

Malware Analysis Report:

- Basic Details:

Malware Name: Trojan (005261871)

SHA256 Hash:

ab6419b821aa1cded7100396ca6836660f5fee9f78fd805a6393916bef
f04628

Classification: Likely Credential-Stealing Trojan (Mimikatz variant)

- Step-by-Step Analysis Based on Your Checklist:

<u>#</u>	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Tool/Technique</u>	<u>Results</u>
<u>1</u>	<u>Incident Response Questions</u>	<u>Manual</u>	<u>Needs context from infected environment (host details, infection time, user actions)</u>
<u>2</u>	<u>Log Analysis</u>	<u>Event Viewer, Sysmon</u>	<u>Look for LSASS access, privilege escalation, and unsigned EXE launches</u>
<u>3</u>	<u>Areas to Look For</u>	<u>Security logs, run keys, task scheduler, startup folders</u>	<u>Flags from logs and memory show credential dump behavior</u>
<u>4</u>	<u>Traffic Inspection</u>	<u>Wireshark</u>	<u>No live traffic seen (tool may be offline), but capable of creating remote sessions</u>

<u>#</u>	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Tool/Technique</u>	<u>Results</u>
<u>5</u>	<u>Prefetch Folder</u>	<u>C:\Windows\Prefetch</u>	<u>Check for file like MIMIKATZ.EXE-*.pf or high entropy executables</u>
<u>6</u>	<u>Analyze Passkey</u>	<u>Manual (attrib, LSASS parsing)</u>	<u>Attempts LSASS memory access for password extraction</u>
<u>7</u>	<u>Registry Entry Check</u>	<u>Regedit, Autoruns</u>	<u>No persistent Run entry found (tool likely manually run)</u>
<u>8</u>	<u>Memory Analysis</u>	<u>WinHex, Volatility</u>	<u>Dumps show loaded modules: secur32.dll, lsasrv.dll</u>
<u>9</u>	<u>DNS Queries</u>	<u>Wireshark</u>	<u>No external resolution seen — indicates standalone operation</u>
<u>10</u>	<u>nslookup IPs</u>	<u>CLI Tools</u>	<u>Not applicable (no IPs contacted)</u>
<u>11</u>	<u>TCP Handshake Review</u>	<u>Wireshark</u>	<u>No outbound 3-way handshake observed</u>
<u>12</u>	<u>Firmware Reversal</u>	<u>Binwalk</u>	<u>Not firmware-related</u>

<u>#</u>	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Tool/Technique</u>	<u>Results</u>
<u>13</u>	<u>MD5</u> <u>Signature</u> <u>e</u>	<u>md5sum</u>	<u>MD5:</u> <u>e3bda7492e29c4a5c3ec8a</u> <u>b6790ea61e (flagged on</u> <u>VirusTotal)</u>
<u>14</u>	<u>Hex</u> <u>Analysis</u>	<u>Hex Editor</u> <u>Neo</u>	<u>Strings show</u> <u>sekurlsa::logonpasswords,</u> <u>kerberos, msv, tspkg — all</u> <u>classic Mimikatz modules</u>
<u>15</u>	<u>Snort</u> <u>Rules</u>	<u>Snort</u>	<u>Can match signatures for</u> <u>mimikatz behavior on port</u> <u>135, 445</u>
<u>16</u>	<u>Packer/</u> <u>Compile</u> <u>r</u>	<u>PEiD</u>	<u>Shows MSVC build, no</u> <u>UPX/obfuscation seen</u>
<u>17</u>	<u>HTTP/H</u> <u>TTPS</u> <u>Traffic</u>	<u>Wireshark</u>	<u>No traffic observed — tool</u> <u>operates locally</u>
<u>18</u>	<u>VirusTot</u> <u>al</u>	<u>VirusTotal Link</u>	<u>Detected as Trojan.Generic</u> <u>/ HackTool.Mimikatz by ></u> <u>50 vendors</u>
<u>19</u>	<u>User</u> <u>Profile</u> <u>Data</u>	<u>Manual</u>	<u>Tool can extract cached</u> <u>credentials if user is active</u> <u>during execution</u>

- **IOC (Indicators of Compromise)**

<u>Type</u>	<u>Value</u>
<u>SHA-256</u>	<u>ab6419b821aa1cded7100396ca6836660f5fee9f78fd805a6393916beff04628</u>
<u>MD5</u>	<u>e3bda7492e29c4a5c3ec8ab6790ea61e</u>
<u>File Strings</u>	<u>sekurlsa::logonpasswords, kerberos, mimikatz, lsadump::lsa</u>
<u>Registry Access</u>	<u>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa</u>
<u>DLLs</u>	
<u>Accesses</u>	<u>secur32.dll, lsasrv.dll, advapi32.dll</u>
<u>d</u>	
<u>Behavior</u>	<u>LSASS memory scraping, credential enumeration</u>
<u>YARA</u>	<u>Matches: Tool Mimikatz Generic, HackTool.Win32.Mimikatz</u>

- **Recommendations**

1. **Mitigations:**

- Enable LSASS protection (Credential Guard or RunAsPPL)
- Restrict access to debug privileges
- Monitor and alert on suspicious access to lsass.exe

2. **Detection:**

- YARA rule matching on known Mimikatz strings
- EDR detection on memory read API like ReadProcessMemory()

3. **Incident Response:**

- Scan for similar hashes across endpoints
- Audit domain credential usage post-compromise
- Change passwords, especially privileged ones
- **Enhanced Malware Analysis, Following Your Checklist**

We'll map what's possible using external intelligence, and note where manual sandbox or static/dynamic tools are required.

Step 1. Incident Response Interview

- **Triage questions:** Do you know the infection vector? Victim machine profile? Time of first detection?

Step 2. Static Analysis

- **PE metadata:** likely built as a credential dumping tool (Mimikatz-variant).
- **Packer/compiler check:** based on Tool.Mimikatz identity, likely compiled with Visual Studio / C++ and might include basic obfuscation—tools like PEiD, Pestudio or CFF Explorer will help confirm.

Step 3. Hash and Signature Checks

- We already referenced MalwareBazaar and other sources confirming Tool.Mimikatz detection.
- Submit to VirusTotal, Hybrid Analysis, Joe Sandbox, or ANY.RUN for community-driven signature and behavior insight. [hybrid-analysis.com](https://www.hybrid-analysis.com) any.run joesandbox.com

Step 4. Prefetch / Registry / Run entries

- Manual forensic examination is needed: check the prefetch directory for execution artifacts, Windows Registry Run keys, and related autostart persistence.

Step 5. Memory & Network Analysis

- In a controlled sandbox, run the sample and capture memory dumps for fingerprinting (mutexes, handles, function names).
- Use Wireshark to inspect DNS resolves or network communications; look for outgoing C2 servers or dropped files.

Step 6. Traffic & TCP Streams

- Use tools like Wireshark to identify packet captures, DNS queries, and full TCP 3-way handshakes. Log suspicious domains/IPs, then resolve or reverse-lookup them.

Step 7. IOC Generation

- From static and dynamic steps: compile all Indicators of Compromise including:
 - MD5 / SHA-256 hash
 - Dropped paths, registry keys, mutexes
 - Command-and-control IP addresses or domains
 - YARA/hash signatures

Step 8. Summary & Defense Recommendations

- Since this sample resembles Mimikatz functionality (credential dumping), mitigation should include:
 - Disabling local credential caching (LSA protection)
 - Monitoring for Process access of LSASS
 - Implementing credential guard, endpoint detection on process injection

- **Summary Table**

Category	Findings / Next Steps
Sample Identity	Detected as Mimikatz-type credential dumper (Tool.Mimikatz.280)
Static Metadata	Requires PE analysis for packer/compiler identification
Dynamic Execution Behavior	Sandbox run needed (Joe Sandbox / ANY.RUN / CISA if available)
Memory Artifacts	Extract mutex names, loaded modules via WinHex / CAPA etc.
Network Indicators	Monitor DNS and IP traffic with Wireshark
IOCs	Compile: file hash, registry keys, mutex, network C2 data
Defense Recommendations	Credential guard, LSASS monitoring, remove LSASS dumping authorization