- Side-channel attack
- Chosen ciphertext attack
- Can be used to decrypt any ciphertext without knowing the key
- Can also be used to encrypt any plaintext without knowing the key

You need a system where:

- The ciphertext is modifiable by you
- Uses CBC mode for multiple blocks
- Uses PKCS#7 as the padding mechanism
- For encryption: the IV is modifiable by you
- The system returns for a given ciphertext whether the padding is okay or not before parsing the message

curl "http://<url>/token?token=794ebcc5bd4e4e314d6447e4cf1fef50 4163e0b8f013990f81460d387d36ed9d781d3bd7aa290f0f"

Ooops! Padding problem

Other common ways:

• Different status codes

200: OK

422: Parse error


500: Wrong padding


• Using a different side channel


794ebcc5bd4e4e314d6447e4cf1fef504163e0b8f013990f81460d387d36 ed9d781d3bd7aa290f0f


794ebcc5bd4e4e314d6447e4cf1fef504163e0b8f013990f81460d387d36 ed9d781d3bd7va290f0f


CIPHERTEXT























Do this until we arrive at padding \8 \8 \8 \8 \8 \8 \8 \8





Using at most 8*256 = 2048 operations (brute forcing would cost $256^8 = 18446744073709551615$ operations)




















How to fix the following code?

```
BEGIN
    TRY: dec = DEC(input)
    CATCH: return "Input problem"
    END
    TRY: nopad = REMOVE_PAD(dec)
    CATCH: return "Padding problem"
    END
    TRY: data = PARSE(nopad)
    CATCH: return "Parse problem"
    END
    return "OKAY"
END
```

Like this?

```
BEGIN
    TRY: dec = DEC(input)
    CATCH: return "FAIL"
    END
    TRY: nopad = REMOVE_PAD(dec)
    CATCH: return "FAIL"
    END
    TRY: data = PARSE(nopad)
    CATCH: return "FAIL"
    END
    return "OKAY"
END
```



Why?

```
BEGIN
    TRY: dec = DEC(input)
    CATCH: return "FAIL"
                              100ms
    END
    TRY: nopad = REMOVE_PAD(dec)
    CATCH: return "FAIL"
                                    100ms
    END
    TRY: data = PARSE(nopad)
                               100ms
    CATCH: return "FAIL"
    END
    return "OKAY"
END
```

Or like this?

```
BEGIN
    TRY: dec = DEC(input)
    CATCH: sleep(random(200)); return "FAIL"
    END
    TRY: nopad = REMOVE_PAD(dec)
    CATCH: sleep(random(100)); return "FAIL"
    END
    TRY: data = PARSE(nopad)
    CATCH: return "FAIL"
    END
    return "OKAY"
END
```

Implementation note: Canvel et al. [CBCTIME] have demonstrated a timing attack on CBC padding based on the time required to compute the MAC. In order to defend against this attack, implementations MUST ensure that record processing time is essentially the same whether or not the padding is correct.

Source: RFC5246 (TLS 1.2)

BEGIN

Or like this?

Data is now:

<data><padding><MAC>

TRY: dec = DEC(input)

CATCH: return "FAIL"

END

TRY: maccheck(dec)

CATCH: return "FAIL"

END

TRY: nopad = REMOVE_PAD(dec)

CATCH: return "FAIL"

END

TRY: data = PARSE(nopad)

CATCH: return "FAIL"

END

return "OKAY"

END

