

RANDOMIZED ALGORITHMS

- Assume "good" source of randomness
- Can avoid worst-case through random behavior
- Metrics: Expected (average) runtime, runtime w/ high probability ($\pm \delta$), error probability (1-sided / 2-sided)

MAX 3-SAT

- Given 3CNF formula (exact), maximize the number of satisfied clauses
- Claim:** Every exact 3CNF formula can satisfy $\geq \frac{3}{4}$ of the clauses
- random assignment, on average, does this

Let $X(S)$ = # of clauses satisfied by S , a random assignment to \emptyset ($\frac{1}{2}T$, $\frac{1}{2}F$ for each)

$$\rightarrow E[X] = E[X_1 + X_2 + \dots + X_n] \quad (\text{in clauses}) \\ = E[n \cdot \frac{X}{n}] \leftarrow \Pr(X_i = 1) \\ = \frac{3}{8}n$$

• MARKOV'S INEQUALITY: $\Pr(X \geq x) \leq \frac{E[X]}{x}$

$\Pr(\exists S \ni X \geq x) \leq E[X]/x$

- can use to bound probability of Randomized

- $\geq' = n - x$; $\Pr(\exists S \ni X \geq \geq') \leq \binom{n}{x} \cdot \frac{1}{4^x}$

- COROLLARY: $\Pr[\exists S \ni x \geq a \cdot E[X]] \leq \frac{1}{4^a}$

- REVERSE: $\Pr[\exists S \ni x \geq a] \leq \frac{E[X] - a}{B - a}$

if B is upper bound for val. x

UNION BOUND: idea that union \leq sum

$$P(A \cup B \cup C \dots) \leq P(A) + P(B) + \dots$$

QUICKSORT

• Randomly pick pivot, partition on pivot, and recursively sort each half

- IDEA: $O(n^2) = O(\# \text{ comparisons})$

- 2 elements compared at most once (one is pivot)

- X_{ij} : indicator RV if i, j compared

→ # of times of comparison, nothing between i, j pivot

$$\rightarrow \text{So, } E[X_{ij}] = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{n-1}$$

- Total runtime becomes $\approx \ln(n)$

RANDOMIZED PRIMALITY TESTING

• Theme: randomly test property ALWAYS satisfied by primes and rarely satisfied by composite #'s

→ False positives possible ("probably" prime)

• EXTENDED FERMAT'S LITTLE THEOREM:

- if n is prime, $a^{n-1} \equiv 1 \pmod n$

for all $1 \leq a \leq n-1$

- if n is composite, $a^{n-1} \not\equiv 1 \pmod n$ for at least

half the set of $2 \leq a \leq n-1$ except in

the case of Carmichael numbers, which behave like primes

• Proof Suppose $p = 1$ is prime and consider $2 \leq a \leq p-1$.

Facts since $\gcd(a, p) = 1$, there exists $a^{-1} \pmod p$

Claim: $[2a, 3a, \dots, (p-1)a] \equiv [1, \dots, p-1] \pmod p$

→ It's impossible for $a \equiv 0 \pmod p$ for $1 \leq a \leq p-1$, not prime $p \mid a$

→ It's impossible for $a \equiv 1 \pmod p$ for $1 \leq a \leq p-1$

→ So $a \equiv 2a \equiv 3a \equiv \dots \equiv (p-1)a \equiv 1 \cdot 2 \cdot \dots \cdot (p-1) \pmod p$

Therefore $a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod p \rightarrow a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod {p-1}$

• Fermat's Primality Test:

- Pick witness $a \in \mathbb{Z}, a \neq 1$ randomly

- if $a^{n-1} \equiv 1 \pmod n$ → prime

else, composite

- compute a^{n-1} using FME

• Miller-Rabin Primality Test

- $n = 2^d \cdot d + 1$ (n always odd)

- Pick witness uniformly at random

- "Prime" if $a^{n-1} \equiv 1 \pmod n$ AND

$(a^m)^{n-1} \equiv 1 \pmod n$ OR $a^{2^e} \equiv 1 \pmod n$ for $r \leq s$

- works against Carmichael Numbers

FLT (extended)

For prime p , $0 \leq a \leq p-1$

$$a^{k(p-1)} \equiv 1 \pmod p$$

EULER'S THEOREM

For any $a \in \mathbb{Z}$ coprime with n ($\gcd(a, n) = 1$):

$$a^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod n$$

$\phi(n)$: # of elements in \mathbb{Z}_n coprime w/ n

$$\phi(p) = p-1 \text{ for prime } p$$

$$\phi(pq) = (p-1)(q-1) \text{ for primes } p, q$$

EULER'S FOR FME

$$\text{Compute } 34^{3^{34}} \pmod{77}.$$

$$= \gcd(34, 77) = 1; \quad 77 = 7 \cdot 11$$

$$= \phi(77) = (7-1)(11-1) = 60$$

$$= 34^{3^{34}} \pmod{77} \equiv 34^{(59)(60) + 54} \pmod{77}$$

$$= (34^{54})^{3^{34}} \pmod{77}$$

[Do normal FME from here on out]

• Show $L \in \text{NP}$ when proving $L \in \text{NP-Complete}$

- Los Vegas Algos: Worst-case runtime may be unbounded, but output always correct
- Randomized Quicksort ($\log n$ vs. n^2)
- Using unfair coins to flip H/T w/ equal probability (flip in pair until TH or HT; return first flip)

- Monte Carlo Algos: bounded runtime, but can sometimes produce wrong answer (one-sided vs. two-sided)

- Can run repeatedly to decrease error
- Atlanta City Algo: numeric val $\pm \epsilon$ run multiple time + take median

EXTENDED EUCLIDEAN ALGO

$$\text{gcd}(259, 23) = \text{gcd}(23, 259 - 11 \cdot 23) \\ = \text{gcd}(23, 6) \\ = \text{gcd}(6, 23 - 3 \cdot 6) \\ = \text{gcd}(6, 5) \\ = \text{gcd}(5, 6 - 1 \cdot 5) = \text{gcd}(5, 1) = 1$$

Find $23^{-1} \pmod{259}$:

$$\begin{aligned} 1 &= 6 - 5 = 6 - (23 - 11 \cdot 2) \\ &= 11 \cdot 2 - 23 \\ &= 4 \cdot (259 - 11 \cdot 23) - 23 \\ &= 4 \cdot (259) - 45 \cdot (23) \\ &\equiv 4 \cdot (259) - 45 \cdot (23) \pmod{259} = (214) \cdot (23) \pmod{259} \end{aligned}$$

FAST MODULAR EXPONENTIATION

- Use binary representation to calc faster
- $7^{10} \pmod{13} = 7^{(64+32+16+4+1)} \pmod{13}$
- $7^1 \equiv 7 \pmod{13}$
- $7^2 \equiv 49 \equiv 1 \pmod{13}$
- $7^3 \equiv 49^2 \equiv 1^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{13}$
- $7^4 \equiv 49^4 \equiv 1^4 \equiv 1 \pmod{13}$
- $7^5 \equiv 49^3 \equiv 1^3 \equiv 1 \pmod{13}$

CHEBYSHEV BOUNDS

- If X_1, X_2, \dots are i.i.d. RVs w/ expectation μ , then $\frac{1}{n} \sum X_i$ converges to μ ($n \rightarrow \infty$)
- Lower Tail Bound:

$$\Pr\left(\sum_{i=1}^n X_i \leq \mu n - k\right) \leq e^{-2k^2/n}$$

Upper Tail Bound:

$$\Pr\left(\sum_{i=1}^n X_i \geq \mu n + k\right) \leq e^{-2k^2/n}$$

These hold for X_i w/ range $[0, 1]$, expected val μ , $k > 0$.

• Mean-in-the-Middle Attack:

- If message modified, this can be messed with

- Eve chooses $c \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, uses or fake key

CRYPTOGRAPHY

- Alice + Bob communicating over insecure channel; adversary Eve seeing every message and trying to decode it
- Randomized Logarithm (DLog). These problems are "expected to be" NP-intermediate. If $P = NP$, they become P, which kinda kills modern security systems

ONE-TIME PADS + CAESAR CIPHER

- $C = \text{Cyphertext}$; $M = \text{msg}$; $K = \text{key}$
- $C = m + k$
- Wealthiness: must agree on key prior
- Cannot reuse same key (Info leakage)
- $C = m + k$; $C' = m' + k$
- $C - C' = m - m' \rightarrow \text{valuable info}$

DIFFIE-HELLMAN

- Generators:
- $\mathbb{Z}_p = \{0, 1, \dots, p-1\}$
- g is generator of \mathbb{Z}_p^* ; $\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \mathbb{Z}_p - \{0\}$
- iff for all $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, $\exists k \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $g^k \equiv x \pmod p$.
- g^k powers cycle thru all $p-1$ values possible for $g^m \pmod p$
- Fact: every prime has some generator
- DHOO CONJECTURE: Given $p, g, x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, no efficient algo exists to find $y \in \mathbb{N}$ s.t. $g^y \equiv x \pmod p$
- D-H Protocol:

- Params: Big prime p , generator g (known)
- Alice picks $a \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, Bob picks $b \in \mathbb{Z}_p$
- Alice sends $x = g^a \pmod p$ to Bob
- Bob sends $y = g^b \pmod p$ to Alice
- Secret key: $k = g^{ab} \pmod p = y^a \equiv x^b$
- Eve cannot figure out a, b in P-time
- Alice, Bob both now know secret key

RSA Protocol

- Idea: Public Key (lock) that everyone has
- Private key (key) that only you have
- Anyone can send messages to you
- Everything is a number with some upper bound; we want to securely transmit $m \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ (flags n bits) (like file size limit in email)

\mathbb{Z}_n : set of messages

E: encoding func.; D: decoding func.

$D \circ E = D(E(m)) = \text{identity function}$

Find non-obvious identity functions

• RSA identity:

$$a^{\phi(n)} = 1 \pmod n$$

• Protocol:

Pick large, secret primes p, q , $n = pq$

Generate public/private keys (e, d)

$$ed = 1 + k(p-1)(q-1)$$

→ ed = 1 + k(p-1)(q-1)

• Alice sends Bob (n, e)

• $c = m^e \pmod n$ (Bob sends Alice)

• $m \pmod n = c^d \pmod n$ (Alice decodes)

RSA Example

secret

$$n = pq = 3 \cdot 17 = 51$$

$$(e, d) = (3, 11) \rightarrow ed = 33 = 1 + 2 \cdot 16$$

• Alice sends (n, e) publicly

• Bob encodes $m = 4 \pmod n = 4^3 \pmod{51} = 13$

• Alice receives 13, decodes as:

$$13^{11} \pmod{51} = 4$$

Choices C was selected in the previous question, so we will prove $L_{\text{NO-PUNCTUATION}}$ is undecidable using Rice's Theorem.

$L_{\text{NO-PUNCTUATION}} = \{M : L(M) \text{ does not contain punctuation}\}$

$\bar{P} = \{L \subseteq \Sigma^* : L(M) \text{ does not contain punctuation}\}$

Then, by the following chain of equivalences, $L = L_P$

$(M) \in L_{\text{NO-PUNCTUATION}} \iff M \text{ does not accept any punctuation}$

$\iff L(M) \text{ does not contain punctuation}$

$\iff L(M) \in \bar{P}$

$\iff (M) \in L_P$

P is also nontrivial. $\emptyset \in P$, because \emptyset is empty, so it does not contain any punctuation.

$\Sigma^* \notin P$, because Σ^* contains all inputs. Both \emptyset and Σ^* are recognizable languages. Thus, $L_{\text{NO-PUNCTUATION}}$ is undecidable by Rice's Theorem.

EXAMPLE

D-H, RSA both rely

on NP-Intermediate problem

like integer factorization or

Discrete Logarithm (DLog). These

problems are "expected to be"

NP-intermediate. If $P = NP$,

they become P, which kinda

kills modern security systems

EXAMPLE

EXAMPLE: TURING REDUCTION

$L_2 = \{M : M \text{ is a TM that loops on the input string "0cc376"}$

Solution: The language L_2 is undecidable. We will prove this via Turing reduction with $L_{\text{HALT}} \leq L_2$. Assume that we have some decider D_2 for L_2 . We will construct a Turing machine D_{HALT} that decides L_{HALT} using D_2 as follows:

$D_{\text{HALT}}((M), x)$:

1: Construct a Turing machine M' as follows:

$M'(w)$:

1: Run $M(x)$

2: If $M(x)$ accepts then

3: Reject

4: Accept

Note that the Turing machine M' halts on w and it will loop on all the strings if M loops on x .

$(M', w) \rightarrow L_2 \iff M(x) \text{ rejects} \rightarrow M' \text{ loops on } w \rightarrow L_2$

$(M', w) \rightarrow L_{\text{HALT}} \iff M(x) \text{ accepts} \rightarrow M' \text{ loops on } w \rightarrow L_{\text{HALT}}$

Since D_2 decides L_{HALT} , we have the Turing reduction $L_{\text{HALT}} \leq L_2$. Then we can know L_2 is undecidable because L_{HALT} is undecidable.

Prove that $L_2 = \{M : L(M) = \emptyset\}$ is NP-hard by reduction from 3SAT. Explain why L_2 is not NP-Complete.

Solution: Recall that since 3SAT is NP-Complete, it has some exponential time decider D . Consider the following function $f : 3SAT \rightarrow L_2$:

$f(i, t) \in \{0, 1\}$

• Construct the following program

• $M(w)$: return opposite of $D(\bar{w})$

• return M'

This function is efficient as we are constructing the program M , not running it. Further, this reduction is correct as

$\emptyset \in L_2 \implies M(\emptyset) \text{ rejects} \implies M(w) \text{ rejects for all } w \implies (M) \in L_2$

$(M, w) \in L_2 \implies M(w) \text{ loops} \implies M \text{ loops on all the strings, including the string "0cc376"} \implies D(w) \text{ accepts} \implies M(w) \text{ accepts} \implies (M) \notin L_2$

Therefore L_2 is NP-hard. However, L_2 is not NP-Complete because L_2 is undecidable, whereas everything in NP is decidable (in at most exponential time).

Solution: $L_2 = \{M : L(M) = \emptyset\}$ is NP-Complete

EXAMPLE: Polytime (full) including NP-Proof

Field-Trip = $\{G = (V, E), C = (c_1, c_2, \dots, c_l) : \sum c_i \geq n \text{ and some assignment exists s.t. for all vehicles } i, \text{ vehicle } i \text{ knows all the students in the list of vehicle carrying capacities}$

vehicles, every pair of students in the vehicle knows each other.

Proof that Field-Trip is NP:

$f(G) = (V, E, C)$:

• Check that the certificate does not have more than the allowed number of vehicles and only uses students that exist and only uses them a single time. If this is not true, REJECT

• For each vehicle in C , where its index is i , check that it has exceeded its carrying capacity by calculating $\deg(c_i) \geq \text{number of students in the vehicle}$. Furthermore, check that each of the students knows each other by verifying there is an edge between them in the graph. If either of these statements is not true, REJECT

• Check that every student is assigned to a vehicle by looping through the vehicles and checking that each student is within a vehicle. If this is not the case, REJECT

• ACCEPT

Correctness Analysis:

$G, C, \text{cert} \in \text{Field-Trip} \implies$ there is some assignment of students to vehicles s.t. we will not exceed vehicle carrying capacity and every student in a vehicle knows each other $\implies \text{cert}.t \in L$

$G, C, \text{cert} \in \text{Field-Trip} \implies$ there is no assignment of students to vehicles s.t. we will not exceed vehicle carrying capacity and every student in a vehicle knows each other $\implies \text{cert}.t \in L$

Efficiency Analysis:

The first bullet point is a simple size check and a loop through the certificate.

For the second bullet point, checking the number of students in a vehicle can trivially be done efficiently. Checking that each student in a vehicle knows each other can be done in n^2 comparisons, where n is the number of students.

For the third bullet point, checking that every student is assigned to a vehicle can be done by simply looping through the assignments and making sure every student is present.

Since each line can be computed efficiently, the entire verifier is efficient