

## **The Evidence Standard**

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1. We will never falsify facts, opinions, dissents, or any other information.
2. We will never knowingly distribute information that has been proven to be inaccurate, even if the source of the information is legitimate.
3. We will actively fight the dissemination of false information and will provide the community with clarity if we learn that a third-party has attempted to commit deception.
4. We will never knowingly support or distribute studies, news articles, or other materials that use inaccurate methodologies to reach a conclusion or prove a point.
5. We will provide meaningful clarification to any who question the legitimacy of information that we distribute.
6. We will actively contribute to students' understanding of the world by using evidence from a multitude of perspectives and schools of thought.
7. We will, within our power, assist the community as a whole in its mission to achieve the goals and vision of this activity.

These seven statements, while simple, represent the complex notion of what it means to advance students' understanding of the world around them, as is the purpose of educators.

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## Letter from the Editor

This debate topic offers a unique opportunity for students to engage with some of the most pressing geopolitical and security challenges of our time. While it may seem daunting, tackling a resolution with such complex implications provides students with a chance to deepen their understanding of U.S. foreign policy in East Asia, specifically the intricate relationship between the U.S., Taiwan, and China. Rather than oversimplifying the dynamics at play, this topic encourages students to explore the broader context, including economic ties, diplomatic efforts, and regional security alliances, all of which are vital for a comprehensive understanding of the issue.

The phrase "substantially reduce" invites debaters to consider a range of potential scenarios, from shifts in military aid to changes in strategic partnerships. This flexibility empowers students to analyze and interpret what constitutes a substantial reduction, fostering critical thinking and encouraging them to define and defend their positions with clarity. However, I caution debaters to prepare for the possibility of needing to adjust mid-debate to these potential scenarios. Does "substantially reduce" mean a complete withdrawal of military support, a reduction in arms sales, or simply fewer joint military exercises? Without parameters, the debate could become muddled, with both sides arguing different versions of what "substantial reduction" actually means.

Moreover, by researching U.S.-Taiwan relations against the backdrop of rising tensions with China, students are exposed to real-world geopolitical strategies, including the role Taiwan plays in global trade and technology, particularly in the production of semiconductors. These aspects of the debate offer rich material for students to explore how security, economics, and diplomacy are interconnected in shaping U.S. strategic interests.

Finally, the topic challenges students to navigate the moral and political dilemmas involved in global diplomacy, such as balancing the protection of an ally with the risks of escalation. This allows debaters to refine their argumentation skills while grappling with the nuanced consequences of foreign policy decisions, ultimately preparing them to engage with complex issues in future academic and professional settings.

Yair Fraifeld  
Editor-in-Chief

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## Table of Contents

<b>The Evidence Standard .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Letter from the Editor .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Table of Contents .....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Topic Analyses.....</b>	<b>11</b>
Topic Analysis By Yair Fraifeld.....	12
Topic Analysis By Rachel Mauchline .....	17
Topic Analysis By Thadeus Smith .....	25
<b>General Information.....</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>Pro Arguments. ....</b>	<b>43</b>
PRO: Military support of Taiwan does not have public support. ....	44
PRO: Increasing military support creates geopolitical risks.....	47
PRO: Increasing military support increases tension with China. ....	51
PRO: Increasing military support diminishes Taiwan’s independence. ....	55
PRO: Increasing military support creates nuclear risks. ....	60
PRO: Increasing military support risks U.S.-Chinese tensions. ....	64
PRO: Increasing military support damages diplomatic opportunities.....	68
PRO: Increasing military support encourages Taiwan to overstep boundaries. ....	73
PRO: Military support would by definition include escalation of conflict. ....	78
PRO: Increasing military support is not necessary because China wants to avoid military issues.....	83
PRO: Increasing military support disrupts efforts to improve relations with China. ....	88
PRO: Reducing military support could lead to strategic de-escalation. ....	92
PRO: Reducing military support allows U.S. to focus more on other conflicts. ....	96
PRO: Reducing support could offer stabilization opportunities. ....	100
PRO: Support is unsustainable.....	104
<b>Pro Responses to Con Arguments.....</b>	<b>108</b>
A/2: Protecting Taiwan protects semiconductor chip production. ....	109

A/2: Protecting Taiwan prevents global economic collapse.....	117
A/2: Protecting Taiwan strengthens US-India relations. ....	125
A/2: Protecting Taiwan strengthens US-Japan relations. ....	130
A/2: Reducing protections for Taiwan encourages Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons. ....	137
A/2: Relations with Taiwan help the US maintain a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. ....	142
A/2: Support for Taiwan affirms US commitment to its allies .....	146
A/2: Aid to Taiwan demonstrates US support for democracy.....	149
A/2: Increasing military support deters China from using force for reunification. ....	152
A/2: Military support could lead to useful intelligence for the US.....	155
A/2: Reducing military support for Taiwan could create regional instability.....	158
A/2: Protecting Taiwan promotes the United States' commitment to democracy in East Asia. .....	160
A/2: Failure to defend Taiwan could create an arms race .....	162
A/2: Reducing military support for Taiwan could lead to a Chinese invasion .....	164
A/2: Reducing military support for Taiwan will reduce US influence .....	166

## **Con Arguments. ....168**

CON: Protecting Taiwan protects semiconductor chip production.....	169
CON: Protecting Taiwan prevents global economic collapse. ....	176
CON: Protecting Taiwan strengthens US-India relations.....	181
CON: Protecting Taiwan strengthens US-Japan relations.....	186
CON: Reducing protections for Taiwan encourages Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons. ..	191
CON: Relations with Taiwan help the US maintain a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. .	195
CON: Support for Taiwan affirms US commitment to its allies. ....	200
CON: Aid to Taiwan demonstrates US support for democracy. ....	205
CON: Increasing military support deters China from using force for reunification. ....	209
CON: Military support could lead to useful intelligence for the US. ....	213
CON: Reducing military support for Taiwan could create regional instability. ....	217
CON: Protecting Taiwan promotes the United States' commitment to democracy in East Asia. .....	221
CON: Failure to defend Taiwan could create an arms race. ....	224
CON: Reducing military support for Taiwan could lead to a Chinese invasion. ....	228
CON: Reducing military support for Taiwan will reduce US influence. ....	231

## **Con Responses to Pro Arguments.....234**

A/2: Military support of Taiwan does not have public support. ....	235
A/2: Increasing military support creates geopolitical risks.....	238
A/2: Increasing military support increases tension with China. ....	242
A/2: Increasing military support diminishes Taiwan's independence.....	246
A/2: Increasing military support creates nuclear risks. ....	250
A/2: Increasing military support risks U.S.-Chinese tensions. ....	255

A/2: Increasing military support damages diplomatic opportunities.....	258
A/2: Increasing military support encourages Taiwan to overstep boundaries. ....	261
A/2: Military support would by definition include escalation of conflict. ....	265
A/2: Increasing military support is not necessary because China wants to avoid military issues.....	269
A/2: Increasing military support disrupts efforts to improve relations with China. ....	273
A/2: Reducing military support could lead to strategic de-escalation. ....	277
A/2: Reducing military support allows U.S. to focus more on other conflicts. ....	280
A/2: Reducing support could offer stabilization opportunities.....	283
A/2: Support is unsustainable.....	286

## **Topic Analysis By Yair Fraifeld**

***Resolved: The United States should substantially reduce its military support of Taiwan.***

### **Introduction**

The Nov/Dec debate topic touches on a crucial and highly sensitive issue in international relations. U.S. military support for Taiwan has been a cornerstone of the delicate balance in East Asia, particularly in managing tensions with China. This resolution asks debaters to explore whether the U.S. should back away from this support and what the implications of such a move might be. Taiwan plays a significant role in the geopolitical landscape, both as a strategic location in the Pacific and as a symbol of democracy amidst the rise of authoritarian regimes, particularly China. For years, the U.S. has offered military aid to Taiwan in an effort to deter Chinese aggression. However, with rising tensions between the U.S. and China, the future of this relationship is in question, making this topic relevant and timely for high school debaters.

### **Strategic Considerations**

When debating whether the U.S. should substantially reduce its military support of Taiwan, it's important to consider several key factors. First, both the affirmative and negative sides need to define what "substantially reduce" means. Does it mean a reduction in arms sales, fewer joint military exercises, or the removal of troops from the region? How much reduction is "substantial"? Clarifying this early on will help guide the debate and will be vital for strategic purposes.

Next, debaters need to understand the larger context of U.S.-China relations. This debate is not just about Taiwan but also about how the U.S. interacts with China, its largest competitor on the global stage. Any move regarding Taiwan could affect everything from trade to cybersecurity, so a broad understanding of U.S.-China relations is crucial.

Another consideration is the balance between national security and diplomatic relations. The U.S. has long used its military might to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Reducing military support for Taiwan could destabilize this balance. However, continuing to arm Taiwan might also provoke China and lead to further conflict. This delicate balance between security and diplomacy is at the heart of the debate.

Lastly, economic factors play a significant role. Taiwan is a global leader in semiconductor manufacturing, and any disruption in its security could impact global supply chains, especially for technology. Both sides should consider the economic consequences of either reducing or maintaining U.S. military support.

### **Affirmative Arguments**

The affirmative side argues that the U.S. should substantially reduce its military support for Taiwan for several reasons. First, avoiding potential conflict with China. One of the strongest arguments for reducing military support is to avoid provoking China. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway province and has consistently warned the U.S. against supporting its military. The affirmative can argue that continuing to supply arms or engage in military exercises with Taiwan increases the risk of direct conflict with China. By reducing military support, the U.S. would de-escalate tensions and focus on diplomacy rather than military posturing.

Another argument to make is that the U.S. may be shifting its focus to domestic issues. Another affirmative argument is that the U.S. should prioritize its domestic issues over foreign conflicts. Military aid is expensive, and the resources allocated to supporting Taiwan could be better used for domestic programs like healthcare, education, or infrastructure. The affirmative might argue that the U.S. has been overly involved in foreign military operations and needs to focus more on issues at home.

Next, a reduction in military support could push Taiwan to invest more in its own defense. Instead of relying on the U.S., Taiwan might strengthen its military capabilities and seek other alliances in the region. This could lead to a more balanced power dynamic in East Asia, where regional players like Japan or South Korea could step up and share the burden of maintaining security.

Finally, improving U.S.-China relations. Reducing military support for Taiwan could improve U.S.-China relations. As China rises as a global superpower, the U.S. will need to manage this relationship carefully. Reducing military support for Taiwan might signal to China that the U.S. is willing to negotiate and find peaceful solutions, which could lead to better trade relations and cooperation on global issues like climate change or pandemics.

### **Negative Arguments**

The negative side argues that the U.S. should continue its military support for Taiwan and resist any reduction. One of the core arguments for maintaining military support is deterrence. The U.S. military presence in Taiwan serves as a warning to China that any attempt to invade or coerce Taiwan will be met with force. The negative can argue that reducing military



support would embolden China to take more aggressive actions against Taiwan, possibly leading to an invasion. Taiwan's sovereignty and democracy are at stake, and the U.S. has a responsibility to protect its ally.

Another argument critical argument is that U.S. military support for Taiwan helps maintain stability in the entire Asia-Pacific region. Taiwan is located in a strategically important position, and any disruption in its security could have ripple effects across the region. The U.S. presence in Taiwan deters not only Chinese aggression but also ensures that other countries in the region, like Japan and South Korea, feel secure. If the U.S. reduces its military support, it could lead to regional instability, affecting trade, alliances, and security partnerships.

Next is protecting global supply chains. Taiwan is the world leader in semiconductor manufacturing, which is vital for global technology industries, including smartphones, computers, and even military equipment. The negative can argue that reducing U.S. military support risks the security of Taiwan's semiconductor industry, which could disrupt global supply chains. This would have severe economic consequences for the U.S. and its allies.

Finally, reducing military support for Taiwan may damage U.S. credibility on the world stage. The U.S. has long presented itself as a defender of democracy and a reliable ally. If it reduces military support for Taiwan, other countries might question the U.S.'s commitment to its allies, weakening its influence globally. This could also encourage adversaries like Russia or North Korea to test U.S. resolve in other regions.

### **Conclusion**

The debate over whether the U.S. should substantially reduce its military support for Taiwan is complex, involving national security, international relations, economic interests, and diplomatic strategy. The affirmative side highlights the risks of provoking China, the need to focus on domestic issues, and the potential benefits of a more self-reliant Taiwan. On the other hand, the negative side emphasizes the importance of deterring Chinese aggression, maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific region, protecting global technology supply chains, and preserving U.S. credibility. As debaters tackle this issue, they will need to weigh the risks and benefits of U.S. military support and consider the broader implications for global security and diplomacy. Both sides will need to articulate clear strategies and outcomes to persuade the judge that their approach is the most prudent path forward.

## Topic Analysis By Rachel Mauchline

***Resolved: The United States should substantially reduce its military support of Taiwan.***

### Introduction

By the very nature of Public Forum as an event, the topic for November/December is focused on a constantly changing geopolitical situation. While the original reading suggests that this resolution is simple to understand, it is important to understand the complex nature of international relations and the history of the topic. Upon a quick Google search of the resolution, Brookings provides a great summary of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship in a contemporary context. I would highly encourage individuals to read this as a primer to any argument brainstorming. This sets the stage for a topic that has many layers to understand. This topic analysis, along with the remainder of the brief, provides some key topic understanding that debaters will need to have to understand how the action of the resolution will influence the international scope. Investing time in doing the research and creating an understanding of the literature helps prevent awkward moments in cross-examination when you are asked about the basic historical context of the topic and fail to know the answer.

Therefore, this topic, having received a majority of the coach and student vote, creates an opportunity for individuals to learn more about how the United States interacts with other areas of the world from an international perspective. I personally think a more international relations-leaning topic for November/December is easier for first-year students competing than having that topic in September/October like last year. It is important to note that this topic,

focused on a constantly changing geopolitical situation, puts debaters in a position to update their arguments based on the changing events. Of course, this can sometimes be challenging, especially around a time of year with holiday breaks, other commitments, and end-of-semester engagements. Students who are debating on this topic will need to constantly be updating their arguments – not just the uniqueness of the original arguments - throughout the duration of the topic. I would recommend that students consider this when selecting the tournaments that they plan to compete on throughout this period of time.

### **Strategy Considerations**

As I've mentioned in previous topic analysis, the first step to understanding when considering any topic is to define the words in the resolution itself. This provides a foundational understanding that shapes the topic analysis and research stage of preparation. Transparently, though, this resolution is structured in a way that it is a particular phrase that will shape how the debates play out. That phrase is "substantially reduce its military support." This phrase is what most debates will focus on. Pro teams will defend that a substantial reduction in military support is good for X reason. Con teams will defend that a substantial reduction in military support is bad, fails, or does nothing. That is the most simplistic way to look at the topic at face value without delving into specific arguments. Analyzing those keywords within that phrase will aid in understanding the closest framer's interpretation of what the resolution means.

The first of those words is "substantially". This word appears to be occurring in more and more resolutions. By general nature, substantially means just significantly or to a great extent. Therefore, the reduction that pro teams are defending can't just be like a 0.00001%

difference. I would be cautious about getting into a percent debate about what equates substantial in the context of this resolution. There are more important components of the debate to focus on beyond the scale of impact. The second word to focus on is "reduce." This is another word that is commonly understood as simply referring to a decrease or a limit in number. Therefore, the action of the resolution is one in which the military support, as determined by the debate, is being reduced by a pro ballot at the end of the round.

The phrase "military support" isn't the simplest Google search. Transparently, when I took this step when conducting this research, the best definition actually came from an AP US History resource named [Fiveable](#). They define that the phrase "military support refers to the assistance provided by armed forces to enhance the capabilities of allied nations or groups during conflicts or crises. This can include direct intervention, logistical assistance, training, and intelligence sharing, all aimed at bolstering the effectiveness of military operations and ensuring strategic objectives are met." Of course, this isn't the most scholarly source, so I would encourage teams to actually define military support in the context of the topic literature and the actors themselves. [Al Jazeera](#) released an article in September titled "U.S. approves \$567m in military support for Taiwan" which focuses on the military support coming in the form of funding for military endeavors and projects. Of course, this is still generic in nature. There are opportunities for teams to find specific projects, actions, and programs that have been historically within the United States-Taiwan military relationship. It's important to define this term clearly as a key action that a team is either supporting or opposing in each debate.

Beyond the definitions, the historical understanding of a relationship between two countries is important to consider. The United States has had a non-official defense relationship

with Taiwan since 1979 with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). This allows the United States to have unofficial relationships with Taiwan, especially in the wake of the understanding of Beijing as the legal sole government of China. Over time, different administrations have had different priorities and focus on both sides regarding what the United States-Taiwan relationship looks like, but there has continued to be an unofficial relationship over the last four decades. There is a vast amount of research that teams can look into to understand the intricacies of this relationship rather than this quick summary for this topic analysis. Therefore, the question that individuals will most likely ask upon reading this topic is simply: why is there a need to make a change now? There are a couple of specific reasons as to why this topic is being debated at this time.

First, the presidential election in November in the United States raises the question of future United States relationships with both China and Taiwan. Both candidates for President have different perspectives on this specific issue. There is an understanding that Vice President Kamala Harris will continue the stance that President Joe Biden has taken by publicly supporting Taiwan. However, there is also an understanding that Former President Trump will continue the stance that he upheld while in office, which focused on countering Chinese aggression with hard-line military support for Taiwan with increased arms sales. [Brookings](#) has a great article (which was only just released on October 3<sup>rd</sup>) that is comparative of how the outcome of the 2024 election is important for the signaling of the future of the United States-Taiwan relationship. Therefore, it is important that the question of our policy actions be questioned with this resolution within the scope of the election. I think this goes back to the analysis I

made earlier in this topic brief about the importance of keeping arguments up to date based on the changing geopolitical situations.

The second area as to why this topic is timely in nature for discussion is the change of leadership within Taiwan. President Lai, the candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was elected in January with the inauguration in May. With a change in leadership from Former President Tsai Ing-wen, who had been in power since 2016, now is the moment in which foreign policy shifts have a higher likelihood to occur. [The Center for Strategic and International Studies](#) states that President Lai “has signaled clearly and strongly that he seeks peace and predictability in his relationship with the United States, with China, and with the global community.” It is important to consider that now, a few months into the term, it will be interesting to see if this original statement will remain true or if the military support currently in place is in the best interests of the United States and Taiwan going forward. There are more timely articles coming out on this topic quite frequently. I would encourage teams to rely on finding sources that consider the current stance both countries have on the relationship and the needs within the relationship.

The third reason why this topic is current to debate as we end 2024 is the rising tensions between the Taiwan and China. [Brookings](#) (yes they have released a lot of great articles on this specific topic) just three weeks ago released an article analyzing why the U.S. security partnership is important with the growing tensions between Taiwan and China. There are many questions that both sides will need to consider the answers to when looking at their arguments on this topic.

1. What will a reduction in United States military support to Taiwan signal to China?

2. Should the United States support Taiwan in a potential war with China?
3. If yes, how can they do this without funneling consistent money into conflict?
4. If not, what does that mean for the relationship between Taiwan and the United States in the future?.
- 5.

These are just some of the questions to consider strategically. I believe that the arguments being discussed in the debate should consider the real-world implications that can occur. It's important that teams consider these questions and the many others that can be asked when crafting their positions on this topic in general. Often, the strategy of winning a debate comes first in a competitive setting, but it's also important to consider the truth and the implications of this resolution on a real-world scale.

### **Affirmative Arguments**

The affirmative in this debate has to focus on a change from the status quo regarding the United States military's stance on Taiwan. The central thesis of the affirmative, no matter what the specific arguments are being read, is that a change is needed. There are many arguments that affirmative teams could choose to present, but I'll highlight the most stock arguments that can shape the affirmative core positions on this topic. It is important for the affirmative to establish a clear uniqueness question as to why a change is needed. [Reuters](#), at the end of September, highlighted that China has increased military activities and that the threat of war is growing. There is even more recent evidence about this that teams can introduce at the top level of their cases.



The first stock argument, therefore, is that reducing military support is critical to reduce the risk of escalation. [The Council of Foreign Relations](#) reports that there is a heightened risk of conflict now – which could draw in the United States with its involvement with Taiwan. Therefore, a reduction in military support could signal to China that the United States will not be drawn into a potential conflict if a situation occurs between China and the United States. The impact of this could be related to what this aggression could mean for the people of each respective country or the risk of conflict on a long-lasting global level.

The second stock argument that I would consider as the pro would be the stretch that the military of the United States is already under. As more and more situations occur throughout the world that the United States feels obligated to respond to, there will become a breaking point. This breaking point can be financial in nature or just general resources or bandwidth. There are different impact scenarios that can come from this argument about the budget, but also the prioritization of possibly other programs that are domestic in nature. I believe it's a question of what the priority should be. I believe the pro teams can identify specific focus areas that are needed to handle X issues in the country.

### **Negative Arguments**

The negative team on this topic has to defend why the status quo is good or how a change to military support is uniquely bad. I believe there are different ways. I think the thesis on the negative positions in this debate needs to be focused on how the Taiwan-United States relationship is important and leads to unique benefits. I think specific con arguments can be

focused on these industries or focused on the consequences of a change to the Indo-Pacific region.

The first argument that I'd focus on is deterring China in the region. As China continues to become more of a threat to the region, which can be discussed at the uniqueness level of the debate, there needs to be some type of checkback against this aggression. [The United States Department of Defense](#) highlights the importance of providing military support to the region in order to deter threats in the region. While this may be from the perspective of the United States themselves and be a bit more outdated, there are many articles that can shape why this action could potentially cause more consequences. I think the deterrence angle is an interesting angle for these debates, and it has some good impacts on how history proves the benefits of the military-based relationship.

The second argument that con teams should consider for their positions is that of cyber warfare. The [DefensePost](#) from just October 7<sup>th</sup> illustrates that China's threats indicate a time-sensitive situation of a possible invasion of Taiwan. There is specific evidence that China could easily utilize cyber-attacks to freeze infrastructure or cause impacts on specific industries. Con teams can argue that it is important for the United States to provide military support to Taiwan to help them funnel funding into cybersecurity operations. If this is the predicted vulnerability, con teams will say that this can provide vital support to protect from grid collapse and other industries failing.

Overall, hopefully, this will give a preview of the topic, but the remaining topic analysis literature and the brief itself will present a more in-depth analysis to help teams with the last topic of 2024. Good luck to all 😊

## Topic Analysis By Thadeus Smith

***Resolved: The United States should substantially reduce its military support of Taiwan.***

### Introduction

This topic is what I would describe as an “evergreen” topic, meaning that it has been a subject of debate for many years. Taiwan DAs have appeared in Policy and Lincoln-Douglas debate for many years, as have arguments in Public Forum saying that some other policy will trade off with aid to Taiwan. In fact, the Cross Examination Debate Association debated the US-Taiwan relationship almost twenty years ago, in 2005. Despite the topic being evergreen, it’s also constantly shifting – It was just [a month ago](#) when the White House released over half a billion dollars in aid to Taiwan.

The evergreen nature of this topic has benefits and downsides for students. While teams will benefit from the wide range of topic literature and pre-written arguments accessible on [Open Caselist](#), they may also struggle to gain the historical and ideological understandings necessary to properly debate the topic. Coaches should expect to do some learning alongside their students! Teams should also consider that their first tournament on this topic may coincide with the 2024 Presidential Election, an event that could have serious ramifications for US-Taiwan relations. Which candidate is elected (be it Harris, Trump, or long-shot Oliver) and which party gains control of the Senate and House could change the balance of power and shift conventional wisdom on the issue. Teams should be prepared to update their arguments, at least past the first few weeks of November.

### Strategy Considerations

This topic is a very straightforward one, with only two real parts that teams will need to define. This section will start with those definitions before providing some more detail on the 2024 Presidential Election and some recommended sources for teams to start their research.

There are two parts to the resolution that teams will need to define. First is the idea of “substantially reduc[ing]” something. Searching for a definition of “substantial” is not particularly helpful, with Oxford defining it as an adjective used to describe something “of considerable importance, size, and worth.” This is not much help, so I recommend teams think about this more generally. Common sense should tell you that for something to be substantial, it needs to be large. Realistically, most teams are not going to defend a reduction that the average person would consider small – That is, it’s not a winning strategy to say, “We’ll take a few bucks off every year.” Teams should avoid delving into specifics and focus more on the big picture, which is that this topic focuses on a general reduction of aid. Arguing about semantics, especially in front of lay judges, will cause more frustration than it’s worth.

The second definition teams need to consider is what exactly “military support” means. The United States provides two specific types of military support to Taiwan. The first is arms sales – These are generally performed by private companies, with the US government granting final approval. These could be considered a form of government support because the government is granting a tacit form of approval by allowing the sale to take place. These arms sales have been significant for many years, with Taiwan purchasing [more than \\$50 billion in weapons](#) from the United States between 1950 and 2022. The other form of support the United

States has given to Taiwan is direct military aid from the government. This was prominent during the Cold War but quickly fell off. However, [legislation in 2022](#) allowed the government to give Taiwan weapons directly from the US military's own stockpiles. The only other country that receives this sort of aid is Ukraine.

The second big thing teams should understand is the political landscape of the United States. Currently, support for Taiwan aid has broad bipartisan support – The most recent aid packet [passed the Senate](#) with 79 votes in favor and 18 against. Republicans are more likely to oppose aid but generally support it as a way to hedge against China's influence in the region. Even in the current election, both Trump and Harris will likely continue to support Taiwan. During Trump's presidency, he approved billions in arms sales to Taiwan, while Harris will likely continue Biden's public support for Taiwan. Something that might make things difficult, however, is the United States' continued support for Israel's invasion of Gaza. Regardless of where you stand on this issue, American support for Israel is increasingly becoming a point of contention. Military aid for Taiwan is often directly linked to aid for other countries – If Taiwan aid stays linked to aid for Israel, it could become a political liability.

The third big thing teams should consider is their sourcing. Some think tanks should be avoided, with [Heritage](#) being an obvious example – Their connections to the highly controversial "[Project 2025](#)" make for an easy indict. Some good, non-partisan think tanks for background and ideas on this topic include [Brookings](#), [Carnegie](#), and [Lowy](#). These organizations are based in the United States and generally support the continuation of US aid to Taiwan. Taiwanese-centered organizations include the [Global Taiwan Institute](#) and the [Taiwan Center](#)

[for Security Studies](#). For a more critical lens, teams may start their research with [Cato](#) and the [Foundation for the Defense of Democracies](#).

### **Affirmative Arguments**

The affirmative side of this debate is going to be defending a reduction in America's military aid to Taiwan. There are a couple main arguments here that teams should consider. The first argument has to do with preventing escalation with China and the second argument has to do with political tradeoffs.

The first argument is about Chinese escalation. The basic link chain here is very simple – Any sort of American military presence in Taiwan, even a purely symbolic one, poses a threat to China's control of the region. The more heightened tensions are with China, the more likely there is a risk for miscalculation or eventual war. Teams may also argue that America would be obligated to defend Taiwan if it were invaded, which could quickly spiral into regional or nuclear war. This basic link chain has room for a wide range of impact scenarios, evidence for which you will find in this brief. Something extremely important for teams to consider, however, is why reducing our support lowers the chance of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. At first glance, this may seem counter-intuitive – After all, why would a country that wants to invade another step back if they see that country unsupported? The answer here has to do with Chinese domestic politics. The affirmative can essentially argue that Taiwan is more valuable to China as an aspirational goal rather than an actual territory. Reducing military support to Taiwan might give China an internal "win" and give them the opportunity to say that they have successfully countered American influence. Without a present "American threat," there would be no actual reason for China to invade.

The second main argument has to do with political tradeoffs. As I said earlier, military aid is often bundled together, but aid to Taiwan is given in a very specific way – It is drawn from military stockpiles, just like our aid to Ukraine. If we continue granting aid to Taiwan, it could pose a threat to our aid to Ukraine as well. Affirmative teams could argue that military aid to Taiwan is less important than aid to Ukraine, especially because Ukraine is currently in an active conflict with another country while Taiwan is in something closer to a cold war.

### **Negative Arguments**

The negative side of this debate has the specific burden to defend the status quo – Importantly, they do not need to defend an *increase* in aid, just a militainment of our current level of support for Taiwan. Again, there are two main stock arguments I see on this topic. The first has to do with (you guessed it) preventing Chinese escalation, while the second has to do with intelligence sharing.

The first argument is about Chinese escalation. This is essentially the opposite link chain of the affirmative argument – It says that China wants to invade now but will not do so as long as the United States has a presence. That's because China does not want to risk engaging in war with the United States. While this is the most basic form of the link chain, there are several unique options the negative could pursue. For example, abandoning an American ally like Taiwan could cause our other allies in the region to overreact, potentially sparking an arms race. Japan and South Korea are two countries that could feel abandoned if the United States were to withdraw from the region. There are obviously significant impacts to war, but there are

also economic ramifications to consider. Taiwan is a major producer of semiconductors – What happens if the world is cut off from that?

The second argument has to do with intelligence sharing. Part of military support is intelligence, where we provide information to Taiwan in exchange for information from them. Taiwan is situated extremely close to China, making it ideal for intelligence on Chinese troop movements and internal politics. If we were to withdraw, that could be the end of our intelligence sharing and mean that we are in the dark about China. That has impacts that extend far beyond just the United States – We engage in a variety of intelligence treaties, such as Five Eyes, meaning that if we lose intelligence, the rest of the world loses intelligence as well.

Hopefully this overview is helpful as you start your research! Make sure to read the rest of the brief for some more insights and for starter evidence on these arguments (and so many more) – We look forward to seeing y'all win tournaments in the near future!

### **About Thadeus Smith**

Thadeus is a speech & debate teacher at the American Heritage School in Plantation, FL, where he has coached state and national champions in multiple events. He holds an MA in Theory & Practice of Human Rights from the University of Essex, where he competed internationally in British Parliamentary Debate. He competed in a variety of events for Kingston High School in Washington and placed tenth in World Schools Debate at NSDA Nationals in 2019.



**General Information**

***Resolved: The United States should substantially reduce its military support of Taiwan.***

**Foreword:** We at Champion Briefs feel that having deep knowledge about a topic is just as valuable as formulating the right arguments. Having general background knowledge about the topic area helps debaters form more coherent arguments from their breadth of knowledge. As such, we have compiled general information on the key concepts and general areas that we feel will best suit you for in- and out-of-round use. Any strong strategy or argument must be built from a strong foundation of information; we hope that you will utilize this section to help build that foundation.

### **Why the United States?**

China is intensifying its military, economic, and diplomatic coercion of Taiwan, which it considers a piece of lost territory that must be returned, by force if necessary. While a war between China and the United States over Taiwan is neither imminent nor inevitable, rising tensions raise important first-order questions that need to be addressed: Why does Taiwan matter and why should Americans care about its fate? How would Chinese aggression against Taiwan impact the United States? What, if anything, can and should be done to protect U.S. interests?

While the United States is thousands of miles from Taiwan, the island's fate will have major implications for U.S. security and prosperity. What happens in the Taiwan Strait will also bear on fundamental questions of international order and the future of democracy. Our recent Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored Independent Task Force Report, *U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era: Responding to a More Assertive China*, explains that the United States has vital strategic interests at stake in the Taiwan Strait and examines how the United States should protect these interests.

Taiwan sits in an important position in the world's most economically consequential region. As Assistant Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner noted, "Taiwan is located at a critical node within the first island chain, anchoring a network of U.S. allies and partners—stretching from the Japanese archipelago down to the Philippines and into the South China Sea—that is critical to the region's security and critical to the defense of vital U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific."

Taiwan's inherent military value cannot be wished away. Instead, its location dictates that its fate will in large part determine the balance of power in the region. With Taiwan outside of its control and U.S. allies and partners arrayed throughout the first island chain, China's military will struggle to project power far beyond China's shores. However, if China were to annex Taiwan and base military assets, such as underwater surveillance devices, submarines, and air defense units on the island, it would be able to limit the U.S. military's operations in the region

and, subsequently, its ability to defend its Asian allies. With Taiwan under China's control, it would be far more difficult for the United States to maintain a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific or prevent a Chinese bid for regional dominance.

What happens in the Taiwan Strait will have enormous implications for the future of U.S. alliances in the region, which constitute Washington's most important asymmetric advantage over Beijing. If the United States chose to stand aside in the face of Chinese aggression against Taiwan and China successfully annexed the island, it would be only seventy miles from Japanese territory and 120 miles from the Philippines. U.S. allies would come to question whether the United States would or even could come to their defense. Having lost confidence in the U.S. commitment to their security, allies would contemplate either accommodating China or hedging against it by growing their militaries or even developing nuclear weapons. Either outcome would result in diminished U.S. influence and increased regional and global instability.

**Why is “Should” used in this resolution?**

The word "should" signals a call to action, indicating that this resolution is about whether the U.S. is obligated or justified in reducing its military support for Taiwan. It implies that there is an option or responsibility to change the current course of action, which will be debated.

**Why are the words “substantially reduce” used in this resolution?.**

"Substantially" indicates that the reduction in military support would be significant or large in scale. It's important to define what "substantial" means within the context of the debate. Does it refer to cutting arms sales, reducing troop deployments, or scaling back military training programs? Clarifying what constitutes a "substantial" reduction will be key for debaters to argue their points.

The word "reduce" means to lessen or decrease. In this case, it refers to lowering the level of U.S. military support provided to Taiwan. The nature of the reduction could vary—it could mean fewer weapons sales, a decrease in military presence, or reduced involvement in defense strategies. Debaters must establish how this reduction might be implemented and what the consequences of such a reduction would be.

**What is “military support”?**

Military support refers to the assistance that one country provides another in terms of defense and security. In the case of Taiwan, U.S. military support includes arms sales, intelligence sharing, military training, joint exercises, and defense-related diplomatic backing. The U.S. has long provided Taiwan with defensive weapons and support to help it deter aggression, particularly from China. This support is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), which mandates that the U.S. supply Taiwan with arms to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

**Why is Taiwan significant and what historical context is important for this resolution?.**

The history of U.S. military support for Taiwan is rooted in the post-World War II and Cold War periods. After World War II, Taiwan, then known as Formosa, was placed under the governance of the Republic of China (ROC), led by Chiang Kai-shek. However, in 1949, the Chinese Civil War resulted in the victory of the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong, forcing the ROC government to retreat to Taiwan. Mainland China became the People's Republic of China (PRC), while Taiwan remained under the control of the ROC.

For decades, the U.S. recognized the ROC as the legitimate government of China and provided support to Taiwan as a key ally in East Asia, countering the spread of communism. However, in 1979, the U.S. formally recognized the PRC and established diplomatic relations with Beijing, shifting its stance on Taiwan. Despite this, the U.S. passed the Taiwan Relations Act that same year, ensuring continued military support for Taiwan's self-defense.

Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. committed to selling defensive arms to Taiwan and helping the island maintain the ability to defend itself, without directly committing to military intervention in the event of a conflict with China. The Act has been pivotal in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait by serving as a deterrent to Chinese aggression while maintaining a balance that avoids provoking direct conflict.

China considers Taiwan a breakaway province and has made it clear that it seeks reunification, by force if necessary. The "One China" policy, which is supported by the PRC, asserts that there is only one China, and Taiwan is part of it. Beijing has long opposed any form of U.S. military involvement with Taiwan, viewing it as interference in its internal affairs.

The U.S. military has played a crucial role in Taiwan's security through the sale of advanced weapons systems, military training, and regular joint military exercises. These efforts help Taiwan build its defense capabilities, but they also serve as a signal to China that any aggression

against Taiwan would have serious consequences. The U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region, with its allies like Japan and South Korea, further bolsters Taiwan's security position.

In recent years, tensions between the U.S. and China have increased, particularly over Taiwan. The Trump and Biden administrations have both increased arms sales to Taiwan, including advanced missile systems, fighter jets, and other military equipment. At the same time, China has increased its military activities in the Taiwan Strait, sending aircraft into Taiwan's air defense zone and conducting naval exercises. The ongoing tensions between the U.S. and China, combined with Taiwan's role as a leading manufacturer of semiconductors, have made this issue even more critical. A significant reduction in U.S. military support for Taiwan could shift the balance of power in the region, embolden China, and raise questions about the U.S.'s commitments to its allies and global stability.



### **What is China's position on Taiwan?**

Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China (ROC), is an island separated from China by the Taiwan Strait. It has been governed independently from mainland China, officially the People's Republic of China (PRC), since 1949. The PRC views the island as a renegade province and vows to eventually "unify" Taiwan with the mainland. In Taiwan, which has its own democratically elected government and is home to twenty-three million people, political leaders have differing views on the island's status and relations with the mainland.

Cross-strait tensions have escalated since the election of former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016. Tsai refused to accept a formula that her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, endorsed to allow for increased cross-strait ties. Meanwhile, Beijing has taken increasingly aggressive actions, which includes flying fighter jets near the island. Some analysts fear a Chinese attack on Taiwan has the potential to draw the United States into a war with China.

Beijing asserts that there is only "one China" and that Taiwan is part of it. It views the PRC as the only legitimate government of China, an approach it calls the One China principle, and seeks Taiwan's eventual "unification" with the mainland.

Beijing claims that Taiwan is bound by an understanding known as the 1992 Consensus, which was reached between representatives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) party that then ruled Taiwan. However, the two sides don't agree on the content of this so-called consensus, and it was never intended to address the question of Taiwan's legal status. For the PRC, as Chinese President Xi Jinping has stated, the 1992 Consensus reflects an agreement that "the two sides of the strait belong to one China and would work together to seek national reunification." For the KMT, it means "one China, different interpretations," with the ROC standing as the "one China."

Taiwan's KMT-drafted constitution continues to recognize China, Mongolia, Taiwan, Tibet, and the South China Sea as part of the ROC. The KMT does not support Taiwan's independence and has consistently called for closer ties with Beijing.

The KMT's chief rival party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has never endorsed the understanding laid out in the 1992 Consensus. Former President Tsai refused to explicitly accept the consensus. Instead, she has attempted to find another formulation that would be acceptable to Beijing. In Tsai's 2016 inaugural address, she noted she was "elected president in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of China," which is a One China document, and said she would "safeguard the sovereignty and territory of the Republic of China."

However, Beijing rejected this formulation and cut off official contacts with Taiwan. Tsai's successor, current DPP leader and Taiwanese Vice President Lai Ching-te, called for reopening dialogue with China to "replace confrontation" during his 2024 presidential election victory speech and pledged to maintain the "cross-strait status quo," aligned with his party. But experts are skeptical that China will be willing to engage in cross-strait dialogue.

In a 2019 speech, Xi reiterated China's long-standing proposal for Taiwan: that it be incorporated into the mainland under the formula of "one country, two systems." This is the same formula used for Hong Kong, which was guaranteed the ability to preserve its political and economic systems and granted a "high degree of autonomy." Such a framework is deeply unpopular among the Taiwanese public. Pointing to Beijing's recent crackdown on Hong Kong's freedoms, even the KMT have rejected the "one country, two systems" framework.

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**PRO: Military support of Taiwan does not have public support.**

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**Argument:** Military support of Taiwan does not have public support.

**Warrant:** Americans do not support supplying military troops.

Sobczak, Aaron. "Fewer Americans Willing To Fight And Die For Other Countries."

Responsible Statecraft, August 21, 2024, <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/america-polling-interventionism/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**A July poll shows that a majority of the American public does not support sending U.S. troops to defend Taiwan or Ukraine, sentiment that lines up with findings from other recent surveys on these heated subjects, which suggests that Americans appear to be warming to restraint and non-interventionism in international affairs.** Indeed, another poll, conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in February found that a majority of Americans (56%) do not believe that the United States should pick a side in Israel's war on Gaza. And a more recent survey from Council this month found that just four in ten support the United States sending troops to defend Israel if attacked by its neighbors.

**Warrant:** More Americans want to avoid war with China than support Taiwan's autonomy.

Sobczak, Aaron. "Fewer Americans Willing To Fight And Die For Other Countries."

Responsible Statecraft, August 21, 2024, <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/america-polling-interventionism/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

The Defense Priorities poll also found that just 22% of those surveyed support the United States defending Ukraine. Forty-six percent opposed while 32% were neutral. **Thirty percent said they support America militarily defending Taiwan against China, while 37%**

opposed and 33% were neutral. Additionally, a plurality of Americans surveyed, 44%, agreed that avoiding war with China is more important than Taiwan's autonomy.

**Warrant:** Public support for Taiwan is declining in the status quo.

"Decline in US Public Support for Defense of Taiwan." Politics Today, November 15, 2023, <https://politicstoday.org/decline-in-us-public-support-for-defense-of-taiwan/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

With President Biden at the helm, the United States has seen a shift in public opinion regarding foreign military support, especially concerning Taiwan. Biden has affirmed defense support for Taiwan on multiple occasions, a stance seemingly at odds with recent trends in American public opinion. **The Chicago Council on Global Affairs has conducted polls that reveal a decline in support for the use of troops to defend Taiwan, from 52% in 2021 to a lower 44% in 2022, and further down to 38% in a 2023 Reuters poll.**

**Impact:** Public support is key to effective governance.

"Five reasons to involve others in public decisions." University of Minnesota Extension, n.d., <https://extension.umn.edu/public-engagement-strategies/five-reasons-involve-others-public-decisions>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

It helps meet regulations and requirements. Many programs, laws and rules require some level of public participation. **It adheres to democratic principles. U.S. culture and society embrace the notion that people have the right to influence what affects them. Paying attention to the public's ideas, values and issues results in more responsive and democratic governance. It can create more substantive decisions and outcomes. Better results occur when decision-makers have access to: More information.** Public involvement brings more information to the decision, including scientific or technical knowledge, knowledge about the context where decisions are implemented, institutions

involved, history and personalities. More information can make the difference between a good and poor decision.

**Impact:** Defending Taiwan would require strong public support to succeed.

Loomis, James. "Would the American Public Really Defend Taiwan?" Stimson Center, January 19, 2021, <https://www.stimson.org/2021/would-the-american-public-really-defend-taiwan/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Any sustained military action taken to defend Taiwan will require the domestic support of the American public. The doctrine of "strategic ambiguity" and absence of a legally binding security guarantee effectively makes strong domestic support the de facto backbone upholding the credibility of America's defense of Taiwan. This support is critical both to preventing and winning war.** China knows that an attack on Japan is tantamount to an attack on the U.S. by virtue of America's security guarantee; this formal treaty is thus a fixed and immovable pillar of our deterrent credibility. The lack of such a firm defense commitment to Taiwan conversely makes our deterrent posture more fluid than fixed, susceptible to the ebbs and flows of domestic political considerations and shifting public support. **Whichever American President is misfortunate enough to govern during a Chinese invasion of Taiwan will have little formal basis upon which justify American military intervention; instead, he or she will have to rely on the public's willingness to commit troops and expend resources over an unknown period of time.**

**Explanation:** This argument states that the American public opposes military aid to Taiwan. Teams could focus on the specific opposition to existing aid or the fact that Americans might oppose an actual military intervention, which we could be obligated to do if China were to invade. For impacts and weighing, teams could describe the various benefits of listening to public opinion or look at politics, as it is possible that reducing support for Taiwan could have external impacts on Biden's political capital.

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**PRO: Increasing military support creates geopolitical risks.**

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**Argument:** Military support of Taiwan risks escalation in the South China Sea.

**Turn:** China wants to capture Taiwan in the status quo.

“What’s behind China-Taiwan tensions?” BBC, May 23, 2024,  
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34729538>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

China has launched major military drills around Taiwan, simulating a full-scale attack on the island - just days after the new president William Lai was sworn in. **The exercises reinforce what is at the heart of the issue: China's claim over self-governed Taiwan. Beijing sees the island as a breakaway province that will, eventually, be part of the country, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this. But many Taiwanese consider themselves to be part of a separate nation** - although most are in favour of maintaining the status quo where Taiwan neither declares independence from China nor unites with it.

**Warrant:** Reducing military support is key to renewed conversations with China.

Pao, Jeff. “Chinese warn of Taiwan crisis from US military aid.” Asia Times, April 23, 2024,  
<https://asiatimes.com/2024/04/chinese-warn-of-taiwan-crisis-from-us-military-aid/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**“The US insists on passing and signing a bill containing negative content related to Taiwan, seriously interfering in China’s internal affairs and seriously violating the one-China principle and the provisions of the three Sino-US joint communiques,”** Chen Binhua, spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, said Monday. **“We express strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to this.”** Chen also said the

Democratic Progressive Party, the ruling party in Taiwan, is trying to rely on the US and use force to seek independence but such an attempt is doomed to failure. **“By providing military aid to Taiwan, the US is trying to stir up a crisis and confrontation in the Taiwan Strait and related region,”** Li Haidong, a professor at the Institute of International Relations of China Foreign Affairs University, told the Global Times in an interview. “The US will then use the chaos and conflicts it creates to make countries in East Asia and Western Pacific regions lean to its side and form an alliance.”.

**Warrant:** An American military presence triggers Chinese escalation in Taiwan.

Larison, Daniel. “Why Sending More US Military Troops To Taiwan Is So Risky.”

Responsible Statecraft, February 28, 2023,

<https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/02/28/more-overt-us-support-for-taiwan-is-fraught-with-risk/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**As the United States intensifies its efforts to support Taiwan, it risks further damaging the relationship with China and hamstringing its ability to advance U.S. interests** on a wide range of other issues from arms control to climate change. There is also the danger that an **increased U.S. military presence in Taiwan could trigger Chinese responses in the form of increased economic warfare and military exercises** that would create additional headaches and costs for Taiwan. Combined with Speaker McCarthy’s expected visit to Taiwan in the spring, these moves may lead to another unnecessary confrontation. **Insofar as they are perceived as further eroding U.S. commitments to a One China policy, these actions could make the overall situation less stable rather than more.**

**Impact:** Preventing a Chinese invasion is crucial because it could spillover into other Southeast Asian countries.



Bing, Ngeow Chow. "How Southeast Asia Might React in a Potential Military Conflict Over Taiwan." Carnegie Endowment, June 17, 2024, <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/how-southeast-asia-might-react-in-a-potential-military-conflict-over-taiwan?lang=en&center=china>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**These Southeast Asian claimant states may also fear that if they do not join the fight against China, and China later prevails over the United States and Taiwan, they would be the next victims of Chinese hegemony.** As Asian security expert Drew Thompson argues, **"it would be disingenuous and delusional for those states to ignore the precedent set by a cross-Strait conflict initiated by Beijing since they would eventually also be subject to Chinese military coercion over their own disputes."** **Based on this logic, it could be better for claimant states to seize the opportunity afforded by a Taiwan conflict to push back against China in the South China Sea once and for all,** and seek to ensure that the U.S.-led coalition prevailed over China. This argument might be met with a warm reception in the Philippines, but would be considered a risky strategy in the rest of Southeast Asia.

**Impact:** Regional war could trigger a nuclear arms race.

Nan, Hao. "US-China tensions risk igniting nuclear arms race in East Asia." South China Morning Post, September 19, 2024, <https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3278834/us-china-tensions-risk-igniting-nuclear-arms-race-east-asia>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Amid a deterioration in US-China relations, the risks of a nuclear arms race in East Asia are growing alarmingly.** The recent US-China diplomatic battles over nuclear arms control are a continuation of earlier unsuccessful attempts at dialogue. Both countries have attempted to resume the long-stalled nuclear arms control talks. On November 6,

the first official nuclear arms control dialogue since 2018 was convened in the lead-up to Biden's talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping on November 15, 2023, on the sidelines of the Apec summit. However, these talks produced no concrete results, and no specific date for follow-up discussions was announced. Semi-official channels were also explored, such as a track two nuclear arms dialogue in March – the first since 2019. **The trajectory of nuclear developments in East Asia, driven by US-China rivalry, threatens to destabilise the region and spark a chain reaction of nuclear deterrence efforts. It is imperative for global security that the US and China resume meaningful arms control dialogue to prevent a cascading series of escalatory measures that could have catastrophic consequences.**

**Explanation:** This argument is very straightforward, arguing that the presence of American support in Taiwan could cause unnecessary escalation with China. Teams should consider describing the ideological reasons China is opposed to American involvement, especially the fact that China views Taiwan as essentially a territory. Teams should also emphasize the likelihood of other countries intervening in the conflict.

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**PRO: Increasing military support increases tension with China.**

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**Argument:** Military support of Taiwan risks a ground invasion by China.

**Turn:** China wants to capture Taiwan in the status quo.

“What’s behind China-Taiwan tensions?” BBC, May 23, 2024,  
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34729538>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

China has launched major military drills around Taiwan, simulating a full-scale attack on the island - just days after the new president William Lai was sworn in. **The exercises reinforce what is at the heart of the issue: China's claim over self-governed Taiwan. Beijing sees the island as a breakaway province that will, eventually, be part of the country, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this. But many Taiwanese consider themselves to be part of a separate nation** - although most are in favour of maintaining the status quo where Taiwan neither declares independence from China nor unites with it.

**Warrant:** Reducing military support is key to renewed conversations with China.

Pao, Jeff. “Chinese warn of Taiwan crisis from US military aid.” Asia Times, April 23, 2024,  
<https://asiatimes.com/2024/04/chinese-warn-of-taiwan-crisis-from-us-military-aid/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**“The US insists on passing and signing a bill containing negative content related to Taiwan, seriously interfering in China’s internal affairs and seriously violating the one-China principle and the provisions of the three Sino-US joint communiques,”** Chen Binhua, spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, said Monday. **“We express strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to this.”** Chen also said the

Democratic Progressive Party, the ruling party in Taiwan, is trying to rely on the US and use force to seek independence but such an attempt is doomed to failure. **“By providing military aid to Taiwan, the US is trying to stir up a crisis and confrontation in the Taiwan Strait and related region,”** Li Haidong, a professor at the Institute of International Relations of China Foreign Affairs University, told the Global Times in an interview. “The US will then use the chaos and conflicts it creates to make countries in East Asia and Western Pacific regions lean to its side and form an alliance.”.

**Turn:** China is prepping to invade Taiwan by 2027.

Tiron, Roxana. “China on Track to Be Ready to Invade Taiwan by 2027, US Says.”

Bloomberg, March 20, 2024, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-20/china-on-track-to-be-ready-for-taiwan-invasion-by-2027-us-says>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**China is building its military and nuclear arsenal on a scale not seen since World War II and all signs suggest it’s sticking to ambitions to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027,** a top US admiral testified. Despite Beijing’s economic challenges, its official defense budget has increased by 16% over recent years to more than \$223 billion, Admiral John Aquilino, the leader of the Indo-Pacific Command, told the US House Armed Services Committee in prepared testimony on Wednesday. **In the three years** since he took command, he said **the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, has added more than 400 fighter aircraft, along with more than 20 major warships. It’s also doubled its inventory of ballistic and cruise missiles since 2020, he said.**

**Impact:** An invasion of Taiwan could involve preemptive strikes on American bases outside of China’s sphere of influence.

“Will China Invade Taiwan? A Potential Timeline for Conflict.” Global Guardian, February 8, 2024, <https://www.globalguardian.com/global-digest/will-china-invade-taiwan>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

One possibility is the implementation of a blockade, a measure that would effectively isolate Taiwan from the international community. Alternatively, China might opt for more aggressive approaches such as taking over Taiwan’s most outlying islands right off the mainland’s coast. **The most extreme possibility involves a full-scale amphibious invasion, characterized by bombardment and ground troops landing and systematically seizing strategic locations, including ports, government buildings and airfields. An attack would likely extend to preemptive strikes on American bases in Guam, the Philippines and Japan, thereby posing risks to U.S. military personnel.**

**Impact:** A ground invasion destroys the semiconductor industry.

Tan, Huileng. “The world’s top chipmakers can flip a ‘kill switch’ should China invade Taiwan, Bloomberg reports.” Business Insider, <https://www.businessinsider.com/asml-tsmc-semiconductor-chip-equipment-kill-switch-china-invade-taiwan-2024-5>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**The news of a forced shutdown, or a "kill switch," on ASML's chipmaking gear comes amid intensifying rivalry between Washington and Beijing and mounting concerns over a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its own territory.** Taiwan is the world's epicenter for semiconductor chips, the ubiquitous parts that are used in products from data centers to smartphones. A war in the region would have major consequences for the global economy. The US, citing national security concerns, imposed restrictions on China under the Advanced Computing Chips Rule in November. The restrictions make it harder for the East Asian giant to import advanced AI chips from American manufacturers. The US has also pressured the Netherlands to block some ASML

exports to China to limit the country's ability to manufacture advanced chips. The Dutch company has also said it will stop servicing some equipment previously exported to China. **But US concerns over a Chinese invasion of Taiwan remain, and Washington has expressed them to Dutch and Taiwanese officials, Bloomberg reported. ASML assured Dutch officials about the option to push the "kill switch" when they met with the company, per the media outlet.**

**Explanation:** This argument contains a similar link chain to other AFF arguments, stating that the presence of American aid could escalate conflict with China. This argument focuses on a unique impact scenario which states that a ground invasion of Taiwan would be devastating for the country. While teams could focus on lives impacts, discussing the economic ramifications of losing access to semiconductors may make for easier weighing.

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**PRO: Increasing military support diminishes Taiwan's independence.**

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**Argument:** Military support of Taiwan harms Taiwanese self-defense.

**Turn:** China wants to capture Taiwan in the status quo.

“What’s behind China-Taiwan tensions?” BBC, May 23, 2024,  
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34729538>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

China has launched major military drills around Taiwan, simulating a full-scale attack on the island - just days after the new president William Lai was sworn in. **The exercises reinforce what is at the heart of the issue: China's claim over self-governed Taiwan. Beijing sees the island as a breakaway province that will, eventually, be part of the country, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this. But many Taiwanese consider themselves to be part of a separate nation** - although most are in favour of maintaining the status quo where Taiwan neither declares independence from China nor unites with it.

**Warrant:** Taiwan's personal military readiness is not great in the status quo.

Campbell, Caitlin. “Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues.” Congressional Research Service, August 15, 2024, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12481>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

Taiwan also faces defense challenges at home. Civil-military relations are strained for historical, political, and bureaucratic reasons. The archipelago's energy, food, water, internet, and other critical infrastructure systems are vulnerable to external disruption. According to some observers, **Taiwan's civil defense preparedness is insufficient, and its military struggles to recruit, retain, and train personnel. At a societal level, it is not clear**

what costs—in terms of economic security, physical safety and security, and lives—Taiwan’s people would be willing or able to bear in the face of PRC armed aggression.

**Warrant:** Taiwan is overly reliant on the US and does not take its own defense seriously.

Fukuyama, Francis and Shuren Koo. “Fukuyama: Taiwan doesn’t take its self-defense seriously enough.” Commonwealth Magazine, January 12, 2022, <https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=3159>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

There's a really important point I would like to get across to your Taiwanese readers. I've been following Taiwanese defense policy for twenty years. I've had graduate students write dissertations about it. **And I do not believe Taiwan has taken its own self-defense seriously enough. They have under-invested, and in the wrong kinds of weapons systems. Too often there is a desire to buy the most sophisticated kinds of fighters, rather than military equipment that will actually be useful.** The biggest mistake Taiwan has made was to abolish the draft.

**Warrant:** Absent US interaction, Taiwan becomes more self-sufficient than the status quo.

Kuo, Raymond. “The Counter-Intuitive Sensibility of Taiwan’s New Defense Strategy.” War on the Rocks. December 6, 2021, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/12/the-counter-intuitive-sensibility-of-taiwans-new-defense-strategy/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

These voices all miss the root of the problem: the lack of U.S. political commitment to Taiwan’s security and survival. Until that issue is resolved, **Taipei will always concentrate on the question of whether the United States will show up to a fight, rather than how they can best fight together. Taiwan faces a difficult operational and political tradeoff**



**in adopting asymmetric defense.** Hunzeker and Alexander Lanoszka convincingly argue that Taipei should adopt an elastic denial-in-defense strategy, investing in popular resistance to Chinese invasion. In doing so, however, Taiwan deliberately reduces its ability to confront Chinese gray zone strategies and operations, as well as to defeat China's air force and navy. **Instead, it would acquire numerous small and cheap capabilities to deny territory, attrit Chinese forces, and prolong the conflict.**

**Impact:** Preventing a Chinese invasion is crucial because it could spillover into other Southeast Asian countries.

Bing, Ngeow Chow. "How Southeast Asia Might React in a Potential Military Conflict Over Taiwan." Carnegie Endowment, June 17, 2024, <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/how-southeast-asia-might-react-in-a-potential-military-conflict-over-taiwan?lang=en&center=china>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**These Southeast Asian claimant states may also fear that if they do not join the fight against China, and China later prevails over the United States and Taiwan, they would be the next victims of Chinese hegemony.** As Asian security expert Drew Thompson argues, **"it would be disingenuous and delusional for those states to ignore the precedent set by a cross-Strait conflict initiated by Beijing since they would eventually also be subject to Chinese military coercion over their own disputes."** **Based on this logic, it could be better for claimant states to seize the opportunity afforded by a Taiwan conflict to push back against China in the South China Sea once and for all,** and seek to ensure that the U.S.-led coalition prevailed over China. This argument might be met with a warm reception in the Philippines, but would be considered a risky strategy in the rest of Southeast Asia.

**Impact:** That's important because China could be willing to use nuclear weapons in Taiwan.

Anderson, James. "The Next Taiwan Crisis Will (Almost) Certainly Involve Nuclear Threats." U.S. Naval Institute, March 2024, <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/march/next-taiwan-crisis-will-almost-certainly-involve-nuclear-threats>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

China's NFU policy is one reason nuclear threats in Taiwan invasion scenarios have not received adequate scrutiny. For decades, China has declared it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. **It would be a mistake, however, to take China's NFU policy at face value. For starters, predicting China's behavior in crisis situations is far from an exact science.** As Center for a New American Security analyst Jacob Stokes argues, "Decisions with such grand strategic importance are likely to be informed by the worldview of China's leadership—especially Xi [Jinping] himself for the foreseeable future—in ways that supersede official doctrine or other strategic analysis written by military bureaucracies or analysts."<sup>4</sup> **At the very least, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would provide a major stress test of its NFU policy if the People's Liberation Army (PLA) struggled to subdue the island with conventional force.** Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders might even consider failure an existential threat. As defense analyst Mike Sweeney at Defense Priorities put it: **Any battle over Taiwan will not just be a question of territorial aggression but a fight over the core conception of modern China's soul. And for the leaders who launch such an endeavor, their political futures will hinge on the outcome, as will, possibly, their physical safety and that of their families in the event of failure. Under such circumstances, nuclear use might not be palatable, but it could seem far more plausible if military defeat were to equate to loss of domestic power and possible death anyway.**

**Explanation:** This argument focuses on the current inability of Taiwan to support itself. Teams should make sure to emphasize that removing US aid spurs Taiwan to further develop its own defense industry. Teams should be prepared to provide reasons why the US would defend

Taiwan regardless of providing aid or provide reasons why China would not invade Taiwan, which could be practical or ideological.

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**PRO: Increasing military support creates nuclear risks.**

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**Argument:** Military support of Taiwan risks nuclear escalation.

**Warrant:** China wants to capture Taiwan in the status quo.

“What’s behind China-Taiwan tensions?” BBC, May 23, 2024,  
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34729538>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

China has launched major military drills around Taiwan, simulating a full-scale attack on the island - just days after the new president William Lai was sworn in. **The exercises reinforce what is at the heart of the issue: China's claim over self-governed Taiwan. Beijing sees the island as a breakaway province that will, eventually, be part of the country, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this. But many Taiwanese consider themselves to be part of a separate nation** - although most are in favour of maintaining the status quo where Taiwan neither declares independence from China nor unites with it.

**Warrant:** Reducing military support is key to renewed conversations with China.

Pao, Jeff. “Chinese warn of Taiwan crisis from US military aid.” Asia Times, April 23, 2024,  
<https://asiatimes.com/2024/04/chinese-warn-of-taiwan-crisis-from-us-military-aid/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**“The US insists on passing and signing a bill containing negative content related to Taiwan, seriously interfering in China’s internal affairs and seriously violating the one-China principle and the provisions of the three Sino-US joint communiques,”** Chen Binhua, spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, said Monday. **“We express strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to this.”** Chen also said the

Democratic Progressive Party, the ruling party in Taiwan, is trying to rely on the US and use force to seek independence but such an attempt is doomed to failure. **“By providing military aid to Taiwan, the US is trying to stir up a crisis and confrontation in the Taiwan Strait and related region,”** Li Haidong, a professor at the Institute of International Relations of China Foreign Affairs University, told the Global Times in an interview. “The US will then use the chaos and conflicts it creates to make countries in East Asia and Western Pacific regions lean to its side and form an alliance.”.

**Warrant:** An American military presence triggers Chinese escalation in Taiwan.

Larison, Daniel. “Why Sending More US Military Troops To Taiwan Is So Risky.”

Responsible Statecraft, February 28, 2023,

<https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/02/28/more-overt-us-support-for-taiwan-is-fraught-with-risk/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**As the United States intensifies its efforts to support Taiwan, it risks further damaging the relationship with China and hamstringing its ability to advance U.S. interests** on a wide range of other issues from arms control to climate change. There is also the danger that an **increased U.S. military presence in Taiwan could trigger Chinese responses in the form of increased economic warfare and military exercises** that would create additional headaches and costs for Taiwan. Combined with Speaker McCarthy’s expected visit to Taiwan in the spring, these moves may lead to another unnecessary confrontation. **Insofar as they are perceived as further eroding U.S. commitments to a One China policy, these actions could make the overall situation less stable rather than more.**

**Impact:** China could be willing to use nuclear weapons in Taiwan.

Anderson, James. "The Next Taiwan Crisis Will (Almost) Certainly Involve Nuclear Threats." U.S. Naval Institute, March 2024, <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/march/next-taiwan-crisis-will-almost-certainly-involve-nuclear-threats>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

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**Impact:** Nuclear war could kill millions of people.

Diaz-Maurin, Francois. "Nowhere to Hide." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 20, 2022, <https://thebulletin.org/2022/10/nowhere-to-hide-how-a-nuclear-war-would-kill-you-and-almost-everyone-else/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**One detonation of a modern-day, 300-kiloton nuclear warhead—that is, a warhead nearly 10 times the power of the atomic bombs detonated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined—on a city like New York would lead to over one million people dead and about twice as many people with serious injuries in the first 24 hours after the explosion.** There would be almost no survivors within a radius of several kilometers from the explosion site. In a nuclear war, hundreds or thousands of detonations would occur within minutes of each other. **Regional nuclear war between India and Pakistan that involved about 100 15-kiloton nuclear weapons launched at urban areas would result in 27 million direct deaths.**

**Explanation:** This argument contains a similar link chain to other AFF arguments, stating that the presence of American aid could escalate conflict with China. This argument focuses on a unique impact scenario which states that any conflict with China would go nuclear. Teams should emphasize the possibility of a nuclear arms race.

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**PRO: Increasing military support risks U.S.-Chinese tensions.**

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**Argument:** A non-neutral stance by the US increases Chinese Aggression.

**Warrant:** The US's stance in Taiwan is causing China to develop stronger deterrent forces.

“DOD Releases 2023 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China” *DOD*, October 19, 2023  
<https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3561549/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**The PRC views a “strong strategic deterrent force system” as a set of advanced military capabilities across various domains to maintain national security and play a strategic deterrent role.** Building this system consists of two parts: the development of traditional nuclear deterrent force building and the construction of conventional strategic deterrent forces in emerging fields and technologies. **The PRC’s pursuit of a “strong strategic deterrent force system” is probably driven by threat perceptions of the United States and by specific concerns over Taiwan. Strategic deterrence is a core component of the PRC’s objectives of securing its status as a great power, achieving “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and developing a world class military by 2049.**

**Warrant:** US actions are being viewed as interference that is harming strategic stability.

“DOD Releases 2023 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China” *DOD*, October 19, 2023  
<https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3561549/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.



Beijing considers building a “strong strategic deterrent force system” as necessary to defend its national sovereignty, security, and development interests. It also views it as necessary to increase the PRC’s ability to manage escalation in a conflict by deterring and preventing an adversary from escalating confrontation at will. As of 2022, the PRC perceives an erosion of strategic stability in the US-PRC relationship. PLA academics and PRC government officials also perceive that the United States is interfering in the PRC’s periphery. The PRC views building a “strong strategic deterrence force system” as a “trump card” for safeguarding the PRC’s core interest of achieving unification with Taiwan.

**Warrant:** US neutrality has seen positive effects in the past.

O’Hanlon, Michael, et. al. “Should the United States change its policies toward Taiwan?”  
*The Brookings Institution*, April 16, 2024,  
<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/should-the-united-states-change-its-policies-toward-taiwan/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

This political ambiguity has allowed a stable status quo in the Taiwan Strait—one of no unification, no independence, and no use of force—and enabled Taiwan to exercise considerable autonomy from Beijing despite Taipei having very few formal diplomatic allies. It has been one of the most successfully durable and flexible U.S. foreign policies in the modern era and it is still the best hope to forestall global catastrophe arising from a conflict over Taiwan. U.S. de facto neutrality on the settlement of Taiwan’s sovereignty has accomplished two things: first, it leaves open the door for the sovereignty issue to be resolved in either side’s favor, therefore allowing all capitals to kick the can down the road until circumstances most favor their preferred resolution; second and relatedly, it keeps Taiwan’s status in the realm of a political, rather than a military, dispute.

**Warrant:** Focusing on a military solution doesn't lower the preference for aggression.

Clark, Brian. "U.S. Deterrence Against China Is Not Working" *foreignpolicy*, September 5, 2023, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/05/us-military-china-deterrence-taiwan-defense-war-east-asia-indo-pacific-strategy/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Washington's current military strategy aims to prove to Xi that an invasion would be defeated in battle—a notion that presupposes continued U.S. military dominance in the region. Instead, campaigning would focus on lowering his preference for aggression in the first place, making other paths more attractive. This strategy of dissuasion would require U.S. leaders to accept that China will not fade away, Xi will not give up on his goals, and U.S. military preeminence is no longer guaranteed. But focusing on a campaign of dissuasion may be the only path to peaceful coexistence in a world no longer dominated by the United States.**

**Impact:** Chinese aggression in Taiwan hurts the global economy.

Luetkemeyer, Blaine. "Blaine's Bulletin: China's War On Taiwan And Our Economy" *luetkemeyer*, April 12, 2024, <https://luetkemeyer.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=401079>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

An analysis from global financial firm GTS has estimated a short-term stock market plummet of up to 34% after an invasion, as uncertainty about the U.S. response may lead institutional investors and retail investors to quickly exit their equity positions while market makers struggle to accurately price stocks in this volatile environment. **The long-term effects would be much greater. Bloomberg speculates that a military engagement over Taiwan would cost roughly \$10 trillion and reduce global GDP by 10%. This drop would be almost twice what was observed in the aftermath of the global financial crisis**

and Covid pandemic, events which triggered peak to trough declines of 57% and 35% in the S&P 500.

**Impact:** Chinese aggression could have nuclear repercussions.

Anderson, James. "The Next Taiwan Crisis Will (Almost) Certainly Involve Nuclear Threats" *U.S. Naval Institute*, March 2024, <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/march/next-taiwan-crisis-will-almost-certainly-involve-nuclear-threats>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

China knows that Japan is the most important U.S. ally when it comes to Taiwan, because Washington depends on Japan for military basing and diplomatic support. **It should come as no surprise that Chinese officials already have sanctioned a crude nuclear threat against Tokyo.** In July 2021, a video surfaced on a CCP-approved channel linked to the PLA that declared, **"We are warning Japan and informing the world that if Japan interferes militarily in our domestic affairs—including the unification of Taiwan with the mainland—nuclear weapons will surely be used against them."**

**Explanation:** This argument can be used to show that because China already views the supporting actions by the US as a preference for Taiwanese independence, military support increases chances of a violent conflict.

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**PRO: Increasing military support damages diplomatic opportunities.**

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**Argument:** Military support reduces the efficacy of diplomatic approaches.

**Warrant:** Escalation only makes peaceful solutions more difficult.

“Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait” *International Crisis Group*, October 27, 2023,  
<https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/taiwan-strait-china/333-preventing-war-taiwan-strait>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**As with previous rounds of tensions, the current escalatory dynamic regarding the Taiwan issue has emerged due to heightened anxieties among all the parties that one of the others is no longer committed to the status quo.** Unlike in earlier periods, however, the parties are more intransigent and repair work is more difficult: China has become stronger, Taiwanese sentiment continues to disassociate from the mainland and Washington increasingly sees Beijing as a strategic rival. **The result is lower trust between Taiwan and China as well as between the U.S. and China.**

**Warrant:** If military presence is not reduced, eventually conflict will come.

Wonacott, Peter. “Costly Conflict: Here’s How China’s Military Options for Taiwan Backfire” *United States Institute of Peace*, October 9, 2024,  
<https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/10/costly-conflict-heres-how-chinas-military-options-taiwan-backfire>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Given the costs of conflict, there might be an opportunity for both sides to explore a path to peaceful unification. How that might look in practice would need to be worked out between China and Taiwan — and likely the U.S. In the wake of Putin’s grab for Ukraine, and a bipartisan consensus in Washington on tough positions toward Beijing,**

**such an outcome is difficult to envision.** But given the risks of missteps, says Triolo at Albright Stonebridge Group, it's worth considering how all sides can reduce tensions, such as scaling back the militarization of the Taiwan Strait. "That's what needs to happen," says Triolo. "Otherwise, all roads lead to conflict."

**Warrant:** China claims they will increase aggression if the US continues support.

"US ties with Taiwan region harm China-US military relations: Defense Spokesperson"

*China Military*, October 28, 2021,

[http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA\\_209163/TopStories\\_209189/10103136.html](http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/10103136.html).

Accessed October 10, 2024.

**"We have expressed serious concern and lodged solemn representations to the US side, urging the US side to make clarifications to China," said Senior Colonel Tan Kefei, a spokesperson for China's Ministry of National Defense.** Tan mentioned that, for some time, some Americans have violated the political commitment of the one-China principle, constantly played the "Taiwan card", and sent extremely wrong signals to the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces, which has resulted in a seriously negative impact on the relations between the two countries and two militaries, as well as the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. **"If the US continues to stubbornly hold to the illusion of making an issue out of Taiwan so as to contain China, and attempts to substantially improve the military ties between the US and Taiwan region in the "salami-slicing" approach, China will resolutely take countermeasures and fight back," Tan said.**

**Warrant:** China views the arming of Taiwan as opposing the One China solution.

Yadav, Navdeep. "Xi Jinping Tells Joe Biden To 'Stop Arming Taiwan' In 'Blunt' Talks:

'Reunification...Is Unstoppable'" *Benzinga*, November 15, 2023,

<https://www.benzinga.com/23/11/35819743/xi-jinping-tells-joe-biden-to-stop-arming-taiwan-in-blunt-talks-reunification-is-unstoppable>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Xi appealed to the U.S. to cease arming Taiwan** and endorse China's peaceful reunification, according to a statement from China's foreign ministry. **Xi also underscored that the reunification of Taiwan with China is "inevitable."** **"The US side should ... stop arming Taiwan, and support China's peaceful reunification. China will [realize] reunification, and this is unstoppable," Xi told Biden.** The two leaders agreed to reinstate military communications "on the foundation of equality and respect," Chinese state media reported.

**Impact:** The steady increase of military support escalates the entire region.

Swaine, Michael and Park, James. "Paths to Crisis and Conflict Over Taiwan" *Quincy Institute*, January 11, 2024, <https://quincyinst.org/research/paths-to-crisis-and-conflict-over-taiwan/#introduction>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

This brief examines the many trends and variables behind these three sets of factors, and in doing so shows that they would likely play an even more decisive role in a future Sino-American conflict over Taiwan than any calculations regarding relative levels of military capability and expressions of resolve. **Indeed, a myopic focus on increasing levels of military deterrence that ignores or downplays these factors is likely to increase the possibility of a severe, escalating crisis.** Some observers might argue that the U.S. government fully appreciates the dangers listed above and is pursuing moderate policies that effectively balance deterrence with credible levels of reassurance to maintain stability across the Taiwan Strait. But, as shown below, this is clearly not the case. **Many factors operating in China, the United States, and Taiwan are greatly undermining such stability, drawing us closer to a future crisis. The first section briefly describes the**

features and trends of the current Taiwan situation that are making it increasingly susceptible to a future crisis, to the escalation of any such crisis to a military conflict, and to the difficulty confronting de-escalation and crisis termination. The second section lays out several possible pathways to a severe Taiwan crisis and an escalating conflict, presented largely as a series of misperceptions, miscalculations, and deliberate and unintentional actions flowing from the preceding features and trends. The conclusion offers an overall assessment of the implications of the preceding analysis and policy recommendations.

**Impact:** This fundamentally harms US-China relations.

Shepherd, Christian and Chiang, Vic. "China begins military drills around Taiwan as 'punishment' for new president" *Washington Post*, May 23, 2024, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/05/22/china-taiwan-military-drills-new-president/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

By gradually raising pressure, China is "accumulating experience and waiting for a critical moment when it can make a large-scale deployment of force," Lin said. Renewed tensions in the Taiwan Strait could undercut attempts to stabilize U.S.-China relations in the months since President Biden met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in California in November. Washington's concern over Chinese support of Russia's defense industry has already threatened to undo tentative steps toward warmer ties, and progress is made harder by Beijing's hesitancy to make major concessions in a U.S. election year. Already, the drills appear among the largest since China upgraded its playbook of military intimidation in retaliation for then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visiting Taiwan in August 2022. In response to Pelosi becoming the highest-ranking official to visit Taipei in a quarter-century, China cut off high-level military-to-military communications with the United States for 15 months.

**Explanation:** This argument can be used to show how increasing military support is in opposition to peaceful alternatives, and causes a breakdown of communication and increased escalation.



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## PRO: Increasing military support encourages Taiwan to overstep boundaries.

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**Argument:** Military support for Taiwan may cause them to overstep boundaries.

**Warrant:** Taiwan factions desire independence as a country.

Carpenter, Ted. "Taiwan Could Overreach and Cause Disaster for Itself and America" *Cato Institute*, February 26, 2019, <https://www.cato.org/commentary/taiwan-could-overreach-cause-disaster-itself-america#>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

It is increasingly uncertain, though, how long that delicate fiction can continue. Until now, worries have focused on Beijing's possible actions towards Taiwan. **Now a new worry has arisen—that hardline, pro-independence militants on Taiwan may create a political and military crisis. That fear is well-founded, because those factions are pushing for a referendum on Taiwan officially becoming an independent country. It is hard to imagine any Chinese government tolerating such a move.** Even before this latest development, Beijing and Taipei were on a possible collision course. The PRC's patience regarding Taiwan's de facto independence was showing signs of wearing thin. Chinese leaders no longer seemed content, as they did during Deng Xiaoping's time, of letting the ambiguous situation regarding the island's status go on indefinitely. **After the election of the conciliatory Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan's leader in 2008, Beijing pursued a strategy of developing extensive cross-strait economic ties with the expectation that those links would gradually make the Taiwanese people receptive to political unification with the mainland.**

**Warrant:** An increasing number of Taiwanese no longer identify as Chinese.

Green, Mark. "Majority in Taiwan No Longer Say They're Chinese" *Wilson Center*, May 9, 2023, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/majority-taiwan-no-longer-say-theyre-chinese>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

However, the passage of time has naturally meant that more and more of those living on the island have no memory of ever living in mainland China. In addition, the growing economic and governance contrast between Beijing and Taipei has also gradually fostered a sense of a distinctive identity. **Decades ago, the percentages of people who identified as Chinese—or even Taiwanese *and* Chinese—were significantly higher than those who saw themselves as fully Taiwanese. But the balance appears to be shifting: a recent poll found that 70-80 percent of people in Taiwan consider themselves Taiwanese.**

**Warrant:** China doesn't view independence as an option.

Gan, Nectar and Cheung, Eric. "'Impossible' for Communist China to become our motherland as we're older, Taiwan's president argues" *CNN*, October 7, 2024, <https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/07/asia/taiwan-china-motherland-history-hnk-intl/index.html>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**On May 21, the Chinese Communist Party's official People's Daily newspaper dedicated its entire fourth page to strongly refuting Lai's approach to cross-Strait affairs. A commentary titled "Taiwan independence worker's empty rhetoric harms Taiwan" accused Lai of deceitfully promoting a "two-state theory" and exacerbating cross-Strait tensions. Mainland academics described the speech as sending a "very intense" signal to Beijing with its "pro-independence" language. Zhou Zhihui, former director of the Institute of Taiwan at the Chinese Academy of Social Science, said Lai's was the "most pro-independence speech" ever given by a Taiwanese leader. China also used its military to intimidate Taiwan after the speech. On May 23, China conducted two days of**

military exercises that encircled Taiwan. A spokesperson for the Chinese military's Eastern Theater Command, which is responsible for the drills and a potential Taiwan contingency, called the exercise "a strong punishment for the separatist acts of Taiwan independence forces and a serious warning against interference and provocation by external forces."

**Warrant:** China has already decided that they will reunify.

"China's Xi says 'reunification' with Taiwan is inevitable" *Reuters*, December 31, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-calls-taiwan-president-frontrunner-destroyer-peace-2023-12-31/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

China considers Taiwan to be its "sacred territory" and has never renounced the use of force to bring it under Chinese control, though Xi made no mention of military threats in his speech carried on state television. **"The reunification of the motherland is a historical inevitability," Xi said**, though the official English translation of his remarks published by the Xinhua news agency used a more simple phrase: "China will surely be reunified". **"Compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should be bound by a common sense of purpose and share in the glory of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation," he added.** The official English translation wrote "all Chinese" rather than "compatriots". **Last year, Xi said only that people on either side of the strait are "members of one and the same family" and that he hoped people on both sides will work together to "jointly foster lasting prosperity of the Chinese nation".**

**Impact:** China will push harder for reunification.

Ping, Xin. "Who is changing the status quo across the Taiwan Straits?" *Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in the United States of America*, March 11, 2024, <http://us.china->

embassy.gov.cn/eng/zmgx/zxxx/202403/t20240316\_11261528.htm. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**China views the US actions as pushing the change from the status quo the "Taiwan independence" forces led by them will only become more and more reckless in their unscrupulous moves toward separation.** These actions are further attempts at slicing the "sausage" and changing the "status quo" of cross-Straits relations. This is how it is done: **Politically, the US has repeatedly introduced Taiwan-related bills to enhance its contact with Taiwan, encouraging frequent visits to Taiwan by more politicians. It has also supported Taiwan in "expanding" its so-called "international space," such as seeking membership in some international organizations. Militarily, the US has increased arms sales to Taiwan and frequently sent warships to the Taiwan Straits. By so doing, the US has continuously set negative "precedents" regarding the Taiwan question. It has blurred, hollowed out and distorted the one-China principle and the "prefix" and "suffix" of its own "one-China policy" have become increasingly convoluted.** It is the US that has kept trying to change the status quo across the Taiwan Straits while falsely accusing China of doing the same. Under these tactics, the "status quo" across the Taiwan Straits no longer refers to a peaceful state in which the two sides live in peace and harmony, but a dangerous process in which the DPP authorities continue to promote de-Sinicization and independence, aiming to haul the island further away from the motherland.

**Impact:** China will interfere with Taiwan's democracy.

Yu, Alan. Et. Al. "Taiwan's Election: PRC Interference and Its Implications for the 2024 Election Landscape" *American Progress*, February 1, 2024, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/taiwans-election-prc-interference-and-its-implications-for-the-2024-election-landscape/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

The DPP's approach to cross-strait relations—emphasizing a Taiwan identity and close ties with the United States and U.S. allies—is in direct contradiction to China's political interests and corresponding narratives. **Two weeks ahead of the election, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that “reunification is a historic inevitability.” PRC officials framed the election as a choice of war or peace, urging voters to make the “correct choice.”** Furthermore, a Taiwan intelligence source reported to Reuters that Wang Huning, China's fourth-ranked official, led a December 2023 meeting involving key agencies, such as the Ministry of State Security and the United Front Work Department, to coordinate strategies for influencing the 2024 election outcome. This suggests a centralized and timed approach, immediately following the finalization of election candidates in November.

**Explanation:** This argument shows that by supporting Taiwan militarily, the US is fostering the idea of independence for Taiwanese, which is driving aggressive behavior from China.

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## PRO: Military support would by definition include escalation of conflict.

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**Argument:** Proper defense of Taiwan would require attacks of the Chinese mainland, escalating any conflict.

**Warrant:** The US would have to attack Chinese mainland in order to defend Taiwan.

Bandow, Doug. "What Price Are Americans Prepared to Pay for Defending Taiwan?" *Cato Institute*, August 29, 2024, <https://www.cato.org/commentary/what-price-are-americans-prepared-pay-defending-taiwan#>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

First, the interest involved, control over Taiwan, is more important for the PRC than the U.S. Even students otherwise critical of the Beijing government for its intrusive censorship, laborious demands, and other oppressive controls insist that the island republic is part of China. One reason is deeply emotional, the belief that reversing Taiwan's detachment by Japan in 1895 would complete the PRC's recovery from the "century of humiliation" at the hands of others. Another is security: **no country, including the U.S. (remember the Cuban Missile Crisis!) will tolerate its great rival maintaining a military base but a few score miles offshore. For China more than the U.S., failure would not be an option.** Second, Beijing would enjoy a significant geographic advantage, able to use mainland bases for operations against Taiwan and surrounding waters. This would force Washington to target the Chinese homeland, which the PRC would almost certainly see as an escalation requiring a response. The latter could include attacks on U.S. facilities in Guam and the Commonwealth of Mariana Islands, Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan, and even in Hawaii. It would be difficult for Washington not to escalate in return. Perhaps good sense would prevail. Yet

the American and Soviet peoples barely avoided catastrophe in the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the U.S. played the role of China today. It would be foolish to tempt fate twice.

**Warrant:** A mainland attack would increase chances of nuclear warfare.

Tompkins, Joanne. "How U.S. Strategic Policy Is Changing China's Nuclear Plans" *Arms Control Association*, January 2003, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003-01/features/how-us-strategic-policy-changing-chinas-nuclear-plans>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

Finally, the NPR is also forcing Chinese strategic thinkers to look at their response to conventional attack on the Chinese mainland. Currently, the consensus in China is that conventional attacks, no matter how destructive, would not trigger a nuclear response. **But a small community of experts, primarily located at universities and think tanks in Shanghai, is beginning to argue that China must have more flexibility in the face of overwhelming U.S. military power. Some argue that China should abandon its no-first-use pledge if China's national security is seriously threatened, no matter the means. Whether China used nuclear weapons would depend on the nature of the U.S. attack. According to a security analyst in Beijing, a conventional attack against Chinese cities likely would not trigger a nuclear response, unless Beijing and Shanghai were attacked. Those cities are critical to China's security, and an overwhelming conventional attack on either one might justify a nuclear response.** Advocates of nuclear flexibility also hold that any conventional attack against Chinese nuclear facilities or its command and control capabilities could also invite nuclear retaliation. This extreme view has so far not gained a large following, and many think it unlikely that the United States would ever attack the mainland, even in a conflict over Taiwan, but the debate is underway.

**Warrant:** A mainland strike is not off the table for the US.

Meyers, John. "Mainland Strikes and U.S. Military Strategy Towards China" *RAND*, July 2019,  
[https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs\\_dissertations/RGSD400/RGSD430/RAND\\_RGSD430.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD400/RGSD430/RAND_RGSD430.pdf). Accessed October 10, 2024.

The growth of Chinese military power has generated a far-ranging debate in the United States about how the American military should adapt itself for the future. A key axis in this debate concerns the willingness of a future U.S. president and his advisors to recommend mainland strikes — conventional strikes on the Chinese mainland during wartime. **Some strategists believe that this course of action is likely, perhaps inevitable, should war occur. Another group of strategists argues that an American president would likely not authorize such a move against the homeland of another nuclear-armed power.** Both camps make different recommendations for American military force planning based on their conflicting assumptions. This dissertation wades into the middle of this debate. Careful theorizing and systematic research can help adjudicate the arguments found in this disagreement. Towards that end, this dissertation presents three complementary research approaches focused on investigating the willingness of an American president and his advisors to authorize mainland strikes. **First, historical research complemented with material from presidential archives enabled this project to investigate the parallels between the bombing campaigns in the Korean War and the Vietnam War and a hypothetical U.S.-China war. Second, twenty interviews with American national security elites analyzed the decision-making frameworks they employed to assess the desirability of mainland strikes in potential conflicts. Finally, an online scenario-based survey experiment with eighty-five national security elites tested the effect of different scenario characteristics and respondent backgrounds on the likelihood of mainland strikes in a Taiwan-related scenario. This research indicates that mainland strikes are neither guaranteed nor off the table.**



**Warrant:** Taiwan is already arming itself for mainland attacks.

Dangwal, Ashish. “‘Delay, Degrade & Deny’ – US To Arm Taiwan With Cutting-Edge ‘Asymmetrical Weapons’ To Fend Off China” *Eurasian Times*, September 16, 2022, <https://www.eurasiantimes.com/delay-degrade-deny-us-to-arm-taiwan-with-cutting-edge/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**In its 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review, Taiwan emphasized on steadily strengthening its long-range strike capabilities. Long-range conventional precision strike (LRCPS) systems would significantly contribute to Taipei’s deterrent stance. Taiwan is currently concentrating on developing missiles that can be fired from aircraft or the ground to attack the mainland. Despite being cloaked in secrecy, Taiwanese efforts at home seem to be focused on the supersonic Yun Feng and the subsonic Hsiung Feng IIE. From the US side, the ATACMS tactical ballistic missile and HIMARS launchers are two of the most well-known systems Washington can offer. The HIMARS’ 300-kilometer range allows it to put PLA targets on the stretch of coastline opposite Taiwan in danger.**

**Impact:** This could escalate to nuclear war with China.

O’Hanlon, Michael, et. al. “Could the United States and China really go to war? Who would win?” *Brookings Institute*, August 15, 2024, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/could-the-united-states-and-china-really-go-to-war-who-would-win/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Military strategists in the United States consider China the nation’s main military worry—with the distinct possibility of a major U.S.-China war in the years to come. That is a terrifying prospect.** The two countries are the world’s top two economic and military powers, both armed with nuclear weapons, each contributing 15% to 20% to

world gross domestic product, and each dependent on the other for its prosperity given the depth and breadth of their economic relationships. **Were they to go to war, however, global prosperity might soon become the least of our concerns; World War III could not be ruled out, and the survival of the human race might even be on the line.**

**Impact:** Increasing Chinese risk taking to preserve the CPP.

MacLean, Brian. "Reconsidering Attacks on Mainland China" *Air University*, February 3, 2021,  
<https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2491279/reconsidering-attacks-on-mainland-china/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

Once China's leaders commit to a political outcome they view as critical to the survival of their regime, surprising them could alter the trajectory of the conflict in unpredictable ways, nullifying past assumptions by prompting them to "take new risks even against long odds." **According to Joshua Rovner, an associate professor of foreign policy at American University, "it is not difficult to see how mainland strikes could cause Chinese leaders to take enormous risks to avoid a humiliating and rapid defeat." Aaron Friedberg, a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, recounted Chinese analysts saying publicly that "in some instances," the People's Liberation Army "might be prepared to use nuclear weapons in retaliation to conventional attacks."**

**Explanation:** This argument shows that in order to truly be able to defend Taiwan, we must be willing to risk a very large conflict with China and possibly Nuclear war. This renders benefits such as deterrence as unlikely because the consequences of defending Taiwan are so large.

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**PRO: Increasing military support is not necessary because China wants to avoid military issues.**

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**Argument:** China prefers a peaceful resolution.

**Warrant:** China has stated it would prefer a peaceful resolution.

Shivaram, Deepa. "China's Xi Jinping urges a 'peaceful reunification' with Taiwan" *NPR*, October 9, 2021, <https://www.npr.org/2021/10/09/1044714406/xi-jinping-china-taiwan-peaceful-reunification>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping says he prefers China take control of Taiwan through peaceful methods rather than military means. His comments Saturday come as tensions between China and Taiwan are at the highest in 40 years, according to one Taiwanese official. Recently, a record number of Chinese fighter jets have been patrolling the air space around Taiwan. China has, for a long time, promised to regain control of Taiwan and the tension over the fighter jets has led many to think China's leaders would take a more aggressive approach toward Taiwan. But Xi said Saturday that "peaceful reunification" would best serve China's and Taiwan's interests.

**Warrant:** War in Taiwan would be devastating for China economically.

Wonacott, Peter "Costly Conflict: Here's How China's Military Options for Taiwan Backfire" *United States Institute of Peace*, October 9, 2024, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/10/costly-conflict-heres-how-chinas-military-options-taiwan-backfire>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

Bloomberg Economics has estimated a war with Taiwan would cost a staggering \$10 trillion, equivalent to 10% of global GDP — far outpacing the economic toll from Ukraine's war, the COVID pandemic and the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. China's GDP would suffer a 16.7% blow compared to 40% for what would be a devastated Taiwanese economy. Bloomberg Economics also modeled the fallout from a military blockade of the island, including retaliatory measures between China and the U.S. It estimated a 12.2% hit to Taiwan's economy, 8.9% for the Chinese mainland and 3.3% for the U.S. Some experts say the economic damage from a China-Taiwan clash is steeper if the final price tag includes the costs of foreign investors exiting the Chinese mainland and neighboring island for safer but less-productive — and less-lucrative — locations.

**Warrant:** A failed attempt to capture Taiwan would threaten Xi's leadership.

Willasey-Wilsey, Tim. "Why Would China Not Invade Taiwan Now?" *Army University Press*, June 4, 2020, <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2020/Wilsey-The-Question/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

This article does not argue that China will invade Taiwan. There are good reasons for the Chinese not doing so. **It would be a huge gamble for armed forces which have not been employed in combat during the careers of even their most senior officers. The aircraft carriers and amphibious landing ships are still relatively new. A lot could go wrong. A very public military failure would be a humiliating and possibly career-threatening experience for President Xi Jinping and for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).** Many members of the leadership would doubtless argue for patience.

**Warrant:** China is likely to recapture Taiwan without military force.

Blumenthal, Dan and Kagan, Fred. "China doesn't need to invade to achieve Taiwanese unification" *The Hill*, May 13, 2024,  
<https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4657439-china-doesnt-need-to-invade-to-achieve-taiwanese-unification/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**China is more likely to pursue a "short of war coercion campaign," as we call it, centered on political and economic warfare accompanied by limited kinetic action than an invasion of Taiwan for three main reasons:** First, annexing Taiwan by means short of war significantly limits possible damage to other Chinese grand strategic objectives. The People's Republic of China's long-term strategic goals are to continue to build-up what it calls its comprehensive national power and become the world's leading power. It then aims to decisively reshape international politics and place itself at the center. Although Chinese leader Xi Jinping clearly believes that unifying Taiwan with the mainland is a key component of this grand strategy, he may be loath to risk China's march to geopolitical dominance by starting a full scale and likely global war. Second, **a short of war strategy centered on political warfare and limited kinetic action could be successful. Taiwan's most recent elections highlighted deep domestic political divisions, coinciding with a rise in skepticism of America's support. These sentiments are further reinforced by the fact that Taiwan remains internationally isolated. Taiwan status is *sui generis* in international affairs: it is a fully functioning nation-state not recognized by the international powers. This creates an opening for China's manipulation of Taiwan's understandable fears of abandonment.** Third, strategies short of war are consistent with Chinese strategic thinking and previous behavior. A number of Chinese warfighting concepts reference the utility of fighting wars using means beyond traditional applications of kinetic force.

**Impact:** Focus on military distracts from other Chinese tactics.

Blanchette, Jude and Glaser, Bonnie. "Taiwan's Most Pressing Challenge Is Strangulation, Not Invasion" *War on the Rocks*, November 9, 2023, <https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/taiwans-most-pressing-challenge-is-strangulation-not-invasion/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Yet while an invasion is the most consequential scenario, we do not think it is the most probable, and treating it as if it is comes at the cost of distraction from the short- and near-term challenges to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.** Beijing seeks to compel Taipei to enter formal negotiations on "reunification," and to achieve goal, it is pursuing an increasingly aggressive "gray zone" campaign of political, psychological, economic, and diplomatic coercion that is designed to make Taiwan's citizens feel powerless, divided, and isolated. **If China can visibly undermine the credibility of American support and security assistance while simultaneously demonstrating to the Taiwan people that their government lacks the will or capability to respond to Chinese pressure, an invasion won't be needed.**

**Impact:** Aid backfires and increases tensions.

"China blasts US military aid to Taiwan, saying the island is entering a 'dangerous situation'" *The Associated Press*, April 24, 2024, <https://apnews.com/article/china-taiwan-military-assistance-e505267d2fc595be2d45b2e70d6d1ead>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**China on Wednesday blasted the latest package of U.S. military assistance to Taiwan on Wednesday, saying that such funding was pushing the self-governing island republic into a "dangerous situation."** The U.S. Senate late Tuesday passed \$95 billion in war aid to Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan after months of delays and contentious debate over how involved the United States should be in foreign wars. China claims the entire island of Taiwan as its own territory and has threatened to take it by force if necessary. The

mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office said the aid "seriously violates" U.S. commitments to China and "sends a wrong signal to the Taiwan independence separatist forces." Office spokesperson Zhu Fenglian added that Taiwan's ruling pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, which won a third four-year presidential term in January, is willing to "become a pawn for external forces to use Taiwan to contain China, bringing Taiwan into a dangerous situation."

**Explanation:** This argument does two things, first it minimizes the impact of providing military aid to Taiwan by showing other more likely strategies China will use to capture Taiwan, and that military support of Taiwan could make Chinese aggression worse.

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## PRO: Increasing military support disrupts efforts to improve relations with China.

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**Argument:** Reducing military support of Taiwan would improve relations with China, leading to the benefits of greater cooperation.

**Warrant:** Current US-Taiwan arms deals threaten cooperation across the board.

Chung, Lawrence. "Beijing Tells US to Cancel US\$330 Million Taiwan Arms Deal." South China Morning Post, September 25, 2018, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2165609/us-announces-new-taiwan-arms-deal-worth-us330-million>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Beijing protested to Washington on Tuesday and demanded it cancel a planned US\$330 million arms sale to Taiwan, warning that bilateral cooperation would be affected** if it went ahead with the deal. The proposal announced by US defence officials on Monday comes as relations between Beijing and Washington are **already strained**. Taiwan said the deal would help boost the self-ruled island's defences, but Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said Beijing had lodged stern representations with the US about the plan. "We urge the US side ... to **immediately cancel this deal and cut off military ties with Taiwan to avoid doing serious damage to China-US relations, peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and cooperation between US and China in important areas**," Geng told a regular press briefing on Tuesday, without elaborating.

**Warrant:** Good relations with China are key—non-proliferation efforts are on the brink of failure.



Carlson, John. "Is the NPT Still Relevant? – How to Progress the NPT's Disarmament Provisions." *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, May 9, 2019, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2019.1611187>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Today, however, there are major challenges to the non-proliferation regime, including: a series of major non-proliferation violations**, where the IAEA has found several states in non-compliance with their safeguards agreements (namely, **Iraq, Romania, North Korea, Libya, Iran and Syria**); **political ambivalence of many governments**, or at least their diplomats, about the benefits of non-proliferation, **too often presented as a North-South issue**; the spread of proliferation-sensitive nuclear technologies (enrichment and reprocessing), and even nuclear weapon designs, particularly through an active black market.

**Impact:** China is the key player on preventing proliferation – a US concession on Taiwan is key to unlock further cooperation.

Hiim, H.S. "Counterproliferation Bargaining with the United States: China and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," *Asian Security*, August 10, 2017, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2017.1351951>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

First, **China occupies a pivotal position in international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation**. Its importance springs from two major dimensions. **China is a major source of nuclear technology and materials**. It is also a crucial **supplier of ballistic missiles** and missile technology, which are most states' preferred means of delivery for nuclear weapons. **Beijing has provided several states with nuclear and missile assistance**, potentially easing their path to the bomb. More broadly, as a major player in the international system, **China has a strong influence on** how nonproliferation

challenges are managed in arenas like the United Nations Security Council (**UNSC**) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (**IAEA**), as well as in **multilateral negotiations**. Beyond its institutional role, **China has provided** economic, diplomatic, and military **support to** confirmed or suspected **proliferators such as Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran**. Through these ties, **China has a determining impact on whether international efforts to curb proliferation fail or succeed.** .

**Impact:** Arms sales are the single sticking point – hardline US policy ensures China will spoil nonproliferation efforts.

Hiim, H.S. "Counterproliferation Bargaining with the United States: China and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," Asian Security, August 10, 2017, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2017.1351951>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

Conclusion From the early 1990s, **China started linking its nonproliferation policy** – particularly in the missile domain – **to US policy in unrelated areas**. China signaled clearly that it **expected US concessions on issues like Taiwan arms sales** and missile defense **if it was to cooperate on preventing proliferation**. In contrast to what other analysts have argued, this article has demonstrated that issue linkage tactics is **still very much a feature** of China's approach to nonproliferation. Throughout the 2000s, **China** has sought compensation from the US for its willingness to cooperate on issues like **Iran** and **North Korea**. Moreover, it **has retaliated by thwarting nonproliferation efforts when the US has hurt Chinese interests** in other, unrelated areas. **China** is not the only state that **uses assistance to nuclear proliferators as a bargaining tool visa-vis the United States**.

**Analysis:** China has significant power on the global stage, making U.S.-China relations a critical area of potential cooperation that could shape the future of vitally important interests – particularly nonproliferation.

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**PRO: Reducing military support could lead to strategic de-escalation.**

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**Argument:** Reducing military support of Taiwan would lead to strategic de-escalation with China, limiting the potential for war in the Taiwan strait.

**Warrant:** Taiwan is a likely arena of future conflict.

Nathan, Andrew. "What Exactly Is America's China Policy?" Foreign Policy, April 14, 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/14/us-china-biden-strategy-geopolitics/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

To call the military threat regional, however, was not to treat it as trivial. **Taiwan is the most dangerous of the four military flash points. China needs to control the island if it is to prevent the United States or any other hostile power from using it as a base to threaten the mainland.** The United States insists on the "**peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue,**" a policy that goes back to the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. Were Washington to abandon its position, the credibility of its international commitments would take a severe hit. Taiwan, of course, has compelling reasons to avoid coming under the control of the increasingly repressive Chinese regime. There is obviously no way to satisfy all three actors. Russia's assault on Ukraine has increased anxiety over an already **tense situation**. A war over Taiwan would likely draw in other powers, wreak tragic destruction, present a risk of nuclear escalation, and spawn decades of disastrous political consequences for all involved.

**Warrant:** Reducing military tensions deescalates tensions and builds strategic trust.

Lieberthal, Kenneth. "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust." Brookings Institute, March 2012, [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0330\\_china\\_lieberthal.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf). Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Reducing distrust** over Taiwan: **Both sides want to work toward a peaceful resolution of existing differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan are viewed** in Washington and Taipei as a necessary ingredient for sustaining the confidence of U.S. support in Taipei necessary for Taipei to continue to develop wide ranging cross-Strait relations. Those same sales **in Beijing** are viewed **as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China's domestic affairs** and to **prevent peaceful unification** from occurring, thereby **harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest**. Washington and Beijing should engage in serious discussion of the overall security situation surrounding the Taiwan Strait. Lack of such discussion has contributed to having each side make worst case assumptions in their acquisition and deployment of military resources, enhancing **mutual distrust** and ultimately potentially **reducing the chances of maintaining the peace** in the Taiwan Strait that both sides desire.

**Warrant:** Ending arms sales is key---other options fail because China cares about Taiwan way more than the US does.

Gomez, Eric. "Deep Accommodation: The Best Option for Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait." CSIS, August 6, 2015, <http://cimsec.org/deep-accommodation-best-option-preventing-war-taiwan-strait/18128>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**The status quo in the Taiwan Strait will be unsustainable as China continues to improve its military capabilities** and adopt more aggressive military strategies. If the U.S. wants to avert a war with China in the Taiwan Strait, it must start looking for an alternative to the status quo. Taiwan's strategy of economic accommodation with China under the Ma Ying-jeou administration has brought about benefits. The U.S. should encourage Taiwan to deepen its military and political accommodation with China. This would be a difficult pill for Taiwan to swallow, but it could offer the most sustainable

deterrent to armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait. For years, Taiwan's de facto independence from China has relied on a qualitatively superior, defense-focused military that could prevent the landing of a large Chinese force on the island. **The growing power of the Chinese military, especially its naval and missile forces, has begun eroding this qualitative advantage.** Indeed, some observers have already concluded that "the days when [Taiwan] forces had a quantitative and qualitative advantage over [China] are over." Taiwan still possesses a formidable military and could inflict high costs on an attacking Chinese force, but ultimately American intervention would likely be necessary to save Taiwan from a determined Chinese attack.

**Impact:** American military involvement makes China war significantly worse .

Gomez, Eric. "Deep Accommodation: The Best Option for Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait." CSIS, August 6, 2015, <http://cimsec.org/deep-accommodation-best-option-preventing-war-taiwan-strait/18128>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Military intervention by the U.S. on the behalf of Taiwan would be met with formidable Chinese resistance. China's anti-access/area denial [A2/AD] strategy complicates the U.S.'s ability to project power in the Taiwan Strait.** China's latest maritime strategy document, released in May of this year, states that China's navy will start shifting its focus further offshore to include open seas protection missions. Such a shift implies an aspirational capability to keep intervening American forces away from Taiwan. American political leaders have not given up on Taiwan, and the 2015 U.S. National Military Strategy places a premium on reassuring allies of America's commitments. However, the fact that China's improving military capabilities will make an American military intervention on behalf of Taiwan more and more costly must not be ignored. **The best option for preventing a war in the Taiwan Strait is deepening the strategy of accommodation** that Beijing and Taipei have already started. According to Baohui Zhang, accommodation "relies on expanding common interests,

**institutionalizing dialogues, promoting security confidence-building and offering assurances to establish mutual trust.”** The Ma Ying-jeou administration in Taiwan has tried to use accommodation as a way to lock in the status quo and avoid conflict, but their efforts have been met with more and more popular backlash in Taiwan. China’s military strategy document does acknowledge that “cross-Taiwan Straits relations have sustained a sound momentum of peaceful development, but the root cause of instability has not yet been removed.” **If Taiwan is serious about accommodation as a means of deterring military conflict, then it should cease purchasing military equipment from the U.S.**

**Analysis:** China has been seeking ‘reunification’ with Taiwan for decades, the question of the debate then becomes the best way to prevent that reunification. As the Lieberthal and Gomez authors argue, in the wake of eroding U.S. power projection capabilities in the indo-pacific, only accommodation has any possibility of preventing a war over Taiwan.

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## PRO: Reducing military support allows U.S. to focus more on other conflicts.

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**Argument:** Reducing military support of Taiwan would allow us to free up resources and allocate them to more vital battlegrounds (Ukraine).

**Warrant:** Resources are finite and policymakers must make hard decisions about *where* to allocate them.

Poznansky, Michael. "The Ukraine-Taiwan Tradeoff" Foreign Policy, January 5, 2024, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/ukraine-taiwan-tradeoff>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**The first step in wrestling with potential tradeoffs between bolstering resolve and bolstering capabilities is to identify them. In a world of finite resources, policymakers will have to make tough choices about what to allocate, where, and for how long. These decisions will only grow more salient as the White House and Congress continue to debate funding to Ukraine and how to deal with China and Taiwan.** Ultimately, however, policymakers should prioritize resolve. They should privilege the priceless asset of reputation while spending what they can to improve capabilities, maintaining the flow of aid to Ukraine despite the downsides.

**Warrant:** The beliefs of Xi are crucial in determining the best course of action in Taiwan.

Poznansky, Michael. "The Ukraine-Taiwan Tradeoff" Foreign Policy, January 5, 2024, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/ukraine-taiwan-tradeoff>. Accessed October 10, 2024.



In May, two Republican foreign policy hands, Elbridge Colby and Alex Velez-Green, wrote that the United States must focus its “resources on Taiwan’s defense against China, by far the United States’ strongest rival, while relying primarily on European allies to defend against a weakened Russia.” Both of these competing arguments touch on dynamics relevant to deterrence. **Whether Xi believes that the United States would come to the defense of Taiwan, or at least provide it with the resources needed to defend itself through requisite military assistance, is critical. At the same time, it also matters whether Xi believes that the United States has the capacity to provide the necessary resources. Both dynamics are about credibility—the credibility that one has the will to act and the credibility that one can actually do so. In a world of finite resources, policymakers must come to terms with painful tradeoffs between these twin goals. Devoting scarce supplies to bolster resolve may reduce the capacity to respond to crises elsewhere.**

**Warrant:** Taiwan and Ukraine need the *same kind of weapons*—guarantees tradeoff.

Poznansky, Michael. “The Ukraine-Taiwan Tradeoff” Foreign Policy, January 5, 2024, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/ukraine-taiwan-tradeoff>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

As a Center for a New American Security report has noted, although there are important differences between **the kinds of weapons that the United States is providing to Ukraine and the types of weapons that would be needed to stymie a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, there is certainly some overlap**. This is especially true in the case of air defense systems of various kinds—capabilities that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has pleaded for.

**Impact:** Ukraine is losing the war now—only weapons deliveries, particularly in terms of missile capacity, can turn the tide.

“The war is going badly. Ukraine and its allies must change course.” The Economist, September 26, 2024, <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2024/09/26/the-war-is-going-badly-ukraine-and-its-allies-must-change-course>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

However much Mr Zelensky wants to drive Russia from all Ukraine, including Crimea, he does not have the men or arms to do it. Neither he nor the West should recognise Russia’s bogus claim to the occupied territories; rather, they should retain reunification as an aspiration. In return for Mr Zelensky embracing this grim truth, **Western leaders need to make his overriding war aim credible by ensuring that Ukraine has the military capacity and security guarantees it needs.** If Ukraine can convincingly deny Russia any prospect of advancing further on the battlefield, it will be able to demonstrate the futility of further big offensives. **Whether or not a formal peace deal is signed, that is the only way to wind down the fighting and ensure the security on which Ukraine’s prosperity and democracy will ultimately rest. This will require greater supplies of the weaponry Mr Zelensky is asking for. Ukraine needs long-range missiles that can hit military targets deep in Russia and air defences to protect its infrastructure.**

**Impact:** If we fail to protect Ukraine, the result will be devastation.

Shalom, Stephen. “Ukraine and the Dangers of Nuclear War” New Politics, August 23, 2022, <https://newpol.org/ukraine-and-the-dangers-of-nuclear-war/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

Imagine what would **happen if Washington responded to Putin’s nuclear bluster by stopping its weapons supplies to Ukraine or lifting its sanctions. The Kremlin, now with a proven method of getting its way, could then demand surrender from Georgia and Moldova, two former Soviet republics where Russian troops currently hold contested territory. And when the United States and NATO refused to provide arms to**

these governments (because, after all, one doesn't want to risk nuclear war), the two countries would have little option but to submit. But why stop there? If Russia then demanded (with appropriate rhetoric and missile tests) that NATO **troops be removed from the Baltic states, would it be worth risking madman Putin escalating to nuclear war? So best comply.** And if it then further demanded that no NATO arms be provided to these former components of the Soviet Union, again, why provoke the Bear? **But at some point, either Moscow or Washington will miscalculate – will NATO back down? is Russia bluffing? — and we'll be in the midst of a nuclear war.**

**Analysis:** military aid and support is finite, and this argument can be particularly effective if it is articulated as supporting an ally in an *active conflict* (Ukraine) versus preparing for a *speculative conflict* (Taiwan).

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**PRO: Reducing support could offer stabilization opportunities.**

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**Argument:** Reducing military support of Taiwan is critical to prevent inevitable miscalculation.

**Warrant:** The unprecedented growth of China makes policy-making in the region difficult.

Swaine, Michael. "The Deepening U.S.-China Crisis: Origins and Solutions" Carnegie Endowment, February 21, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/21/deepening-u.s.-china-crisis-origins-and-solutions-pub-78429>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**The ugly dynamic of growing suspicion and worst-case assumptions is increasing the likelihood of future U.S.-China political or military crises in Asia**, crises that could in turn eventually propel the two sides into a Cold War or worse. The deepening suspicion and hostility in the relationship is occurring during, and (in part) as a result of, a shifting balance of power in Asia within the First Island Chain. This negative turn also reflects a general failure to resolve several contentious issues in the region, including the Korean Peninsula; Taiwan; maritime disputes; and military-related intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities. I believe that **China's continued growth in military and economic power and influence in Asia, and the resulting relative decline in U.S. maritime predominance, will eventually create an unstable rough parity** between China and U.S./allied states within the First Island Chain along China's maritime periphery (within approximately 1,500 kilometers of the country's coast).

**Warrant:** Absent accommodation, spirals over Taiwan will escalate into military conflict.

Swaine, Michael. "The Deepening U.S.-China Crisis: Origins and Solutions" Carnegie Endowment, February 21, 2019,

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/21/deepening-u.s.-china-crisis-origins-and-solutions-pub-78429>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**This could cause China to overestimate its leverage and ability to advance its interests on contentious and provocative issues such as Taiwan and maritime sovereignty disputes. At the same time, it could also cause the United States and Japan to overreact** to such behavior, partly to disabuse China and others of the notion that the United States is losing its dominant position. **Without adequate communication and a clear sense of each other's red lines, and without reassuring understandings on limits and intentions, such miscalculations could easily escalate into tests of relative resolve,** with neither side willing to make accommodations to reach a middle ground. Although Beijing and Washington could perhaps avoid letting such a crisis devolve into **actual military conflict**, even a major nonviolent confrontation could severely, and perhaps irreparably, **damage U.S.-China relations well beyond anything seen thus far, producing untold shocks to the global economy and both regional and global security.** Under present conditions, the issue of Taiwan is particularly concerning. Given the current and worsening U.S. trend toward a zero-sum strategic competition with Beijing in virtually all areas, it is quite possible that anti-China zealots in or around the U.S. government could successfully argue that Washington should start regarding Taiwan as a strategic asset that it should deny China. These sentiments are already found among defense analysts in the United States and Japan. **Needless to say, if such views became policy, the U.S. One China policy would collapse, along with the original basis for normalized relations with Beijing. The result could be a military conflict.**

**Impact:** Reduced military support would show China that the U.S. does not have mal intent in Taiwan, resulting in de-escalation and reduces the risk of miscalculation in the Taiwan strait.

Swaine, Michael. "The Deepening U.S.-China Crisis: Origins and Solutions" Carnegie Endowment, February 21, 2019,

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/21/deepening-u.s.-china-crisis-origins-and-solutions-pub-78429>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

Expanded official contacts with Taiwan will require consultations with Beijing; the United States and its allies will have to refashion battle plans to exclude Taiwan; Washington will have to support the new approach to cross-strait peace through its public diplomacy; and U.S. intelligence agencies will have to be more careful about scrutinizing technology transfers to the island because the prc's intelligence gathering on Taiwan will inevitably expand. **Most important, Washington will have to significantly scale back its arms sales to Taipei. In 1982, the United States pledged to China that it would reduce its arms sales to Taiwan - a promise that it has conspicuously broken ever since. Today, as then, there is a golden opportunity to demilitarize the conflict.** The U.S. Congress is not particularly interested in pressing President Barack Obama on the issue, and Taiwan's economic decline has moderated Taipei's appetite for major arms purchases anyway. In the past, sales of fighter jets, destroyers, tanks, and missiles to Taiwan were premised as much on the political message they sent to Beijing as on their tactical value. In the new climate, .

**Impact:** Cutting of arms sales specifically is key.

Swaine, Michael. "The Deepening U.S.-China Crisis: Origins and Solutions" Carnegie Endowment, February 21, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/21/deepening-u.s.-china-crisis-origins-and-solutions-pub-78429>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Washington can reinforce the détente by holding back planned sales of items such as Black Hawk helicopters, Patriot missiles, and additional fighter jets.** The Pentagon must view the shift not as simply a minor adjustment due to reduced cross-strait tensions but as a **wholesale rejection** of the vision of **Taiwan as a militarized base**

within the U.S. strategic orbit. By **signaling that Washington is finally respecting China's territorial integrity**, these reductions could, in turn, **lead to verifiable force reductions by China**, as well as to **an end to its Taiwan-focused military attack drills**. Removing Taiwan as a major player in the United States' Asian security strategy would have ripple effects on U.S. strategy in the region as a whole. Indeed, it is likely that Asian-only security organizations, such as the asean Regional Forum, would increasingly take the lead in defining Asia's future security architecture. The arguments in favor of Finlandization are stronger today than ever before: **a Finlandized Taiwan would play a much more transformative role in China itself, thus improving the chances of a peacefully rising China**. As was the case for Finland in its relations with the Soviet Union, **Taiwan could create a model for the peaceful resolution of China's many resource, boundary, and military conflicts throughout Asia**. More broadly, the Taiwan-China détente is a test of liberal approaches to international relations - specifically, the notion that a broad integration of domestic interests will pacify relations between states far more than a militarized balance of power.

**Analysis:** Arm sales to Taiwan are heightening the risk of miscalculation in the Asia Pacific – which cannot be prevented through deterrence – making reduced military support a necessity for the U.S.

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**PRO: Support is unsustainable.**

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**Argument:** U.S. Military support of Taiwan is structurally unsustainable, meaning it cannot keep up with China's power projection capabilities.

**Warrant:** US primacy in Asia is unsustainable in the wake of domestic priorities .

Heer, Paul. "Rethinking U.S. Primacy in East Asia." National Interest, January 8, 2019, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/rethinking-us-primacy-east-asia-40972?page=0%2C1>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**U.S. primacy in the region itself is not sustainable, and trying to sustain it will probably be counterproductive.** For all intents and purposes, American primacy in East Asia—depending on how it is defined—is arguably already a thing of the past. Since about a decade ago, China has a larger share of East Asian regional trade than the United States, and is now the biggest trading partner of most of its neighbors. If defined in military terms, most net assessments suggest that **the American advantage in power projection forces within the region is eroding relative to Chinese capabilities; and it is not at all clear in the wake of sequestration and competing budgetary priorities that the United States could or will devote the resources necessary to arrest this trend.** American primacy in East Asia has often been characterized in terms of the United States serving as the guarantor of regional security, protecting the “global commons” and providing “public goods” there. The U.S. alliance network in the region certainly extends an umbrella of protection to those countries with which Washington has defense pacts; and its military freedom of navigation operations signal an intention to resist excessive Chinese maritime claims.

**Warrant:** East Asian countries are concerned about America's shifting priorities .



Heer, Paul. "Rethinking U.S. Primacy in East Asia." National Interest, January 8, 2019, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/rethinking-us-primacy-east-asia-40972?page=0%2C1>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

Indeed, **most East Asian countries—including U.S. allies—appear increasingly uncertain about Washington’s attention to their interests and their security.** Questions and even doubts about the substance and sustainability of the American commitment to the region have grown over the past decade, and most of the countries in the region—again, including U.S. **allies—have already been adjusting their foreign and security policies to hedge against the potential unreliability of the United States.** Indeed, such hedging and independent-mindedness by U.S. allies is itself contributing to the erosion of U.S. influence in the region. **On balance, it is hard to make the case that the United States retains effective primacy in the Western Pacific when much of the region has doubts about Washington’s ability and willingness to exercise it.** So what can and should Washington do to address these new historical circumstances? It may be possible to regain the confidence of U.S. allies and partners in East Asia, but restoring and retaining American primacy there over the long term is probably no longer achievable, given the shifts in the regional balance of power and the constraints on U.S. resources. It’s not 1945 anymore, or even 1991. The United States sought and maintained a preponderance of power during the Cold War, but this almost certainly is not permanently sustainable, either globally or within East Asia. American primacy in the Western Pacific was a historical anomaly, and sooner or later the United States will have to get used to a regional role that is something less than that.

**Warrant:** Shifting US priorities risk escalation .

Heer, Paul. "Rethinking U.S. Primacy in East Asia." National Interest, January 8, 2019, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/rethinking-us-primacy-east-asia-40972?page=0%2C1>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

Moreover, **policies and strategies aimed at upholding U.S. primacy** in East Asia are likely to be counterproductive because such an approach, probably more than anything else, would **reinforce Beijing's belief that the United States seeks to contain China by keeping it subordinate** within its own region. **This would increase the chances of Beijing feeling compelled to adopt a more confrontational and aggressive posture.** Chinese pursuit of a more exclusive hostile hegemony could thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

**Impact:** Voters want a country focused on domestic issues, not on maintaining empire or preventing wars abroad.

Monck, Adrian. "The Choice Facing a Declining United States." The Atlantic, August 28, 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/08/americas-global-influence-is-declining/568708/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**America's global influence is certain to decline relatively in the years ahead; it is the inevitable** consequence of the return of the Middle Kingdom. As that happens, the U.S. should be more deliberate about the policy choices it makes. It's a lesson I've seen my own country—which was once an empire, too—learn the hard way. On the way down from global hegemony, Britain came around too slowly to investing in domestic welfare. The U.S. should apply those lessons sooner. The time is ripe. Its 45th president swung to power on the backs of **voters [are] worn out by the burden of expensive wars, tired of wartime austerity, and fed up with rising inequality.** America has spent nearly \$6 trillion on sustaining long-running conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. **Median wages haven't gone up in decades. Its health-care inequality is a byword in failure, infant mortality barely better than that of developing countries, and** some states' death rates are soaring because of "diseases of despair." It's clear that many voters **gave up on the American empire.** When they voted in 2016, they didn't care for the international

institutions the U.S. had so carefully constructed after World War II: nato; the United Nations; the World Bank. **They didn't care for their country to protect the liberal world order**, to lead the "Free World." Voters on the left **and** the right showed **their readiness for a policy turn inwards. They wanted a country focused on domestic policies.**

**Analysis:** if these authors are correct in their assessment of U.S. capabilities in the Asia Pacific – namely, that it is structurally unsustainable – there is no way for U.S. military support to effectively deter *or* defend Taiwan against China. Thus, this argument provides a top-level defensive narrative against NEG invasion scenarios.

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## A/2: Protecting Taiwan protects semiconductor chip production.

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**Delink:** The US will no longer be reliant on Taiwan for semiconductor chips.

**Warrant:** The US has made it an initiative to produce more of its own semiconductors.

Chang, Alisa, Enrique Rivera, and Justin Kenin, “The new CHIPS and Science Act will bring semiconductor chip manufacturing to the U.S.” *NPR*, August 9, 2022, <https://www.npr.org/2022/08/09/1116591031/the-new-chips-and-science-act-will-bring-semiconductor-chip-manufacturing-to-the>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

All right, stop for a moment and look around your car, your desk, your kitchen. How many high-tech gadgets do you see? I mean, look - your laptop, your cell phone, your TV, all of those things - **they need semiconductor chips in order to function. And most of those chips are not made in the U.S. Now, the Biden administration is determined to change that. So today, the president signed the CHIPS and Science Act into law. It allocates more than \$50 billion to bring semiconductor chip manufacturing to the U.S. and away from its current production hub in East Asia.**

**Warrant:** The US has already seen progress.

Ngo, Madeleine. “Billions in Chips Grants Are Expected to Fuel Industry Growth, Report Finds.” *The New York Times*, May 8, 2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/08/us/politics/chips-grants-fuel-industry-growth.html>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

Billions in federal subsidies for semiconductor manufacturers are expected to help reverse a decades-long decline in America’s share of global chip manufacturing. **The United States will triple its domestic chip manufacturing capacity by 2032, the largest**

increase in the world, according to a report released on Wednesday by the Semiconductor Industry Association and the Boston Consulting Group. As a result, America's share of world chip manufacturing is expected to rise for the first time in decades, to 14 percent by 2032, up from about 10 percent today. The report found that much of the industry's growth would be fueled by the bipartisan CHIPS Act, which gave the Commerce Department \$39 billion to encourage semiconductor manufacturing in the United States. Absent that legislation, America's share of global chip manufacturing would have fallen to 8 percent by 2032, according to the report.

**Turn:** The US is actually the problem; they are on record as saying they would destroy the factories instead of letting them go to China.

**Warrant:** US intelligence officials said they would destroy semiconductor factories in the event of a Taiwan invasion.

Nguyen, Britney. "US would destroy Taiwan's semiconductor factories rather than letting them fall into China's hands, a former national security advisor says." *Business Insider*, March 14, 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/08/us/politics/chips-grants-fuel-industry-growth.html>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

**A former national security advisor said the US would destroy Taiwan's semiconductor factories if China seemed on the verge of controlling them after an invasion. Robert O'Brien, who served as national security advisor in the Trump administration, told Semafor the US "and its allies are never going to let those factories fall into Chinese hands."** Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company is the world's largest chipmaker, making up an estimated 90% of the market for advanced processors. The company produces chips for most devices and equipment like phones and cars that are used every day. More advanced chips produced by the manufacturer are used in highly

advanced technology like machine learning and guided missiles. **If China were to take control of these factories, the country would be "like the new OPEC of silicon chips," O'Brien said, adding that China would be able to "control the world economy."**

**Impact:** Destruction of Taiwan's semiconductor production capabilities will lead to billions in losses.

Reuters. "Top US spy says Chinese invasion halting Taiwan chip production would be 'enormous' global economic blow." *Reuters*, May 4, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/technology/top-us-spy-says-chinese-invasion-halting-taiwan-chip-production-would-be-2023-05-04>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

WASHINGTON, May 4 (Reuters) - **A Chinese invasion of Taiwan could potentially halt production by the world's largest advanced semiconductor chip maker, wiping out up to \$1 trillion per year from the global economy per year in the first few years, the top U.S. intelligence official said on Thursday.** U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines presented what she called a "general estimate" during testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. **She noted that the advanced semiconductor chips produced by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd (TSMC) are used in 90 percent of "almost every category of electronic device around the world."** If a Chinese invasion stopped TSMC from producing those chips, "it will have an enormous global financial impact that I think runs somewhere between \$600 billion to \$1 trillion on an annual basis for the first few years," she said.

**Delink:** Semiconductors are actually the reason China won't invade.

**Warrant:** China is reliant on Taiwanese semiconductors.

FP Analytics. "Semiconductors and the U.S.-China Innovation Race." *Foreign Policy*, February 16, 2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/16/semiconductors-us-china-taiwan-technology-innovation-competition/>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

However, **despite China's immense resource allocation to its semiconductor sector, 84 percent of China's semiconductors are still imported or made domestically by foreign manufacturers.** In fact, the largest Chinese-based integrated circuit (IC) foundry, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), is four years behind in terms of innovation compared with market leaders in the U.S., Taiwan, and South Korea.

**Warrant:** China has yet to invade because they can't afford semiconductor manufacturing to stop.

Calhoun, George. "Why China (Probably) Won't Go To War Over Taiwan's Semiconductor Riches." *Forbes*, February 25, 2023, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgecalhoun/2021/09/29/why-china-probably-wont-go-to-war-over-taiwans-semiconductor-riches/>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

Autarky Is Impossible. **The conclusion – that is, the rational conclusion – is that the military solution would not work for China. The Taiwanese dominance of the foundry segment is a very important feature of the semiconductor industry and indeed of the 21st century digital economy. But it is not a standalone asset, viewed from a macro perspective. It is part of a globalized eco-system that China cannot really escape from.** Nor is it, as shown, a turn-key-able asset, a fungible capability that could easily be placed under "new management" in the event of a military takeover. The technological and logistical complexity of this critical sector invalidate any theory of "semiconductor autarky" or full self-sufficiency, certainly for China – and probably also for the U.S. (a caveat for the CHIPS bill and other measures gestating in Congress right now).

**Turn:** Military presence doesn't scare China.

**Warrant:** China has been gearing up even while the US has a presence.

Maizland, Lindsay. "China's Modernizing Military." *Council on Foreign Relations*, February 5, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-modernizing-military>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

**The Chinese government is working to make its military stronger, more efficient, and more technologically advanced to become a top-tier force within thirty years.** With a budget that has soared over the past decade, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) already ranks among the world's leading militaries in areas including artificial intelligence and anti-ship ballistic missiles. **Experts warn that as China's military modernizes, it could become more assertive in the Asia-Pacific region by intensifying pressure on Taiwan and continuing to militarize disputed islands in the East and South China Seas.** U.S. President Donald J. Trump's administration believes China is a great-power rival, though the PLA still has a way to go before it can challenge the United States, experts say.

**Warrant:** They haven't been afraid to be aggressive with the US in the region.

Feng, Emily and Connie Hanzhang Jin. "China is subtly increasing military pressure on Taiwan. Here's how." *NPR*, December 18, 2023, <https://www.npr.org/2023/12/18/1216317476/china-military-taiwan-air-defense>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

TAIPEI, Taiwan — There is an ominous new normal in the Taiwan Strait, the narrow strip of water between Taiwan and China. Beijing has long considered self-governed Taiwan as part of China and has threatened to force it to "unify" with the mainland. **But over the past year, Beijing has been stepping up military pressure on Taiwan, while**



stopping short of an outright invasion. China has been sending ships and planes to encircle Taiwan and mounting more sophisticated military drills simulating a blockade of the island. In September, Taiwan's defense ministry counted a record number of Chinese fighter planes — 103 warplanes to be exact — flying in airspace around Taiwan in just one day. Security experts call this "gray zone" tactics, a strategy of intimidation and daily harassment designed to gradually wear Taiwan down, without drawing the United States and its Asian allies, like Japan and South Korea, into a wider conflict.

**Warrant:** The US is present, but Beijing is still on course for a 2027 invasion.

Stewart, Phil and Idrees Ali. "How the US is preparing for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan." *Reuters*, January 31, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/logistics-war-how-washington-is-preparing-chinese-invasion-taiwan-2024-01-31/>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

The U.S. has not formally said it would intervene if China were to attack Taiwan but President Joe Biden has repeatedly suggested he would deploy U.S. troops to defend the island. **Xi has ordered his military to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027, U.S. officials say. But many analysts see that as an attempt to galvanize his military rather than a timeline for invasion.** A senior U.S. military official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said supplies of ammunition are at the top of the list of priorities in the Indo-Pacific, followed by fuel, food and spare parts for equipment. "

**Impact:** US involvement will likely lead to a longer, protracted war.

Bandow, Doug. "What would a US war with China look like?" *Responsible Statecraft*, October 24, 2022, <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/10/24/what-would-a-us-war-with-china-look-like/>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

“If conflict does break out, U.S. officials should not be sanguine about how it would end. Tamping or reversing Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific could require a massive use of force. An authoritarian CCP, always mindful of its precarious domestic legitimacy, would not want to concede defeat even if it failed to achieve its initial objectives. **And historically, modern wars between great powers have more typically gone long than stayed short. All of this implies that a U.S.-China war could be incredibly dangerous, offering few plausible off-ramps and severe pressures for escalation.**” The consequences of such a conflict would spread globally, with much greater impact than the Russo-Ukraine war. Imagine Taiwanese industry devastated from combat or conquest. Allied sanctions against Beijing and its trading partners. Nations big and small pushed to choose sides. Both the U.S. and China interrupting if not sweeping the other nations’ trade from the seas. At the end, defeat for the U.S. and its allies would be possible if not likely. In recent years U.S. wargames have generally shown Beijing as the victor. The best case, after a fashion, appears to be an indecisive and thus lengthy war. **Concluded one analysis: “The overarching takeaway from participants in the war game: If China invades Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific region will plunge into a broad, drawn-out war that could include direct attacks on the U.S., including Hawaii and potentially the continental United States.”** .

**Impact:** Thousands of US soldiers would die.

London, Brad and Oren Liebermann. “War game suggests Chinese invasion of Taiwan would fail at a huge cost to US, Chinese and Taiwanese militaries.” *CNN Politics*, January 9, 2023, <https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/politics/taiwan-invasion-war-game-intl-hnk-ml/index.html>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of service members. Such losses would damage the US global position for many years,” the

report said. **In most scenarios, the US Navy lost two aircraft carriers and 10 to 20 large surface combatants. Approximately 3,200 US troops would be killed in three weeks of combat, nearly half of what the US lost in two decades of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.**

**Analysis:** There are several good responses here that respond to different parts of the original argument. The strongest route to take is probably that the US presence doesn't deter China and makes the situation worse, which is a combination of the bottom three responses. The other strong path is that protecting Taiwan is not in US interests which is a combination of response one and four. You can really just pull the cards from whichever response you want; just be careful when using them because a few responses are mutually exclusive.

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**A/2: Protecting Taiwan prevents global economic collapse.**

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**Turn:** Military presence doesn't scare China.

**Warrant:** China has been gearing up even while the US has a presence.

Maizland, Lindsay. "China's Modernizing Military." *Council on Foreign Relations*, February 5, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-modernizing-military>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

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**Warrant:** They haven't been afraid to be aggressive with the US in the region.

Feng, Emily and Connie Hanzhang Jin. "China is subtly increasing military pressure on Taiwan. Here's how." *NPR*, December 18, 2023, <https://www.npr.org/2023/12/18/1216317476/china-military-taiwan-air-defense>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

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Stewart, Phil and Idrees Ali. "How the US is preparing for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan." *Reuters*, January 31, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/logistics-war-how-washington-is-preparing-chinese-invasion-taiwan-2024-01-31/>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

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Bandow, Doug. "What would a US war with China look like?" *Responsible Statecraft*, October 24, 2022, <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/10/24/what-would-a-us-war-with-china-look-like/>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

"If conflict does break out, U.S. officials should not be sanguine about how it would end. Tamping or reversing Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific could require a massive use of force. An authoritarian CCP, always mindful of its precarious domestic legitimacy, would not want to concede defeat even if it failed to achieve its initial objectives. **And historically, modern wars between great powers have more typically gone long than stayed short. All of this implies that a U.S.-China war could be incredibly dangerous, offering few plausible off-ramps and severe pressures for escalation.**" The consequences of such a conflict would spread globally, with much greater impact than the Russo-Ukraine war. Imagine Taiwanese industry devastated from combat or conquest. Allied sanctions against Beijing and its trading partners. Nations big and small pushed to choose sides. Both the U.S. and China interrupting if not sweeping the other nations' trade from the seas. At the end, defeat for the U.S. and its allies would be possible if not likely. In recent years U.S. wargames have generally shown Beijing as the victor. The best case, after a fashion, appears to be an indecisive and thus lengthy war. **Concluded one analysis: "The overarching takeaway from participants in the war game: If China invades Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific region will plunge into a broad, drawn-out war that could include direct attacks on the U.S., including Hawaii and potentially the continental United States."**

**Impact:** Thousands of US soldiers would die.

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The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of service members. Such losses would damage the US global position for many years,” the report said. **In most scenarios, the US Navy lost two aircraft carriers and 10 to 20 large surface combatants. Approximately 3,200 US troops would be killed in three weeks of combat, nearly half of what the US lost in two decades of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.**

**Delink:** European allies wouldn’t impose vast sanctions.

**Warrant:** The EU is already in a recession.

Taafe-Maguire, Sarah. “Eurozone officially entered recession after Eurostat revises figures.” *Sky News*, June 8, 2023. <https://news.sky.com/story/eurozone-officially-Entered-recession-after-eurostat-revises-figures-12898726>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

**The 20 countries using the euro were officially in recession over the winter, latest statistics show. Revised data from the European statistics office, Eurostat, showed the eurozone economy contracted 0.1% in the first three months of this year and the final three months of 2022.**The group of countries therefore met the definition of a technical recession: two-quarters of negative economic growth. Not since the COVID pandemic has there been a six-month period where the economy shrank. **Previous estimates from Eurostat had shown a stagnant economy but these have since been revised downwards. The European Central Bank (ECB) was expecting no growth but did not forecast contraction.**

**Warrant:** Many of their goods come from China.

“China.” *European Commission*, n.d., [https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china\\_en](https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en). Accessed October 8, 2024.

**China is the EU’s second largest trading partner for goods after the United States, with bilateral trade reaching €739 billion in 2023. This represents a decline of 14% compared to 2022. China is the EU's third-largest partner for exports and the biggest for imports.** The EU-China trade balance has been persistently in favour of China. In 2023, the EU deficit amounted to €292 billion. EU exports to China amounted to €223.6 billion, whereas EU imports from China amounted to €515.9 billion, indicating year-on-year decreases of 3.1% and 18% respectively.

**Warrant:** Sanctioning China is not politically popular in Europe.

“2022 Transatlantic Trends” *The German Marshall Fund of the United States*, 2022, <https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/Transatlantic%20Trends%202022.pdf>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

Pluralities in France, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Spain, Türkiye, and the United States say they want their country to only take diplomatic steps should China invade Taiwan. By contrast, pluralities in Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom say they want their country to join others in imposing sanctions against China. **Across the 14 countries surveyed, 35% of respondents support only diplomatic measures and 32% joint economic sanctions while very few support sending arms (4%) or troops (2%) to Taiwan. And 12% want their country to take no action. The clearest preferences for an exclusively diplomatic response to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan are from Romanian and Turkish respondents (45%), followed by Italian (44%) and Lithuanian and Portuguese (both 38%) ones.** The strongest support for imposing joint sanctions is in Portugal (40%) and Canada, Germany, and Sweden



(each 39%). There is a gender gap in many European countries, however. Men support sanctions more than women do in the Netherlands (45% vs. 29%), Sweden (46% vs. 32%), Germany (45% vs. 33%), the United Kingdom (45% vs. 35%), and France (33% vs. 23%). Overall, there is very little appetite for involvement beyond diplomatic measures and sanctions. The share of respondents who want their country to send arms or troops to Taiwan is highest in the United States, but it is small (8% Send arms to Taiwan Send troops to Taiwan and 7% respectively). Support for these measures is also very low among the United States' closest allies in Europe: in the United Kingdom (5% and 3%) and France (3% and 2%). **In other countries, less than 5% of respondents support the deployment of troops, with the lowest shares of between 1% and 2% in Italy, Poland, Türkiye, Spain, Romania, and Lithuania. Sending arms does not have much more support,** with the highest backing for this (5%) in Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

**Delink:** US is already moving away from China in status quo, sanctioning China won't kill the economy.

**Warrant:** Labor has become cheaper in Mexico than in China.

"Is It Cheaper to Manufacture in Mexico Than in China?" *NovaLink*, 2023.

<https://novalinkmx.com/mexico-manufacturing-advantage/manufacturing-in-mexico-vs-china/is-it-cheaper-to-manufacture-in-mexico-than-in-china>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

**Several years ago, when China was emerging as a global manufacturing center, labor costs were very low; however, it is not the case anymore as labor costs in China have been steadily increasing for years. Mexico's labor costs make it cheaper to manufacture in Mexico than in China as a result. A recent study found Mexico's average labor cost per hour to be \$4.50, compared to China's \$6.50, a 44% difference.**

Companies in labor-intensive industries can benefit from this cost difference. In the past decade, China has been shifting from a cheap labor driven economy to more matured, service-oriented markets and industries. While the economy continues to grow, prices and wages keep on increasing as well. - Statista Companies in Mexico can invest the savings from manufacturing in innovation and features for their customers and products without dealing with high labor costs.

**Warrant:** US companies are moving to Mexico from China.

Goodman, Peter. "Why Chinese Companies Are Investing Billions in Mexico." *The New York Times*, June 20, 2023,  
<https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/03/business/china-mexico-trade.html>.  
Accessed October 9, 2024.

**That same objective explains why scores of major Chinese companies are investing aggressively in Mexico, taking advantage of an expansive North American trade deal. Tracing a path forged by Japanese and South Korean companies, Chinese firms are establishing factories that allow them to label their goods "Made in Mexico," then trucking their products into the United States duty-free.** The interest of Chinese manufacturers in Mexico is part of a broader trend known as nearshoring. International companies are moving production closer to customers to limit their vulnerability to shipping problems and geopolitical tensions. The participation of Chinese companies in this shift attests to the deepening assumption that the breach dividing the United States and China will be an enduring feature of the next phase of globalization. Yet it also reveals something more fundamental: Whatever the political strains, the commercial forces linking the United States and China are even more powerful. **Chinese companies have no intention of forsaking the American economy, still the largest on earth. Instead, they are setting up operations inside the North American trading bloc as a way to supply Americans with goods, from electronics to clothing to furniture.**

**Warrant:** Mexico has become the USA's number one trading partner.

USAFacts Team. "Who are the US's top trade partners?" USAFacts, September 4, 2024, <https://usafacts.org/articles/who-are-the-uss-top-trade-partners/>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

**Combining imports and exports, the United States's top trade partner in 2023 was Mexico, with nearly \$798 billion in goods and services exchanged between them.** Following that were Canada (\$773 billion) and China (\$575 billion). These nations have been the US's top three every annually at least 2009, accounting for 42% of all US trade in 2023.

**Analysis:** I think that all three responses give you a pretty clean response against this argument. The first response really says that invasion and sanction will happen regardless of the US presence. The second response says that the sanctions won't be that bad because they won't be multilateral. The third says that China has already found a way around the sanctions through Mexico. Basically, the argument is completely ripped to shreds on all levels.

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**A/2: Protecting Taiwan strengthens US-India relations.**

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**Turn:** The US being involved in the war would make the war worse.

**Warrant:** US involvement will likely lead to a longer, protracted war.

Bandow, Doug. "What would a US war with China look like?" *Responsible Statecraft*, October 24, 2022, <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/10/24/what-would-a-us-war-with-china-look-like/>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

"If conflict does break out, U.S. officials should not be sanguine about how it would end. Tamping or reversing Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific could require a massive use of force. An authoritarian CCP, always mindful of its precarious domestic legitimacy, would not want to concede defeat even if it failed to achieve its initial objectives. **And historically, modern wars between great powers have more typically gone long than stayed short. All of this implies that a U.S.-China war could be incredibly dangerous, offering few plausible off-ramps and severe pressures for escalation.**" The consequences of such a conflict would spread globally, with much greater impact than the Russo-Ukraine war. Imagine Taiwanese industry devastated from combat or conquest. Allied sanctions against Beijing and its trading partners. Nations big and small pushed to choose sides. Both the U.S. and China interrupting if not sweeping the other nations' trade from the seas. At the end, defeat for the U.S. and its allies would be possible if not likely. In recent years U.S. wargames have generally shown Beijing as the victor. The best case, after a fashion, appears to be an indecisive and thus lengthy war. **Concluded one analysis: "The overarching takeaway from participants in the war game: If China invades Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific region will plunge into a broad, drawn-out war that could include direct attacks on the U.S., including Hawaii and potentially the continental United States."** .

**Impact:** Thousands of US soldiers would die.

London, Brad and Oren Liebermann. "War game suggests Chinese invasion of Taiwan would fail at a huge cost to US, Chinese and Taiwanese militaries." *CNN Politics*, January 9, 2023, <https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/politics/taiwan-invasion-war-game-intl-hnk-ml/index.html>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of service members. Such losses would damage the US global position for many years," the report said. **In most scenarios, the US Navy lost two aircraft carriers and 10 to 20 large surface combatants. Approximately 3,200 US troops would be killed in three weeks of combat, nearly half of what the US lost in two decades of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.**

**Delink:** India will turn to the US no matter what because they are worried about China.

**Warrant:** China and India have seen rising tensions.

"India-China dispute: The border row explained in 400 words." *BBC*, December 13, 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53062484>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Relations between India and China have been worsening.** The two world powers are facing off against each other along their disputed border in the Himalayan region. Here's what you need to know in 400 words. What's the source of tension? **The root cause is an ill-defined, 3,440km (2,100-mile)-long disputed border.** Rivers, lakes and snowcaps along the frontier mean the line can shift, bringing soldiers face to face at many points, sparking a confrontation. **The two nations are also competing to build infrastructure along the border, which is also known as the Line of Actual Control.** India's construction of a new road to a high-altitude air base is seen as one of the main triggers for a deadly 2020 clash with Chinese troops.

**Warrant:** India has turned to the US for military training and weapons.

Chahal, Husanjot. "A Roadmap for India-US Military AI Collaboration." *Center for Security and Emerging Technology*, August 17, 2021, <https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/a-roadmap-for-india-us-military-ai-collaboration/>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

**India and the United States have a multifaceted defence partnership that entails significant trade and large-scale joint military exercises. There is also a growing consensus that collaboration on emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) can promote common security interests.** In March 2021, US Secretary of Defense Llyod Austin discussed "the contours of sharing high-end technology" in defence with his Indian counterpart, and the two countries also formed a "Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group" as part of the Quad security dialogue along with Japan and Australia. **As India and the United States look to navigate the road ahead, their bilateral collaboration in the area of AI applications for military logistics can be a pragmatic way forward.**

**Warrant:** India is looking to strengthen their relationship with the US.

"Joint Statement from the United States and India." *The White House*, June 22, 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/06/22/joint-statement-from-the-united-states-and-india/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. and Prime Minister Narendra Modi today affirmed a vision of the United States and India as among the closest partners in the world – a partnership of democracies looking into the 21<sup>st</sup> century with hope, ambition, and confidence. The U.S.-India Comprehensive Global and Strategic Partnership is anchored in a new level of trust and**

mutual understanding and enriched by the warm bonds of family and friendship that **inextricably link our countries together**. Together, we will build an even stronger, diverse U.S.-India partnership that will advance the aspirations of our people for a bright and prosperous future grounded in respect for human rights, and shared principles of democracy, freedom, and the rule of law. **Our cooperation will serve the global good as we work through a range of multilateral and regional groupings – particularly the Quad– to contribute toward a free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific**. No corner of human enterprise is untouched by the partnership between our two great countries, which spans the seas to the stars.

**Delink:** Our allies won't leave us.

**Warrant:** Our allies can be reasoned with.

Schiffrin, Nick and Dan Sagalyn. "Three experts on U.S. role and response options in Taiwan-China conflict." *PBS News*, December 15, 2021, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/three-experts-on-u-s-role-and-response-options-in-taiwan-china-conflict>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

I think the ideal policy is a clearly conditional commitment, one that's clear that we will protect Taiwan if it's attacked by China, an unprovoked attack, but, at the same time, clear to Taiwan that we will not come to Taiwan's aid if Taiwan provokes the attack by declaring independence or moving too close to China's red lines. But I'd like to return to Richard's point about that — essentially, that **if we break the commitment to Taiwan, we're giving up in East Asia. And I think this greatly exaggerates the risk. We can explain to Japan and other allies that Taiwan is very different than they are, from the U.S. perspective, and, most importantly, from China's perspective. China does not think Japan is part of China**. Second, we can do many things to make clear that our commitment to Japan and our other East Asian allies stands, including increasing our defense spending, increasing the tightness of the alliances and so forth.

**Warrant:** The US is still regarded as the most powerful country in the world.

“Most Powerful Countries 2024.” *World Population Review*, n.d.,  
<https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/most-powerful-countries>.  
Accessed October 10, 2024.

**According to the 2023 survey, the United States is the world’s most powerful country. The United States has the world’s largest economy, with a GDP of \$25.5 trillion in 2022 and the most massive military budget of \$778 billion in 2020. The U.S. defense spending is higher than the next ten largest defense spenders** (China, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Germany, France, Japan, South Korea, and Italy) combined. China and Russia are the second and third most powerful countries, known for their military spending and vast physical expanse. China also has a large economy with a GDP of \$18 trillion as of 2022. Next on the list are Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and France, all of which have large economies and distribute high amounts of international aid.

**Analysis:** These responses are really strong because they basically prove that India will stay with the US no matter what it does. You must make sure to stress to your judge how valuable India sees the US as a military partner, especially as they both try to distance themselves from China. If you can prove to the judge that disdain for China is a stronger bond than US unreliability, you should be able to shut down the opposing team's argument.



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**A/2: Protecting Taiwan strengthens US-Japan relations.**

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**Delink:** The relationship between the US and Japan is too important for Japan to leave it behind.

**Warrant:** Japan has been an ally of the US since the end of WW2.

Vergun, David. "U.S.-Japan Alliance Increasingly Strengthened Since End of WWII." *U.S. Department of Defense*, August 14, 2020.  
<https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/Story/Article/2306658/>.  
Accessed October 10, 2024.

**After the official surrender of Japan to the Allies on Sept. 2, 1945, the United States began the process of helping to bring Japan back into the international community by strengthening military, political and economic ties, much as it was doing with former foes Italy and Germany.** The American military occupation of Japan lasted from 1945 to 1951. During that time, Japan categorically rejected militarism, embraced democracy, eagerly sought economic prosperity and began to embrace the U.S. as an ally and equal partner. However, the U.S. still occupied several island chains in the Western Pacific that used to be part of Japan. That occupation ended when the U.S. returned the Bonin Islands, including Iwo Jima, to Japan in 1968 and Okinawa and other Ryukyu Islands in 1972. **A series of treaties followed the occupation of mainland Japan. First was the San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed Sept. 8, 1951, that went into effect April 28, 1952. It marked the end of the Allied occupation of the Japanese mainland. Japan's first security agreements with the United States and with nations other than the Soviet Union also were signed then. Bilateral talks on revising the 1952 security pact began in 1959, and the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed in Washington, Jan. 19, 1960.** Also, the status of forces agreement under that treaty came into effect, setting the rules under which U.S. forces stationed in Japan would operate

with respect to Japanese domestic laws. In 1976, the U.S. and Japan established a subcommittee for defense cooperation in the framework of a bilateral Security Consultative Committee, provided for under the 1960 security treaty.

**Warrant:** US alliances in the region are very strong.

Grossmann, Derek. "America's Indo-Pacific Alliances Are Astonishingly Strong." *RAND*, December 8, 2023, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/12/Americas-indo-pacific-alliances-are-astonishingly-strong.html>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**In Northeast Asia, the United States is in a historically powerful position. The U.S.-Japan security alliance has always been the cornerstone of Washington's strategy in the region, but today the two allies cooperate and coordinate on nearly every aspect of their foreign policy and defense strategy.** As a like-minded democratic power that seeks a free and open Indo-Pacific, Tokyo is part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad (alongside Australia, India, and the United States). In recent years, Japan has carved out some wiggle room from Article 9 of its constitution to allow it to conduct military operations farther away from Japanese shores, including joint patrols with the U.S. Navy and other partners in the South China Sea. **Japan consistently raises not only concerns over North Korea, but also the need to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, which has greatly irked China as it considers Taiwan's status an internal matter. Washington and Tokyo are further deepening their intelligence sharing against these threats, and Japan is enhancing security cooperation with other U.S. allies and partners, such as the Philippines, South Korea, India, and Vietnam.**

**Warrant:** The US-Japanese trade relationship is also incredibly strong.

“Japan – Country Commercial Guide.” *International Trade Administration*, January 2, 2024, <https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/japan-market-overview>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Japan is one of the United States’ most important trade and investment partners. In 2022, bilateral U.S.-Japan trade in goods and services was worth \$309 billion. Both exports and imports increased over 2021, as the Covid-19 pandemic restrictions eased. U.S. goods exports to Japan were about \$80 billion, while services exports were approximately \$38 billion, for a total of \$119.8 billion, up 7 percent from 2021.**

**Delink:** Japan is scared of China even if the US doesn’t defend Taiwan.

**Warrant:** The Japanese public is scared of China.

“Japan public sentiment toward China worsens, Cabinet Office survey finds.” *The Japan Times*, January 20, 2024, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/01/20/japan/society/japan-china-public-sentiment>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

Japanese public sentiment toward China worsened in 2023, a Cabinet Office survey has shown, amid rows over the Fukushima wastewater release and other issues. **According to the survey released Friday, 86.7% of respondents felt unfriendly toward China, up 4.9 percentage points from the preceding year, while 12.7% felt friendly, down 5.1 points. The proportion of those that believe Japan-China ties are important to both countries and the Asia-Pacific region dropped 5.3 points to a record low of 68.2%.** The mail survey, conducted from Sept. 7 through Oct. 15 last year, covered 3,000 people aged 18 or older across Japan, of which 55% provided valid replies.

**Warrant:** Japan will accept any help the US is willing to give.

Jett, Jennifer and Megan Lebowitz. "The U.S. and Japan announce historic upgrade in security ties to counter China." *NBC News*, April 10, 2024, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-japan-announce-historic-upgrade-security-ties-china-threat-looms-rcna147133>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**The U.S. and Japan announced a historic upgrade to their security alliance Wednesday, as President Joe Biden hosts Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida for an official visit that highlights Japan's role in countering China in the Asia-Pacific. "Through our partnership, we have strengthened the alliance. We have expanded our work together. We've raised our shared ambitions," Biden said in his opening remarks at a joint news conference in the White House Rose Garden. "And now the U.S.-Japan alliance is a beacon to the entire world."** The official visit, the first by a Japanese leader in nine years, comes amid differences between the two countries over the proposed acquisition of U.S. Steel by a Japanese company. Kishida addressed Biden's opposition to the deal at the news conference, saying he hoped "these discussions will unfold in directions that would be positive for both sides," according to the translation. **"Investment from Japan to the U.S. can only increase upwards in the months and years to come," Kishida said. "And we wish to cement this win-win relationship."** **Biden said he stands by his commitment to American workers: "I'm a man of my word. I'm going to keep it."** On Tuesday, the Bidens welcomed Kishida and his wife at the White House before they had dinner. The Biden-Kishida summit Wednesday was followed by a formal state dinner featuring dry-aged rib-eye steak, cherry blossoms and a performance by Paul Simon.

**Delink:** Our allies won't leave us.

**Warrant:** Our allies can be reasoned with.

Schiffrin, Nick and Dan Sagalyn. "Three experts on U.S. role and response options in Taiwan-China conflict." *PBS News*, December 15, 2021, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/three-experts-on-u-s-role-and-response-options-in-taiwan-china-conflict>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

I think the ideal policy is a clearly conditional commitment, one that's clear that we will protect Taiwan if it's attacked by China, an unprovoked attack, but, at the same time, clear to Taiwan that we will not come to Taiwan's aid if Taiwan provokes the attack by declaring independence or moving too close to China's red lines. But I'd like to return to Richard's point about that — essentially, that **if we break the commitment to Taiwan, we're giving up in East Asia. And I think this greatly exaggerates the risk. We can explain to Japan and other allies that Taiwan is very different than they are, from the U.S. perspective, and, most importantly, from China's perspective. China does not think Japan is part of China.** Second, we can do many things to make clear that our commitment to Japan and our other East Asian allies stands, including increasing our defense spending, increasing the tightness of the alliances and so forth.

**Warrant:** The US is still regarded as the most powerful country in the world.

"Most Powerful Countries 2024." *World Population Review*, n.d., <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/most-powerful-countries>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**According to the 2023 survey, the United States is the world's most powerful country. The United States has the world's largest economy, with a GDP of \$25.5 trillion in 2022 and the most massive military budget of \$778 billion in 2020. The U.S. defense spending is higher than the next ten largest defense spenders (China, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Germany, France, Japan, South Korea, and Italy) combined. China and Russia are the second and third most powerful countries, known**

for their military spending and vast physical expanse. China also has a large economy with a GDP of \$18 trillion as of 2022. Next on the list are Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and France, all of which have large economies and distribute high amounts of international aid.

**Turn:** The US being involved in the war would make the war worse.

**Warrant:** US involvement will likely lead to a longer, protracted war.

Bandow, Doug. "What would a US war with China look like?" *Responsible Statecraft*, October 24, 2022, <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/10/24/what-would-a-us-war-with-china-look-like/>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

"If conflict does break out, U.S. officials should not be sanguine about how it would end. Tamping or reversing Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific could require a massive use of force. An authoritarian CCP, always mindful of its precarious domestic legitimacy, would not want to concede defeat even if it failed to achieve its initial objectives. **And historically, modern wars between great powers have more typically gone long than stayed short. All of this implies that a U.S.-China war could be incredibly dangerous, offering few plausible off-ramps and severe pressures for escalation.**" The consequences of such a conflict would spread globally, with much greater impact than the Russo-Ukraine war. Imagine Taiwanese industry devastated from combat or conquest. Allied sanctions against Beijing and its trading partners. Nations big and small pushed to choose sides. Both the U.S. and China interrupting if not sweeping the other nations' trade from the seas. At the end, defeat for the U.S. and its allies would be possible if not likely. In recent years U.S. wargames have generally shown Beijing as the victor. The best case, after a fashion, appears to be an indecisive and thus lengthy war. **Concluded one analysis: "The overarching takeaway from participants in the war game: If China invades Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific region will**

plunge into a broad, drawn-out war that could include direct attacks on the U.S., including Hawaii and potentially the continental United States.” .

**Impact:** Thousands of US soldiers would die.

London, Brad and Oren Liebermann. “War game suggests Chinese invasion of Taiwan would fail at a huge cost to US, Chinese and Taiwanese militaries.” *CNN Politics*, January 9, 2023, <https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/politics/taiwan-invasion-war-game-intl-hnk-ml/index.html>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of service members. Such losses would damage the US global position for many years,” the report said. **In most scenarios, the US Navy lost two aircraft carriers and 10 to 20 large surface combatants. Approximately 3,200 US troops would be killed in three weeks of combat, nearly half of what the US lost in two decades of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.**

**Analysis:** These responses are really strong because they basically prove that Japan will stay with the US no matter what it does. Japan and the US have a very special and close relationship that is unlike the relationship that the US has with Taiwan. If you can make the judge see that Japan understands how close this relationship is, you can definitely take down the opposing teams arguments and maybe even gain offense off the turn from the last response.

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## A/2: Reducing protections for Taiwan encourages Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons.

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**Turn:** The US's vast nuclear arsenal makes nuclear war far more likely.

**Warrant:** The US being involved would make nuclear war inevitable.

Sanger, Edward. "Biden Approved Secret Nuclear Weapons Strategy Focusing on China." *The New York Times*, August 20, 2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/20/us/politics/biden-nuclear-china-russia.html>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**President Biden approved in March a highly classified nuclear strategic plan for the United States that, for the first time, reorients America's deterrent strategy to focus on China's rapid expansion in its nuclear arsenal.** The shift comes as the Pentagon believes China's stockpiles will rival the size and diversity of the United States' and Russia's over the next decade. **The White House never announced that Mr. Biden had approved the revised strategy, called the "Nuclear Employment Guidance," which also newly seeks to prepare the United States for possible coordinated nuclear challenges from China, Russia and North Korea. The document, updated every four years or so, is so highly classified that there are no electronic copies, only a small number of hard copies distributed to a few national security officials and Pentagon commanders.** But in recent speeches, two senior administration officials were allowed to allude to the change — in carefully constrained, single sentences — ahead of a more detailed, unclassified notification to Congress expected before Mr. Biden leaves office. "The president recently issued updated nuclear-weapons employment guidance to account for multiple nuclear-armed adversaries," Vipin Narang, an M.I.T. nuclear strategist who served in the Pentagon, said earlier this month before returning to academia. "And in



particular,” he added, the weapons guidance accounted for “the significant increase in the size and diversity” of China’s nuclear arsenal.

**Turn:** Taiwan would never develop nuclear weapons because of export controls.

**Warrant:** Taiwan participates in export controls.

“What is export control?” *University of Edinburgh*, January 24, 2024. <https://research-office.ed.ac.uk/winning-research-funding/manage-award/export-control/what-is-export-control>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Export controls are designed to restrict the export and communication of sensitive technology or strategic goods, with the aim of preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and countering international threats such as terrorism.** The controls apply to the academic community (including researchers at the University of Edinburgh) in the same way as any organisation. Export could include the physical movement of goods or the transfer of software, data, technology or know how by any means (including verbal or electronic transfer). Export of controlled items can occur in a variety of activities such as academic and commercial collaborations, teaching, consultancy and licensing activities and even travelling to a third country overseas with a laptop which contains controlled items.

**Warrant:** Taiwan follows nuclear proliferation rules set by export control.

“Taiwan Overview.” *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, September 6, 2023, <https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/taiwan-overview>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

Taiwan does not possess nuclear weapons, although it historically possessed a nuclear weapons program. Taiwan is not believed to have biological or chemical weapons programs, but it has been accused of possessing such programs in the past. Because of its unique status, Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations, and cannot participate in nonproliferation regimes as an internationally-recognized state would. **Taiwan asserts that it maintains policies in accordance with widely followed export control regimes, despite not being able to participate in them in an official capacity. Taiwan is not legally considered a sovereign state by most countries or international organizations, including the UN, thus it cannot participate in international nonproliferation treaties or export control regimes.** <sup>1</sup> Both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) lay claim to the island of Taiwan, but it is under de facto control of the government in Taipei. **Taiwan does not possess nuclear weapons, although it attempted to acquire them in the past.** <sup>2</sup> Despite some suspicions of offensive and defensive chemical and biological weapon programs, there is no conclusive evidence that Taiwan developed or deployed either.

**Delink:** China won't fire a nuclear weapon.

**Warrant:** China has a very strict no first policy.

Havren, Sari. "China's No First Use of Nuclear Weapons Policy: Change or False Alarm?" *Royal United Services Institute*, October 13, 2023, <https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/chinas-no-first-use-nuclear-weapons-policy-change-or-false-alarm>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**In August 2023, at the NPT Review Conference, the Director-General of the Department of Arms Control of the Foreign Ministry of China, Sun Xiaobo, reaffirmed China's 1964 policy 'not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances' and 'not to threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-**

**weapon states’.** Nonetheless, a month later, China’s proposal for global governance seems to have dropped this decades-old policy. Up until August 2023, China had repeatedly reaffirmed its No First Use policy from 1964 onwards, although on some occasions Beijing has stretched it to exclude other nuclear powers, especially the US. **The dual pledges of No First Use and No Threatening to Use nuclear weapons have long been cornerstones of China’s nuclear strategy.** The fact that China’s proposal on global governance omits these commitments – while otherwise expressing China’s positions in a detailed manner – could indicate a change in China’s position on nuclear weapons, especially because China has never previously wavered or appeared ambiguous about these commitments.

**Turn:** The US being involved in the war would make the war worse.

**Warrant:** US involvement will likely lead to a longer, protracted war.

Bandow, Doug. “What would a US war with China look like?” *Responsible Statecraft*, October 24, 2022, <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/10/24/what-would-a-us-war-with-china-look-like/>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

“If conflict does break out, U.S. officials should not be sanguine about how it would end. Tamping or reversing Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific could require a massive use of force. An authoritarian CCP, always mindful of its precarious domestic legitimacy, would not want to concede defeat even if it failed to achieve its initial objectives. **And historically, modern wars between great powers have more typically gone long than stayed short. All of this implies that a U.S.-China war could be incredibly dangerous, offering few plausible off-ramps and severe pressures for escalation.**” The consequences of such a conflict would spread globally, with much greater impact than the Russo-Ukraine war. Imagine Taiwanese industry devastated from combat or conquest. Allied sanctions against Beijing and its trading partners.

Nations big and small pushed to choose sides. Both the U.S. and China interrupting if not sweeping the other nations' trade from the seas. At the end, defeat for the U.S. and its allies would be possible if not likely. In recent years U.S. wargames have generally shown Beijing as the victor. The best case, after a fashion, appears to be an indecisive and thus lengthy war. **Concluded one analysis: "The overarching takeaway from participants in the war game: If China invades Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific region will plunge into a broad, drawn-out war that could include direct attacks on the U.S., including Hawaii and potentially the continental United States."** .

**Impact:** Thousands of US soldiers would die.

London, Brad and Oren Liebermann. "War game suggests Chinese invasion of Taiwan would fail at a huge cost to US, Chinese and Taiwanese militaries." *CNN Politics*, January 9, 2023, <https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/politics/taiwan-invasion-war-game-intl-hnk-ml/index.html>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of service members. Such losses would damage the US global position for many years," the report said. **In most scenarios, the US Navy lost two aircraft carriers and 10 to 20 large surface combatants. Approximately 3,200 US troops would be killed in three weeks of combat, nearly half of what the US lost in two decades of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.**

**Analysis:** I think this is a strong response. Honestly, there's risk of nuclear escalation in both worlds; however, there's probably a higher risk in a con world than a pro world. This is because nuclear weapons are actually present on both sides in a con world, while the nuclear weapons are just theoretical in the pro world. If you can explain this fact to your judge, you should be able to win this argument.

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## A/2: Relations with Taiwan help the US maintain a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

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**Response:** Strong relations with Taiwan make it harder for the US to maintain a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

**Turn:** If China views the US position as firm, they will act militarily.

Mastro, Oriana Skylar. "This Is What America Is Getting Wrong About China and Taiwan." Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, October 18, 2023, <https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/what-america-getting-wrong-about-china-and-taiwan>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

For now, **lingering doubts over Chinese military capabilities and the specter of U.S. and allied retaliation are enough to restrain Mr. Xi. But if he concludes that the United States has broken, once and for all, from its previous position on Taiwan and is bent on thwarting unification, he may feel that he must act militarily.** The United States might be able to build the necessary military power in the region to deter a Chinese war of choice. But the level of dominance needed to stop Mr. Xi from launching a war he sees as necessary might be impossible to achieve. **Reassuring China would require Mr. Biden to reiterate that the United States does not support Taiwanese independence or oppose the island's peaceful unification with China and that, ultimately, Taiwan's fate is up to Taipei and Beijing.** It would mean moving away from attempts to create international space for Taiwan and chastising Beijing when it pulls away Taipei's diplomatic partners. The White House would also need to use what leverage it has to discourage members of Congress from visiting Taiwan and threaten to veto provocative legislation.

**Turn:** China's position on this is firm and has not wavered.

“China Condemns US Military Aid to Taiwan.” Prensa Latina, October 9, 2024,  
<https://www.plenglish.com/news/2024/10/09/chinas-condemns-us-military-aid-to-taiwan/>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**Ministry spokesman Wu Qian stressed that Washington’s actions send a wrong signal to the separatist forces seeking Taiwan’s independence. He also accused the United States of “stirring up tensions” and pushing Taiwan into a dangerous scenario of conflict. He also stated that this measure seriously violates the “one China” principle and the three joint statements between Beijing and Washington, which represents a serious threat to stability. Wu urged the US to abandon its double talk regarding this issue and to cease its military actions in the region to avoid further damage to relations between the armed forces of both countries. The functionary stressed that the People’s Liberation Army is prepared to thwart any separatist activity or external intervention, and reaffirmed its commitment to defend China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.** “What needs to be emphasized is that arming Taiwan is promoting ‘Taiwan’s independence,’ ‘Taiwan’s independence’ means war, and using Taiwan to contain China will only reap disastrous consequences,” the spokesman said.

**Turn:** Recent military transfers have exacerbated tensions.

Sheng, Yang and Liu Xuanzun. “US ‘keeps creating tension’ over Taiwan with new arms funding.” Global Times China, August 31, 2023,  
<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202308/1297345.shtml>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

The US intends to keep creating the tension of the Taiwan question to provoke China rather than to ease the tension, analysts said on Thursday, as **US President Joe Biden's administration has approved a military transfer to the island of Taiwan under the**

**Foreign Military Financing, or FMF, which is normally used for sovereign states.** A notification sent to the US Congress, seen by Reuters, informed congressional committees of the US State Department's intention to obligate up to \$80 million of FMF funds in support of Taiwan. **"This violates the one-China principle and the stipulations of the three China-US joint communiqués, especially the August 17 Communiqué," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said** at a routine press conference on Thursday. "It seriously violates international law and basic norms governing international relations, undermines China's sovereignty and security interests, and jeopardizes peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits, and sends a seriously wrong signal to the separatist forces for 'Taiwan independence.' China firmly opposes and sternly condemns this," Wang said.

**Turn:** Intentions don't matter – Only the end effect.

Kristof, Nicholas. "What Worries Me About War With China After My Visit to Taiwan."

The New York Times, January 27, 2024,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/27/opinion/china-taiwan-war.html>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**There is a fine line between deterring China and provoking it.** My take is that while we should do significantly more to help Taiwan boost defenses and deter aggression, we should do so quietly, without needlessly humiliating China. **Sometimes Americans loudly embrace Taiwan in ways that inflame tensions at times when we should be hoping to lower them.** Let me also make the case that we think too much in terms of an invasion — when the greater risk may be China's taking lesser nibbles to pressure Taiwan, leading to the possibility of accidents and escalation that could drag us into an unintended world war, as happened in 1914.

**Explanation:** A good starting place here is the answer that the US balance of power is predicated on peace in the region and inflaming/provoking China (potentially triggering an invasion) might be very unfavorable to that goal. Backing off on our military support to Taiwan may be worth it if it reduces conflict escalation risk (wouldn't it be better for Taiwan not to need that military aid at all?).



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**A/2: Support for Taiwan affirms US commitment to its allies .**

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**Response:** Support for Taiwan increases the likelihood of conflict, which harms allies.

**Turn:** Our allies specifically are calling for a peaceful solution, not a military none.

Liff, Adam. "How Japan and South Korea diverge on Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait."

Brookings Institute, February 22, 2024, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-japan-and-south-korea-diverge-on-taiwan-and-the-taiwan-strait/>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**Over the past three years, concerns about a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait have for the first time simultaneously emerged in Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) as a topic of mainstream policy discussions.** U.S. President Joe Biden's historic joint statements in spring 2021 emphasizing "the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait" with then-Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and then-ROK President Moon Jae-in, respectively, were key catalysts. Additional impetus came from Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and saber-rattling by the People's Republic of China (PRC), especially the unprecedented, large-scale military exercises around Taiwan in August 2022 following then-U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan. Most notably, **new leadership in Seoul and Tokyo agreed last summer to a trilateral statement that "reaffirm[ed] the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international community" and called "for a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues."**

**Warrant:** America's alliances in the Indo-Pacific are extremely strong – No risk to them.

Grossman, Derek. "America's Indo-Pacific Alliances Are Astonishingly Strong." Foreign Policy, December 5, 2023, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/12/05/us-china->

alliances-allies-geopolitics-balance-power-asia-india-taiwan-japan-south-korea-quad-aukus/. Accessed October 12, 2024.

But as 2023 draws to a close, **it is remarkable to observe that U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific are just about the deepest and most robust they have been in all their history.** Some of this is a testament to the exceptional durability of the United States' alliances and partnerships, given that they survived—and, in the case of India and Japan, even thrived—in spite of Trump's bullying and destructiveness. Indeed, **Washington has been cultivating and institutionalizing these friendship networks for decades.** Credit is also due to the Biden administration: Not only has it returned these important relationships to their normal status quo following four years of disruption under Trump, but it has also bolstered them to enhance deterrence against China and North Korea, the two main threats in the region.

**Delink:** America's allies in the region still support a One China policies.

Pak, James and Mike Mochizuki. "The U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Partnership: Pursuing Regional Stability and Avoiding Military Escalation." Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, April 22, 2024, <https://quincyinst.org/research/the-u-s-japan-south-korea-trilateral-partnership-pursuing-regional-stability-and-avoiding-military-escalation/>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

At the same time, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have in recent years become more reluctant to endorse the original understandings they each reached with China about Taiwan. For the sake of reassurance, **the three countries together should clearly confirm in official statements their One China policies and declare that they oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by any side, do not support Taiwan independence, and will accept any resolution of the Taiwan issue (including unification) achieved by**

**peaceful and non-coercive means.** Each country's respective relationship with Taiwan should also remain strictly unofficial.

**Non-Unique:** Other countries in Asia are already forming their own alliances.

DePetrìs, Daniel. "Bridging the divide: the significance of the US-South Korea-Japan trilateral." Lowy Institute, August 17, 2023, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/bridging-divide-significance-us-south-korea-japan-trilateral>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**South Korea-Japan relations still aren't rosy, but they are far better off today than they were four or five years ago.** Exhibit A: this week's trilateral summit hosted by US President Joe Biden at the Camp David presidential retreat. The administration has high hopes for the session; as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told reporters on 15 August, the meeting is "historic" in-and-of-itself. "Strengthening our trilateral cooperation is critical to delivering for our people, for the region, and for the world." **The deliverables are still up in the air, but there are rumours that the three countries will set up a hot-line for consultations during times of crisis, regularise trilateral military exercises, hold trilateral leaders' summits on an annual basis, and ensure that their respective national security advisers are meeting at least twice a year.** While this may not sound revolutionary, one would be hard pressed to envision a similar set of agreements even a year ago.

**Explanation:** This response reframes the state of US alliances in a few ways: 1) South Korea and Japan both want the priority in Taiwan and the SCS to be peace (the best way to do that is probably not to keep upsetting China). 2) they also have both heavily invested into this trilateral relationship with the US and are not going to jump ship if we pull some military aid to Taiwan. 3) I suppose they still need us and we need them to collectively hedge against North Korea even if everything went south and China forcibly took back Taiwan.

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**A/2: Aid to Taiwan demonstrates US support for democracy.**

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**Response:** Future US investment is unnecessary.

**Delink:** South Korea and Japan are engaging in mainstream policy discussions now.

Liff, Adam. "How Japan and South Korea diverge on Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait."

Brookings Institute, February 22, 2024, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-japan-and-south-korea-diverge-on-taiwan-and-the-taiwan-strait/>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**Over the past three years, concerns about a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait have for the first time simultaneously emerged in Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) as a topic of mainstream policy discussions.** U.S. President Joe Biden's historic joint statements in spring 2021 emphasizing "the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait" with then-Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and then-ROK President Moon Jae-in, respectively, were key catalysts. Additional impetus came from Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and saber-rattling by the People's Republic of China (PRC), especially the unprecedented, large-scale military exercises around Taiwan in August 2022 following then-U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan. **Most notably, new leadership in Seoul and Tokyo agreed last summer to a trilateral statement that "reaffirm[ed] the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international community" and called "for a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues."**

**Delink:** America's alliances in Asia have never been stronger.

Grossman, Derek. "America's Indo-Pacific Alliances Are Astonishingly Strong." Foreign Policy, December 5, 2023, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/12/05/us-china->

alliances-allies-geopolitics-balance-power-asia-india-taiwan-japan-south-korea-quad-aukus/. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**But as 2023 draws to a close, it is remarkable to observe that U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific are just about the deepest and most robust they have been in all their history.** Some of this is a testament to the exceptional durability of the United States' alliances and partnerships, given that they survived—and, in the case of India and Japan, even thrived—in spite of Trump's bullying and destructiveness. Indeed, Washington has been cultivating and institutionalizing these friendship networks for decades. Credit is also due to the Biden administration: **Not only has it returned these important relationships to their normal status quo following four years of disruption under Trump, but it has also bolstered them to enhance deterrence against China and North Korea, the two main threats in the region.**

**Turn:** The trilateral partnerships in the Indo-Pacific are strong but must stay unofficial to succeed.

Park, James and Mike Mochizuki. "The U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Partnership: Pursuing Regional Stability and Avoiding Military Escalation." Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, April 22, 2024, <https://quincyinst.org/research/the-u-s-japan-south-korea-trilateral-partnership-pursuing-regional-stability-and-avoiding-military-escalation/#h-executive-summary>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

At the same time, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have in recent years become more reluctant to endorse the original understandings they each reached with China about Taiwan. **For the sake of reassurance, the three countries together should clearly confirm in official statements their One China policies and declare that they oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by any side, do not support Taiwan independence, and will accept any resolution of the Taiwan issue (including unification) achieved by**

**peaceful and non-coercive means. Each country's respective relationship with Taiwan should also remain strictly unofficial.**

**Delink:** Alliances are improving now.

DePetrìs, Daniel. "Bridging the divide: The significance of the US-South Korea-Japan trilateral. Lowy Institute, August 17, 2023, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/bridging-divide-significance-us-south-korea-japan-trilateral>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**The Philippines may be the oldest US treaty ally in Asia, but South Korea and Japan are arguably the closest. The US-South Korea mutual defence treaty will turn 70 years old this October, and both countries have spent the last several months implementing the April 2023 Washington Declaration that reiterates Washington's extended deterrence commitment to Seoul in the face of North Korea's growing nuclear and missile capability. Japan, meanwhile, is undergoing its own defence transformation of sorts, planning a doubling of its defence budget over the next five years and boosting the interoperability of their forces with countries from the Philippines to Australia.**

**Explanation:** The US is obviously heavily invested in the democracies in the region. Appeasing China 1) keeps the peace, keeping Taiwan safe and 2) protects our ties with Japan and South Korea, the two big democratic strongholds in the region.

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## A/2: Increasing military support deters China from using force for reunification.

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**Response:** Military support causes China to overreact and use force.

**Turn:** A firm US commitment to Taiwan triggers a Chinese invasion.

Mastro, Oriana. "This Is What America Is Getting Wrong About China and Taiwan."

Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, October 18, 2023,

<https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/what-america-getting-wrong-about-china-and-taiwan>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

For now, lingering doubts over Chinese military capabilities and the specter of U.S. and allied retaliation are enough to restrain Mr. Xi. **But if he concludes that the United States has broken, once and for all, from its previous position on Taiwan and is bent on thwarting unification, he may feel that he must act militarily.** The United States might be able to build the necessary military power in the region to deter a Chinese war of choice. But the level of dominance needed to stop Mr. Xi from launching a war he sees as necessary might be impossible to achieve. **Reassuring China would require Mr. Biden to reiterate that the United States does not support Taiwanese independence or oppose the island's peaceful unification with China and that, ultimately, Taiwan's fate is up to Taipei and Beijing. It would mean moving away from attempts to create international space for Taiwan and chastising Beijing when it pulls away Taipei's diplomatic partners.** The White House would also need to use what leverage it has to discourage members of Congress from visiting Taiwan and threaten to veto provocative legislation.

**Turn:** China's position on this is firm and has not wavered.

“China Condemns US Military Aid to Taiwan.” Prensa Latina, October 9, 2024,  
<https://www.plenglish.com/news/2024/10/09/chinas-condemns-us-military-aid-to-taiwan/>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

Ministry spokesman Wu Qian stressed that Washington’s actions send a wrong signal to the separatist forces seeking Taiwan’s independence. He also accused the United States of “stirring up tensions” and pushing Taiwan into a dangerous scenario of conflict. He also stated that this measure seriously violates the “one China” principle and the three joint statements between Beijing and Washington, which represents a serious threat to stability. Wu urged the US to abandon its double talk regarding this issue and to cease its military actions in the region to avoid further damage to relations between the armed forces of both countries. The **functionary stressed that the People’s Liberation Army is prepared to thwart any separatist activity or external intervention, and reaffirmed its commitment to defend China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.** “What needs to be emphasized is that arming Taiwan is promoting ‘Taiwan’s independence,’ ‘Taiwan’s independence’ means war, and using Taiwan to contain China will only reap disastrous consequences,” the spokesman said.

**Turn:** Recent military transfers have exacerbated tensions.

Sheng, Yang and Liu Xuanzun. “US ‘keeps creating tension’ over Taiwan with new arms funding.” Global Times China, August 31, 2023,  
<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202308/1297345.shtml>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

The US intends to keep creating the tension of the Taiwan question to provoke China rather than to ease the tension, analysts said on Thursday, as **US President Joe Biden's administration has approved a military transfer to the island of Taiwan under the Foreign Military Financing, or FMF, which is normally used for sovereign states.** A notification sent to the US Congress, seen by Reuters, informed congressional



committees of the US State Department's intention to obligate up to \$80 million of FMF funds in support of Taiwan. **"This violates the one-China principle and the stipulations of the three China-US joint communiqués, especially the August 17 Communiqué," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said** at a routine press conference on Thursday. "It seriously violates international law and basic norms governing international relations, undermines China's sovereignty and security interests, and jeopardizes peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits, and sends a seriously wrong signal to the separatist forces for 'Taiwan independence.' China firmly opposes and sternly condemns this," Wang said.

**Turn:** Intentions don't matter – Only the end effect.

Kristof, Nicholas. "What Worries Me About War With China After My Visit to Taiwan."

The New York Times, January 27, 2024,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/27/opinion/china-taiwan-war.html>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**There is a fine line between deterring China and provoking it.** My take is that while we should do significantly more to help Taiwan boost defenses and deter aggression, we should do so quietly, without needlessly humiliating China. **Sometimes Americans loudly embrace Taiwan in ways that inflame tensions at times when we should be hoping to lower them.** Let me also make the case that we think too much in terms of an invasion — when the greater risk may be China's taking lesser nibbles to pressure Taiwan, leading to the possibility of accidents and escalation that could drag us into an unintended world war, as happened in 1914.

**Explanation:** Again, a good starting place here is the answer that the US balance of power is predicated on peace in the region and inflaming/provoking China (potentially triggering an invasion) might be very unfavorable to that goal. Backing off on our military support to Taiwan may be worth it if it reduces conflict escalation risk (wouldn't it be better for Taiwan not to need that military aid at all?).

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## A/2: Military support could lead to useful intelligence for the US

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**Response:** Taiwan is not necessary due to other countries in the Indo-Pac region.

**Delink:** The US has intelligence sharing agreements with South Korea and Japan.

Clark, Colin. "South Korea and Japan resume intel sharing agreement, but not all problems are solved." Breaking Defense News, April 17, 2023, <https://breakingdefense.com/2023/04/south-korea-and-japan-resume-intel-sharing-agreement-but-not-all-problems-are-solved/>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**Getting the deal signed was a big win for the Obama administration**, but a trade dispute and continuing tensions over the comfort women issue led South Korea to pause participation in the deal in 2019. At least, the trade dispute was the nominal reason: Relations between the two countries have been rocky for decades. Japan, Korea's former colonial master, has never directly apologized for its behavior during World War II, and the issue of so-called comfort women, Koreans forced to sleep with Japanese soldiers, still resonates. **Since then, the governments in both countries have shifted, and in 2022 officials made clear there was interest in resuming GSOMIA. Following the March summit, Yoon announced plans to "normalize" the agreement going forward.**

**Delink:** Taiwan is not the only country that needs cooperation for intelligence sharing to succeed.

Curtis, Lisa, Evan Wright, and Hannah Kelley. "Forging a New Era of U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Cooperation." Center for a New American Security, March 21, 2024, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/forging-a-new-era-of-u-s-japan-south-korea-trilateral-cooperation>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**Encourage trilateral cooperation beyond the Indo-Pacific. Japan and South Korea have coordinated some diplomatic activities** in response to the Israel-Hamas conflict. The United States should take advantage of this progress and encourage trilateral cooperation in other regional or functional areas of mutual interest, such as energy security in the Middle East or Russia's war in Ukraine. **Increase trilateral intelligence sharing to enhance collective maritime domain awareness. The three countries should begin strengthening intelligence sharing beyond the North Korean missile threat by strengthening cooperation on maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.**

**Delink:** The US has a trilateral relationship with Japan and South Korea.

Park, James and Mike Mochizuki. "The U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Partnership: Pursuing Regional Stability and Avoiding Military Escalation." Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, April 22, 2024, <https://quincyinst.org/research/the-u-s-japan-south-korea-trilateral-partnership-pursuing-regional-stability-and-avoiding-military-escalation/#h-executive-summary>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**A trilateral partnership is emerging in northeast Asia.** Building off last August's Camp David summit between the countries' leaders, **the United States, Japan, and South Korea are now engaging militarily in an unprecedented fashion, shaping an alignment aimed to counter North Korea and China.**

**Delink:** Japan is open about intelligence sharing with the United States.

"The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2024, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

Communications and Electronics: The two Governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities. **Intelligence**

**Activities: The two Governments will cooperate in intelligence activities in order to ensure effective bilateral operations. This will include coordination of requirements, collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence products. Each Government will be responsible for the security of shared intelligence.** Logistics Support Activities:

U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense Forces will conduct logistics support activities efficiently and properly in accordance with appropriate bilateral arrangements.

**Explanation:** The place to start here is that we share intelligence with Japan and South Korea already. Their argument is probably not that specific. Make them a) make a founded claim that Taiwan would stop sharing intelligence if we reduce our military support, b) do the probability work on that claim, and c) THEN point out what kind of shortfall we'd have on intelligence about China considering we'd still have these two big allies in the reason sharing information with us.

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## A/2: Reducing military support for Taiwan could create regional instability

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**Response:** Reducing military support for Taiwan could actually decrease tensions and promote diplomatic solutions in the region.

**Turn:** Reducing military support for Taiwan could lead to improved U.S.-China relations and regional stability.

Swaine, Michael. "Stabilizing the Growing Taiwan Crisis: New Messaging and Understandings are Urgently Needed." Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, <https://quincyinst.org/research/stabilizing-the-growing-taiwan-crisis-new-messaging-and-understandings-are-urgently-needed/#>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

Instead of addressing the worsening interactive dynamic underway, Washington continues to point publicly to Chinese provocations as a justification for taking the above actions. This mirrors and encourages China's own one-sided, unreflective behavior.

**More broadly, in high-level dialogues between U.S. and Chinese officials, Washington's efforts to avoid confrontation or conflict focus on the maintenance of communication channels in order to clarify policies and avoid misunderstandings, rather than creating a pattern of constructive, cooperative interactions that could address the core sources of tension between both nations and, in the process, build a modicum of trust between the two leaderships.** In China, U.S. assertions that the One China policy has not changed, or that its relations with Taiwan remain unofficial, thus fall on deaf ears. **And the apparent hypocrisy of U.S. behavior is then used to justify more provocative Chinese actions, which lead many Americans to conclude that Beijing is jettisoning its commitment to peaceful unification.**

**Turn:** China's aggression is partly a response to perceived U.S. military threats in the region.

Mastro, Oriana Skylar. "The Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force."  
Foreign Affairs, June 31, 2021,  
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-03/china-taiwan-war-temptation>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

But China could decide to escalate much more rapidly if it concluded that the United States was likely to intervene militarily regardless of whether Beijing moved swiftly or gradually. **Chinese military strategists believe that if they give the United States time to mobilize and amass firepower in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait, China's chances of victory will decrease substantially. As a result, they could decide to preemptively hit U.S. bases in the region, crippling Washington's ability to respond. In other words, U.S. deterrence—to the extent that it is based on a credible threat to intervene militarily to protect Taiwan—could actually incentivize an attack on U.S. forces once Beijing has decided to act. The more credible the American threat to intervene, the more likely China would be to hit U.S. forces in the region in its opening salvo.** But if China thought the United States might stay out of the conflict, it would decline to attack U.S. forces in the region, since doing so would inevitably bring the United States into the war.

**Explanation:** This argument presents a nuanced perspective on the potential benefits of reducing military support for Taiwan. It suggests that such a move could create opportunities for diplomatic solutions and potentially decrease regional tensions.

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## A/2: Protecting Taiwan promotes the United States' commitment to democracy in East Asia.

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**Response:** The United States can demonstrate its commitment to democracy in East Asia through non-military means.

**Delink:** Economic and diplomatic support can be more effective in promoting democracy than military aid.

O'Hanlon, Michael, "Should the United States change its policies toward Taiwan?"

Brookings, April 16, 2024, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/should-the-united-states-change-its-policies-toward-taiwan/>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

**Raw military power still has a role to play in undergirding deterrence. But whatever the utility of such a capability against a massive invasion attempt, it is less germane against the much more likely scenario of limited aggression, to include a blockade of some type.** In situations where China had not necessarily caused large numbers of casualties itself, the practicality or wisdom of a U.S. response that could quickly kill tens of thousands is not obvious. The essence of a better and more credible strategy should therefore be integrated, and asymmetric, deterrence. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has been rightly emphasizing the integrated element, just as I did in my 2019 book, "The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great-Power War over Small Stakes."

**Delink:** That support is especially effective against China.

O'Hanlon, Michael, "Should the United States change its policies toward Taiwan?"

Brookings, April 16, 2024, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/should-the-united-states-change-its-policies-toward-taiwan/>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

**Right now, of course, the Western world's combined dependencies often are more than 25 to 50 percent, so we need to diversify and harden our economies.** In other words, we must imagine ourselves in an economic war with China and be sure that our economies and peoples could survive that war (even if they face inevitable hardship in the process). **If the threat of economic pain and punishment is to be a cornerstone of our deterrent against limited attacks in particular, the ability of the United States and allies to persevere in the face of inevitable Chinese retaliation in kind must be ensured.**

**Delink:** Military support can sometimes undermine democratic processes and institutions.

Grewal, Sharan. "When do militaries undermine democratization?" Brookings, Nov. 3, 2023, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/when-do-militaries-undermine-democratization/>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

**Empowered militaries are far more likely to thwart transitions to democracy. Democracy is likely to push empowered militaries out of their ministerial positions and redistribute their bloated budgets toward public services for the electorate. Beyond corporate interests, there are also two secondary mechanisms at play.** Empowered militaries attract the country's elite, who view the military as the best pathway to power and wealth. The rich, however, generally prefer the autocratic status quo over democracy. Finally, empowered militaries, that have been at the center of the regime, come to justify their role in governance as part of their professional duties. Democracy will thus strip these politicized militaries of what they have come to believe is their rightful place in the state.

**Explanation:** This argument presents alternative methods for the United States to support democracy in East Asia beyond military aid. It suggests that economic, diplomatic, and multilateral approaches might be more effective and sustainable in promoting democratic values.



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**A/2: Failure to defend Taiwan could create an arms race .**

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**Response:** Reducing military support for Taiwan could lead to regional de-escalation and cooperative security arrangements.

**Turn:** China expects its enemies to take the lead on de-escalation.

“De-Escalation and War Termination in Multi-Domain Wars.” Center for Global Security Search, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 2021,  
[https://cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/2024-08/DEWT\\_Workshop\\_Summary.pdf](https://cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/2024-08/DEWT_Workshop_Summary.pdf).  
Accessed October 11, 2024.

China’s strategic thought on de-escalation focuses on de-escalation by its enemies and seems not to concern itself with the possibility that China may face difficult choices about whether and how to de-escalate. China’s strategists differentiate between wars that have gone nuclear and wars that have not. In a war that has gone nuclear, China expects to counter-attack and re-attack until the enemy chooses to stop its nuclear attacks (whether China’s leaders believe that China has the nuclear posture adequate to this task is a matter of debate among outside scholars). **In a war that has not gone nuclear, China expects to be able to put the burden of escalation and de-escalation onto its enemies, through (future) dominance at the conventional level of war and implementation of its “war control” strategies. In a war with the US over Taiwan, China would draw on a limited war theory of victory that relies on the escalatory threat of large-scale space, cyber, and conventional missile weapons to coerce adversary decision-makers by targeting their “societal functions.”**

**Turn:** Arms races are often driven by perceptions of external threats.

Craig, Anthony and Valeriano, Brandon. "Conceptualising Cyber Arm Races." 8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, 2016, <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/Art-10-Conceptualising-Cyber-Arms-Races.pdf>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

**Arms races have been the subject of much research in the field of international relations as scholars have attempted to investigate their causes and consequences. In its traditional conceptualisation, an arms race results from mutual insecurity and the need to defend against an external threat.** The build-up of arms is a core principle in realist theory, which tells us that the anarchical and self-help nature of the international system creates powerful incentives for countries to seek security through military strength and deter potential aggressors in an environment where they can never trust others' intentions.

**Explanation:** This argument suggests that reducing military support for Taiwan could lead to a more cooperative regional security environment, potentially avoiding an arms race. It emphasizes the role of diplomacy, mutual security arrangements, and economic interdependence in maintaining stability.

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## A/2: Reducing military support for Taiwan could lead to a Chinese invasion .

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**Response:** Reducing military support for Taiwan could actually decrease the likelihood of Chinese invasion by reducing cross-strait tensions.

**Turn:** China sees Taiwan as primarily an internal affair.

Perkovich, George. "Engaging China on Strategic Stability and Mutual Vulnerability."

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 12, 2022,

<https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/10/engaging-china-on-strategic-stability-and-mutual-vulnerability?lang=en>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

The United States and its allies, on one side, and China, on the other, all perceive themselves as defensively oriented. Each side perceives the other to be seeking enough superiority to achieve (or retain) regional hegemony. **China sees Taiwan as an internal affair, as affirmed by the 1979 mutual recognition agreement between the United States and China. Hence, China sees its acquisition of capabilities to prevent the breaking away of Taiwan as defensive. The United States and its partners see China's increasing capabilities as intended to bring about forceful absorption of Taiwan and see themselves to be defensively protecting Taiwan's freedom.** Similar differences in perspective affect disputes over islands, reefs, and maritime resources in the South and East China Seas, though these are less strategically fraught than Taiwan.

**Turn:** Diplomatic engagement and economic integration, rather than military deterrence, may be more effective in preventing Chinese aggression towards Taiwan.

Luchsinger, Nico. "What does Taiwan need – Diplomatic engagement or military deterrence?" International Institute for Management Development, Feb. 6, 2024, <https://www.imd.org/ibyimd/asian-hub/what-does-taiwan-need-diplomatic-engagement-or-military-deterrence/>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

**Another dimension of this strategy is economics. Integrating Taiwan more deeply into the global economy serves multiple purposes. It not only bolsters Taiwan's economic resilience but also binds the interests of other countries with Taiwan's stability. This economic interdependence creates a web of shared interests that acts as a deterrent against unilateral aggression by Beijing.** The efficacy of this approach is evident.

Diplomatic engagement has enabled Taiwan to navigate through a landscape riddled with threats in the past, maintaining its de facto independence without provoking direct conflict. This success underscores the potency of diplomacy over military escalation.

**Moreover, diplomatic engagement aligns with the global community's broader goals. In an era where challenges like climate change and global health crises demand international cooperation, Taiwan's involvement contributes significantly to these global public goods. Its exclusion, driven by geopolitical rivalries, does a disservice to the global community.** Taiwan's status quo is fragile. In a world shaped by heightened US-China tensions, maintaining it requires a robust diplomatic effort. Only diplomacy can provide credible assurances to China that no one is seeking unilateral changes to the status quo.

**Explanation:** This argument suggests that reducing military support for Taiwan could actually decrease the likelihood of Chinese invasion by addressing some of the root causes of tension. It emphasizes the importance of economic ties and diplomatic engagement in maintaining stability.

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**A/2: Reducing military support for Taiwan will reduce US influence .**

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**Response:** An independent Taiwan means independent foreign policies among U.S. allies in the region.

**Delink:** In response to military and economic competition between the United States and China, Southeast Asian nations have developed greater strategic autonomy to insulate themselves from any military or economic fallout.

Zhang, Jie. "Rebuilding strategic autonomy: ASEAN's response to US–China strategic competition." China International Strategy Review, April 30, 2023, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42533-023-00128-3>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

**With the expansion and intensification of China–U.S. strategic competition and confrontation, ASEAN has moved from its optimistic, cautious, wait-and-see posture to a more passive stance, as a result of increasing anxiety. It subsequently turned its focus to improving its strategic autonomy and initiative.** ASEAN has consistently aimed to protect and strengthen its three primary characteristics. First, it has strived to build internal consensus and to speak out collectively on regional and international issues in a timely manner, maintaining internal unity. Secondly, ASEAN has focused on efforts to improve the quality of multiple dialogues, hosting three major diplomatic events and balancing between China and the U.S. to rebuild its centrality. Besides, to strengthen ASEAN Economic Community, engaging China and the U.S. in its development of priorities, and promoting open and inclusive regional cooperation. **These policies are the result of ASEAN's long-held policy of balance between major countries and the principle of not "taking sides", fully demonstrating ASEAN's strategic flexibility and initiative.**

**Explanation:** This argument suggests that reducing military support for Taiwan could lead to more independent and balanced foreign policies among U.S. allies, rather than pushing them towards other powers.

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**CON: Protecting Taiwan protects semiconductor chip production.**

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**Argument:** Taiwan is a major source of semiconductor production, which is incredibly important for the functioning of the modern world. US protection stops a war on the island, which would disrupt this production.

**Warrant:** Semiconductor chips are a building block of the modern world.

Datacenters.com Technology, "Semiconductors: The Building Blocks of Modern Technology." *Datacenters.com*, September 11, 2023, <https://www.datacenters.com/news/semiconductors-the-building-blocks-of-modern-technology>. Accessed October 7, 2024.

**Semiconductors are very important for modern technology. They help power the devices and technologies we use every day.** Without them, our world would be very different. These small electronic pieces are like Lego blocks. They help to build the circuits inside our phones, computers, and other gadgets. This makes it possible to do complex tasks. **From processing information to storing data, semiconductors have revolutionized the way we communicate, work, and entertain ourselves. From smartphones to computers, from cars to medical equipment, semiconductors are the unsung heroes that make it all possible. .**

**Warrant:** Taiwan is a major producer of semiconductor chips.

"Taiwan's dominance of the chip industry makes it more important." *The Economist*, March 6, 2023, <https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/03/06/taiwans-dominance-of-the-chip-industry-makes-it-more-important>. Accessed October 7, 2024.

They are the chips that power everything from mobile phones to electric cars—and they make up 15% of Taiwan’s GDP. **Taiwan produces over 60% of the world’s semiconductors and over 90% of the most advanced ones. Most are manufactured by a single company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC). Until now, the most advanced have been made only in Taiwan. The semiconductor industry is called Taiwan’s “silicon shield”, giving the world a big reason to defend the island.** Yet chips are the industry most affected by the split between America and China. Parts of the shield are now moving abroad. In December TSMC held a ceremony to mark the start of a chip plant (or “fab”) in Arizona. Joe Biden was there, as were Tim Cook from Apple and TSMC’s founder, Morris Chang. Mr Chang said TSMC would triple its investment in Arizona to \$40bn, open a second fab in 2026 and make three-nanometre chips, now the most advanced, in America. Mr Biden declared that “American manufacturing is back, folks.” Mr Chang more morosely called globalisation and free trade “almost dead”. **The chip industry was built on globalisation, with every part of the supply chain supporting it. TSMC’s fabs, based on efficiency and high-skilled, long-hour labour, could make chips faster and more accurately than any rival. Experts agree that replicating this supply chain elsewhere would be inefficient. Mr Chang told reporters in November that the cost of making chips in America would be 55% higher.** He reportedly told Nancy Pelosi that American efforts to bring the business home were “doomed to fail”. Yet the shift to local supply chains is happening, boosted by covid-19 and the war in Ukraine. Governments want critical tech made in safer places, closer to home. And America and China are competing to control the most sophisticated chips that may prove crucial to the next generation of advanced weapons.

**Warrant:** The United States specifically receives a lot of semiconductors from Taiwan.

Shepardson, David. “US official says Chinese seizure of TSMC in Taiwan would be 'absolutely devastating'.” *Reuters*, May 8, 2024,



<https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-official-says-chinese-seizure-tsmc-taiwan-would-be-absolutely-devastating-2024-05-08>. Accessed October 7, 2024.

U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said Wednesday a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and seizure of chips producer TSMC would be "absolutely devastating" to the American economy. **Asked at a U.S. House hearing about the impact, Raimondo said "it would be absolutely devastating," declining to comment on how or if it will happen, adding: "Right now, the United States buys 92% of its leading edge chips from TSMC in Taiwan."** TSMC declined to comment. Last month, Raimondo announced the Commerce Department would award TSMC's U.S. unit a \$6.6 billion subsidy for its most advanced semiconductor production in Phoenix, Arizona and up to \$5 billion in low-cost government loans. TSMC agreed to expand its planned investment by \$25 billion to \$65 billion and to add a third Arizona fab by 2030, Commerce said in announcing the preliminary award. The Taiwanese company will produce the world's most advanced 2 nanometer technology at its second Arizona fab expected to begin production in 2028, the department said. TSMC, the world's largest contract chipmaker and a major supplier to Apple and Nvidia had previously announced plans to invest \$40 billion in Arizona. TSMC expects to begin high-volume production in its first U.S. fab there by the first half of 2025, Commerce said. Congress in 2022 approved the Chips and Science Act to boost domestic semiconductor output with \$52.7 billion in research and manufacturing subsidies to wean the United States from reliance on Asia for chips. Lawmakers also approved \$75 billion in government loan authority. **A 2023 U.S. government paper estimated a major manufacturing disruption in Taiwan could lead to as high as a 59% increase in the U.S. price of logic chips that domestic downstream producers would have to pay.**

**Warrant:** An invasion of Taiwan would stop semiconductor production.

Engel, Richard, Charlotte Gardiner, Jennifer Jett, and Alexander Smith. "Why war with China over Taiwan could ruin the global economy." *NBC News*, June 30, 2023, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/taiwan-war-china-us-ruin-global-economy-semiconductors-chips-rcna91321>. Accessed October 7, 2024.

**A military conflict over Taiwan would set the global economy back decades because of the crippling disruption to the supply chain of crucial semiconductors, according to the head of one of the island's leading makers of microchips.** Taiwan, a self-ruling democracy about 100 miles off China, makes the world's most advanced microchips — the brains inside every piece of technology from smartphones and modern cars to artificial intelligence and fighter jets. China claims Taiwan as its territory and has said it would be prepared to use force to take control of the island, although it has not laid out any timeline for doing so. Officially, the U.S. discourages conflict but takes a neutral stance, although President Joe Biden has repeatedly suggested he would step in to defend Taiwan. **If the industry were to be disrupted by military conflict, the impact on the global economy would be "huge," said Miin Wu, the founder and chief executive of the Taiwanese chipmaker Macronix. "My opinion is, you will be set back at least 20 years," he told NBC News on Monday in the company's showroom at Hsinchu Science Park in northwestern Taiwan.** The island is a microchip fabrication hotbed, producing 60% of the world's semiconductors — and around 93% of the most advanced ones, according to a 2021 report from the Boston Consulting Group. The U.S., South Korea and China also produce semiconductors, but Taiwan dominates the market, which was worth almost \$600 billion last year.

**Warrant:** US protection stops this invasion from occurring.

Ismay, John, Edward Wong, and Pablo Robles. "A New Pacific Arsenal to Counter China." *The New York Times*, April 26, 2024,

<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/04/26/us/politics/us-china-military-bases-weapons.html>. Accessed October 7, 2024.

**Taiwan's foreign minister, Joseph Wu, said in an interview in Taipei that the strengthened alliances and evolving military force postures were critical to deterring China.** "We are very happy to see that many countries in this region are coming to the realization that they also have to be prepared for further expansions of the P.R.C.," he said, referring to the People's Republic of China. To some Chinese military strategists, the U.S. efforts are aimed at keeping China's naval forces behind the "first island chain" — islands close to mainland Asia that run from Okinawa in Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines. **U.S. military assets along these islands could prevent Chinese warships from getting into the open Pacific waters farther east if conflict were to break out.** **Leaders in China's People's Liberation Army also talk of establishing military dominance of the "second island chain"** — which is farther out in the Pacific and includes Guam, Palau and West Papua.

**Warrant:** China would take control of semiconductor production if they controlled the island.

"China and Taiwan: A really simple guide." *BBC*, January 7, 2024,  
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-59900139>. Accessed October 7, 2024.

Taiwan sits in the so-called "first island chain", which includes a list of US-friendly territories that are crucial to Washington's foreign policy in the region. China's increasingly aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea has also made Taiwan more significant to US calculations. **Taiwan's economy is another factor. Much of the world's electronics - from phones to electric cars - are powered by computer chips made in Taiwan. By one measure, a single Taiwanese company - the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company or TSMC - has over half of the world's market. So if China**

takes the island, it could be freer to project power in the western Pacific and rival the US. Beijing would also have control over an industry that drive the global economy.

But China insists that its intentions are peaceful - and accuses the US of encircling it with military bases that stretch from Australia in the south to Japan in the north.

**Impact:** Disruption of semiconductor production would cost a trillion dollars per year.

Reuters. "Top US spy says Chinese invasion halting Taiwan chip production would be 'enormous' global economic blow." *Reuters*, May 4, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/technology/top-us-spy-says-chinese-invasion-halting-taiwan-chip-production-would-be-2023-05-04>. Accessed October 7, 2024.

**A Chinese invasion of Taiwan could potentially halt production by the world's largest advanced semiconductor chip maker, wiping out up to \$1 trillion per year from the global economy per year in the first few years, the top U.S. intelligence official said on Thursday.** U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines presented what she called a "general estimate" during testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. She noted that the advanced semiconductor chips produced by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd (TSMC) are used in 90 percent of "almost every category of electronic device around the world." If a Chinese invasion stopped TSMC from producing those chips, "it will have an enormous global financial impact that I think runs somewhere between \$600 billion to \$1 trillion on an annual basis for the first few years," she said.

**Impact:** Chinese control of this production would be particularly devastating to the US economy.

Shepardson, David. "US official says Chinese seizure of TSMC in Taiwan would be 'absolutely devastating'." *Reuters*, May 8, 2024,

<https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-official-says-chinese-seizure-tsmc-taiwan-would-be-absolutely-devastating-2024-05-08>. Accessed October 7, 2024.

**U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said Wednesday a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and seizure of chips producer TSMC (2330.TW) would be "absolutely devastating" to the American economy.** Asked at a U.S. House hearing about the impact, Raimondo said "it would be absolutely devastating," declining to comment on how or if it will happen, adding: "Right now, the United States buys 92% of its leading edge chips from TSMC in Taiwan."

**Analysis:** This argument is two-fold. The first part is that a Chinese invasion would significantly hurt semiconductor production. The key to this part really relies on convincing the judge that US military presence is an effective deterrence to a Chinese invasion. The second part is that a reduced military presence would lead to China capturing the island and controlling semiconductor chip production. The key to this part is proving that China would be bad to the rest of the world if they seized production.

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**CON: Protecting Taiwan prevents global economic collapse.**

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**Argument:** A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would lead to the global community sanctioning China, disrupting the global supply chain and global economy. US deterrence prevents this sanctioning and disruption from occurring.

**Warrant:** China is a major producer of goods for the world economy.

Lunness, Jake. "China's role in global trade and why it still matters." *Columbia Threadneedle Investments*, March 23, 2023,  
<https://www.columbiathreadneedle.co.uk/en/inst/insights/chinas-role-in-global-trade-and-why-it-still-matters/>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

**China is a big deal: it singlehandedly accounts for more than 18% of the world's GDP (gross domestic product). Across the world's 10 biggest economies it is the top trading partner for eight and a top five partner for the remaining two. It has the world's largest trade surplus at \$676 billion, which is roughly equivalent to the GDP of Poland. And it is the leading import market for six out of 10 of the world's largest economies (Figure 1).** Within the emerging Asian economies, China is the largest export market for these nations, highlighting its importance regionally as well.

**Warrant:** China specifically does a lot of trade with the US.

Swanson, Ana. "The Contentious U.S.-China Relationship, by the Numbers." *The New York Times*, July 7, 2023,  
<https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/07/business/economy/us-china-relationship-facts.html>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

Despite the rising tensions, trade between the countries remains extremely strong.

**China is America's third-largest trading partner, after Canada and Mexico. U.S. imports of goods and services from China hit a record \$563.6 billion last year.** But the share of U.S. imports that come from China has been falling, a sign of how some businesses are breaking off ties with China. **China is also a major export market, with half of all soybeans that the United States sends abroad going to China. The U.S.-China Business Council estimated that U.S. exports to China supported nearly 1.1 million jobs in the United States in 2021.**

**Warrant:** China also does a lot of trading with America's European allies.

"China." *European Commission*, n.d., [https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china\\_en](https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en). Accessed October 8, 2024.

**China is the EU's second largest trading partner for goods after the United States, with bilateral trade reaching €739 billion in 2023.** This represents a decline of 14% compared to 2022. **China is the EU's third-largest partner for exports and the biggest for imports. The EU-China trade balance has been persistently in favour of China. In 2023, the EU deficit amounted to €292 billion.** EU exports to China amounted to €223.6 billion, whereas EU imports from China amounted to €515.9 billion, indicating year-on-year decreases of 3.1% and 18% respectively.

**Warrant:** A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would lead to the US sanctioning China.

Vest, Charlie and Agatha Kratz. "Sanctioning China in a Taiwan crisis: Scenarios and risks." *Atlantic Council*, June 21, 2023, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/sanctioning-china-in-a-taiwan-crisis-scenarios-and-risks/#Goals-of-economic-countermeasures>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

A sense of heightened risk in the Taiwan Strait and the use of sanctions against Russia has led decision-makers around the world to reflect on the potential use of economic countermeasures against China in a Taiwan crisis. **US lawmakers have already proposed legislation mandating sanctions on China in the event of an invasion of Taiwan.** Surveys of European countries underline an increasing—if still minority—willingness to sanction China if it were to take military action against Taiwan. Officials in Beijing are asking these questions as well, with China’s State Council reportedly considering the potential for Western sanctions in a Taiwan crisis. The economic fallout from sanctions on Russia have also led business leaders and major banks to conduct contingency planning exercises exploring their exposures to a cross-strait crisis, including sanctions on China.

**Warrant:** America’s allies are likely to follow in the sanctioning because they share the same values.

Economy, Elizabeth. “Is the US-China relationship the most consequential relationship for America in the world?” *The Brookings Institute*, February 6, 2024, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-the-us-china-relationship-the-most-consequential-relationship-for-america-in-the-world>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

There are many ways to describe the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. For example, the relationship is the world’s most complex, most challenging, or most competitive. However, the relationship is not “the most consequential in the world for America.” **Far more consequential is the United States’ relationship with its network of allies and partners in Asia, Europe, and North America. Unlike China, the United States’ allies and close partners share the same values, norms, and strategic objectives.** They are the United States’ most important trade and investment partners. And state-to-state and multilateral engagements are extensive. **Most importantly, they play the most**



**consequential role in both advancing and constraining the United States' ability to realize its most important strategic ambitions.**

**Warrant:** US military presence deters a Chinese invasion.

Ismay, John, Edward Wong, and Pablo Robles. "A New Pacific Arsenal to Counter China." *The New York Times*, April 26, 2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/04/26/us/politics/us-china-military-bases-weapons.html>. Accessed October 7, 2024.

**Taiwan's foreign minister, Joseph Wu, said in an interview in Taipei that the strengthened alliances and evolving military force postures were critical to deterring China.** "We are very happy to see that many countries in this region are coming to the realization that they also have to be prepared for further expansions of the P.R.C.," he said, referring to the People's Republic of China. To some Chinese military strategists, the U.S. efforts are aimed at keeping China's naval forces behind the "first island chain" — islands close to mainland Asia that run from Okinawa in Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines. **U.S. military assets along these islands could prevent Chinese warships from getting into the open Pacific waters farther east if conflict were to break out.** **Leaders in China's People's Liberation Army also talk of establishing military dominance of the "second island chain"** — which is farther out in the Pacific and includes Guam, Palau and West Papua.

**Impact:** Deterring this invasion is important because these sanctions would cost trillions.

Welch, Jennifer, Jenny Leonard, Maeva Cousin, Gerard DiPippo, and Tim Orlik. "Xi, Biden and the \$10 Trillion Dollar Cost of War Over Taiwan." *Bloomberg*, January 8, 2024, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2024-01-09/if-china-invades-taiwan-it-would-cost-world-economy-10-trillion>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

War over Taiwan would have a cost in blood and treasure so vast that even those unhappiest with the status quo have reason not to risk it. **Bloomberg Economics estimate the price tag at around \$10 trillion, equal to about 10% of global GDP — dwarfing the blow from the war in Ukraine, Covid pandemic and Global Financial Crisis. China's rising economic and military heft, Taiwan's burgeoning sense of national identity, and fractious relations between Beijing and Washington mean the conditions for a crisis are in place.** With cross-Strait relations on the ballot, Taiwan's Jan. 13 election is a potential flashpoint.

**Analysis:** Given the nature of China's manufacturing empire, it would be easy to prove that sanctions against China would be devastating for the global economy thus making this a strong argument. However, you need to make sure that you convince your judge of two things. First is that the US presence is stopping a war and thus sanctions from happening, and second is that countries would actually put in place these sanctions. If you can do that, it should be a good path to the ballot just based on the massive economic fallout.

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**CON: Protecting Taiwan strengthens US-India relations.**

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**Argument:** India looks at Taiwan for an example of how committed it is to its allies. If the US pulls out, India will look towards other countries for protection.

**Warrant:** The United States has promised to defend Taiwan.

Brunnstorm, David and Trevor Hunnicutt. "Biden says U.S. forces would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion." *Reuters*, September 19, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-us-forces-would-defend-taiwan-event-chinese-invasion-2022-09-18>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

**U.S. President Joe Biden said U.S forces would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, his most explicit statement on the issue, drawing an angry response from China that said it sent the wrong signal to those seeking an independent Taiwan. Asked in a CBS 60 Minutes interview broadcast on Sunday whether U.S. forces would defend the democratically governed island claimed by China, he replied: "Yes, if in fact, there was an unprecedented attack." Asked to clarify if he meant that unlike in Ukraine, U.S. forces - American men and women - would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, Biden replied: "Yes."** The CBS interview was just the latest time that Biden has appeared to go beyond long-standing stated U.S. policy on Taiwan, but his statement was clearer than previous ones about committing U.S. troops to the defend the island. The United States has long stuck to a policy of "strategic ambiguity" and not making clear whether it would respond militarily to an attack on Taiwan.

**Warrant:** India and the US work together militarily.

Chahal, Husanjot. "A Roadmap for India-US Military AI Collaboration." *Center for Security and Emerging Technology*, August 17, 2021,

<https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/a-roadmap-for-india-us-military-ai-collaboration>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

**India and the United States have a multifaceted defence partnership that entails significant trade and large-scale joint military exercises. There is also a growing consensus that collaboration on emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) can promote common security interests.** In March 2021, US Secretary of Defense Llyod Austin discussed “the contours of sharing high-end technology” in defence with his Indian counterpart, and the two countries also formed a “Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group” as part of the Quad security dialogue along with Japan and Australia. **As India and the United States look to navigate the road ahead, their bilateral collaboration in the area of AI applications for military logistics can be a pragmatic way forward.**

**Warrant:** India’s is already not that strong with the US to begin with.

Grossman, Derek. “U.S.-India Ties Remain Fundamentally Fragile.” *RAND*, April 7, 2024, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/04/us-india-ties-remain-fundamentally-fragile.html>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

For the United States, foreign policy has always been a mix of securing interests and promoting values, and India checks the box on multiple counts. Washington and New Delhi routinely highlight that the world's oldest democracy, the United States, is cooperating with the world's largest democracy, India. **Partnering with India holds immense promise for U.S. security interests as well, particularly Washington's strategy to counter China. But despite widespread optimism about the future of the U.S.-India partnership, relations are considerably more fragile than they might appear. Indeed, the two countries continue to experience friction in several areas that, if left unaddressed, could ultimately undermine or even derail future cooperation. On**

democratic values, for instance, the United States holds deepening concerns that Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are making India less tolerant of minorities, especially Muslims. In 2019, the Modi government revoked the special semi-autonomous status—granted under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution—of Jammu and Kashmir, a Muslim-majority region. Since then, Kashmiris have suffered from repressive government policies that include curbs to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and other basic rights, according to Human Rights Watch.

**Warrant:** If the US doesn't protect Taiwan, India will move away from the US.

Schiffrin, Nick and Dan Sagalyn. "Three experts on U.S. role and response options in Taiwan-China conflict." *PBS News*, December 15, 2021, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/three-experts-on-u-s-role-and-response-options-in-taiwan-china-conflict>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

Nick Schiffrin: Richard Haass, could the U.S. explain the difference between Japan and Taiwan? Richard Haass: I think we're kidding ourselves. **If China's allowed to take Taiwan, and the United States does not respond, Japan, Australia, India and every other country in that part of the world, including South Korea, will recalibrate their dependence on the United States.** It gives China tremendous geographic and strategic advantages to pressure its neighbors.

**Impact:** Deepening India-US relations are important because it helps stop Chinese hegemony in Asia.

Bajpae, Chietigj. "Why the US–India relationship needs a healthy dose of realism." *Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank*, October 8, 2024,

<https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/10/why-us-india-relationship-needs-healthy-dose-realism>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

**Deepening US–India relations have also coincided with a deterioration in Beijing’s relations with New Delhi and Washington. India has become less apprehensive about participating in US-led bilateral and Western multilateral initiatives, where it would have previously worried about offending China.** There has also been deepening US–India defence cooperation and a more collaborative approach to regional security and global governance, and both countries have voiced concerns about China’s behaviour. **For instance, India has become more willing to call out China’s actions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.** However, there are limits on the extent to which India would side with the US in a potential disagreement or conflict with China. This is rooted in India’s longstanding commitment to strategic autonomy in its foreign policy, which involves engaging all major poles of influence in the international system. **This means that while India will align itself closer to the US, it will remain well short of an alliance due to New Delhi’s strategic constraints – including its economic reliance on China and military reliance on Russia.** This introduces a degree of ambiguity over what role India would play in a potential US–China conflict over Taiwan for example.

**Impact:** Deepening India-US relations aid in India’s future economic growth.

“India-US trade: Unlocking a \$500bn potential amid challenges.” *Policy Circle*, October 1, 2024, <https://www.policycircle.org/economy/india-us-trade-challenges/>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

The deepening FDI relationship is also reflected in collaborations in advanced sectors like clean energy, defence, and technology. The signing of multiple agreements at global forums, including the G20, demonstrates both nations’ commitment to fostering industrial growth and innovation. **With bilateral trade hovering around \$200 billion,**

there is immense potential for India and the US to expand their economic partnership. The next phase of growth could see trade volumes reach \$500 billion, driven by sectors like clean energy, technology, pharmaceuticals, and defence. Both countries are already working to strengthen their strategic partnership, with recent dialogues focusing on issues like carbon capture, energy security, and agricultural trade. However, for this growth to materialise, several structural issues need to be addressed. Lowering trade barriers, harmonising regulatory standards, and establishing frameworks for digital and intellectual property trade will be essential. With the world's two largest democracies cooperating across sectors, the future of India-US trade looks promising—poised to become a critical driver of global economic growth.

**Analysis:** This argument is good because it builds on the fundamental idea that America's network of alliances all relies on other countries relying on America to uphold its promises regarding these alliances. You can use the warranting in this argument to really build on the idea that India is a very important partner for America. However, I think the better way to use this argument is as a subpoint in a larger case about the importance of American alliances.

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**CON: Protecting Taiwan strengthens US-Japan relations.**

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**Argument:** Japan looks at Taiwan for an example of how committed the US is to its allies. If the US pulls out, Japan will look towards other countries for protection.

**Warrant:** The United States has promised to defend Taiwan.

Brunnstorm, David and Trevor Hunnicutt. "Biden says U.S. forces would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion." *Reuters*, September 19, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-us-forces-would-defend-taiwan-event-chinese-invasion-2022-09-18>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

**U.S. President Joe Biden said U.S forces would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, his most explicit statement on the issue, drawing an angry response from China that said it sent the wrong signal to those seeking an independent Taiwan. Asked in a CBS 60 Minutes interview broadcast on Sunday whether U.S. forces would defend the democratically governed island claimed by China, he replied: "Yes, if in fact, there was an unprecedented attack." Asked to clarify if he meant that unlike in Ukraine, U.S. forces - American men and women - would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, Biden replied: "Yes." The CBS interview was just the latest time that Biden has appeared to go beyond long-standing stated U.S. policy on Taiwan, but his statement was clearer than previous ones about committing U.S. troops to the defend the island. The United States has long stuck to a policy of "strategic ambiguity" and not making clear whether it would respond militarily to an attack on Taiwan.**

**Warrant:** Japan relies on US military protection.



Kelly, Tim. "Explainer: Why Japan is seeking military ties beyond its U.S. ally." *Reuters*, January 13, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/why-japan-is-seeking-military-ties-beyond-its-us-ally-2023-01-13/>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

At the top of Japan's threat list is China, which it worries could attack Taiwan or nearby Japanese islands. Chinese military activity is intensifying around the East China Sea, including joint air and sea drills with Russia. At the same time, North Korea has fired missiles into the Sea of Japan, and in October lobbed an intermediate-range missile over Japan for the first time since 2017. **LONE ALLY For the past seven decades, Japan, which gave up the right to wage war after its defeat in World War Two, has relied on the United States for protection. In return for its promise to defend the country, the U.S. gets bases that allow it to maintain a major military presence in East Asia.** Japan hosts 54,000 American troops, hundreds of military aircraft, and dozens of warships led by Washington's only forward-deployed aircraft carrier.

**Warrant:** Japan is watching to see how the US reacts.

Colby, Elbridge. "The United States Should Defend Taiwan." *National Review*, December 2, 2021, <https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2021/12/20/the-united-states-should-defend-taiwan>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

This is because Taiwan's loss would require compensation in two key respects. **Washington's abandonment of Taiwan, even if deftly done (which cannot be presumed), would inevitably cause alarm in other important capitals, such as Manila, Seoul, and Tokyo, that they too would be on the chopping block if things got too hairy for America. In order to allay these well-grounded fears, Washington would very likely need to take dramatic steps to show its resolve and staying power,** steps that might be ill advised. Because of this, abandoning Taiwan might end up requiring a more aggressive and dangerous approach than seeking to defend it.

**Warrant:** Abandoning Japan would mean abandoning an ally that has also signed up for war.

Kuhn, Anthony. "After Being Silent For Decades, Japan Now Speaks Up About Taiwan — And Angers China." *NPR*, August 2, 2021, <https://www.npr.org/2021/07/26/1020866539/japans-position-on-defending-taiwan-has-taken-a-remarkable-shift>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

Mainland China and Taiwan split during a civil war in 1949, and Beijing has vowed to unify with the self-governing island — by force, if necessary. The Biden administration is counting on help from its allies, especially Japan, to deter such a move. For decades, Japan considered the Taiwan issue too politically sensitive to speak out about it publicly. Japan's military is focused on defense of its own territory and has no expeditionary forces to fight overseas. **But in recent weeks, top Japanese officials have said that if mainland China attacks the island, Japan should join the U.S. in defending it. "We have to protect Taiwan, as a democratic country," Japan's deputy defense minister, Yasuhide Nakayama, said in a conference in June.** Japan's shift in thinking comes as China has stepped up pressure on Taiwan, including sending fighter jets and warships around the island. But the bolder talk could also be driven by further moves by China.

**Warrant:** Japan will recalibrate its dependence on America.

Schiffrin, Nick and Dan Sagalyn. "Three experts on U.S. role and response options in Taiwan-China conflict." *PBS News*, December 15, 2021, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/three-experts-on-u-s-role-and-response-options-in-taiwan-china-conflict>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

Nick Schiffrin: Richard Haass, could the U.S. explain the difference between Japan and Taiwan? Richard Haass: I think we're kidding ourselves. **If China's allowed to take**

Taiwan, and the United States does not respond, Japan, Australia, India and every other country in that part of the world, including South Korea, will recalibrate their dependence on the United States. It gives China tremendous geographic and strategic advantages to pressure its neighbors.

**Impact:** A strong relationship with Japan is very important economically.

Office of the Spokesperson. "Reaffirming the Unbreakable U.S.-Japan Alliance." *United States Department of State*, March 14, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/reaffirming-the-unbreakable-u-s-japan-alliance>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

With over \$300 billion worth of goods and services exchanged each year, the United States and Japan are top trading partners, and the U.S.-Japan bilateral economic relationship is one of strongest in the world. Japan-affiliated firms employ or support more than 948,100 jobs in the United States. The United States is Japan's top source of direct investment, and Japan is the top investor in the United States, with \$644.7 billion invested in 2019 across all 50 states. Both countries acknowledge the important role of women as drivers of economic progress in all sectors. The United States and Japan are working closely via whole-of-government initiatives, bilateral partnerships, cooperation with like-minded countries, and enhanced private-sector engagement to assist countries in the Indo-Pacific and across the globe to catalyze investment in infrastructure, energy, and the digital economy to promote connectivity and economic growth.

**Impact:** A strong US-Japanese alliance is very important for the US's military and social interests.

Office of the Spokesperson. "Reaffirming the Unbreakable U.S.-Japan Alliance." *United States Department of State*, March 14, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/reaffirming-the-unbreakable-u-s-japan-alliance>. Accessed October 8, 2024.

**The U.S.-Japan Alliance has served as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and across the world for over six decades.** We are committed to working together on our shared challenges, including curbing the global COVID-19 pandemic, combatting climate change, strengthening democracy and human rights, promoting free and fair trade, and countering malign influences and PRC provocations in Asia and around the world. **The American and Japanese people share deeply rooted values of defending freedom, championing economic and social opportunity and inclusion, upholding human rights, respecting the rule of law, and treating every person with dignity.** The peoples of Japan and the United States support each other in times of need. Japan was one of the first countries to offer assistance following the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina, and Americans are proud to have supported Japan in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake, ten years ago this month, through Operation Tomodachi.

**Analysis:** This argument is good because it highlights the importance of the special connection that the United States has with Japan. Considering that the US-Japanese alliance is between two of the most important countries in the world, it is a really important alliance. Make sure that you stress this point to your judge. You should also make sure that your judge understands exactly why an American pull out of Taiwan would be bad for Japan.

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**CON: Reducing protections for Taiwan encourages Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons.**

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**Argument:** Taiwan currently feels secure enough because of their substantial protection by the US. If that were to go away, Taiwan would start to develop nuclear weapons to continue to feel safe.

**Warrant:** Taiwan once worked on developing nuclear weapons.

Menton, Jane and Andrew Reddle. "Taiwan Can't Shake Its Nuclear Ghosts." *Foreign Policy*, March 14, 2024, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/14/taiwan-nuclear-energy-weapons-policy-history>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

**In 1955, Taiwan and the United States reached an agreement for cooperation on the peaceful uses of atomic energy that kick-started Taiwan's nuclear program, allowing the KMT government to obtain key technologies and send scientists and military personnel abroad for training and education.** Although Taipei officially renounced nuclear weapons in exchange for Washington's assistance with civilian projects, in practice leaders hedged their bets, cultivating expertise that could be directed toward other ends. **Taiwan's covert nuclear weapons program began in earnest following China's first successful nuclear test in 1964.** The test shattered Taiwan's sense of security. Although the United States had committed itself to Taiwan in the 1955 Mutual Defense Treaty, the KMT government feared abandonment, especially after the White House rebuffed its calls to strike mainland Chinese nuclear facilities. Leaders also worried that proliferation would bolster Beijing's status in the international community at Taipei's expense. Once Beijing crossed this threshold, the KMT government doubled down on its own nuclear weapons program. To spearhead these efforts, leaders established the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research, which was closely linked to the

military—although the government publicly insisted that its activities were exclusively civilian. **In 1969, Taiwan purchased a natural uranium-fueled, heavy water-moderated research reactor, known as the Taiwan Research Reactor, from Canada. (This kind of reactor is conducive to the production of weapons-grade plutonium.) From there, the government tried to acquire other critical technologies, including plutonium reprocessing facilities, from foreign suppliers**—although Washington, increasingly suspicious of Taipei's intentions, thwarted many of these sales. Nevertheless, Taiwan's weaponization research and indigenous capabilities progressed, albeit at a smaller scale and slower pace than originally planned.

**Warrant:** US protection is the reason nuclear development stopped.

Mizokami, Kyle. "China's Greatest Fear Almost Came True: Taiwan Armed with Nuclear Weapons." *The National Interest*, February 26, 2024, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/chinas-greatest-fear-almost-came-true-taiwan-armed-nuclear-weapons-209656>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

Taiwan's nuclear weapons program, initiated in response to China's first nuclear test in 1964, aimed to balance military threats by developing its own nuclear arsenal. Despite the potential for deterrence, the United States, fearing escalation with China, pressured Taiwan to halt its efforts. The program, which began in earnest in 1967, sought to develop either tactical or city-killing nuclear capabilities, with efforts including the acquisition of a heavy-water reactor and attempts at plutonium stockpiling. However, **U.S. surveillance and diplomatic interventions, combined with IAEA inspections revealing program discrepancies, led to repeated U.S. demands for Taiwan to cease its nuclear ambitions. The program's definitive end came in 1988, following the defection of a key Taiwanese scientist to the U.S.,** averting a major postwar crisis in Asia but also closing a chapter on Taiwan's pursuit of a nuclear deterrent against China.

**Warrant:** Taiwan sees nuclear weapons as a way to protect itself from Chinese aggression.

Anderson, James. "The Next Taiwan Crisis Will (Almost) Certainly Involve Nuclear Threats." *U.S. Naval Institute*, March 2024, <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/march/next-taiwan-crisis-will-almost-certainly-involve-nuclear-threats>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

Washington's interest in counterproliferation is another reason to take the growth of China's nuclear arsenal seriously. **In this vein, recall that Taiwan pursued a nuclear weapons program for decades before relinquishing its nuclear ambitions in the 1980s. Taipei's leaders may be tempted to restart the island's long-defunct nuclear program if they conclude no other course of action can deter a Chinese invasion.** Then-President Lee Teng-hui declared Taiwan was reconsidering its nuclear option during the July 1995 crisis with China, though he walked back his statement a few days later. Taiwan has given no indication it is presently reconsidering its nonnuclear status, but its calculus could change over time.

**Warrant:** China would feel threatened.

Mizokami, Kyle. "China's Greatest Fear Almost Came True: Taiwan Armed with Nuclear Weapons." *The National Interest*, February 26, 2024, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/chinas-greatest-fear-almost-came-true-taiwan-armed-nuclear-weapons-209656>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

**Another, far worse possibility is that Taiwan could have developed a larger, city-killing bomb. This could have been used to threaten Beijing directly, trading the destruction of one government for another, and would have been a more useful deterrent.** Still, the 1,800-mile distance it would take to deliver a nuke on Beijing was at the time as insurmountable as the Taiwan Strait itself. Not even Israel had the technology to assist

in developing long-range missiles or aircraft to deliver such a nuke. Taiwan's nuclear-weapons program, although understandable, was ill considered. **A Taiwanese-Chinese nuclear standoff would have destabilized the entire region—ironic, considering Taiwan was seeking nuclear weapons to stabilize its defense posture. There was really no military dilemma that Taiwanese nuclear weapons would have decisively solved;** any strike would have only been made worse by the inevitable Chinese nuclear counterattack.

**Impact:** Nuclear war's further impact would kill billions around the world.

Tegmark, Max. "Here's How Bad a Nuclear War Would Actually Be." *TIME*, June 29, 2023, <https://time.com/6290977/nuclear-war-impact-essay/>. Accessed October 9, 2024.

This makes Earth freezing cold even during the summer, with farmland in Kansas cooling by about 20 degrees centigrade (about 40 degrees Fahrenheit), and other regions cooling almost twice as much. **A recent scientific paper estimates that over 5 billion people could starve to death, including around 99% of those in the US, Europe, Russia, and China – because most black carbon smoke stays in the Northern hemisphere where it's produced, and because temperature drops harm agriculture more at high latitudes.**

**Analysis:** The sheer magnitude and scope of this argument make it a good argument. To be honest, the key to winning this argument is the fact that the only option Taiwan will see for protection without the US is nuclear weapons. If you can win that link, you're basically set to win the debate. Even if you aren't fully winning on the probability debate (which you probably won't be), you can still win on the weighing debate by highlighting the devastation of the impact of this argument.



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**CON: Relations with Taiwan help the US maintain a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.**

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**Argument:** Strong relations with Taiwan help the US maintain a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

**Warrant:** Taiwan has major implications for US security.

Sacks, David. "Why is Taiwan Important to the United States?" Council on Foreign Relations, June 20, 2023, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-taiwan-important-united-states>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**While the United States is thousands of miles from Taiwan, the island's fate will have major implications for U.S. security and prosperity.** What happens in the Taiwan Strait will also bear on fundamental questions of international order and the future of democracy. Our recent Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored Independent Task Force Report, U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era: Responding to a More Assertive China, explains that the United States has vital strategic interests at stake in the Taiwan Strait and examines how the United States should protect these interests. Taiwan sits in an important position in the world's most economically consequential region. As Assistant Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner noted, **"Taiwan is located at a critical node within the first island chain, anchoring a network of U.S. allies and partners—stretching from the Japanese archipelago down to the Philippines and into the South China Sea—that is critical to the region's security and critical to the defense of vital U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific."** Taiwan's inherent military value cannot be wished away.

**Warrant:** Increased ties with Taiwan are key to preserving the international liberal order.

Lai, Christina. "US-Taiwan Relations and the Future of the Liberal Order." Army War College Publications, March 7, 2024, <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/News/Display/Article/3706524/us-taiwan-relations-and-the-future-of-the-liberal-order/>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**Strengthening ties with Taiwan is the best chance the United States has to preserve the liberal international order in Asia and improve its security relative to China.** This study offers a normative perspective on how **Taiwan can contribute to US-led international institutions and the Asian regional order and reduce conflict risk.** It concludes with recommendations for the United States and its partners to integrate Taiwan into multilateral institutions in Asia. After World War II, the United States and its Western allies set up international institutions characterized by liberal ideas (such as liberal democracy, the free market, and the rule of law). This system is known as the liberal international order. The US effort to uphold the LIO has encountered increasing challenges from authoritarian countries such as China and Russia, who pick and choose among the existing rules and exploit them. In the context of China-Taiwan relations, a realist perspective might argue that China, with its rising capabilities, would try to take control of Taiwan and exert greater influence in Asia in the near future.

**Warrant:** Peace in Taiwan is crucial to peace in Asia.

Blanchette, Jude, Ryan Haas, and Lily McElwee. "Building International Support for Taiwan." Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 13, 2024, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-international-support-taiwan>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**It is widely accepted that much of the world's economic growth and dynamism over the coming decades will emanate from Asia.** The region was projected to contribute roughly 70 percent of global growth in 2023 and is home to nearly two-thirds (60 percent) of the

world's population.[9] **In the coming years, Asia's importance to global security and prosperity will only grow. The region's upward trajectory is predicated on stability and the continued free flow of goods and services. And these factors are dependent upon the maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The more Taiwan comes to be viewed as critical to regional stability on its own terms and, by extension, global prosperity, the more invested other stakeholders will be in its security.** Preservation of peace and stability is the common interest that unites G7 advanced democracies with developing economies and transcends every continent. If there is a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, every leader on every continent would have to manage an external shock that would be greater than the effects of the war in Ukraine and the Covid-19 pandemic combined.

**Impact:** Strategic ambiguity prevents peace.

Chinoy, Sujan "The Taiwan Factor in the US's Regional Posture." Observer Research Foundation, December 18, 2023, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-taiwan-factor-in-the-us-s-regional-posture>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**The US has long grappled with the Taiwan issue. So far, its policy of 'strategic ambiguity' has deterred the use of force by the People's Republic of China (PRC).** It is a moot question if this policy can be sustained to counter the PRC's assertive military posture in the Taiwan Strait. The question before the US is whether it can deter an invasion and avoid a war with the PRC, simultaneously. The PRC is determined to seek reunification and has not ruled out the use of force. If force is used, the US will likely be drawn into the conflict. On the other hand, **if the US stands by and watches without intervening as the Taiwan cookie crumbles, US presence, prestige, and power in the region will never quite be the same again. Therefore, the US needs to inject clarity in its positions, particularly whether it would militarily defend Taiwan.** In light of the growing Chinese threat to Taiwan, the real question is whether current US policy will be able to

deter an invasion and avoid a war in the Taiwan Strait simultaneously. It is instructive to look back a little in history when the Republic of China (ROC) was a permanent member of the UN Security Council and continued to be recognised as such even after the Nationalists fled to Taiwan in 1949 and claimed to represent the whole of China as part of the ROC, while enjoyed the US's diplomatic recognition.

**Impact:** Substantive improvement in Taiwanese defense boosts US-Taiwan relations.

Lin, Fei-Fan. "Substance, symbolism, and Taiwan-US relations." Brookings Institute, October 12, 2023, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/substance-symbolism-and-taiwan-us-relations/>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

However, the Tsai administration has not officially taken a stance on this issue. In my observation, **Taiwan-U.S. relations have progressed in a more substantive direction. Both Taipei and Washington have acknowledged the importance of their close coordination in managing regional risks in recent years.** Nevertheless, this does not mean that there are no differences in views between Taiwan and the United States. In fact, **there is ongoing debate on the symbolic versus substantive dimensions of their relationship**, particularly concerning the complexities of risk management. Certain perspectives argue that **emphasizing symbolic improvements in Taiwan-U.S. relations may result in heightened risks to regional stability due to China's increasing assertiveness. The United States, therefore, tends to consider progress in enhancing Taiwan's actual defense capabilities to be of substantive significance. Notably, Taiwan does not adopt a diplomatic strategy that favors symbolism over substance in its interactions with the United States. More than anything, leaders in the country prioritize efforts to strengthen its defense preparations, its economy, and other crucial aspects through meaningful cooperation with the United States.**

**Explanation:** This argument includes strong groundwork for a link about the balance of power in the Indo-Pac region and could be boosted with some analysis about Taiwan's strategically important location, the way they can act as an anchor for US values in Asia, and why this means we should be invested in Taiwanese security. The final card in this argument has an interesting narrative about substantive interaction with Taiwan being less likely than symbolic improvements in relations to provoke China.

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**CON: Support for Taiwan affirms US commitment to its allies.**

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Argument: Support for Taiwan affirms US commitment to its allies and shores up faith in our other alliances.

**Warrant:** Losing Taiwan causes an arms race in Asia.

Chinoy, Sujan. "The Taiwan Factor in the US's Regional Posture." Observer Research Foundation, December 18, 2023, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-taiwan-factor-in-the-us-s-regional-posture>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

From the point of view of the strategic balance of power in the Western Pacific, **Taiwan's fall would be a huge breach in the first island chain; it would pave the way for the expansion and projection of Chinese naval power into the Pacific Ocean, both surface and sub-surface.** This, in turn, could threaten Guam, the US naval presence throughout the Western Pacific, and commercial shipping and other sea lanes of communication in Micronesia, Polynesia, and Melanesia, all the way down to Papua New Guinea and Australia. **Japan would be most traumatised by US inaction on Taiwan. In such an eventuality, it would probably rush to acquire nuclear weapons and, over time, see little value in a US security presence and security umbrella.** It may be tempted to reach a modus vivendi with the PRC, to buy peace backed by a nuclear deterrence of its own, and perhaps even run the risk of being relegated to a second-class status in the region. The economic interdependence for such a scenario already exists between the two nations. **If Japan goes nuclear, South Korea will not be far behind in seeking a nuclear deterrence of its own against the independent threats posed by North Korea, the PRC, and Japan in the long term. Equally, the fall of Taiwan, accompanied by US inaction, could convince South Korea to abandon its new Indo-Pacific vision and revert to past policies centred around the Korean peninsula and China.** Australia, another country

heavily dependent on the PRC's market for its own prosperity, may also be tempted to revert to the past when economic logic trumped all else.

**Warrant:** Bilateral security arrangements are specifically key to preventing this arms race.

Chinoy, Sujan. "The Taiwan Factor in the US's Regional Posture." Observer Research Foundation, December 18, 2023, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-taiwan-factor-in-the-us-s-regional-posture>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

Not being able to live up to the expectations of the TRA, especially **not being able to prevent a forceful takeover of Taiwan, would be a huge body blow to US prestige and credibility. US prevarication on this issue, on the grounds that it does not have a formal treaty in place to defend Taiwan, would send the wrong message to Japan and South Korea. Their faith in the bilateral security arrangements with the US would plummet. US inaction could lead Japan and South Korea to seek their own nuclear deterrence and, alongside,** search for a new accommodation within a Chinese sphere of influence in north-east Asia. A military takeover of Taiwan by the PRC could lead Japan, South Korea, and many others to review the risks involved in hosting US bases and forces. The US policy of strategic ambiguity does not lend itself easily to deterring a possible use of force by the PRC in the Taiwan Strait. The US needs to inject clarity in its positions, particularly whether it would intervene militarily to deter China or to defend Taiwan. It is a moot point if the US and its allies are coalescing their positions to send a stronger signal to deter the PRC. A peaceful reunification between China and Taiwan is a moot question. However, **if the people of Taiwan somehow become convinced that the US will not come to their defence in the event of a military takeover by China, it could make them more resigned to a potential fait accompli. It could make them more amenable to the idea of reunification within a shorter timeframe. After all, contacts, and exchanges on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have been burgeoning recently, and living standards are**

more compatible now. If the Taiwan cookie crumbles, US posture, prestige, and power in the region will never quite be the same again.

**Warrant:** The Taiwan strait has profound implications for US allies.

Sacks, David. "Why is Taiwan Important to the United States?" Council on Foreign Relations, June 20, 2023, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-taiwan-important-united-states>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**What happens in the Taiwan Strait will have enormous implications for the future of U.S. alliances in the region**, which constitute Washington's most important asymmetric advantage over Beijing. **If the United States chose to stand aside in the face of Chinese aggression against Taiwan and China successfully annexed the island, it would be only seventy miles from Japanese territory and 120 miles from the Philippines. U.S. allies would come to question whether the United States would or even could come to their defense.** Having lost confidence in the U.S. commitment to their security, allies would contemplate either accommodating China or hedging against it by growing their militaries or even developing nuclear weapons. **Either outcome would result in diminished U.S. influence and increased regional and global instability.**

**Impact:** A strong US coalition in Asia prevents Chinese expansion.

Colby, Elbridge. "Why Protecting Taiwan Really Matters to the U.S." Time, October 11, 2023, <https://time.com/6221072/why-protecting-taiwan-really-matters-to-the-u-s/>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

In this context, **America's goal should be to prevent China from dominating Asia without a war.** That is the optimal aim: a decent peace without war. **But the only prudent way to achieve that goal is to be prepared to fight in a way that shows Beijing it just will not**



**gain if it starts a conflict.** This is a cliché: if you want peace prepare for war. But the reason it is so clichéd is that it is deeply rooted common sense. **The key to achieving this goal—of blocking China from dominating Asia—is a coalition.** The need for this coalition is not rooted in anything about “sacred” alliances or the rules-based international order. It is practical reality necessary to achieve this aim. **The U.S. needs a coalition because it is neither realistic nor fair for Americans to take on the enormous task of blunting Beijing’s ambitions alone. Fortunately, there are many countries in Asia that have the will and the way to help stand up to China, like India, Japan, Australia, and Taiwan itself.** The key, though, is to make sure this coalition works—that it stands up and holds together in the face of Chinese pressure and, if necessary, aggression. But we cannot take that for granted. Countries in Asia are quite reasonably wondering whether it is prudent to stand up to China. Most do not want to live under Beijing’s thumb, but if the alternative is disaster and exclusion from all the goods Beijing has to offer, they are much more likely to cut a deal.

**Impact:** A US coalition boosts democracy in Asia.

Blanchette, Jude, Ryan Haas, and Lily McElwee. “Building International Support for Taiwan.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 13, 2024, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-international-support-taiwan>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

Asked in 2023 if they would back sending Australian military personnel, support is much lower, at 42 percent, although it could be argued that this is relatively high compared with other democratic and regional nations. **In some ways, smaller democracies take their political cues from the United States. After all, it is only the United States that can offer credible military deterrence to a Chinese takeover of Taiwan.** Therein lies both the problem and the solution. Countries such as Australia not only have to deal with their

own public, but they also have to work with like-minded countries to influence debate in the United States as well. And that is a steep mountain to climb.

**Explanation:** This argument says that decreasing military support to Taiwan convinces Taiwan that the US will not defend it, making them more amenable to the idea of reunification. That's bad because reunification wipes out US power in the region, not only because we lose Taiwan but because other US allies become more amenable to Chinese hegemony. Teams should read this evidence and use the rhetoric from it more maximum narrative impact.

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**CON: Aid to Taiwan demonstrates US support for democracy.**

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**Argument:** Aid to Taiwan demonstrates US investment in democratic strongholds in the world.

**Warrant:** US investment must be framed as peaceful but committed to defense.

Blanchette, Jude, Ryan Hass, and Lily McElwee. "Building International Support for Taiwan." Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 13, 2024, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-international-support-taiwan>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

To counter this narrative, the United States should become bolder in explaining the logic of its actions to preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. U.S. officials should publicly rebut suggestions that **the United States** views Taiwan as a tool for use in competition with China, or that the United States has designs on Taiwan's ultimate status in relation to the People's Republic of China (PRC). It **should frame its goals around preserving peace and keeping open space for leaders in Beijing and Taipei to ultimately arrive at a peaceful resolution of their differences**. This should reflect the will of the people of Taiwan, who have democratic agency to express their preferences. Such an eventual goal may seem remote or even impossible, given the political trajectory in China under Xi Jinping, but in keeping open the prospect for some form of peaceful reconciliation, U.S. officials can puncture Chinese efforts to paint the United States as the destabilizing actor in the Taiwan Strait. **Washington needs to present itself as not seeking a fight with China over Taiwan, but rather as being credible, principled, and firm in its defense of Taiwan's security, prosperity, and democratic way of life.**

**Warrant:** Taiwan's involvement supports the Liberal International Order (LIO).

Lai, Christina. "US-Taiwan Relations and the Future of the Liberal Order." Army War College Publication, March 7, 2024, <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/News/Display/Article/3706524/us-taiwan-relations-and-the-future-of-the-liberal-order/>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**After World War II, the United States and its Western allies set up international institutions characterized by liberal ideas (such as liberal democracy, the free market, and the rule of law). This system is known as the liberal international order. The US effort to uphold the LIO has encountered increasing challenges from authoritarian countries such as China and Russia, who pick and choose among the existing rules and exploit them.** In the context of China-Taiwan relations, a realist perspective might argue that China, with its rising capabilities, would try to take control of Taiwan and exert greater influence in Asia in the near future. This scenario is certainly possible, given the intense power competition between the United States and China. Although the LIO has fostered unprecedented cooperation among states in Europe, East Asia, and North America since 1945, this concept remains highly contested in international relations. This article offers a common understanding of the LIO: states and non-state actors follow rules, norms, and legal procedures in international affairs. The rules-based aspect is a constitutive part of the Asian regional order. The future of Taiwan and the Asian regional order also depends on the resilience of the LIO and other middle-power states in the Asia-Pacific. While liberalists are confident that the LIO will remain strong even following America's recent decline, some have questioned whether the LIO was ever liberal at all. Still others suggest that new forums or alternative institutional settings might emerge to regulate economic affairs and global politics. **Despite their contested meanings, this article centers on the fundamental elements underpinning the current US-led LIO: democracy, free trade, and international institutions. It also highlights how Taiwan can significantly strengthen the LIO in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.**

**Turn:** Taiwan and the LIO are heavily intertwined.

Sacks, David. "Why is Taiwan Important to the United States?" Council on Foreign Relations, June 20, 2023, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-taiwan-important-united-states>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**Taiwan's fate also has implications for the most fundamental tenets of international order. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, if China were to successfully absorb Taiwan despite Taiwanese resistance, it would establish a pattern of authoritarian countries using force to attack democratic neighbors and change borders.** One of the most basic pillars of international relations—that countries cannot use force to alter borders—would be severely undermined. **Politically, Taiwan is one of Asia's few democratic success stories and by some measures the region's freest society.** Its open political system demonstrates to China's citizens that there is an alternative path of development for a majority ethnically Chinese society. **If China were to take Taiwan by force, Taiwan's democracy would be extinguished, and its twenty-three million people would see their rights severely curtailed. As this would come in the wake of China's crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong, the ramifications would be even greater.**

**Impact:** If China expands, tens of millions of lives are at risk.

Edwards, Lee. "U.S. Must Defend Taiwan's Independence." Heritage Foundation, October 21, 2021, <https://internationalpolicy.org/publications/taiwan-tensions-with-china-five-recommendations-for-us-policy/>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**The looming Taiwan crisis presents the U.S. with the opportunity to follow a balanced policy of idealism and realism. On the idealistic side, Taiwan warrants our backing because it is a vibrant democracy.** It was a stalwart ally during World War II, engaging an estimated one million Japanese troops who otherwise would have defended Japan in the event of a U.S. invasion. In addition, **we should be concerned with the fate of the 24**

**million people of Taiwan if they should become vassals of China's expanding authoritarian regime.**

**Impact:** US support bolsters Taiwan's morale and resolve.

Hass, Ryan and Jude Blanchette. "How the United States Can Support Taiwan's Democracy." Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 15, 2023, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-united-states-can-support-taiwans-democracy>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**First, the United States' overriding interest is in a healthy, resilient, and confident Taiwan. A core pillar of this is its consistent and predictable democratic process, which depends on a competitive multiparty system and most importantly, the free expression of the will of the Taiwan electorate.** The people of Taiwan have agency for their own future through their democratic processes. The more that U.S. leaders elide Taiwan's own interests, the less influence the United States will have over Taiwan's future choices. As a foremost supporter of Taiwan's democracy, U.S. leaders need to act with an awareness of the importance of supporting Taiwan's competitive multiparty system as a whole and resist the temptation to favor a given party or candidate. Just as U.S. voters and electoral candidates expect foreign leaders to remain out of our domestic politics, U.S. officials should remain on the sidelines of Taiwan's democratic process.

**Explanation:** This argument is premised on the idea that Taiwan is one of the freest countries in the Indo-Pac region and that it is important to the millions of people in Taiwan that they continue to be free. The US demonstrates it has a stake in the Taiwanese people by supporting their security. If we do not continue militarily supporting Taiwan, there's an ever-larger threat of it coming under China's authoritarian rule.

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## CON: Increasing military support deters China from using force for reunification.

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**Argument:** Military support for Taiwan deters China from using force for reunification.

**Warrant:** The US can use its power in Asia to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Lai, Christina. "US-Taiwan Relations and the Future of the Liberal Order." Army War College Publications, March 7, 2024, <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/News/Display/Article/3706524/us-taiwan-relations-and-the-future-of-the-liberal-order/>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**Deterring a military conflict between China and Taiwan is certainly no easy task**, given the power shift toward China and geographical challenges in East Asia. **Nevertheless, the United States and its partners in Asia can still leverage their collective and technological advantages to raise the cost of a possible Chinese attack amidst China's continued provocations.** This article provides a roadmap for the United States and its allies on the means and ends to stabilize regional order and secure Taiwan's autonomy. **These goals will require real and sustained US support for Taiwan's participation in multilateral institutions**, and US initiatives could gradually gain support from other like-minded countries in Asia and beyond.

**Warrant:** A tough US posture is key to deterring a forcible takeover of Taiwan.

Chinoy, Sujan. "The Taiwan Factor in the US's Regional Posture." Observer Research Foundation, December 18, 2023, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-taiwan-factor-in-the-us-s-regional-posture>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**If the PRC is to be deterred from attempting a forcible takeover of Taiwan, the US needs to maintain a tough political and military stand against reunification by force, reinforced by the exhortation that peaceful resolution through dialogue and negotiations remains the only way forward.** Anything short of that is tantamount to turning a blind eye to China's aggressive forays and incremental probing of the limits of the so-called policy of strategic ambiguity. **At stake is the US's credibility.** The US has been the most important factor in ensuring the balance of power and stability in the Asia Pacific since the Second World War. It entered two wars, in the Korean peninsula and Vietnam, to prevent abrupt unilateral change in that balance of power by states and ideologies inimical to the interests of the US and the liberal order. **Despite mixed success in Korea and a denouement in Vietnam, the intent and messaging emanating from Washington was strong and reassuring. Clearly, such a position contributed to regional stability. As such, the need of the hour is for the US to maintain a steady and tough line in the context of Taiwan.**

**Warrant:** US and partners are key to deterring conflict in Asia.

Blanchette, Jude, Ryan Hass, and Lily McElwee. "Building International Support for Taiwan." Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 13, 2024, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-international-support-taiwan>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**If the United States is to meet Beijing's growing threats to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, it must build a strong coalition capable of meaningfully supporting Taiwan and willing to send credible deterrent signals to China.** Toward this end, Washington needs a granular understanding of why Taiwan matters to key international stakeholders, what tolerance for risk these partners are willing to bear, and what strategic narratives on Taiwan resonate with their leaders and polities. Importantly, U.S. leaders must also appreciate that their actions and statements can either strengthen or



undercut efforts to forge international unity behind preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. **Building such a coalition is key to deterring conflict and preserving Taiwan's space to grow as a prosperous and resilient democracy. The broader and deeper the coalition of stakeholders, the more unmistakable the signal to Beijing that it would pay a significant price for escalating pressure on Taiwan.**

**Impact:** A Chinese invasion costs millions to the global economy.

Blanchette, Jude, Ryan Hass, and Lily McElwee. "Building International Support for Taiwan." Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 13, 2024, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-international-support-taiwan>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

U.S. efforts to build greater cohesion among partners also reflect the reality that Taiwan has become an issue of global consequence. The economic, financial, and supply chain impacts of any instability in the Taiwan Strait would be felt in every country and community that is connected to the global economy. **Given the centrality of Taiwan's exports of semiconductors and intermediate goods, any type of crisis in the waters surrounding Taiwan would bring global value chains to a grinding halt and cause a seizing up of international trade. One recent estimate from Bloomberg finds that a conflict in the Taiwan Strait might cost the global economy nearly \$10 trillion.**

**Impact:** The stakes of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan are incredibly high.

Sacks, David. "Why is Taiwan Important to the United States?" Council on Foreign Relations, June 20, 2023, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-taiwan-important-united-states>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

The stakes are clear, which is why **the United States needs to redouble its efforts to deter China from using force or coercion to achieve unification with Taiwan.** While a military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait is neither imminent nor inevitable, the chances of one are increasing. **U.S. policy toward Taiwan needs to evolve to contend with a more capable, assertive, and risk-acceptant China that is increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo.**

**Explanation:** This is a fairly stock argument which says that a strong US-Taiwan relationship deters any attempt at forcible reunification. This argument is stock because it's strong and has a lot of truth value, so teams should hammer in the fundamental principle that raising the costs of an invasion for China makes it less likely that they will try that.

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**CON: Military support could lead to useful intelligence for the US.**

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**Argument:** Continued support facilitates a strategic partnership with Taiwan, including intelligence-sharing that is valuable to the US.

**Warrant:** There is intelligence sharing between Taiwan and the US in the status quo.

Blanchard, Ben. "Relations between Taiwan and the United States." Reuters, July 17, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/relations-between-taiwan-united-states-2024-07-17/>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**The U.S. does maintain some military personnel in Taiwan for training purposes, and Taiwan sends its F-16 pilots to be trained at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona. Senior Taiwan defence officials also visit the United States, and intelligence sharing takes place too.** The U.S. retains a large de facto embassy in Taipei called the American Institute in Taiwan, staffed by diplomats. The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office is the name of Taiwan's de facto embassy in the United States.

**Warrant:** Taiwan's military intelligence is growing through cooperation with the United States and "Five Eyes".

Hsiao, Russell. "Taiwan's Military Intelligence Undergoing Reforms amid Growing Threats from the PLA." Global Taiwan Institute, August 9, 2023, <https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/08/taiwans-military-intelligence-undergoing-reforms-amid-growing-threats-from-the-pla/>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

Reflecting the enhanced intelligence cooperation between the two sides, Yang was also reportedly invited to the CIA headquarters for an exchange. **Since assuming office, Yang is reported to have made at least two visits to the United States. It is perhaps**

**unsurprising that Yang's ascendance to the head of the MIB came amid deepening intelligence cooperation between the United States and Taiwan to respond to and counter China's growing military threats.** Having served as deputy chief for intelligence, Yang is well-positioned to coordinate the intelligence collection firepower of the MIB in terms of targeting and aligning with joint objectives. Yang also has many years of experience serving as a military attaché abroad that he can apply to his current job. **As a further sign of Taiwan's expanding intelligence cooperation under Tsai, in April 2023 the new NSB Director-General Tsai revealed that Taiwan can now exchange real-time intelligence with the "Five Eyes" alliance of the United States, Canada, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.** "We can connect with the 'Five Eyes' alliance through a confidential system," Tsai reportedly stated.

**Warrant:** American military support is key to maintaining this intelligence sharing.

Symonds, Peter. "US to sell drones to Taiwan in provocative intelligence-sharing plan."  
World Socialist Web, June 11, 2023,  
<https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2023/06/12/itor-j12.html>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

The Financial Times (FT) revealed last week that **plans are well underway in the US to sell four MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones to Taiwan to provide intelligence on Chinese naval movements, to be shared in real time with both the American and Japanese militaries.** The US Department of Defence approved the sale of the drones in May but has not commented on the intelligence-sharing arrangement, reportedly disclosed to the FT by four sources. The decision is a further step in integrating Taiwan into US war plans against China and underscores the absurdity of US claims that it still upholds a "One China" policy under which it de facto recognises Taiwan as part of China. **Washington is not only supplying military hardware, as it has done in the past, but drawing Taipei into its framework of military alliances in the Indo-Pacific directed against China.**

**Impact:** Intelligence sharing is key to counter a Chinese invasion.

Chen, Liang-chih Evans. "Let Taiwan and the Quad Fight Side by Side: How Can the Quad Incorporate Taiwan into Its Military Deterrence against China?" Air University Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, April 1, 2022, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2979897/let-taiwan-and-the-quad-fight-side-by-side-how-can-the-quad-incorporate-taiwan/>. Accessed October 12, 2024.

**Because the PLA's amphibious assaults would be launched from military bases and positions on China's coastline (most likely in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Guangdong), Taiwan and the Quad would need to target these potential military facilities and bases.** As the PLA's invasion of Taiwan and landing operations would rely heavily on naval vessels, especially amphibious forces and transport docks, it is strongly recommended that Taiwan and the Quad concentrate their fire on attacking the PLAN's amphibious transport docks, such as the Type 071 landing platform dock and Type 075 landing helicopter dock, and later, the warships and facilities. Specifically, compared to its Chinese counterpart, the Quad-Taiwan joint force should preserve their advantage of control of the air and sea. Without amphibious transport docks, it is less likely that the PLA could conduct a successful amphibious assault and landing operation. To achieve this strategic goal, the Quad-Taiwan force's surface-to-surface and antiship missile capability needs to be bolstered. **Additionally, the allies need to reinforce their surveillance capability and intelligence sharing, particularly those related to any movements of the PLA's amphibious vessels and personnel. Similarly, the Chinese airborne troops are the target as well, although they are not as significant as the PLAN's amphibious ones at this moment.**

**Explanation:** This argument says that Taiwan is the source of a lot of the US's intelligence about China, so if our bilateral relationship deteriorates the US won't be able to access this information. This makes us less able to assess China as a security risk in any other aspect of global relations. Teams should pay attention to the weighing here and pay special attention to the Air University card, which is very information dense.

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## CON: Reducing military support for Taiwan could create regional instability.

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**Argument:** Reducing military support for Taiwan could embolden China to be more aggressive in the region.

**Warrant:** China has been increasing its military activities near Taiwan in recent years.

Davidson, Helen. "China begins military drills around Taiwan after US speaker meeting."  
The Guardian, April 7, 2023,  
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/08/china-to-hold-military-drills-around-taiwan-after-us-speaker-meeting>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

**China's military has sent dozens of planes across the Taiwan Strait median line, just hours after announcing three days of drills around Taiwan in response to the island's president, Tsai Ing-wen, visiting the US and meeting the House speaker.** Tsai met the speaker, Kevin McCarthy, while in Los Angeles in Wednesday, angering Beijing, which claims Taiwan as a Chinese province it intends to annex. **On Saturday morning, less than 24 hours after Tsai's return home, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) said it would hold "combat readiness patrols" and exercises in the Taiwan Strait and to the north, south and east of Taiwan "as planned".** The exercises are focused on "testing the ability to seize sea control, air control, and information control", state media said. **A few hours later Taiwan's defence ministry said it had detected 42 PLA fighter jets and eight warships in Taiwan's air defence identification zone (ADIZ), with up to 29 of the planes crossing the median line – the de facto border in the Taiwan Strait.** The PLA has sent planes and ships into the ADIZ on a near daily basis in recent years and, since the drills last August, has increased the frequency of median line crossings.

**Warrant:** U.S. military support has been a key factor in deterring Chinese aggression towards Taiwan.

Mastro, Oriana Skyler. "This Is What America Is Getting Wrong About China and Taiwan." Stanford University, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Oct. 18, 2023, <https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/what-america-getting-wrong-about-china-and-taiwan>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

**For a half-century, America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance.** That equilibrium has been upset. China is building up and flexing its military power; hostile rhetoric emanates from both Beijing and Washington. War seems likelier each day. It's not too late to restore the kind of balance that helped to keep the peace for decades, but it will require taking steps to ease China's concerns. This will be difficult because of Chinese intransigence and the overheated atmosphere prevailing in Washington. But it is worth the political risk if it prevents war. **Deterrence came in the form of the implied use of U.S. military force to thwart a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Reassurance was provided by the understanding that the United States would not intrude on decisions regarding Taiwan's eventual political status. The United States and its regional allies must continue to create a robust military deterrence.** But U.S. leaders and politicians also need to keep in mind the power of reassurance, try to understand China's deep sensitivities about Taiwan and should recommit — clearly and unequivocally — to the idea that only China and Taiwan can work out their political differences, a stance that remains official U.S. policy.

**Warrant:** Reducing military support could be seen as a green light for Chinese aggression.

Mastro, Oriana Skylar. "The Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force." Foreign Affairs, June 31, 2021,



<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-03/china-taiwan-war-temptation>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

U.S. policymakers may hope that Beijing will balk at the potential costs of such aggression, but there are many reasons to think it might not. **Support for armed unification among the Chinese public and the military establishment is growing. Concern for international norms is subsiding. Many in Beijing also doubt that the United States has the military power to stop China from taking Taiwan—or the international clout to rally an effective coalition against China in the wake of Donald Trump’s presidency.** Although a Chinese invasion of Taiwan may not be imminent, for the first time in three decades, **it is time to take seriously the possibility that China could soon use force to end its almost century-long civil war.**

**Impact:** Emboldening China could lead to increased regional instability and potential military conflicts in East Asia, even nuclear war.

Zhao, Tong. “Political Drivers of China’s Changing Nuclear Policy: Implications for U.S.-China Nuclear Relations and International Security.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024, [https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Zhao\\_Political%20Drivers\\_final-2024.pdf](https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Zhao_Political%20Drivers_final-2024.pdf). Accessed October 11, 2024.

**The increasingly realistic risk of a major military conflict over Taiwan has resulted in the nuclear issue shifting from the periphery to a more prominent position in the U.S.-China security relationship.** Political factors are the primary source of rising tensions over Taiwan. Foremost among these factors is Xi’s personal sense of mission to advance unification and realize his Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. **Portraying himself as a key figure in Chinese contemporary history on par with Mao, Xi seems to harbor aspirations of leaving a significant historical legacy.** Having run the country for more

than ten years and removed constitutional term limits, he is the first paramount leader in recent decades to serve a third term. **But he will face an increasing challenge to justify a fourth or even fifth term—leaving observers to wonder whether he will push for progress in unifying Taiwan to fortify his domestic position.** By contrast, the general public and policy elites would like to see unification with Taiwan eventually but are not pushing for a near-term resolution. For the most part, they have been following Xi's lead.

**Explanation:** This argument is strong because it highlights the immediate and tangible consequences of reducing U.S. military support for Taiwan. It effectively links U.S. policy to regional stability and demonstrates how a change in U.S. stance could have far-reaching implications. However, it may be challenged on the grounds that it assumes China's behavior is solely dependent on U.S. actions.

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## CON: Protecting Taiwan promotes the United States' commitment to democracy in East Asia.

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**Argument:** Protecting Taiwan promotes the United States' commitment to democracy in East Asia.

**Warrant:** Taiwan is a thriving democracy in a region with several authoritarian regimes.

“Freedom in the World 2023: Taiwan.” Freedom House, 2023,  
<https://freedomhouse.org/country/taiwan/freedom-world/2023>. Accessed  
October 11, 2024.

**Taiwan’s vibrant and competitive democratic system has allowed for regular peaceful transfers of power since 2000, and protections for civil liberties are generally robust. Ongoing concerns include** inadequate safeguards against the exploitation of migrant workers and **the Chinese government’s** efforts to influence policymaking, media, and the democratic infrastructure.

**Warrant:** U.S. support for Taiwan is seen as a commitment to democratic values in the region.

Sacks, David. “Why Is Taiwan Important to the United States?” Council on Foreign Relations, June 20, 2023, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-taiwan-important-united-states>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

**Politically, Taiwan is one of Asia’s few democratic success stories and by some measures the region’s freest society.** Its open political system demonstrates to China’s citizens that there is an alternative path of development for a majority ethnically Chinese society. **If China were to take Taiwan by force, Taiwan’s democracy would be**

extinguished, and its twenty-three million people would see their rights severely curtailed. As this would come in the wake of China's crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong, the ramifications would be even greater. **The stakes are clear, which is why the United States needs to redouble its efforts to deter China from using force or coercion to achieve unification with Taiwan.** While a military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait is neither imminent nor inevitable, the chances of one are increasing. U.S. policy toward Taiwan needs to evolve to contend with a more capable, assertive, and risk-acceptant China that is increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo.

**Impact:** Maintaining support for Taiwan reinforces the U.S. role as a defender of democracy globally, strengthening its soft power and democratic influence.

"U.S. Soft Power Must Focus on Cooperation." Global Americans, May 5, 2023, <https://globalamericans.org/u-s-soft-power-must-focus-on-cooperation/>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

**Soft power has become a significant tool in modern international relations, allowing nations to influence and attract other countries through non-coercive means.** In Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States has historically relied heavily on its economic and military power to maintain influence. However, in recent years, the region has undergone significant political and social transformations, and the traditional power dynamics have shifted. Therefore, **the United States needs to focus on strengthening its soft power capabilities in the region through deepening cooperation.** The White House's 2022 National Security Strategy attempts to balance the need for more cooperation with the clear challenges that have developed in the hemisphere over the last two decades. **The current state of U.S. soft power in Latin America and the Caribbean highlights the need for further investment in specific initiatives to enhance cooperation and improve diplomatic relations.**

**Explanation:** This argument effectively ties U.S. support for Taiwan to broader American values and foreign policy goals. It's particularly strong in a high school debate context as it appeals to idealistic notions of promoting democracy. However, it may be vulnerable to counterarguments that prioritize realpolitik over ideological considerations.

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**CON: Failure to defend Taiwan could create an arms race.**

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**Argument:** Failure to defend Taiwan could trigger a broader regional arms race as neighboring countries bolster their defenses.

**Warrant:** Countries in the region are already increasing their defense spending due to concerns about China's growing military power.

Rajagopalan, Rajeswari. "Asian Military Spending: A Sign of Worsening Security Environment." The Diplomat, March 4, 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/asian-military-spending-a-sign-of-worsening-security-environment/>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

**What explains growing military expenditures in the Indo-Pacific? Japan, for instance, has approved a "record" defense expenditure of 5.34 trillion yen (\$51.7 billion) for 2021. The approved budget saw a hike of 0.5 percent from the allocation for 2020. Japan's defense budget has risen for the past nine years, primarily on account of regional threats including China and North Korea. China's assertive behavior, especially in the maritime domain, and North Korea's nuclear and missile threats have been cited as important rationales for the continued hike in defense spending.** Tokyo has also assigned funding for non-conventional military areas like outer space, cyber, and electromagnetic warfare, all of which have been a focus of China's People's Liberation Army, especially after the establishment of the PLA Strategic Support Force.

**Warrant:** The United States's diplomatic and military presence has been a stabilizing factor in the region, preventing an arms race.

Yeo, Andrew. "Cultivating America's alliances and partners in the Indo-Pacific." Brookings, Sept. 16, 2024, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/cultivating-americas-alliances-and-partners-in-the-indo-pacific/>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

**In the early 1950s, the United States established a series of bilateral security alliances in Asia with the goal of deterring communist aggression and expansion in Asia. In contrast to the collective defense arrangement established through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe, the United States established a "hub-and-spokes" alliance system that included signing treaty alliances with the Philippines (1951); Japan (1951, revised in 1960); Australia and New Zealand (1951); South Korea (1953); and the Republic of China or Taiwan (1954, ending in 1979). The network of U.S. alliances remains an enduring feature of Asia's security landscape today.** However, Asia's regional architecture has evolved considerably since the end of the Cold War to respond to new challenges including China's rise, North Korea's nuclear threat, and maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. During the past three-and-a-half years, U.S. alliances and partnerships (i.e., security relations established without a mutual defense treaty) in Asia have experienced a renewal characterized by strengthened bilateral ties, new or revitalized mini-laterals (groupings with three or four partners), and expanded cross-regional networks including cooperation between NATO and the "Indo-Pacific Four" (Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand). **In response to geopolitical shifts and to some degree domestic leadership change in Asia, the Biden administration played a significant role in strengthening U.S. alliances and cultivating Asia's evolving regional architecture.**

**Warrant:** Reduced U.S. support for Taiwan could lead other countries to seek alternative security arrangements.

Pikayev, Alexander. "East Asia and Missile Defenses: Right Militarily and Wrong Politically?" Nautilus Institute, March 2001, <https://nautilus.org/projects/nuclear->

policy-2nd-workshop/east-asia-and-missile-defenses-right-militarily-and-wrong-politically/?view=pdf. Accessed October 11, 2024.

**Gradual but steady changes in the regional balance accompanied by periodic tensions across the Taiwan Strait is slowly eroding a system of the US led alliances in the East Asia.** The US security guarantees cannot provide the allies with a feeling of security like the one enjoyed by the Europeans after the end of the Cold War. **At the same time, there is little prospect of establishing alternative security arrangements which would be capable of adequately addressing the changing security environment in the region. An absence of a truly integrated area in the Western Pacific, difficult political relations and mutual suspicions between some of key regional players makes the continuing US geopolitical presence there an extremely and increasingly important stabilizing factor.** There is a critically urgent need to halt further erosion of the US security guarantees, **and, hopefully, to reverse the process.** In that context, anti-missile defenses are widely considered not as a panacea, but a primary tool for preserving the US presence and, thus, maintaining the fragile regional stability.

**Impact:** A regional arms race would increase tensions, reduce stability, and potentially lead to violent conflicts in East Asia.

Garlauskas, Markus. "The United States and its allies must be ready to deter a two-front war and nuclear attacks in East Asia." Atlantic Council, Aug. 16, 2023, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-united-states-and-its-allies-must-be-ready-to-deter-a-two-front-war-and-nuclear-attacks-in-east-asia/>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

**The challenges to deterrence in East Asia have begun to change fundamentally in recent years, putting them on track to present grave risks to US national security interests over the coming decade.** This report summarizes the results of a study focused on two of



these emerging and interrelated challenges to deterrence in East Asia. **The first is the potential for a conflict with either the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or North Korea to escalate horizontally and become a simultaneous conflict with both. The other is the possibility that either or both adversaries would choose to escalate vertically to a limited nuclear attack—rather than concede defeat—in a major conflict.** US thinking about war in East Asia often neglects the possibility that the United States would have to fight the PRC and North Korea simultaneously rather than separately. Furthermore, conventional wisdom in the United States underestimates the risk that either the PRC or North Korea would resort to a limited nuclear strike in the event of a conflict in the region. **However, the recent behavior of the United States’ adversaries in East Asia suggests that this thinking may be off the mark; the PRC military has reorganized itself to prepare to fight a two-front war, while both the PRC and North Korea continue to develop the sophistication and size of their tactical nuclear arsenals.**

**Explanation:** This argument effectively links U.S. policy on Taiwan to broader regional security dynamics. It's particularly strong because it highlights the potential unintended consequences of reducing support for Taiwan.

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## CON: Reducing military support for Taiwan could lead to a Chinese invasion.

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**Argument:** Reducing military support for Taiwan could lead to a Chinese invasion or annexation.

**Warrant:** China has consistently maintained its intention to reunify with Taiwan, by force if necessary.

Willasey-Wilsey, Tim. "US Policy on Taiwan and the Perils of 'Strategic Ambiguity.'" Rusi, Sept. 26, 2022, <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/us-policy-taiwan-and-perils-strategic-ambiguity>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

**A good example of strategic clarity is China's position on Taiwan. Taiwan will be reunified with China: no ifs, no buts. The only uncertainties surround the timing and the method.** 2035 and 2049 have been suggested as possible dates (being centenaries of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese People's Republic) but it could be much sooner.

**Warrant:** U.S. military support has been a key factor in deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Garlauskas, Markus. "The United States and its allies must be ready to deter a two-front war and nuclear attacks in East Asia." Atlantic Council, Aug. 16, 2023, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-united-states-and-its-allies-must-be-ready-to-deter-a-two-front-war-and-nuclear-attacks-in-east-asia/>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

The challenges to deterrence in East Asia have begun to change fundamentally in recent years, putting them on track to present grave risks to US national security interests over the coming decade. This report summarizes the results of a study focused on two of these emerging and interrelated challenges to deterrence in East Asia. **The first is the potential for a conflict with either the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or North Korea to escalate horizontally and become a simultaneous conflict with both. The other is the possibility that either or both adversaries would choose to escalate vertically to a limited nuclear attack—rather than concede defeat—in a major conflict.** US thinking about war in East Asia often neglects the possibility that the United States would have to fight the PRC and North Korea simultaneously rather than separately. Furthermore, conventional wisdom in the United States underestimates the risk that either the PRC or North Korea would resort to a limited nuclear strike in the event of a conflict in the region. **However, the recent behavior of the United States’ adversaries in East Asia suggests that this thinking may be off the mark; the PRC military has reorganized itself to prepare to fight a two-front war, while both the PRC and North Korea continue to develop the sophistication and size of their tactical nuclear arsenals.**

**Warrant:** A reduction in U.S. support could alter China's cost-benefit analysis regarding military action against Taiwan.

Mastro, Oriana Skylar. “The Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force.”

Foreign Affairs, June 31, 2021,

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-03/china-taiwan-war-temptation>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

U.S. policymakers may hope that Beijing will balk at the potential costs of such aggression, but there are many reasons to think it might not. Support for armed unification among the Chinese public and the military establishment is growing. Concern for international norms is subsiding. **Many in Beijing also doubt that the United States**

has the military power to stop China from taking Taiwan—or the international clout to rally an effective coalition against China in the wake of Donald Trump’s presidency. Although a Chinese invasion of Taiwan may not be imminent, for the first time in three decades, it is time to take seriously the possibility that China could soon use force to end its almost century-long civil war.

**Impact:** A Chinese invasion or annexation of Taiwan would dramatically alter the geopolitical landscape of East Asia and potentially trigger a larger international conflict.

“The Widening Schism across the Taiwan Strait.” International Crisis Group, Sept. 26, 2024, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/taiwan-strait-china/342-widening-schism-across-taiwan-strait>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

The dispute over Taiwan, a self-governing island that sits 160 km east of China, is a simmering flashpoint that could bring the nuclear armed, economic giants China and the U.S. directly into war. Such a conflict would upend global supply chains and trade. One estimate puts the potential cost at a staggering \$10 trillion, about 10 per cent of global GDP. **The cost of an all-out war between the U.S. and China that involved nuclear weapons is incalculable.**

**Explanation:** This argument presents a clear and direct consequence of reducing U.S. military support for Taiwan. It's particularly strong because it ties into existing concerns about China's intentions and the fragile status quo in the Taiwan Strait. It also speaks to the dire consequences of a global conflict—possibly nuclear war—in the event of reunification by force.

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**CON: Reducing military support for Taiwan will reduce US influence.**

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**Argument:** Reducing military support for Taiwan will push the United States' allies toward the influence of other global powers.

**Warrant:** U.S. allies in Asia closely monitor American commitment to regional security.

Grossman, Derek. "America's Indo-Pacific Alliances Are Astonishingly Strong." RAND, December 8, 2023, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/12/americas-indo-pacific-alliances-are-astonishingly-strong.html>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

But as 2023 draws to a close, **it is remarkable to observe that U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific are just about the deepest and most robust they have been in all their history.** Some of this is a testament to the exceptional durability of the United States' alliances and partnerships, given that they survived—and, in the case of India and Japan, even thrived—in spite of Trump's bullying and destructiveness. **Indeed, Washington has been cultivating and institutionalizing these friendship networks for decades.** Credit is also due to the Biden administration: Not only has it returned these important relationships to their normal status quo following four years of disruption under Trump, but it has also bolstered them to enhance deterrence against China and North Korea, the two main threats in the region. **The Biden team is also receiving a huge assist from Beijing itself, whose relentless assertiveness is heightening anxiety among its neighbors.**

**Warrant:** Some U.S. allies are already hedging their bets by improving relations with China.

Zhu, Kaize. "Multilateralism and China's Hedging Strategy." The Diplomat, Feb. 7, 2024, <https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/multilateralism-and-chinas-hedging-strategy/>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

When countries find themselves tactically navigating the push and pull of larger global forces, they master the art of hedging. From India to Indonesia, Turkey to South Africa, Saudi Arabia to Brazil, nations constantly balance their economic ties with China against their security alliances, predominantly with the United States. This balancing act is becoming a daily reality as the world witnesses an evolving multipolarity and intense geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China. This diplomatic combination involves a blend of trade agreements, military alliances, and sometimes strategic ambiguity, allowing these nations to harness benefits from all sides without unwavering allegiance to any. Simultaneously, global powers like the United States and China are not mere spectators but active players in this game of hedging. Even with their formidable global stature, they employ hedging strategies to safeguard their national and global interests while fostering stability in a world of growing unpredictability. The U.S. strengthens its alliances across Europe and Asia while keeping the lines of communication open with rivals like Russia and China, trying to collaborate with strategic competitors in areas like climate change and counterterrorism. **Meanwhile, China is expanding its economic reach through ambitious initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and the Three Global Initiatives, asserting its leadership in the Global South.** At the same time, China continues integrating itself within existing global institutions, endorsing the current world order from which it benefits, and maintains ongoing dialogue with the United States.

**Impact:** Weakened alliances risk exposing the United States to military attack and a weakened position in the global economy.

O'Hanlon, Michael. "Could the United States and China really go to war? Who would win?" Brookings, Aug. 15, 2024, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/could-the-united-states-and-china-really-go-to-war-who-would-win/>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

Here's something most Americans may be surprised to hear: **military strategists in the United States consider China the nation's main military worry—with the distinct possibility of a major U.S.-China war in the years to come. That is a terrifying prospect.**

The two countries are the world's top two economic and military powers, both armed with nuclear weapons, each contributing 15% to 20% to world gross domestic product, and each dependent on the other for its prosperity given the depth and breadth of their economic relationships. **Were they to go to war, however, global prosperity might soon become the least of our concerns; World War III could not be ruled out, and the survival of the human race might even be on the line.**

**Explanation:** This argument states that reducing America's support for Taiwan will only push Taiwan towards other global powers. Teams will need to make an aggressive and vocal case that all other powers are a worse option for Taiwan for this argument to be successful.

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**A/2: Military support of Taiwan does not have public support.**

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**Response:** Military support of Taiwan does have public support.

**Delink:** Half of Americans support providing support to Taiwan.

Smeltz, Dina and Craig Kafura. “For First Time, Half of Americans Favor Defending Taiwan If China Invades.” August 2021, <https://globalaffairs.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/2021%20Taiwan%20Brief.pdf>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**The American public supports a range of US policies in support of Taiwan. Majorities favor US recognition of Taiwan as an independent country (69%), supporting its inclusion in international organizations (65%), and signing a US-Taiwan free trade agreement (57%). A slimmer majority (53%) support the United States' signing a formal alliance with Taiwan, and a plurality (46%) favor explicitly committing to defend Taiwan if China invades.**

**Mitigate:** Almost half of Americans support providing specific military aid to Taiwan.

Smeltz, Dina and Craig Kafura. “For First Time, Half of Americans Favor Defending Taiwan If China Invades.” August 2021, <https://globalaffairs.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/2021%20Taiwan%20Brief.pdf>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

Republicans (60%) are more likely to support sending US troops to Taiwan’s defense than Democrats (50%) or Independents (49%) – see appendix for more information on partisan divides and Taiwan. **At the same time, Americans are divided over whether the United States should (50%) or should not (47%) sell arms and military equipment to Taiwan.**



**Delink:** The most recent polls show that Americans support continued aid to Taiwan, including weapons transfers.

Hiciano, Lery. "Most Americans support US helping Taiwan: poll." Taipei Times, October 10, 2024,  
<https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/10/10/2003825064>.  
Accessed October 10, 2024.

Fifty-one percent of respondents in the Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey said they believe that the US should encourage Taiwan to maintain the "status quo," rather than move toward independence (36 percent) or unification (4 percent). **The survey found positive sentiment toward Taiwan from most Americans: 61 percent of respondents said they supported recognizing Taiwan as an independent country, 59 percent support Taiwan's inclusion in international organizations and 74 percent support US weapons transfers to Taiwan.**

**Impact:** Public support is key to effective governance.

"Five reasons to involve others in public decisions." University of Minnesota Extension, n.d., <https://extension.umn.edu/public-engagement-strategies/five-reasons-involve-others-public-decisions>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

It helps meet regulations and requirements. Many programs, laws and rules require some level of public participation. **It adheres to democratic principles. U.S. culture and society embrace the notion that people have the right to influence what affects them. Paying attention to the public's ideas, values and issues results in more responsive and democratic governance. It can create more substantive decisions and outcomes. Better results occur when decision-makers have access to: More information.** Public involvement brings more information to the decision, including scientific or technical

knowledge, knowledge about the context where decisions are implemented, institutions involved, history and personalities. More information can make the difference between a good and poor decision.

**Impact:** Defending Taiwan would require strong public support to succeed.

Loomis, James. "Would the American Public Really Defend Taiwan?" Stimson Center, January 19, 2021, <https://www.stimson.org/2021/would-the-american-public-really-defend-taiwan/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Any sustained military action taken to defend Taiwan will require the domestic support of the American public. The doctrine of "strategic ambiguity" and absence of a legally binding security guarantee effectively makes strong domestic support the de facto backbone upholding the credibility of America's defense of Taiwan. This support is critical both to preventing and winning war.** China knows that an attack on Japan is tantamount to an attack on the U.S. by virtue of America's security guarantee; this formal treaty is thus a fixed and immovable pillar of our deterrent credibility. The lack of such a firm defense commitment to Taiwan conversely makes our deterrent posture more fluid than fixed, susceptible to the ebbs and flows of domestic political considerations and shifting public support. **Whichever American President is misfortunate enough to govern during a Chinese invasion of Taiwan will have little formal basis upon which justify American military intervention; instead, he or she will have to rely on the public's willingness to commit troops and expend resources over an unknown period of time.**

**Explanation:** This response is effective because it turns the AFF's evidence against them. This states that the AFF evidence about public support is inaccurate, which allows the NEG to utilize the positive benefits of public opinion against the AFF.

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## A/2: Increasing military support creates geopolitical risks.

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**Response:** Reducing military support of Taiwan triggers escalation in the South China Sea.

**Turn:** China wants to capture Taiwan in the status quo.

“What’s behind China-Taiwan tensions?” BBC, May 23, 2024,  
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34729538>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

China has launched major military drills around Taiwan, simulating a full-scale attack on the island - just days after the new president William Lai was sworn in. **The exercises reinforce what is at the heart of the issue: China's claim over self-governed Taiwan. Beijing sees the island as a breakaway province that will, eventually, be part of the country, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this. But many Taiwanese consider themselves to be part of a separate nation** - although most are in favour of maintaining the status quo where Taiwan neither declares independence from China nor unites with it.

**Turn:** The American presence keeps China from invading Taiwan.

Sevastopulo, Demetri and Joe Leahy. “Xi Jinping claimed US wants China to attack Taiwan.” Financial Times, June 15, 2024, <https://www.ft.com/content/7d6ca06c-d098-4a48-818e-112b97a9497a>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

China’s President **Xi Jinping told European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen that Washington was trying to goad Beijing into attacking Taiwan, according to people familiar with the matter.** The Chinese leader has also delivered the warning to domestic officials in his own country, one person said. Xi issued the warning in a meeting with von der Leyen in April 2023 that was described to the Financial Times by several people. **He**

said the US was trying to trick China into invading Taiwan, but that he would not take the bait. Another person said he had issued similar warnings to his officials. The comments provide a window into Xi's thinking on Taiwan — the most thorny issue in US-China relations.

**Turn:** An American military presence could prevent an invasion of the island.

Rogin, Josh. "The U.S. military plans a 'Hellscape' to deter China from attacking Taiwan."

The Washington Post, June 10, 2024,

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/06/10/taiwan-china-hellscape-military-plan/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

The key to thwarting Xi's assumed strategy is a U.S. strategy called "Hellscape," Paparo told me. The idea is that as soon as China's invasion fleet begins moving across the 100-mile waterway that separates China and Taiwan, the U.S. military would deploy thousands of unmanned submarines, unmanned surface ships and aerial drones to flood the area and give Taiwanese, U.S. and partner forces time to mount a full response. "I want to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape using a number of classified capabilities," Paparo said. "So that I can make their lives utterly miserable for a month, which buys me the time for the rest of everything." "I can't tell you what's in it," he replied when pressed about details. "But it's real and it's deliverable." There are some public signs the Hellscape plan is making progress. In March, the Defense Department announced it would spend \$1 billion on a program called "Replicator" to build swarms of unmanned surface ships and aerial drones for this very mission. Paparo said the Replicator program shows that the United States is also learning lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war, where Ukraine has innovated with drone technology.

**Impact:** Preventing a Chinese invasion is crucial because it could spillover into other Southeast Asian countries.

Bing, Ngeow Chow. "How Southeast Asia Might React in a Potential Military Conflict Over Taiwan." Carnegie Endowment, June 17, 2024, <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/how-southeast-asia-might-react-in-a-potential-military-conflict-over-taiwan?lang=en&center=china>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**These Southeast Asian claimant states may also fear that if they do not join the fight against China, and China later prevails over the United States and Taiwan, they would be the next victims of Chinese hegemony.** As Asian security expert Drew Thompson argues, **"it would be disingenuous and delusional for those states to ignore the precedent set by a cross-Strait conflict initiated by Beijing since they would eventually also be subject to Chinese military coercion over their own disputes."** **Based on this logic, it could be better for claimant states to seize the opportunity afforded by a Taiwan conflict to push back against China in the South China Sea once and for all,** and seek to ensure that the U.S.-led coalition prevailed over China. This argument might be met with a warm reception in the Philippines, but would be considered a risky strategy in the rest of Southeast Asia.

**Impact:** That's important because China could be willing to use nuclear weapons in Taiwan.

Anderson, James. "The Next Taiwan Crisis Will (Almost) Certainly Involve Nuclear Threats." U.S. Naval Institute, March 2024, <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/march/next-taiwan-crisis-will-almost-certainly-involve-nuclear-threats>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

China's NFU policy is one reason nuclear threats in Taiwan invasion scenarios have not received adequate scrutiny. For decades, China has declared it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. **It would be a mistake, however, to take**

China's NFU policy at face value. For starters, predicting China's behavior in crisis situations is far from an exact science. As Center for a New American Security analyst Jacob Stokes argues, "Decisions with such grand strategic importance are likely to be informed by the worldview of China's leadership—especially Xi [Jinping] himself for the foreseeable future—in ways that supersede official doctrine or other strategic analysis written by military bureaucracies or analysts."<sup>4</sup> **At the very least, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would provide a major stress test of its NFU policy if the People's Liberation Army (PLA) struggled to subdue the island with conventional force.** Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders might even consider failure an existential threat. As defense analyst Mike Sweeney at Defense Priorities put it: **Any battle over Taiwan will not just be a question of territorial aggression but a fight over the core conception of modern China's soul. And for the leaders who launch such an endeavor, their political futures will hinge on the outcome, as will, possibly, their physical safety and that of their families in the event of failure. Under such circumstances, nuclear use might not be palatable, but it could seem far more plausible if military defeat were to equate to loss of domestic power and possible death anyway.**

**Explanation:** This response is effective because it turns the AFF's evidence against them. This response states that military support is the only thing prevent China from invading in the status quo, which means that the AFF impacts about a potential escalation in the South China Sea can be turned against them.

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**A/2: Increasing military support increases tension with China.**

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**Response:** Reducing military support of Taiwan triggers the ground invasion.

**Turn:** China wants to capture Taiwan in the status quo.

“What’s behind China-Taiwan tensions?” BBC, May 23, 2024,  
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34729538>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

China has launched major military drills around Taiwan, simulating a full-scale attack on the island - just days after the new president William Lai was sworn in. **The exercises reinforce what is at the heart of the issue: China's claim over self-governed Taiwan. Beijing sees the island as a breakaway province that will, eventually, be part of the country, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this. But many Taiwanese consider themselves to be part of a separate nation** - although most are in favour of maintaining the status quo where Taiwan neither declares independence from China nor unites with it.

**Turn:** The American presence keeps China from invading Taiwan.

Sevastopulo, Demetri and Joe Leahy. “Xi Jinping claimed US wants China to attack Taiwan.” Financial Times, June 15, 2024, <https://www.ft.com/content/7d6ca06c-d098-4a48-818e-112b97a9497a>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

China’s President **Xi Jinping told European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen that Washington was trying to goad Beijing into attacking Taiwan, according to people familiar with the matter.** The Chinese leader has also delivered the warning to domestic officials in his own country, one person said. Xi issued the warning in a meeting with von der Leyen in April 2023 that was described to the Financial Times by several people. **He**

said the US was trying to trick China into invading Taiwan, but that he would not take the bait. Another person said he had issued similar warnings to his officials. The comments provide a window into Xi's thinking on Taiwan — the most thorny issue in US-China relations.

**Turn:** China is prepping to invade Taiwan by 2027.

Tiron, Roxana. "China on Track to Be Ready to Invade Taiwan by 2027, US Says."

Bloomberg, March 20, 2024, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-20/china-on-track-to-be-ready-for-taiwan-invasion-by-2027-us-says>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**China is building its military and nuclear arsenal on a scale not seen since World War II and all signs suggest it's sticking to ambitions to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, a top US admiral testified.** Despite Beijing's economic challenges, its official defense budget has increased by 16% over recent years to more than \$223 billion, Admiral John Aquilino, the leader of the Indo-Pacific Command, told the US House Armed Services Committee in prepared testimony on Wednesday. **In the three years since he took command, he said the People's Liberation Army, or PLA, has added more than 400 fighter aircraft, along with more than 20 major warships. It's also doubled its inventory of ballistic and cruise missiles since 2020, he said.**

**Impact:** An invasion of Taiwan could involve preemptive strikes on American bases outside of China's sphere of influence.

"Will China Invade Taiwan? A Potential Timeline for Conflict." Global Guardian, February 8, 2024, <https://www.globalguardian.com/global-digest/will-china-invade-taiwan>. Accessed October 10, 2024.



One possibility is the implementation of a blockade, a measure that would effectively isolate Taiwan from the international community. Alternatively, China might opt for more aggressive approaches such as taking over Taiwan's most outlying islands right off the mainland's coast. **The most extreme possibility involves a full-scale amphibious invasion, characterized by bombardment and ground troops landing and systematically seizing strategic locations, including ports, government buildings and airfields. An attack would likely extend to preemptive strikes on American bases in Guam, the Philippines and Japan, thereby posing risks to U.S. military personnel.**

**Impact:** A ground invasion destroys the semiconductor industry.

Tan, Huileng. "The world's top chipmakers can flip a 'kill switch' should China invade Taiwan, Bloomberg reports." Business Insider, <https://www.businessinsider.com/asml-tsmc-semiconductor-chip-equipment-kill-switch-china-invade-taiwan-2024-5>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**The news of a forced shutdown, or a "kill switch," on ASML's chipmaking gear comes amid intensifying rivalry between Washington and Beijing and mounting concerns over a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its own territory.** Taiwan is the world's epicenter for semiconductor chips, the ubiquitous parts that are used in products from data centers to smartphones. A war in the region would have major consequences for the global economy. The US, citing national security concerns, imposed restrictions on China under the Advanced Computing Chips Rule in November. The restrictions make it harder for the East Asian giant to import advanced AI chips from American manufacturers. The US has also pressured the Netherlands to block some ASML exports to China to limit the country's ability to manufacture advanced chips. The Dutch company has also said it will stop servicing some equipment previously exported to China. **But US concerns over a Chinese invasion of Taiwan remain, and Washington has expressed them to Dutch and Taiwanese officials, Bloomberg reported. ASML assured**

**Dutch officials about the option to push the "kill switch" when they met with the company, per the media outlet.**

**Explanation:** This response is effective because it turns the AFF's evidence against them. This response states that military support is the only thing prevent China from invading in the status quo, which means that the AFF impacts about a ground invasion of Taiwan impacting the semiconductor industry can be turned against them.

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**A/2: Increasing military support diminishes Taiwan's independence.**

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**Response: Taiwan cannot defend itself without the US.**

**Turn:** Taiwan lacks an ability to defend itself in the status quo.

Loh, Matthew. "There is 'no situation' where Taiwan can defend itself against China the way Ukraine has fought against Russia, says APAC security expert." Business Insider, April 17, 2023, <https://www.businessinsider.com/taiwan-cant-defend-against-china-without-direct-american-help-2023-4>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Taiwan's ability to defend against a hypothetical Chinese invasion wouldn't hinge on whether the island can fight off Beijing, but whether it can hold out until US forces arrive, said a political scientist who studies China's military and Asia-Pacific security. There's "no situation under which Taiwan can defend itself without direct military intervention from the United States,"** Oriana Skylar Mastro, a fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, told The Washington Post. It's a scenario often compared to Russia's war in Ukraine, where Kyiv has successfully rebuffed the Kremlin's advances for a year with a NATO-supplied arsenal, but no official reinforcements.

**Turn:** China has a military advantage over Taiwan.

Kolipaka, Sharath. "Evaluating Taiwan's ability to defend itself against China." Cescube, February 15, 2023, <https://www.cescube.com/vp-evaluating-taiwan-s-ability-to-defend-itself-against-china>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

In conclusion, **while Taiwan has made impressive strides in enhancing its military capabilities, its ability to defend itself against a potential attack from China remains**

limited. The geographical proximity of China and its military prowess pose a significant challenge to Taiwan's defence strategy. Furthermore, any direct intervention by the United States in response to an attack on Taiwan could lead to a dangerous escalation of the conflict, potentially involving other major powers and even leading to the use of nuclear weapons.

**Turn:** Taiwan's self-defense improvements would be too little, too late – They need the USA.

Boot, Max. "Taiwan is finally beefing up its defenses. Will it be too little, too late?" The Washington Post, January 9, 2023, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/09/taiwan-china-invasion-defense-ukraine/>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

Taiwan is responding to the growing danger by taking long overdue steps to build up its defenses. The government, led by President Tsai Ing-wen, is raising the defense budget for 2023 by 13.9 percent, expanding mandatory military service from four months to a year, and buying from the United States advanced weapons systems such as Harpoon anti-ship missiles, Stinger antiaircraft missiles and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). **But Taiwan, which is much smaller in area and population than Ukraine, still has a long way to go before it can credibly deter a military threat from an enemy that is far more populous and powerful than Russia. While Taiwan's defense budget is growing, it is still only 2.4 percent of GDP — less than in the United States. And while conscripts will soon be serving longer periods in the military, they will still spend less time in uniform than draftees in Israel or South Korea.**

**Impact:** The United States has explicitly said they will defend Taiwan,.

Brunnstrom, David and Trevor Hunnicutt. "Biden says U.S. forces would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion." Reuters, September 19, 2022,

<https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-us-forces-would-defend-taiwan-event-chinese-invasion-2022-09-18/>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

**U.S. President Joe Biden said U.S forces would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, his most explicit statement on the issue**, drawing an angry response from China that said it sent the wrong signal to those seeking an independent Taiwan. **Asked in a CBS 60 Minutes interview broadcast on Sunday whether U.S. forces would defend the democratically governed island claimed by China, he replied: "Yes, if in fact, there was an unprecedented attack."** Asked to clarify if he meant that unlike in Ukraine, U.S. forces - American men and women - would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, Biden replied: "Yes."

**Impact:** US and Taiwan together would defeat Taiwan.

Lendon, Brad and Oren Liebermann. "War game suggests Chinese invasion of Taiwan would fail at a huge cost to US, Chinese, and Taiwanese militaries." CNN, January 9, 2023, <https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/politics/taiwan-invasion-war-game-intl-hnk-ml/index.html>. Accessed October 11, 2024.

**A Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2026 would result in thousands of casualties among Chinese, United States, Taiwanese and Japanese forces, and it would be unlikely to result in a victory for Beijing, according to a prominent independent Washington think tank**, which conducted war game simulations of a possible conflict that is preoccupying military and political leaders in Asia and Washington. A war over Taiwan could leave a victorious US military in as crippled a state as the Chinese forces it defeated.

**Explanation:** This response is effective because it turns the AFF's evidence against them. This response states that the lack of Taiwan defense in the status quo makes it less likely that they

could defend themselves. The NEG has an advantage here because it will obviously take time for Taiwan to develop a self-sufficient industry, leaving them open to attack in the meantime.

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**A/2: Increasing military support creates nuclear risks.**

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**Response: Reducing military support is what triggers nuclear escalation.**

**Turn:** China wants to capture Taiwan in the status quo.

“What’s behind China-Taiwan tensions?” BBC, May 23, 2024,  
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34729538>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

China has launched major military drills around Taiwan, simulating a full-scale attack on the island - just days after the new president William Lai was sworn in. **The exercises reinforce what is at the heart of the issue: China's claim over self-governed Taiwan. Beijing sees the island as a breakaway province that will, eventually, be part of the country, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this. But many Taiwanese consider themselves to be part of a separate nation** - although most are in favour of maintaining the status quo where Taiwan neither declares independence from China nor unites with it.

**Turn:** The American presence keeps China from invading Taiwan.

Sevastopulo, Demetri and Joe Leahy. “Xi Jinping claimed US wants China to attack Taiwan.” Financial Times, June 15, 2024, <https://www.ft.com/content/7d6ca06c-d098-4a48-818e-112b97a9497a>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

China’s President **Xi Jinping told European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen that Washington was trying to goad Beijing into attacking Taiwan, according to people familiar with the matter.** The Chinese leader has also delivered the warning to domestic officials in his own country, one person said. Xi issued the warning in a meeting with von der Leyen in April 2023 that was described to the Financial Times by several people. **He**

said the US was trying to trick China into invading Taiwan, but that he would not take the bait. Another person said he had issued similar warnings to his officials. The comments provide a window into Xi's thinking on Taiwan — the most thorny issue in US-China relations.

**Turn:** Preventing a Chinese invasion is crucial because it could spillover into other Southeast Asian countries.

Bing, Ngeow Chow. "How Southeast Asia Might React in a Potential Military Conflict Over Taiwan." Carnegie Endowment, June 17, 2024, <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/how-southeast-asia-might-react-in-a-potential-military-conflict-over-taiwan?lang=en&center=china>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

These Southeast Asian claimant states may also fear that if they do not join the fight against China, and China later prevails over the United States and Taiwan, they would be the next victims of Chinese hegemony. As Asian security expert Drew Thompson argues, "it would be disingenuous and delusional for those states to ignore the precedent set by a cross-Strait conflict initiated by Beijing since they would eventually also be subject to Chinese military coercion over their own disputes." Based on this logic, it could be better for claimant states to seize the opportunity afforded by a Taiwan conflict to push back against China in the South China Sea once and for all, and seek to ensure that the U.S.-led coalition prevailed over China. This argument might be met with a warm reception in the Philippines, but would be considered a risky strategy in the rest of Southeast Asia.

**Impact:** Regional war could trigger a nuclear arms race.



Nan, Hao. "US-China tensions risk igniting nuclear arms race in East Asia." South China Morning Post, September 19, 2024, <https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3278834/us-china-tensions-risk-igniting-nuclear-arms-race-east-asia>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Amid a deterioration in US-China relations, the risks of a nuclear arms race in East Asia are growing alarmingly.** The recent US-China diplomatic battles over nuclear arms control are a continuation of earlier unsuccessful attempts at dialogue. Both countries have attempted to resume the long-stalled nuclear arms control talks. On November 6, the first official nuclear arms control dialogue since 2018 was convened in the lead-up to Biden's talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping on November 15, 2023, on the sidelines of the Apec summit. However, these talks produced no concrete results, and no specific date for follow-up discussions was announced. Semi-official channels were also explored, such as a track two nuclear arms dialogue in March – the first since 2019. **The trajectory of nuclear developments in East Asia, driven by US-China rivalry, threatens to destabilise the region and spark a chain reaction of nuclear deterrence efforts. It is imperative for global security that the US and China resume meaningful arms control dialogue to prevent a cascading series of escalatory measures that could have catastrophic consequences.**

**Impact:** That's important because China could be willing to use nuclear weapons in Taiwan.

Anderson, James. "The Next Taiwan Crisis Will (Almost) Certainly Involve Nuclear Threats." U.S. Naval Institute, March 2024, <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/march/next-taiwan-crisis-will-almost-certainly-involve-nuclear-threats>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

China's NFU policy is one reason nuclear threats in Taiwan invasion scenarios have not received adequate scrutiny. For decades, China has declared it will never be the first to

use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. **It would be a mistake, however, to take China's NFU policy at face value. For starters, predicting China's behavior in crisis situations is far from an exact science.** As Center for a New American Security analyst Jacob Stokes argues, "Decisions with such grand strategic importance are likely to be informed by the worldview of China's leadership—especially Xi [Jinping] himself for the foreseeable future—in ways that supersede official doctrine or other strategic analysis written by military bureaucracies or analysts."<sup>4</sup> **At the very least, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would provide a major stress test of its NFU policy if the People's Liberation Army (PLA) struggled to subdue the island with conventional force.** Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders might even consider failure an existential threat. As defense analyst Mike Sweeney at Defense Priorities put it: **Any battle over Taiwan will not just be a question of territorial aggression but a fight over the core conception of modern China's soul. And for the leaders who launch such an endeavor, their political futures will hinge on the outcome, as will, possibly, their physical safety and that of their families in the event of failure. Under such circumstances, nuclear use might not be palatable, but it could seem far more plausible if military defeat were to equate to loss of domestic power and possible death anyway.**

**Impact:** Nuclear war could kill millions of people.

Diaz-Maurin, Francois. "Nowhere to Hide." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 20, 2022, <https://thebulletin.org/2022/10/nowhere-to-hide-how-a-nuclear-war-would-kill-you-and-almost-everyone-else/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**One detonation of a modern-day, 300-kiloton nuclear warhead—that is, a warhead nearly 10 times the power of the atomic bombs detonated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined—on a city like New York would lead to over one million people dead and about twice as many people with serious injuries in the first 24 hours after the explosion.** There would be almost no survivors within a radius of several kilometers from

the explosion site. In a nuclear war, hundreds or thousands of detonations would occur within minutes of each other. **Regional nuclear war between India and Pakistan that involved about 100 15-kiloton nuclear weapons launched at urban areas would result in 27 million direct deaths.**

**Explanation:** This response is effective because it turns the AFF's evidence against them. This response states that military support is the only thing prevent China from invading in the status quo, which means that the AFF impacts about potential nuclear impacts can be turned against them.

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**A/2: Increasing military support risks U.S.-Chinese tensions.**

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**Response:** China has aggressive intentions anyways.

**Mitigate:** China has dropped peaceful rhetoric.

Tian, Yew and Chen, Laurie. "China drops 'peaceful reunification' reference to Taiwan" *Reuters*, March 5, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-drops-peaceful-reunification-reference-taiwan-raises-defence-spending-by-2024-03-05/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

China will boost its defence spending by 7.2% this year, fuelling a military budget that has more than doubled under President Xi Jinping's 11 years in office as Beijing hardens its stance on Taiwan, according to official reports on Tuesday. The increase mirrors the rate presented in last year's budget and again comes in well above the government's economic growth forecast for this year. **China also officially adopted tougher language against Taiwan as it released the budget figures, dropping the mention of "peaceful reunification" in a government report delivered by Premier Li Qiang at the opening of the National People's Congress (NPC), China's rubber-stamp parliament, on Tuesday.**

**Mitigate:** Military support can coexist with a neutral stance.

Nye, Joseph. "How to prevent a war over Taiwan" *Diplomatic Courier*, April 19, 2024, <https://www.diplomaticcourier.com/posts/how-to-prevent-a-war-over-taiwan>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

For years, the U.S. policy was known as "strategic ambiguity," but it could be better described as "double deterrence." **The U.S. wanted to deter China from using force, but also to deter Taiwan from provoking Beijing by declaring formal independence. That**

meant providing Taiwan with weapons for its self-defense, but not issuing a formal security guarantee, since that might tempt Taipei into declaring independence.

**Turn:** Taiwan needs more military support to have deterrence.

Sacks, David. "Taiwan Announced a Record Defense Budget: But Is It Enough to Deter China?" *Council on Foreign Relations*, August 20, 2023, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/taiwan-announced-record-defense-budget-it-enough-deter-china>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**While Taiwan cannot be expected to match China's military spending dollar for dollar, it will need to both spend more and invest that money wisely to maintain deterrence.**

In practice, this means procuring more anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, investing in rapid mining capabilities, developing drones and unmanned underwater vehicles, expanding domestic defense industrial capacity, and hardening critical infrastructure.

**Given its limited resources, Taiwan will have to make difficult decisions and divest some legacy platforms in favor of investing in a greater quantity of cheaper systems.**

**Mitigate:** China is aggressive anyways.

Maizland, Lindsay. "Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense" *Council on Foreign Relations*, February 8, 2024, <https://www.cfr.org/background/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Cross-strait tensions have escalated since the election of former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016.** Tsai refused to accept a formula that her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, endorsed to allow for increased cross-strait ties. **Meanwhile, Beijing has taken increasingly aggressive actions, which includes flying fighter jets near the island.** Some

analysts fear a Chinese attack on Taiwan has the potential to draw the United States into a war with China.

**Turn:** China would view a reduction as a weakness, provoking them.

Keegan, David. "Strengthening Dual Deterrence on Taiwan: The Key to US-China Strategic Stability" *Stimsons*, July 6, 2021, <https://www.stimson.org/2021/strengthening-dual-deterrence-on-taiwan-the-key-to-us-china-strategic-stability/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**In August 1982, the U.S. and China signed their third joint communique, which China understood would lead to the end of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Instead, we have sold Taiwan large numbers of F-16 combat aircraft, missiles of all sorts, and even main battle tanks. If the U.S. were to make this retrenchment, China would conclude that the U.S. was acting simply to disguise its weakness, confirming China's judgment that the U.S. is a declining power. China would 1) increase military pressure against the U.S. and its allies across the region, including in the South and East China seas, and 2) suggest to U.S. allies and partners that its interests would be better served by accommodating China.**

**Explanation:** This block attempts to separate US neutrality from China's behavior by showing that they are aggressive regardless of the stance the US takes on the issue. Additionally, without proper deterrence and a hard stance, China is likely to increase their aggression further.

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**A/2: Increasing military support damages diplomatic opportunities.**

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**Response:** China needs deterrence to take diplomacy seriously.

**Mitigate:** Military and diplomacy can coexist.

Keegan, David. "Strengthening Dual Deterrence on Taiwan: The Key to US-China Strategic Stability" *Stimsons*, July 6, 2021, <https://www.stimson.org/2021/strengthening-dual-deterrence-on-taiwan-the-key-to-us-china-strategic-stability/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**The U.S. should instead update and strengthen its "dual deterrence," quietly enhance its military power, and actively improve Taiwan's security in all dimensions, including through progress toward a bilateral trade agreement.** These efforts must be coupled with quiet, authoritative assurances to Beijing, coordinated with Taipei, that we will respect the commitments we have made to China since 1971.

**Turn:** Deterrence can promote negotiations.

Wonacott, Peter "Costly Conflict: Here's How China's Military Options for Taiwan Backfire" *United States Institute of Peace*, October 9, 2024, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/10/costly-conflict-heres-how-chinas-military-options-taiwan-backfire>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

Bloomberg Economics has estimated **a war with Taiwan would cost a staggering \$10 trillion, equivalent to 10% of global GDP — far outpacing the economic toll from Ukraine's war, the COVID pandemic and the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. China's GDP would suffer a 16.7% blow compared to 40% for what would be a devastated Taiwanese economy.** Bloomberg Economics also modeled the fallout from a military

**blockade of the island, including retaliatory measures between China and the U.S. It estimated a 12.2% hit to Taiwan's economy, 8.9% for the Chinese mainland and 3.3% for the U.S.** Some experts say the economic damage from a China-Taiwan clash is steeper if the final price tag includes the costs of foreign investors exiting the Chinese mainland and neighboring island for safer but less-productive — and less-lucrative — locations.

**Mitigate:** China has already made up its mind on reunification.

"China's Xi says 'reunification' with Taiwan is inevitable" *Reuters*, December 31, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-calls-taiwan-president-frontrunner-destroyer-peace-2023-12-31/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**China's "reunification" with Taiwan is inevitable, President Xi Jinping said in his New Year's address on Sunday, striking a stronger tone than he did last year with less than two weeks to go before the Chinese-claimed island elects a new leader.** The Jan. 13 presidential and parliamentary elections are happening at a time of fraught relations between Beijing and Taipei. China has been ramping up military pressure to assert its sovereignty claims over democratically governed Taiwan. **China considers Taiwan to be its "sacred territory" and has never renounced the use of force to bring it under Chinese control, though Xi made no mention of military threats in his speech carried on state television. "The reunification of the motherland is a historical inevitability," Xi said,** though the official English translation of his remarks published by the Xinhua news agency used a more simple phrase: "China will surely be reunified".

**Mitigate:** The US is not changing its diplomatic stance on the issue.

Gangitano, Alex. "Biden tells Xi 'One China' policy toward Taiwan has not changed" *The Hill*, November 14, 2022,



<https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/3734233-biden-tells-xi-one-china-policy-toward-taiwan-has-not-changed/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

President Biden on Monday said he told Chinese President Xi Jinping that the U.S. policy toward Taiwan has not changed, adding he doesn't think there's an imminent attempt from China to invade the democratic island. **"The One China policy, our One China policy, has not changed, has not changed. We oppose unilateral change in the status quo by either side and we're committed to maintaining the peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits,"** Biden said in a press conference following his 3 1/2-hour bilateral meeting with Xi in Bali.

**Explanation:** This argument works to reduce the perceived benefit of diplomacy, as all parties involved know what they want and are unwilling to change. It also shows that deterrence can be a useful tool when combined with diplomacy.

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## A/2: Increasing military support encourages Taiwan to overstep boundaries.

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**Response:** The involved parties have no desire to push China's boundaries.

**Mitigate:** Taiwanese people do not want independence.

McCartney, Micah. "Sixty Percent in Taiwan Poll Want US Military Alliance to Counter China" *Newsweek*, November 28, 2023, <https://www.newsweek.com/poll-says-most-taiwanese-favor-america-military-alliance-1847593>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**The survey also asked for respondents' views on independence.** China has said any official declaration of independence by Taiwan would trigger war. Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen has said Taiwan, which has its own democratic system of government, army and diplomatic relations, is already independent. On the question: "Do you support Taiwan's independence, maintenance of the status quo [across the Taiwan Strait] or reunification with China?" **44.3 percent said they wanted to maintain the status quo forever, 35.8 percent said they wanted to maintain the status quo and work toward independence, and 3.8 percent sought independence as soon as possible.**

**Mitigate:** Military support of Taiwan is for defense, not attacking the mainland.

Cohen, Jerome. "The Taiwan Relations Act: Charting a Stable Course for the U.S. in Asia" *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, April 8, 2019, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/04/the-taiwan-relations-act-charting-a-stable-course-for-the-u-s-in-asia/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

In February 2019, Assistant Secretary of Defense Randall Schriver offered assurances that the U.S. will continue to provide Taiwan with all the arms necessary to defend itself. That is what the TRA says: for Taiwan to defend itself, *not* to attack the Mainland. **Taiwan had to give up that idea, which Chiang Kai-shek had endorsed, with the unrealistic hope that he might renew the civil war with the communists and retake the Mainland. In the 1980s, Beijing thought the arms sales problem would be settled rather quickly. In the “Third Communiqué” issued by the U.S. and the PRC in 1982, the Reagan administration assured Beijing that, as tensions relaxed across the Strait and as the situation improved, the U.S. would gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan. But the end to arms sales that Beijing hoped for has not happened. The U.S. formula for arms sales that has prevailed is not the one Beijing believed it had secured after negotiations on several occasions, but, rather, the Taiwan Relations Act’s formula.** Under the TRA, the U.S. remains obligated to continue to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” For Beijing, this is more than a thorn in its side.

**Turn:** Military support can be accompanied with an ambiguous stance.

Cunningham, Michael. “Should the USA Maintain Its Policy of Strategic Ambiguity Towards Taiwan?” *The Heritage Foundation*, July 24, 2024, <https://www.heritage.org/china/commentary/should-the-usa-maintain-its-policy-strategic-ambiguity-towards-taiwan>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

The United States’ policy of “strategic ambiguity” has helped prevent conflict in the Taiwan Strait for decades by creating dual deterrence: neither Beijing nor Taipei dares provoke a war for fear that the United States would—or from Taiwan’s perspective would not—intervene. **Strategic ambiguity isn’t perfect, but it works. Proposals for abandoning strategic ambiguity in favor of greater clarity about U.S. involvement in a conflict over Taiwan are not without merit. For example, officially committing the U.S.**

to intervene militarily if Taiwan is ever attacked would make it harder for a future president to water down support for the island and ensure Beijing never believes it could attack Taiwan without suffering excessive military losses. But a shift to strategic clarity could create more problems than it solves.

**Non-Unique:** China is already overstepping boundaries.

“Taiwan tells China to 'back off' after official denies marine boundary” *The Guardian*, September 22, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/22/taiwan-tells-china-back-off-official-denies-marine-boundary>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Taiwan has demanded that China “back off” and accused it of threatening peace after a Beijing official rejected the existence of a largely respected marine boundary following recent incursions.** The Taiwanese foreign minister, Joseph Wu, urged Beijing on Tuesday to “return to the civilised international standards” after a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said there was no so-called median line in the Taiwan Strait “as Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory”. Wu told reporters: “The median line has been a symbol of preventing military conflicts and maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for many years. The Chinese foreign ministry’s comment is equivalent of destroying the status quo.” **“I call on the international community to condemn the CCP [Chinese Communist party] for its dangerous and provocative words and deeds threatening peace ... China must back off,”** he added in a tweet.

**Mitigate:** Taiwanese leaders do not want to declare independence .

Cunningham, Michael. “Is Taiwan About To Declare Independence? Not Exactly” *The Heritage Foundation*, March 18, 2024, <https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/taiwan-about-declare-independence-not-exactly>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**But any fear that Lai might cause a war by declaring formal independence is overblown. He lacks both the will and the power to do so. Despite Lai's previous rhetoric, on the campaign trail the vice president repeatedly renounced formal independence, pledging instead to maintain his predecessor Tsai Ing-wen's moderate approach to China and preserve the status quo.** His selection of Taiwan's former representative to the U.S., Hsiao Bi-khim—a noted moderate with deep ties to Tsai—as his vice president and his restrained rhetoric since being elected indicate he intends to keep this pledge.

**Explanation:** Because the desire by Taiwan and its people is to maintain the status quo, and their defensive military stance, it's unlikely that any actions they will take will aggravate China further. Additionally, China is already taking aggressive action, regardless of the actions of Taiwan.

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**A/2: Military support would by definition include escalation of conflict.**

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**Response:** Taiwan and the US want to focus on a defensive strategy of deterrence, not attacking China.

**Mitigate:** The US won't support a mainland attack.

Meyers, John. "The Real Problem with Strikes on Mainland China" *War on the Rocks*, August 4, 2015, <https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/the-real-problem-with-strikes-on-mainland-china/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**China is a nuclear-armed state capable of launching nuclear-tipped missiles at the United States or U.S. forces in Asia. The Chinese nuclear missiles and the radars and command centers that support these missiles are all currently located on the Chinese mainland, which explains why the president might be reluctant to authorize mainland strikes.** Furthermore, because the Chinese Second Artillery Corps controls both the conventional and the nuclear missile forces, the two types of missiles are sometimes co-located. This could lead the president to fear accidentally targeting a nuclear site, putting Chinese leaders in a use-it-or-lose-it situation. **The president could also believe that China has rational incentives to turn the conflict nuclear.**

**Mitigate:** The arms sales to Taiwan are only to support self defense.

Cohen, Jerome. "The Taiwan Relations Act: Charting a Stable Course for the U.S. in Asia" *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, April 8, 2019, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/04/the-taiwan-relations-act-charting-a-stable-course-for-the-u-s-in-asia/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

In February 2019, Assistant Secretary of Defense Randall Schriver offered assurances that the U.S. will continue to provide Taiwan with all the arms necessary to defend itself. **That is what the TRA says: for Taiwan to defend itself, *not* to attack the Mainland. Taiwan had to give up that idea, which Chiang Kai-shek had endorsed, with the unrealistic hope that he might renew the civil war with the communists and retake the Mainland. In the 1980s, Beijing thought the arms sales problem would be settled rather quickly. In the “Third Communiqué” issued by the U.S. and the PRC in 1982, the Reagan administration assured Beijing that, as tensions relaxed across the Strait and as the situation improved, the U.S. would gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan. But the end to arms sales that Beijing hoped for has not happened.** The U.S. formula for arms sales that has prevailed is not the one Beijing believed it had secured after negotiations on several occasions, but, rather, the Taiwan Relations Act’s formula. Under the TRA, the U.S. remains obligated to continue to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” For Beijing, this is more than a thorn in its side.

**Mitigate:** Taiwan is more likely to employ the porcupine strategy.

Filkins, Dexter. “A Dangerous Game Over Taiwan” *The New Yorker*, November 14, 2022, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/11/21/a-dangerous-game-over-taiwan>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

For years, Taiwan’s plan for its defense was to attack the mainland bases that would support an invasion. **“The strategy is to go to the origin,” Chang, the former deputy commander of the Taiwanese Air Force, told me. The Taiwanese military maintains a formidable conventional force, consisting of fighter bombers, cruise missiles, and anti-ship missiles. But Taiwan’s strategy was designed in the years when its military was closer to parity with China’s. Lee Hsi-Min, who served as chief of the general staff of**

the Taiwanese military until he retired in 2019, told me that he had pushed for reform without success. **“The government didn’t listen to me,” he said.** As China’s capabilities have raced ahead, American officials have begun prodding Taiwan to rely instead on a defensive “porcupine strategy,” which would aim to slow down an invading force using sea mines, anti-ship missiles, and other inexpensive weapons.

**Mitigate:** China claims a no first use policy of nuclear weapons.

“China blasts US report, reiterates ‘no 1st use’ nuke policy” *The Associated Press*, December 6, 2022, <https://apnews.com/article/taiwan-china-beijing-nuclear-weapons-defense-policy-ed6faa3fbf16ed24637527d470849b86>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**China strictly adheres to its policy of no first use of nuclear weapons “at any time and under any circumstances,”** its Defense Ministry said Tuesday in a scathing response to a U.S. report alleging a major buildup in Beijing’s nuclear capabilities. The Pentagon last week released an annual China security report that warned Beijing would likely have 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035, and that it has provided no clarity on how it plans to use them. **That report “distorts China’s national defense policy and military strategy, makes groundless speculation about China’s military development and grossly interferes in China’s internal affairs on the issue of Taiwan,”** ministry spokesperson Tan Kefei said in a statement.

**Turn:** Military support works as deterrence to prevent a conflict from happening at all.

Garamone Jim. “U.S. Strengthening Deterrence in Taiwan Strait” *U.S Department of Defence*, September 19, 2023, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/article/3531094/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.



U.S. officials do not believe conflict with China is inevitable, Ratner said. Part of this is because deterrence works. **"Deterrence across the strait today is real and strong, and we are doing more than ever to keep it that way," he said. "Our budget request shows that the department is focused on delivering cutting-edge capabilities for our military right now, while investing in the capabilities we need to maintain deterrence well into the future." Just as important, the United States is working to advance alliances and partnerships in the region.** "Over the past year, we have announced transformative achievements with Japan, Australia and the Philippines, among others, that will make our force posture across the Indo-Pacific increasingly distributed, mobile, resilient and lethal," Ratner said.

**Explanation:** This block shows that Taiwan and the US are unlikely to attempt an attack on the Chinese mainland because its too risky, they are deploying a defensive strategy, and the military support provided to Taiwan acts as deterrence.

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**A/2: Increasing military support is not necessary because China wants to avoid military issues.**

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**Response:** China is increasing aggression and military deterrence is what is preventing an invasion.

**Mitigate:** China will use force if necessary.

Maizland, Lindsay. "Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense" *Concil on Forgein Relations*, February 8, 2024, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Taiwan has been governed independently of China since 1949, but Beijing views the island as part of its territory. Beijing has vowed to eventually "unify" Taiwan with the mainland, using force if necessary. Tensions are rising.** The Democratic Progressive Party, whose platform favors independence, won a third consecutive term in 2024, while Beijing has ramped up political and military pressure on Taipei. Some analysts fear the United States and China could go to war over Taiwan. U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's trip to the island in 2022 heightened tensions between the countries.

**Turn:** Military deterrence is working to make this true.

Henley, Lonnie. "Deterrence and Dissuasion in the Taiwan Strait" *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, December 12, 2023, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/12/deterrence-and-dissuasion-in-the-taiwan-strait/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

These discussions have two unstated assumptions: that our ability to deter attack on Taiwan is waning as China's military and economic power grows, but that deterrence is

sufficient to avoid conflict if we employ the right combination of denial and punishment. I take issue with both those premises. **Deterrence is working in the Taiwan Strait, as it has for seventy years. Clearly, Chinese forces would have seized Taiwan long ago if it were easy and cheap. But it is not, and nothing on the horizon will change that. Today's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is vastly more capable than even a decade ago, and it will continue improving. But invading Taiwan in the face of US military opposition remains among the most daunting military operations any country has considered.** The risk of failure will remain high even with the next generation of PLA hardware, and the one after that. (I have argued elsewhere that China can win despite a failed invasion, but at a very high cost to all involved.).

**Mitigate:** China is dropping peaceful rhetoric.

Cogan, Mark. "Firmer, less peaceful language on Taiwan reunification" *Asia Times*, March 8, 2024, <https://asiatimes.com/2024/03/firmer-less-peaceful-language-on-taiwan-reunification/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**The New Year's message posted to the office's website had not-so-subtle wording, as Song warned "the motherland will eventually be reunified, and it will inevitably be reunified."** The message came less than two weeks before Taiwan held its presidential and parliamentary elections and coincided with Chinese President Xi Jinping's message that reunification was an all but foregone conclusion. The thin rhetorical veneer of peaceful reunification has been gradually but significantly replaced with language that is more crisp in "advancing the cause of reunification." **This week, upon releasing budget figures at the opening of the National People's Congress, Premier Li Qiang dropped mention of "peaceful reunification" in his government report, according to a Reuters analysis of his speech.**

**Turn:** China is waiting for their expanded military.

Dress, Brad. “China will be ready for potential Taiwan invasion by 2027, US admiral warns” *The Hill*, March 21, 2024, <https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4547637-china-potential-taiwan-invasion-2027-us-admiral-warns/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**U.S. Adm. John Aquilino, head of Indo-Pacific Command, said “all indications” point to the Chinese military being ready for a potential invasion of Taiwan by 2027, the date China’s leader Xi Jinping has set for a possible military operation.** Aquilino testified in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues an “aggressive military buildup” and modernization effort. All indications point to the PLA meeting President Xi Jinping’s directive to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027,” the admiral said in a statement released ahead of his testimony. **“Furthermore, the PLA’s actions indicate their ability to meet Xi’s preferred timeline to unify Taiwan with mainland China by force if directed.”** China increased its defense budget by 7.2 percent this year, the third year in a row that Beijing has boosted the budget, Aquilino told lawmakers during the Senate hearing.

**Mitigate:** China has already threatened other countries because of the Taiwan conflict.

Bryen, Stephen. “The reason why China threatens to “nuke Japan continuously”” *Center for Security Policy*, July 22, 2021, <https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/the-reason-why-china-threatens-to-nuke-japan-continuously/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

In perhaps the most reckless threat ever made, China has threatened to “nuke Japan continuously” if Japan supports the US in protecting Taiwan from a Chinese invasion. It is the first time ever that any state with nuclear weapons openly threatened a non-nuclear state with a nuclear attack –and not just any nuclear attack but a massive and continuous one. The threat is in a video originally posted on a military comment

**channel on the Chinese video site called Xigua.** It was soon removed, but after two weeks it has now reappeared on a Communist Party channel in Baoji, a major city in China's northern province of Shaanxi. suggesting the threat is not just from some ultra-Chinese nationalist military people, but from the ruling Communist Party. .

**Explanation:** This block works to show that China is only being peaceful because of the deterrence at play. We need to increase military support of Taiwan in order to maintain this deterrence otherwise China's aggressive tendencies will show.

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## A/2: Increasing military support disrupts efforts to improve relations with China.

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**Response:** China will never cooperate with the U.S., regardless of our actions on Taiwan.

**De-Link:** Xi has conditioned his entire external image on *nationalism* and opposition to the U.S., hampering cooperation.

Schuman, Michael. "Cooperation with China: Challenges and opportunities Atlantic Council." Atlantic Council, July 28, 2022, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/cooperation-with-china-challenges-and-opportunities/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**The centralization of power in the person of Xi Jinping has created new impediments to cooperation.** To justify his political dominance, Xi has fostered a personality cult centered on the assertion that he is the man to fulfill the "Chinese Dream," the vaguely defined achievement of national rejuvenation. **Propaganda within China portrays Xi as the great defender of the Chinese nation**, who will right the wrongs of the "century of humiliation" and restore respect for China on the world stage. This narrative potentially ties Xi's hands in managing a flexible foreign policy, and almost compels him to take a more aggressive and recalcitrant position in international affairs. **Much of the "wolf warrior" diplomacy is aimed at bolstering nationalist support for Xi's regime, even as it sours Beijing's relations abroad. Many of China's dealings with the United States are marketed in state media as Chinese victories over disrespectful foreigners. For instance, the recent settlement of the US Justice Department's fraud case against Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou was portrayed domestically as a triumph of Chinese diplomacy over unfair US persecution, while Politburo member Yang Jiechi was heralded as a national hero for lecturing his US counterparts at a 2021**

**meeting in Alaska.** In his discussions with President Joe Biden, Xi is characterized as “finger wagging” the US leader over issues such as Taiwan. As long as Xi needs to burnish **his** domestic standing with assertiveness abroad, with a **stress on political point scoring rather than sincere dialogue, the Beijing government may be too “boxed in” to certain positions to make cooperation** with Washington **possible**. Members of the democratic alliance that have taken somewhat less confrontational approaches to China may find Beijing more flexible, but only so far as collaboration isn’t seen in Beijing as potentially undermining Xi’s domestic political credibility. **With Xi widely expected to retain control of China** past the usual 10-year term at a major Communist Party congress later this year, **the US and its allies should anticipate that his nationalistic domestic and foreign policies will continue to hamper attempts to negotiate and collaborate with the Chinese government .**

**De-link:** China has conditioned cooperation on U.S. silence to human rights abuses—something we will never do—making cooperation impossible.

Kim, Patricia. “Working toward responsible competition with China.” Brookings, October 8, 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/10/08/working-toward-responsible-competition-with-china/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

Since coming into office, the **Biden administration has proposed that the United States will simultaneously confront and compete with China, while seeking cooperation** in areas of common interest. **Beijing, however, has rejected this framework, making the case that Washington should not expect China’s cooperation** on issues like climate change as long as it continues to challenge China’s policies elsewhere. Chinese leaders have expressed that the “ball is in the U.S. court” to rectify its “misguided policies.” This past July, **Beijing** presented U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman with “three bottom lines” and “two lists.” Included in these are **demands that the U.S. must refrain from criticizing China’s domestic system and its policies toward Hong Kong, Xinjiang,**

**Tibet**, and Taiwan, **and that all** sanctions, tariffs, and **export restrictions** imposed on China **be removed**. This counterproposal harkens back to President Xi's calls for a "new type of major power relations," which was first proposed to the Obama administration in 2013 and urged the two sides commit to "no conflict and no confrontation," "mutual respect," and "win-win" cooperation. At the time, the Obama administration resisted this framework for several reasons, including concerns that Beijing would interpret U.S. endorsement of the concept as blanket acceptance of China's "core interests." Today, **there is zero chance that such a proposition would be accepted in Washington given heightened threat perceptions** of China among policymakers and the general public.

**Response:** Appeasing China by reducing military support will do nothing to change their decision-making calculus to cooperate. Only negotiating from a position of strength – by maintaining arm sales – has any hope of fostering cooperation. .

**Turn:** Only negotiating from a position of strength – by maintaining arm sales – has any hope of fostering cooperation. .

Bassler, Chris. "Negotiating from Strength: Washington, Beijing and Climate Change."

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, August 30, 2021,

<https://csbaonline.org/about/news/negotiating-from-strength-washington-beijing-and-climate-change>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**There is growing pressure for the Biden administration to de-escalate tensions with China for the sake of climate cooperation.** In a letter published on July 8, climate organizations called on the United States to work on "environmental, human rights, social, and governance standards" with China to avert a new Cold War. **Enticing China** to act in support of the Biden administration's effort **to reduce** global carbon dioxide **emissions will not succeed**. China's significance as the **world's greatest emitter of pollution** and Chinese **policymakers' own view of climate change negotiations will**



**render any cooperative strategy ineffective.** As our primary strategic rival, **China will** likely **only respond to pressure** on climate.

**Explanation:** China makes policy decisions based on its interests—only negotiating from a position of strength has any hope of fostering cooperation with them.

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**A/2: Reducing military support could lead to strategic de-escalation.**

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**Response:** Reducing military support will signal *weakness* and an opportunity for China to invade.

**TURN:** China will not invade Taiwan now – but reducing arms sales shows the CCP they have a window to conquer the island, incentivizing military action.

Chen, Ping-Kuei. “Sitting Outside the Network: Reassessing the Stability of the Taiwan Strait under the Trump Administration.” UNISCI, January 2018, <http://www.unisci.es/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/UNISCIDP46-2Ping-Kuei.pdf>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

If Taiwan’s current pro-independence parties maneuver toward de facto independence, China will launch an attack and the US then has to decide whether it wants to intervene. The past experience shows that the US is unwilling to be entrapped by Taiwan. The US will give a warning to Taiwan and signal the lack of resolve to defend Taiwan if Taiwan is moving toward independence. The US will have to reign in Taiwan by withholding its security assistance. The US may have to restrain its Asian allies and Taiwan, but it does not mean that the US will weaken its position on Taiwan. On the contrary, **as China becomes more impatient and its capabilities more intimidating, the US will need to show greater and clearer deterrent by punishment or by denial to discourage a Chinese invasion. To achieve this goal, the US should strengthen the existing bilateral security cooperation with Taiwan.** Obama signed a military exchange bill before the end of his term.<sup>51</sup> This bill allows senior military officers to visit Taiwan. It is not clear if Trump wants to satisfy the calls for an exchange program. Sending senior officers to Taiwan will be a strong signal of the US’s interest. The US Senate recently backed a proposal to allow US vessels to call at ports in Taiwan.<sup>52</sup> If this bill passes and the administration is willing to carry out these requirements, it will be a strong signal of US support to Taiwan. Meanwhile, the US arms sales to Taiwan should continue. For

instance, the US can help Taiwan acquire the necessary technology to build diesel submarines.

**TURN:** Arm Sales are necessary to deterrence, both materially and in terms of US commitment – the aff guarantees invasion.

Chen, Ping-Kuei. “A Farewell to Arms? US Security Relations with Taiwan and the Prospects for Stability in the Taiwan Strait.” *Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace*, 2017, [https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.15?seq=1#metadata\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.15?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents). Accessed October 10, 2024.

**WHY ENDING US ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN COULD BE DESTABILIZING** How would a **reduced US security commitment to Taiwan affect the likelihood of cross-Strait conflict**? More concretely, what would happen if the United States were to terminate arms sales to the island? Remember that in our simple model conflict occurs if Taiwan claims a level of sovereign status to the left of point R on the I-U continuum. How, then, might an end to arms sales affect the probability that Taiwan’s claimed status would lie to the left of point R? Here, we begin by considering the most intuitive, direct ways that changing levels of arms sales to Taiwan could affect the parameters of the model and the associated implications. In the following subsection, we consider more indirect and nonintuitive effects of ending arms sales, which in turn serve to qualify points made in this subsection. Intuitively, it would seem that US arms sales to Taiwan directly affect both the costs (cc) that China would expect to pay in a cross-Strait military conflict and the probability (p) that China would win such a conflict. On the margins at least, **arms sales should improve Taiwan’s military capabilities relative to those of the PRC**, thereby reducing p and increasing cc. Of course, p and cc are determined not simply by the balance of power between China and Taiwan but also by likely US behavior in the event of a cross-Strait war: US intervention would at a minimum **greatly complicate the PRC’s ability to prevail in a cross-Strait war** and would **certainly increase China’s**

**expected costs of such a conflict.** Thus a higher likelihood of US intervention implies a smaller  $p$  and a larger  $cc$ . **Arms sales to Taiwan, in turn, may signal some level of US commitment to the island.** To the extent that arms sales to Taiwan do in fact increase confidence in Beijing and Taipei **that the United States is likely to intervene** in a cross-Strait conflict, **continued US arms sales to Taiwan imply a smaller  $p$  [probability China would win] and larger  $cc$  [costs that China would pay** in a cross-Strait military conflict] than would be the case in the counterfactual world where the United States did not sell weapons to Taiwan. These direct effects suggest, then, that **ending arms sales should reduce China's expected costs of war and increase the probability of PRC victory**;  $R$ , in turn, should shift to the right. This makes intuitive sense: to the extent that the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait favors the PRC, we might expect Beijing to be more demanding on sovereignty issues (and less tolerant of outcomes that diverge sharply from its ideal point of unification). Were  $R$  to shift to the right of Taiwan's actual status, **the model suggests that the PRC would prefer to fight a war rather than to accept a continuation of that status quo**; military conflict would ensue if Taiwan failed to accommodate this new reality by redefining its sovereign status (i.e., to push the status quo back to the right of  $R$ ).

**Analysis:** reducing military support would make it materially easier for China to capture Taiwan—and signal that the U.S. would not intervene militarily to protect our ally.

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## A/2: Reducing military support allows U.S. to focus more on other conflicts.

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**Response:** No trade-off, the U.S. can supply Taiwan and Ukraine at the same time.

**De-link:** Ukraine and Taiwan need different weapons, making resourcing both sustainable. .

Kavanagh, Jennifer and Cohen, Jordan. “The True Military Assistance Tradeoff Is Between Israel and Taiwan.” War On the Rocks, November 21, 2023, <https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/the-true-military-assistance-tradeoff-is-between-israel-and-taiwan/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**While there are important areas of overlap between the military needs of Taiwan and Ukraine — especially when it comes to air defense and uncrewed aerial systems — their many differences made resourcing both marginally sustainable. Ukraine’s highest-priority needs include heavy artillery, ammunition, tanks, short-range missiles, and mobile air defense, while Taiwan has much more need for anti-ship missiles, naval mines, long-range missiles, and more advanced, longer-range air defense systems.**

Adding aid to Israel changes this calculus. Israel’s needs overlap somewhat with Ukraine’s but more extensively with Taiwan’s and those of other Indo-Pacific allies. This means that a commitment to fully aiding Israel could leave Taiwan and other U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific facing longer delays for systems they require and could leave U.S. forces ill-equipped to counter China. To avoid putting Indo-Pacific allies in this position, Washington should confront the resource constraints and necessary tradeoffs it faces on military aid. The Indo-Pacific is America’s top defense priority, according to Biden’s National Defense Strategy, and Washington faces greater medium to long-term escalation risks there if it cannot effectively deter China. Moreover, the military threat posed by China is substantially greater than that of Hizballah or Iran.

**De-link:** the U.S. has already prioritized arm sales to Ukraine over Taiwan—affirming doesn’t change anything.

Velez-Green, Alex. “Managing Trade-offs Between Military Aid for Taiwan and Ukraine.”

Heritage Foundation, August 31, 2023,

<https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/managing-trade-offs-between-military-aid-taiwan-and-ukraine>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

Finally, providing weapons to Taiwan is critical for deterrence, but it is only part of the solution. Taiwan must also redouble efforts to strengthen its own defenses, including by raising defense spending; prioritizing acquisition of the asymmetric defense capabilities required to defeat a Chinese invasion; and accelerating defense reforms, such as modernization of Taiwan’s reserve forces.<sup>9</sup> If Taiwan does not do these things, it may be very difficult or impossible for the United States to deny a Chinese invasion on its own, and deterrence will suffer as a result. Taiwan bears first responsibility for its own defense and must act accordingly, not least so it can put weapons sent by the United States to the best possible use. **Navigating Taiwan–Ukraine Trade-offs** A key challenge facing U.S. policymakers is that Taiwan and Ukraine require many of the same weapons to defend themselves. Despite increasing risk of conflict in Asia, **Washington has thus far prioritized sending weapons to Ukraine. But this has significantly reduced U.S. stockpiles and delayed the U.S. ability to provide arms to Taiwan.** Such delays undercut deterrence against China by preventing Taiwan from fielding weapons quickly enough to keep pace with China’s military buildup. They also create risks for U.S. forces who may be called to Taiwan’s defense. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs testified, arming Taiwan reduces operational risk to U.S. forces in the region. Well-armed Taiwanese defenders can neutralize Chinese forces, for instance, before they fire on American servicemembers.

**De-link:** Ukraine doesn't need US aid—it has European backing.

“Ukraine: The EU’s Unprecedented Provision of Lethal Aid is a Good First Step.” United States Institute of Peace, October 27, 2022,  
<https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/10/ukraine-eus-unprecedented-provision-lethal-aid-good-first-step>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Just three days after Russia began its war of aggression against Ukraine, the European Union announced that it would provide weapons to Ukraine through a new financing instrument, the European Peace Facility (EPF), marking the first time in EU history that the bloc provided lethal weaponry. Over the past six months, the EU has provided €2.5 billion to Ukraine through the EPF for arms and equipment, signaling a more muscular EU foreign policy featuring the unprecedented provision of direct military assistance. While this represents an important step in aiding Ukrainians in their fight against Russia’s aggression, more can be done to bolster Ukraine’s defenses and Europe’s security.**

**Explanation:** if Ukraine and Taiwan can be resourced and defended at the same time – whether it is by the U.S. or its allies – there is no trade-off, and thus no aff offense.

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**A/2: Reducing support could offer stabilization opportunities.**

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**Response:** Miscalculation is a myth—accidental war will never happen.

**Impact Defense:** Mutually Assured Destruction means that leaders will seek to defuse crises at every turn and will never risk it—decades of empirics prove that miscalculation *never occurs*.

Brands, Hal. “If America and China go to war, it won’t be an accident.” American Enterprise Institute, August 7, 2020, <https://www.aei.org/op-eds/if-america-and-china-go-to-war-it-wont-be-an-accident/>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

A generation after that, Franklin Roosevelt may not have foreseen that slapping an oil embargo on Japan would lead to the aerial assault on Pearl Harbor. But he certainly understood that war was a distinct possibility once the U.S. began strangling the economy of a country that was already pillaging Asia. Likewise, the Six Day War of 1967 is sometimes treated as an inadvertent conflict. But again, Egyptian leaders were hardly blind to the danger of war when they mobilized forces in the Sinai Peninsula, blockaded Israel’s port on the Red Sea and took other belligerent steps. **The reality, as the historian Marc Trachtenberg has shown, is that countries tend to avoid war when neither really desires it.** Yes, leaders do sometimes misjudge how wars will turn out and how destructive they will be. Tensions can gradually ratchet up in a way that makes de-escalation progressively harder. Yet there is no more monumental decision than to initiate a major conflict. So when countries really do want to avert a showdown, they are generally willing to tack or retreat, even at the cost of some embarrassment. **During the Cold War, there was plenty of superpower brinkmanship, and some hair-raising incidents involving U.S. and Soviet military forces.** There were several near misses in the Cuban Missile Crisis alone. But **in that case and every other case, the crisis was defused and the superpowers drew back, precisely because they didn’t believe that the stakes merited a nuclear bloodbath. Accidental war also seems unlikely today.**



**De-link:** their assessment of U.S.–China tensions is dead wrong, and there is no risk of “accidental war”.

Heath, Tim. “U.S.-China Tensions Are Unlikely to Lead to War.” National Interest, April 30, 2017, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-china-tensions-are-unlikely-lead-war-20411?page=2>. Accessed October 10, 2024.

Graham Allison's April 12 article, “How America and China Could Stumble to War,” explores how misperceptions and bureaucratic dysfunction could accelerate a militarized crisis involving the United States and China into an unwanted war. However, the article fails to persuade because it neglects the **key** political and geostrategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Without those conditions in place, the risk that a crisis could accidentally escalate into war **becomes far lower. The U.S.-China relationship today may be trending towards greater tension, but the relative stability and overall low level of hostility make the prospect of an accidental escalation to war extremely unlikely.** In a series of scenarios centered around the South China Sea, Taiwan and the East China Sea, Allison explored how well-established flashpoints involving China and the United States and its allies could spiral into unwanted war. Allison’s article argues that given the context of strategic rivalry between a rising power and a status-quo power, organizational and bureaucratic misjudgments increase the likelihood of unintended escalation. According to Allison, “the underlying stress created by China’s disruptive rise creates conditions in which accidental, otherwise inconsequential events could trigger a large-scale conflict.” This argument appears persuasive on its surface, in no small part because it evokes insights from some of Allison’s groundbreaking work on the organizational pathologies that made the Cuban Missile Crisis so dangerous. However, Allison ultimately fails to persuade because he fails to specify the political and strategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Allison’s analysis implies that the **United States** and China are in a situation

analogous to that of the Soviet Union and the United States in the early 1960s. In the Cold War example, the two countries faced each other on a near-war footing and engaged in a bitter geostrategic and ideological struggle for supremacy. The two countries experienced a series of militarized crises and fought each other repeatedly through proxy wars. It was this broader context that made issues of misjudgment so dangerous in a crisis. **By contrast, the U.S.-China relationship today operates at a much lower level of hostility and threat. China and the United States may be experiencing an increase in tensions, but the two countries remain far from the bitter, acrimonious rivalry that defined the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s.** Neither Washington nor Beijing regards the other as its principal enemy. Today's rivals may view each other warily as competitors and threats on some issues, but **they also view each other as important trade partners** and partners on some **shared concerns**, such as North Korea, as the recent summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese president Xi Jinping illustrated.

**Explanation:** these responses fundamentally dispute the idea that US-China tensions could escalate or lead to 'accidental war' or 'miscalculation' by highlighting the *overwhelming incentives* policymakers face to deescalate at every *turn*.

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**A/2: Support is unsustainable.**

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**Response:** US primacy in Asia is sustainable.

**De-link:** In the long-term, hegemony is sustainable for a variety of reasons.

Kroenig, Matthew. "The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus Autocracy from the Ancient World to the U.S. and China." *The Return of Great Power Rivalry*, pg. 205-207. 2020,  
[https://books.google.com/books/about/The\\_Return\\_of\\_Great\\_Power\\_Rivalry.html?id=dXLKDwAAQBAJ&source=kp\\_book\\_description](https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Return_of_Great_Power_Rivalry.html?id=dXLKDwAAQBAJ&source=kp_book_description). Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Indeed, the United States spends more on defense than the next nine countries combined, and most of these countries are U.S. allies and partners.** China is certainly expanding its military capabilities, but it takes time (often a decade or more) to build major military platforms. Even if Xi Jinping makes the decision to do so today, it would take China until 2050 at the earliest to become a global military superpower.

**Washington also has trust in its officer corps and strong civil-military relations. The United States is comfortable delegating tactical decisions to commanders on the ground.** This provides a significant advantage over more sclerotic autocratic competitors, especially in a messy, high-intensity fight. The United States also retains a healthy lead in military applications of **high technology** and strategic forces. Washington first deployed stealth technology in the late 1980s, for example. China has been working on stealth technology since that time, and it is still not clear whether it has mastered it. Washington is still the only great power that conducts regular **nuclear deterrence** patrols with its submarine force; this is a strategic advantage that is sixty years old and counting. Washington is also exploring new military technologies: **hypersonic** glide vehicles, directed-energy lasers for missile defense, **and** other sci-fi-like capabilities. The United States is already incorporating 3D printing into its defense acquisition process,

with the potential to produce better products while drastically lowering the defense budget.<sup>13</sup> China and Russia are also working in these areas, but history and theory, from the Greek phalanx to thermonuclear weapons, suggest that an open society will likely be the first to develop novel military technologies and the operational concepts to put them to good use. Perhaps America's greatest military strength, however, is the simple fact that it can focus its **defense strategy** against foreign threats. **Unlike its autocratic foes, U.S. leaders do not worry that the American system of government might fall tomorrow. As a result, they do not need to spend exorbitant amounts on domestic security.**

**De-link:** China will never surpass the United States — their authors mis-measure economic and military power.

Beckley, Michael. "Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World's Sole Superpower." Pg 1-2, 2018,  
[https://books.google.com/books/about/Unrivaled.html?id=qR1VDwAAQBAJ&source=kp\\_book\\_description](https://books.google.com/books/about/Unrivaled.html?id=qR1VDwAAQBAJ&source=kp_book_description) Accessed October 10, 2024.

**Yet in terms of wealth and military capabilities—the pillars of global power—the United States is in a league of its own.** With only 5 percent of the world's population, the United States accounts for **25 percent of global wealth, 35 percent of world innovation, and 40 percent of global military spending.** <sup>4</sup> It is home to nearly **600** of the world's 2,000 most **profitable companies** and **50** of the **top 100 universities**. And it is the only country that can fight major wars beyond its home region and strike targets **anywhere on earth** within an **hour**, with **587 bases** scattered across **42 countries** and a **navy** and **air force** stronger than that of the **next ten nations combined.** <sup>6</sup> According to Yale historian Paul Kennedy, "Nothing has **ever existed like this disparity of power;** nothing." The United States is, quite simply, "the greatest superpower ever." Why is the United States so dominant? And how long will this imbalance of power last? In the

following pages, I argue that **the United States will remain the world's sole superpower for many decades**, and probably throughout this century.

**Explanation:** if U.S. dominance and power projection is sustainable, there is no reason to reduce military support.