AegisX

Smart Contract Audits | KYC

PALLADIUM

Security Assessment

Day of Defeat Token

December 15, 2022

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Assessment Summary

This report has been prepared for Day of Defeat Token on the BNB Chain network. AegisX provides both client-centered and user-centered examination of the smart contracts and their current status when applicable. This report represents the security assessment made to find issues and vulnerabilities on the source code along with the current liquidity and token holder statistics of the protocol.

A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Cross Referencing, Static Analysis, In-House Security Tools, and line-by-line Manual Review.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Inspecting liquidity and holders statistics to inform the current status to both users and client when applicable.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Verifying contract functions that allow trusted and/or untrusted actors to mint, lock, pause, and transfer assets.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

Technical Findings Summary

Classification of Risk

Severity	Description
Critical	Risks are those that impact the safe functioning of a platform and must be addressed before launch. Users should not invest in any project with outstanding critical risks.
Major	Risks can include centralization issues and logical errors. Under specific circumstances, these major risks can lead to loss of funds and/or control of the project.
Medium	Risks may not pose a direct risk to users' funds, but they can affect the overall functioning of a platform
Minor	Risks can be any of the above but on a smaller scale. They generally do not compromise the overall integrity of the Project, but they may be less efficient than other solutions.
Informational	Errors are often recommended to improve the code's style or certain operations to fall within industry best practices. They usually do not affect the overall functioning of the code.

Findings

Severity	Found	Pending	Resolved
Critical	2	1	1
Major	3	0	3
Medium	0	0	0
Minor	5	4	1
Informational	3	2	1
Total	14	7	7

Project Overview

Contract Summary

Parameter	Result
Address	
Name	Day of Defeat
Token Tracker	Day of Defeat (DOD)
Decimals	18
Supply	100,000,000,000,000
Platform	BNB Chain
compiler	v0.8.7^
Contract Name	DODTokenV2
Optimization	
LicenseType	MIT
Language	Solidity
Codebase	Solidity file provided by the project team.
Payment Tx	

Project Overview

Risk Analysis Summary

Parameter	Result
Buy Tax	19%
Sale Tax	19%
Is honeypot?	Clean
Can edit tax?	Yes
Is anti whale?	No
Is blacklisted?	No
Is whitelisted?	Yes
Holders	
Security Score	94
Auditor Score	74
Confidence Level	Medium

The following quick summary it's added to the project overview; however, there are more details about the audit and its results. Please read every detail.

Main Contract Assessed Contract Name

Name	Contract	Live
Day of Defeat		No

TestNet Contract Assessed Contract Name

Name	Contract	Live
Day of Defeat	0x941b219e90faca6de369eb1cc725718b311adc5a	No

Solidity Code Provided

SolID	File Sha-1	FileName
DODTokenV2	d4fcfe10a81e7ecca878660abfe49f84b64e0712	DODTokenV2.sol

Mint Check

The project owners of Day of Defeat do not have a mint function in the contract, owner cannot mint tokens after initial deploy.

The Project has a Total Supply of 100,000,000,000,000 and cannot mint any more than the Max Supply.

Mint Notes:

Auditor Notes: A mint Function does exist but it could be only called once when the contract was being created.

Project Owner Notes:



Fees Check

The project owners of Day of Defeat have the ability to set fees over 25%
We Recommend the team to create a new contract with fees restrictions to avoid any problems, as alternative the team can use multi signature wallet to ensure the project is safe from a potential fee increase.

Tax Fee Notes:

Auditor Notes: The contract does have a tax of 19%, but can set up to a maximum of 30% and is controlled by a DAO.

Project Owner Notes:

Blacklist Check

The project owners of Day of Defeat do not have a blacklist function their contract.

The Project allow owners to transfer their tokens without any restrictions.

Token owner cannot blacklist the contract: Malicious or compromised owners can trap contracts relying on tokens with a blacklist.

Blacklist Notes:

Auditor Notes: The contract does not have a blacklist function.

Project Owner Notes:

MaxTx Check

The Project Owners of Day of Defeat can set max tx amount.

The ability to set MaxTx can be used as a bad actor, this can limit the ability of investors to sell their tokens at any given time if is set too low.

We recommend the project to set MaxTx to Total Supply or similar to avoid swap or transfer from failures.

MaxTX Notes:

Auditor Notes: Does have a max tx limit function set to 9.99% currently.

Project Owner Notes:

Pause Trade Check

The Project Owners of Day of Defeat don't have the ability to stop or pause trading.

The Team has done a great job to avoid stop trading, and investors has the ability to trade at any given time without any problems

Pause Trade Notes:

Auditor Notes: Does not have a pause trade function.

Project Owner Notes:

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Contract Ownership

The contract Day of Defeat is not live yet.

Liquidity Ownership

The token does not have liquidity at the moment of the audit, block

If liquidity is unlocked, then the token developers can do what is infamously known as 'rugpull'. Once investors start buying token from the exchange, the liquidity pool will accumulate more and more coins of established value (e.g., ETH or BNB or Tether). This is because investors are basically sending these tokens of value to the exchange, to get the new token. Developers can withdraw this liquidity from the exchange, cash in all the value and run off with it. Liquidity is locked by renouncing the ownership of liquidity pool (LP) tokens for a fixed time period, by sending them to a time-lock smart contract. Without ownership of LP tokens, developers cannot get liquidity pool funds back. This provides confidence to the investors that the token developers will not run away with the liquidity money. It is now a standard practice that all token developers follow, and this is what really differentiates a scam coin from a real one.

Read More

Call Graph

The contract for Day of Defeat has the following call graph structure.



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KYC Information

The Project Owners of Day of Defeat are not KYC'd. .

The owner wallet has the power to call the functions displayed on the priviliged functions chart below, if the owner wallet is compromised this privileges could be exploited.

We recommend the team to renounce ownership at the right timing if possible, or gradually migrate to a timelock with governing functionalities in respect of transparency and safety considerations.

KYC Information Notes:

Auditor Notes:

Project Owner Notes:

Smart Contract Vulnerability Checks

ID	Severity	Name	File	location
SWC-100	Pass	Function Default Visibility	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-101	Pass	Integer Overflow and Underflow.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-102	Pass	Outdated Compiler Version file.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-103	Low	A floating pragma is set.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 2 C: 2
SWC-104	Pass	Unchecked Call Return Value.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-105	Pass	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-106	Pass	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-107	Pass	Read of persistent state following external call.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-108	Pass	State variable visibility is not set..	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-109	Pass	Uninitialized Storage Pointer.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-110	Pass	Assert Violation.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-111	Pass	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-112	Pass	Delegate Call to Untrusted Callee.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0

ID	Severity	Name	File	location
SWC-113	Pass	Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-114	Pass	Transaction Order Dependence.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-115	Pass	Authorization through tx.origin.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-116	Pass	A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-117	Pass	Signature Malleability.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-118	Pass	Incorrect Constructor Name.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-119	Pass	Shadowing State Variables.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-120	Pass	Potential use of block.number as source of randonmness.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-121	Pass	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-122	Pass	Lack of Proper Signature Verification.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-123	Pass	Requirement Violation.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-124	Pass	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-125	Pass	Incorrect Inheritance Order.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-126	Pass	Insufficient Gas Griefing.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0

ID	Severity	Name	File	location
SWC-127	Pass	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-128	Pass	DoS With Block Gas Limit.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-129	Pass	Typographical Error.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-130	Pass	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E).	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-131	Pass	Presence of unused variables.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-132	Pass	Unexpected Ether balance.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-133	Pass	Hash Collisions with Multiple Variable Length Arguments.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-134	Pass	Message call with hardcoded gas amount.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-135	Pass	Code With No Effects (Irrelevant/Dead Code).	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0
SWC-136	Pass	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain.	DODTokenV2.sol	L: 0 C: 0

We scan the contract for additional security issues using MYTHX and industry-standard security scanning tools.

Smart Contract Vulnerability Details

SWC-103 - Floating Pragma.

CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime.

References:

Description:

Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested with thoroughly. Locking the pragma helps to ensure that contracts do not accidentally get deployed using, for example, an outdated compiler version that might introduce bugs that affect the contract system negatively.

Remediation:

Lock the pragma version and also consider known bugs (https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/releases) for the compiler version that is chosen.

Pragma statements can be allowed to float when a contract is intended for consumption by other developers, as in the case with contracts in a library or EthPM package. Otherwise, the developer would need to manually update the pragma in order to compile locally.

References:

Ethereum Smart Contract Best Practices - Lock pragmas to specific compiler version.

Inheritance

The contract for Day of Defeat has the following inheritance structure.

The Project has a Total Supply of 100,000,000,000,000



Privileged Functions (onlyOwner)

Function Name	Parameters	Visibility
setGovernor		External
unlockFundPool		External
setExcludeFee		External
batchSetExcludeFee		public
takeOutTokenInCase		public

DOD-01 | Potential Sandwich Attacks.

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Security	Informational	DODTokenV2.sol: 103,21, 110,25, 119,25	Pending

Description

A sandwich attack might happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (before the transaction being attacked) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by back running (after the transaction being attacked) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large:

- swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()
- swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()
- swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()
- addLiquidityETH()

Remediation

We recommend setting reasonable minimum output amounts, instead of 0, based on token prices when calling the aforementioned functions.

Referrences:

What Are Sandwich Attacks in DeFi — and How Can You Avoid Them?.

DOD-02 | Function Visibility Optimization.

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Gas Optimization	Minor	DODTokenV2.sol:	Pending

Description

The following functions are declared as public and are not invoked in any of the contracts contained within the projects scope:

Function Name	Parameters	Visibility
burn		public
burnFrom		public
autoSwapInPool		public
swap		public
getUnlockInfo		public
getFeeInfo		public
batchSetExcludeFee		public
takeOutTokenInCase		public
getPoolInfo		public
setAccess		public
setForFundPath		public
setBurnAmount		public

Function Name	Parameters	Visibility
setSwapToFundAmount		public
setSwapToFundInterval		public
setSwapOneKey		public
recoverToken		public

The functions that are never called internally within the contract should have external visibility

Remediation

We advise that the function's visibility specifiers are set to external, and the array-based arguments change their data location from memory to calldata, optimizing the gas cost of the function.

References:

external vs public best practices.

DOD-03 | Lack of Input Validation.

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Volatile Code	Minor	DODTokenV2.sol: 149,5, 329,5, 124,5, 133,5, 137,5, 141,5, 136,5, 145,5, 149,5	Pending

Description

The given input is missing the check for the non-zero address.

Remediation

We advise the client to add the check for the passed-in values to prevent unexpected errors as below:

```
...
 require(receiver != address(0), "Receiver is the zero address");
...
```

Project Action

Since the initial review, input validations have been implemented on many functions by the dev. However, there still are some functions that can utilize input validations. It's the best practice to utilize require to ensure the data is valid and not waste gas.

DOD-04 | Centralized Risk In addLiquidity.

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Coding Style	Major	DODTokenV2.sol: 583,5, 831,5	Resolved

Description

uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this), tokenAmount, 0, 0, owner(), block.timestamp);

The addLiquidity function calls the uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH function with the to address specified as owner() for acquiring the generated LP tokens from the DOD-WBNB pool.

As a result, over time the _owner address will accumulate a significant portion of LP tokens.If the _owner is an EOA (Externally Owned Account), mishandling of its private key can have devastating consequences to the project as a whole.

Remediation

We advise the to address of the uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH function call to be replaced by the contract itself, i.e. address(this) , and to restrict the management of the LP tokens within the scope of the contract's business logic. This will also protect the LP tokens from being stolen if the _owner account is compromised. In general, we strongly recommend centralized privileges or roles in the protocol to be improved via a decentralized mechanism or via smart-contract based accounts with enhanced security practices, f.e. Multisignature wallets.

1. Indicatively, here are some feasible solutions that would also mitigate the potential risk:
2. Time-lock with reasonable latency, i.e. 48 hours, for awareness on privileged operations;
3. Assignment of privileged roles to multi-signature wallets to prevent single point of failure due to the private key;

Introduction of a DAO / governance / voting module to increase transparency and user involvement

Project Action

Add liquidity function no longer exists.

DOD-05 | Missing Event Emission.

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Volatile Code	Minor	DODTokenV2.sol:	Pending

Description

Detected missing events for critical arithmetic parameters. There are functions that have no event emitted, so it is difficult to track off-chain changes.The linked code does not create an event for the transfer.

Remediation

Emit an event for critical parameter changes. It is recommended emitting events for the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.

DOD-06 | Conformance with Solidity Naming Conventions.

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Coding Style	Minor	DODTokenV2.sol: 77,5, 184,5	Resolved

Description

Solidity defines a naming convention that should be followed. Rule exceptions: Allow constant variable name/symbol/decimals to be lowercase. Allow _ at the beginning of the mixed_case match for private variables and unused parameters.

Remediation

Follow the Solidity naming convention.

https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.4.25/style-guide.html#naming-convention

DOD-07 | State Variables could be Declared Constant.

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Coding Style	Minor	DODTokenV2.sol: 64,5, 14,5, 15,5, 16,5	Pending

Description

Constant state variables should be declared constant to save gas.

```
BUSD
BNB
ROUTER
```

Remediation

Add the constant attribute to state variables that never changes.

https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/contracts.html#constant-state-variables

DOD-10 | Initial Token Distribution.

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Centralization / Privilege	Major	DODTokenV2.sol: 632,5	Resolved

Description

All of the Day of Defeat tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract.
This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.

Remediation

We recommend the team to be transparent regarding the initial token distribution process, and the team shall make enough efforts to restrict the access of the private key.

Project Action

A separate genesis wallet has been implemented where all of the tokens get sent to.

DOD-11 | Max TX.

Category	Severity	Location	Status
transferLimit // Limit per transfer	Critical	DODTokenV2.sol: 20,5, 122,13	Pending

Description

According to the paper provided, the intention is to set max tx to 99.9% to ensure that there is a tiny amount of dust left when a holder completely sells his/her token holdings. However, it is currently set to 9.99%, instead of 99.9%, and it gets applied to buys as well, not just sells or wallet to wallet transfers.

Remediation

If this feature must be implemented to make the number of holders appear to be more presentable, then implement a logic to ONLY apply if the holder is attempting to completely sell/transfer his/her token holdings.

Project Action

Pending Customer Response

DOD-12 | Centralization Risks In The onlyOwner Role(s)

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Centralization / Privilege	Major	DODTokenV2.sol: 479, 9	Resolved

Description

In the contract DayofdefeatToken, the role onlyOwner has authority over the functions that lead to centralization risks.

Any compromise to the onlyOwner account(s) may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.

Remediation

The risk describes the current project design and potentially makes iterations to improve in the security operation and level of decentralization, which in most cases cannot be resolved entirely at the present stage.

We advise the client to carefully manage the privileged account's private key to avoid any potential risks of being hacked.

In general, we strongly recommend centralized privileges or roles in the protocol be improved via a decentralized mechanism or smart-contract-based accounts with enhanced security practices, e.g., multisignature wallets.

Project Action

Have implemented different roles to call on functions that isn't the deployer/owner address.

DOD-13 | Extra Gas Cost For User

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	Informational	DODTokenV2.sol: 694, 13	Pending

Description

The user may trigger a tax distribution during the transfer process, which will cost a lot of gas and it is unfair to let a single user bear it.

Remediation

We advise the client to make the owner responsible for the gas costs of the tax distribution.

Project Action

Swap and liquify no longer exists. Instead, autoSwapInPool function exists to replace the serve the purpose of the previous swap and liquify function with another limit of swap interval that lessens the frequency of making an individual users bear a burden of extra gas cost from the contract swapping.

DOD-14 | Unnecessary Use Of SafeMath

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	Informational	DODTokenV2.sol: 5,1, 41,1	Resolved

Description

The SafeMath library is used unnecessarily. With Solidity compiler versions 0.8.0 or newer, arithmetic operations will automatically revert in case of integer overflow or underflow.

An implementation of SafeMath library is found. SafeMath library is used for uint256 type in DayofdefeatToken contract.

Remediation

We advise removing the usage of SafeMath library and using the built-in arithmetic operations provided by the Solidity programming language

Project Action

Compiler version was updated and Safemath was eliminated.

DOD-15 | Divide Before Multiply.

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Mathematical Operations	Critical	DODTokenV2.sol: 707,13, 826,9	Resolved

Description

Starting from line 707 to 826, it was found that divisions are being done before multiplication. Performing integer division before multiplication truncates the low bits, losing the precision of calculation.

Remediation

It is strongly advised to apply multiplication before division to avoid loss of precision that can result in a significant loss in assets

Project Action

All of the arithmetic equations have been updated to perform multiplication before division.

Social Media Checks

Social Media	URL	Result
Website	https://www.dayofdefeat.app/	Pass
Telegram	https://t.me/DayOfDefeatBSC	Pass
Twitter	https://twitter.com/dayofdefeatBSC	Pass
OtherSocial	https://titanservice.cn/dayofdefeatCN	Pass

We recommend to have 3 or more social media sources including a completed working websites.

Social Media Information Notes:

Auditor Notes: undefined

Project Owner Notes:

Assessment Results

Score Results

Review	Score
Overall Score	77/100
Auditor Score	74/100
Review by Section	**Score**
Manual Scan Score	11/18
SWC Scan Score	36 /37
Advance Check Score	30 /45

The maximum score is 100, however to attain that value the project must pass the reviews and provide all the data needed for the assessment. Minimum score to pass is 80 points. If a project fails to attain 80 and/or has a critical and/or major finding(s) in the Palladium tier assessments, an automatic failure is given. Read our notes and final assessment below.

Audit Fail

Assessment Results

Auditor Score = 74
Audit Failed



Important Notes from the Auditor:

- NEW: Max Transfer is set to 9.99%. The provided paper shows the intention is to set max tx to 99.9% to ensure some dust leftover.
- Initial: Use of the most up-to-date compiler version is recommended to avoid known bugs and chances of exploits.
- Follow-Up: Updated to the latest compiler version.
- Initial: There is a fee of 19% and cannot be changed.
- Follow-Up: There is a tax of 19% and can be changed up to a maximum of 30% only by their DAO.
- Initial: The owner can ban a user with the function setBlacklist.
- Follow-Up: A blacklist function no longer exists.
- Initial: A complete audit cannot be done as key information behind the custom interface, IDao is missing.
- Follow-Up: All necessary files have been provided.
- Initial: Division before multiplication will result in a loss of precision in arithmetic calculations, which can lead to a

significant loss in assets.

- Follow-Up: All arithmetic equations have been updated to do multiplication before division.

Appendix

Finding Categories

Centralization / Privilege

Centralization / Privilege findings refer to either feature logic or implementation of components that actagainst the nature of decentralization, such as explicit ownership or specialized access roles incombination with a mechanism to relocate funds.

Gas Optimization

Gas Optimization findings do not affect the functionality of the code but generate different, more optimalEVM opcodes resulting in a reduction on the total gas cost of a transaction.

Logical Issue

Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on howblock.timestamp works.

Control Flow

Control Flow findings concern the access control imposed on functions, such as owner-only functionsbeing invoke-able by anyone under certain circumstances.

Volatile Code

Volatile Code findings refer to segments of code that behave unexpectedly on certain edge cases that mayresult in a vulnerability.

Coding Style

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated byte-code but rather comment on how to makethe codebase more legible and, as a result, easily maintainable.

Inconsistency

Inconsistency findings refer to functions that should seemingly behave similarly yet contain different code,such as a constructor assignment imposing different require statements on the input variables than a setterfunction.

Coding Best Practices

ERC 20 Conding Standards are a set of rules that each developer should follow to ensure the code meet a set of creterias and is readable by all the developers.

Disclaimer

AegisX has conducted an independent security assessment to verify the integrity of and highlight any vulnerabilities or errors, intentional or unintentional, that may be present in the reviewed code for the scope of this assessment. This report does not constitute agreement, acceptance, or advocation for the Project, and users relying on this report should not consider this as having any merit for financial advice in any shape, form, or nature. The contracts audited do not account for any economic developments that the Project in question may pursue, and the veracity of the findings thus presented in this report relate solely to the proficiency, competence, aptitude, and discretion of our independent auditors, who make no guarantees nor assurance that the contracts are entirely free of exploits, bugs, vulnerabilities or deprecation of technologies.

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