



Household Life Insurance Demand

Edward W. (Jed) Frees PhD, FSA & Yunjie (Winnie) Sun ASA

To cite this article: Edward W. (Jed) Frees PhD, FSA & Yunjie (Winnie) Sun ASA (2010) Household Life Insurance Demand, North American Actuarial Journal, 14:3, 338-354, DOI: [10.1080/10920277.2010.10597595](https://doi.org/10.1080/10920277.2010.10597595)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10920277.2010.10597595>



Published online: 27 Dec 2012.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 134



Citing articles: 8 View citing articles [↗](#)

HOUSEHOLD LIFE INSURANCE DEMAND: A MULTIVARIATE TWO-PART MODEL

Edward W. (Jed) Frees* and Yunjie (Winnie) Sun†

ABSTRACT

What types of households own life insurance? Who owns term life and who owns whole life insurance? These are questions of great interest to insurers that operate in a highly competitive market. To answer these questions, we jointly examine household demand of two types of insurance, term and whole life, using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, a probability sample of the U.S. population. We model both the frequency and the severity of demand for insurance, building on the work of Lin and Grace by using explanatory variables that they developed. For the frequency portion, the household decisions about whether to own term and whole life insurance are modeled simultaneously with a bivariate probit regression model. Given ownership of life insurance by a household, the amounts of insurance are analyzed using generalized linear models with a normal copula. The copula permits the bivariate modeling of insurance amounts for households who own both term and whole life insurance, about 20% of our sample. These models allow analysts to predict who owns life insurance and how much they own, an important input to the marketing process.

Moreover, our findings suggest that household demand for term and whole life insurance is jointly determined. After controlling for explanatory variables, there exists a negative relationship for a household's decision to own both whole and term life insurance (the frequency part) and a positive relationship for the amount of insurance purchased (the severity part). This indicates that the greater the probability of holding one type, the smaller the probability of holding the other type of life insurance. However, higher demand for both types of insurance exists when a household decides to own both. This mixed effect extends prior work that established a negative relationship, suggesting that term life insurance and whole life insurance are substitutes for one another. In contrast, our findings reveal that the ownership decision involves substitution, but, for households owning both types of insurance, amounts are positively related. Therefore, term and whole life insurance are substitutes in the frequency yet complements in the severity.

1. INTRODUCTION

There is a large market for life insurance. As evidence, the direct premium written for life insurance in the United States reached about \$184 billion in 2007 (Insurance Information Institute 2009). Life insurance can be decomposed into two major categories: term life insurance, which offers pure insurance protection, and whole life insurance, which incorporates a savings component. In 2007, approximately 2.3 million term life insurance policies were sold by the top 10 life insurers (by number of term life policies) with about \$442 billion insurance issued. Similarly, the top 10 life insurers (by number of whole life policies) issued approximately 2.8 million whole life policies with about \$183 billion insurance written. Thus, life insurance is a significant insurance market. Understanding the character-

* Edward W. (Jed) Frees, PhD, FSA, is the Assurant Health Professor of Actuarial Science at the Wisconsin School of Business, 975 University Avenue Madison, Wisconsin 53706, jfrees@bus.wisc.edu.

†Yunjie (Winnie) Sun, ASA, is a doctoral candidate at the Wisconsin School of Business, 975 University Avenue Madison, Wisconsin 53706, ysun4@wisc.edu.

istics of a household that drive life insurance demand can help insurers target their markets effectively and efficiently.

We use the Survey of Consumer Finances to examine a household's demand for term and whole life insurance. In the insurance and consumer science literature, much research has addressed how much life insurance protection households seek given their economic and demographic structure (see Goldsmith 1983; Burnett and Palmer 1984; Lin and Grace 2007). This research has focused primarily on middle-aged married couples and have provided solid economic justification underpinning life insurance demand. We therefore work with middle-aged married couples using the explanatory variables suggested by the recent work of Lin and Grace (2007). The objective of our analysis is to explore the complicated relationship between the two types of life insurance using advanced analytic techniques.

In contrast to the traditional ordinary and censored (Tobit) regression models that are widely applied in the life insurance demand literature, we propose a two-part model to analyze household demand for life insurance. In a two-part model, the frequency component (whether the household owns life insurance) and the severity component (how much life insurance is owned given the household owns life insurance) are modeled separately. Compared with ordinary regression, which ignores the special pattern of a large portion of zeros in the dependent variable, a two-part model can provide an unbiased estimation. Though the Tobit model takes the zeros into consideration, a drawback is that the same set of covariates are applied to both the frequency and severity components. Cragg (1971) presented several instances in which each part of the model can be explained by different sets of covariates. Therefore, a model that has the flexibility to allow for different covariates for the censoring (frequency) and the magnitude (severity) process is preferred. Many actuarial data sets come in two parts naturally; it is common to utilize a two-part model in such cases. See Frees (2010, ch. 16) for further discussion.

We study a household's demand for insurance in a multivariate framework, examining term life and whole life ownership jointly. Lin and Grace (2007) hypothesized that term life insurance is a substitute for whole life insurance, and they incorporated the term life insurance face value linearly into the demand function of the whole life insurance. The method of Lin and Grace implies that household demand of whole life insurance depends on the demand of term life. In contrast, we treat these two demands as being jointly determined. When a household makes decisions about life insurance ownership, they consider both term and whole life insurance simultaneously.

Through our joint model, we shed light on whether term and whole life insurance are substitutes (negative relationship in demand) or complements (positive relationship in demand). Recall that two economic goods are substitutes if one can serve as a replacement for the other. Therefore, when the demand for one good increases, the demand for the other good decreases. They are complements if they "go together": that is, an increase in the demand for one good is aligned with an increase in the demand for the other good. Our proposed two-part, as well as multivariate, models allow us to expand the examination of the complement/substitutes effect between term and whole life insurance. When a household considers owning life insurance, how does the purchase decision on these two types of life insurance impact each other after controlling all the observable characteristics of the households? For households who own both types of life insurance, does the amount they choose to purchase on each type affect one another? Are term and whole life insurance substitutes or complements in this two-stage decision-making process? About 20% of our sample are households who own both types of life insurance. Our model helps to understand the behavior of this group of households.

One hypothesis is that the relationship of demand for term and whole life insurance may differ between the frequency and severity components, a phenomenon that may be caused by unobserved characteristics of the households. For example, consider a group of income-constrained, risk-adverse households. After taking into account all observable information, there may be a negative relationship in ownership of term and whole life insurance because of income constraints. Yet, for the subgroup who decides to purchase both types of insurance, a positive relationship in purchase amounts might exist because of households' conservative attitudes toward risk. Modeling the demand for these two types of insurance in a multivariate two-part model provides us with more insights into their relationship caused by unobservable factors.

This paper focuses on the analytical techniques to analyze household demand for life insurance. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 describes the statistical models used and provides the empirical results of our analysis. Section 4 contains concluding remarks.

2. SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCE DATA

2.1 Data Description

We use the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data to conduct the analysis. The SCF is a triennial survey of U.S. families conducted by the Federal Reserve. The data set is from a probability sample of the U.S. population with wealthy households oversampled. The households participating in the survey were randomly selected to represent all economic strata of the country. Using the probability sampling weights for each observation, the sample survey results can be extrapolated to the national population. Unlike many insurance experience study data sets, we need not be concerned that our findings are limited by the underwriting or other practices of a limited group of insurers. The data set includes extensive demographic and economic characteristics of the households as well as behavioral aspects such as “the motive to leave a bequest.” The respondent was designated as the head of the household (see Federal Reserve 2004).

The SCF data files impute missing information by five methods for each household, providing five “implicates” data sets. Following Bernheim et al. (2001) and Lin and Grace (2007), we use the first implicate in this study.

The 2004 SCF data set has 4,492 household level (“primary economic unit”) observations after we cleaned data errors. Among these households, 2,683 are married couples (or living with partner) and 921 are single-person households (never married, separated, divorced, or widowed). About 77% of married couple households have some type of life insurance, and for single-person households, this rate is about 53%.

Following the insurance and consumer science literatures, we focus our analysis on married couples in the 20–64 age range (sample size reduces to 2,160). Similar to Lin and Grace (2007), we exclude two households where the respondent or the spouse had irregular labor income. In addition, we delete a few observations with missing or implausible values, such as negative salary. The final number of observations used for the analysis is $n = 2,150$.

There are two important limitations of the SCF data for our work. First, the SCF data are based on the whole household. Specific information about the policyholder of the life insurance and the face value for each policy is not available. This is an obstacle to understanding individual demand for life insurance (except for those single-person households). For married couples, we consider the whole household as a decision-making unit. It is appropriate to draw conclusions about the household’s total life insurance demand based on the household’s characteristics. However, when we make an inference, we should be cautious of the generalization of the results.

Second, we do not know when the insurance was purchased. Compared with term life insurance, a short-term product, whole life insurance is a long-term commitment. The characteristics of the household may have been changed since the time that the whole life insurance was purchased. Using the current characteristics of the household to estimate a decision made in the past may introduce measurement error. Therefore, we define the demand for whole life insurance as the amount of whole life insurance that a household is willing to retain at the time of the survey.

2.2 Variables of Interest

2.2.1 Dependent Variables

The dependent variables in our analysis measure two types of life insurance, term and whole life. For term life insurance, Table 1 shows that 1,416 of our 2,150 households, or 65.86%, own term life

Table 1
Life Insurance Summary Statistics

Variable	Number	Percent	Distribution of Positive Values				
			Minimum	25th Percentile	Median	75th Percentile	Maximum
FACETerm	1,416	65.86	0.8	100	270	1,000	150,000
NAR	718	33.40	0.66	60.25	202.5	900	45,000

Note: Monetary variables are in thousands of dollars.


insurance. To measure the amount of demand, we examine the face amount of the policy (FACETerm). As is seen in Table 1 and Figure 1, the distribution is skewed to the right and heavy-tailed.

For the whole life component, Table 1 shows that 718 households, or 33.40%, purchased whole life insurance. For this amount, one could use the face value to measure the demand. Instead, we follow the insurance literature (e.g., Lin and Grace 2007) and used the “net amount at risk” (NAR). The NAR is the difference between the face value and the saving component (cash value) of the whole life insurance. It can be interpreted as the amount of protection for unforeseen risk that a household has at the time of the survey.

To assess the relationship between term and whole life ownership in the frequency component, we look to joint ownership, that is, households who own both term and whole life insurance. There are 424 households, or 19.72%, who own both term and whole life insurance. If we assume the decisions of owning term life insurance and whole life insurance are independent, the probability of owning both types of life insurance should be 21.99% ($= 0.6586 \times 0.3340$). The empirical 19.72% sample probability of owning both types suggests a slight negative association. Of course, this calculation does not control for the effects of explanatory variables, nor does it establish statistical significance.

To assess the relationship between term and whole life ownership in the amount component, we calculated the Spearman correlation between FACETerm and NAR for the 424 households who own both types of life insurance. The correlation of 0.467 suggests that when a household decides to own both types of life insurance, the amounts they choose are positively related (without controlling for

Figure 1
Histograms of Life Insurance Amounts (in Thousands)



Notes: The left-hand panel is for face amount of term life insurance, the right-hand panel is for NAR of whole life insurance. Both distributions are right-skewed and heavy-tailed.

explanatory variables). This interesting finding encourages us to investigate the bivariate attributes of the data set.

2.2.2 Explanatory Variables

We build on the work of Lin and Grace (2007) by using explanatory variables they developed with some minor modifications. Their explanatory variables can be grouped into the following categories:

- *Assets*: The role of assets in the demand for life insurance is unclear. One theory, based on the widely accepted decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), suggests that an increase in wealth will reduce the individual's willingness to insure (e.g., Chavas 2004). Another theory, increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA), is that individuals' risk aversion increases with wealth. This theory implies that an increase in wealth may increase an individual's willingness to insure. Some studies, including Halek and Eisenhauer (2001), have examined the existence of IRRA. The mixture of these two effects makes the relation between household assets and life insurance demand ambiguous. Lin and Grace (2007) split assets into eight categories: cash and cash equivalents, mutual funds, stocks, bonds, annuities, individual retirement accounts, real estate, and other assets. We follow this practice.
- *Debt*: The total debt of a household (DEBT) includes credit card, mortgage, line of credit, loan for home improvement, land contract loan, other real estate mortgage, car loan, education loan, consumer loans, other debt, and margin loan. Life insurance, on the one hand, can protect the survivor from the financial burden of debt. On the other hand, debt might make insurance unaffordable for households under financial pressure. Therefore, the relationship between debt and life insurance demand is unclear.
- *Income*: The effect of the household income on the life insurance demand is similar to the wealth (asset) effect. As Lin and Grace (2007) hypothesized, a DARA individual will purchase less insurance at higher income level. However, their other hypothesis is that a higher income may generate more risk for the individual, and therefore it increases an individual's life insurance demand. Numerous studies (e.g., Goldsmith 1983; Burnett and Palmer 1984) have shown evidence for the latter hypothesis. We use the regular salary and wage before taxes of the respondent (SALARY1) and the spouse (SALARY2) as measures of household income.
- *Bequests, Obligations, and Inheritance*: In the SCF data, there is a behavioral question about whether the household has a motive to leave a bequest. Other questions that can influence the life insurance demand include the estimated amount of expected inheritance and the existence of foreseeable major financial obligation. To control for these factors we include two binary variables indicating the desire to leave a bequest (BEQUEST) and the existence of financial obligation (OBLIGATION) and a continuous variable for the size of the inheritance expected (INHERITANCE).
- *Age*: In general, life insurance demand increases up to an age and then decreases as an individual ages. This is because at first an individual needs more protection when he or she is married or has children. But when he or she is getting old, the accumulated wealth can reach the level that mostly meets the needs of the survivor. Another hypothesis is that since term life insurance is more affordable than whole life insurance, in the early stage of the life cycle when individuals earn relatively low income, they are more likely to purchase term life insurance than whole life insurance. From a convention employed in many similar investigations (Lin and Grace 2007), we use the average age of the household to show the age effect, and in addition, we add a quadratic term of the average age of the household to investigate the changing effect in age.
- *Education*: Education gives individuals opportunities to understand the importance of risk management, especially in the context of insurance purchases. Burnett and Palmer (1984) show that life insurance demand is positively related to education level of an individual. The number of years in school for the respondent (EDUCATION1) and the spouse (EDUCATION2), respectively, measures the education level of the household.

- *Financial Vulnerability Index*: The financial vulnerability index (IMPACT), developed by Lin and Grace (2007), measures the adverse financial impact on a household in terms of living standard decline upon the death of one household member. It is a life-cycle measure that depends on the household's current living standard, the expected reduction in living standard, and the expected mortality. For detailed calculations, see Appendix A. The hypothesis is that the higher the financial vulnerability index, the more life insurance is demanded.

Compared with the Lin and Grace (2007) study, our IMPACT variable has approximately 5% values that are far above the maximum reported in Lin and Grace. One explanation is that Lin and Grace excluded about 1% of their data deemed to be outliers for their four-period analysis (1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001). Another possible explanation is that several households in the 2004 data are very wealthy. To improve the utility of this measure, we cap the value of IMPACT at 4, at its approximate 95th percentile. We add a binary variable (INDIMPACT) to indicate when the IMPACT value exceeds 4: that is, for those households whose original IMPACT value is greater than 4, we adjust their IMPACT value to be 4 and set the binary variable INDIMPACT value to be 1. About 5% households have 1 for INDIMPACT; they are usually households in which one person has an extremely high income while the other person has zero or low income.

Although we build on the work of Lin and Grace (2007) by using the explanatory variables that they developed, our reported models feature two main differences in the selection of explanatory variables. First, we included binary variables to indicate zero values for monetary variables. The motivation is similar to the intuition of the two-part model for dependent variables; we supplement the explanatory variable for the amount with a binary variable that indicates its presence or absence. For example, we have a variable to indicate whether a household invests in stocks (INDSTOCK) as well as a variable to indicate the amount of stock investment (STOCK). The indicator variable INDSTOCK equals 1 when a household does not have any stock investments.

Second, Lin and Grace (2007) hypothesized that a household's life insurance demand depends on asset variables and that dependence varies by three age groups (20–34, 35–49, and 50–64). From a preliminary investigation, we did not see any significant results supporting this hypothesis. Instead of using the interaction terms between age groups and assets covariates, we use the average age of the household as well as the quadratic form of the age to control the nonlinear effects of age. It turns out that our main results in Section 3.3 for the associations are not qualitatively impacted by these choices of explanatory variables.

2.3 Summary Statistics

Table 2 summarizes the continuous explanatory variables, and Table 3 provides means for the binary variables.

For our married couple sample, Table 2 shows that the median age is 47.5, with 16 years of education for the respondent and 15 years for the spouse. The median salary was \$60,000 for the respondent and \$13,000 for the spouse. Because of the skewed nature of the monetary covariates, we incorporate transformed monetary covariates in the model. The logarithmic transform is a natural choice given the log-link that we will introduce in Section 3.2. To handle zero values, we use a modified logarithm transformation (for example, $\text{LNSTOCK} = \text{Log}(1 + \text{Stock})$).

Table 2 also emphasizes the preponderance of zeros for many of the asset and income variables. Because of this feature, we created binary variables to indicate the presence of zero values in these categories. These binary variables appear in Table 3. For example, this table shows that 58.7% of households do not have any stock investments.

Compared with Lin and Grace (2007), who used 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001 SCF data, households surveyed in 2004 owned more life insurance. Our sample consists of couples who are older, better

Table 2
Continuous Explanatory Variable Summary Statistics

Variable	Minimum	25th Percentile	Median	75th Percentile	Maximum
Cash and cash equivalent	0	3	17	98	32,628
Mutual fund	0	0	0	20	57,500
Stock	0	0	0	50	200,000
Bond	0	0	0	1	100,000
Individual annuity not including job pension	0	0	0	0	200,000
Retirement account	0	0	52	272	35,000
Real estate	0	127	350	1,294	194,380
Other assets	0	15	31	66	97,203
Debt	0	13	110	286	121,686
Salary and wages of respondent before taxes	0	29	60	163	80,112
Salary and wages of spouse before taxes	0	0	13	40	2,700
Sizable inheritance expected	0	0	0	0	906,060
Average age of the couple	21	39.5	47.5	54.5	64
Education of respondent	1	12	16	17	17
Education of spouse	0	12	15	16	17
Financial vulnerability index (IMPACT)	0	0.049	0.113	0.340	1,265.02

Note: Monetary variables are in thousands of dollars.

Table 3
Binary Explanatory Variable Means

Variable Mean	INDCASH 0.033	INDFUND 0.700	INDSTOCK 0.587	INDBOND 0.675	INDANNUITY 0.886
Variable Mean	INDRETIREMENT 0.250	INDREALESTATE 0.123	INDOTHASSETS 0.044	INDDEBT 0.156	INDINHERITANCE 0.798
Variable Mean	BEQUEST 0.488	OBLIGATION 0.589	INDIMPACT 0.048		

Notes: Indicator variables for assets/monetary covariates indicate the absence of the assets. For example, INDCASH = 1 means zero cash and cash equivalent holding. INDIMPACT = 1 if financial vulnerability index (IMPACT) ≥ 4 .

educated, have more children and wealth, and rely more on debt. The average financial vulnerability measured by the median is similar.

3. STATISTICAL MODELS

For notation, let r_{i1} and r_{i2} be binary variables that indicate whether household i purchases term life insurance and whole life insurance, respectively. Similarly, let y_{i1} and y_{i2} denote the amounts, if available. We decompose the joint distribution of the dependent variables into frequency and severity components by

$$f(r_{i1}, r_{i2}, y_{i1}, y_{i2}) = f_F(r_{i1}, r_{i2}) \times f_S(y_{i1}, y_{i2} | r_{i1}, r_{i2}).$$

For the frequency component $f_F(r_{i1}, r_{i2})$, we employ a bivariate probit regression model in Section 3.1. For the conditional severity component $f_S(y_{i1}, y_{i2} | r_{i1}, r_{i2})$ in Section 3.2, we use generalized linear models with a copula.

3.1 Frequency Models

A bivariate probit regression model extends the probit regression model to a two-dimensional vector of binary responses (e.g., Greene 2008). This distribution can be easily computed using a standard bivariate normal distribution.

To assess the frequency distribution f_{Fi} , we note that there are four possible outcomes for the i th observation:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(r_{i1} = 1, r_{i2} = 1) &= \Phi_2(\mathbf{x}'_i\beta_1, \mathbf{x}'_i\beta_2; \rho), \\ \Pr(r_{i1} = 1, r_{i2} = 0) &= \Pr(r_{i1} = 1) - \Pr(r_{i1} = 1, r_{i2} = 1) = \Phi(\mathbf{x}'_i\beta_1) - \Phi_2(\mathbf{x}'_i\beta_1, \mathbf{x}'_i\beta_2; \rho), \\ \Pr(r_{i1} = 0, r_{i2} = 1) &= \Phi(\mathbf{x}'_i\beta_2) - \Phi_2(\mathbf{x}'_i\beta_1, \mathbf{x}'_i\beta_2; \rho), \\ \Pr(r_{i1} = 0, r_{i2} = 0) &= 1 - \Phi(\mathbf{x}'_i\beta_1) - \Phi(\mathbf{x}'_i\beta_2) + \Phi_2(\mathbf{x}'_i\beta_1, \mathbf{x}'_i\beta_2; \rho),\end{aligned}$$

where $\Phi_2(\cdot, \cdot; \rho)$ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard bivariate normal distribution with correlation parameter ρ . With these expressions, the frequency log-likelihood of the i th observation is

$$\begin{aligned}l_{Fi} &= r_{i1}r_{i2} \ln \Phi_2(\mathbf{x}'_i\beta_1, \mathbf{x}'_i\beta_2; \rho) \\ &\quad + r_{i1}(1 - r_{i2}) \ln[\Phi(\mathbf{x}'_i\beta_1) - \Phi_2(\mathbf{x}'_i\beta_1, \mathbf{x}'_i\beta_2; \rho)] \\ &\quad + (1 - r_{i1})r_{i2} \ln[\Phi(\mathbf{x}'_i\beta_2) - \Phi_2(\mathbf{x}'_i\beta_1, \mathbf{x}'_i\beta_2; \rho)] \\ &\quad + (1 - r_{i1})(1 - r_{i2}) \ln[1 - \Phi(\mathbf{x}'_i\beta_1) - \Phi(\mathbf{x}'_i\beta_2) + \Phi_2(\mathbf{x}'_i\beta_1, \mathbf{x}'_i\beta_2; \rho)].\end{aligned}$$

The total frequency log-likelihood is $\sum_{i=1}^n l_{Fi}$. With this, it is straightforward to determine maximum likelihood estimators using readily available statistical software.

3.2 Severity Model

This paper explores a copula framework for analyzing the joint distribution of life insurance amounts. See Nelson (1999), Frees and Valdez (1998), and Genest and Favre (2007) for introductions to copula modeling. One important advantage of this approach is that one is not constrained to using (log) normal marginal distributions. Instead, any distributions can be specified as the marginal distribution. Historically, one of the first studies of life insurance coverage amounts, by Norwegian actuary Birger Meidell in 1912, used a Pareto distribution, a long-tailed distribution (Kleiber and Kotz 2003, p. 62).

Another advantage of the copula approach is that “copulas preserve the marginals”: that is, by specifying a copula to model the relationship, marginal distribution is maintained when only a single amount is examined. This is important for our data, where 59.8% ($= 0.6586 + 0.3340 - 2 \times 0.1972$) own only one type of life insurance.

Using copulas for the generalized linear model has been widely applied in biomedical and financial risk management literatures. Our work is most closely related to Frees and Wang (2005), who used Gaussian and t copulas with marginal gamma regression models to fit aggregate automobile claims.

Beginning with the joint severity distribution function $f_S(y_{i1}, y_{i2})$, we let $f_{S1}(y_{i1}) = f_S(y_{i1}, y_{i2} | r_{i1} = 1, r_{i2} = 0)$ be the marginal distribution for term and similarly define $f_{S2}(y_{i2})$ for whole life. This sequence of definitions is viable because copulas preserve the marginals. We assume that each distribution is parameterized by a location parameter μ_{ij} and scale parameter ϕ_j , $j = 1$ for term and $j = 2$ for whole life. We use a generalized linear model (GLM) framework with a logarithmic link so that $\mu_{ij} = \exp(\mathbf{x}'_{ij}\beta_j)$, $j = 1, 2$.

We use a copula to express the relationship between the marginal distributions. Thus, we can write the bivariate distribution function as

$$\begin{aligned}f_S(y_{i1}, y_{i2}) &= f_S(y_{i1}, y_{i2} | r_{i1} = 1, r_{i2} = 1) \\ &= f_{S1}(y_{i1})f_{S2}(y_{i2})c(F_{S1}(y_{i1}), F_{S2}(y_{i2})),\end{aligned}\tag{1}$$

where $F_{Sj}(y_{ij})$ is the distribution function corresponding to $f_{Sj}(y_{ij})$, $j = 1, 2$. This function $c(\cdot)$ is called a copula density function. Typically copulas are calibrated by one or two parameters that describe the

dependence and other features. In our empirical work, we focus on the normal copula with correlation parameter ρ_S .

The log-likelihood of the i th household's life insurance demand given they own term and whole life insurance is

$$l_{S12i} = \ln f_{S1}(y_{i1}) + \ln f_{S2}(y_{i2}) + \ln c(F_{S1}(y_{i1}), F_{S2}(y_{i2})).$$

Thus, the total severity log-likelihood for the i th household is

$$l_{Si} = r_{i1}(1 - r_{i2}) \ln f_{S1}(y_{i1}) + (1 - r_{i1})r_{i2} \ln f_{S2}(y_{i2}) + r_{i1}r_{i2} \times l_{S12i}.$$

The total severity likelihood is $\sum_{i=1}^n l_{Si}$. With this, it is straightforward to determine maximum likelihood estimators using readily available statistical software.

When examining the distribution of insurance amounts, Figure 1 shows skewed distributions, suggesting that a logarithmic transformation might be used to induce approximate normality. This is a widely used approach in regression modeling, commonly known as a "Box-Cox" transformation. Thus, to understand the joint distribution of the insurance amounts, it is natural to consider logarithmic amounts and use a bivariate normal distribution. Intuitively, one drawback of working in the logarithmic scale is that model inference is based on optimizing "log dollars," a measurement scale that is not of interest to analysts. See, for example, Frees (2010, ch. 17) for further discussions of this point.

Because taking logarithms and using a bivariate normal regression is a commonly used approach, we did this analysis as a robustness check to our copula modeling framework; more details about the robustness check can be found in Appendix B. We found that these results are qualitatively similar to our more general approach.

3.3 Results

3.3.1 Frequency Model

The bivariate probit regression for the frequency model has 63 coefficients. Table 4 shows the result when the dependent variable is a vector of two binary indicators for term life insurance and whole life insurance. Of the assets variables, only stock, bond, and real estate impact both term and whole life insurance ownership decision and have negative coefficients. In general, the more assets a household has, the less likely a household is to own life insurance. However, for the real estate variable, it is negatively related to the probability of term life insurance ownership although positively related to that of whole life. One explanation is that when the household has more real estate, they prefer life insurance with saving component to diversify their investment. Most indicator variables for zero assets have negative coefficients. This means when a household does not have some type of assets, they are less likely to own life insurance. It may be that life insurance is not affordable for them.

The amount of debt a household owes positively affects the decision to hold term life insurance. The more debt a household owes, the more likely that it is to hold term life insurance protection, which is relatively inexpensive. The income level of the household also positively relates to the decision to hold life insurance. This is consistent with previous studies such as Lin and Grace (2007). The desire to leave a bequest only has positive impact on the likelihood of demand of whole life insurance.

The quadratic term of the age variable has a negative coefficient whereas the original age variable has a positive coefficient on term life insurance demand. This implies that as members of the household age, they are more likely to demand life insurance. However, the probability increases in a decreasing manner. The education level of the head of the household positively relates to the decision to hold term life insurance. This confirms findings of Burnett and Palmer (1984).

Surprisingly, the financial vulnerability variable proposed by Lin and Grace (2007) impacts only the frequency of term life insurance demand, not the whole life insurance demand. The larger the financial vulnerability index, the more likely is a household to own term life insurance. However, when the financial vulnerability index is extremely large (i.e., indicator for extremely high financial vulnerability

Table 4
Bivariate Probit Regression

Parameter	Term Life (= 1 if own)		Whole Life (= 1 if own)	
	Estimate	t-statistic	Estimate	t-statistic
Intercept	0.667	0.724	-0.939	0.992
Log (1 + cash and cash equivalent)	0.030	1.593	0.042	2.164**
Indicator for zero cash and cash equivalent	-0.241	-1.036	0.290	1.069
Log (1 + fund)	0.031	1.227	-0.044	-1.795*
Indicator for zero fund	0.344	1.133	-0.697	-2.381**
Log (1 + stock)	-0.052	-2.544**	-0.037	-1.855*
Indicator for zero stock	-0.425	-1.854*	-0.477	-2.160**
Log (1 + bond)	-0.040	-2.405**	-0.037	-2.335**
Indicator for zero bond	-0.440	-2.657***	-0.547	-3.525***
Log (1 + annuity)	-0.072	-1.853*	0.023	0.620
Indicator for zero annuity	-0.872	-1.788*	0.049	0.107
Log (1 + retirement)	0.024	1.072	-0.032	-1.433
Indicator for zero retirement	-0.122	-0.481	-0.388	-1.523
Log (1 + real estate)	-0.209	-5.336***	0.090	2.257**
Indicator for zero real estate	-2.581	-5.684***	0.818	1.739*
Log (1 + other assets)	0.038	1.384	0.011	0.421
Indicator for zero other assets	0.372	1.179	-0.339	-1.014
Log (1 + debt)	0.056	2.307**	0.005	0.182
Indicator for zero debt	0.195	0.656	-0.002	-0.006
Log (1 + salary of the respondent)	0.018	2.280**	0.004	0.490
Log (1 + salary of the spouse)	0.014	2.323**	0.015	2.443**
Indicator for the desire to leave a bequest	-0.003	-0.042	0.114	1.681*
Indicator for foreseeable major financial obligation	0.075	1.201	-0.001	-0.008
Log (1 + sizable inheritance expected)	-0.023	-0.641	-0.011	-0.294
Indicator for zero inheritance expected	-0.323	-0.687	-0.172	-0.368
Average age of the couple	0.058	2.240**	0.003	0.123
Squared average age of the couple	-0.001	-2.105**	0.000	0.670
Education level of the respondent	0.058	3.470***	-0.017	-0.985
Education level of the spouse	0.021	1.387	0.014	0.866
Financial Vulnerability Index (IMPACT)	0.170	2.672***	0.056	0.969
Indicator for IMPACT ≥ 4	-0.473	-1.933*	-0.162	-0.727
Rho (correlation parameter)	-0.285	-7.668***		

Notes: Number of observations: 2,150; log-likelihood value: -2,417.

*** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.

index = 1), those households are less likely to own term life insurance. In fact, in calculating the financial vulnerability index, we notice that households with a very large financial vulnerability index are those households with extreme high income on one person and low or zero income on the other. Intuitively, very wealthy families do not demand much life insurance.

The association between term life and whole life insurance demand is significantly negative after controlling for the covariates. This indicates that term life insurance and whole life insurance are substitutes in frequency. The greater the probability of holding one type, the smaller is the probability of holding the other type of life insurance.

3.3.2 Severity Model

For the severity model, the sample includes only those households that own at least one type of life insurance. There are 65 coefficients in this model, including the scale parameters for the GLM and the correlation parameter for the Gaussian copula. Table 5 shows the results. Here the dependent variables are the face amount of the term life insurance and the net amount at risk of whole life insurance.

Unlike the frequency model (as well as results in Lin and Grace 2007), the coefficients of almost all asset variables are positive. This suggests that the more assets a household has, the more life insurance they demand when they decide to have life insurance. This is consistent with the IRRA hypothesis. However, the indicators for all zero asset variables surprisingly show positive coefficients as well. It may be that less wealthy households with zero assets have greater needs for life insurance protection.

Table 5
Gaussian Copula with Gamma Marginals

Parameter	Term Life (Face Amount)		Whole Life (NAR)	
	Estimate	t-statistic	Estimate	t-statistic
Intercept	0.669	0.903	0.130	0.118
Log (1 + cash and cash equivalent)	0.171	8.545***	0.024	0.855
Indicator for zero cash and cash equivalent	1.196	3.859***	-1.115	-2.078**
Log (1 + fund)	0.030	1.218	0.056	1.542
Indicator for zero fund	0.396	1.356	0.935	2.156**
Log (1 + stock)	0.044	2.206**	0.075	2.531**
Indicator for zero stock	0.415	1.882*	1.001	2.994***
Log (1 + bond)	0.063	3.588***	0.074	3.279***
Indicator for zero bond	0.457	2.874**	0.625	2.795***
Log (1 + annuity)	0.016	0.458	0.067	1.176
Indicator for zero annuity	0.257	0.623	0.628	0.887
Log (1 + retirement)	0.023	1.080	0.091	2.858***
Indicator for zero retirement	0.175	0.713	0.753	1.954*
Log (1 + real estate)	0.201	5.779***	0.326	5.428***
Indicator for zero real estate	2.195	5.435***	3.506	4.632***
Log (1 + other assets)	0.174	5.939***	0.196	4.957***
Indicator for zero other assets	1.825	5.220***	1.286	2.385**
Log (1 + debt)	0.129	5.263***	0.040	0.990
Indicator for zero debt	1.054	3.386***	0.868	1.673*
Log (1 + salary of the respondent)	0.017	1.994*	0.012	0.976
Log (1 + salary of the spouse)	-0.024	-3.951***	-0.028	-2.908***
Indicator for the desire to leave a bequest	0.206	3.097***	0.635	5.758***
Indicator for foreseeable major financial obligation	0.087	1.391	0.163	1.710*
Log (1 + sizable inheritance expected)	0.163	4.504***	0.041	0.696
Indicator for zero inheritance expected	1.963	4.261***	0.563	0.745
Average age of the couple	0.023	2.674***	0.022	1.832*
Squared average age of the couple	-0.001	-5.700***	-0.001	-5.141***
Education level of the respondent	0.046	2.604**	0.006	0.203
Education level of the spouse	0.024	1.349	0.056	2.074**
Financial Vulnerability Index (IMPACT)	0.105	1.791*	0.253	2.733***
Indicator for IMPACT ≥ 4	-0.464	-1.970*	-0.815	-2.384**
Scale	0.913	0.032 ^a	0.746	0.024 ^a
Rho (correlation parameter)	0.099	1.964*		

Notes: Number of observations: 1,710; log-likelihood value: -30,277.

^a This is the standard error for the scale parameter.

*** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.

The severity model coefficients of debt, age and squared age of the couple, education level of the household, and salary of the household head have the same signs as in the frequency model. For the spouse salary, the coefficient is negative for the severity model, implying that the more salary the spouse earns, the less is the need for higher amounts of life insurance.

The inheritance expected has a positive impact on the amount of the insurance demand. This is inconsistent with the intuition. The desire to leave a bequest and the existence of foreseeable major obligation also drive the household to demand more life insurance.

The financial vulnerability index and the indicator for extreme index value are both statistically significant in the severity model. The higher the financial vulnerability index, the more life insurance protection a household seeks. However, for those households with an extremely high index (i.e., indicator for extremely high financial vulnerability index = 1), they demand less life insurance.

The main result of the severity part is that, for households who own both term and whole life insurance, the correlation between the amount of term and whole life insurance is positive and significant. This is directly opposite to the frequency model result. A positive correlation in severity after controlling all covariates indicates higher demand for both types of insurance when a household decides to own both. Therefore, term life and whole life insurance demands are complements in severity.

As a robustness check, we also fit the data with a t copula and a marginal gamma regression model. The fitted degrees of freedom for the t copula are 32.49, which implies that the fitted t copula is approximately normal. The result from this model is very comparable to the results with Gaussian copula, and therefore not reported.

3.4 Tobit Model Comparison

Tobit regression is a well-known left-censored regression model first proposed by Tobin (1958). In this model, an unobserved, or latent, variable is assumed to follow a linear regression model. The observed outcomes are censored or “limited” in the sense that they are bounded from below, typically by zero. One drawback of the Tobit model is its reliance on the normality assumption. A second, and more important, drawback is that a single censoring mechanism dictates both the magnitude of the response as well as the probability of being a zero. This can be an issue, for example, when studying health-care expenditures, where a zero can represent a person’s choice or decision not to utilize health care during a period. For many studies, the amount of health-care expenditure is strongly influenced by a health-care provider (such as a physician) or the presence of health insurance; the decision to utilize and the amount of health care can involve very different considerations. See, for example, Frees, Gao and Rosenberg (2009) for further discussion.

Table 6
Tobit Models for Term and Whole Life

Parameter	Term Life (Log Face Amount)		Whole Life (Log NAR)	
	Estimate	t-statistic	Estimate	t-statistic
Intercept	-0.144	-0.026	-15.252	-1.375
Log (1 + cash and cash equivalent)	0.315	2.648***	0.642	2.796***
Indicator for zero cash and cash equivalent	-1.554	-0.998	3.414	1.031
Log (1 + fund)	0.181	1.168	-0.408	-1.455
Indicator for zero fund	1.675	0.901	-6.981	-2.061**
Log (1 + stock)	-0.428	-3.387***	-0.538	-2.334**
Indicator for zero stock	-3.857	-2.786***	-6.522	-2.531**
Log (1 + bond)	-0.251	-2.447**	-0.468	-2.547**
Indicator for zero bond	-2.790	-2.873***	-6.901	-3.820***
Log (1 + annuity)	-0.393	-1.689*	0.105	0.252
Indicator for zero annuity	-4.877	-1.725*	-1.227	-0.237
Log (1 + retirement)	0.123	0.892	-0.288	-1.105
Indicator for zero retirement	-1.220	-0.791	-4.563	-1.519
Log (1 + real estate)	-1.010	-4.130***	0.879	1.864*
Indicator for zero real estate	-12.922	-4.552***	6.812	1.221
Log (1 + other assets)	0.309	1.805*	0.283	0.906
Indicator for zero other assets	2.715	1.358	-2.985	-0.760
Log (1 + debt)	0.449	2.904***	0.202	0.672
Indicator for zero debt	1.534	0.806	0.490	0.130
Log (1 + salary of the respondent)	0.154	2.947***	0.086	0.893
Log (1 + salary of the spouse)	0.087	2.350**	0.184	2.602***
Indicator for the desire to leave a bequest	0.305	0.740	1.597	2.004**
Indicator for foreseeable major financial obligation	0.620	1.627	0.258	0.354
Log (1 + sizable inheritance expected)	-0.112	-0.500	-0.155	-0.363
Indicator for zero inheritance expected	-1.739	-0.607	-2.572	-0.466
Average age of the couple	0.405	2.500**	0.251	0.746
Squared average age of the couple	-0.004	-2.306**	0.000	0.020
Education level of the respondent	0.388	3.714***	-0.064	-0.308
Education level of the spouse	0.196	2.019**	0.234	1.213
Financial Vulnerability Index (IMPACT)	1.337	3.653***	1.221	1.837*
Indicator for IMPACT ≥ 4	-3.703	-2.591***	-3.276	-1.284
Log (1 + net amount at risk of whole life insurance)	-0.263	-8.052***		
Log (1 + face value of term life insurance)			-0.450	-7.565***
Log-likelihood value	-5.587	-3.561		

Notes: Number of observations: 2,150.

*** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.

In our study of term life insurance demand, the coefficient for the salary of the spouse is positive in the frequency model yet negative in the severity model. A Tobit model does not have the flexibility to capture such reversal of signs that can be important for understanding the problem. As a robustness check, we also fit a Tobit model to our data set to compare with our two-part model and Lin and Grace (2007)'s results. Table 6 displays the results. Here the dependent variables are the logged value of face amount of term life insurance and logged value of net amount at risk of whole life insurance.

The results from Tobit model reveal that the relationship between these two types of life insurance is negative, which supports Lin and Grace (2007)'s finding that these two insurances are substitutes. In contrast, in our more flexible two-part model, the frequency part shows a negative relationship between term and whole life insurance ownership, while the severity part shows a positive relationship after controlling all the explanatory variables. These inconsistent results imply that some important attributes of the data may be overlooked when using the Tobit model.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper explores a multivariate two-part framework for household ownership of life insurance. We use statistical models of multivariate binary data and multivariate severity data. When joint insurance ownership or claims behavior are analyzed, these tools can be of significant use. In our case, they help to improve our understanding of a household's life insurance demand.

We find that variables such as the amount of stock, bond, real estate, and debt a household owns and income earned can have a significant impact on life insurance demand. However, the impact on the frequency and severity part as well as the type of life insurance can differ even in terms of the signs of coefficients. For example, the greater the real estate holding of a household, the less likely it is to own term life insurance and the more likely it is to own whole life insurance. Further, if the household owns any life insurance, then the greater the real estate holdings, the higher life insurance amount it tends to demand on either term or whole life insurance. Demographic characteristics, such as age and education level, may also affect life insurance demand. In general, older and more educated households have a higher demand for life insurance. Also, the financial vulnerability index proposed by Lin and Grace (2007) proves to be a significant variable in explaining household life insurance demand.

One important contribution of our study is that we find that the demand of term and whole life insurance are substitutes in frequency and complements in severity, after controlling for all the explanatory variables. This mixed effect extends prior work that established that term life insurance and whole life insurance are substitutes for one another. Although not included here, we also examined life insurance demand for single-person households, where the decision maker and policyholder is explicitly known. The results for this subpopulation supports our findings for the married couples subpopulation.

This paper combines the use of advanced statistical techniques and detailed data on insurance ownership to get a better understanding of factors that drive life insurance demand. Unlike other applications of predictive modeling that focus on risk segmentation, underwriting, and pricing, our work is primarily directed to the marketing process and associated decisions. As described in Section 2.1, our data are a representative sample of the United States and not restricted to experience from a single insurer or group of insurers. This means that the inferences made in this paper can reasonably apply to new customers for an insurer. Moreover, because of the probability sampling basis of these data, a next step would be to extrapolate our findings to the national population; such results would be useful for public policy purposes.

APPENDIX A: FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY INDEX

This appendix describes the financial vulnerability index defined by Lin and Grace (2007). For the calculation, the SCF variables needed are:

1. Household total labor and nonlabor income before taxes and deductions, $Tincome_i$
2. Salary of the respondent ($y_{res,i}$) and spouse ($y_{spouse,i}$)

3. Age of respondent (x) and spouse (y)
4. Number of children N .

In addition to the SCF variables, the calculation requires mortality and consumption to income information. We used the mortality database available from the Society of Actuaries, which can be found at <http://www.soa.org/professional-interests/technology/tech-table-manager.aspx>. The consumption to income information is available from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics at <http://www.bls.gov/ce/csxann04.pdf>.

The financial vulnerability index (IMPACT_i) measures the financial impact (living standard decline) of the death of one member of the household on the rest. It is calculated according to the following steps.

1. The living standard (C_i) is the per person consumption level. It is based on the total income of the household and the population consumption-to-income ratio for the household income bracket, adjusted for number of household members and household scale economies,

$$C_i = \alpha_i \frac{Tincome_i}{\left(2 + \frac{N}{2}\right)^{0.678}}.$$

Here α_i is the consumption-to-income ratio for the general population in the $Tincome_i$ income bracket. The 2 indicates there are two adults in the household and 0.678 measures household scale economies. This suggests that to achieve the same living standard, a two-adult household must spend 1.6 times ($2^{0.678}$) as much as an one-adult household. (Bernheim et al. 2001).

2. When the respondent dies, the reduced living standard of the spouse becomes

$$C_{spouse,i} = \beta_{spouse,i} \frac{Tincome_i - y_{res,i}}{\left(1 + \frac{N}{2}\right)^{0.678}}.$$

Here $\beta_{spouse,i}$ is the spouse's consumption-to-income ratio if the respondent dies.

3. The relative impact on the household if the respondent dies can be expressed as a percentage decline:

$$\text{IMPACT}_{spouse,i} = \frac{C_{spouse,i}}{C_i} - 1 = \frac{\beta_{spouse,i}(Tincome_i - y_{res,i}) \left(2 + \frac{N}{2}\right)^{0.678}}{\alpha_i Tincome_i \left(1 + \frac{N}{2}\right)^{0.678}} - 1.$$

4. The absolute impact on the household if respondent dies is

$$\text{IMPACT}_{spouse,i} * y_{res,i}.$$

5. If the respondent dies at age x , the household will incur an annual absolute living standard decline for $(65 - x)$ years. The age effect of the death of the respondent at age x can be captured by an annuity factor $\alpha_{\overline{65-x}|}$. This is an annuity certain.
6. The current life insurance holding reflects the household's expectation of its potential risks if one of the spouses dies in the foreseeable future, for example, one year. The one-year death probabilities $q_{x,i}^{res}$ for the respondent reflects such concern.
7. The impact on the household if the spouse dies can be obtained by reversing res and $spouse$.
8. Taking into account all of the above factors, the index of financial vulnerability (IMPACT_i) of the household i is defined in a way similar to the definition of standard deviation,

$$\text{IMPACT}_i = \sqrt{q_{x,i}^{res} (\text{IMPACT}_{spouse,i} * y_{res,i} * \alpha_{\overline{65-x}|})^2 + q_{y,i}^{spouse} (\text{IMPACT}_{res,i} * y_{spouse,i} * \alpha_{\overline{65-y}|})^2}.$$

APPENDIX B: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

B.1 Frequency Component

To check the robustness of our result, we fit an alternative multivariate frequency models to our data, the multinomial logit regression model.

A multinomial logit regression model is a natural extension of the logistic regression model (e.g., Frees 2010). The multinomial logit regression model assumes the various categories of the dependent variable response differently from the same set of explanatory variables. When we use multinomial logit regression, we choose one category of the dependent variable as the reference category. We can represent the linear combination of explanatory variables as the log odds ratio of a certain category of the dependent variables relative to the reference category.

The variable of interest is r_i , which can take values $1, 2, \dots, c$ (c mutually exclusive categories in total). We choose c as the reference category, then for a single observation r_i ,

$$\ln \frac{\Pr(r_i = j)}{\Pr(r_i = c)} = \mathbf{x}_i' \boldsymbol{\beta}_j, \quad j = 1, \dots, c - 1.$$

For each category of r_i ,

$$\Pr(r_i = j) = \frac{\exp(\mathbf{x}_i' \boldsymbol{\beta}_j)}{\sum_{j=1}^c \exp(\mathbf{x}_i' \boldsymbol{\beta}_j)}, \quad j = 1, \dots, c - 1,$$

$$\Pr(r_i = c) = \frac{1}{\sum_{j=1}^c \exp(\mathbf{x}_i' \boldsymbol{\beta}_j)}.$$

With this, the log-likelihood of the i th observation is

$$l_i = \mathbf{1}(r_i = c) \ln \frac{1}{\sum_{j=1}^c \exp(\mathbf{x}_i' \boldsymbol{\beta}_j)} + \sum_{j=1}^{c-1} \mathbf{1}(r_i = j) \ln \frac{\exp(\mathbf{x}_i' \boldsymbol{\beta}_j)}{\sum_{j=1}^c \exp(\mathbf{x}_i' \boldsymbol{\beta}_j)},$$

where $\mathbf{1}(\cdot)$ is an indicator function.

We can express the likelihood of all observations as $\sum_{i=1}^n l_i$. By maximizing the log-likelihood, we can obtain reliable parameter estimates.

For our application, the multinomial logit regression model has a four-level dependent variable INSURANCE: no life insurance purchase (INSURANCE = 0), term life insurance only (INSURANCE = 1), whole life insurance only (INSURANCE = 2), and both term life insurance and whole life insurance (INSURANCE = 3). We choose no life insurance purchase as the reference level, and all the covariates estimated for level i are based on a comparison between level i and the reference level.

Using multinomial logit regression in our case means estimating a system of three equations simultaneously. There are 31 covariates for each level, and therefore 93 coefficients are estimated. Compared with single equation estimation, the joint estimation of a system of equations is more efficient (e.g., Zellner and Lee 1965). Though the dependent variables are not exactly the same, Table B.1 still reveals a similar results as Table 4 for the marginal distribution. Given a household's characteristics, one can examine the association between these two types of life insurance using multinomial logit regression model.

B.2 Severity Component

The robustness for our severity part result is checked by mimicking a bivariate lognormal distribution. The logged face value of term life insurance and the logged NAR of whole life insurance are fitted by two OLS respectively. Then we calculated the Spearman correlation for the residuals from each model, for those observations owning both types of life insurance. The Spearman correlation is 0.09925. This results confirms that the relationship between the face value of term life insurance and the NAR of whole life insurance is positive.

Table B.1
Multinomial Logit Regression

Parameter	Term Life Only (992)		Whole Life Only (294)		Both Term and Whole (424)	
	Estimate	t-statistic	Estimate	t-statistic	Estimate	t-statistic
Intercept	2.484	1.152	0.643	0.245	0.199	0.077
Log (1 + cash and cash equivalent)	0.033	0.806	0.043	0.831	0.144	2.842***
Indicator for zero cash and cash equivalent	-0.361	-0.804	0.461	0.731	-0.222	-0.199
Log (1 + fund)	0.090	1.504	-0.007	-0.106	-0.013	-0.202
Indicator for zero fund	0.894	1.235	-0.458	-0.556	-0.593	-0.751
Log (1 + stock)	-0.124	-2.545**	-0.094	-1.680*	-0.182	-3.414***
Indicator for zero stock	-0.932	-1.728*	-0.834	-1.291	-1.803	-3.009***
Log (1 + bond)	-0.138	-3.443***	-0.144	-3.210***	-0.170	-3.933***
Indicator for zero bond	-1.394	-3.399***	-1.638	-3.407***	-2.165	-4.838***
Log (1 + annuity)	-0.180	-1.689*	-0.097	-0.893	-0.152	-1.349
Indicator for zero annuity	-2.793	-2.033**	-2.219	-1.546	-2.579	-1.765*
Log (1 + retirement)	0.099	1.924*	0.019	0.304	0.011	0.187
Indicator for zero retirement	0.044	0.080	-0.652	-0.931	-0.628	-0.936
Log (1 + real estate)	-0.394	-4.609***	-0.009	-0.086	-0.246	-2.380**
Indicator for zero real estate	-4.836	-4.926***	-0.613	-0.497	-3.575	-2.911***
Log (1 + other assets)	0.089	1.474	0.065	0.926	0.106	1.539
Indicator for zero other assets	0.769	1.145	-0.280	-0.318	0.195	0.230
Log (1 + debt)	0.088	1.724*	0.021	0.316	0.113	1.721*
Indicator for zero debt	0.359	0.600	0.165	0.207	0.302	0.370
Log (1 + salary of the respondent)	0.053	3.064***	0.041	1.976*	0.044	2.172**
Log (1 + salary of the spouse)	0.029	2.189**	0.028	1.705*	0.058	3.696***
Indicator for the desire to leave a bequest	0.274	1.819*	0.612	3.175***	0.259	1.450
Indicator for foreseeable major financial obligation	0.148	1.098	0.035	0.206	0.144	0.887
Log (1 + sizable inheritance expected)	-0.108	-1.343	-0.120	-1.197	-0.083	-0.882
Indicator for zero inheritance expected	-1.347	-1.303	-1.467	-1.125	-1.171	-0.963
Average age of the couple	0.137	2.649**	0.086	1.174	0.143	1.943*
Squared average age of the couple	-0.001	-2.479**	-0.001	-0.774	-0.001	-1.277
Education level of the respondent	0.096	2.828***	-0.015	-0.338	0.080	1.787*
Education level of the spouse	0.061	2.010**	0.076	1.772*	0.065	1.560
Financial Vulnerability Index (IMPACT)	0.401	2.393**	0.238	1.280	0.500	2.826***
Indicator for IMPACT ≥ 4	-1.413	-2.211**	-1.067	-1.510	-1.498	-2.238**

Notes: Number of observations: 2,150. The reference level is No life insurance purchase (440).

*** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The first author thanks the Assurant Health Insurance Professorship for funding to support this research. We thank Professor Margie Rosenberg as well as anonymous reviewers for comments that helped improve the paper.

REFERENCES

- BERNHEIM, B. D., K. G. CARMAN, J. GOKHALE, AND L. J. KOTLIKOFF. 2001. The Mismatch between Life Insurance Holdings and Financial Vulnerabilities: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances. NBER working paper 8544.
- BURNETT, J. J., AND B. A. PALMER. 1984. Examining Life Insurance Ownership through Demographic and Psychographic Characteristics. *Journal of Risk and Insurance* 51(3): 453–467.
- CHAVAS, J. P. 2004. *Risk Analysis in Theory and Practice*. San Diego: Elsevier Academic Press.
- CRAGG, J. G. 1971. Some Statistical Models for Limited Dependent Variables with Application to the Demand for Durable Goods. *Econometrica* 39(5): 829–844.
- FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD. 2004. *Codebook for the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances*. New York: Federal Reserve.
- FREES, E. W. 2010. *Regression Modeling with Actuarial and Financial Applications*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- FREES, E. W., J. GAO, AND M. A. ROSENBERG. 2009. Predicting the Frequency and Amount of Health Care Expenditures. Working paper.
- FREES, E. W., AND E. A. VALDEZ. 1998. Understanding Relationships Using Copulas. *North American Actuarial Journal* 2(1): 1–25.
- FREES, E. W., AND P. WANG. 2005. Credibility Using Copulas. *North American Actuarial Journal* 9(1): 31–48.
- GENEST, C., AND A.-C. FAVRE. 2007. Everything You Always Wanted to Know about Copula Modeling but Were Afraid to Ask. *Journal of Hydrologic Engineering* 12: 347–368.

- GOLDSMITH, A. 1983. Household Life Cycle Protection: Human Capital versus Life Insurance. *Journal of Risk and Insurance* 50(3): 473–486.
- GREENE, W. 2008. *Econometric Analysis*. 6th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice-Hall.
- HALEK, M., AND J. G. EISENHAEUER. 2001. Demography of Risk Aversion. *Journal of Risk and Insurance* 68(1): 1–24.
- INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE. 2009. Facts and Statistics. Available at: www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/life/.
- KLEIBER, C., AND S. KOTZ. 2003. *Statistical Size Distributions in Economics and Actuarial Sciences*. New York: Wiley.
- KLUGMAN, S. A., H. H. PANJER, AND G. E. WILLMOT. 2008. *Loss Models: From Data to Decisions*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
- LIN, Y., AND M. F. GRACE. 2007. Household Life Cycle Protection: Life Insurance Holdings, Financial Vulnerability, and Portfolio Implications. *Journal of Risk and Insurance* 74(1): 141–173.
- MCCULLAGH, P., AND J. A. NELDER. 1989. *Generalized Linear Models*. 2nd ed. London: Chapman & Hall.
- NELSON, R. B. 1999. *An Introduction to Copulas*. Lecture Notes in Statistics 139. New York: Springer.
- TOBIN, J. 1958. Estimation of Relationships for Limited Dependent Variables. *Econometrica* 26: 24–36.
- VIDAL-MELLÁ, C., AND A. LEJÁRRAGA-GARCÍA. 2005. The Bequest Motive and Single People's Demand for Life Annuities. *Belgian Actuarial Bulletin* 4: 4–15.
- ZEGER, C. V., AND P. DIGGLE. 1992. Modeling Multivariate Binary Data with Alternating Logistic Regressions. *Biometrika* 80(3): 517–526.
- ZELLNER, A., AND T. H. LEE. 1965. Joint Estimation of Relationships Involving Discrete Random Variables. *Econometrica* 33: 382–394.

Discussions on this paper can be submitted until January 1, 2011. The authors reserve the right to reply to any discussion. Please see the Submission Guidelines for Authors on the inside back cover for instructions on the submission of discussions.