Aesthetics and Freedom: Jacques Rancière's Schillerian Roots

Duncan Stuart

N00685951

Spring 2021

Qualifying Paper submitted in requirement for the fulfillment of the MA in Philosophy at the New School for Social Research

Supervisor: Dr.J.M. Bernstein

Second Reader: Dr.Dmitri Nikulin

Word Count: 8,517

Introduction[1]

Emancipation means to be set free. It presupposes one is in an initial position of unfreedom and domination. The question of emancipation then becomes one of attaining freedom from a state of unfreedom. French Philosopher Jacques Rancière offers a unique theory of equality and emancipation: equality is not achieved, it is demonstrated, and emancipation is always self-emancipation.

Thus, Rancière's understanding of emancipation and equality is a theory of freedom. It is not, however, a new or unprecedented theory of freedom. It draws on the idea of freedom as produced by aesthetic experience which is at the heart of Friedrich Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* (henceforth *Aesthetic Education*). In short, Schiller places freedom as an always latent possibility in humanity, always realizable through aesthetic experience. Schiller has three concepts that cover this aesthetic experience: aesthetic education, the aesthetic condition and the aesthetic state. Schiller's concepts of aesthetic education and the aesthetic condition are crucial to understanding Rancière's own account of politics, the aesthetic state is, however, absent. Teasing out the reasons for this absence raises questions about Rancière's approach to history and the consistency of his project. The purpose of this paper is thus twofold: to establish and defend an overlooked source of Rancière's thought; and, through Schiller, bring into view critical questions about Rancière's project which outline a direction for future research.

The question of who influences Rancière dominates the secondary literature. It has been suggested that Rancière draws heavily from a diverse range of western thinkers: Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, Karl Marx, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault.[2] The

[1] I would like to acknowledge various people without whom this paper would not have been written. First and foremost is my supervisor Dr.J.M. Bernstein for giving his time to supervise and guide this projection to completion. Dr.Dmitri Nikulin gracefully agreed to be the second reader on this project. As part of a weekly working group, Tara Mastrelli, Rodrigo Lima and Leonard Sedlmayer proved invaluable as discussants and proofreaders of various early drafts of this paper. Finally, my father, David Stuart, generously agreed to proofread a late draft. All errors, factual or otherwise, remain my responsibility.

[2] Knox Peden. 'Grace and Equality, Fried and Rancière (and Kant)' in *Michael Fried and Philosophy* ed.Mathew Abbott (Routledge, London 2018): 189-190; Jean-Philippe Deranty. 'Jacques Rancière's Contribution to the Ethics of Recognition' *Political Theory* 31:1 (Feb 2003): 136-156; Emmanuel Renault. 'The Many Marx of Jacques Rancière' in *Jacques Rancière and the Contemporary Scene* eds.Jean-Phillippe Deranty and Alison Ross (Continuum, London 2012): 168-186; Samuel Chambers. *The Lessons of Rancière* (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012); Davide Panagia. *Rancière's Sentiments* (Duke University Press, Durham 2018): 3; Adeena Mey. 'Rancière as Foucauldian?' in *Foucault, Biopolitics, Governmentality*. Eds. Jakob Nilsson and Sven-Olov Wallenstien (Södertörn University Press, Stockholm 2013): 175-184.

comparison between Schiller and Rancière is not novel, but it is underexplored.[3] There is, however, more at stake than a question of intellectual history. By becoming clear about the influences on Rancière's theoretical framework, we are better able to understand his work and the logic behind his unique account of equality, emancipation, and freedom.

The paper is divided into four sections. Section One introduces the question of emancipation and vicious circles of domination. The question of emancipation, or more precisely self-emancipation, runs aground on its own circular logic: either I can emancipate myself because I am free, or I require someone to make me free which brings into question the very status of my freedom itself. The vicious circle, which takes a slightly different form for Schiller, is a common problem for both him and Rancière, a problem for which the solution is freedom.

Having established the shared problematic between Schiller and Rancière, in Section Two I outline Schiller's idea of aesthetic education and its relationship to freedom. Schiller links an absolute freedom to aesthetic experience. Clarifying this requires understanding that there are at least two notions of freedom in Schiller: a Kantian one – where freedom is following the moral law - and an absolute one.[4] Furthermore, I explicate Schiller's concepts of aesthetic education, the aesthetic condition and the aesthetic state. This section concludes with a discussion of the idea of the aesthetic state in Schiller and the critiques of it made by Frederick Beiser and Philip J. Kain. The status of the aesthetic state and its relation to the aesthetic condition allows us to develop a fuller account of Schiller's influence on Rancière.

Section Three considers Rancière's project. Like Schiller's work, at its heart is the question of aesthetics and freedom. A close reading of Rancière's essay *The Aesthetic Heterotopia* shows this link between aesthetics and freedom. Rancière comes to understand freedom and emancipation as the ability to do anything including nothing. To develop a fuller account of Rancière's project, I define and explicate a litany of terminology: politics, the police, the

[3] The most substantial treatment of Schiller and Rancière I know of occurs in Rika Dunlap's essay "From Freedom to Equality: Rancière and the Aesthetic Experience of Equality". See: Rika Dunlap. "From Freedom to Equality: Rancière and the Aesthetic Experience of Equality.", *Continental Philosophy Review* 48 (2015): 341-358.
[4] Frederick Beiser claims there are three concepts of freedom in Schiller. I remain unconvinced of this point. However there are certainly two. See: Frederick Beiser. *Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination* (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005): 157. Kant's theory of freedom is not covered in depth here. For the purposes of understanding Schiller's notion of freedom it suffices to know that for Kant to be free is to act in accordance with the moral law. As Kant writes in his *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*: "a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same." (Kant 2012: 7-8:448).

distribution of the sensible, the ethical, representative and aesthetic regime of arts and his peculiar definition of emancipation. For Rancière politics is the shifting of the distribution of the sensible and this connection to sense, inherent to politics, is aesthetic.

Section Four is dedicated to a close reading of Rancière's essay *The Aesthetic Revolution and its Outcomes*, where Rancière discusses Schiller at length. He traces a series of distinctions between life and art, showing that Schiller's analysis of aesthetics and freedom leads to different traditions, or, as he terms them, 'plots'. Rancière rejects the 'plots' of Hegel and Marx, in which art (Hegel) and politics (Marx) come to a close. This section returns us to the question of the relationship between the aesthetic condition and the aesthetic state. It now becomes clear that Rancière's opposition to the end of art and politics can also be read as an opposition to the aesthetic state. The aesthetic state indicates a state of freedom to come, one that undermines the notion of the always possible freedom in the aesthetic condition, suggesting that freedom is insubstantial. In short, Schiller wanted to think beyond the aesthetic condition with his conception of the aesthetic state; for Rancière, the aesthetic condition is sufficient.

In the concluding section, I draw out the consequences of Schiller's influence on Rancière and raise the question of what Rancière's rejection of the aesthetic state entails, suggesting it points towards a peculiar concept of history. It is not clear that Rancière is consistent on this account – is not his notion of the regimes of art itself historical? This is a problem that will remain to be solved, but that it is a problem at all has been brought into focus by understanding Schiller's influence on Rancière and the subsequent clarification of his idea of freedom and emancipation.

Section 1: Emancipation, Freedom and the Vicious Circle of Enlightenment

In Ernesto Laclau's *Emancipation(s)* he offers a definition of emancipation which is worth considering briefly:

> There is no emancipation without oppression, and there is no oppression without the presence of something which is impeded in its free development by oppressive forces. Emancipation is not, in this sense, an act of *creation* but instead of liberation of something which precedes the liberating act.[5]

[5] Ernesto Laclau, *Emancipation(s)* (Verso, London 2007): 1

Laclau here sets up a problematic of emancipation. Emancipation firstly requires something to be emancipated from – oppression - but this means the moment of freedom somehow must also come before being set free. This problem cannot be resolved by one being emancipated by another. For this raises all kinds of problems, as Gert Biesta argues:

> Emancipation requires an intervention from the outside; an intervention, moreover, by someone who is not subjected to the power that needs to be overcome. This not only shows that emancipation is understood as something that is done to somebody. It also reveals that emancipation is based upon a fundamental inequality between the emancipator and the one to be emancipated…[t]he first contradiction is this: although emancipation is oriented toward equality, independence, and freedom, it actually installs dependency at the very heart of the act of emancipation. The one to be emancipated is, after all, dependent upon the intervention of the emancipator.[6]

These two passages set up a problematic in the idea of emancipation. For emancipation to be proper emancipation it must be self-emancipation, yet self-emancipation already requires exercising freedom of some kind. This supposes that either we are already free or that freedom can be generated from within the site of domination.

Kant indirectly proposed a solution to this kind of problem in his essay *An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?"* where he defines enlightenment as man's "emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another."[7] Man can, however, emerge from his state of self-incurred immaturity through his reason alone, provided that he is free: "For enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is *freedom*."[8] However, Kant will reverse this towards the end of his essay writing: "once the germ on which nature has lavished most care – man's inclination and vocation to *think freely* – has developed within his hard shell, it gradually reacts upon the mentality of the people, who thus gradually become increasingly able to act freely."[9] The use of one's own reasoning, thinking

[6] Gert Biesta. "A New Logic of Emancipation: The Methodology of Jacques Rancière", *Educational Theory* 60:1 (2010): 44-45.
[7] Immanuel Kant. "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?' trans H.B. Nisbet in *Political Writings* ed.H.S. Reiss (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991): 54. This sentence is sometimes translated as "Enlightenment is man's emancipation from his self-incurred immaturity."
[8] Ibid, 55.
[9] Ibid, 59.

freely, grows under conditions of freedom and thus produces more freedom. Hence, the fact we can reason at all, even if at times we choose not to, ensures the possibility of liberation.[10]

The project of reason as a liberating force alone will be exactly what Schiller challenges in *Aesthetic Education*. Beiser summarizes the goal of the Enlightenment as follows:

> The grand goal of enlightenment was to make the world safe for reason, and so to create a rational society and state. This goal could not be achieved, however, if the principles of reason were locked in an ivory tower, the privilege of an elite few. The challenge facing the Aufklärer[The Enlightenment], therefore, was how to surmount the gap between speculation and action, theory and practice. This gap could be overcome, they were convinced, only through the education of the public, by spreading enlightenment among the people.[11]

This grand goal founders during the French Revolution. The failure of the French revolution, and the fact the struggle for freedom led to tyranny, is the very problem Schiller confronts in *Aesthetic Education*. Writing to Prince Frederick Christian von Augustenburg in July 1793, Schiller claims:

> the attempt by the French to realize themselves in their sacred rights of man and thereby achieve political freedom has merely revealed their own incapacity and unworthiness, casting not only this happy people, but also with them, a considerable part of Europe, back a whole century in barbarism and servitude. The moment was favourable, but it found a corrupted generation unworthy of it, which knew neither how to appreciate it, nor how to make use of it. The use that it makes and has made of this great gift of chance proves indisputably that the human race has not yet grown out of the force of tutelage, that the liberal regime of Reason there comes too soon, where one will be scarcely capable of resisting the brutal force of animality, and that the time is not yet ripe for *civil* liberty, since so much that is human is absent.[12]

[10] Kant's essay already shows us the problem of freedom and emancipation, as freedom in his text has both the status of a requirement and an end goal.
[11] Beiser, *Schiller*, 129.
[12] Friedrich Schiller. 'Letters to Prince Frederick Christian von Augustenburg' trans.Keith Tribe in *On the Aesthetic Education of Man and Letters to Prince Frederick Christian von Augustenburg* (Penguin, London 2016): 123-4.

The French Revolution fails because the human race has not yet grown out of the force of tutelage. This is the language of the Enlightenment and more specifically of Kant's essay. Schiller, as we will see, will reformulate the problem in *Aesthetic Education* in terms of moral sensibility. In doing so, he rejects the role of reason alone in liberation that Kant suggests in his essay. Schiller, by emphasizing moral sensibility will, however, discover a vicious circle: the State cannot raise man's sensibilities because it is corrupt, but neither can man raise their own sensibilities because they too are corrupt. It is aesthetic education and the freedom it produces via the aesthetic condition that is the solution to this problem.

Section 2: Schiller's Idea of Aesthetic Education

The problem Schiller's *Aesthetic Education* seeks to solve is the problem of the failure of Enlightenment and the French Revoluton. Schiller opens his letters on *Aesthetic Education* by asking if his efforts are not better spent on discussing "the most perfect of all works of art: the construction of a true political liberty?"[13] What Schiller seeks to show in the letters, however, is that "it is by way of beauty that one approaches liberty."[14] With this goal in mind, Schiller considers briefly the revolutions on "both sides of the Atlantic", concluding that they that have not succeeded in making "true liberty the foundation of political association."[15] Why? Because the "moral possibility is lacking" for an emergence into true liberty.[16] Here Schiller advances his position over his July 1793 letter, locating a precise cause for the terrors of post-revolutionary France.

[13] Friedrich Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* trans.Keith Tribe (Penguin, London 2016): 5.
[14] Ibid, 6.
[15] Ibid, 14.
[16] Ibid.

Schiller's claim is that man – 'man' is here understood as a term for human beings in general - must have his moral possibility and sensibility restored to him.[17] Man is lacking this, but not just the men and women of the French revolution. Schiller offers a history of this split between sensibility and reason, of man divided and in disharmony with himself.[18] This argument unfolds between letters III and V of *Aesthetic Education*. In letter III Schiller sets out to show that reason and morality do not cohere. He argues that man exists already in a state. He calls this a natural state and means by it a state put together through force.[19] Reason led man out of this natural state, at the expense of his moral development. However, as Schiller says, "physical society cannot cease to exist for a moment *in time* while moral society is forming *as an idea.*"[20] What Schiller is claiming is that a split emerges between reasoning man and moral man and that both capacities cannot be developed in tandem, for morality must be developed within the state reason has made. In letter VI Schiller will discuss the ancient Greeks, for him a model of harmony between sense and reason. What has happened since the time of the ancient Greeks is the development of reason, necessary to bring us to this point.[21] This requires, however, the jettisoning of the development of moral man, because both cannot be developed in tandem.

[17] Man is the language Schiller uses, but he means humankind. I follow Schiller's usage here as it means my words do not clash with quotes from Schiller. Despite the gendered language Schiller clearly has everyone in mind, since what he is talking about is something that is constitutive of being a human being, of which men are an unfortunate subset.

[18] Schiller can be read here as offering a critique of modernity and conception of alienation, like the one found in Karl Marx and Critical Theory. Nathan Ross thinks there is an idea of division of labor in Schiller, but one that he qualifies as cognitive. Philip Kain suggests Schiller's account of man's fragmentation is simply a straightforward theory of the division of labor. See: Nathan Ross. *The Philosophy and Politics of Aesthetic Experience* (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham 2017): 34; Philip J. Kain *Schiller, Hegel, And Marx*: *State, Society, and the Aesthetic Ideal of ancient Greece* (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal 1982): 14.

[19] Schiller, *Aesthetic Education*, 8.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Although the Ancient Greeks possess harmony between reason and sense, our modern lives and state are ultimately preferable to theirs. On this point see: Kain. *Schiller, Hegel, And Marx*, 15.

This split is precisely the problem. As Schiller writes in his letter IV: "a *totality* of character has therefore to be found in the people both capable and worth of exchanging the state of compulsion for that of liberty."[22] How is this restoration of reason and moral feeling to be achieved? We know already it cannot be the State because it is corrupt.[23] Nor can it be man, for he is also corrupt. What it is that can achieve such an end? For Schiller, the answer is fine art and the contemplation of beauty.[24] That is to say, aesthetic education.[25] Unfortunately, Schiller is somewhat vague about what, exactly, aesthetic education *is*. Schiller is more forthcoming about what it does and how it is supposed to work.

Schiller addresses the obvious criticism he is conceding too much to the power of art by addressing the question of beauty. He wants to develop a transcendental concept of beauty such that aesthetic education could have the effect he describes. This is to say that beauty is a necessary category for human experience. In this case, it is a necessary category for human perfection.[26]

Crucial to Schiller's account of beauty and freedom is the discussion of *material impulse* (*Stofftrieb)* and *formal impulse* (*Formtrieb*).[27] The former concerns sensation, the latter rationality, sometimes referred to as intellect. It is in the contemplation of beauty that these impulses combine in the *playful impulse (Spieltrieb*), which Schiller defines as "living form: a concept serving to characterize all aesthetic properties of phenomena, what is in a word most

[22] Schiller, *Aesthetic Education*, 13.
[23] Beiser, *Schiller*, 127.
[24] Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, 29.
[25] Beiser, *Schiller*, 128.
[26] The extent to which Schiller is misusing the term transcendental I do not address. For more on Schiller's use of this term and his argument see: Beiser, *Schiller,* 136 and Lesley Sharpe. *Friedrich Schiller: Drama, Thought and Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1991): 156.
[27] See: Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, 41-42. The term varies with translation and is sometimes called 'sensuous drive' and 'formal drive' See: Sharpe, *Schiller: Drama, Thought and Politics*,157.

generally called *beauty*."[28] This leads to freedom. Thus, aesthetic education leads to freedom and it does so by achieving a state in which sense and intellect, the material and formal impulses are balanced.[29]

To understand this, we need to clarify Schiller's idea of freedom. We know Schiller has set up a division in man. Man is both a creature of sense and a creature of intellect, expressed in the two impulses. Yet these seem to be in conflict with one another, and furthermore the failure to develop and perfect both produces political disaster. In letter XIX Schiller writes about the formal and material impulses that:

> Each of these fundamental impulses, once developed, necessarily seeks its own satisfaction; since, however, both are necessary, but seek contradictory objects, these dual compulsions cancel each other out and the will has complete freedom of choice between them. It is therefore the will that relates to both impulses as a power (which is the basis of reality), while neither of the two impulses can act of themselves as a power against the other…There is no power in man other than his will, and he can be robbed of his inner liberty only by that which robs him of his existence: death and all loss of consciousness.[30]

The impulses themselves are structured by necessity, and it is only when man experiences both – the sensuous activated by life and the rational activated by law – that "his humanity is constructed."[31] It is when both these impulses are experienced, are active within man, that "they both lose their compulsion, and the opposition of two necessities lends freedom its origin."[32]

This means that for man to become free both these inherent impulses must be activated, for it is then and only then that his freedom can be realized.[33] This condition, where both impulses are

[28] Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, 53.
[29] Beiser, *Schiller*, 156.
[30] Schiller, *Aesthetic Education*, 70.
[31] Ibid, 71.
[32] Ibid, 72.
[33] Ibid, 73.

active is a condition of "Real and active determinability" which is called, for Schiller, "the aesthetic."[34] It is commonly referred to as the "aesthetic condition."[35]

Yet this condition of active determinability, this aesthetic condition is one where man is a "nullity."[36] Here we arrive at the crux of a perplexing issue in Schiller. In the paragraph following this definition Schiller writes:

> [B]eauty provides no single result for either intellect or will; it follows neither one single intellectual aim, nor anyone purposes; it discovers not one truth, does not help us fulfil any special duty; in sum, it is as unsuitable for the foundation of character as it is for enlightening one's brain. Beauty is *nature*, and man owes both its concepts and its resolutions only *to himself*. In aesthetic culture the personal worth of a man, or his dignity insofar is this something that lies within his power, remains completely undetermined, and no more is achieved other than the fact that, *thanks to nature*, he can henceforth make of himself what he will – that the liberty of being what he ought to be is fully restored to him.[37]

Schiller posits that this state of nullity and freedom will pass. Man can regain it, "each time anew through the aesthetic life, if he is to be able to pass into an opposite condition."[38]

In short, for Schiller, freedom occurs through beauty, which unites these basic impulses in a moment he calls the aesthetic condition. In such a condition, man can be absolutely free, but such a condition is impermanent. It can, however, always be restored.[39]

---

[34] Ibid, 75.
[35] Schiller, *Aesthetic Education*, 79; Beiser, *Schiller*, 154.
[36] Schiller, *Aesthetic Education*, 77.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] This is not the only place that Schiller discusses freedom. In his essay 'On the Sublime' Schiller links the sublime to an experience of freedom (Schiller 1966: 191-212). We have to be careful to distinguish the two and understand the role this category plays in his thought. This is important because the sublime is rejected by Rancière as a productive category for thinking about freedom and emancipation. There are two points we should note here about the sublime. While the sublime is associated with freedom in Schiller, it is associated with Kantian freedom, with the freedom of following the moral law (Beiser, 2005: 257). For Kain, Schiller does at times suggest the sublime represents a higher freedom over nature, while Beauty remains within nature, yet "As soon as the sublime is considered, we find a tension between it and beauty; and then Schiller wavers between trying to make the two compatible or choosing beauty over the sublime." (Kain 1982: 19) It seems that either the freedom of the sublime is Kantian freedom, or Schiller himself is unsure what to make of the tension between the sublime and beauty in his own theory.

This freedom is not to be confused with the Kantian idea of freedom. Schiller uses and refers to Kant's concept of freedom, for example when he equates reason and freedom.[40] As we have seen above, however, this is not the concept of freedom produced by beauty. Schiller has two notions of freedom at play, as Beiser explains:

> There is not only the freedom of moral autonomy, Schiller now realizes, but also the freedom of choice. This power of choice cannot be identified with morality alone because it is compatible with acting morally or immorally. As Schiller sometimes put it, freedom of choice is simply the *capacity* to act morally, not the *actualization* of that capacity in specific virtuous actions.[41]

This is a strange moment in Schiller's argument. Schiller has originally proposed a problem about moral sensibility that must be refined. He has proposed a solution: fine art produces a contemplation of beauty which refines man's sensibilities. In the process of the argument however, he has instead claimed that beauty produces freedom. This freedom of the interplay of the form and material impulses is, however, not the Kantian freedom of following the moral law, which we could easily relate to the original problem. Instead, it is the absolute exercise of the will. How does this concept of freedom relate to the problematic with which Schiller began, of the failure of the French revolution and of man's disharmony with himself?

In making sense of this moment, we should reflect back on our original question of emancipation and self-emancipation. Recall the vicious circle Schiller is trying to escape in order to solve the problem of the failure of the French Revolution. Man is corrupt. The State is corrupt. How can Man cease to be corrupt if his condition is corruption? We can put this in the terms of Kant's

[40] He is clear about this relationship in a footnote at the end of the XIX Letter, where he indicates two ideas of freedom, one "freedom that is necessarily part of man's intelligence, which can neither be given to him nor taken away" and "that freedom which is based upon his mixed nature.". See: Schiller, *Aesthetic Education*, 72. For more on Kant see fn.3 on p.3 above.
[41] Beiser, *Schiller*, 206.

"*What is Enlightenment*?": If all that is stopping people becoming enlightened is their lack of freedom, but enlightenment is the exercise of one's own understanding such that one could realize one is unfree, people will never know they are unfree until they are free. This is, once again, a question of emancipation and dependency. Nonetheless, if it is possible for there to be even a moment of absolute freedom, then it is possible for Man to cease to be corrupt, to choose otherwise, to choose morality from a state of immorality, to begin to become free by being free.

In understanding this problem fully, we should consider Schiller's idea of the aesthetic state, which he discusses in the XVII letter. He compares it with two other states: the dynamic state and the ethical state:

> In the *dynamic* state of rights one man encounters another as force, and limits his impact, and if he encounters another in the *ethical* state of obligation and opposes him with the majesty of the law and curbs his desire, then where conduct is governed by beauty, in the *aesthetic* state he may appear to the other only as a figure, only as the object of free play. The basic law of this realm is *to give freedom by means of freedom*.[42]

In the aesthetic state, in contradistinction to the dynamic state and the ethical state, the will of the whole is fulfilled by "the nature of the individual."[43] This is a state of pure equality, as Schiller goes on to clarify:

> In the aesthetic state everyone is a free citizen, even those who are no more than tools: free citizens who have rights equal to the most noble, and intellect which violently bends the acquiescent mass to its ends has here to seek assent. Thus the ideal of equality is fulfilled here in the realm of appearance.[44]

Here then is the problematic. Schiller proposes, as part of aesthetic education, the resultant aesthetic condition, the moment induced by the experience of beauty, the moment of pure freedom. This is part of overcoming man's fragmentary nature, a restoration of wholeness that is not just momentary, but final. As Kain writes: "Aesthetic education, the development of all the

[42] Schiller, *Aesthetic Education*, 110
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid, 112.

powers and capacities of the individual, the spontaneity and harmony of sense and reason, will bring about reconciliation between man and state."[45] For Kain, the aesthetic state is what aesthetic education produces. The final overcoming of the failure of the French revolution is the aesthetic state.

The aesthetic condition, as we have seen, lapses. The aesthetic state then is the permanent state of overcoming. Its status, however, is unclear, nor is it clear exactly what it will be. Schiller's remarks about the task of writing a constitution for the aesthetic in his final footnote suggest that is more than a poetic fiction. Both Beiser and Kain, however, think it is nothing more than a regulative ideal.[46]

If, however, there is no aesthetic state, then Schiller's project provides an account of how freedom emerges but lacks the corollary of how it can be sustained. The aesthetic condition fades, freedom disappears. Given Schiller's historical problematic – the failures of the French revolution, but also the problems of man's fragmentation and the division of labor - this appears to be a flawed solution to his problem. The aesthetic state must be more than a chimerical ideal if Schiller is to solve the problem as he himself defined it.

Schiller has three crucial concepts: aesthetic education, the idea that beauty can refine man's sensibilities; the aesthetic condition, the state of pure freedom produced by the experience of beauty; and the aesthetic state, the final arrangement that secures the freedom given by aesthetic education and the aesthetic condition. In *Aesthetic Education* Schiller's forges a link between aesthetics and freedom. It is this that Rancière takes from Schiller, as we will see in the next section.

Section 3: Rancière, Aesthetics and Freedom.

Schiller posits aesthetic education as the solution to the vicious circle of moral corruption. Vicious circles dominate Rancière's work. In an early essay on Pierre Bourdieu, *The Ethics of Sociology*, Rancière accuses Bourdieu of constructing a vicious circle of misunderstanding when

[45] Kain, *Schiller, Hegel, Marx*, 26.
[46] Kain, *Schiller, Hegel, Marx*, 30; Beiser, *Schiller*, 164.

it comes to the lower classes. The specific case is their exclusion from the university system. Rancière writes:

> The sociologist will only obtain 'his' science if he can explain this too-evident consequence of the circle of necessary misunderstanding. A perfect circle that is formed by two propositions:
>
> 1) Children from the popular classes are excluded from the universities because they are unaware of the true reasons why they are excluded
> 2) Misunderstanding of the real reasons why they are excluded is a structural effect produced by the very existence of the system that excludes them.
>
> In other words, they are excluded because they do not know why they are excluded; and they do not know why they are excluded because they are excluded. The tautology of this demonstration becomes the necessity of its misunderstanding. The sociologist places himself in the position of eternal denouncer of a system endowed with the ability to conceal itself from its agents for all eternity.[47]

For Rancière, Bourdieu institutes a circle of misunderstanding that makes the sociologist necessary, that requires them to take on the role of eternal denouncer. Those trapped within the system require a Bourdieu to escape it. In Rancière's oeuvre such circles will reappear. There is the circle of powerlessness in the *Ignorant Schoolmaster*, a circle founded on the belief that the student needs one to explicate the class material or text to him and in so doing constructs and perpetuates this very dependency.[48] Or consider the closed circle of *epithumia*, the circle of needs and desire that in Plato's *Republic* condemns the artisans to passivity, to only being spectators.[49]

How does one escape from such circles? Although this framing of Rancière is unusual, we can come to understand Rancière's concept of equality and emancipation precisely in such terms. His example from *The Ignorant Schoolmas*ter is instructive here.

---

[47] Jacques Rancière. *The Intellectual and his People* trans.David Fernbach (Verso, London 2012): 161.
[48] Jacques Rancière. *The Ignorant Schoolmaster* trans.Kristin Ross (Stanford University Press, Stanford 1991): 7.
[49] Jacques Rancière, "The Aesthetic Heterotopia", *Philosophy Today* 54 (2010): 16-17. In the *Emancipated Spectator,* Rancière will claim that "emancipation begins when we challenge the opposition between viewing and acting" (Rancière 2011: 13).

Rancière recounts the tales of schoolmaster Joseph Jacotot, who teaches his pupils French with no object other than a dual language text. This is the fact of learning without explication. The old method, the method of explication, would require the schoolmaster to explain the text to the student who could not otherwise understand. Rancière calls this the "The myth of explication"[50], which divides the world into "knowing minds and ignorant ones, ripe minds and immature ones, the capable and the incapable, the intelligent and the stupid."[51] This division is a division between superior and inferior intelligence, the intelligence of those who reason and those trapped "within the closed circle of habit and need."[52] This image of the circle is crucial here, and Rancière will refer back to it as "the circle of powerlessness."[53] Against this circle, Rancière proposes a circle of power and emancipation, a circle which "must be *begun*."[54] It is begun by Jacotot's decision to teach the students without explication, to break with the circle of powerlessness. In doing so he assumes the equal intelligence of students which is both a demonstration of equality and what enables the students (and Jacotot) to break out of the circle of powerlessness and begins the circle of power and emancipation. It is a singular act that presupposes and demonstrates equality.

The question for us is how this shared motif of vicious circles between Schiller and Rancière is more than just a problem in common. To understand the importance of aesthetics and freedom, we need to know more about Rancière's account of politics.

In understanding Rancière's account of politics we must begin with a critical concept at the heart of his work. This is the distribution of the sensible.[55] Rancière defines it as "the system of self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existences of something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it."[56] It determines what is sayable, what is sensible and so on. In doing so it unites, it tells us what is

[50] Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster,* 6.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid, 7.
[53] Ibid, 15.
[54] Ibid,16.
[55] This has several formulations, and sometimes translated as "partition of the perceptible", most notably in *Disagreement*.
[56] Jacques Rancière. *The Politics of Aesthetics*. trans.Gabriel Rockhill (Bloomsbury, London 2005): 7.

common. Yet in doing so it also excludes. It is essential to the function of any community, which is to say it always exists.[57] Rancière, illuminatingly, provides some examples:

> A speaking being, according to Aristotle, is a political being. If a slave understands the language of its rulers, however, he does not 'possess' it. Plato states that artisans cannot be put in charge of the shared or common elements of the community because they do *not have the time* to devote themselves to anything other than their work. They cannot be *somewhere else* because *work will not wait.* The distribution of the sensible reveals who can have a share in what is common to the community based on what they do and on the time and space in which this activity is performed.[58]

Such a distribution, however, can be challenged. In *Disagreement* Rancière describes the example of the Roman plebians who secede upon the Aventine Hill. The plebs, much like the ancient Greek slaves (at least according to Aristotle), do not speak, at least not according to the patricians, for "the order that structures patrician domination recognizes no *logos* capable of being articulated by beings deprived of *logos*, no *speech* capable of being proffered by nameless beings."[59] The plebians do not revolt insofar as they do not attempt to fight the patricians. This would reinforce the established order, for fighting is not speaking. Instead, the plebs set up another order, "another partition of the perceptible, by constituting themselves not as warriors equal to other warriors but as speaking beings sharing the same properties as those who deny them these."[60] They demonstrate their capacity for speech. In doing so they shift the distribution of the sensible, they show they possess a capacity denied to them.

[57] Jacques Rancière. *Disagreement* trans Julie Rose (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1999): 26.
[58] Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics*, 7-8
[59] Rancière. *Disagreement*, 24.
[60] Ibid.

For Rancière, all attempts to maintain the distribution of the sensible belong to what he calls the order of the police. The term 'police' simply indicates any attempt to maintain the status quo, there may be orders of police infinitely preferably to others. The order that works against the police, the order to shift the distribution of the sensible is what Rancière calls politics. As he clarifies: "Politics exists because those who have no right to be counted as speaking beings make themselves of some account."[61] The police on the other hand? They represent "the set of procedures whereby aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles and the systems for legitimizing this distribution."[62]

These moments that challenge the police, that shift the distribution of the sensible, that display intelligence where stupidity was assumed, that have the nameless take on a name and the speechless speak, are moments of what Rancière calls dissensus. Rancière defines a dissensus as "a division inserted in 'common sense': a dispute over what is given and about the frame within which we assume something as a given."[63] One of Rancière's key examples of dissensus is that of Olympe de Gouges. During the French Revolution, de Gouges was put on trial for betraying the revolution. De Gouges argued that, even though women could neither vote nor stand for election, they could be put to death as enemies of the revolution.[64] de Gouges' point was not something that could be endorsed by lawmakers; she was not pleading her case.[65] Rather de Gouges enacted a dissensus. de Gouges stages a dissensus by her demonstration that she has the

[61] Ibid, 27.
[62] Ibid, 28.
[63] Jacques Rancière, "Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?" trans Steven Corcoran in *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics* ed.Steven Corcoran(Bloomsbury, New York 2015): 77
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.

very rights she is denied, that to put her to death is to make her a subject of the very order she is being excluded from.

The question is how or why do these moments happen? For Rancière, it is not a question of knowledge, of knowing one is unequal or oppressed. In his polemics against political art he challenges the very assumption of political art, that "art compels us when it shows us revolting things."[66] For Rancière "[t]here is no straightforward road from the fact of looking at a spectacle to the fact of understanding the state of the world; no direct road from intellectual awareness to political action."[67] Against political art, Rancière is interested in the impact of aesthetics. He writes, for example of the effects of literature in the following way:

> What literature does is not messages or representations that make workers aware of their conditions. Rather it triggers new passions, which means new forms of balance – or imbalance – between an occupation and the sensory equipment appropriate to it. The politics of literature is not the politics of writers.[68]

This is an unusual position. Rancière rejects the path from ignorance to knowledge to political action, which we should note is the model of the Enlightenment and precisely the model Schiller opposes, the model that has failed in the French Revolution. Rather, and again like Schiller, it is a question of the senses and the triggering of these passions, a question of aesthetic experience. Although Rancière in his writings on politics concerns himself with examples of speaking and revolting slaves, it is always a question of the sensible for him and thus always a question of aesthetics.

To explore this relationship further, let us consider an example from *The Aesthetic Heterotopia.* Rancière focuses on two paintings of beggar boys by the Baroque Spanish master Bartolemé

[66] Jacques Rancière "The Paradoxes of Political Art" trans Steven Corcoran in *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics* (Bloomsbury, New York 2015): 143.
[67] Rancière, *The Emancipated Spectator*, 75.
[68] Ibid, 72.

Esteban Murillo and an analysis of these paintings offered by Hegel. Hegel writes of the paintings' subjects that they are "almost like the gods of Olympus; they do nothing, they say nothing, but they are people all of one piece without any surliness or discontent; and since they possess this foundation of all capacity, we have the idea that anything may come of these youths."[69]

In making sense of this comment of Hegel's, Rancière makes a connection between freedom and aesthetics, one that indicates his debt to Schiller. Rancière points towards the opposition of activity and passivity - essential to the circle of *epithumia* - between the great actors of history and those who do who do nothing.[70] One can think here of heroes and ordinary people, but the sociologist too is active, saving the passive members of the working class from the circle of misunderstanding that entraps them. Passivity here is not necessarily doing nothing. Writing on Plato's condemnation of the artisans in *The Republic*, Rancière says:

> Passivity does not mean that they spend their time resting. Quite the contrary: it means that what they do all the time – working with their hands to earn their livings by providing for other people's needs – is enclosed in the circle of needs and desires, or the circle *epithumia*. The shadows of the theatre are attuned to a certain look, the look of those people who do not see but who focus on the turmoil of the appearances. They are attuned to certain ears, the ears of people who only perceive the noise of discourse and react as noisy persons, by clapping their hands. So the use of their hands, their eyes, is suited to both the baseness of their condition and the falsehood of the spectacles they are listening to and looking at.[71]

Rancière will describe this as a relation between sense and sense: "a relation between what people do, what they see, what they hear and what they know."[72] This idea is in fact what Rancière means by the distribution of the sensible. A regime that says the sons of the working classes, because they are the sons of the working class, will never understand their exclusion, or Plato's view that the artisans' appreciation of the theatre is tied to the baseness of their

[69]G.F.W Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art Vol.I* trans.T.M Knox (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1970): 170.
[70] Rancière, "Aesthetic Heterotopia", 16
[71] Ibid, 16-7.
[72] Ibid, 17.

conditions are distributions of the sensible. The denial of capacities, rights, equality all of these are not just political phenomena but aesthetic ones.

What then to make of this doing nothing? Rancière tells us: "This is what the aesthetic 'doing nothing' means: the disruption of a relation between a way of doing, a way of seeing and a way of being."[73] This disruption produces a voice for the voiceless, knowledge for the ignorant and so on. As Rancière goes on to explain:

> The constitution of a "voice" of the workers presupposes this "aesthetic" distribution of the whole set of relations between activity and passivity, ignorance and knowledge. "Anything can come of these youths" said Hegel. This what this "anything can come" may mean.[74]

Here the link is forged between aesthetics and doing nothing which breaks from one's assigned role and capacity. In what follows Rancière will connect this to freedom:

> the freedom that the individual worker and the collective of the workers can affirm is not the effect of any politics of art. But it is part of an "aesthetics of politics." The politics of aesthetics comprises a new sphere of visibility, where the products of art are the objects of a specific experience that annuls the hierarchy of human activities as well as the hierarchy of subjects and forms of representation.[75]

The aesthetics of politics is the disruption of sense, the redistribution of the sensible, but as Rancière notes here it affirms a freedom. This link between aesthetics and freedom is Schillerian. Aesthetics is a specific experience of the relation between sense and sense, including a shift, an enacting of one incommensurable sense with another – the dissensus that leads to the redistribution of the sensible. To step out of the circles that deny man his capacity to be anything at all, one requires and affirms freedom. This state of being anything at all and of doing nothing is not only the disruption of the distribution of the sensible but it also a state of freedom akin to the aesthetic condition of Schiller, a state of total freedom. To be emancipated is to be free in this sense, driven by an aesthetic experience that affirms one can be anything. In *The Ignorant Schoolmaster,* Rancière offers us Jactot's definition of emancipation: "that every common person

[73] Ibid, 20.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.

might conceive his human dignity, take the measure of his intellectual capacity, and decide how to use it."[76] Later on Rancière says: "whoever emancipates doesn't have to worry about what the emancipated person learns. He will learn what he wants, nothing maybe."[77] The aesthetics of politics is the politics of emancipation, of people under domination becoming anything and doing nothing, which is to say that at its heart it is a politics of absolute freedom.

Section 4: The Fate of The Aesthetic State

The production of freedom through the experience of beauty, and the production of freedom as a pathway to emancipation are both wholly Schillerian and wholly Rancièrian themes. However, Rancière's notion of freedom is more like the freedom of the aesthetic condition than that of the aesthetic state. In fact, in Rancière's account the aesthetic state has disappeared from this relationship between aesthetics and politics.

In addressing this and bringing our analysis to a close it is crucial to look at Rancière's essay *The Aesthetic Revolution and its Outcomes* in which he discusses Schiller at length. In coming to terms with this essay we need to understand Rancière's tripartite division of the regimes of arts into the ethical, representative and aesthetic.

The ethical regime is the one wherein art is not identified but is "subsumed under the question of images."[78] The relevant issue in this regime is of the origin of the image and of their end or purpose, a question of what they are for and what they do. This is the regime under which Plato's polemic against "the simulacra of paintings, poems, and the stage" occurs.[79] For in the ethical regime it is "a matter of knowing in what way images' mode of being affects the *ethos*, the mode of being of individuals and communities."[80]

In the representative -or poetic – regime of art there is break from the ethical regime of art and its focus on images. Art becomes identified with the couple poiesis/mimesis.[81] It "defines proper ways of doing and making as well as means of assessing imitations."[82] As an exemplar, consider

[76] Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster,* 17.
[77] Ibid, 18.
[78] Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics*, 16.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid, 17.

how, in his *Poetics,* Aristotle seeks to elaborate on and explore the rules of tragedy, of what makes something a tragedy and what makes it a good tragedy.[83] It is not question of the effect of arts, like in the ethical regime, but a question of how much an artform conforms to its ideal type.

In the aesthetic regime of the arts, art longer functions according to a division within ways of doing and making or conformity with ideal types. Rather it is the regime that "identifies art in the singular and frees it from any specific rule, from any hierarchy of the arts, subject matter, and genres."[84] It can be associated artistically with Proust's idea of a perfectly planned book removed from the realm of the will, Mallarme's idea of a poem written by the steps of an illiterate dancer, or the Surrealist practice of automatism.[85] All of these examples break apart knowing and doing. It transcends the questions of ends and purpose from the ethical regime and the demand of conformity from the representative regime.

In *The Aesthetic Revolution and Its Outcomes* Rancière places Schiller at the heart of the aesthetic regime of arts. It is Schiller's statement that "man is only completely human when he plays" that Rancière cites.[86] In Schiller play is identified with the unification of the form and material impulse, the unification of the intellect and the sense, the moment of the development of man's moral sensibilities and the occurrence of his freedom. Rancière tells us that this statement of Schiller's is capable of "bearing the whole edifice of the art of the beautiful and of the still more difficult art of living."[87] This is all Rancière needs from Schiller to begin an exploration of the aesthetic, a "specific sensible experience that hold the promise of both a new world of Art and a new life for individuals and the community."[88] Schiller links life and art - this 'and' leads us to the defining feature of the aesthetic regime: a new way of life can come from art, reflecting Schiller's idea that beauty leads the way to liberty. There are three ways this 'and', this connection between art and life, can manifest. "Art can become life. Life can become art. And art

[83] Aristotle. *Poetics* trans.Malcolm Heath (Penguin, London 1996).
[84] Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics*, 18-19.
[85] Ibid,18.
[86] Schiller *Aesthetic Education*, 57.
[87] Jacques Rancière, "The Aesthetic Revolution and Its Outcomes" trans.Steven Corcoran in *Dissensus*: *On Politics and Aesthetics* ed.Steven Corcoran (Bloomsbury, New York 2015): 123.
[88] Ibid.

and life can exchange their properties."[89] I want to focus on the first and third scenarios, which further illuminate Schiller's influence on Rancière relationship.[90]

The first scenario or 'plot' is of art becoming life and is the position suggested by a straightforward reading of Schiller: "matters of art are matters of education. As self-education art is the formation of a new sensorium – one which signifies, in actuality, a new ethos."[91] Such a plot appears in the young Marx of the 1840s: "The coming revolution will be at once the consummation and abolition of philosophy; no longer merely 'formal' and 'political', it will be a 'human' revolution."[92] Rancière refers here to Marx's 1843 text *On The Jewish Question*, where the conflict between religious and political emancipation is displaced by a third category, that of human emancipation, which is the true emancipation.[93]

We know that Rancière opposes the formulation of emancipation in *On The Jewish Question*. Let us spend a little more time with these texts. Against the opposition of religious emancipation – the granting of religious liberties – and political emancipation – the granting of rights, Marx will show both are insufficient. According to Rancière, Marx is unmasking the ideological illusion of rights as emancipatory and saying that they are insufficient for emancipation. Rather, rights veil the world of private property relations which is a world of domination. Marx declares that "the practical application of the right of man to freedom is the right of man to *private property*."[94] That is the right of liberty, what one would assume is the goal or outcome of *political* emancipation is nothing more than a relation to civil society, to the world of egotistical man and the unfreedom inherent in capitalism. Implicit in Marx's critique of rights is the idea that something new must be made, that true emancipation lies in the creation of a new form of life.

Rancière, in his discussion of *On The Jewish Question* in *Disagreement,* glosses the text as follows: "[t]he inability of citizenship to achieve man's true humanity becomes its capacity to

[89] Ibid, 127.
[90] The second 'plot', which focuses on Hegel's idea of the end of art, that art will end when we can tell prose from poetry and the artist becomes aware of what he is doing, operates analogously to the first, its just that what comes to a close is aesthetics and not politics. See: Rancière, "Aesthetic Revolution", 130-132.
[91] Rancière, 'Aesthetic Revolution", 127.
[92] Ibid, 128. The reference is to Marx's 'On The Jewish Question' in which the question of religious and political emancipation are famously displaced for the coming human emancipation.
[93] Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question" trans.Rodney Livingston in *Early Writings* (Penguin, London 1992), 211-242.
[94] Ibid, 229.

serve, by masking them, the interests of man the property owner. Political "participation" is then just the mask of the allocation of lots."[95] Rancière's critique is that when Marx argues that political emancipation is insufficient because what is required is a higher emancipation, a true overcoming, he is necessarily denigrating the efforts of political 'participation'. Marx is claiming that certain forms of thought and strategy are politically misguided and thus foreclosing certain politics in advance. We should notice that what gives Marx's argument his force is the idea of a further emancipation, one that negates the relevance of the other two forms. Rancière's rejection of Marx's analysis is also a rejection of total transformation of the situation, because such a stance requires denigrating action from outside its occurrence, reinstituting the circle of knowledge and ignorance. When Rancière connects this logic to Schiller and the idea of art becoming life, he is also rejecting the kind of permanence and finality implied in Schiller's idea of the aesthetic state, which demands the freedom of the aesthetic condition be used for something, in contradistinction to Rancière's connection between emancipation and doing nothing.

Rancière claims that the third scenario of "art and life exchanging their properties" can be associated with romantic poetics. Romantic art's principle is a "multiplication of the temporalities of art", which dismisses the two previous scenarios of art becoming life or life becoming art, of the end of art and the disappearance of politics.[96] It is replaced instead with scenarios of latency and reactualization.[97] This third scenario produces a situation in which the material for the aesthetic comes from the world, the living becomes art, but in doing so something must go back: "by making what is ordinary extraordinary, it makes what is extraordinary ordinary, too."[98] Everything from anytime can now become art, anyone can be anything. In Rancière's terms, anyone can become a speaking being, but we will never achieve the overcoming of a distribution that excludes because such a distribution defines community itself. This is to say that capacities are demonstrated, those denied certain abilities demonstrate said abilities. Yet there is no overcoming the division implied by the distribution of the sensible permanently. Here if we understand the demonstration of equality as an affirmation of freedom

[95] Rancière, *Disagreement*, 83.
[96] Rancière, "Aesthetic Revolution", 133.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid, 134.

stemming from aesthetic experience that then lapses, like the aesthetic condition in Schiller, we can see how this third scenario is one without the aesthetic state.

Conclusion: The Revenge of History

What Rancière rejects in *The Aesthetic Revolution and Its Outcomes* is a finality to the process of freedom and emancipation. This is a question, we can say, of the future. In Schiller the aesthetic state makes permanent the freedom and wholeness of the aesthetic condition, which guides us away from our current condition of fragmentation. This question of the future is thus one also of history. Schiller tells us a history, of Man once unified (in Ancient Greece), now fragmented. That fragmentation is the necessary condition of progress. Schiller, in his *Naïve and Sentimental Poetry*, will claim the Naive poet represents the unified ancient Greek citizen, yet it is the sentimental one, fragmented and modern, who is preferable.[99] However, we can re-achieve this unification, and a such an achievement is required to resolve the very problematic Schiller identifies.

In parsing the differences between Schiller and Rancière another question confronts us. The question of history and of the final overcoming of our fragmented being. Schiller and Rancière share the diagnosis of fragmentation. For Rancière it is about how the world is sensibility articulated and always articulated by exclusion. And although, as Rancière articulates the different outcomes of aesthetic revolution and Schiller's concept of aesthetic, he sides with one in which the exchange of life and art is constant, it is unclear how this open-ended conception of politics and freedom work alongside a historical diagnosis.

For it is not clear that Rancière breaks with history or has a pluralist or non-progressive vision of history. At times, he seems to suggest such a view. For example, in *The Figures of History* he writes: "If history doesn't show itself without the construction of some kind of heterogenous fiction, that is because it is itself made up of heterogenous tenses, of anachronisms."[100] Here he suggests it is not possible to have an account of history where there is a straightforward story of progress and overcoming.

[99] Friedrich Schiller *Naïve and Sentimental Poetry* trans Julius A. Elias (Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., New York 1966): 112-113; Kain, *Schiller, Hegel, Marx*, 15.
[100] Jacques Rancière, *Figures of History* trans. Julie Rose (Polity Press, Cambridge 2014): 57.

Furthermore, Rancière's examples are drawn from throughout history and he places the very problematic he is wrestling within as occurring not just in modernity, including the French Revolution, but also in Ancient Greece in the slave revolts and the theories of Plato and Aristotle.[101] For Schiller, on the other hand, Ancient Greece stands as a distant state to which we have moved past but should emulate and the French Revolution's failure is the immediate problem to be overcome.

Furthermore, Rancière's proposal of the three regimes of arts – ethical, representative and aesthetic – appears to follow a chronological order. It is with Plato we derive the ethical regime, then afterwards with Aristotle the representative regime, and then Schiller with the aesthetic regime. Therefore, at a certain point the aesthetic regime emerges. This regime, and its link to the concept of aesthetics that is so important for Rancière's account of freedom, suggests that emancipation and freedom historically emerge within Rancière's own account. Yet this throws into question the transhistorical nature of his examples of emancipation.

For Rancière then there is always the possibility of freedom and its self-generation via aesthetics. Rancière has developed his ideas on the link between freedom and aesthetics from Schiller. He rejects, however, any notion of the true realization of freedom as an enduring state. For to do so would undermine the instances on which freedom has been achieved throughout history. The plebians who take upon the Aventine Hill realize freedom and equality and emancipation just as much as the pupils of Jacotot. If one believes equality is and can always be demonstrated, one cannot believe in the telos of history or a final community to come. No aesthetic state, only the aesthetic condition.

This question of freedom and aesthetics is now also a question of history. We have a better understanding of Rancière's notion of freedom, his relationship to Schiller. However, there remain questions to address. If we accept Rancière's position on the idea of history and freedom, then it is easy to level the charge of ahistoricism at him. It is also unclear that Rancière himself can consistently hold to this view. His regimes of art have a historical character, or at the very least appear to. These problems may not be insurmountable, but if we want to clear about

[101] Todd May discusses this at length in his book on Rancière, and points out the transhistorical nature of Rancière's work. See: Todd May. *The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière: Creating Equality*. (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2008): 65-69.

Rancière and his understanding of equality and emancipation these questions must be addressed. Such a problematic remains unresolved, but this problematic has itself only come into focus by understanding Schiller's influence on Rancière and the vicissitudes of self-emancipation.

Bibliography

Aristotle. *Poetics* trans.Malcolm Heath (Penguin, London 1996).

Beiser, Frederick. *Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination* (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005).

Biesta, Gert. "A New Logic of Emancipation: The Methodology of Jacques Rancière", *Educational Theory* 60:1 (2010): 39-59.

Chambers, Samuel. *The Lessons of Rancière* (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012).

Deranty, Jean Philippe. "Jacques Rancière's Contribution to the Ethics of Recognition", *Political Theory* 31:1 (Feb 2003): 136-156.

Dunlap, Rika. "From Freedom to Equality: Rancière and the Aesthetic Experience of Equality.", *Continental Philosophy Review* 48 (2015): 341-358.

Hegel, G.F.W. *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art Vol.I* trans.T.M Knox (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1970).

Kain, Philip J. *Schiller, Hegel, And Marx*: *State, Society, and the Aesthetic Ideal of ancient Greece* (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal 1982).

Kant, Immanuel. "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'" trans H.B. Nisbet in *Political Writings* ed.H.S. Reiss (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991): 54-60.

Kant, Immanuel. *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* trans.Mary Gregor and Jens Timmerman (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012).

Laclau, Ernesto. *Emancipation(s)* (Verso, London 2007).

Marx, Karl. "On the Jewish Question" trans.Rodney Livingston in *Early Writings* (Penguin, London 1992): 211-242.

May, Todd. *The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière: Creating Equality*. (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2008).

Mey, Adeena. "Rancière as Foucauldian?" in *Foucault, Biopolitics, Governmentality*. eds. Jakob Nilsson and Sven-Olov Wallenstien (Södertörn University Press, Stockholm 2013): 175-184.

Panagia, Davide. *Rancière's Sentiments* (Duke University Press, Durham 2018).

Peden, Knox. "Grace and Equality, Fried and Rancière (and Kant)" in *Michael Fried and Philosophy* ed.Mathew Abbott (Routledge, London 2018): 189-190.

Rancière, Jacques. *The Ignorant Schoolmaster* trans.Kristin Ross (Stanford University Press, Stanford 1991).

_____. *Disagreement* trans.Julie Rose (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1999).

_____. *The Politics of Aesthetics*. trans.Gabriel Rockhill (Bloomsbury, London 2005).

_____. "The Aesthetic Heterotopia", *Philosophy Today* 54 (2010): 15-25.

_____. *The Emancipated Spectator* trans.Gregory Elliot (Verso, London 2011).

_____. *The Intellectual and his People* trans.David Fernbach (Verso, London 2012).

_____. *Figures of History* trans Julie Rose (Polity Press, Cambridge 2014).

_____. "Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?" trans.Steven Corcoran in *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics* ed.Steven Corcoran (Bloomsbury, New York 2015): 70-83.

_____. "The Aesthetic Revolution and Its Outcomes" trans.Steven Corcoran in *Dissensus*: *On Politics and Aesthetics* ed.Steven Corcoran (Bloomsbury, New York 2015):123-141.

_____. "The Paradoxes of Political Art" trans.Steven Corcoran in *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics* ed.Steven Corcoran (Bloomsbury, New York 2015): 142-159.

Renault, Emmanuel. 'The Many Marx of Jacques Rancière' in *Jacques Rancière and the Contemporary Scene* eds.Jean-Phillippe Deranty and Alison Ross (Continuum, London 2012): 168-186.

Ross, Nathan. *The Philosophy and Politics of Aesthetic Experience* (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham 2017).

Sharpe, Lesley. *Friedrich Schiller: Drama, Thought and Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Schiller, Friedrich. *Naïve and Sentimental Poetry* trans.Julius A. Elias (Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., New York 1966).

Schiller, Friedrich. *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* trans.Keith Tribe (Penguin, London 2016).

Schiller, Friedrich. 'Letters to Prince Frederick Christian von Augustenburg' trans.Keith Tribe in *On the Aesthetic Education of Man and Letters to Prince Frederick Christian von Augustenburg* (Penguin, London 2016): 113-168.