In Theory

Common Elements in the Analysis of the Negotiation Process

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Like the proverbial blind men who confronted the elephant and brought back conflicting accounts of its salient characteristics, contemporary analysts of negotiation appear to be talking about different things under the name of the same phenomenon. Some have even called for a search for a common understanding of the subject so that analysis can proceed on the same epistemological track.

This article, however, suggests that a common understanding of the negotiation process has already developed and analysts are using it. The diversity that can be found in a number of approaches—five of which are identified—merely displays different ways of talking about the same phenomenon, and in fact even involves the same questions and parameters presented from different angles and under different names. There is more unity than some have suspected, and more complementarity too, as different approaches reinforce and build on each other's analysis. However, many aspects of the process still elude this common but multifaceted analysis. The common notion of the process has led analysts to confront these continuing problems, but there is of course no certainty that further answers to obdurate problems will not produce new terms of analysis and even new notions of the whole process.

It is paradoxical and perhaps confusing that there is no single dominant analytical approach to negotiation. The confusion arises from the presence of many different attempts at analysis, sometimes inventing their own wheels to carry forward their insights and sometimes crossreferencing from a number of different analytical approaches (e.g., see cases in Zartman, 1987a and 1987b; and Davidow, 1984). The fact that all of these are studies of great value only confirms the analytical confusion. The paradox arises because behind this analytical diversity there lies a single phenomenon to be analyzed. Although some

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authors have a hard time seeing the essential identity of the negotiation process (Young, 1975), most others (including those who then focus on different sub-types for analytical purposes) start with a common definition of the phenomenon (Pruitt, 1981; Raiffa, 1982; Walton and McKersie, 1965; Ikle, 1964).

In simple terms, negotiation is a process of combining conflicting positions into a common position, under a decision rule of unanimity, a phenomenon in which the outcome is determined by the process (Kissinger, 1969, p. 212). The essential element of process is important because it posits a determining dynamic, not just an assortment of scattered actions or tactics. The challenge then becomes one of finding the nature of that dynamic and its parameters. It is because this challenge has not been met to universal satisfaction that there are still a number of contending approaches to the study of the process. The same reason also explains, in part, why there is such resistance among practitioners of the process to adopting and applying the work of analysts to their practice.

The question still remains: If there is a single recognized phenomenon, and if the various approaches that are employed to analyze that phenomenon are all insightful, why is there not greater consensus on how to explain negotiation? This article will propose some answers to that question, but in the process it will heighten—but also seek to remove—the paradox. The answer proposed is that each of the analytical approaches puts forward a deterministic analysis in its most rigorous form, but it is only useful insights, not whole theories, that are gained when the unreal conditions of determinism are dropped. The clash between deterministic integrity and realistic looseness keeps each analytic approach separate from the others in trying to overcome its internal problems of analysis rather than facing external problems of coordination. The fact that many of the separate approaches are supported by a disciplinary basis also keeps them locked in their internal analytical problems.

The underlying paradox is that the approaches are really more similar than has been recognized, not only in their study of the same phenomenon but also in their answers to the same or similar questions in the same or similar ways, albeit under different disciplinary labels. Exorcising these differences may permit an economy of side movement and an increase of forward movement in the analysis of the negotiation process.

The basic analytical question for all approaches to answer is: How are negotiated outcomes explained? To give generalized answers and to get away from the idiosyncracies of history, the analyst must find dominant, operationalizable variables that provide terms in which the answer can be given. These, in turn, should be able to provide useful insights—indeed, even strategies of behavioral rules—for practitioners seeking to obtain the best possible outcomes for themselves. Thus, practical forms of the same question are: How can each party deploy its efforts to obtain an outcome favorable enough to be acceptable to itself but attractive enough to the other party to draw it away from its own attempts at a unilateral solution and win its acceptance of an agreement? Or (in the terms of the classic "Toughness Dilemma") when should a party be tough and when should it be soft, knowing that conceding little will mean holding to its position but decrease the chances of an agreement while conceding a lot will increase the chances of an agreement but move it away from the positions it values? (Bartos, 1987; Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Zartman and Berman, 1982) Five different

"families" of analysis will be examined to see how these questions are handled, and where the differences and similarities of the approaches lie. (For attempts to show the differences in some or all of these schools, see Walton and McKersie, 1965; Young, 1975; Zartman, 1978 and 1987*b*.)

Structural Analysis
Structural analysis is based on a distribution of elements, in this case of instrumental elements or power, defined either as parties' relative positions (resource possessions) or as the relative ability to make their options prevail (or to counter the other's efforts to make its options prevail [see Schelling, 1960; Wriggins, 1987; Bacharach and Lawler, 1981; Habeeb, 1987]). Structural analysis is the most commonplace approach, and its deterministic statement that "the strongest side wins" is usually tautological and post hoc. To avoid the tautology, the definitional identity between power structure and winning must be broken both by using an independent measure of power and by focusing on the way in which parties with different relative strengths achieve their outcomes. The latter approach has received some attention in the analysis of situations of asymmetry, where the better performance of the weaker of the two sides makes for an interesting challenge for explanation. The explanation most often given can be called "tactics," which generally serve to restore the structural equality of power between the two parties (Snyder and Diesing, 1977, pp. 118-24; Hopmann, 1978; Deutsch, 1973; Zartman, 1985; Wriggins, 1987). Various tactics provide various prescriptions for overcoming asymmetry.

Another body of literature associated with the same approach starts with a different structural assumption, of symmetry rather than asymmetry. This is based on the finding that parties do best in negotiation when they are or feel equal (Rubin and Brown, 1975, pp. 199 and 214-21) and that negotiation takes place when parties' unilateral achievement of their goals is blocked either by the other's veto or by their own incapabilities. Thus, some analysis has used structures of symmetry to identify situations most propitious for negotiation, using *when* to negotiate as a key to *how* to negotiate (Saunders, 1985; Zartman, 1985).

By these paths, by the time that structural analysis has moved away from its initial post hoc formulation that outcomes are determined by the power positions of the parties, it has shifted toward simply tactical analysis based on a different definition of power. Power becomes no longer a position or a possession—something a party "has"—but a way of exercising a causal relation—something one "does"—to bring about an outcome and not just the ability to do so (Habeeb, 1987; see also Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950, p. 75; Simon, 1957, p. 5).

While such studies may be termed structural because they deal with power, that element is treated as a responsive, incidental, and situational characteristic rather than as an element in a theory of conceptualization of the negotiation process. This is a common problem with studies of power, and in the case of negotiations it has produced an array of insightful, if idiosyncratic, books of proverbs on how parties can be brought to agreement. (Karass, 1970; Nierenberg, 1973; Fisher and Ury, 1981) Their emphasis is on various angles of insight into the negotiation process.

Despite a lack of theoretical focus or coherence, these studies do propose ways to make a given offer appear more attractive, to induce the other party to accept the first party's current offer, or to induce it to improve its own offer.

Whether stated or not, these tactics operate on either current offers, expectations, or outcomes to be obtained without negotiation (security points). They do so in one of only two ways—either by altering the contingent value of current offers relative to the other two points of comparison (expectations and security points) or by identifying certain procedures ("fractionate" or "trade off") or atmospherics ("trust" or "confidence") that facilitate the basic process. All these tactics are acts of (attempted) power, and all of them are ways to bring about acceptance of a given offer. Furthermore, they all focus on a part of a common and general process of replacing unilateral and conflicting positions with a common position or outcome, whether that process is explicitly stated as such or not. Explicit statements about the nature of the process should be useful and would facilitate links between approaches; but even in the absence of such statements, it is clear that the process is the same.

Strategic Analysis

Strategic analysis is also based on an array of elements, but its structure is one of ends, not means. Strategic analysis, as portrayed in game theoretic matrices, begins with the assumption that outcomes are determined by the relative array of their values to the parties, under conditions of rational (i.e., preferred) choice. The standard strategic models—Prisoner's Dilemma Game and Chicken Dilemma Game—are symmetrical, and therefore incorporate the same assumption of equality as often found in structural analysis. It has frequently been noted that game theory excludes any use of power as a result of its rigorous analytical forms and its clear logic of determinism; rather, it records values as given and shows the strategies that will be chosen and the consequences of doing so (Young, 1975; Axelrod, 1984).

As a result, some observers assert that strategic analysis is of real value only in comparing the decision to negotiate with the decision to hold out, a comparison parallel to the insights gained from an analysis of symmetrical structures. Since game theory values are given (and indeed, at worst, sometimes inferred from the strategies adopted), there is no way to fractionate or trade off; all that can be done is to enter the value of any such external operations into the appropriate box in the matrix. Likewise, there is no way to change any of those values within the matrix; the only option is to record any changes from one matrix to another.

Yet when the rigorous assumptions that provide the basis for its determinism are relaxed and game theory presentations are used heuristically as the starting point for analysis, a number of the associated limitations fall away and new possibilities appear. Strategic analysis shows that the only way to break out of deadlock is through asymmetry. Therefore, instead of working to improve offers of cooperation (CC)—absolutely or in relation to expectations which cannot be shown on a matrix—parties are best advised to alter the payoffs or perceptions of payoffs associated with nonnegotiated or unilateral outcomes (DD). This, in turn, brings in new understandings of power, seen as the use of security points to induce or resist changes in bargaining positions (Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Zagare, 1978; Brams, 1985).

Movement is the essence of the negotiation process, and movement cannot be shown on a matrix. But the conditions that produce movement—again, different evaluations of outcomes as the source of power—can be shown on a

matrix and analysis drawn from it, just as movies result from a succession of stills. The result is the same process as indicated in the relaxation and refinement of structural analysis, in which parties move from their unilateral options to a common cooperative decision so shaped as to be more attractive than their security points.

The problem with strategic analysis at present is not its rigidity but its limited scope. Many of the important and more detailed questions on how to move parties toward a common solution lie outside the analysis; even such important insights as the ways to reinforce commitment (Schelling, 1960; Baldwin, 1987) are triggered by a need to consider security points but are outside game theoretic analysis. An effort to render more precise the importance of the security point in comparison to unilateral demands and multilateral compromise is an important new advance of the strategic approach, but the calculation to Critical Risk depends on the difficult shift from ordinal to cardinal values in the matrix (Ellsberg, 1975; Snyder and Diesing, 1977).

On the other hand, strategic categories of encounters can help answer some of the puzzling analytical questions of negotiations. For example, the Toughness Dilemma may be resolved by use of the two game theory dilemmas: Whereas parties who see their situation as a Prisoner's Dilemma Game may do best by playing soft to open and tough to punish (Axelrod, 1984), parties who see themselves in a Chicken Dilemma Game do better by playing tough to demand and soft to reward (Nyerges, 1987). This, in turn, confirms an answer from structural analysis to the Toughness Dilemma, based on appropriate tactics for strong and weak powers, respectively. Further examples could be produced where strategic analysis, despite apparent limitations, ends up discussing elements of the same process, and often the same process problems, as other approaches but in different terms.

Process Analysis

Process analysis has the common feature of explaining outcomes through a series of concessions determined by some element inherent in each party's position. The particular element varies slightly according to the particular version of the theory; most process analysis is based on a security point theory in some form, although a few other variations are also used. Process analysis indicates that the party will concede on the basis of a comparative calculation of its own versus its opponents costs or of its own costs versus some acceptability level (Zeuthen, 1975; Cross, 1969; Pen, 1975; Hicks, 1932; Snyder and Diesing, 1977). On this basis, one can determine which party will concede how much until the final point of convergence is reached. This is, of course, a way of diagramming a negotiation process that is the same as that discussed by other approaches.

Other variations are end point theories and concession rate theories, both of which are parts of the same process. The first determines the parties' movement so as to assure a mutually fair and maximizing outcome; the second—concession rate theories—determines the parties' movement on the basis of reactions to each other's degree of concession (Bartos, 1978; Zeuthen, 1975; Nash, 1975; Cross, 1969, 1978; cf., Pruitt, 1981). These latter variations (endpoint and concession-rate theories of process) are only prescriptively deterministic; that is, they indicate how parties will act and where they will end up if they want to reach a mutually fair and maximizing outcome, and thus they are not good des-

criptions of the process. But they do serve the useful function of providing a baseline against which unfairness and power can be measured; hence, they are relevant to some understanding of the process (Pillar, 1983).

Process theories, which originate in economics, are in fact structural theories which indicate that the weaker party will concede until the tables are turned, at which point the other party will concede in its turn, and so on to agreement. Hence, they are theories of power, with power measured in terms of a comparison between offers and security points or, in other words, in terms of critical risk factors. Although this is never done in these theories, to the extent that parties can alter each other's or their own security points, they can exercise power as well as simply possess it; this therefore reduces the deterministic possibilities of the theory but increases its reality. The similarity between process and strategic theories has long been recognized (Harsanyi, 1956 and 1977; Wagner, 1975) although their mechanisms are indeed different. The similarity with structural theories should also be registered; although many structuralists would probably not "read" game theory or "talk" bilateral monopoly, their analyses are complementary, covering the same phenomena within the same process.

The neatness of processes theory only works in idealized situations, and then only with idiosyncracies (Khury, 1968; Bartos, 1974, 1987; Hamermesch, 1987). Concession behavior does not always match; often it mismatches or non-matches or tracks (Pruitt, 1981), and parties do not even concede responsively. Rather, they try to teach and learn, respond and elicit responses, all at the same time, combining several types of behavior that make theoretically neat patterns unrealistic (Coddington, 1968; Cross, 1969; Bartos, 1987). The point here is that in the process, analysts are discerning both involuntary and voluntary, mechanical and manipulative, process and power elements that make up negotiation, all of them clustered about a similarly understood effort to combine conflicting positions into a common one. As the references in this review are beginning to show, analysts do not even belong exclusively to one school or another but sometimes borrow naturally from different approaches. Yet the fact that the field is seen as pluralistic as it is, or that bibliographies remain largely in the author's discipline (Rubin and Brown, 1975) means that there is not enough natural borrowing and crossreferencing.

Behavioral Analysis

Behavioral analysis provides an obviously different explanation of negotiated outcomes by using the negotiators themselves as the focus of analysis (Jönsson, 1978). The terms of analysis used are the personalities of the negotiators, either directly or in interaction. Personality in social psychology can be used to refer to personal predispositions that exist at a number of different levels, from biologically-ingrained needs to more influenceable attitudes. At whatever level, this school of analysis responds to a common belief about negotiation—that "it all depends on the personalities of the negotiators." The challenge then becomes to translate that popular perception into identifiable and nontautological variables that can be used for analysis.

A more literary and intuitive basis for behavioral analysis began with Nicolson's (1939) distinction between Shopkeepers and Warriors. It has been extended and developed through a number of forms into Snyder and Diesing's (1977)

Softliners and Hardliners. There are many characterizations possible for these basic types, but some can be given in terms already used by other schools: The Hardline Warrior sees situations as a Prisoner's Dilemma Game and acts as a mismatcher, expecting toughness to lead to softness (and his victory) and softness to lead to a toughness (and his defeat); on the other hand, the Softline Shopkeeper sees situations as a Chicken Dilemma Game and follows matching behavior, expecting toughness to lead to toughness (and deadlock) and softness to lead to softness (and agreement). Thus, behavioral analyses take up the same parameters as elements in the same process as other approaches, combining them into typologies equated with the behaver rather than leaving them independent as behaviors.

A more developed approach involves categorizing personality types according to their Interpersonal Orientation (IO), an approach that is both more insightful and more complex because it is not merely dichotomous and because its effects depend on interaction rather than on simple or direct taxonomic associations. Opposed to a Low IO type are two types of High IOs—Cooperators and Competitors. Either produces a positive result when negotiating with the same type of personality but, when cross-paired, the match is unproductive because the two types grate on each other. Rather than explaining an outcome in its own terms, as the previous typologies tend to do, IO analysis operates on the basis of a causal interaction (Rubin and Brown, 1975). It also identifies different types of outcomes, depending on joint or comparative maximization, a point also developed in studies of Motivational Orientations (Rubin and Brown, 1975; Filley, 1975). But this approach too deals with such elements as the propensity to compromise, to construct positive- or divide zero-sum outcomes, or to adopt a tough or soft line (i.e., a flatter or steeper concession rate) during the process of combining conflicting positions into a joint decision.

Integrative Analysis

Integrative analysis, like behavioral analysis, would seem to constitute an exception to the general understanding of a negotiation process. Although it too conceives of negotiation as a process, its process runs through stages, in which the outcome is explained by the performance of behaviors identified as specifically appropriate to each successive stage (Gulliver, 1979; Saunders, 1985; Zartman and Berman, 1982; Zartman, 1987a; Druckman, 1986).

Rather than seeing a process that works from fixed points of discord to a common point of convergence, integrative analysis emphasizes the imprecision of parties' interests in their own minds. Integrative analysis stresses the need to manipulate conceptualizations of the problem into mutually satisfying positive-sum outcomes before proceeding to an elaboration of a detailed division of the spoils. By extending its concept of the negotiation process back before the time when positions appear as fixed points, integrative analysis not only allows for greater and more positive manipulation of those positions (Fisher and Ury, 1981) but also meets practitioners' understanding of negotiation by drawing attention to the prenegotiation part of the process (Bendahmane and McDonald, 1984 and 1986; Zartman, 1987b).

But again, these positive aspects of the approach should not obscure the fact that the subject is the same process as analyzed elsewhere. The integrative analyst's emphasis on opening options is preliminary to a focus on closure, using

expanded possibilities of mutual benefit to buy agreement to an outcome that is less—or at least different—than the original demands. The same process can be described as giving something to get something, a process of establishing terms of trade for an exchange of items in the absence of fixed prices and even of fixed monetary units. Using terms mentioned earlier, integrative analysis explores the mechanics of the Shopkeeper confronted with Warrior aspects of the problem and with the need to get around those Warrior aspects. Negotiators—at least diplomatic negotiators and probably most others—are not merely Shopkeepers who can make a deal on any issue. There are, after all, items that are better postponed, interests that are properly nonnegotiable, and limits to acceptable deals that are imposed by security points. If finding a common agreement through this maze is more than a matter of convergence, it is a matter of convergence as well.

A growing branch of this analysis focuses on precise mechanisms for identifying the best possible deal that each party can obtain, given the differences in the nature of their interests. While this is a complex extension of the Nash (1975) solution that occupies a basic position in the strategic and process approaches, the complexity of stakes makes a simple positive-sum outcome too schematic to be useful (Valavanis, 1958; Ikle and Leites, 1962; Barclay and Peterson, 1976; Raiffa, 1982; Sebenius, 1984). The process involves finding as many dimensions of components to the parties' interests as possible in order to provide the best tradeoffs, and thereby insure the greatest durability to the outcome. In addition to finding how much of a conflicting position a party must give up to gain assent, the process also involves finding how much of a non- (or less-) valued position a party can trade to gain a more valued position (Homans, 1961, p. 62). But the element of conflict is never absent, and the process of shaping a single multilateral decision out of conflicting unilateral claims remains.

An Agenda of Unanswered Questions

It should be clear that the study of negotiation has come a considerable way in the past two decades in building and expanding on a common concept of a process. The study today involves far more than the rather loose characterization given in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (Ikle, 1968) that negotiation was a "form of interaction through which (parties) . . . try to arrange . . . a new combination of some of their common and conflicting interests." The "form of interaction" has taken shape as a process of combining conflicting positions into a common outcome by joint decision, allowing more specific focus of attention on how this done, whether by power, by patterns of movement, by restructuring stakes and values, by interacting personality types, or by a series of steps. Yet, just as clearly, there is much more to do to know the process, although many of those further directions are indicated by using the common concept of process as a starting point.

One problem raised by the notion of negotiation as a process is that of measuring success, an answer to which is necessary to an evaluation of behavior and prescriptions for its improvement. The question of success is more complex than it may appear (Zartman, 1987*a*). The nature of negotiation is to arrive at the largest mutually satisfactory agreement with any one (and therefore, each) getting at least enough to make it want to keep the agreement. By that very nature, negotiation is not a process of winning and losing so that success must be

evaluated against the problem, not against the adversary. (However, there is a subcategory of negotiations in which one party's aims are to deny the adversary a particular payoff rather than to get as much as possible for itself, making a positive-sum evaluation more complex.) A number of criteria are potentially relevant for the evaluation of success, none of which gives a completely satisfactory answer.

First, *signature* of an agreement is a prima facie or nominal sign of success because it indicates a judgment by the parties that they expect to be better off with the agreement than without it, and that they can do no better by either continuing negotiations or choosing an alternative outcome. Second, this perception can be verified empirically to see if the parties are indeed *better off*, either by comparing their condition before and after the agreement or by comparing their position after the agreement with their presumed position at the same time in the absence of an agreement (a more relevent comparison, but a counterfactual one that involves some judgment [Sebenius, 1984, p.72-73]). While nothing says that the parties must be equally well off or even equally better off, further evaluations could also investigate how unequally better off the agreement made them and also whether they were Pareto-optimally better off—that is, whether they had missed opportunities to improve the condition of either of them without making the other less well off. Since some negotiations may be designed to redress power inequities while others may reflect power inequities, the criteria of success based on the relative improvement of the parties' postions will vary. Third, the results can be evaluated against the parties' *opening positions*, with all the caveats about the initial vagueness and inflation of demands that is inherent in the process. Nash solutions and Bartos solutions—discussed under end-point determinism—are a function of opening positions, and can serve as a baseline to evaluate actual outcomes. Despite the fact that they are commonly used, all three of these criteria for evaluation have flaws and complexities that call for further work—there is presently very little—on systems of evaluation.

Another topic of concern is the analysis of negotiations in the case of the three very different types of stakes—those solvable by division, those by creation, and those by exchange. Although much of the earlier literature on negotiation focused on the more obvious topic of division (Schopenhauer, 1896; Nicolson, 1939; Schelling, 1960) with its notion of negotiation as winning or losing, much more attention lately has been drawn to the improvement of exchanges (Homans, 1961; Axelrod, 1970; Nash, 1975; Sebenius, 1984; Zartman, 1987*a*) with its notion of mutual satisfactions.

The importance of resolving problems by exchange bears much emphasis because parties in conflict often forget that resolution by multilateral decisions means "buying" the other party's agreement through inducements in terms of items that party values, in order to make agreement attractive to itself. At the same time, emphasis on exchange carries a different image of negotiation from an encounter of conceding and winning, portraying instead a positive-sum process where "everyone wins" (something). Unfortunately, this is not the whole picture. Just as there must be a ltttle Warrior in every successful Shopkeeper, so there is inevitably some zero-sum aspect to every positive-sum. Once parties have created a greater good, there is some need to decide how to divide and share it. Furthermore, there are some stakes that are indivisible and others that are

unexchangeable. These aspects of negotiation are still not the subject of exhaustive or definitive treatment, and they are somewhat different from the earlier, insightful analysis of redistributive bargaining (Walton and McKersie, 1965).

To date, there are three ways of thinking about the problem of division. First is to replace it in the context of exchange by means of *compensation*. By determining what the item is worth, the other party can counterbalance it through compensatory concessions. Unfortunately, some stakes have an absolute or infinite worth, so that no compensation is possible. Second is to *restructure* perceptions of the stakes so that things are seen differently and the zero-sum nature of the outcomes is removed. Again, some stakes escape such creative reformulation or, even when subject of an attractive formula, they prove intractable in detail. Third is to manipulate notions of *justice* which can then be translated to the specific, an idea akin to the previous notion of a creative formula. But that merely intellectualizes the problem without solving it in many cases, since it is the conflicting notions of justice that make the problems of divisions so intractable in the first place. Obviously, practitioners need more help in ways of dealing with the zero-sum aspects of negotiation—the "Jerusalem Problems"—that lie beyond positive-sum creativity.

A third topic of continuing inquiry highlighted by the generally accepted notion of the negotiation process is the Toughness Dilemma. The question of when to be tough and when to be soft, and the paradox on which it is based, has already been identified as the major tactical question for analysts and practitioners alike. By now, it is plain that there is no way out of the dilemma as presented, and that correct and insightful answers depend on some intermediate variable, such as personality, timing, phase, power, etc. But there is still no sense of any hierarchy among these intermediate variables—other than the eternal debates among disciplines as to which gives the best analysis—and no notions as to which are trumps. Somewhere between the anecdotal proverbs and the unoperationalizable theory lies a not-yet-fully mined terrain of inquiry which may require new parameters.

Finally, an area of negotiation that falls outside the current paradigm is multilateral bargaining. The current process notion has thus far worked to exclude effective consideration of multilateral negotiation, and those that have been treated well tend to be reduced to bilateral analysis (Lipson, 1985, p. 220). When not reduced to dyads, multilateral negotiation tends to be treated merely descriptively even if insightfully, a problem that has posed particular challenges in regard to the successive GATT rounds (Preeg, 1970; Evans, 1971; Cline et al., 1978; Winham, 1987). There have been a number of excellent attempts to devise an approach to multilateral negotiations (that is, a large number of participants, not merely more than two, as in Raiffa, 1982; Zagare, 1978) which indicate some promising directions (Zartman, 1987c).

One set of approaches treats multilateral negotiations as a problem in *coalition*-formation (Rubin and Brown, 1975, pp. 64 ff.; Snyder and Diesing, 1977, pp. 349 ff.; Raiffa, 1982). However, coalition is a very different process from negotiation. And, to the extent that coalition covers the shaping of outcomes to be decided up or down by some sort of weighted decision rule, it hides a separate negotiation process. There is something going on in the interstices of coalition that needs a separate analysis that is not yet available. Like the strategic approach to bilateral negotiations, to which it is related, coalition analyzes what happens

between negotiations and impinges on them but does not capture them.

Secondly, *preferences and scaling* have been used in some different and imaginative ways (Sebenius, 1984; Friedheim, 1987; Hipel and Fraser, 1984). But they too indicate ingredients to an agreement rather than the process by which it is obtained; as in coalition, negotiation becomes voting or at least approaches it. Other approaches are conceivable but have not been used—small group dynamics might provide a new analytical context, as might a conceptual examination of the construction of an agreement out of individual pieces.

In multilateral negotiation as in the predominant bilateral mode, the two categories of ingredients are parties and stakes. Negotiated agreements are made of stakes by parties. Bilateral negotiation has its general process model as a basis for analysis that permits many approaches to coexist and reinforce each other. Multilateral negotiation needs either to fit into that concept of process or invent its own basic model to enjoy the same benefits. In any case, in regard to bilateral negotiation, there are many blind men but only one elephant, and the two should not be confused with each other.

NOTE

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