - 2. Explicit consent
 - 3. Tacit consent
 - 4. Wild west internet
 - ii. Informed consent
 - 1. Informed
 - a. Accuracy
 - b. Understandable / level of detail
 - 2. Capable of deciding
 - 3. Voluntary

- b. What must be disclosed
- c. Strengths of notice and consent model
 - i. Spells out all details
 - ii. Gives consumer basis for trust
 - iii. Opportunity for market differentiation
 - iv. Other strengths
- d. Problems with notice and consent
 - i. Consent part
 - 1. Inescapable / no real choice
 - 2. Hard to judge risks / consequences of agreeing
 - 3. Difficulty of knowing competence of person agreeing
 - ii. Notice part
 - 1. TL;DR
 - 2. Policy revisions
 - a. Lock-in
 - 3. 3rd party use
 - 4. Legalese
 - a. Interpretation against body of case law
 - iii. Other problems
 - 1. Economic externalities
 - 2. Affects the value we put on privacy
 - 3. Spider lawyers
- e. Attempts to fix notice and consent
 - i. Standardizing and simplifying policies
 - ii. Stavra example
 - iii. Opt out vs opt in
- f. Transparency paradox
 - i. Paradoxes
 - ii. The transparency paradox
 - iii. What guarantees the paradox

- iv. Objection: informed consent works in medicine
 - 1. Response: Nope not fixed in medicine
 - 2. Response: Unknowability
- v. Alternative approaches to saving notice and consent
 - 1. Privacy consultants
 - a. Concerns about privacy consultants
 - 2. Ratings organizations
- 3. Nissenbaum's approach
 - a. Contexts
 - b. Contextual integrity
 - c. Informational norms
 - i. Norms of appropriateness
 - ii. Norms of flow / distribution
 - iii. 3 elements
 - d. Her opponent
 - i. Distinct
 - ii. Distinctive
 - iii. Contra distinct
 - iv. Contra distinctive
 - e. Decision heuristic
 - i. Locate relevant existing contexts
 - ii. Explicate existing norms
 - iii. Identify disruptive flows
 - iv. Evaluate flows against norms
 - f. Easier cases
 - i. Privacy in medicine
 - ii. Privacy in banking
 - iii. Netflix, youtube, etc
 - g. Harder cases
 - i. Analogs of social media?

- ii. 2 guidelines for locating contexts in hard cases
 - 1. How the company presents itself
 - 2. Looking to relevant values or purposes
 - a. Problem: does this abandon contexts?
 - h. Objections
 - i. Overly conservative
 - ii. Contexts as cement shoes
 - iii. Commercial nature of the web
 - iv. Basing on the real world better not mean the real world
- E. Q2: Bads and blames
- 1. Intro
 - 2. Test cases
 - a. Data hoarder
 - b. Argument tweeter
 - c. Internet isolation
 - d. People Ratings Agencies
 - 3. Harms of informational privacy violation
 - a. Methodology
 - i. The problem with starting from privacy
 - ii. Focus on harmful violations of privacy
 - b. The concept of harm
 - i. Harm principle
 - ii. Definition of harm
 - 1. Setback of interest
 - a. Interests
 - i. Well-being
 - b. Setbacks
 - i. Death
 - ii. Other problems
 - 2. Wrongfulness

- 3. Method
- 4. Odd cases
 - a. Harmless rights violations
 - b. Hurting without harming (self-defense)
- c. Informational harms -- setbacks
 - i. Exploiting weaknesses
 - ii. Location
 - 1. Car
 - 2. Phone
 - a. Apps
 - 3. Social media
 - iii. Threats to autonomy
 - iv. Relationships
 - v. Democracy
 - vi. Surveillance capitalism
- d. Informational harms -- rights violations
 - i. Which rights?
 - 1. Non privacy rights
 - 2. Right to protected sphere
 - ii. Accounts of right to protected sphere
 - 1. Negative Liberty account
 - a. Positive liberty
 - b. Negative liberty
 - c. Right to protected sphere
 - d. Objections
 - i. Focus on interference
 - ii. Intrinsic wrongness of privacy invasion
 - 2. Republican account
 - a. Domination
 - b. Right to protected sphere

- c. Objections
 - i. Is collection always domination?
 - ii. Intrinsic wrongness of privacy invasion
 - 3. Relational account
 - a. Right to protected sphere
 - b. Objections
 - e. Can machines violate privacy?
 - i. No. Understanding matters
 - ii. Application of 3 approaches
- 4. Responsibility
 - a. Intro
 - b. Test cases
 - c. What do we mean by moral responsibility
 - i. (1) Reactive attitudes and evaluation are appropriate
 - ii. (2) Compensation / retribution / apology may be owed
 - iii. (3) Punishment may be appropriate
 - d. Necessary conditions for moral responsibility
 - i. (1) Causal connection: Actus reus
 - ii. (2) Knowledge: Mens rea
 - iii. Problems: causal connection
 - 1. Problem of many-hands
 - a. Therac-25 treatment machine
 - 2. Temporal and physical distance
 - iv. Problems: knowledge
 - v. Problems: freedom
 - e. Expanding the notion of responsibility
 - i. Forward and backwards looking conceptions
 - ii. Responsibility, liability, accountability
 - f. Floridi and gatekeepers
 - i. Warm up

- ii. Starting points
- iii. Agents
- iv. Moral agents
- v. Objections
- vi. Moral agency without responsibility
- vii. Pros
- g. Are gatekeeper algorithms moral agents
- h. AI bad things