








Architecture



Importance of ICS Security

Critical functions that controls the plant ensure

the safety operation

Meets the business goal



Priority

High

Low



Integrity

Confidentiality

Attack Surface

Publicized ICS Attacks								
Year	Incident	Location						
2000	Sewage-processing plant attack by a former employee	Maroochy, Australia						
2003	Nuclear power plant system was disabled via the Slammer worm	Ohio, USA						
2008	Train derailment due to hacking	Lodz, Poland						
2009	Traffic signal system hacked	LA, California, USA						
2010	Stuxnet worm destroyed uranium centrifuge operations	Natanz, Iran						
2011	Ambulance service disrupted via a malware infection	New Zealand						
2013	Banking and broadcasting services were disrupted	South Korea						

Attack Surface

	Category	Common Vulnerability
	Improper Input Validation	Buffer overflow
I CEE OVDED	DICKG	Lack of bounds checking
I SEE CYBER	шэкэ	Command injection OS command injection SQL injection
		Cross-site scripting
		Path traversal
		Use of potentially dangerous function
		NULL pointer dereference
	Committee of the Commit	Improper access control (authorization)
		Execution with unnecessary privileges Incorrect default permissions
		Authentication bypass issues
EVERYN		Missing authentication for critical function Use of client-side authentication Channel accessible by nonendpoint (MitM)
		Cross-site request forgery
		Missing support for integrity check
	made on impur	Download of code without integrity check
	Cryptographic Issues	Missing encryption of sensitive data Clear-text transmission of sensitive information
The state of the s	E00.59	Use of a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)	Credentials Management	Insufficiently protected credentials Plaintext storage of a passwordUnprotected transport of credentials
S MAD IN COLUMN TO THE REAL PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF THE		Use of hard-coded credentials
	ICS Software Security Configuration and Maintenance	Poor patch management Unpatched or Old Versions of Third-party Applications Incorporated into ICS Software
		Improper security configuration

cert.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/DHS_Common_Cybe

Assessment in Three Easy Steps

Reconnaissance

Active:

Port scanning, Patched against publicly disclosed vulnerabilities

Passive:

Monitoring network traffic

Exploration

Conduct some documentation research

Look for attack vectors

Vulnerabilities pertaining to Published, Web, Input validation, Database, Improper authentication and authorization, ICS data and command message manipulation and injection


Exploit

Exploit the identified problem

STUXNET

- Attacked Siemens PLC
- Took advantage of Windows and vulnerable Siemens products
- Printer shared on network is accessible by anyone as a Guest user in order to print documents
- Stuxnet used "printer spooler service" to make RPC to write a malware to disk






LStLambert-658-1-171-124.w80-11.abo.wanadoo.fr

TOP OPERATING SYSTEMS







ashish: zsh - Konsole File Edit View Bookmarks Settings Help Completed NSE at 20:23, 11.33s elapsed Initiating NSE at 20:23 Completed NSE at 20:23, 0.00s elapsed Nmap scan report for 192.168.100.40 Host is up (0.0063s latency). Not shown: 998 closed ports PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 21/tcp open ftp vsftpd (before 2.0.8) or WU-FTPD 80/tcp open http Schneider-WEB 2.2.0 http-favicon: Unknown favicon MD5: 8C291E32E7C7C65124D19EB17BCECA87 Supported Methods: GET HEAD http-server-header: Schneider-WEB/V2.2.0 http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html). _Requested resource was http://192.168.100.40/index.htm MAC Address: 00:80:F4:14:F2:32 (Telemecanique Electrique) Device type: general purpose Running: Wind River VxWorks OS CPE: cpe:/o:windriver:vxworks OS details: VxWorks Uptime quess: 0.016 days (since Wed Jul 5 20:00:05 2017) Network Distance: 1 hop TCP Sequence Prediction: Difficulty=262 (Good luck!) IP ID Sequence Generation: Incrementing by 2 HOP RTT **ADDRESS** 1 6.34 ms 192.168.100.40 NSE: Script Post-scanning. Initiating NSE at 20:23 Completed NSE at 20:23, 0.00s elapsed Initiating NSE at 20:23 Completed NSE at 20:23, 0.00s elapsed Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ . Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 26.44 seconds Raw packets sent: 1472 (65.514KB) | Rcvd: 1016 (41.098KB)

→ ~ sudo nmap -

ashish: zsh

192.168.100.40

ashish: zsh — Konsole File Edit View Bookmarks Settings Help Completed NSE at 20:22, 8.32s elapsed Initiating NSE at 20:22 Completed NSE at 20:22, 0.00s elapsed Nmap scan report for 192.168.100.10 Host is up (0.0050s latency). Not shown: 998 closed ports PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 21/tcp open ftp vsftpd (before 2.0.8) or WU-FTPD 80/tcp open http Schneider-WEB 2.1.0 http-favicon: Unknown favicon MD5: 8C291E32E7C7C65124D19EB17BCECA87 http-methods: Supported Methods: GET HEAD http-server-header: Schneider-WEB/V2.1.0 | http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html). Requested resource was http://192.168.100.10/index.htm MAC Address: 00:80:F4:15:2B:0F (Telemecanique Electrique) Device type: general purpose Running: Wind River VxWorks OS CPE: cpe:/o:windriver:vxworks OS details: VxWorks Uptime guess: 0.016 days (since Wed Jul 5 19:59:11 2017) Network Distance: 1 hop TCP Sequence Prediction: Difficulty=258 (Good luck!) IP ID Sequence Generation: Incremental TRACEROUTE HOP RTT ADDRESS 5.00 ms 192.168.100.10 NSE: Script Post-scanning. Initiating NSE at 20:22 Completed NSE at 20:22, 0.00s elapsed Initiating NSE at 20:22 Completed NSE at 20:22, 0.00s elapsed Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap .0S and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 22.73 seconds Raw packets sent: 1477 (65.734KB) | Rcvd: 2030 (82.128KB) ashish: zsh

→ ~ sudo nmap

192.168.100.10



ashish: ftp - Konsole Edit View Bookmarks Settings Help ftp 192.168.100.10 Connected to 192.168.100.10. 220 host FTP server (VxWorks 6 4) roady Name (192.168.100.10:ashish) 331 Password required for Password: 230 User sysdiag logged in. Remote system type is VxWorks:. ftp> ls 200 PORT command successful. 150 Opening ASCII mode data connection for 'file list'. 1024 Jan 1 00:00 www.root drwxrwxAwx 10 512 Jan 1 00:00 ftp drwxrwxAwx 10 512 Jan 1 00:01 rdt 179 Sep 7 15:00 http.ini 110 Sep 7 15:00 webloader.ini -rwxrwxAwx 612 Sep 7 15:00 UserWebFiles.ftp -rwxrwxAwx 1 0 56604 Sep 7 15:00 datalogging.jar 59012 Sep 7 15:00 email.jar -rwxrwxAwx 10 5192 Sep 7 15:00 plc.jar 1625 Sep 7 15:00 DC.properties 803 Sep 7 15:00 factorycast.properties 1939 Sep 7 15:00 logserver.properties 226 Transfer complete.

YOUR PASSWORD IS
"123456"?
HOW CRYPTIC OF YOU

ashish : ftp



Modbus Packet

巾 modbus.pcapng File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/> Expression... No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info 274 2.703354 192.168.100.40 192.168.100.115 Modbus... 107 Response: Trans: 0; Unit: 255, Func: 3: Read Holding Registers 275 2.703741 192.168.100.115 192.168.100.40 TCP 60 12737 → 502 [ACK] Seg=579 Ack=2077 Win=32754 Len=0 276 2.713090 192.168.100.115 192.168.100.40 Modbus... Ouerv: Trans: 0; Unit: 255, Func: 15: Write Multiple Coils 277 2.713159 192.168.100.9 Modbus... Query: Trans: 0; Unit: 255, Func: 15: Write Multiple Coils 192.168.100.40 278 2.724031 192.168.100.40 192.168.100.9 Modbus... 66 Response: Trans: 0; Unit: 255, Func: 15: Write Multiple Coils 279 2.724099 192.168.100.40 192.168.100.115 Modbus... 0; Unit: 255, Func: 15: Write Multiple Coils 66 Response: Trans: TCP 60 12737 → 502 [ACK] Seq=593 Ack=2089 Win=32765 Len=0 280 2.724440 192.168.100.115 192.168.100.40 281 2.733106 192.168.100.115 192.168.100.40 Modbus... Query: Trans: 0; Unit: 255, Func: 3: Read Holding Registers 282 2.733168 192.168.100.9 192.168.100.40 Modbus... Query: Trans: 0; Unit: 255, Func: 3: Read Holding Registers 283 2.740126 192.168.100.40 192.168.100.9 Modbus... 91 Response: Trans: 0; Unit: 255, Func: 3: Read Holding Registers Modbus... 0; Unit: 255, Func: 3: Read Holding Registers 284 2.740179 192.168.100.40 192.168.100.115 91 Response: Trans: 205 2 740505 102 100 100 115 102 100 100 10 TCD CO 12727 . FOR FACK! COS-COE Ask-212C Usn-227FO Lon-O > Frame 276: 68 bytes on wire (544 bits), 68 bytes captured (544 bits) on interface 0 Ethernet II, Src: DigitalE 3e:86:3c (00:01:23:3e:86:3c), Dst: AsustekC c5:33:d4 (d8:50:e6:c5:33:d4) > Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.100.115, Dst: 192.168.100.40 Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 12737, Dst Port: 502, Seq: 579, Ack: 2077, Len: 14 ▼ Modbus/TCP Transaction Identifier: 0 Protocol Identifier: 0 Length: 8 Unit Identifier: 255 ▼ Modbus .000 1111 = Function Code: Write Multiple Coils (15) Reference Number: 119 Bit Count: 1 Byte Count: 1 Data: 01 d8 50 e6 c5 33 d4 00 01 23 3e 86 3c 08 00 45 00 .P..3... #>.<..E. 00 36 2a 1f 40 00 ff 06 07 b6 c0 a8 64 73 c0 a8 .6*.@...ds..

d(1.... R...{.P.

. . . .

modbus

00 01 01 01

0040

64 28 31 c1 01 f6 b7 1d 52 81 cc 8f 7b 98 50 18

80 00 5f c2 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 ff 0f 00 77

Packets: 1721 · Displayed: 1721 (100.0%) · Load time: 0:0.40

Profile: Defaul

Modbus Packet

modbus.pcapng

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

Apply	a display filter <ctrl-></ctrl->					Expression	+
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol L	Length Info		^
	288 2.752124	192.168.100.40	192.168.100.9	Modbus	179 Response: Trans: 0; Unit: 255, Func: 3: Read Holding Registers		
	289 2.752184	192.168.100.40	192.168.100.115	Modbus	179 Response: Trans: 0; Unit: 255, Func: 3: Read Holding Registers		
	290 2.752610	192.168.100.115	192.168.100.40	TCP	6012737 → 502 [ACK] Seq=617 Ack=2251 Win=32736 Len=0		
	291 2.762891	192.168.100.115	192.168.100.40	Modbus	66 Query: Trans: 0; Unit: 255, Func: 1: Read Coils		
	292 2.763013	192.168.100.9	192.168.100.40	Modbus	66 Query: Trans: 0; Unit: 255, Func: 1: Read Coils		
	293 2.771957	192.168.100.40	192.168.100.9	Modbus	64 Response: Trans: 0; Unit: 255, Func: 1: Read Coils		
	294 2.772024	192.168.100.40	192.168.100.115	Modbus	64 Response: Trans: 0; Unit: 255, Func: 1: Read Coils		
	295 2.772387	192.168.100.115	192.168.100.40	TCP	60 12737 → 502 [ACK] Seq=629 Ack=2261 Win=32765 Len=0		
	296 2.808420	192.168.100.9	192.168.100.40	TCP	54 41243 → 502 [ACK] Seq=629 Ack=2261 Win=29200 Len=0		
	297 2.912077	192.168.100.115	192.168.100.40	Modbus	68 Query: Trans: 0; Unit: 255, Func: 15: Write Multiple Coils		
	298 2.912145	192.168.100.9	192.168.100.40	Modbus	68 Query: Trans: 0; Unit: 255, Func: 15: Write Multiple Coils		

- > Frame 297: 68 bytes on wire (544 bits), 68 bytes captured (544 bits) on interface 0
- > Ethernet II, Src: DigitalE 3e:86:3c (00:01:23:3e:86:3c), Dst: AsustekC c5:33:d4 (d8:50:e6:c5:33:d4)

100 100 100 0

- > Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.100.115, Dst: 192.168.100.40
- > Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 12737, Dst Port: 502, Seq: 629, Ack: 2261, Len: 14
- ▼ Modbus/TCP

Transaction Identifier: 0 Protocol Identifier: 0

Length: 8

Unit Identifier: 255

▼ Modbus

.000 1111 = Function Code: Write Multiple Coils (15)


100 100 100 10

Reference Number: 119

Bit Count: 1 Byte Count: 1 Data: 00

```
d8 50 e6 c5 33 d4 00 01 23 3e 86 3c 08 00 45 00
                                                      .P...3... #>.<..E.
0010 00 36 32 1f 40 00 ff 06 ff b5 c0 a8 64 73 c0 a8
                                                     .62.@... ....ds..
                                                     d(1..... R... | PP.
0020 64 28 31 c1 01 f6 b7 1d 52 b3 cc 8f 7c 50 50 18
0030 80 00 5e d9 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 ff 0f 00 77
                                                     ..^....w
0040 00 01 01 00
```

O. Unit. OFF Funce 15. Unita Multiple Caile






- Perform arpspoof to forward all the traffic from the client to the attacker machine
- Use IPTABLES to forward it to local port
- Keep an application listening on that local port and modify the payload
- Send back the packet along with modified payload to server


Advance MITM







Advance MITM



Worm Execution

- Powershell default policy set to "Restricted"
- Use the "Bypass" Execution Policy Flag

```
Windows PowerShell

PS C:\temp> PowerShell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .\runme.ps1

My voice is my passport, verify me.

PS C:\temp>
```





