

ANNEX L**PRINCIPLES AND KEY FEATURES OF AN END-TO-END
SAFETY ASSURANCE REGIME**

1. The Functional Safety Board chairmen will collectively provide comprehensive safety and, where appropriate, environmental protection assurance coverage for all Defence activities.
2. FSB chairmen will provide an annual assurance report for their functional safety domain.
3. Each FSB will set out its policy in a level 2 JSP.
4. Implementation of the assurance arrangements may be supported by 'how to' details in level 3 JSPs, guidance and Duty Holder specific instructions.
5. FSB reviews shall concentrate on how well policies, standards, arrangements, etc are being implemented by duty holders and whether they are performing adequately as evidence for assurance.
6. The evidence for the assurance report may be provided from a number of sources including but not limited to:
 - Audits and Reviews – Corporate, Functional safety domain, Duty Holder and risk based.
 - Accident and incident reporting.
 - Service inquiries.
 - Crown censures, etc.
 - Inspections and Reviews of Documentation
7. Each FSB shall have representation from all appropriate Duty Holders across MOD, regulators if appropriate and any others who may provide assurance inputs.
8. The detail of how each FSB will provide end-to-end assurance still requires resolution, and it is not likely that there will be a single, one-size-fits-all process. However, the following principles provide guidance on the process of end-to-end assurance:
 - End-to-end is interpreted as meaning all characteristics (e.g. operating maintenance, training, reporting) and applications (concept through to disposal) of the process/function across all relevant organizational groupings (TLBs/TFAs) within the Department.
 - Assurance on the effective management of environment and safety risks and systems must be provided using objective evidence as far as possible.
 - The evidence should be as independent as possible, but bearing in mind proportionality: the more serious the consequence, the greater the need for independent scrutiny. This would be particularly applicable to high consequence, low probability risks.