Christos Dimitrakakis

October 2, 2019

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What is it?



What is it?

► Meritocracy.

What is it?

- ► Meritocracy.
- Proportionality and representation.

What is it?

- ► Meritocracy.
- Proportionality and representation.
- ► Equal treatment.

What is it?

- ► Meritocracy.
- Proportionality and representation.
- ► Equal treatment.
- ► Non-discrimination.

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Example 1 (College admissions)

- ► Student *A* has a grade 4/5 from Gota Highschool.
- ► Student *B* has a grade 5/5 from Vasa Highschool.

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Example 2 (Additional information)

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- ▶ 50% of admitted Vasa graduates with 5 get their degree.

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Solutions

Admit everybody?

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- Admit everybody?
- Admit randomly?

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Solutions


- Admit everybody?
- Admit randomly?
- Use prediction of individual academic performance?

Proportional representation

Little progress is being made to improve diversity in genomics

Share of samples in genetic studies, by ancestry

■373 studies, up to 2009 ■2,511 studies, up to 2016




Hiring decisions

Dominated by men


Top U.S. tech companies have yet to close the gender gap in hiring, a disparity most pronounced among technical staff such as software developers where men far outnumber women. Amazon's experimental recruiting engine followed the same pattern, learning to penalize resumes including the word "women's" until the company discovered the problem.

GLOBAL HEADCOUNT

■ Male ■ Female



EMPLOYEES IN TECHNICAL ROLES








Fairness and information


Example 3 (College admissions data)


School	Male	Female
Α	62%	82%
В	63%	68%
C	37%	34%
D	33%	35%
E	28%	24%
F	6%	7%
Average	45%	38%



















Whites get lower scores than blacks¹





Black White

Figure: Apparent bias in risk scores towards black versus white defendants.

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But scores equally accurately predict recidivsm²




Figure: Recidivism rates by risk score.

But non-offending blacks get higher scores




Figure: Score breakdown based on recidivism rates.

Graphical models and independence

- Why is it not possible to be fair in all respects?
- Different notions of conditional independence.
- Can only be satisfied rarely simultaneously.

Graphical models




Figure: Graphical model (directed acyclic graph) for three variables.

Joint probability

Let
$$x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$$
. Then $x : \Omega \to X$, $X = \prod_i X_i$ and:

$$\mathbb{P}(\boldsymbol{x} \in A) = P(\{\omega \in \Omega \mid \boldsymbol{x}(\omega) \in A\}).$$

Factorisation

$$\mathbb{P}(x) = \mathbb{P}(x_B \mid x_C) \mathbb{P}(x_C), \qquad B, C \subset [n]$$

Graphical models




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Factorisation

So we can write any joint distribution as

$$\mathbb{P}(x_1) \mathbb{P}(x_2 \mid x_1) \mathbb{P}(x_3 \mid x_1, x_2) \cdots \mathbb{P}(x_n \mid x_1, \dots, x_{n-1}).$$

Directed graphical models




Figure: Graphical model for the factorisation $\mathbb{P}(x_3 \mid x_2) \mathbb{P}(x_2 \mid x_1) \mathbb{P}(x_1)$.

Conditional independence

We say x_i is conditionally independent of x_B given x_D and write $x_i \mid x_D \perp \!\!\! \perp x_B$ iff

$$\mathbb{P}(x_i, x_B \mid x_D) = \mathbb{P}(x_i \mid x_D) \mathbb{P}(x_B \mid x_D).$$

Example 4 (Smoking and lung cancer)




Figure: Smoking and lung cancer graphical model, where *S*: Smoking, *C*: cancer, *A*: asbestos exposure.

Explaining away

Even though \mathcal{S},\mathcal{A} are independent, they become dependent once you know \mathcal{C}

Example 5 (Time of arrival at work)




Figure: Time of arrival at work graphical model where T is a traffic jam and x_1 is the time John arrives at the office and x_2 is the time Jane arrives at the office.

Conditional independence

Even though x_1, x_2 are correlated, they become independent once you know T.

Example 6 (Treatment effects)





Figure: Kidney treatment model, where x: severity, y: result, a: treatment applied

	Treatment A	Treatment B
Small stones	87	270
Large stones	263	80
Severity	Treatment A	Treatment B
Small stones)	93%	87%
Large stones	73%	69%
Average	78%	83%

Example 7 (School admission)







Figure: School admission graphical model, where z: gender, s: school applied to, a: whether you were admitted.


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Exercise 1




Factorise the following graphical model.

Exercise 1




Factorise the following graphical model.

$$\mathbb{P}(x) = \mathbb{P}(x_1) \, \mathbb{P}(x_2 \mid x_1) \, \mathbb{P}(x_3 \mid x_1) \, \mathbb{P}(x_4)$$



Factorise the following graphical model.



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$$\mathbb{P}(\boldsymbol{x}) = \mathbb{P}(x_1) \, \mathbb{P}(x_2 \mid x_1) \, \mathbb{P}(x_3 \mid x_1) \, \mathbb{P}(x_4 \mid x_3)$$

What dependencies does the following factorisation imply?

$$\mathbb{P}(x) = \mathbb{P}(x_1) \, \mathbb{P}(x_2 \mid x_1) \, \mathbb{P}(x_3 \mid x_1) \, \mathbb{P}(x_4 \mid x_2, x_3)$$

$$x_3$$


$$x_4$$

$$x_2$$

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Deciding conditional independence

There is an algorithm for deciding conditional independence of any two variables in a graphical model.

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Inference and prediction in graphical models




Figure: Inference and prediction in a graphical model.

Inference of latent variables

$$\mathbb{P}(\theta \mid x_1,\ldots,x_t)$$

- Model parameters.
- System states.

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Inference and prediction in graphical models




Figure: Inference and prediction in a graphical model.

Prediction

$$\mathbb{P}(x_{t+1} \mid x_1, \dots, x_t) = \int_{\Theta} P(x_{t+1} \mid x_1, \dots, x_t) \, \mathrm{d}P(\theta \mid x_1, \dots, x_t)$$

Predictions are testable.

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Coin tossing, revisited

Example 8

The Beta-Bernoulli prior



Figure: Graphical model for a Beta-Bernoulli prior

$$\theta \sim \mathcal{B}eta(\xi_1, \xi_2),$$
 i.e. ξ are Beta distribution parameters (3.1) $x \mid \theta \sim \mathcal{B}ernoulli(\theta),$ i.e. $P_{\theta}(x)$ is a Bernoulli (3.2)

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Example 9

The n-meteorologists problem (again)

- ▶ Meteorological models $\mathcal{M} = \{\mu_1, \dots, \mu_n\}$
- ▶ Rain predictions at time t: $p_{t,\mu} \triangleq P_{\mu}(x_t = rain)$.
- Prior probability $\xi(\mu) = 1/n$ for each model.
- ▶ Decision *a*, resulting in utility $U(a, x_{t+1})$




Figure: Inference, prediction and decisions in a graphical model.

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Measuring independence

Theorem 10

If $x_i \mid x_D \perp \!\!\! \perp x_B$ then

$$\mathbb{P}(x_i \mid x_B, x_D) = \mathbb{P}(x_i \mid x_D)$$

Example 11

$$\|\mathbb{P}(a \mid y, z) - \mathbb{P}(a \mid y)\|_1$$

which for discrete a, y, z is:

$$\max_{i,j} \| \mathbb{P}(a \mid y = i, z = j) - \mathbb{P}(a \mid y = i) \|_{1} = \max_{i,j} \| \sum_{k} \mathbb{P}(a = k \mid y = i, z = j) - \mathbb{P}(a \mid y = i,$$

Measuring independence

Theorem 10

If $x_i \mid x_D \perp \!\!\! \perp x_B$ then

$$\mathbb{P}(x_i \mid \boldsymbol{x}_B, \boldsymbol{x}_D) = \mathbb{P}(x_i \mid \boldsymbol{x}_D)$$

This implies

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathsf{x}_i \mid x_B = b, x_D) = \mathbb{P}(\mathsf{x}_i \mid x_B = b', x_D)$$

so we can measure independence by seeing how the distribution of x_i changes when we vary x_B , keeping x_D fixed.

Example 11

$$\|\mathbb{P}(a \mid y, z) - \mathbb{P}(a \mid y)\|_1$$

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Example 12

An alternative model for coin-tossing This is an elaboration of Example ?? for hypothesis testing.





Figure: Graphical model for a hierarchical prior

- μ_1 : A Beta-Bernoulli model with $\mathcal{B}eta(\xi_1, \xi_2)$
- \blacktriangleright μ_0 : The coin is fair.


$$\theta \mid \mu = \mu_0 \sim \mathcal{D}(0.5),$$
 i.e. θ is always 0.5 (3.3) $\theta \mid \mu = \mu_1 \sim \mathcal{B}eta(\xi_1, \xi_2),$ i.e. θ has a Beta distribution (3.4)

$$x \mid \theta \sim \mathcal{B}ernoulli(\theta),$$
 i.e. $P_{\theta}(x)$ is Bernoulli

Bayesian testing of independence



(a) Θ_0 assumes independence



(b) Θ_1 does not assume independence

Example 13

Assume data $D = \{x_1^t, x_2^t, x_3^t \mid t = 1, ..., T\}$ with $x_i^t \in \{0, 1\}$.


$$P_{\theta}(D) = \prod P_{\theta}(x_3^t \mid x_2^t) P_{\theta}(x_2^t \mid x_1^t) P_{\theta}(x_1^t), \qquad \theta \in \Theta_0$$
 (3.6)

$$P_{\theta}(D) = \prod_{t} P_{\theta}(x_3^t \mid x_2^t, x_1^t) P_{\theta}(x_2^t \mid x_1^t) P_{\theta}(x_1^t), \qquad \theta \in \Theta_1$$
 (3.7)


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Bayesian testing of independence



(a) Θ_0 assumes independence



(b) Θ_1 does not assume independence

Example 13

$$\theta_{1} \triangleq P_{\theta}(x_{1}^{t} = 1) \qquad (\mu_{0}, \mu_{1})
\theta_{2|1}^{i} \triangleq P_{\theta}(x_{2}^{t} = 1 \mid x_{1}^{t} = i) \qquad (\mu_{0}, \mu_{1})
\theta_{3|2}^{j} \triangleq P_{\theta}(x_{3}^{t} = 1 \mid x_{2}^{t} = j) \qquad (\mu_{0})
\theta_{3|2,1}^{i,j} \triangleq P_{\theta}(x_{3}^{t} = 1 \mid x_{2}^{t} = j, x_{1}^{t} = i) \qquad (\mu_{1})$$




Figure: Hierarchical model.

$$\mu_i \sim \phi$$
 (3.6)

$$\mu_{i} \sim \phi \tag{3.6}$$

$$\theta \mid \mu = \mu_{i} \sim \xi_{i} \tag{3.7}$$

Marginal likelihood

$$\mathbb{P}_{\phi}(D) = \phi(\mu_0) \, \mathbb{P}_{\mu_0}(D) + \phi(\mu_1) \, \mathbb{P}_{\mu_1}(D) \tag{3.8}$$

$$\mathbb{P}_{\mu_i}(D) = \int_{\Theta_i} P_{\theta}(D) \, \mathrm{d}\xi_i(\theta). \tag{3.9}$$

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


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Model posterior

$$\phi(\mu \mid D) = \frac{\mathbb{P}_{\mu}(D)\phi(\mu)}{\sum_{i} \mathbb{P}_{\mu_{i}}(D)\phi(\mu_{i})}$$
(3.8)

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Monte-Carlo approximation

$$\int_{\Theta} P_{\theta}(D) \, \mathrm{d}\xi(\theta) \approx \sum_{n=1}^{N} P_{\theta_n}(D) + O(1/\sqrt{N}), \qquad \theta_n \sim \xi$$
 (3.9)

Importance sampling

$$\int_{\Omega} P_{\theta}(D) \, \mathrm{d}\xi(\theta) \tag{3.10}$$

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 (3.9)

Importance sampling

$$\int_{\Theta} P_{\theta}(D) \, \mathrm{d}\xi(\theta) = \int_{\Theta} P_{\theta}(D) \frac{\mathrm{d}\psi(\theta)}{\mathrm{d}\psi(\theta)} \, \mathrm{d}\xi(\theta)$$

(3.10)

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Monte-Carlo approximation

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(3.10)

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 (3.10)

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$$\mathbb{P}_{\xi}(D)$$

(3.14)

Example 14 (Beta-Bernoulli)

$$\mathbb{P}_{\xi}(x_t = 1 \mid x_1, \dots, x_{t-1}) = \frac{\alpha_t}{\alpha_t + \beta_t},$$

with
$$\alpha_t = \alpha_0 + \sum_{n=1}^{t-1} x_n$$
, $\beta_t = \beta_0 + \sum_{n=1}^{t-1} (1-x_n)$ October 2, 2019 30 / 41

$$\mathbb{P}_{\xi}(D) = \mathbb{P}_{\xi}(x_1, \ldots, x_T)$$

(3.14)

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$$\mathbb{P}_{\xi}(D) = \mathbb{P}_{\xi}(x_1, \dots, x_T)
= \mathbb{P}_{\xi}(x_2, \dots, x_T \mid x_1) \mathbb{P}_{\xi}(x_1)$$
(3.11)

(3.14)

Example 14 (Beta-Bernoulli)

$$\mathbb{P}_{\xi}(x_t = 1 \mid x_1, \dots, x_{t-1}) = \frac{\alpha_t}{\alpha_t + \beta_t},$$

with $\alpha_t = \alpha_0 + \sum_{n=1}^{t-1} x_n$, $\beta_t = \beta_0 + \sum_{n=1}^{t-1} (1-x_n)$ October 2, 2019 30 / 41

$$\mathbb{P}_{\xi}(D) = \mathbb{P}_{\xi}(x_1, \dots, x_T)$$

$$= \mathbb{P}_{\xi}(x_2, \dots, x_T \mid x_1) \mathbb{P}_{\xi}(x_1)$$

$$= \prod_{t=0}^{T} \mathbb{P}_{\xi}(x_t \mid x_1, \dots, x_{t-1})$$
(3.11)

(3.14)

Example 14 (Beta-Bernoulli)

$$\mathbb{P}_{\xi}(x_t = 1 \mid x_1, \dots, x_{t-1}) = \frac{\alpha_t}{\alpha_t + \beta_t},$$

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 $\mathbb{P}_{\varepsilon}(D) = \mathbb{P}_{\varepsilon}(x_1, \dots, x_T)$

$$= \mathbb{P}_{\xi}(x_{2}, \dots, x_{T} \mid x_{1}) \, \mathbb{P}_{\xi}(x_{1})$$

$$= \prod_{t=1}^{T} \mathbb{P}_{\xi}(x_{t} \mid x_{1}, \dots, x_{t-1})$$

$$= \prod_{t=1}^{T} \int_{\Theta} P_{\theta_{n}}(x_{t}) \, \mathrm{d} \, \underline{\xi}(\theta \mid x_{1}, \dots, x_{t-1})$$
(3.12)
$$(3.13)$$

(3.11)

Example 14 (Beta-Bernoulli)

$$\mathbb{P}_{\xi}(x_t = 1 \mid x_1, \dots, x_{t-1}) = \frac{\alpha_t}{\alpha_t + \beta_t},$$

with
$$\alpha_t = \alpha_0 + \sum_{n=1}^{t-1} x_n$$
, $\beta_t = \beta_0 + \sum_{n=1}^{t-1} (1-x_n)$ October 2, 2019 30 / 41


Further reading

Python sources

- A simple python measure of conditional independence src/fairness/ci_test.py
- A simple test for discrete Bayesian network src/fairness/DirichletTest.py
- Using the PyMC package https://docs.pymc.io/notebooks/Bayes_factor.html


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


 $\pi(a \mid x)$ (policy)

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
 $\pi(a \mid x)$ (policy)



 $\pi(a \mid x)$ (policy)


 $\mathbb{P}(y \mid a, x)$ (outcome)

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$$\pi(a \mid x)$$
 (policy)


$$\mathbb{P}(y \mid a, x) \qquad \text{(outcome)}$$



$$\pi(a \mid x)$$
 (policy)

$$\mathbb{P}(y \mid a, x) \qquad \text{(outcome)}$$

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



$$\pi(a \mid x)$$
 (policy)

$$\mathbb{P}(y \mid a, x)$$
 (outcome)

$$U(a, y)$$
 (utility)

Independence






Black

White

Figure: Apparent bias in risk scores towards black versus white defendants.

$$\mathbb{P}^{\pi}_{\theta}(a \mid z) = \mathbb{P}^{\pi}_{\theta}(a)$$

(non-discrimination)



- Result.
- a Assigned score.
- Race.


$$\mathbb{P}^{\pi}(y \mid a, z) = \mathbb{P}^{\pi}(y \mid a)$$

(calibration) (balance)

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 $\mathbb{P}^{\pi}(a \mid y, z) = \mathbb{P}^{\pi}(a \mid y)$

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- y Result.
- a Assigned score.
- z Race.

$$\mathbb{P}^{\pi}(y \mid a, z) = \mathbb{P}^{\pi}(y \mid a)$$

$$\mathbb{P}^{\pi}(a \mid y, z) = \mathbb{P}^{\pi}(a \mid y) \tag{}$$

(calibration) (balance)

4 D > 4 A > 4 B > 4 B >

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Meritocratic decision

$$a_t(\theta, x_t) \in \underset{a}{\operatorname{arg max}} \mathbb{E}_{\theta}(U \mid a, x_t) = \int_{\mathcal{Y}} U(a_t, y) \mathbb{E}_{\theta}(U \mid a_t, x_t)$$
 (4.1)

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Smooth fairness

$$D[\pi(a \mid x), \pi(a \mid x')] \le \rho(x, x').$$
 (4.2)




Figure: A Lipschitz function

The constrained maximisation problem

$$\max_{\pi} \big\{ U(\pi) \ \big| \ \rho(x,x') \leq \epsilon \big\}_{\square \ \mapsto \ \square \ \square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie \ \square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 2, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 2, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 2, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 2, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 2, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 2, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \bowtie} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3, 2019}} = (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\{ (4.3)_{\square \ \square} \, \big\}_{\text{October 3,$$

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Fairness metrics: balance

$$F_{\text{balance}}(\theta, \pi) \triangleq \sum_{y, z, a} | \mathbb{P}_{\theta}^{\pi}(a \mid y, z) - \mathbb{P}_{\theta}^{\pi}(a \mid y) |^{2}$$
 (4.4)

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Fairness metrics: balance

$$F_{\text{balance}}(\theta, \pi) \triangleq \sum_{y, z, a} | \mathbb{P}_{\theta}^{\pi}(a \mid y, z) - \mathbb{P}_{\theta}^{\pi}(a \mid y) |^{2}$$
 (4.4)

Utility: Classification accuracy

$$U(\theta,\pi) = \mathbb{P}^{\pi}_{\theta}(y_t = a_t)$$

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Fairness metrics: balance

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Utility: Classification accuracy

$$U(\theta,\pi) = \mathbb{P}^{\pi}_{\theta}(y_t = a_t)$$

Use λ to trade-off utility and fairness

$$V(\lambda, \theta, \pi) = (1 - \lambda) \underbrace{U(\theta, \pi)}_{\text{unfairness}} - \lambda \underbrace{F(\theta, \pi)}_{\text{unfairness}}$$
(4.5)

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Model uncertainty

θ is unknown

Theorem 15

A decision rule in the form of a lottery, i.e.

$$\pi(a\mid x)=p_a$$

can be the only way to satisfy balance for all possible θ .

Possible solutions

- \blacktriangleright Marginalize over θ ("expected" model)
- Use Bayesian reasoning

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Let λ represent the trade-off between utility and fairness.

$$V(\lambda, \theta, \pi) = \lambda \underbrace{U(\theta, \pi)}_{\text{tairness violation}} - \underbrace{(1 - \lambda)F(\theta, \pi)}_{\text{fairness violation}}$$
(4.6)

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The Bayesian decision problem

The Bayesian value of a policy

$$V(\lambda, \xi, \pi) = \int_{\Theta} V(\lambda, \theta, \pi) \, \mathrm{d}\xi(\theta). \tag{4.7}$$

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Online resources

- COMPAS analysis by propublica https://github.com/propublica/compas-analysis
- ▶ Open policing database https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/

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Learning outcomes

Understanding

- Graphical models.
- Conditional independence.
- Fairness as independence.
- Fairness as meritocracy.

Skills

- Be able to specify a graphical model capturing dependencies between variables.
- ▶ Be able to verify if a policy satisfies a fairness condition.

Reflection

▶ When looking at sensitive attributes, how easy is it to determine fairness?