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DM-388

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DEPUTIES* MEETING

Monday, 14 March 1955

PRESENT: Mr. Dulles, General Cabell, Messrs. Wisner, Amory, Colonel White, Messrs. Kirkpatrick, Helms, Bissell, Sheldon and Earman

Mr. Dulles:

a. Noted that during his conversation with Sir Percy Spender on Friday, 11 March, he (Spender) had indicated he would appreciate some guidance on the Bandung Conference. The Director said this might be taken up during the forthcoming talks with Menzies; however, he intended to mention it at the OCB Meeting on 16 March, and asked Mr. Earman to remind him to do so. Mr. Dulles also said that he was under the impression that a U. S. Committee had been formed to furnish advice and guidance on the above-mentioned Conference and asked Mr. Earman to find out about this. Mr. Helms said he knew that Kim Roosevelt had been working on the Bandung problem.

b. Stated the Secretary of State had asked whether the recent Soviet book on Soviet Economics had been published in English. The Director said the Secretary was most interested in this since it was his understanding this book was "the Russian Bible on Economics" and therefore felt it would be of interest to a number of people in Government. Mr. Amory said we had received it during the latter part of 1954; however, he did not know at the moment whether it had been fully translated into English and undertook to find out for the Director. Mr. Dulles said if it had not been translated and if it appeared to be too big a job, he would be willing to turn it over to a selected publishing firm for translation, noting he would approve partial payment for the cost thereof.

c. Briefly reported on his conversation with Admiral Carney on 12 March, respecting coordination of intelligence and CIA cover on Taiwan. Mr. Wisner noted he was preparing a memorandum for the record of this meeting. It was agreed that General Cabell would mention the coordination matter at the IAC Meeting on 15 March as a starter in attempting to solve this problem. Based on this discussion at the IAC, the Director intends to forward a memorandum to Admiral Carney.

d. Referred to a proposed letter for his signature to the Secretary of the Navy enclosing the Agreement between the Navy and CIA on support [redacted] at Subic Bay, and state EO 13526 w

3.3(b)(8)>25Yrs

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of certain directives from the Department of Defense he was of the opinion that we should either direct our letter to Bob Anderson or at least touch base with him or General Erskine. After some discussion it was agreed that Colonel White would get in touch with the Navy people who had assisted in working out this Agreement and based on this contact recommend to the Director to whom it should be initially addressed.

e. Asked Mr. Bissell to get in touch with Mr. Donald Quarles respecting the "Earth Satellite".

f. Noted he had seen Admiral Byrd on Thursday, 10 March, and asked Mr. Wisner to inform Finn Ronne that any lobbying he might do in connection with his proposed expedition to the Antarctic would have to be done on his own time.

General Cabell:

Recommended that the Board of CAT be invited to Washington for a briefing and dinner, and stated while they are here they could also hold a regular Board Meeting. The Director approved and asked that this be arranged sometime after 15 April. It was noted that the dinner would be held in the Director's new dining room in South Building.

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Earth Satellite

ER 7-5056

DD/S

55-2460

10 October 1955

10/10/55

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : CIA Support for Earth Satellite Program

1. I would like to make the following suggestions as to the scale of support by the CIA to the earth satellite program.

a. We should agree, subject to Bureau of the Budget concurrence, to provide [redacted] in the current [redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
[redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

b. We should undertake to provide further funds in the latter part of this fiscal year if, and only if, you decide to seek a supplemental appropriation from the Congress. This action is feasible as approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and the requested appropriation is actually voted by the Congress. [redacted]

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

c. We should undertake to provide [redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs more in Fiscal Year 1957.

2. In explanation of what may appear to be a rather generous proposal, I can only repeat arguments that were advanced in the meeting of 6 October.

a. There is no doubt in my mind that the satellite program is not justified as a purely military venture, and it seems to me legitimate that the Department of Defense should ask those arms of the Government that are concerned with non-military aspects of the cold war to give significant financial support to an undertaking which they supported and one of the purposes of which is to accomplish non-military results. [redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
[redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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3. I offer these specific comments on the proposal in paragraph 1 above.

a. The total CIA contribution [redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
 [redacted] seems to me not unreasonable [redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
 on the basis of the argument in paragraph 2 above or as subscription to
 the common stock in an enterprise in which you wish to acquire and main-
 tain a continuing interest.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

4. In closing, I might point out that no important issue of national financial policy is here involved since the decision has been made to proceed with the satellite and the only question at issue is where a given sum of money is to come.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
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[redacted]
 I place so high a value
 as a citizen on the Pentagon's research and development project that I have
 tried to be objective in the above recommendation.

(sgd) Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
 Special Assistant to the Director
 for Planning and Coordination

cc: DD/S ✓
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Executive Registry

7-5073

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
 THROUGH : Deputy Director/Intelligence *Reh*
 Deputy Director/Support
 SUBJECT : CIA Financial Support for Earth Satellite Project

1. The program for development and launching of a small earth satellite vehicle was approved by NSC 5520.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

[redacted] you indicated that CIA would render some financial support to the NSC 5520 project. It is believed that CIA support is justified for the following reasons:

a. The importance of this program in connection with psychological warfare. The announcement of the US program for launching an earth satellite as part of the International Geophysical Year has already caused favorable reactions abroad. It is essential that this initial success not be discounted by failure to actually launch a satellite within the time limit, or by permitting the Soviets to anticipate it with a launching of their own due to our failure to press ahead vigorously.

b. CIA has a long-term interest in the development of a true reconnaissance satellite, for which the vehicle contemplated by NSC 5520 would provide valuable data and experience. While the Defense Department would probably be delegated responsibility for the planning and launching of a

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reconnaissance satellite, CIA would be a principal user and beneficiary of the data collected by such means.

c. The satellite contemplated by NSC 5520 is to be utilized as part of the US support to the International Geophysical Year, in which the Soviets are also participating.

[redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

d. From a national point of view, the launching of the satellite under the auspices of an international, cooperative scientific effort will enable progress to be made toward more sophisticated and instrumented satellites without necessarily involving a test of the principle of "Freedom of Space", the implications of which for the United States are as yet undetermined.

3. In the light of the CIA interests outlined above, it is believed that the CIA financial contribution to the earth satellite vehicle program should be of a magnitude which will permit the Agency to have a reasonable voice and influence in the development and direction of the program.

[redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
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EO 13526 3.5(c)

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence

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14 May 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Guided Missile Intelligence Committee

THROUGH : Col. John White, CIA Representative to GMIC

ATTENTION : E. W. Proctor, ORR Guided Missile Coordinator
Chief, Services Division, ORR *lwd*
Chief, Transportation Branch, Services Division, ORR

FROM : [redacted], CIA EO 13526 3.5(c)

SUBJECT : Recommendation in Regard to Detecting the Possible
Development and Execution of a Surprise Intercontinental
Nuclear Ballistic Missile Attack Against the Continental
United States

Summary

1. Intelligence of possible significance to the Soviet development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the threat of a possible future ballistic missile attack upon the continental United States is possibly being inadvertently overlooked by the intelligence community. This conclusion has been reached as the result of attempting to do research into the significance of recent Soviet railroad developments in northern Siberia.

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2. Resolution of the problem will require a comprehensive research program to be carried on by an "Ad Hoc Working Group" having available the combined talents of those with scientific, economic, geographic, military, and strategic knowledge. The designated mission of such a group would be to make a complete analysis of all pertinent data pertaining to the possible planning, development, and execution of a decisive Soviet intercontinental nuclear ballistic missile surprise attack upon the continental United States within the next five years. The Group would determine the major Soviet objectives and isolate the major criteria relating to the accomplishment of such objectives. A specific but selective list of indicators would then be codified in conjunction with specialists in all related fields on the basis of the determined criteria and then sanitized, if necessary, and passed on to the analysts. The analytical process from which the indicators were determined would serve as a complete frame of reference into which suspect intelligence might then be fitted for interpretation. Unless the new criteria necessary to evaluate information concerning a possible Soviet surprise attack by the use of this new weapon are determined and passed on to analysts, either in the form of criteria or sanitized indicators, then information which might prove to be of vital significance to such an attack may be overlooked. A more detailed discussion of the problem and the recommendation for its solution follows.

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Justification:

15. If the Soviets are further advanced in the development of the long-range missile than is indicated by present estimates, the system, if effectively developed and applied, may well bring to light intelligence already available within the community, the significance of which has not yet been apparent.

16. Outside of an extensive research program on the part of the group assigned this responsibility, the program would not involve a basic change in the intelligence process, nor an increase in the intelligence burden. The system would provide the community with a new analytical tool to be used to measure the growth of an inevitable threat.

17. It is conceivable that conclusive information on such a Soviet program could be gained by observing activities of a less sensitive Soviet security classification than those directly connected with a long-range guided missile program providing of course, that such information would be fitted into a meaningful frame of reference.

18. Such a system would most certainly prove useful to present U.S. disarmament efforts in regard to setting up an inspection system which would detect all possible means of concealing a possible surprise attack.

19. U.S. operational planning efforts might benefit from the work of such a group, particularly if the group had access to the most current scientific, strategic and industrial thinking in the nation.

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21. The greatest value of such a research effort and the primary reason for developing such a system, however, is to bring to bear on the ICBM problem the efforts of analysts already screening intelligence data for other purposes.

Recommendation:


22. It is therefore recommended that this problem be resolved by formation of a special "Ad Hoc Working Group" composed of scientific,

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economic and strategic personnel.

23. The designated mission of such a group would be to make a complete analysis of all pertinent domestic and foreign data in order to determine the most probable courses of action to be taken by the Soviets in developing a decisive intercontinental ballistic missile attack capability upon the continental United States. The group would determine the major Soviet objectives, which would have to be accomplished to develop such a capability and isolate the major criteria controlling the accomplishment of such objectives. A specific but selective list of indicators, would then be codified in conjunction with specialists in all related fields on the basis of the determined criteria, and then sanitized, if necessary. Once determined the indicators would be incorporated into the present worldwide indication network. The analytical process from which the indicators were determined would then serve as a complete frame of reference into which suspect intelligence might then be fitted for interpretation.



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21 April 1955

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

21 April 1955

THE WEEK IN BRIEF

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

FORMOSA STRAITS Page 1

The military situation was quiet in the Formosa Straits last week. Logistic activity continues.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE Page 2

The outstanding events thus far at the Afro-Asian conference have been the vigorous anti-Communist speeches delivered by several chief delegates of pro-Western countries. Chou En-lai until now has refrained from trying to maneuver the conference into endo-iping's claims to all Nationalist-held territory.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

USSR APPARENTLY PREPARED
TO SIGN AUSTRIAN TREATY Page 2

The Soviet note of 19 April calling for a conference on Austria adds to the evidence that the USSR is prepared to sign a treaty promptly, although difficulties may still arise over a four-power guarantee of Austrian neutrality. In its propaganda, Moscow is parading the Austrian treaty before the West Germans, who are interested but will be really impressed only by concessions on Germany. The Austrians are so eager now for a treaty that they are not likely to give firm support to any Western attempts to influence the terms of a neutrality guarantee.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EAST GERMANY MAINTAINS
PRESSURE ON WEST BERLIN Page 4

The East German government continues to build up pressure against West Berlin in an effort to demonstrate the city's vulnerability and to convince the West, and particularly the West Germans, of the serious consequences that may result if the Federal Republic is rearmed under NATO.

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21 April 1955

NO POLITICAL SOLUTION IN SIGHT
AS SAIGON "TRUCE" ENDS

Page 5

Saigon's third "truce" ended on 20 April with skirmishes between the Binh Xuyen and government troops.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
AVOIDING NEW INCIDENTS

Page 6

There were no new incidents between Afghanistan and Pakistan during the past week. The next move by the Afghans--possibly removal of Prime Minister Daud by senior members of the royal family--will determine whether tensions are likely to abate.

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PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

The Soviet Communiqué on the Near East: The Soviet Foreign Ministry's communique of 16 April was issued primarily to influence the Bandung conference. The Communists' efforts to exploit disputes in the Near and Middle East are hampered by Moscow's immediate objective of encouraging Indian neutralism and its longer-term program of economic penetration of the area.

Pa EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Japan's Relations With the Sino-Soviet Bloc: The Soviet Union's acceptance of Japan's suggestion to conduct negotiations either in London or Geneva appears designed to sustain domestic pressure in Japan for closer relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Interest in such relations had been noticeably subsiding as a result of earlier Soviet stalling.

Page 2 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Peiping Hints at Reprisals Against Hong Kong: Since the crash of an Air India plane on 11 April in which eight members of Peiping's delegation to the Bandung conference were killed, Chinese Communist spokesmen have been hinting at reprisals against the British colony of Hong Kong. Peiping may believe that such tactics will help to dissuade Britain from supporting the American position on Formosa.

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Soviet Research on Earth Satellite: The scientific eminence of the six men who on 16 April were listed as members of the USSR's Permanent Interdepartmental Commission for Interplanetary Communications suggests a co-ordinated survey of the theoretical problems involved in the establishment of a space station.

[REDACTED] PEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

South Korea Renews Efforts to Isolate Japan: South Korea is renewing its efforts to undermine the United States' faith in Japan as a reliable ally, and to supplant Japan in American strategic planning with a group of small Asian nations led by South Korea. The more immediate objective, however, is to attract the major part of long-term American aid allocated to the Far East.

[REDACTED] . . . PEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Negotiations in Laos: The arrival in Vientiane of some 30 Pathet Lao representatives opens another phase in the long-drawn-out negotiations between the royal government and the Communists for a political settlement. The Laotian government still appears in no hurry to conclude the talks and is hopeful that its recent memorandum to the International Control Commission may result in favorable action.

[REDACTED] . . . PEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Hungarian Leaders Ousted: The ouster of two top leaders of the Hungarian Workers' Party--Premier Imre Nagy and Mihaly Farkas--may be only the beginning of a widespread removal of anti-Rakosi elements in the party.

[REDACTED] . . . PEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Genoa Port Strike Becoming More Serious: The walkout of some 1,600 Communist-dominated ship repair workers in Genoa is now in its thirteenth week with no end in sight. Twice this month, sympathy strikes have stopped cargo loadings and unloadings and have led to numerous clashes between strikers and police.

[REDACTED] . . . PEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Iraqi-Syrian Relations: Syria's cabinet capitulated last week to army pressure for negotiating a defense pact with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. An army coup and a concomitant threat of Iraqi military intervention have been averted for the time being.

[REDACTED] . . . EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

THE KHRUSHCHEV APPROACH IN INTERNAL POLICY. Page 1

Party Secretary Khrushchev's propensity for using spectacular methods for rapidly solving specific organizational and production problems in the Soviet agricultural program may provide some insight into his approach to other problems.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA. Page 2

The growing importance of the African as a force in international politics is pointed up by the attendance of official delegates from Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Gold Coast at the Bandung conference. The major factors affecting the future of Africa south of the Sahara are racialism, colonialism and the influence of India, the United Nations, and Communism. Numerous areas, however, are at present largely untouched by these forces either because of their isolation or lack of development.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

21 April 1955

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

FORMOSA STRAITS

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

The lull in combat operations in the Formosa Straits area continued throughout the past week, and there were no indications that the Chinese Communists were about to initiate major attacks against the Nationalists.

For the first time since last September, when the Communists began to intensify pressure on the offshore islands, there was no artillery fire against the Quemoyes for an entire week

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AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE

The outstanding events thus far at the Afro-Asian conference have been the vigorous anti-Communist speeches delivered by several chief delegates of pro-Western countries.

The anti-Communists, who heavily outnumber the Communists and neutralists, have strongly influenced the organization of the conference. While they agreed to conference unanimity for approval of any resolution, they successfully demanded that the working committees be permitted to issue communiqués discussing disagreements and tabulating any votes that are taken.

Thailand's Prince Wan--a leading advocate of Asian co-operation with the West--has been elected rapporteur of the extremely important political committee, which is composed of all chief delegates. It appears that the anti-Communist delegates are seeking to have the deliberations of the conference follow the principles of the United Nations rather than that of "peaceful coexistence" or the "five principles" of Mao Tse-tung.

Chou En-lai has until now refrained from trying to maneuver the conference into endorsing Peiping's claims to all

Nationalist-held territory. Evidently believing that any such effort would be defeated, Chou publicly stated that the question of Formosa would only enmesh the conference in "disputes...without any solution."

Chou seems to be going ahead at Bandung with conversations aimed at assessing the attitudes of other Far Eastern states toward possible Communist courses of action

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Most of those approached by Chou are expected to argue against the use of force by the Chinese Communists and to support the idea of an early Formosa conference.

Prime Minister Nehru, who was expected to be a dominant figure, has kept almost completely out of the limelight. On the opening day, visibly irritated at the way things were developing, he stalked out of the auditorium during an anti-Communist speech. He may be expected, however, to continue efforts to keep the conference general and friendly rather than specific and bitter, and to seek some common ground upon which it can be concluded.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

USSR APPARENTLY PREPARED TO SIGN AUSTRIAN TREATY

The propaganda line from Moscow tends to confirm that the immediate Soviet purpose in moving rapidly toward an

Austrian settlement is to revive West European interest in big-power negotiations before West German rearmament is carried out.

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21 April 1955

In particular, the USSR wants to show the Germans the advantages of dealing directly with Moscow and to dangle before them the possibility of unity on the Austrian neutrality model.

The Soviet note of 19 April proposed that the foreign ministers of the four great powers and Austria meet soon in Vienna to consider and sign the Austrian treaty.

The rapidity and manner in which the USSR is moving indicates that Moscow probably will not insist on a discussion of any issues other than Austria. The Soviet Union apparently is prepared to sign the treaty unless some Western objection gives it a chance to blame the West for the delay.

The only issue the USSR deliberately has left obscure is what kind of four-power guarantees it wants for Austrian neutrality. A clue as to what the USSR has in mind was Molotov's reference to the guarantees of perpetual neutrality, independence, and territorial inviolability of Switzerland which emerged from the 1815 Congress of Vienna.

If the Soviet negotiators meet resistance from the Western powers on this issue, it seems likely that they are prepared to issue a strong unilateral guarantee rather than stall the conference.

Under the Hungarian and Rumanian peace treaties, the withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops from Austria is supposed to result in the return of the

line of communication troops in Hungary and Rumania to Soviet territory. It is expected, however, that Moscow will use the Soviet bloc security system which is being formed as an excuse for making arrangements with these countries to keep troops there.

Most West Germans will welcome the encouraging results of the Moscow meeting. They are not likely to see progress on Austria as cause for abandoning the Western alliance, but they will hope that it means a fundamental change in Soviet policy. From nearly all quarters, there will probably be insistence that talks on Germany be held as soon as possible.

The deputy leader of the Christian Democratic faction in the Bundestag told American officials in Bonn on 14 April that he is greatly concerned over the probable impact of Austrian developments. He feels the Bonn government will be faced with a strong popular trend to accept a neutral position for Germans.

Nevertheless, it will be Soviet proposals directly on Germany, not actions on Austria, which will determine the German government's attitude.

The results of the meeting in Moscow have been greeted with almost universal popular enthusiasm in Austria, and any attempt to delay the four-power meetings will almost certainly meet with popular opposition there.

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The West may also find it difficult to obtain Austrian co-operation in any negotiations for neutrality guarantees acceptable to the West. Austria may already have agreed to accept a unilateral Soviet guarantee if necessary.

Carried along by popular enthusiasm, Chancellor Raab is not likely to engage in cautious contemplation of the dangers of Soviet influence to which his country might be

subjected under the proposed conditions of the treaty.

The Western powers probably cannot now depend on the usual sobering influence of Socialist leaders on Austrian dealings with the USSR, since Vice Chancellor Schaerf and Foreign State Secretary Kreisky were on the delegation to Moscow, and their party can ill afford to battle the tide of enthusiasm by pulling apart the agreements that have been made.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(8)>25Yrs

EAST GERMANY MAINTAINS PRESSURE ON WEST BERLIN

The East German government has continued in the past week to build up its pressure against West Berlin and to attempt to force West German agreement to negotiate the truck tax question at the ministerial level.

Behind the East German policy is the desire to demonstrate the vulnerability of West Berlin to Communist pressures and to convince West Europeans, particularly West Germans, that rearming the Federal Republic under NATO may have serious consequences.

The Communists, moreover, have been contrasting West Germany's difficulties--alleged to result from its alignment with the West--with the advantages Austria is gaining through its policy of neutrality.

Following the East German charge on 12 April that West Berlin is the Allies' main spy center and a threat to the GDR, an editorial in the leading East German Communist daily stated on 16 April that the "consequences" of Bonn's refusal to negotiate the truck tax question on a ministerial level "will have to be borne by West Berlin."

The East Berlin authorities on 19 April cut off the flow of electricity to West Berlin. Because of West Berlin's self-sufficiency in electric power, however, the effect of the ban is largely psychological.

According to the West Berlin Land Labor Office, 3,000 West Berliners working in East Berlin have been fired in the past two months and West Berlin officials fear that the remaining 12,500 will soon be dismissed.

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There have also been a number of unconfirmed reports that the East Germans are preparing plans for other restrictive measures including sealing off West Berlin from East Germany.

These plans are alleged to include the creation of a no man's land security strip around Berlin, cutting East German communication lines running through West Berlin and strengthening the border police units preparatory to restricting the movement of persons into and out of Berlin.

East Germany probably also desires to isolate West Berlin for internal security reasons. The city serves as a haven for East Germans fleeing military conscription, as a base for Western intelligence agencies operating in East Germany, and as a show window for the West which undoubtedly exacerbates the uneasy internal situation in the German Democratic Republic.

The increasing belligerency of the East German government, and its refusal to negotiate the truck tax question on the technical level as desired by

Bonn, have moved the Federal Republic to slow shipments to East Germany of goods already scheduled for delivery and to place an embargo on future shipments.

On 14 April, Chancellor Adenauer and West Berlin mayor Suhr reportedly agreed that discussion of the road tolls with the "illegitimate regime of the Soviet zone" is out of the question. Both Adenauer and Suhr are urging Allied intervention with Moscow, since road access to Berlin is a quadripartite responsibility.

The Western powers intend to run additional military convoys and to begin practice flights into Berlin to impress the USSR. Their protest notes to Pushkin, however, have been ignored.

Bonn and West Berlin officials are inclined to believe that either too strong or too weak a reaction will provoke new harassments. Allied officials, however, point out that by interfering in German inter-zonal trade the West has the best means of forcing East Germany to terms, since East Germany heavily depends on West German steel. (Con-
urred in by ORR) EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

NO POLITICAL SOLUTION IN SIGHT
AS SAIGON "TRUCE" ENDS

Saigon's third "truce" ended on 20 April to the sound of hand-grenade explosions and machine-gun fire.

The rebel Binh Xuyen engaged in several provocative acts including the kidnaping and shooting of government

troops in several parts of the city. The most sensational act of violence was fire from a passing truck directed at the sidewalk café of the Hotel Majestic on the main street of Saigon.

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
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Under continued pressure from the French not to act against the Binh Xuyen--pressure backed up by the Expeditionary Corps--the government

has refrained from taking more than localized action against Binh Xuyen raids.

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AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
AVOIDING NEW INCIDENTS

There were no new incidents between Afghanistan and Pakistan during the past week. The next move by the Afghans--possibly the removal of Prime Minister Daud by senior members of the royal family--will determine whether tensions are likely to abate.

No further incidents have occurred in either country since the 1 April reprisal attack against the Afghan consulate in Peshawar, and no further tribal unrest has been reported.

Pakistan's evacuation of dependents from its posts in

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Afghanistan, which seems designed to impress Kabul with the "seriousness" of the situation, proceeded without any incidents. Both governments are impressed with the seriousness of the situation and for the present at least will avoid creating new incidents.

Reports of Soviet involvement have not been confirmed. Some press and radio releases by the USSR on the situation generally favor Afghanistan. Only direct interference by Pakistan, or chaos arising from major tribal disturbances, appears likely to result in active Soviet intervention.

There are no indications that a tribal uprising is imminent, and Ambassador Hildreth reports that Karachi's policy now excludes the possibility of trying to unseat the Afghan royal family.

The resolution of the crisis now appears to rest with Afghanistan. The majority of recent reports suggests that Prince Daud will be "disciplined" to permit the Afghan government to make face-saving concessions, particularly in the light of the strong Western and Near Eastern diplomatic representations over the March incidents.

What will actually be done in reference to Daud

depends on whether his two uncles--who lead the opposition to him within the oligarchy--can command greater popular support than Daud and whether they can influence the king.

Action against Daud would consist either of his removal from office or his retention on a pledge of good behavior. If he is removed, the situation is likely to return to normal.

Even should Daud remain as prime minister, either on sufferance or as a victor in the struggle for power, the outlook for the near future is not necessarily alarming. He has been somewhat cowed by the strong diplomatic protests and is probably worried by the fact that tribal movements after the late March demonstrations were directed against Afghanistan rather than Pakistan.

The longer-range outlook is less promising. Eventually Daud is likely to indulge in some headstrong action inimical to Western interests in Afghanistan, despite promises he may give to the royal family. Moreover, in the next few years, death or incapacitation of the aging royal uncles may remove the last restraining elements on Daud and may enable him to control the government by dominating the king.

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PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTSThe Soviet Communiqué
On the Near East

The Soviet Foreign Ministry's communiqué of 16 April on developments in the Near and Middle East was released primarily to influence the Bandung conference.


The communiqué emphasized that Western-sponsored regional defense arrangements are colonialism in a new form and contrasted what it called Western imperialism with the exemplary conduct of the Soviet Union in encouraging the independence of new nations in the area.

While this line is "old hat" in Soviet propaganda, Moscow is putting it out now in official form to emphasize

that it is concerned over the development of military blocs such as the "northern tier," and to encourage anti-Western elements in countries such as Syria to count on Soviet support.

To give greater weight to such sentiments, the communiqué warned that any continued "policy of pressure and threat in relation to countries of the Near and Middle East" would "have to be considered by the UN."

Actually, the USSR's freedom of action in the Near and Middle East is hampered by its immediate objective of encouraging Indian neutrality

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and its longer-term program of economic penetration in the area.

In order to further these policies, the Soviet leaders have been careful to avoid using coercion or subversion which would appear as gross interference in the eyes of the Indian and other South Asian peoples.

It also is likely that the USSR looks on the area as a point of conflict among American, British and French policies, and would therefore desist from any threats or interference which might force these governments to adopt a common policy.

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Japan's Relations
With the Sino-Soviet Bloc

The latest Soviet note concerning Soviet-Japanese negotiations expresses a willingness to meet at London or Geneva, sites which Japan had previously mentioned as possibilities. The Soviet reply appears designed to sustain domestic pressure in Japan for closer relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc, which was noticeably subsiding as a result of earlier Soviet stalling.

The Soviet leaders may have felt that their short-term interests were best served by a gesture of "reasonableness" which would help Prime Minister Hatoyama through the forthcoming Diet session. Hatoyama's position has become shaky as a result of inept diplomacy, and, if he fell, he would probably be succeeded by a premier less willing to compromise with the bloc.

The note will probably prove acceptable to Japan. Shunichi Matsumoto, a former ambassador to London, has already been picked to head the Japanese delegation. Matsumoto is able, pro-West and reported on good terms with both Prime Minister Hatoyama and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu.

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The differences between Japan and Communist China center around Chinese attempts to maneuver the Japanese government into de facto relations prematurely.

In Tokyo, Japanese officials have refused to assume official responsibility for the execution of a private trade agreement. The government is also under pressure to participate in the enforcement of a private fisheries pact signed on 15 April in Peiping.

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Peiping Hints at Reprisals Against Hong Kong

Since the crash of an Air India plane on 11 April in which eight members of Peiping's delegation to the Bandung conference were killed, Chinese Communist spokesmen have been hinting at reprisals against the British colony of Hong Kong.

The Chinese Communists have been asserting that the British were responsible for failing to deter American and Chinese Nationalist "agents" in the colony. One spokesman has publicly stated that if the

British continue to "indulge" such agents, "this state of affairs will become a serious threat to China."

The Chinese Communists in the past have avoided threats against Hong Kong. Peiping may intend to use the airliner incident, however, to create apprehension over Hong Kong's future. The Chinese Communists may believe that such tactics will help to dissuade the British from supporting the American position on Formosa.

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Soviet Research On Earth Satellite

Moscow radio on 16 April announced the names of six of the members of the Permanent Interdepartmental Commission for Interplanetary Communication of the Academy of Science.

These six--P. Kapitsa, A. Karpenko, L. Sedov, V. Ambartsumyan, P. Parenago, and B. Kukharkin--are among the leading scientists in the USSR, and have internationally recognized competence in such fields as astrophysics, and cosmic ray and nuclear energy research.

The broadcast also carried a short interview with the secretary of the commission, who said that "one of the first tasks of the commission lies in organizing work for the creation of an automatic laboratory of scientific research in cosmic space."

Inclusion in the Soviet group of top-notch people in a field where competent personnel are scarce suggests a co-ordinated survey of the theoretical problems involved in the establishment of a space station.

To date, the work was probably not advanced beyond the theoretical stages, since the commission is subordinate to the Academy of Sciences and four of the six men listed have dealt almost exclusively with highly theoretical problems.

Construction of the propulsion device required to place a small object into an orbit around the earth is considered scientifically possible.

Enlargement of such a satellite into a usable space laboratory is beyond present-day scientific knowledge. This step would depend on the

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solution of many of the problems now facing the guided missile field, particularly in the research and development of the intercontinental ballistic missile.

Such a space platform could not only serve scientific research, but also could be an invaluable aid to military operations and intelligence collection activities. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
(Prepared by OSI)

South Korea Renews Efforts to Isolate Japan

Recent North Korean overtures toward Japan, abetted by Prime Minister Hatoyama's initial favorable response, have given South Korea an opportunity to renew its efforts to isolate Japan.

This is fundamentally an effort to undermine America's faith in Japan as a reliable ally, and to supplant Japan in American strategic planning with a group of small Asian nations led by South Korea. The more immediate objective, however, is to create a basis for attracting the major part of long-term, large-scale American aid allocated to the Far East.

Rhee has set his sights on obtaining 90 percent of all American aid allocated to the Far East. He has recently requested, through his aid officials, a total of \$350,000,000 in economic aid, and \$620,000,000 in military aid for fiscal 1956--an increase of \$270,000,000 over the current year.

Rhee's official press has warned that if Japan enters into negotiations with North Korea, South Korea should withdraw diplomatic relations and regard Japan as an enemy. The demand has also been

raised that South Korea should claim reparations from Japan to cover the 40 years of Japanese rule.

In late March, Rhee declared that other Asian nations must be made aware that Japan is moving toward Communism and could not be trusted. All of these nations, he asserted, must attempt to make the United States aware of the Japanese trend.

Rhee's "fact-finding" mission to Southeast Asia has issued statements warning free Asian nations to unite for protection against what it describes as a reviving, rearming Japan, which is moving toward collaboration with Communists. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

South Korea has also attempted to convince the United States that free Asian nations fear a resurgent Japan even more than Communism and, if confronted with a choice, would prefer the latter to the former.

The South Korea government has continued attempts to maneuver the United States into intervening with Japan on behalf of Korean objectives, and has called on the United States to force Japan to end its differences with "other free Asian nations." EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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Negotiations in Laos

The unheralded descent on Vientiane of some 30 Pathet Lao negotiators, just prior to the departure of Laotian officials for Bandung, was apparently timed carefully to soften any statements by the government of Laos at the Afro-Asian conference regarding Communist intransigence.

The Communists' volte-face, after arguments on the flimsiest of grounds against carrying on the talks in Vientiane, may also have been motivated in part by Viet Minh foreign minister Pham Van Dong's recent conversations with Nehru in New Delhi.

Nhouy Abhay, the government's chief negotiator, has stated that he plans to submit to the Pathet Lao a "reasonable proposal." He described this only in vague terms but it will apparently include an offer to "reintegrate" those Pathet Lao who at some former time held civil or military positions with the royal government.

Nhouy, although in no hurry to conclude the negotiations, believes his proposal will be accepted without difficulty if the Pathet Lao are "true Laotians"; if not, he asserts, they will be told frankly they are "Viets" and packed off home.

The government's continued lack of a sense of urgency in dealing with the Pathet Lao--reflected even by able officials such as Nhouy--was demonstrated again by Premier Katay in a 13 April talk with Ambassador Peurifoy in Bangkok.

Katay maintained that negotiations must not be broken off until it was apparent to all Laotians that the Pathet Lao was unreasonable and Communist-dominated. He insisted that the degree of Communist domination over the Pathet Lao organization was not firmly established.

The Pathet Lao has taken every advantage of the government's indecision. The Communists' immediate goal is to gain time in which to consolidate their hold and build up their organization in the northern provinces. However, their actions and propaganda attacks on the royal government have resulted in increasing disillusion on the government's part.

On 13 April the government sent to the International Control Commission a strongly worded memorandum on Pathet Lao violations of the truce and on Viet Minh collusion in the northern provinces. The efficacy of this tactic in solving the dispute with the Communists is highly doubtful, but the propaganda effect may prove helpful.

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Hungarian Leaders Ousted

The ouster of two top leaders of the Hungarian Workers' Party--Premier Imre Nagy and Mihaly Farkas--may be only the beginning of a wholesale weeding out of anti-Rakosi elements in the party on grounds of "rightist deviation."

Since Farkas has long been closely associated with party leader Matyas Rakosi, his removal on the charge that he had supported Nagy's "anti-party, anti-Marxist" views indicates that the split in the leadership extends beyond a simple struggle for power between Rakosi and Nagy.

Publication in the official party newspaper in early April of articles sharply critical of right-wing deviationism indicates widespread opposition among local party officials to the central committee resolution modifying new course policies.

While Nagy is not believed to have been a powerful force in the Hungarian party before his elevation to the premiership in July 1953, he has since then, as the spokesman for new course liberal policies, apparently built up an extensive following both within the central committee and at lower levels of the party hierarchy.

Farkas has been one of the most important party leaders and was minister of defense until July 1953.

In recent months both men had displayed unusual independence in their relations with Rakosi

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A reliable source of the American legation in Budapest has reported that Rakosi flew to Moscow on 14 April, apparently immediately after the central committee met to expel Nagy and Farkas from their party posts. If true, this suggests that Rakosi met again with strong opposition in the central committee and felt it

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necessary to gain Kremlin approval before announcing action against Nagy and his "right-wing" supporters which he knew would be unpopular.

The elevation of Andras Hegedus to the premiership indicates that the regime remains concerned over the "near stagnation" of agriculture, Hegedus, who has been first deputy premier since July 1953 and acting premier in recent weeks, has been closely connected with agriculture since 1951 and has co-ordinated the regime's agricultural policies since October 1954.

Hegedus is only 32 years old and first attained prominence in 1945 when he was elected secretary of the youth movement. He presumably does not have a significant personal party following.

In his maiden speech to the National Assembly on 18 April, he parroted the March central committee resolutions.

Despite the harsh action against Nagy and Farkas and the possibility of further ousters, Rakosi, backed by the Kremlin, is apparently still trying to follow a middle course and to avoid alienating any larger segments of the party membership than necessary.

Istvan Kovacs, whose recent speeches have appeared to reflect a moderate viewpoint, was promoted to the politburo, and Erno Gero, a representative of the extreme left wing of the party, reappeared in an important role at several Liberation Day celebrations after a long absence due to illness.

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Genoa Port Strike
Becoming More Serious

The strike situation in the Italian port of Genoa is becoming increasingly serious.

The walkout of some 1,600 ship repair workers is now in its thirteenth week with no end in sight. Twice this month sympathy strikes have completely disrupted cargo loadings and unloadings and resulted in numerous clashes between strikers and the police.

The Genoa strike began in January in protest against new hiring regulations which threatened to eliminate the virtual monopoly hitherto enjoyed among ship repair workers by the Communist-dominated General Labor Confederation (CGIL). Thus far there has been

no sign of wavering on the part of management, the union, or the government.

A 48-hour sympathy strike on 12 and 13 April by some 4,000 stevedores tied up more than 50 cargo ships. When the port authority warned that sympathy strikers would be fined if they walked out again, the stevedores called another 24-hour strike.

Some observers believe the strikers cannot hold out much longer. The leaders of both CGIL and the Italian Communist Party, however, may be expected to use every resource in pressing the strike. They are especially anxious for a victory in Genoa now to offset

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the heavy defeats suffered by CGIL in recent shop steward elections in industrial plants,

particularly the Fiat factories in Turin and Milan.

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Iraqi-Syrian Relations

Syria's cabinet capitulated last week to army pressure for negotiating a defense pact with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. An army coup and a concomitant threat of Iraqi military intervention have been averted for the time being.

The Syrian cabinet authorized Foreign Minister Azm on 13 April to negotiate a pact with Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the basis of his elimination of the anti-Iraqi provisions in Cairo's original draft.

Azm's proposals would make the treaty an Arab defense pact aimed at Israel. Even in this form, the projected pact, because of its anti-Iraqi and anti-Turkish inspiration, will probably be opposed by Baghdad and Ankara.

Azm is now at the Afro-Asian conference, where he will carry on negotiations with Egyptian and Saudi officials.

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The cabinet's endorsement of Azm's policy resulted largely from pressure by pro-Egyptian elements in the army who are in league with the anti-Western and extremist Arab Socialist-Resurrectionist Party.

These elements had threatened a coup if the endorsement were not forthcoming. They are likely to renew their efforts if Azm runs into difficulty when he refers the matter to the cabinet after his return from Bandung.

In the meantime, Iraq, under pressure from the West, has apparently given up the idea of sending troops into Syria in the event anti-Iraqi elements stage a coup.

Iraq and Turkey remain opposed to the Syrian government and its pro-Egyptian policy. However, they evidence less determination than formerly to prevent the signing of any new Arab pact.

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PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVESTHE KHRUSHCHEV APPROACH IN INTERNAL POLICY

Soviet party secretary Khrushchev's propensity for taking large-scale, spectacular gambles for quick results in agriculture suggests that he may use similar methods in tackling other internal policy matters.

A typical example of Khrushchev's approach was his abortive "agrogorod" plan to consolidate collective farm villages into "agricultural cities" which, as a member of the politburo and secretariat, he advocated in 1950 and early 1951. The plan called for centralizing the peasants on each large amalgamated farm by housing them in a single, urban-type village, or "agrogorod."

Khrushchev's scheme would have tightened political control over the peasantry. Indeed, it would have provided the basis for the transformation of the collective farms into completely government-operated state farms, and the eventual transfer of all land from the peasants to the state.

Had such a policy been pursued on a large scale, it would have diverted vast amounts of labor from agricultural production to building construction and caused a dangerous degree of apathy and even of resistance among the peasantry. Khrushchev's plan was so outweighed by more immediate considerations that the "agrogorod" scheme was quietly shelved.

During the same period, Khrushchev also advocated the merger of small collective farms, and this was carried out, with a reduction of the total number by two thirds.

One of the chief reasons behind this consolidation was that it made possible the dismissal of thousands of inefficient, uneducated and dishonest farm chairmen, and the assumption of their posts by specialists with secondary and higher agricultural training.

The improvement of farm management apparently fell short of the plan, however, and now Khrushchev is sponsoring a new scheme of dispatching some 30,000 capable urban workers to the countryside to be collective farm chairmen. Under this scheme, approximately one third of all the collective farm leaders would be replaced by July 1955. This appears to be another desperate attempt to improve the quality of farm management and will certainly cause serious organizational confusion for a considerable period of time.

Khrushchev has long been prone to try such wholesale remedies, however. In 1946, for instance, as Ukrainian party boss, he reported to the Ukrainian central committee that he had masterminded a "mass replacement" of half the top officials in the Ukrainian party and government in the preceding 18 months.

In 1953 Khrushchev instituted a program under which up to 7,000 mechanical engineers were supposedly being sent to the machine tractor stations and up to 100,000 agronomists and other technicians assigned to them and the collective farms.

He also radically reorganized party work in the rural areas, providing each of the 9,000 tractor stations

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with a group of party instructors headed by a district party committee secretary. To help accomplish the party's work in the rural areas, he recommended that at least 50,000 party workers be transferred to the countryside.

Last year, over 100,000 komsomols "volunteered" for settlement on the new lands, and this year, Khrushchev is urging another 100,000 to make a similar move. He has also commissioned a group of special central committee representatives to investigate the state farms in the "new lands" area.

The mass transfer approach to personnel problems apparently appeals to Khrushchev, but his plans do not always seem to be well thought out.

For instance, his call in 1953-1954 for urban workers to return to the farm in many cases merely permitted factory managers to cull out their poorest workers.

Khrushchev generally seems so preoccupied with the production side of planning that he neglects the many mundane but vital housekeeping problems that accompany a quick transfer of thousands of people.

Khrushchev also is prone to take long chances. In championing the new lands program he put his hopes on expanding grain acreage in an area approximately three fourths of which is situated on the periphery of the dry steppe-lands and deserts of the Kazakh plateau with an average of no more than 10 to 15 inches of precipitation annually. The program is further complicated by organizational and investment difficulties.

Planting corn in marginal areas, Khrushchev's latest panacea for solving the live-stock feed problem, and indirectly for solving the agricultural problem as a whole, is another daring innovation. Even more than in the "new lands" plan, mistakes in the corn program can be particularly costly from the standpoint both of investment and of failure to fulfill the country's needs for grain.

With only a very small area in the Soviet Union suited for corn, a grandiose corn-planting scheme would seem to have a small chance of achieving full success. Yet Khrushchev again seems prepared to take the big chance when he can envision prospects for immediate results. [] (Concurred EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs in by ORR)

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POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

The growing importance of the African as a force in international politics is pointed up by the attendance of official delegates from Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Gold Coast at the Bandung conference.

The major factors affecting the future of Africa south of

the Sahara are racialism, colonialism, and the influence of India, the United Nations, and Communism. Numerous areas, however, are at present largely untouched by these forces either because of their isolation or lack of development.

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Portuguese Africa's economic development has been very slow, and because of the colony's relative isolation and the regime's tight rule, native unrest has not manifested itself.


In the French areas, the pace of economic development has been somewhat faster. The granting of suffrage to the Africans has spurred political consciousness, but outbursts of nationalism are quickly suppressed.

Under a paternalistic system, the Belgian Congo is experiencing rapid economic

growth accompanied by social development of the African. So far, it has escaped most of the nationalism and racialism of surrounding areas.

Areas of British Africa--Gambia, Sierra Leone and Tanganyika--are generally stable, although economic difficulties, strikes or constitutional problems demand attention from time to time.

The independent nations of Ethiopia and Liberia, while stable politically, are confronted by the need for economic development, for closer control by the central



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government over the outlying areas, and for the growth of an educated and politically trained population.

Areas of Racial Unrest

On the high plateau of eastern and southern Africa the white man has established a permanent home. Here, especially in Kenya, the Rhodesias and the Union of South Africa, a small white minority has control. The whites, fearful of inundation by the overwhelming black majority, and scornful of the primitive African culture, are determined to retain control of their own destinies.

In this area the color bar rules, and the emerging African, shedding his own tribal society and yet not accepted in the industrially superior Western culture, is subjected to bitter discrimination. Hatred of the white and loss of understanding between races are replacing the former friendly relations.

Kenya: A rapid increase of the native population around the European centers in Kenya, population pressure on the land, and racial discrimination have all contributed to the Mau Mau terrorism. In the three years of the movement's existence, the terrorists have killed about 8,000 Africans and 30 Europeans, have tied down about 8,000 troops from Britain and thousands of Kenya whites, and have cost Kenya directly some \$75,000,000.

The military campaign in which 8,000 terrorists have been killed and over 50,000 Africans detained in camps has put the Mau Mau on the defensive, but it still retains much influence over the 1,300,000 Kikuyus.

Meanwhile, a revolutionary social change is being accomplished by the settling of

some of the Kikuyus in villages. Without greater reforms, however, such as the granting of additional land and of broader political rights, and the ending of racial discrimination, Kikuyu loyalty is improbable and future terrorist outbreaks are almost a certainty.

White settler criticism of concessions to Africans and of a soft government policy toward terrorists suggests that the local whites are not yet prepared to give constructive leadership to the Africans in the development of a multi-racial society in Kenya.

South Africa: The election of Strijdom as prime minister of South Africa last November has accelerated the trend toward racial disturbance. He is less willing than former premier Malan to compromise with the English minority element and is equally determined to maintain white supremacy.

Strijdom is taking a tough attitude toward non-European organizations, mixed labor unions, constitutional barriers to Nationalist Party racial legislation, and to any criticism of South Africa's racial policy. Racial separation--such as the removal of 70,000 Africans from Johannesburg--will be implemented when possible, but apartheid will probably not be pushed where it conflicts with economic development.

The non-European organizations are undergoing internal changes which may permit the Communists to expand their influence. These movements are rather ineffective at present but are joining with the white Communist-front organization, the Congress of Democrats, to sponsor a large-scale "Congress of the People" in June. The government is alert to the danger and probably will act forcefully.

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Rhodesia: The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, trying to establish political unity and foster economic development, faces a serious racial problem. The official policy is partnership of the races; however, daily operation of government and society is somewhat similar to South Africa.

An approach to multiracialism is apparent in African parliamentary membership and in the new interracial university. On the other hand, the continued white supremacy policy of the European copper miners is more reminiscent of South Africa.

The recently demonstrated strength of the African Mine Workers Union and its co-operation with the African political movement in Northern Rhodesia suggest that African unionized labor will be an increasingly important force.

Areas of Anticolonialism

Rising resentment against colonialism is responsible for nationalist agitation by politically conscious Africans in areas where the white man is not a settler.

The arbitrary political boundaries of European colonies cut across tribal areas to such an extent that any modern African state contains segments of various tribal groups. These groups are frequently antagonistic, culturally distinct, and wholly lack a common loyalty or a national concept. The effects of this situation are apparent in the Gold Coast.

The Gold Coast: As the first tropical African colony to approach independence, the Gold Coast now appears to be bogging down in internal dissension. Strong regional and tribal animosities aroused by a rapidly growing opposition

group--the National Liberation Movement--may force Britain and Prime Minister Nkrumah to make constitutional revisions and reconsider their timetable for complete Gold Coast independence, now scheduled for 1956.

The Liberation Movement, started by the African cocoa farmers last September as a protest against low prices, has become the vehicle of protest for all anti-Nkrumah groups. It refuses to compromise on its demand for a change to a federal system of government.

While Nkrumah maintains overwhelming control of the legislature, the clashes between contending forces and the growing strength of the movement, which is even causing high-level defections from Nkrumah's party, will force the prime minister to find a solution.

Failure to resolve these differences would be a severe setback to Africans throughout the continent who look to the Gold Coast as a model for the development of future native African states.

Nigeria: Britain's other major West African colony, Nigeria, is faced with similar problems. The Moslem north, backward and governed by rulers dependent on Britain for support, fears domination by the more politically sophisticated southern regions which are joined with it in a federation. The south is pressing for self-government in 1956, and Britain has offered to discuss the problem at that time.

In view of the strong tribal loyalties and the absence historically of any Nigerian state, this colony may break up into various weak and antagonistic tribal states unless Britain can prolong the existence of the present federation and constitutionally strengthen the central government.

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Uganda: Tribal and provincial rivalry is responsible for political unrest in Uganda which has prevailed since the deposition in 1953 of the king of Buganda Province. He and the Buganda nationalists, who were proud of the province's economic and political leadership, wanted separate development as well as a pledge of no federation with white-controlled Kenya.

The influence of the Buganda nationalists grew until Britain, late in 1954, agreed to permit the king to return if a constitutional monarchy were accepted in Buganda and if that province would participate in the Uganda legislature. The issue is still unsettled, but the unrest has clearly shown that now there is little sentiment for a Uganda state.

External Factors

Powerful influences are exerted in Africa by India, the United Nations and world Communism.

The Role of the Indian: In eastern and southern Africa the million Indians play an important role. Long a factor in commerce as traders and middlemen, the Indians have now become a political force as agitators and befrienders of African nationalism. They are afraid of expulsion when African states are established, and by giving financial aid and leadership to some of these movements, they apparently hope to ingratiate themselves with the future rulers of the continent.

The Indian is not likely to obtain the Africans' trust, but his agitation causes the present governments additional difficulties and exacerbates racial relations. In West Africa and Ethiopia, Indian influence is limited more to promoting cultural relations.

The Role of the United Nations: UN activities in connection with African affairs are constantly increasing, but the ruling powers are jealous of their sovereignty and resent alleged meddling in internal affairs. This was brought home by South African and Belgian withdrawal from some UN agencies.

Trusteeship Council reports are generally critical of conditions in African areas. The flood of petitions to the UN from Africans usually magnify minor incidents into major catastrophes. The verbatim texts of UN meetings, distributed by UN agencies and containing propaganda statements by Communist delegates, have encouraged discontent with colonialism and Western culture.

The Togoland trusteeship problem must be faced soon by the United Nations because Britain has announced its intention to terminate its trusteeship when the Gold Coast achieves independence. The UN solution will have an important effect in West Africa as well as create a precedent for the termination of such agreements.

The Role of Communism: The third external force, Communism, is still relatively unimportant in Africa, although there are Communist activities in a few widely dispersed areas.

The urbanized native, having lost his tribal ties and now facing a baffling industrial culture, is an easy target for political agitators. This is especially true in the cities of South Africa, the mining camps of Rhodesia, the crowded slums of Nairobi and in the ports of West Africa.

In the rural areas, where the mass of the Africans live, isolation and political apathy have impeded the growth of Communism.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

21 April 1955

Africa is the scene of increasing ferment as the natives become more critical of colonial rule and the European color bar.

Unless the present trend is reversed and African faith

in Western civilization restored, the continent's valuable manpower and military staging areas, strategic resources, and the friendship of 200,000,000 people may be lost.

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TS #102375
TAB B
IAC-D-6/11.5
8 February 1956

US Estimate of Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities*

1. The USSR is engaged in an extensive guided missile program. We estimate that the Western Powers face a growing Soviet guided missile threat over the next several years. A threat to Western offensive capabilities is already beginning to appear in the form of increased Soviet air defense strength. This threat will probably soon be followed by improved Soviet offensive capabilities against US and Allied coastal areas and sea lines of communication, and in tactical operations. Later the threat will probably extend to all Allied base areas in Eurasia and its periphery, and ultimately to the entire US.
2. With the passage of time, the increasing size of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the larger yields estimated to be available from nuclear warheads will make missiles an increasingly effective means of nuclear attack. However, we believe that for the next several years the USSR would rely primarily on high performance aircraft for the delivery of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the advantage of surprise and other considerations might warrant earlier use of missiles with nuclear warheads for certain purposes.

* The dates given in this estimate are the probable years during which small quantities of missiles could have been produced and placed in the hands of trained personnel of one operational unit, thus constituting a limited capability for operational employment. These dates are based on the assumption that a concerted and continuous effort began in 1948, and are those around which the missile could have been operationally tested and be ready for series production. However, an additional period (which would vary according to missile type) would be required before missiles could be produced in quantity and the necessary units trained and deployed. We estimate that at least an additional six months would normally be required for shift or conversion from pilot plant to series production, and an additional period to reach the planned production rate. Some 18 months to two years would probably be required for individual and unit training of each operational unit, although this period could to a considerable extent overlap the production period.

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Specific Missile Capabilities

3. Surface-to-Air Missiles. The USSR is probably devoting very high priority to producing such missiles to overcome its air defense deficiencies. We believe that it now has deployed, at least in the Moscow area, operational surface-to-air missiles. Their performance characteristics are unknown, but might be superior to those previously estimated. The low yield nuclear warhead which could be available after 1958 would greatly increase their kill probability.

4. Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles. Although the USSR could employ nonballistic guided missiles from ground launchers, we believe that it would favor ballistic missiles because of their relative immunity to presently known countermeasures and their greater capability for achieving surprise. In view of growing Allied tactical nuclear capabilities in Europe the USSR will probably give high priority to producing ballistic missiles for support of its field forces. However, aside from these missiles the USSR will probably concentrate over the next years more on ballistic missile development than on quantity production. We estimate that:

a. Short Range. The USSR, in addition to shorter range ballistic missiles, could have had since 1954 an operational 350 mile ballistic missile with CEP of two miles.^{1/} We believe that the USSR has not developed a 500 mile missile.

b. Medium Range. The USSR could have ready for series production in 1955-1956 a single-stage, ballistic missile of 850-900 miles range, with a CEP of three to four miles. However, only a low yield nuclear warhead probably would be available for the next few years.

^{1/} CEP (Circular Probable Error) means 50 percent hits within the stated radius. All CEPs and ranges are given in nautical miles.

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c. Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). In 1958-1959 the USSR could have ready for series production a dual stage ballistic missile of about 1,600 miles range with a CEP of three to four miles. Large yield nuclear warheads would probably be available in 1959-1960. If the USSR were willing to accept a reduced range of 1,400 miles, this missile could be made ready for series production as early as 1957, but in this case only a low yield nuclear warhead would be available.

d. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). We now estimate that as soon as 1960-1961 the USSR could have ready for series production an intercontinental ballistic missile of 5,500 miles range, with a large yield nuclear warhead and a CEP of roughly five miles. Advent of such an ICBM would create an entirely new type of threat to the US.

5. Earth Satellite. We estimate that the Soviets are attempting to develop such a vehicle at the earliest practicable date and could have a relatively uninstrumented vehicle by 1958. A vehicle which could gather and transmit upper atmosphere scientific data could be available by 1963.

6. Air-to-Air Missiles. Because of its air defense weaknesses, the USSR has probably also assigned a very high priority to air-to-air missiles. In 1955 it could have developed a guided rocket with infrared homing. In the period 1955-58, it could develop an improved version with greater range. However, the Soviet guidance system would permit only tail cone attacks under generally fair weather conditions at the engagement altitude. In 1958-60 the USSR could probably have a new all-weather missile.

7. Air-to-Surface Missiles. The USSR also would almost certainly seek to produce in quantity any precision weapon available for effective HE antiship attacks. For this purpose it could now have available and would probably produce a rocket-propelled glide bomb, although limited to good visibility conditions. In view of its extensive bomber capabilities, we do not believe that the USSR would produce a long-range air-to-surface missile for attacks on Allied

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ports and bases over the next several years. In 1960, on the other hand, when we estimate that an all-weather air-to-surface missile with nuclear warhead could be ready for series production, there will probably be a high priority Soviet requirement for a weapon of this type because of the increased effectiveness of Allied air defenses around key target areas.

8. Submarine-Launched Missiles. The USSR will almost certainly have a requirement for submarine-launched missiles for nuclear attacks on US and Allied coastal areas. It could already have available improved V-1 types with nuclear warheads. In 1955, the USSR could have ready for series production a turbo-jet pilotless aircraft (nonballistic guided missile) with improved range, speed, and accuracy, and by 1958 its nuclear warhead yield could approach compatibility with its estimated accuracy and greatly increase its effectiveness.

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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

POSSIBLE GUIDED-MISSILE TESTING RANGES
IN THE USSR



SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

8/52

JUL 9 1957

CIA/RR-GR-148

June 1957

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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CIA/RR-GR-148

June 1957

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Research and Reports

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- USSR: Possible Guided Missile Testing Ranges 21
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POSSIBLE GUIDED-MISSILE TESTING RANGES
IN THE USSR

I. Introduction

The purpose of this study is to determine the possible location of guided missile testing ranges in the USSR through an analysis of geographic conditions in relation to technical criteria recommended by the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC). A statement of recommended technical criteria was prepared by the GMIC for the selection of testing ranges for both intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM). Among the criteria are factors such as distance requirements, location of hazardous areas, logistic requirements at launch and impact areas, instrumentation, and security.

A detailed analysis of geographic conditions in the USSR provided the background for the selection of those areas that most nearly satisfy the conditions of the recommended criteria. The first section of the study is concerned with the procedural approach to the problem. A step-by-step regional analysis is made of such factors as distance from a non-Soviet bloc border, population density, logistics, distance requirements, terrain, and climate. In the next section of the study the most likely impact areas were selected. These were selected before determining possible launching points, since the launching-point selection is dependent on distance to the impact area. The subsequent portion of the study is concerned with the selection of possible launching points that most nearly satisfy

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the conditions of the recommended criteria. In addition, available information on reported guided-missile sites, whether confirmed or not, was taken into consideration.

II. Procedure

Through the application of the various criteria, large sections of the Soviet Union were tentatively eliminated from consideration. It soon became evident, however, that no one site specifically satisfied all the recommended criteria as set forth by the GMIC. Undesirable features of a particular locality had to be weighed against the desirable features. The selection thus became a process of eliminating those areas where the disadvantages exceeded the advantages. The criteria considered are discussed below.

A. Distance from a Non-Soviet Bloc Border

The Soviet testing ranges are likely to be located where danger of outside observation is at a minimum. According to the GMIC, both the launching and impact areas would probably be at least 500 miles* from the nearest non-Soviet bloc observation area. Since this would exclude Kapustin Yar and much of Kamchatka, however, the distance was arbitrarily reduced to 400 miles. Areas within 400 miles of non-Soviet bloc countries are shown on the accompanying maps. Potential observation areas closest to the USSR include, from west to east, Norway, Finland, Sweden (Gotland Island), Austria, Turkey,

*All distances, unless otherwise specified, are in nautical miles. One nautical mile equals approximately 1.15 statute miles.

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Iran, Afghanistan, Japan (Hokkaido), Aleutians (Attu Island), St. Lawrence Island (Bering Strait), and the Alaskan mainland. As is evident from the maps, distance alone tentatively eliminated large parts of the Soviet Union, particularly in Europe and Central Asia.

B. Population Density

Launching and impact areas are probably located where population is sparse. The hazard to population is high within a radius of 25 miles of the launch site and within about 125 miles of the impact area. For security reasons also, areas of sparse population are favored. On the three accompanying maps, the areas with population densities of over 25 and between 10 and 25 persons per square kilometer are shown. If the location of launch sites were limited to areas where the population density is less than 10 per square kilometer, much of European USSR would have to be eliminated from consideration.

A low population density is also required around the booster impact area, which is about 200 to 400 miles down range. The factors of safety and security, however, are possibly not as severe here as at the launch and impact areas.

C. Logistics

Several logistic factors must be considered, particularly for launch sites. Probably any launch site selected would be within 50 or 100 miles of an existing rail line. Roads and an airfield are also needed, but they could easily be constructed if the terrain is

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not excessively rugged. Of particular importance is accessibility to external supplies of missiles, auxiliary equipment, missile components, fuels, and instrumentation. The site should be located where sufficient fresh water is available for 2,000 to 10,000 persons. Logistical requirements for the impact area are less restrictive -- reasonably good accessibility, an airfield, and facilities to care for 100 to 400 persons.

The sources of missile supplies and fuels are largely in European USSR, and most of the Soviet rail network is concentrated in the western half of the country. These factors contribute to the conclusion that launching areas are in the west and that the missiles are fired toward the east.

D. Distance Requirements

The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) requires a range of at least 3,000 miles for research and development purposes. For proof testing, 5,000 to 5,500 miles are needed. The maximum great-circle distance from the western to the eastern territorial limits of the USSR is only about 4,400 miles. Since missiles are being fired from west to east and follow a great-circle route rather than a fixed compass direction, the launch site will be located as far west as conditions will allow. The factors of population density and distance from non-Soviet bloc borders have already placed a restriction on much of the western part of the USSR. The areas farthest west that are not affected by these restrictions are the

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lower Volga, western Kazakhstan, and northeastern European USSR.

From these areas the distance to the territorial limits of the country is 3,300 to 3,800 miles. Although this is ample for research and development purposes, it falls short of the distance needed for proof testing.

The intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) requires a range of at least 800 miles that is capable of extension up to 1,600 miles. A 1,600-mile range within Soviet territorial limits could be established at innumerable places. It is quite possible, however, that IRBM's would be launched from a site where ICBM's also are launched.

E. Terrain

The launch site is likely to be located in an area of relatively flat terrain. Mountains, depressions, and deep valleys or gorges would hamper the development of extensive facilities. It is particularly important that the terrain between the launch site and existing rail facilities offer no major obstacle to the construction of spur rail lines and roads. The terrain must also be suitable for the construction of an airfield nearby. Half-tracked vehicles should have access to the entire launch area the year round.

In western USSR, terrain conditions are generally more favorable in the steppe and desert regions to the south than in the central and northern forested regions, and extensive areas of relatively flat, undissected terrain are more common. The forest cover in the central and northern areas is a deterrent to vehicular movement and

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might also present a fire hazard. In contrast the steppe and desert areas are largely treeless and have a vegetation cover of grass or scattered low brush. The presence of swamps and the resulting poor trafficability eliminate from consideration much of Western Siberia and many areas in northern European USSR.

A major problem in the steppe and desert areas is the procurement of sufficient fresh water for the range-operating staff of 2,000 to 10,000 persons. The lack of water to a large extent restricts the location of launch sites to areas near large rivers or in which ground water is adequate to assure a plentiful supply of fresh well water.

F. Climate

Climatic factors most important to the selection of possible guided-missile launching areas include temperature and precipitation, winds, surface visibility, and cloud cover. The steppe and desert regions have the most favorable combination of climatic conditions in the USSR for missile operations. Conditions are more restrictive in the central and northern forested regions.

Annual precipitation totals are low -- 5 to 14 inches -- in the steppes and deserts of the lower Volga region and western Kazakhstan. The forested regions to the north receive 18 to 24 inches. Here the snow cover attains open-field depths of 20 to 30 inches, compared with 2 to 5 inches in the steppe and desert. The snow cover persists for 160 to 200 days in the northern forested region, as compared with 80 to 100 days in the south (the North Caspian -- Aral Sea region).

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Temperatures decrease from south to north. In the steppe and desert areas the average for January is about 10° to 14° F and for July 75° to 80° F; whereas the corresponding averages in the north are 3° to 10° F and 55° to 66° F. In winter, early morning lows generally reach 4° to 8° F in the south and -2° to $+2^{\circ}$ F in the north. In summer, afternoon highs generally reach 85° to 90° F in the south and 65° to 70° F in the north. Although the differences in winter temperatures are not excessive, summer temperatures are considerably higher in the south than in the north.

Average wind speeds are low throughout most of the western USSR. Winds of gale force (over 32 mph) occur on about 10 days a year, being somewhat more common in spring than in other seasons. In northern European USSR, overall wind speeds average about 6 to 8 miles per hour, while in the steppe and desert the average is 4 to 6 miles.

In winter, surface visibility conditions are similar throughout much of the western USSR, with visibility of less than 2-1/2 miles on about half the days during each month. In the warmer part of the year, surface visibility in the steppe and desert is less than 2-1/2 miles only 1 or 2 days a month, compared with 5 to 10 days in northern European USSR.

Cloud conditions also favor the steppe and desert areas. In January the skies are cloudy 65 to 80 percent of the time in the north, as opposed to 50 to 70 percent in the steppe and desert. In

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July, skies are cloudy 45 to 65 percent of the time in the north and only 10 to 25 percent in the steppe and desert.

III. Selected ICBM Impact Areas

Impact areas are probably located in the Soviet Far East, but it is not specifically known whether the Soviets are using a single area or several areas. Two broad areas, however, seem to satisfy the conditions discussed in the previous section of the report. The more likely of the two -- the estimated impact area -- includes Kamchatka and the northern Kuril Islands. The second -- the possible impact area -- includes much of the western littoral of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Magadan-Kolyma region. Since the location of the impact areas has a direct bearing on the selection of possible launching points, the impact areas are considered first.

The Kamchatka-northern Kuril Islands area is selected as the estimated ICMB impact area. The most important reason is the fact that this area is farther from the launching sites in the west than any other part of the Soviet Union. It thus provides the maximum allowable range within USSR territorial limits. Geographically, Kamchatka is not the eastern-most part of the country, but missiles follow a great-circle route, not a fixed compass direction. The population density of the area is low, generally less than 1 person per square kilometer. The mountainous terrain provides good observation points. Fresh water is easily available for a staff of 100 to 400 persons. Much of Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands consists

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of rugged volcanic terrain in which cross-country trafficability is seriously restricted. However, an access road could be constructed for a project as important as this.

The extent of the estimated impact area is limited by distance from non-Soviet bloc areas. Parts of the area -- the east-central coast of Kamchatka and the Komandorskiye Islands -- extend beyond the prescribed 400-mile limit. This requirement was waived in view of reported activity in the area. The seaward boundaries of the impact area generally extend no farther than 50 miles from land. The northern limit of the impact area is so selected that missiles sent beyond Kamchatka and out over the Pacific (for 5,000- to 5,500-mile proof testing) would pass to the south of Attu and other islands of the Aleutian chain.

The western shore of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Magadan-Kolyma area is selected only as a secondary or possible impact area. The boundary extends into the sea for 50 miles (1) along the coast, (2) from the northern end of Sakhalin, and (3) around small, rocky Iony Island. Rugged terrain and an almost complete lack of roads prevents any considerable extension of the area inland, except at Magadan. Here a paved, all-year highway leads north to the network of roads in the famous Kolyma gold-mining district. If 3,000- to 3,200-mile testing is desired, this area might possibly serve as an impact area.

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IV. Selected Launch Areas

On the basis of the recommended criteria and geographic conditions, five areas have been selected as the possible locations of Soviet launching sites. In addition, available information on known or reported missile activity has been considered. No one site completely satisfies all requirements. Some are weak in several respects but strong in others. The advantages and disadvantages of each are described and evaluated.

A. Kapustin Yar

The Kapustin Yar area more nearly meets all the qualifications for a launching area than any other place within the Soviet Union. This conclusion would have been reached even if it were not known that missile installations do exist there. In selecting this site the Soviets evidently considered the same basic factors as those recommended by the GMIC and discussed in this study.

Kapustin Yar is located on the east bank of the Volga River just east of Stalingrad and within an area of semidesert climate and vegetation. It is in an area where the population density is less than 10 persons per square kilometer and is located just over 400 miles from the nearest potential observation area (eastern Turkey). Kapustin Yar is the western-most point in the Soviet Union that meets these qualifications. The site is relatively close to the heart of the European USSR and is fairly near sources of missile supplies and fuels. A rail line passes through the town of Kapustin

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Yar. The terrain is flat to gently rolling and favors the construction of roads and airfields. The climate is hot and dry in the summer and cold and dry in the winter; visibility and cloud-cover conditions are among the most favorable in the Soviet Union.

For ICBM purposes, a range of about 3,800 miles* can be attained within the USSR territorial limits. This is the calculated great-circle distance from Kapustin Yar to southern Kamchatka. If a distance of 5,000 miles is desired for proof testing, the range would have to extend 1,200 miles into the Pacific Ocean. The booster impact area, 200 to 400 miles down range, falls in an area of low population density southeast of Kuybyshev. From 200 to 300 miles down range the population density is less than 10 persons per square kilometer and from 300 to 400 miles slightly more than 10 persons. Throughout the booster impact area there is scattered agricultural activity, but there are no towns of significant size.

Kapustin Yar is also well located for IRBM purposes. Excellent conditions prevail to the east across central Kazakhstan, where the density of population is extremely low. An IRBM range could extend from Kapustin Yar eastward past Sagiz, Chelkar, and the southern tip of Lake Balkhash and terminate east of Alma-Ata. Another could extend east past Kalmykovo, Kandagach, and Uspenskiy (south of Karaganda) to the vicinity of Ozero Ala-Kul'. A great-circle

*The factors of earth rotation and time in flight are not taken into consideration in this study.

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distance of 1,400 to 1,500 miles is possible within the USSR territorial limits. For a testing range of 1,300 miles the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing range could serve as an impact area. For a distance of 1,600 miles the range would have to be extended across the Chinese border into northwestern Sinkiang. Natural conditions on the Chinese side of the border are still favorable, but security or other considerations probably rule out this possibility. It is also possible that the IRBM could follow the same path as the ICBM, with the range terminating in the vicinity of the Yenisey River, 1,600 miles from Kapustin Yar.

B. Aral'sk

The Aral'sk area lies on the northeastern edge of the Aral Sea in the desert zone of Central Asia. It possesses many of the same advantages as Kapustin Yar, along with certain drawbacks. The general area between Aral'sk and Ozero Tengiz (in the direction of the selected impact area at Kamchatka) is almost totally unpopulated. From 300 to 400 miles down range, however, there is some agricultural activity, a part of the New Lands program. The area is safely beyond the 400-mile limit from foreign borders. Terrain conditions are good -- flat to slightly hilly -- and airfields and access roads could be easily constructed. Climatic conditions are favorable, with hot and dry summers, cold and dry winters, excellent visibility, and a minimum of cloud cover. The main rail line from Moscow to Central Asia passes through Aral'sk. Fresh water should be available from

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either the Syr-Dar'ya River or wells in the sand dune region just east and northeast of Aral'sk.

The primary disadvantages are shorter potential range and greater distance from European USSR sources of missile supplies and fuels. The great-circle distance from Aral'sk to southern Kamchatka is 3,500 miles, 300 miles shorter than the range distance available at Kapustin Yar. For 3,000-mile development testing, the northern coast of the Sea of Okhotsk could serve as an impact area. For 5,000-mile proof testing, the range would have to be extended into the Pacific Ocean 1,500 miles beyond Kamchatka. Aral'sk is located relatively far from the sources of missile supplies and fuels in European USSR -- a disadvantage when compared with Kapustin Yar.

Aral'sk could possibly serve as a launch area for IRBM's. If the ICBM course were followed, an 800-mile range would extend to an area north of Barabinsk and a 1,600-mile range to an area north of Bratsk and Ust'-Kut. A possible IRBM impact area 700 miles east of Aral'sk is the nuclear testing range southwest of Semipalatinsk.

C. Kirov

The Kirov area is located in the northeastern part of European USSR within the taiga zone of northern coniferous forests. It is about 600 miles from Finland, the nearest foreign border, and is located in an area where the population density is less than 10 persons per square kilometer. Kirov was selected as a possible launch area because it is the westernmost part of the northern USSR

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that meets the above two qualifications. It is located fairly close to the heart of European USSR and fairly near sources of missile supplies and fuels. A rail line from Moscow and Gor'kiy passes through Kirov.

Neither the terrain nor the climate at Kirov is as favorable as in the desert and steppe areas of the south. The area is characterized by undulating to hilly relief, dense forests, and many small rivers. Although obtaining fresh water is no problem, the many rivers and creeks increase the difficulty of constructing access roads. Cross-country trafficability in the general launch area is further restricted by the forests. Winters are cold and dry; summers are moderate and wet. The snow cover is seldom more than 2 feet deep, but it persists for almost 6 months. During much of the year, surface visibility is fair. The sky is cloudy more than two-thirds of the time in winter and almost half the time in summer.

The great-circle distance from Kirov to southern Kamchatka is about 3,300 miles -- ample for research and development testing of an ICBM. The booster impact area, 200 to 400 miles down range, would fall astride the sparsely populated northern Ural Mountains. Conditions for IRBM testing are not equally favorable. About 800 miles down range is an area of swampy and inaccessible terrain, and 1,600 miles down range is a remote and inaccessible portion of the Central Siberian Plateau.

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~~S E C R E T~~D. Kola Peninsula

The Kola Peninsula in the northwesternmost corner of the USSR is notable largely because of the important port of Murmansk. This peninsula was selected as a possible launch area mainly because of observer reports that missile activity is carried on here. As a launch site the Kola Peninsula violates many of the criteria established by the GMIC. It is near the Finnish border and thus subject to possible observation. Non-Soviet fishing boats, particularly British and Norwegian, commonly ply the waters of the Barents Sea, where the booster charge might well be visible to them. The area is far from sources of missile supplies and fuels. Climatic conditions are generally unfavorable -- very cold winters, a 7-month snow cover, and cloudy skies about three-fourths of the time the year round. Rocky terrain, poor drainage, and a forest cover contribute to the difficulty of cross-country trafficability.

The great-circle distance from the Kola Peninsula to southern Kamchatka is about 3,200 to 3,300 miles. Although this is ample for ICBM research and development testing, it is no better than that at the three possible launch areas already discussed. The booster impact area would fall over the Barents Sea. The range might possibly be used for IRBM testing. About 800 miles down range is the Kara Sea--Ob' Estuary area, and 1,600 miles down range would be in the vicinity of Nordvik.

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The location of the launching point as indicated on the map is somewhat arbitrary. The site indicated has relatively flat terrain and is as far from the Finnish border as distance from the railroad will permit. If a launch area is already located on the Kola Peninsula, it may perhaps be in the Murmansk--Severomorsk area. It might possibly be of a non-testing nature, designed rather for use in case of war. Murmansk is the point in western USSR closest to the eastern United States.

E. Carpathian Mountains

A possible launching site was selected in the Carpathian Mountains, almost solely because this location would provide the maximum possible range length within the territorial limits of the USSR. The great-circle distance to southern Kamchatka is about 4,300-4,400 miles. Although this site is interesting as a possibility, it violates many of the criteria recommended by the GMIC.

The launch site is in a mountainous area near several satellite frontiers. It is only 300 miles from Austria, the nearest potential observation area. The population density is high, and the removal of the populace within a 25-mile radius would be a major undertaking. Road and rail facilities are available nearby. The site is probably conveniently located with regard to missile supplies and fuels. Except for deep winter snows in the mountains, climatic conditions are generally acceptable.

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A favorable aspect is the location of the booster impact area. The well-known Pripyat' Marshes lie 200 to 340 miles down range. This is a low-lying area of extensive marshes and forests. Scattered tracts of farmland support a population of between 10 and 25 persons per square kilometer. A 1,600-mile IRBM would land in the vicinity of the Arctic Coast east of Nar'yan-Mar.

F. Other Possible Launch Areas

Several other areas within the Soviet Union might possibly serve as launching points. The five locations described are merely the most likely possibilities on the basis of natural conditions and available evidence.

Considerable speculation has centered on the Arabatskaya Strelka, a narrow spit on the east coast of the Crimea. A railroad was recently constructed to Valok, and the area was incorporated into Khersonskaya Oblast'. An ICBM range from here to Kamchatka would have a distance of about 4,300 miles. The area is only 200 miles from the Turkish coast, however, and the booster impact area would fall astride the densely populated, industrialized Donets Basin. The IRBM prospects are considerably better. A missile launched in an easterly direction would cross the northern end of the Caspian Sea and proceed across the wastelands of Central Kazakhstan. Much of the course would coincide with the IRBM range extending eastward from Kapustin Yar. A range distance of over 1,900 miles would be possible before reaching the Chinese border, compared with less than

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1,500 miles from Kapustin Yar. Furthermore, the nuclear testing range between Semipalatinsk and Lake Balkhash, 1,700 miles down range, might provide a convenient impact area.

Considerable speculation has been aroused by the Soviet request to observe the October 1958 solar eclipse from Atafu Island. The island is part of the New Zealand-controlled Tokelau group (near Samoa) in the South Pacific. It is remotely possible that the request to observe the eclipse could be a cover for recording the performance of an ICBM launched from the USSR deep into the Pacific. A 5,500-mile arc measured from Atafu passes through Eastern Siberia. Conveniently astride the arc is the railhead town of Ust'-Kut, about 100 miles northwest of Lake Baikal. A great circle drawn between Ust'-Kut or a more northerly point and Atafu Island extends into the Pacific at the southern end of the Kuril Islands, and nowhere passes through land other than Soviet territory. Ust'-Kut is favorably located for an IRBM range; 1,600 miles to the east is the west coast of Kamchatka.

The Kapustin Yar ICBM range could be lengthened by moving the launch area back to the southwest, to the vicinity of Stavropol'. This would add 250 to 300 miles to the range length, making the great-circle distance to Kamchatka 4,050 to 4,100 miles. The booster impact area would then fall in the Kapustin Yar area. This shift, however, would place the launch area within 200 miles of the

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Turkish border, and the few miles gained would hardly warrant the transfer of installations from the already established site at Kapustin Yar.

V. Summary

An analysis of geographic conditions related to the technical requirements for testing guided missiles provided a basis on which the possible locations of guided-missile ranges in the USSR were selected. A step-by-step regional evaluation was made to determine those general areas that most nearly satisfy the required conditions. This procedure involved the following factors:

1. Distance from a non-Soviet bloc border -- Distance alone tentatively eliminated from consideration large areas, particularly in Europe and Central Asia.
2. Population density -- Low density is a requirement for both launch and impact areas, thus provisionally eliminating much of European USSR except in the southeast and northeast.
3. Logistics -- Because of the dense rail network and nearness to sources of supplies, it is probable that launch sites are in the western half of the country and that the missiles are fired from west to east.
4. Distance requirements -- Although the maximum great-circle distance possible within Soviet territorial limits is 4,400 miles, the factors of high population density and proximity to non-Soviet bloc borders probably limits the maximum length of a testing range to 3,300 to 3,800 miles.

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5. Terrain -- In the western part of the USSR the terrain is generally more favorable for launching operations in the steppe and desert regions to the south than in the north.

6. Climate -- For missile operations the steppe and desert regions possess the most desirable combination of climatic conditions in the USSR.

On the basis of the factors discussed, the two impact areas in the Soviet Far East that would provide the maximum firing-range distance from the west have been selected:

1. The estimated impact area, which includes Kamchatka and the northern Kuril Islands.

2. The possible impact area, which includes much of the western littoral of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Magadan-Kolyma region.

Five points in the west have been selected as possible launching sites on the basis of geographic conditions and recommended technical requirements, supplemented by available information on reported missile sites.

1. Kapustin Yar more nearly meets all the qualifications than any other place in the USSR. It is in an area of low population density, favorable terrain and climatic conditions, fairly near sources of supply, and more than 400 miles from a foreign border. Distance to Kamchatka is 3,800 miles. Kapustin Yar is also a probable range-head for IRBM testing.

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
2. Aral'sk possesses many of the same advantages as Kapustin Yar, but it is farther from sources of supply and the distance to Kamchatka is only 3,500 miles.

3. Kirov is the most suitable launch site in the northeastern European USSR. It is 600 miles from the Finnish border, and is fairly near sources of missile supplies, but the terrain and climate are not so favorable as in the steppe and desert. The distance to Kamchatka is 3,300 miles.

4. Kola Peninsula was selected in spite of relatively unfavorable conditions, largely because of reported missile activity in the area. It is close to the Finnish border and far from sources of supply; and the terrain and climate are generally unsatisfactory. The distance to Kamchatka is 3,200-3,300 miles.


5. The Carpathian Mountain site provides the maximum possible range length within USSR territorial limits (4,400 miles), but it is close to Satellite frontiers and the population density is high. The booster impact area conveniently falls astride the Pripyat Marshes.


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



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System Doc. ID: 31432766 - Page 27









POSSIBLE GUIDED MISSILE TESTING RANGES

Kapustin Yar and Kola Peninsula

Possible launching site
(with 25 mile radius hazardous area).

Population density over 25 persons per square kilometer.

Booster impact area.

Population density 10 to 25 persons per square kilometer.


1 nautical miles.


Territory within 400 nautical miles of non-Soviet bloc country.

EO 13526 3.5(c)


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
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
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Boundaries are not necessarily those recognized by the U.S. Government.

Scale of this map precludes showing exact details of towns.


All distance

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
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
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POSSIBLE GUIDED MISSILE TESTING RANGE Carpathian Mountains

Possible launching site
(with 25 mile radius hazardous area).

Population density over 25 persons per
square kilometer.


Booster impact area.


Population density 10 to 25 persons
per square kilometer.

nautical miles.

Territory within 400 nautical miles of
non-Soviet bloc country.

EO 13526 3.5(c)





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Old draft~~17 Oct. 54~~

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
 OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

4 October 1954

SUBJECT: Post-Mortem of NIE 11-6-54, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in Guided Missiles"

DISCUSSION

1. The preparation of NIE 11-6-54, during the course of which an intensive effort was made to exploit every possible source of evidence, revealed a serious gap in our intelligence in this highly important field. Although we have had available "conclusive evidence" of the great postwar Soviet interest in guided missiles and numerous indications that the USSR has a large and active research and development program, we have "practically no current intelligence" on particular missiles the USSR is presently developing or may now be producing. In view of our estimate in NIE 11-6-54 that the US and its allies will face a growing Soviet guided missile threat, including eventually a grave threat from intercontinental ballistic missiles, this lack of up-to-date intelligence is of critical significance to the intelligence community.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

A. That the Soviet guided missile program be specifically designated as a highest priority National Intelligence Objective on the same plane as the Soviet nuclear program.

B. That a national intelligence estimate on guided missiles be scheduled as an annual exercise to provide an authoritative estimate of Soviet progress in guided missiles and the degree of threat to US security interests.

C. That, pending the initiation of the next NIE in this series, a special ad hoc inter-agency committee be set up under the IAC to examine those fields in which a greatly intensified intelligence effort would have the greatest pay-off and make the necessary recommendations to the IAC. Subsequently this committee would be responsible for

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preparing coordinated requirements for levying on the appropriate intelligence agencies. In view of the critical importance of this exercise, the committee should be sufficiently high level to command the necessary priority attention to its needs.

D. That the IPC and other bodies or agencies then be directed to assign appropriately higher priorities to the collection and analysis of guided missile intelligence.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

29 January 1955

The Honorable
 The Secretary of Defense
 Department of Defense
 Washington 25, D. C.


Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have been following with great interest the progress in the development of the earth satellite vehicle plans. I should like to state the concern of this Agency with both the first launching of the earth satellite and its possible use in advanced form to collect intelligence data.

In addition to the cogent scientific arguments advanced in support of the development of earth satellites, there is little doubt but what the nation that first successfully launches the earth satellite, and thereby introduces the age of space travel, will gain incalculable international prestige and recognition. In many respects it will be comparable to the first release of nuclear energy. Our scientific community as well as the nation would gain invaluable respect and confidence should our country be the first to launch the satellite. Consequently, I feel the psychological impact of this development on friendly, neutral and Communist-controlled countries, particularly when we are anticipating a prolonged state of cold war, is one of the major arguments justifying its prompt development.

I should be happy to discuss the matter further at your convenience and to give any support the Agency might be able to provide in evaluating earth satellite plans. Because of the international and diplomatic implications of this project, I am sending this information to the Secretary of State.

Sincerely yours,


 Allen W. Dulles
 Director

Date	17 OCT 1955
Declassify on	GADR
Reviewed by	REC MGT DIV; WHS
Reason:	ICD 5200.1R, Para 202 d

CIA
 SecDef Cont. No. 01399

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Dr. C. C. Furnas
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Research and Development)
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Dr. Furnas:

In response to your letter of 10 January, I am designating Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., as the Agency representative on matters relating to the scientific earth satellite program. Col. Philip G. Strong and Col. John A. White will act as alternates to Dr. Scoville to attend such meetings as may be appropriate. Mr. Weaver, of your office, has been orally informed of these nominations.

I would like to thank you for your invitation and wish to assure you of our full cooperation in this program.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

(17 Jan 56)

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~~SWgraybeal.mss~~
1 August 1956

THE SOVIET EARTH SATELLITE PROGRAM

[redacted]
DIA. 13 July 1956
SECRET - [redacted]
(recd. 31 July 1956)

Some very significant statements EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

made by Soviet Professors Leonid EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Konstantin Nikitin [redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

[redacted] 1956. Reportedly, we EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Soviets plan to launch 12 to 14 satellite vehicles from a launching site located in the "middle" of the USSR and on such an orbit that the USSR will have "maximum length of time for observation". When asked whether the USSR will notify the scientific world of the launching date, "Sotov replied that the radar built by the United States will spot the Soviet satellite within a few minutes after launching". //

Of the above 12 to 14 satellite vehicles, the Soviets expect malfunction of components and errors in guidance of the earth satellites and will be satisfied if 50 per cent of the vehicles launched attain the calculated orbit. Nikitin expressed great surprise that the United States expected 70 per cent of the launched vehicles to be on orbit, and stated that he did not believe this possible.

CONTENT

1. The foregoing provides the first direct information concerning the number of Soviet satellite vehicles in their program, the first (specific indication) of their satellite launching site, and strengthening evidence

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

of the planned orbit of their satellite vehicles. It also provides the first indication by any Soviet official that they know the EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs surveillance over an area in the USSR from which the Soviets intend to launch their earth satellites.

2. Leonid I. Sedov is Chairman of the Permanent Interagency Commission for Interplanetary Communications and known to be engaged in the Soviet earth satellite program. Konstantin Nikitin is known to be associated with the Soviet guided missile program. Both of these men are high level Soviet scientists who undoubtedly possess complete and specific details of the Soviet earth satellite program and probably considerable information on the Soviet guided missile program. Consequently, they are in a position to provide accurate information.

3. The statement that the Soviets plan to launch 12 to 14 satellite vehicles provides the first specific indication of the magnitude of their program. This program compares very favorably with the US program if the "12 to 14" figure includes test vehicles. The US announced program currently includes seven test vehicles and six actual orbiting satellites. However, in light of the statements that the USSR will be satisfied if 50 per cent of their launched satellites attain the calculated orbit, it is believed likely that the stated figure of 12 to 14 vehicles includes only the actual orbiting satellites and not their test program. In this case, the Soviet earth satellite program would be about twice the size of the US program.

4. The statement that the radar built by the Unit EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs the Soviet satellite within a few minutes after launching undoubtedly refers to the capability of the [redacted] radar and its surveillance over EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Kar Guided Missile Test Range. Although no previous public statement by a Soviet official has referenced this surveillance, it is recognized that the radiation therefrom must certainly have been detected by the USSR and the purpose of the installation deduced some months ago. Association of Kapustin Yar with the statement that the satellites would be launched from the "middle" of Russia is not inconsistent if a rather liberal interpretation is applied to the geographical position of Kapustin Yar.

5. The statement that the Soviets plan to launch their satellite in such a manner that the USSR will have maximum length of EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs is consistent with and strengthens previous Soviet statements that their satellite vehicle will be launched so as to attain a polar orbit. Such an orbit would provide for maximum observation from within the USSR. We believe that the Soviets will attempt a polar orbit on most of their satellites if their initial flights are successful. We further believe that these vehicles will be launched from the Kapustin Yar area into such an orbit. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
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3 May 1956

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Additional Information for DSI Briefing of SEC on Earth Satellite Vehicles

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

1. As per request of AD/SDI, actual quotations paraphrased in AD/SDI memorandum of 10 April to SDI Special Assistant were collected by the Guided Missiles Division. On 2 May, an additional statement

[redacted] Sedov said "It is possible that the Soviet Union will not have its earth satellites ready for firing during the international geophysical year. He believes that the US has put itself on a spot by its optimistic statements." This latest information apparently contradicted two earlier statements attributed to Sedov

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

2. The latest Sedov statement was called to the attention of the DSI, and it was pointed out that it could represent Soviet recognition of greater difficulties in the earth satellite project or that it could be a deliberate plan intended to reduce pressure for haste in the U. S. program.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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ERNEST J. ZELLNER
Deputy Chief, Collection Staff

Enclosure:

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Key Soviet Statements Re Earth Satellite Vehicle (Transmitted to DSI 3 May 1956)

DRAFT/EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Key Soviet Statements Re Earth Satellite Vehicle

1. August 1955: Professor L. I. Sedov, President of the Permanent Interagency Commission for Interplanetary Communications, Academy of Sciences.

"Sedov stated that the Soviets plan to put up satellite like the U. S. at about the same time and agreed that the Soviets felt it was possible to launch a large satellite as well as a small one."

[redacted] October 1955, [redacted]

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs³

"In my (Sedov) opinion it will be possible to launch an artificial earth satellite in the course of the next couple of years, and it is technically possible to create 'artificial satellites' varying in size and weight." TASS, 4 August 1955 [redacted]

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

2. August 1955: Major General (Professor) G. I. Pokrovsky, Doctor of Technical Sciences, reported to be a member of the Permanent Interagency Commission for Interplanetary Communications, and author of articles on earth satellite since 1944.

"Preparations for launching an artificial satellite were taking place in the USSR and that the preliminary stages in scientific research for making such a satellite had already been carried out."

IZVESTIA [redacted]

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

3. September 1955: Khrushchev [redacted]

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

"They (Soviets) were ahead of United States in preparation for space satellite and that United States conception of satellite

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was little more than a guided missile for military purposes.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

4. January 1956: Major General (Professor) G. I. Polkovsky, Doctor of Technical Sciences and reported to be a member of the Permanent Interagency Commission for Interplanetary Communications.

"It will be possible to launch this year (1956) an artificial satellite which will revolve around the earth after having overcome the force of gravity." TRUD (LABOR) - Newspaper of the All Union Central Council of Trade Unions dated 2 January 1956

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

5. March 1956: Soviet Radio Broadcast on Interplanetary Travel

"The construction of a space satellite, automatically controlled from the earth, is being timed to coincide with the International Geophysical Year." 6 March 1956

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

5-8 February 1956:

Sedov also stated that "it is possible that the Soviet Union will not have its earth satellites ready for firing during the international geophysical year. He believes that the US has put itself on a spot by its optimistic statements."

12 April 1956

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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10 APR 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Special Assistant to DDCI

SUBJECT: DDCI 5520, Earth Satellite Program

In connection with the Secretary of Defense letter to the President on the above subject, there is transmitted herewith a summary of the information which you requested as follows:

Soviet Earth Satellite Program - TAB A

It is our estimate that the USSR will launch an earth satellite vehicle possibly as soon as late 1956 or early 1957.

Proposed Agency Position - TAB B

We recommend that the Agency position be to support the reduced Defense program of six vehicles because disbandment or deletion would cause serious damage to U. S. international scientific prestige. Although the Agency has a strong interest in this program due to its bearing on the development of a truly advanced communications satellite for intelligence purposes, it cannot strongly endorse the six additional Defense vehicles for this program in light of the estimated cost, and the small psychological advantage to be obtained from additional orbiting vehicles.

EO 13526 3.5(c)

*Assistant Director, JSC
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence*

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

CIA Control No. 10 115575
Page 1 of 1
Copy 5 of 10

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TAB A

16 APR 1956

DEPARTMENT FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Special Assistant to DCI
SUBJECT: Soviet Earth Satellite Program

1. In accordance with your request, there is summarized herewith the latest information available to DCI on the above subject.

a. Known Soviet guided missile developments together with their estimated capabilities indicate that the USSR possesses all the necessary knowledge and basic components to attain the altitude and velocity necessary for an orbiting earth satellite vehicle.

b. The numerous statements by Soviet officials and scientists indicate both a strong Soviet interest in earth satellite vehicles and an intention to launch such a vehicle at an early date. Specifically, it has been stated that such a vehicle would be launched within the period of the International Geophysical Year 1957-58, and another statement as of January 1956 indicates a possible launching within a year. In September 1955, Zhurkov stated [redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs the USSR was ahead of the U. S. in preparation for space satellites.

c. The most recent National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet guided missiles (NIE 1-12-55, 20 December 1955) estimated that the USSR could launch a relatively un-instrumented vehicle by 1958 and a much more sophisticated version by 1961. From later assessments of Soviet capabilities and the foregoing indications of Soviet intentions, we in DCI now estimate that if the Soviets consider the psychological advantages of producing the world's first satellite vehicle to be of prime significance, and if cost and effort is not spared, the USSR could launch a satellite vehicle as late as 1958 or early 1959.

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~~SECRET: Soviet Earth Satellites Document~~

6. The more advanced type of satellite could not only serve scientific research, but also could be an invaluable aid to military operations and intelligence collection activities. We believe that the majority of the work of designing, fabricating, testing and launching an advanced earth satellite vehicle of the Sinyavina type could be accomplished without significant interference with the present Soviet missile force.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(8)>25Yrs

~~JOHN GOWRIE, Jr.
Assistant Director
Strategic Intelligence~~

~~cc: DIA~~

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10 APR 1956

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DESCRIPTION FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

POSITION: Special Assistant to DCI

NUMBER: 100 5520

1. In reference to Secretary Wilson's letter to the President on the above subject in which Mr. Wilson detailed four possible courses of action, it is felt that serious damage would be done to United States international scientific prestige if the earth satellite program were either abandoned or placed on a normal course of business basis. The President's announcement of 29 July 1955 indicated a strong U. S. intention to launch such vehicles within the period of the International Geophysical Year. Abandonment or deferment of the program in the face of what may well be a successful Soviet counterpart program might impair world confidence in U. S. advanced scientific and technical capabilities.

2. The cost of the original Defense program comprising a dozen vehicles [redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs were to be used for test purposes and the rest for specific scientific experiments in orbit. Subsequently, [redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs has requested a supplemental appropriation for six additional scientific satellites to be launched following the Defense program. With the Defense costs rising at the present alarming rate, we would suggest that the Agency position be to support as a minimum the more limited Defense program with the clear understanding that this program will encompass all requisite testing to enable the [redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs [redacted] to meet the President's commitment during EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs period of the International Geophysical Year.

3. Aside from the psychological aspects cited above, the Agency has a strong interest in this program, as it is expected to solve many of the problems that will be encountered in launching a truly advanced reconnaissance satellite for intelligence purposes.

EO 13526 3.5(c)

HERBERT SCOTTIE, JR.

Assistant Director

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ccs DD/1

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VIA

Assistant Director, Scientific Intelligence
Deputy Assistant Director for Collection
Deputy Assistant Director for Production
Acting Chief, Guided Missiles Division, O/SI

18 January 1956

Status of the Soviet Earth Satellite Program

In accordance with the verbal instructions of Dr. Weber and pursuant to detailed discussions with Mr. Paul Smith of Mr. Furnes' office, subject paper has been prepared. Five copies of this paper are attached--two for forwarding to Mr. Smith by appropriate memorandum and one for each of the above addressees.

SIDNEY N. GRAYBEAL

Attachments: a/s

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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Chief, Collection Staff

17 January 1956

Executive Officer/SI

Earth Satellite Program

1. An Agency decision has been reached establishing CSI as the focal point on the Earth Satellite Program. The AD has directed that staff supervision of the program will be the responsibility of the DAD/C with substantive responsibility assigned to Guided Missiles.
2. Accordingly, action on the attached letter to Mr. Dulles is assigned to Collection Staff. It is suggested that Mr. Furnas be contacted immediately and arrangements made for Office representatives to attend tomorrow's meeting.

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