
Learn Threat Modeling Smart Contracts in <60 minutes

November 2, 2018

Security Activities in the SDLC




Formal Threat Modeling

Approaches

- Software-Centric
- Asset-Centric
- Attacker-Centric

Challenges

- Time Consuming
- For engineers too abstract / too complex
- Usually done by a security person
- Create report that nobody knows what to with



TM for 0x v2 - Relayer Matcher Strategy

Informal Threat Modeling

Everybody does Threat Modeling in their heads

- Spawn an evil twin of yourself
- Get a list of threat scenarios from the evil twin
- Use the list to come up with counter strategies to something about it


Problem: The strategy is only as good as your evil twin




Threat Modeling is about

Answering the following 3 questions

- What are you building?
- What can go wrong?
- What are you going to do about it?





Finding Relevant Threats

TM Approach needs to:

- Do better than our evil twin
- Save time
- Not have to learn formal TM methods

Use data from past blockchain security incidents


- Extract the most frequent attacks
- Categorize them based on attack patterns
- Use them to verify if they apply to your system

Blockchain Incident Database

- University Initiative
- 110 incidents in the database
- Nature: technical root cause, publicly reported
- Sources: Blockchain Graveyard, Reddit and other public places
- Updating incident db not straight forward
- Incident format STIX







Blockchain Incident Categories

1. OPSEC


Incidents compromising an organization or individual's control of information and assets

2. Smart Contract

Incidents related to bugs in smart contract systems

3. Protocol

Incidents arising from malicious exploitation of protocol implementations and designs




Smart Contract Weakness Classification (SWC)

- Scheme to classify weaknesses in smart contracts proposed in <u>EIP-1470</u>
- Currently in Draft
- Overlays on top of CWE
- Definitions in the SWC-registry (<u>Github/Pages</u>)
- Contains crafted as well as real world vulnerable contracts
- Currently 60 test samples and 30 weakness variants
- Working on Python and Go packages to access data

Smart Contract specific Incidents

- SWC-101 : Integer Overflow and Underflow
- SWC-105: Unprotected Ether Withdrawal
- SWC-107: Reentrancy
- SWC-120: Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes SWC-124: Write to Arbitrary Storage Location
- SWC-128: DoS With Block Gas Limit

- SWC-104: Unchecked Return Value
- SWC-106: Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction
- SWC-114: Transaction Order Dependence
- SWC-129: Typographical Error



Incidents categorized based on CAPEC

- CAPEC- 251: Local Code Inclusion
- CAPEC-118: Collect and Analyze Information
- CAPEC-125: Flooding
- CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing
- CAPEC-152: Inject Unexpected Items
- CAPEC-161: Infrastructure Manipulation
- CAPEC-172: Manipulate Timing and State

- CAPEC-100: Overflow Buffers
- CAPEC-122: Privilege Abuse
- CAPEC-128: Integer Attacks
- CAPEC-150: Collect Data from Common Resource Locations CAPEC-151: Identity Spoofing
- CAPEC-153: Input Data Manipulation
- CAPEC-163: Spear Phishing
- CAPEC-172: Manipulating Timing and State

- CAPEC-116: Excavation
- CAPEC-123: Buffer Manipulation
- CAPEC-129: Pointer Manipulation
- CAPEC-156: Engage in Deceptive Interactions
- CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values

| | | | | | CAPEC-262: Manipulate System Resources, 4 CAPEC-153: Input Data Manipulati on, 3 | Input Data | CAPEC- 543: Counterfei | CAPEC- 92: Forced | 172: | | APEC- 6: SQL jectio | CAPEC- 194: Fak the | ke : | APEC- 128: teger |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|---|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------|-------------------|---------------------------|--|--------------|------------------------|
| | | CAPEC-156: Engage in | CAPEC-98: | CAPEC-212: Functionality Misuse, 5 | | Website CAPEC- | CAPEC- 123: | Leveraging | | CAPEC- Force t | | CAPE C | CAPE C | |
| CAPEC-225: Subvert Access Control 18 | CAPEC-225: Subvert Access Control | Deceptive Interactions, 9 | Phishing, 6 | Iviisuse, 3 | CAPEC-122: Privilege Abuse, 4 | CAPEC-163: Spear Phishing, 3 | 416: Manipulat e Human Behavio | Buffer CAPEC- | CAPEC | CAPE C | CAPE C | CAPE C | CAPE C | CAPE C |
| | | CAPEC-255: | CAPEC-118: Collect and Analyze | | | CAPEC-560: Use of | | 116: Excavat | CAPEC | CAPEC | CAPE C | CAPE C | CAPE C | CAPE C |
| | Manipulate Data Structures, 6 | Information, 5 | bug, 5 | CAPEC-407: | Known Domain | 410: Informatio n | CAPEC- 248: Comma | CAPEC | CAPEC | CAPEC | CAPE C | Doub le | Fraud , 1 | |
| | | | CAPEC-21: Exploitation of | CAPEC-151: | Pretexting, 4 CAPEC-152: | CAPEC-555: Remote | Elicitatio | CAPEC- | CAPEC -22: | CAPEC | CAPEC -94: | Sales of | frau | CAP EC- |
| unknown, 33 | CAPEC-210: Abuse Existing Functionality, 15 | CAPEC-125: Flooding, 6 | Trusted | Identity Spoofing, 4 | Inject Unexpect | Services with | typo, 2 | 100: Overflo | CAPEC | CAPEC -17: | CAPEC -150: | Control of the Contro | | 12 PEC |

Mitigation – Types of strategies

Acceptance: does not reduce effects

- e.g. Mitigation outweighs the cost of potential damage
- e.g. It's really unlikely that the threat occurs

Limitation: you have one or multiple mitigation strategies to reduce risk

- e.g. Use a MultiSig wallet
- e.g. Use hardware wallets to manage private keys
- e.g. Conduct security awareness workshops

Transference: hand risk off to a 3rd party

e.g. Get an insurance

Threat Modeling Exercise

Threat Modeling Exercise

Overview

- Extracted the top attack patterns from the incident db
- Find at least 3 threats and mitigation strategies
- Feel free to work in groups
- Time: 15 minutes

Options

- 1. Choose your own system
- 2. Choose the sample system

Material

• Devcon4 Github repo




Threat Modeling Exercise Cheat Sheet 1/2



Take a threat extracted from the Blockchain Incident table

If yes, think about mitigation strategies and add them to your threat model

If no, move on to the next




Clone the devcon4 repo

Is the threat relevant to your system?



Try to modify the threat example to make it more relevant Tip: Use your evil twin





Threat Modeling Exercise Cheat Sheet 2/2

Threat - what can go wrong?

A good threat description both describes cause and effect e.g. A hacker successfully infiltrates an employee's computer and retrieves the file containing the private keys for an account.

Mitigation - you know already what can go wrong so what are you doing about it? E.g. Employees use hardware wallets to make transactions and they always double check public address on the hardware device before they perform a transaction.

CAPEC / Attack Pattern – how adversary

Helps users to understand how adversaries exploit weaknesses by describing similar ways of attacking that frequently occur across a wide range of systems and technologies.

Go, go, go You have 15 minutes

Wrap Up

Takeaways

- OPSEC is not rocket science
- People don't pay enough attention to OPSEC
- Centralization in systems heightens the need for good OPSEC

Where to go from here

- Open it up to the team
- Keep your threat model up to date
- Track mitigation efforts in defect tracker

Questions