

Disaster Relief Operations

Joint Doctrine Publication 3-52
Second Edition

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 3-52

(2nd Edition)

DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

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Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS

The successful conduct of military operations requires an intellectually rigorous, clearly articulated and empirically-based framework of understanding that gives advantage to a country's Armed Forces, and its likely partners, in the management of conflict. This common basis of understanding is provided by doctrine.

UK doctrine is, as far as practicable and sensible, consistent with that of NATO. The development of national doctrine addresses those areas not covered adequately by NATO; it also influences the evolution of NATO doctrine in accordance with national thinking and experience.

Endorsed national doctrine is promulgated formally in Joint Doctrine Publications (JDPs).¹ From time to time, Interim Joint Doctrine Publications (IJDPs) are published, caveated to indicate the need for their subsequent revision in light of anticipated changes in relevant policy or legislation, or future lessons arising out of operations.

Urgent requirements for doctrine are addressed in Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs). JDNs do not represent an agreed or fully staffed position, but are raised in short order by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) to establish and disseminate current best practice. They also provide the basis for further development and experimentation, and a doctrinal basis for operations and exercises.

Details of the Joint Doctrine development process and the associated hierarchy of JDPs are to be found in JDP 0-00 '*Joint Doctrine Development Handbook*'.

¹ Formerly named Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).

RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

[illegible]

PREFACE

1. **Background.** Humanitarian crises and disasters, if not addressed rapidly and effectively, can deteriorate quickly with sometimes significant repercussions.² Nations least able to withstand the effects of natural disaster, or at greatest risk to man-made disaster, are frequently those areas most susceptible to political instability, civil disorder and unrest. Whilst the moral imperative to contribute to humanitarian relief will be paramount, there may also be other UK interest in intervening.
2. **Purpose.** The main purpose of JDP 3-52 '*Disaster Relief Operations*' (DROs) is to inform and guide commanders and staff involved in the planning and conduct of military support to humanitarian relief efforts in predominantly permissive environments overseas.³ The publication may also be of use to Other Government Departments (OGDs), International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) who may operate with or alongside UK military forces.

The Need to Capture Experience: The Deployment of Assets from the Belize Garrison to Mexico and Columbia in 1985



Colombian Volcano, 1985

In September 1985 Royal Engineer personnel, an RAF Hercules and 2 Puma helicopters, all part of the UK Forces permanent presence in Belize, deployed to Mexico City in the aftermath of a huge earthquake, as Operation VASCO. Less than 2 months later a similar package again deployed from Belize, as Operation PRINCE, to Columbia after a volcanic eruption caused a mudslide leaving an estimated 25,000 people dead or missing and a further 22,000 homeless. Despite the relative concurrency of these 2 operations, it was noted in the Operation PRINCE Post Operation Report, that experience gained the hard way was quickly lost. The capture of this experience is an important element of this JDP.

² Defence Strategic Guidance (DSG) 05 Section 2 Military Task 4.1.

³ For operations in the UK see JDP 02 '*Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience*'.

3. **Context.** JDP 3-52 supports operations by forces generated specifically to support disaster relief efforts. While the scope of this publication does not cover the provision of Humanitarian Assistance as a secondary task undertaken within wider missions, the key tenets remain applicable. JDP 3-52 is focused at the operational level; however, where relevant it includes appropriate strategic and tactical issues. The publication generally refers to joint DROs mounted by PJHQ however, for DROs led by a Front Line Command (FLC) the principles are the same and FLC structures and processes should be substituted. DROs are inherently multi-agency operations undertaken using the Comprehensive Approach;⁴ hence JDP 3-52 has been produced in cooperation with OGDs, IOs and NGOs.

4. **Linkages.** JDP 3-52 should be read in conjunction with:

- a. JDP 0-01 '*British Defence Doctrine*'.
- b. JDP 01 '*Campaigning*'.
- c. JDP 3-00 '*Campaign Execution*'.
- d. JDP 4-00 '*Logistics for Joint Operations*'.
- e. JDP 5-00 '*Campaign Planning*'.
- f. JDP 3-45.1 '*Media Operations*'.
- g. JWP 3-50 '*The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*'.
- h. JWP 3-51 '*Non-combatant Evacuation Operations*'.
- i. JWP 3-80 '*Information Operations*'.
- j. JDP 3-90 '*Civil-Military Co-operation*' (CIMIC).
- k. AJP-3.4 '*Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*'.

⁴ See JDP 01 '*Campaigning*', 3rd Edition – programmed for promulgation in 2008.

DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

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CHAPTER 1 – OVERVIEW

101. Over the next 30 years urbanisation, population growth and climate change are all likely to contribute to greater numbers of people inhabiting areas that will be at significant environmental risk. This is particularly so in areas susceptible to volcanic and seismic activity and in low-lying coastal regions where extreme weather events and inundation are likely to occur with increasing frequency.¹ This is likely to result in an increase in humanitarian crises, the response to which may include contribution from the UK military.

102. Following a humanitarian disaster overseas, whether the cause is natural or man-made, the UK may be requested to mount or lend support to a relief effort in the country or region affected. The UK contribution will usually be led by the Department for International Development (DFID) who may call on military assistance if civilian resources are insufficient or if it provides a comparative advantage. A Service Level Agreement (SLA) between DFID and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) is at Annex A and discussed in paragraph 205.

SECTION I – TERMINOLOGY

103. **Humanitarian Disaster.**² A humanitarian disaster is a catastrophe the consequences of which put lives and/or livelihoods at risk, and exceeds the ability of the affected society to cope using only its own resources. A description of common disaster types, their typical effects and the likely post-disaster needs is at Annex B.

104. **Disaster Relief.** Disaster Relief is the organised response to alleviate the results of a catastrophe. The aims are to:

- a. Save life.
- b. Relieve suffering.
- c. Limit damage.
- d. Restore essential services to a level that enables local authorities to cope.

105. **Humanitarian Principles.** There are 4 core humanitarian principles, originally developed by the Red Cross movement, which are now widely endorsed and guide the majority of those responding to humanitarian disasters. Military assistance

¹ 'The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036'.

² The terms *humanitarian disaster*, *humanitarian crises* and *humanitarian emergency* are often used interchangeably. This publication defaults predominantly to the term *humanitarian disaster*, however, where *crisis* or *emergency* are used no distinction is implied.

to disaster relief should be conducted cognisant of and, wherever possible, in accordance with these principles. The 4 core humanitarian principles³ are:

- a. **Humanity.** To bring assistance to people in distress without discrimination.
- b. **Impartiality.** Action is based solely on need.
- c. **Neutrality.** Humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict.
- d. **Independence.** Humanitarian action must be kept separate from political, economic, military or other objectives.

106. **Disaster Relief Operations.** A Disaster Relief Operation (DRO) is a primary Military Task and contribution to a disaster relief response. It provides specific assistance to an afflicted overseas population. Disaster Relief is a specified Military Task categorised as a Contingent Operation Overseas in Defence Strategic Guidance (DSG).

107. **Humanitarian Assistance.** Humanitarian Assistance is a secondary Military Task, which is the provision of relief aid by military forces conducting operations other than DROs. In circumstances where there is a pressing humanitarian need there may be no option but to render assistance. In such cases, the humanitarian principle of impartiality (assistance based on need) should be strictly applied, and responsibility handed over to an appropriate civilian agency at the earliest opportunity. Whether the Joint Force Commander (JFC) requires additional authority from Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) to conduct Humanitarian Assistance will depend on the content and latitude of the Mission Directive.

The Distinction between DROs and Humanitarian Assistance

The UK military contribution to the response to 2 earthquakes in Central Asia, illustrates the distinction between a DRO and a Humanitarian Assistance:

- An earthquake in northern Afghanistan in March 2002 saw UK Chinooks, *already deployed* in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), undertaking relief flights as a *secondary task* within the wider mission and hence as a *Humanitarian Assistance*.
- In October 2005 when an earthquake hit northern Pakistan, UK Chinooks were once more involved but this time as part of a *bespoke DRO*, Operation MATURIN, an Operation *specifically mounted* in response to this disaster.

³ www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/humanitarian-policy

SECTION II – OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

108. **Unpredictability.** Normally DROs will be undertaken in unpredictable, chaotic and sometimes volatile environments. There are exceptions to this. For example, the likelihood of hurricanes in the Caribbean between June and November each year is foreseeable, allowing resources to be pre-positioned and contingency plans devised. Additionally, many disaster-prone countries now have national or regional Disaster Risk Reduction Strategies or Disaster Management Plans to improve disaster preparedness.

Pre-Positioning of Assets



Royal Navy personnel provide assistance following a hurricane in the Caribbean

Each year the Atlantic Patrol Task (North) (APT(N)) pre-positions a warship and fleet auxiliary in the Caribbean for the hurricane season. For example in 2007, HMS PORTLAND and RFA WAVE RULER followed some 150 miles behind Hurricane DEAN and after DEAN's destructive landfall in Belize, APT(N) personnel joined British Army personnel to assist in relief efforts. Later in the season the Lynx helicopter from RFA WAVE KNIGHT was tasked to deliver aid following Tropical Storm NOEL's devastating landfall in the Dominican Republic. The APT(N) is an example of a Front Line Command (FLC) led DRO.

109. **Permissiveness.** A DRO will normally be at the request of the stricken state or on the acceptance of an offer of assistance. While DROs are therefore likely to be conducted in a militarily permissive environment, there are scenarios where a more uncertain security environment exists due to ongoing conflict or unrest following the

disaster. Security, including policing, remains the responsibility of the stricken state. Exceptionally, depending on the internal situation and taking account of any local tensions and the functionality of the state security system, there may be a requirement to provide security for personnel and essential assets. Such assets may include military equipment, accommodation, vehicles, transport aircraft and support helicopters. It may also include relief stores and supplies entrusted to the military if they are deemed to be at risk.

Permissiveness: The Varying Security Environment

In 1979, a RAF C-130 crew was flying Red Cross supplies into Managua, Nicaragua, as part of an ongoing international disaster response. On landing, the aircraft was surrounded by a group of militia who cocked their weapons, withdrew the pins from hand grenades and demanded to be flown to Costa Rica. While the crew kept the engines turning and warned off other relief flights, they were lucky to have a Spanish speaking engineer on board who diffused the situation by bluffing that they had insufficient fuel and would have to land in Nicaragua again en route.

During Operation VIGOUR, in Somalia 1992, aid operations were ostensibly conducted in a benign environment. However aircraft came under small arms fire in Mogadishu and one RAF C130 crew landed at a rough strip only to find the runway edges were marked by landmines, necessitating a careful take-off run!

Even amidst the devastation following the 2004 South Asian Tsunami, the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) in Indonesia, after a brief ceasefire, refused to guarantee the safety of military relief assets.

110. **Humanitarian Space.** Humanitarian space is the access and freedom for humanitarian organisations to assess and meet humanitarian needs.⁴ It can refer to both physical/geographical boundaries and a perceptual space. The concept of humanitarian space includes the distinction between the role and function of civilian humanitarian actors and those with an official, commercial or political agenda, including the military. In an uncertain or hostile security environment, the perceived erosion of humanitarian space can increase the physical risk to civilian humanitarian workers. This perceived erosion could occur through the association of the military with traditional civilian humanitarian roles, the overt relationship between military and humanitarian staffs, and the military use of civilian symbols (for example, civilian clothing and/or vehicles). While a less significant factor in permissive DRO

⁴ European Commission's Directorate for Humanitarian Aid definition, quoted at www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Nov/guttieriNov05.asp.

environments, commanders should be sensitive to humanitarian space and consult Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)⁵ specialists where appropriate.

111. **Constraints.** DROs will be subject to legal and practical constraints, including the availability of personnel, platforms and material. National interest, public expectations or other political considerations may also influence the nature of a response.

112. **Strategic Influence.** In addition to the altruistic aims of disaster relief, listed at paragraph 104, there may be specific UK interest in contributing and being seen to contribute to a disaster response. National interest may include the desire to promote stability and prevent a situation from worsening for political ends, or more generally to achieve favourable strategic influence. A UK military contribution to a disaster response will be a visible and attributable representation of the UK response. While it is DFID policy not to mark aid as explicitly coming from the UK, to respect the dignity of the beneficiary, benefit can be gained from the marking of assets used to deliver this aid, for example the marking of UK military aircraft and helicopters with large Union Flags. The respective strategic aims of participating UK government departments should be mutually understood and recognised as complementary.

‘Earthquake Diplomacy’



Turkish soldiers rejoice after reaching a survivor trapped under rubble for 52 hours, following an earthquake in 1999

⁵ See Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-90 ‘Civil-Military Co-operation’.

After successive earthquakes hit both Greece and Turkey in the summer of 1999, the subsequent bilateral aid efforts resulted in a thawing of relations between the 2 countries, after decades of mutual hostility. The response to the earthquakes was seen as the catalyst for a lasting improvement in Greco-Turkish relations, leading to the coining of the phrase ‘earthquake diplomacy’.

After the 2004 earthquake in Bam, the Iranians briefly accepted international relief aid and personnel, including foreign military aid flights. There was some hope that this international demonstration of support may have led to a softening on the Iranian nuclear position. However, this was not to be the case.

Similarly, following the 8 October 2005 earthquake which affected the India-Pakistan disputed territory of Kashmir, and after initial failure to reach agreement over offers of bilateral aid, crossing points on the previously closed Line of Control were opened. Voices from amongst politicians, the media and public called for the earthquake to be the catalyst for a new era for Kashmir. Although some Line of Control restrictions were reduced, there is little evidence that the earthquake resulted in a significant improvement in relations between the 2 countries. However, the UK contribution to the relief effort generated goodwill and opportunities between the UK and Pakistan, which created a window of opportunity for policy makers and planners to exploit for mutual benefit.

SECTION III – CHARACTERISTICS OF DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

113. **Responsibility.** The overall responsibility for disaster relief rests with the stricken state and external relief efforts should complement the national plan with the Host Nation (HN) Government visibly in charge.

114. **Bilateral Contributions.** Because of individual nations’ interests and methods of contributing to disaster response efforts, contributions to disaster relief are most often offered bilaterally with the stricken state rather than as part of a single multinational operation, although overall coordination may rest with the United Nations (UN). Even if not part of a formal coalition, there may be opportunities for mutual support between other deployed forces, for which purpose Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between participating nations may be negotiated. However, almost inevitably there will be competition for resources, including real estate, and this must be considered during the planning. UK Government Departments will have to consult neighbouring countries over a range of issues such as overflight rights or staging of UK Forces. Commanders must ensure that efforts on the ground are coordinated with other contributors, through the UN if present, in order to promote unity of effort.

Parallel Relief Efforts

During Operation MATURIN the UK Joint Helicopter Force (JHF) contingent initially assumed that it would ‘plug in’ to the established Combined Pakistan Military (PAKMIL)/US Army aid distribution effort. However, whilst the Pakistan Military held primacy for all military matters, DFID wished to focus UK support, through the Pakistani civilian authorities, to the UN effort. The UN operation was a parallel relief effort that was not subordinate to, or coordinated with, the PAKMIL/US aid distribution effort. This disconnect had resulted from disagreement on aid distribution priorities and threatened to compromise HN and US support to the JHF. DFID and the JHF worked together to resolve this issue and it was agreed that, while the UN had priority but were unable to utilise the full JHF lift capacity, spare capacity would be offered to the PAKMIL/US effort.

115. **Media Interest.** Media interest in humanitarian disasters may be considerable and, in common with all operations, the media will have the ability to make uncensored live broadcasts and file instant reports from within the affected area. There is therefore a risk that politicians, international leaders, the stricken society and the general public may draw misconceptions, build unrealistic expectations and generate pressure to take action. The Media Operations plan, normally led by the DFID Press Office, must take this into account and lines to take will be required as part of the National Information Strategy (see paragraph 323).⁶

116. **Actor Complexity.** International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) will be significant actors, as will indigenous agencies and organisations. Ensuring that the military effort complements the contribution of other actors will be one of the major challenges to the military commander and staff, and one of the keys to success. The principles of CIMIC are applicable to DROs, hence commanders should ensure that substantial CIMIC expertise is incorporated into the planning and execution of DROs, including all the necessary linkages with DFID.

117. **Donor Response.** Good intentions do not guarantee an appropriate response, hence the need for constant consultation with HN authorities and experts in the design of a disaster response. For the MOD the principle source for disaster response expertise is DFID.

Appropriateness of Response

Following the 2001 floods in Mozambique, 50% of the donated drugs were either out of date or inappropriate. The expense to Mozambique of safely disposing off the unusable medication was greater than the value of the donations.

⁶ See JDP 3-00 ‘*Campaign Execution*’, JDP 3-45.1 ‘*Media Operations*’ and JWP 3-80 ‘*Information Operations*’.

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CHAPTER 2 – APPROACH TO DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

SECTION I – UK GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

201. **Requests for Assistance.** The affected Government will normally make a request for assistance through the UK diplomatic mission in the respective country, the affected country's Embassy or High Commission in London and/or the United Nations (UN) Resident Representative. The UN or UK Representative may forward any request and recommendations for a UK response to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and/or the Department for International Development (DFID).

202. **UK Government Lead.** In all but exceptional circumstances, the UK Government's response to a humanitarian disaster is initiated by the Secretary of State for International Development and led by DFID. In instances where DFID does not consider the magnitude of the situation merits UK assistance on purely humanitarian grounds, but the Government has wider political or domestic considerations that demand a UK response, the Cabinet Office and the FCO retain the authority to call upon the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to mount a DRO. A disaster occurring in a UK Overseas Territory (OT) may be such an instance where DFID does not consider the situation sufficient to overwhelm local capacity but the UK Government nevertheless feels it has a duty to assist. Should a disaster simultaneously affect a DFID priority country and an OT (or other country meriting a response on other than purely humanitarian grounds), then the FCO will refer decisions for prioritisation and allocation of resources to the Cabinet Office or Ministers. Where a request for assistance is made by the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), the UK lead department will be DFID. This is also the case for a UK contribution to the European Union's (EU) Civilian Protection Mechanism (see paragraph 223c) for a disaster outside of the European Union. Support to this mechanism for a disaster internal to the EU falls to the Cabinet Office. In the case of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) operation, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office will coordinate the UK response.

203. **Ministry of Defence.** Any MOD role in a disaster response will be shaped by the Cabinet or an alternative, bespoke sub-group. Ministers decide on the most effective approach on a case-by-case basis, but may draw upon an existing Government committee such as the National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID) committee, the Wider Cross-Government Group (also known as the Strategic Group) or the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) forum. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) process provides the MOD focus for crisis management and is described at paragraph 312.

204. **Foreign and Commonwealth Office.** The FCO has overall political responsibility for engagement with other nations and is responsible for obtaining political approval for UK military deployment into other nation states, including the stricken state for a Disaster Relief Operation (DRO). The FCO will provide political advice on the circumstances for a potential DRO, including aircraft routing and negotiating diplomatic clearance for over-flight, staging and the operation of a military Forward Mounting Base (FMB), if necessary. Additionally, the FCO can provide assistance with provision of visas and arrangements for the provision of Host-nation Support (HNS) and local resources to the Joint Task Force (JTF).

205. **Department for International Development.** DFID is responsible for leading and coordinating the UK Government's humanitarian assistance overseas. DFID respects the 4 core humanitarian principles of *humanity, impartiality, neutrality* and *independence*, and will attempt to allocate funds to organisations that comply with these principles. As a UK Department of State, DFID is not independent of politics but will promote humanitarian activities which prioritise the needs of those affected above political concerns or national interests. The International Development Act 2002 provides the legal authority for most DFID expenditure. DFID's priority is to improve international disaster response capacity under the overall coordination of the UN. It is DFID policy to integrate disaster preparedness and response work into existing country and thematic programmes where possible. This allows for better transition from the emergency phase to recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Adopting a Comprehensive Approach,¹ DFID has established arrangements with Other Government Departments (OGDs) to facilitate rapid disaster response. This includes: the FCO, who assist in global surveillance of disasters; the Home Office, for the deployment of UK Fire and Rescue personnel; and the MOD for the provision of military capability. A Service Level Agreement (SLA) between DFID and MOD, at Annex A, sets out the principles and processes for collaboration in major humanitarian disasters. DFID and MOD will review the SLA at regular intervals, therefore the MOD custodian should be consulted for the current version.² DFID and the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) conduct regular, routine meetings for joint monitoring and familiarity.

206. **Department for International Development Disaster Response Options.** DFID responses may include:

- a. Financial contributions through national or international humanitarian organisations.

¹ See Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 4/05 '*The Comprehensive Approach*'. Also see British Defence Doctrine (BDD) 3rd Edition, and Joint Doctrine Publications (JDPs): 01, 2nd Edition; 3-00, 3rd Edition; and 5-00 2nd Edition – programmed for promulgation in 2008.

² The extant SLA can be obtained from the MOD custodian DJC-Mar4 and should also be accessible via the DFID web site: www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs

- b. Deployment of humanitarian advisors and/or secondment of personnel, usually to UN agencies.
- c. Donation of goods, stores and equipment.
- d. Operational Support (such as chartering of aircraft and deployment of search and rescue teams).
- e. Request for UK Military support.

207. **Military Involvement.** UN Guidelines,³ commonly known as '*The Oslo Guidelines*', state that civilian assets are to be preferred over military when providing humanitarian assistance. Therefore, DFID will normally only request military assistance when there is an acknowledged gap⁴ between humanitarian needs and the civilian resources to meet them, and where the response is acceptable to the local population and in support of the wider relief effort. The military response must have a comparative advantage over civilian options; the advantage is usually speed of reaction, scale of effort or availability of specific resources. The principle is one of 'demand pull' rather than 'supply push' and a joint MOD and DFID analysis of desired effects and outcomes should precede the determination of capabilities and ultimately individual assets. Notwithstanding this, the MOD must anticipate likely requests at the onset of any humanitarian disaster situation and should offer timely advice on the suitability and availability of military support.

Military Involvement: An Alternative Perspective

The airlift to victims of the famine in Ethiopia during the mid-1980s is often heralded as a shining example of an international military contribution to a disaster response. While the effects of the airlift were generally perceived to be very positive, enabling people stay in place rather than congregate in camps, there are alternate views. For the price of one flight, a grain truck (which could carry twice the load of a C-130) could have been purchased and fuelled for 6 months, and the truck left as a lasting legacy. That said, many areas were inaccessible by road due to the civil war and, ironically, the coming of much needed rain. More controversially, some feel the airlift actually helped to prolong the conflict. It freed the Ethiopian Air Force's own transport aircraft to support the war effort, including a forced resettlement programme. It has also been argued that the relief airlift eased the pressure for

³ UN Guidelines for the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies, known as '*The Oslo Guidelines*', were reissued in November 2006. Details are at: www.ochaonline.un.org

⁴ Jointly assessed by DFID and MOD through the SLA assessment process.

diplomacy, negating potential opportunities that could have arisen through negotiations between the Ethiopian Government and the Rebels over humanitarian access to the stricken population.

208. **Provision of Support by UK Forces Overseas.** Commanders of UK Forces overseas, even when obliged by treaty or other technical agreement, should normally secure Her Majesty's (HM) Representative and MOD authority to act. This includes UK Forces permanently stationed overseas and those deployed temporarily on operations or exercise. All proposals for support to disaster relief efforts should be reported by commanders to MOD by signal,⁵ which should indicate the scope of the proposed aid, the estimated cost, and whether the concurrence of HM's Representative has been obtained. However, where seeking formal authority would involve unacceptable delay, immediate emergency life-saving relief may be offered at the commander's discretion subject to safety imperatives. Immediate emergency life-saving relief is the provision of small-scale supplies and services which are needed as a matter of extreme urgency to save life or to limit physical damage and prevent serious suffering. These may be resourced from Service sources provided that Service requirements are not compromised. Any such relief should not exceed one week's supplies and should normally be provisioned from on-the-spot stores. Commanders should inform HM Representative of any support undertaken and formal mechanisms should be put in place as soon as possible. Only once a formal request for assistance has been received can costs be reimbursed.

209. **Existing UK Representatives.** British Embassies, High Commissions, Consulates and DFID Country Offices play a role in providing early warning of emerging crises and situational awareness following disasters. Their links with host governments and in-country humanitarian agencies make them an important information source and part of the coordination system in the affected country. They can also facilitate some UK disaster response activities, including local procurement of relief goods. In the case of military support, the Defence Attaché, if present, may be particularly useful in establishing links with the stricken state's armed and security forces.

210. **Non-Combatant Evacuation.** In circumstances where UK Eligible Persons (UKEPs)⁶ are at risk as a result of a disaster, the FCO may request military assistance to conduct a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO). The Embassy/High Commission would use the Civil Contingency Plan (CCP) as the basis for any

⁵ Signals should use the Subject Indicator Code (SIC) EFO.

⁶ There are 3 major categories of UKEP: Firstly, British nationals (including dual nationals); secondly, unrepresented European Union nationals; and finally, unrepresented Commonwealth and other foreign nationals by prior agreement.

evacuation. MOD would arrange military assistance in accordance with Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-51 '*Non-combatant Evacuation Operations*'.⁷

SECTION II – LIKELY CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

211. **Initial Contact.** In cases where DFID does not have the lead (see paragraph 202), then the Cabinet Office will convene a bespoke forum of relevant departments. In a DFID led operation, as a crisis emerges DFID will activate its crisis response procedures. Throughout, and in addition to the liaison with MOD described here, there will be a dialogue between DFID, FCO and the Cabinet Office, particularly where there are significant wider considerations, such as political, domestic or consular factors. Within DFID the lead responsibility for planning rapid onset disaster relief rests with the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) and, in circumstances involving Africa, the Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit (ACHU). This is done in close collaboration with DFID geographical departments and overseas offices. CHASE maintains an emergency response capability, with operations controlled from the CHASE Operations Room in London. A CHASE duty officer provides out-of-hours cover and, during a major crisis, the Headquarters may be staffed 24-hours. If DFID identify a potential requirement for military support, the DFID official responsible for MOD liaison⁸ will initiate contact with MOD following the procedure at Appendix A1, to the SLA at Annex A. In the first instance, the relevant Policy and Defence Relations (PDR) geographical desk would take the lead within the MOD. Depending on the scale of the disaster or likelihood of committing future military effect, the lead for coordinating a MOD response may pass from PDR to the Directorate of Strategic Plans (DSP) and/or the Directorate of Joint Commitments (DJC); PDR will remain as the MOD country experts. The DFID point of contact (POC) will be located with the DFID emergency response planning team and will provide continuous information to the MOD POC.

212. **Liaison.** Once DFID makes a formal request to explore military options, then direct liaison between CHASE and PJHQ can take place. If circumstances demand, PJHQ will appoint a liaison officer to DFID, usually to be based in the CHASE Operations Room. Subsequently there may be a requirement for ongoing liaison between CHASE and various PJHQ and JFHQ Divisions, especially J2, J4 and J5. It may be appropriate for DFID and PJHQ to exchange additional Liaison Officers.


213. **Approval.** PJHQ will use the estimate process to establish what resources are available and deployable, in what timescale, for how long and at what cost (see paragraph 216). The estimate will aim to match available resources to the effects requested by DFID. DFID will then decide whether the use of a proposed military

⁷ 'Eligible' Persons and the 3 major categories of UKEP are the extant terminology and categorisation. These changes will be incorporated into the next Edition of JDP 3-51 '*Non-combatant Evacuation Operations*'.

⁸ Normally the CHASE Head of Humanitarian Programmes Team/Operations Team or Head of ACHU.

asset/package is appropriate and affordable, taking into account the UN ‘*Oslo Guidelines*’, although DFID is not bound by these Guidelines. If the decision is to seek formal approval for specific MOD assistance, almost always requiring MOD Ministerial approval, then this is sought through the DCMO process (see paragraph 312) and in consultation with the Cabinet Office. The tasking of air or space reconnaissance, separately or in conjunction with a ground assessment, may add clarity to a confused situation and DFID, in consultation with MOD, should consider these options early.

Chronology of Events: Operation GARRON 2004/5



The apparent delay from disaster to confirmation of a UK military contribution was largely attributed to the scale of the event not being fully evident until 28/29

December. Coming over the holiday period, the events represented a pragmatic approach to expediting response. Following the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff's (Commitments) (DCDS(C)) verbal direction on 29 December to the Directorate of Joint Commitments (DJC) and PJHQ, work on the draft Chief of Defence Staff's (CDS') Directive began on 31 December. However, it was not signed off until well into the Operation; the final version was issued on 18 January. The MOD contribution was not formalised until a Cabinet Office meeting on 2 January, by which time the preparatory actions of deploying a PJHQ Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) and the sailing of HMS CHATHAM had been taken.

SECTION III – FINANCIAL ISSUES

214. **Financial Authority.** As dictated by HM Treasury, costs for DROs fall to the lead Department, usually DFID. The exception to this is the diversion of military assets already in the vicinity for immediate life saving. The costing process for DROs must be swift and will be in accordance with the MOD and DFID SLA. The estimated cost of using military assets is likely to be a critical factor in DFID's decision to request military support. Cost recovery in situations where DFID is not the lead Department will be dealt with in a separate agreement with the requesting Department.

215. **Charging Policy and Offsets.** Director Finance Policy (D Fin Pol), in consultation with the appropriate regional secretariat, is the lead authority for levels of charge and offsets. Cost estimates submitted by MOD to DFID should normally be on a marginal, those additional costs that would not have been incurred if the support had not been undertaken, or no-loss basis. This approach ensures that the Defence budget neither suffers as a result of unscheduled activity nor makes gains. The MOD charging policy, including the scope for offsets and the basis of estimates, should be transparent and aim to achieve a quick working-level understanding with DFID.

216. **Rapid Costings.** The production of rapid and accurate cost estimates is an iterative process requiring a balance between urgency and reliability. PJHQ J8 is responsible for initiating and coordinating the DRO cost estimate when PJHQ has lead planning responsibility. Front Line Commands (FLCs) are responsible when leading single-Service DROs. Subject to advice from D Fin Pol, PJHQ/FLCs should provide a detailed estimate of the likely cost of the military support to DFID, including MOD reconnaissance and Public Information requirements. Notwithstanding time constraints, PJHQ/FLCs should include Top-level Budget (TLB) holders and the Defence Supply Chain Operations and Movements (DSCOM), wherever possible, in the process. The dissemination of current planning assumptions will ensure coherence of the cost estimate. PJHQ's/FLC's resulting submission to MOD should include the consolidated cost estimate and any associated caveats. In submitting cost estimates, costing staffs should not automatically deduct potential offsets but rather highlight them for MOD consideration.

217. **Financial Accounting.** It is essential that MOD captures all costs to ensure reimbursement. D Fin Pol centrally coordinates and manages the cost-capture process and will issue a Financial Instruction once a DRO is declared. Although the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) is delegated financial authority, ideally MOD will deploy a Civil Secretary (Civ Sec) to assist in the financial management of the operation. The Civ Sec should be consulted prior to the commitment of expenditure, and for advice on financial and contractual matters. Based on advice from the Civ Sec, the JTFC will normally issue operation-specific financial delegations with authorisation to commit expenditure. Costs will be categorised as either ‘in theatre’ or ‘out of theatre’. In-theatre costs are the responsibility of the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) and will be captured by use of a Unit Indicator Number (UIN) administered by the Civ Sec. Out-of-theatre costs are the direct responsibility of the spending TLB holders.

SECTION IV – LEGAL ISSUES

218. Most DROs are launched at the request of a Host Nation (HN) or (in the case of Humanitarian Assistance tasks, as part of a wider mission) in accordance with a UN Security Council Resolution. Commanders at all levels should be aware of the precise legal basis for the operation as this will determine the nature and extent of the presence and activities of UK Forces, as well as the use of force permissible under the Rules of Engagement (ROE). Commanders should also be aware of any legal constraints and in all circumstances, should seek advice from their legal staff. UK Forces must operate at all times within UK national, international and (subject to a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or similar arrangement) HN law.

219. **Status of Forces Agreement.** There may be no standing SOFA with the government of a stricken state or existing arrangements may not cover the requirement. In such circumstances, PJHQ J4 HNS will seek to secure appropriate jurisdictional arrangements over deployed UK military personnel and MOD civilians. Given the time imperative, initial agreement will normally be achieved by an Exchange of Letters with the government of the stricken state. Wherever possible these arrangements should be in place before deployment. If there are likely to be FMBs or other logistic footprints in third countries, similar but separate arrangements will need to be made with each such country. The following issues should be addressed in any SOFA or, should the time available not allow for a SOFA to be negotiated, these issues should be included in the negotiated document which may take the form of Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), Military Technical/Implementing Arrangements and/or exchanges of letters between governments (the list is not exhaustive):

- a. Status of personnel including privileges and immunities.
- b. Jurisdictional arrangements.

- c. Exemption from taxes and duties.
- d. Exemption from immigration controls and import regulations.
- e. Wearing of uniforms.
- f. Issue and carriage of personal weapons and ROE (for self-defence).
- g. Use of UK vehicles and validity of UK driving permits.
- h. Freedom of movement in connection with conduct of DRO.
- i. Understanding on the resolution of claims and liabilities.
- j. Investigation of accidents.
- k. Provision of and Payment Regime for HNS. This is normally better dealt with in a separate Implementing Arrangement completed under the umbrella of the main SOFA/MOU.

220. **Visas.** Notwithstanding the potential negotiations about the status of UK Forces, which may take some time, the early identification of visa requirements is essential. MOD should seek FCO guidance at the first indication of a potential DRO.

221. **Rules of Engagement.** DROs after natural disasters should in principle be unarmed. If it is necessary for military personnel to be armed (with either firearm or less lethal weapon), MOD and PJHQ will be responsible for providing a draft ROE profile and submission,⁹ and for providing ROE advice at the military strategic and operational levels respectively. At the earliest opportunity, MOD will ensure that FCO and DFID are aware of ROE. The nominated commander is responsible for the promulgation to theatre of authorised ROE profiles and Guidance Card, in accordance with Joint Services Publication (JSP) 398. In crafting ROE, account should be taken of the legal basis for the operation, the prevailing security conditions, HN capabilities and agreements on the provision of security. Based on these considerations, ROE will govern the use of force in specific circumstances. Within the context of a DRO, ROE are likely to restrict the use of force to that required for protection of UK Forces and other designated persons. Should the circumstances demand broader ROE, for example to prevent looting or for the wider protection of designated persons, appropriate changes should be requested through the chain of command. Moreover, the inherent right to use force in self-defence, including the defence of others, will always exist and is invariably expressed within the preamble to ROE profiles. Where tension exists between restrictive ROE and the right to use force in self-defence, UK Forces must individually exercise careful judgement in order not to undermine mission success.

⁹ Although drafts may also be produced by FLCs.

222. **Arrest or Detention.** It is not envisaged that UK military personnel will be engaged in arrest or detention activities. Exceptionally, where such a requirement arises, this will ordinarily be at the request of the HN and legal authority will derive from HN laws; UK Forces are unlikely to have powers to do any more than assist local authorities.

SECTION V – ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

223. A number of International Organisations (IOs), including UN agencies, and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) may have been working in the stricken country for some time prior to the present disaster. The humanitarian consequences may easily overwhelm in-country capacity and require a shift in focus by those organisations from development to emergency relief. The main national and international elements to an emergency relief response are:

- a. **National Response.** The response from the affected nation includes the government, local emergency services, civil protection, armed and security forces, local administration, community organisations and NGOs. Most lives are saved in the first few hours following a disaster, often by neighbours and local first-responders. It is important to acknowledge, support and not undermine the efforts of local populations in the immediate aftermath.
- b. **United Nations.** UN procedures will be subject to local factors and therefore the resultant structure may at times appear inefficient and incoherent. However, while structures may seem *ad hoc*, they will generally be based on established principles (see paragraph 224) and it is essential that UK assistance forms a coordinated part of the in-country response.
- c. **European Union.** The EU's lead department for disaster relief is ECHO, whose mandate is to provide emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict outside of the European Union. Additionally, the EU's Civilian Protection Mechanism facilitates the mobilisation of support and assistance from Member States in the event of major emergencies. As part of this mechanism a permanent Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) is able to receive alerts and requests for assistance directly from a disaster-stricken country.¹⁰
- d. **North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.** The NATO Doctrine for Disaster Relief is contained within Allied Joint Publication (AJP) -3.4 'Non-

¹⁰ As at publication, there is an ongoing debate within the EU as to whether to establish a permanent EU military emergency task force, as part of reinforcing the EU's disaster response capacity. As a first step the EU has undertaken a screening exercise of all existing resources.

Article 5 Crisis Response Operations’ (NA5CROs).¹¹ This document states that tasks in support of humanitarian operations should only be conducted ‘by exception and upon request’. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) at NATO Headquarters is responsible for coordinating, in close consultation with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), the NATO disaster relief response of member and partner countries. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU) is a non-standing, multi-national force of civil and military elements, which can be deployed in the event of a major natural or man-made disaster in a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) country. For deployments outside the EAPC area, NATO Response Force’s (NRF), due to their high readiness, are the primary source of capability from which NATO draws DRO force elements.

NATO’s Response to Hurricane KATRINA



Hurricane KATRINA

In response to the US request for assistance following Hurricane KATRINA, 39 NATO and Partner countries offered assistance. NATO’s EADRCC coordinated this response. Between 12 September and 2 October 2005, NATO flights delivered relief supplies and a NATO liaison officer was sent to Washington to work with the US Federal Emergency Management Agency.

¹¹ The NATO policy on military support for disaster relief operations is outlined in MC 343 ‘*NATO Military Assistance to International Disaster Relief Operations*’.

e. **Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement.** The national Red Cross or Red Crescent Society, supported by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC or ‘The Federation’), will often play a major role in the response to a disaster, especially in the early hours and days. These organisations can mobilise immediately to assist civil authorities with search and rescue efforts and the distribution of relief items. In many conflict-affected countries, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) may also be present and able to provide similar support.

f. **Non-Governmental Organisations.** International NGOs such as Oxfam, Save the Children and Médecins Sans Frontières, may have a permanent presence in disaster prone countries and will usually respond to disaster situations. In a major emergency many other organisations are likely to deploy, increasing the requirement for coordination and information sharing.

g. **Donors.** Donor governments (through agencies such as DFID, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and multilaterals such as ECHO may provide funding, technical personnel and operational support such as logistics and communications. Some donors may have their own representatives or offices in situ; others will work from national or regional capitals.

224. **United Nations Mechanisms.** The UN coordinates a mechanism for international disaster response:

a. **Resident Coordinator or Humanitarian Coordinator.** Many countries at risk from natural disasters will have a standing UN presence, with a Resident Coordinator (RC) or Representative. Before disaster occurs, the UN RC coordinates preparedness and mitigation activities, monitors and provides early warning of potential emergency situations and leads contingency planning. When an emergency arises, a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) may be appointed or the RC may assume that role. In complex emergencies the UN may appoint a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). UN OCHA¹² will play the central coordinating role. Other UN agencies that may be called on to assist include: UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Health Organisation (WHO).

b. **Clusters.** A UN cluster is a group of organisations with a designated lead (usually a UN agency), working in a common area of humanitarian

¹² OCHA’s ReliefWeb is a useful resource, billed as ‘the global hub for time-critical humanitarian information on Complex Emergencies and Natural Disasters’: www.reliefweb.int

response. These areas include traditional assistance sectors (for example, water and sanitation, nutrition and health), service provision (for example, emergency communications and logistics) and cross-cutting issues (for example, camp coordination, early recovery and protection). The aim of clusters is to strengthen the coordination framework and response capacity.

c. **United Nations Disaster Management Team.** A UN Disaster Management Team (UN DMT), chaired by the UN RC, exists for each disaster prone country. The purpose of the UN DMT is to prepare and ensure an effective response and coordinated UN assistance to the stricken state government. During an emergency, the UN DMT is the main in-country mechanism by which international agencies coordinate policies and programmes of humanitarian assistance in support of the national authorities.

d. **United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.** The UN OCHA has a mandate to coordinate humanitarian emergencies, however, not every responding actor, including UN agencies, will want to be coordinated. UN OCHA operates a 24/7 Disaster Response System and conducts its coordination role by:

- (1) Developing common strategies.
- (2) Assessing situations and needs.
- (3) Convening coordination forums.
- (4) Mobilising resources.
- (5) Addressing common problems.
- (6) Administering coordination mechanisms and tools.

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CHAPTER 3 – MILITARY ANALYSIS, HUMANITARIAN ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING

SECTION I – MILITARY ANALYSIS AND HUMANITARIAN ASSESSMENT

301. **Terminology.** Unlike the military campaigning convention of ‘analysis, planning, execution and assessment’,¹ the Department for International Development (DFID) and most civil actors refer to the initial stage as ‘assessment’. The civilian humanitarian assessment is a critical element of the military analysis for any Disaster Relief Operation (DRO). To enable the commander to understand his contribution in the context of the civilian terminology and sequence of events, the term ‘assessment’ is used in this chapter unless specifically referring to military analysis.

302. **Military Analysis.** The Campaign Plan and Operational Estimate² are as applicable to DROs as to any other military operation. For a DRO the military analysis should incorporate the essence of, and attempt to complement, the civilian humanitarian assessment (see paragraphs 303-306) and will include a review of:

- a. The nature and magnitude of the disaster, geospatial information,³ cultural factors and any specific hazards.
- b. The impact of the disaster on the population and infrastructure, and what should be done and at what scale in order to save and sustain life.

303. **Humanitarian Assessment.** However urgent the situation, a comprehensive (though often phased) assessment of the needs of the stricken population is essential in order to achieve a coordinated, effective relief effort. Poor assessment will hamper decision-making and may prolong suffering and cost further lives through misdirected efforts. The Government of the stricken state bears primary responsibility for the initial needs assessment. Some governments may be able to make an initial assessment within the first 12-72 hours following a disaster. However, many will not and, particularly in the case of major disasters, the national authority may request international help from the United Nations (UN) or from other nations. For larger emergencies the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) may mobilise a UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team with the aim of meeting international needs for early information and coordination during the first phase of an emergency.

¹ Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01, 2nd Edition ‘*Campaigning*’ - programmed for promulgation in 2008.

² JDP 5-00, 2nd Edition ‘*Campaign Planning*’ - programmed for promulgation in 2008.

³ Geospatial Information includes aeronautical, geographical, hydrographical, oceanographical and meteorological information.

304. **DFID Initial Assessment.** In parallel with the national/UN process, DFID will make its own initial assessment, complemented by information from Her Majesty's (HM) Representative and other sources, informed/supported by the military where appropriate. At this stage appropriate access to military intelligence material may be of particular relevance to DFID staff. The DFID humanitarian assessment will include 4 main topics:⁴

- a. Whether to intervene.
- b. The nature and scale of the intervention.
- c. Prioritisation and allocation of resources.
- d. Programme design and planning.

305. **Information Requirements.** A detailed guide to the information necessary for a humanitarian assessment is at Annex C. The topics for consideration include:

- a. General Information, including disaster type, secondary hazards, weather and climate, and area affected.
- b. Population Affected.
- c. Public Health.
- d. Shelter.
- e. Water and Sanitation.
- f. Transport.
- g. Infrastructure.
- h. Food.
- i. Power Supply.
- j. Communications.
- k. Search and Rescue.
- l. Law and Order, including Force Protection issues.
- m. Initial Responses.

⁴ 'Humanitarian Needs Assessment and Decision-making', Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute.

306. **Assessment Factors.** At the core of humanitarian relief are the priorities of saving lives, reducing suffering and protecting dignity. Factors contributing to an accurate assessment include:

- a. **Distinguishing between Emergency and Chronic Needs.** Most developing countries have long-standing chronic needs in most, if not all sectors. Assessment teams must differentiate between what is normal for the location and what is occurring as a result of the disaster, so that the relief effort can be directed to those most in need. It is not within the scope of disaster relief to address chronic needs.
- b. **Timeliness.** A balance must be struck between the need for in-depth assessments to adequately inform decision-making and rapid assessment to initiate the response (see paragraph 315 ‘Force Generation’).
- c. **Coordination.** It is important that the DFID assessments are conducted with reference to the assessment activities of other humanitarian actors, so that the lead authority can prioritise across the whole relief response. In practice, the timely collation and analysis of information remains one of the biggest challenges in humanitarian response, particularly where disasters have disrupted Host Nation (HN) communication infrastructures. Normally, the UN-led cluster system will be established and the cluster leads will centralise information (see paragraph 224b).
- d. **Description of Need.** DFID should ensure that assessment data is quantified and relevant to humanitarian priorities, as this data will form the baseline against which progress is measured. Wherever possible DFID will describe needs using objective standards, such as the Sphere Standards.⁵ The Sphere Standards are a set of universal minimum humanitarian standards covering such themes as water, sanitation and hygiene, nutrition, shelter and health services, and which aim to increase the effectiveness of humanitarian relief and make humanitarian agencies more accountable.
- e. **Needs and Vulnerabilities.** The humanitarian community refers to ‘needs, vulnerabilities and coping capacities’. ‘Needs’ are immediate requirements for survival (food, water, shelter, and medical) and are assessed after an incident has occurred. ‘Vulnerabilities’ are potential threats and factors that increase the risks to a population. Vulnerabilities can be assessed both before and during an emergency and are expressed in terms of their origins (physical/material, social/organisational or motivational/attitudinal).

⁵ The standards can be accessed at <http://www.sphereproject.org>

f. **Coping Capacities.** The means and resources that the affected population can mobilise to address their own needs and vulnerabilities are referred to as ‘Capacities’. An accurate assessment of needs and vulnerabilities against coping capacities provides a way of:

- (1) Preventing an escalation of the emergency in which today’s vulnerabilities become tomorrow’s needs.
- (2) Targeting assistance to the most vulnerable groups.
- (3) Effecting a sustainable recovery based on local resources and institutions.

307. **Field Assessment.** Following the initial assessment, a DFID team may conduct a field assessment. If the initial DFID humanitarian assessment determines that military support is likely, then DFID should request formal Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) participation in order to facilitate timely support. PJHQ may dispatch an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) from the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) at the request of DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) or independently as a contingency measure, to provide ground truth. Ideally, a joint-Departmental reconnaissance team should be formed, benefiting from the subject matter expertise held within the Departments and from the access to the secure communications available to the OLRT. A useful contact for military to military information, particularly in advance of deployment of an OLRT, will be the Defence Attaché of the stricken countries’ embassy/consulate if present in London.

Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team



Meeting a capability requirement identified by a deployed OLRT, a RAF C-17 delivers relief equipment to Bandeh Aceh, Indonesia

Following the tsunami which devastated areas of South East Asia on 26 December 2004, OLRTs deployed to Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Thailand as part of Operation GARRON. The OLRTs working alongside DFID field teams provided timely and pragmatic feedback from in-theatre and ensured a coherent articulation of requirement, while helping to manage the expectations of Whitehall, public, media and Host Nation.

Interaction and cooperation between the OLRT, DFID and FCO personnel in-theatre helped reinforce the MOD's supporting role by ensuring that the purpose and scope of UK military actions were understood by all involved.

308. **Military Intelligence Liaison Officer.** PJHQ may request the deployment of a Military Intelligence Liaison Officer (MILO) to provide an additional information gathering source in country. MILO's are trained as Defence Attachés and can provide assistance to the HM Representative and, if present, the resident Defence Attaché. MILOs may be granted temporary diplomatic status.

309. **Media Profile.** In order to avoid raising public expectations about a military response, PJHQ J9 should ensure that military involvement within the disaster assessment process is carried out with a low media profile, and coordinated with DFID, who when acting as lead Department is responsible for setting the media strategy. While media interest should not be allowed to directly influence military analysis and planning, and planners should not assume a military contribution during initial planning, commanders and planners must, nevertheless, be prepared for media influence and remain flexible.

SECTION II – PLANNING

310. **Contingency Planning.** The Ministry of Defence (MOD) determines UK contingency planning for military involvement in DROs, in consultation with the FCO and DFID. Plans may be drawn from one or more of the following:

a. **Civil Plans.**

(1) **Post Emergency and Civil Contingency Plans.** All diplomatic missions have a generic Post Emergency Plan (PEP) that provide staff instructions for the response to a disaster or major incident involving UK Eligible Persons (UKEPs). PEPs may be supplemented with annexes for specific natural disasters to which a nation may be prone. Some Missions in countries that may face risks leading to an evacuation of

UKEPs will also hold a Civil Contingency Plan (CCP) for the conduct of an evacuation (see paragraph 210).⁶

(2) **National Disaster Management Plan.** Many countries and regions where the risk of natural disaster is high have established planning cells which routinely exercise responses to a disaster. These cells may be developed into a ministry or agency, supported by UN and DFID funding to build an indigenous capacity to prevent or mitigate the effects of disaster. Ideally, the ministry or agency should be capable of providing warning and reporting for a disaster and the focal point for the international response.

Mozambique National Disaster Preparedness



Mozambique Floods in 2001

Mozambique, as a country vulnerable to natural disasters, had developed and exercised national disaster plans which were implemented in the aftermath of the 2001 flooding, following Cyclones CONNIE and ELINE. An example of the level of detail of this planning and preparedness was the use of local flying clubs to identify stretches of roads that could be used as emergency landing strips. In the event, one stretch of pre-identified road was converted into a runway, at the cost of \$300 and 20 litres of white paint, receiving almost 3000 relief flights by light aircraft and helicopters during the operation.

⁶ See Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-51 'Non-combatant Evacuation Operations' (NEO).

b. **Military Plans.**⁷ PJHQ prepare and update Military Contingency Plans on formal direction from MOD. The detail contained in the plan will vary with the likelihood of its use and its update cycle. In increasing level of detail, the 2 types of plan are:

(1) **Joint Planning Guides.** Joint Planning Guides (JPGs) contain general planning data for a particular region, country or type of operation, such as DRO or Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), which can be used as the basis for more detailed planning during an emerging crisis.

(2) **Joint Contingency Plans.** Joint Contingency Plans (JCPs) will be prepared for specific situations where there is a likelihood of a crisis or problem which might affect UK interests, or when the anticipated warning time is reduced. In addition to planning data, JCPs contain the UK's strategic objectives and desired end-state, together with the force capabilities required and deployment options, including readiness states where appropriate. PJHQ will refine the JCP prior to implementation to take account of the situation as a crisis develops.

311. **Intelligence Publications.** Civil and military plans are supported by Defence Profiles (DPs) and Infrastructure Briefing Memoranda (IBM), prepared and updated by the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). The DP includes military intelligence information, including local force composition and capability, whilst the IBM provides data such as climate, topography and civil infrastructure. Additionally, the Intelligence Collection Group (ICG), part of the DIS, may be able to provide geospatial products including mapping and Geographic Research Information Papers and can be tasked to provide specific products, for example lines of communication status or extent of flooding.

312. **The Defence Crisis Management Organisation.** The MOD Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) process applies to DRO as it does to other operations. Although the overall planning process is sequential, much of the activity occurs concurrently as an iterative process that can be compressed to address the scale and urgency of the situation. The process is outlined below:⁸

a. As indications of a developing crisis emerge, analysis at Government Department level takes place. Within MOD the Chiefs of Staff (COS) Committee directs the formation of a Current Operations Group (COG) or a Strategic Planning Group (SPG). In practice, the duty Director of Operations (DOps) will normally initiate the COG or SPG and will assess the need to brief

⁷ See JDP 5-00, 2nd Edition.

⁸ A full explanation is in JDP 5-00, 2nd Edition.

the COS Committee. A SPG may also be formed at the discretion of the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments) (DCDS(C)). The life-span of the SPG and the periodicity of its meetings will be governed by the situation. It will inevitably be bespoke, its remit and exact composition being dependent on the scale and nature of a crisis. The SPG conducts a Political/Military Estimate (PME) in consultation with Other Government Departments (OGDs) as a basis for informing the Political Strategic Assessment (PSA) across Government. The PSA is a cross-government process and is not the sole responsibility of any single department but will be formed from a number of contributions. It seeks to facilitate a definition of UK's national intent in addressing a crisis situation. This analysis will also provide initial strategic planning guidance to the Joint Commander (Jt Comd), usually Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) at PJHQ, issued as a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Planning Directive. A Joint Force Commander (JFC) may begin to plan based upon the receipt of a Warning Order or inferred, rather than explicit, direction to expedite the process through concurrent activity.

b. Once agreement on the principle of UK military involvement has been reached, PJHQ (supported by MOD staff, Front Line Commands (FLCs) and DFID) will conduct a Military Strategic Estimate (MSE). The output of the MSE forms the basis of detailed advice to Ministers on the military options available, the nature and scale of forces required, the implications and likely costs, and a recommended course of action.

c. Once Ministers have approved the preferred option, CDS issues his Directive to the Jt Comd. This should include Command and Control (C2) arrangements, Joint Operations Area (JOA) and resources required. While CJO has responsibility for the deployment, sustainment and recovery of the force, a deployed Operational Level Commander, usually the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), will have responsibility for C2 of forces in theatre. The JTFC will conduct an Operational Estimate. The output of this planning is issued to subordinates as a set of directives, orders and plans.

Current Operations Group

The Directorate of Operational Capability's '*Operational Lessons Report*' for Operation MATURIN recommended that the COG should convene for all operations, regardless of nature and scale, to ensure coherence across Defence and to support the Comprehensive Approach. This is now mandated within DCMO Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

313. **Preparatory Actions.** During the estimate process, deductions may emerge which require action in advance of a formal directive, such as the procurement of shipping and airlift, the tasking of air or space reconnaissance and the deployment of liaison teams. Such preparatory actions need careful consideration as they may have political, financial, security and presentational implications, may impact on overall capability or indicate a premature level of commitment and thereby unnecessarily raise expectations of military participation in support of disaster relief efforts. However, where appropriate, preparatory actions may be essential to ensure an expeditious and effective response.

SECTION III – PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

314. The key planning considerations for DROs are described below. In addition, Annex D provides a checklist for the planning and conduct of a DRO. This framework may be used to facilitate the dialogue between humanitarian organisations and military forces that must precede support to any disaster relief effort. There is significant overlap between Annexes C (DFID format) and D (MOD format), and both guides should be used in parallel to inform a comprehensive military analysis.

315. **Force Generation.** One advantage of the military is the ability to deploy some elements relatively quickly. Forces will normally be drawn from those assigned to the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) which incorporates maritime, land, air and logistic forces held at Notice to Move (NTM) ranging from 24 hours to 30 days. Additionally, there may be discrete capabilities that can make a significant impact in the disaster situation at minimal expense. Military planners should bring these capabilities and the Warning Time required for the Joint Task Force (JTF) to the attention of DFID at the earliest opportunity. The Warning Time is the period before the JTF is ready to conduct operations and consists of the decision, readiness, deployment and in-theatre preparation times.⁹ The information received from a timely use of reconnaissance assets may have direct impact on force generation and could in some circumstances obviate the need for the deployment of a larger force.

316. **Notice to Move.** MOD promulgates NTM for all military assets. Some elements may generate capacity to fulfil a DRO role ahead of declared NTM. Early ministerial agreement to a reduction of NTM, redeployment of assets, sailing of ships and the recovery of aircraft may be essential for the timely support to the international disaster response effort. The cost implications of this should be considered early and the cross-Departmental financial arrangements agreed.

317. **Budgetary Constraints.** DFID funding for humanitarian operations is governed by legal constraints in the form of the International Development Act 2002. Funding is based on the provision of a capability to meet humanitarian needs. The

⁹ See JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition '*Campaign Execution*' - programmed for promulgation in 2008.

budget for the force will therefore be restricted to that which is strictly necessary. Hence, force generation will need to be carefully managed to ensure that no superfluous capacity is included (see paragraphs 214-217).

318. **Legal Issues.** Legal factors that might arise during the operation should be identified and addressed during the planning phase. For example, in addition to the legal basis for the operation and rules governing the use of force and arrangements for the physical safety and protection of UK forces, there may also arise contractual, duty of care and related liability issues. Timely advice and advance planning can reduce the associated risk (see paragraphs 218-222).

319. **Sustainability.** Host-nation Support (HNS) to deployed forces must not undermine the state's own ability to cope with the emergency. Therefore, a deployed force may have to be self-sufficient or seek alternative sources of support. PJHQ should determine the extent of HNS at an early stage, as this will influence the size and make-up of the deployed force. Furthermore, DFID and PJHQ must ensure that the HN is fully engaged and not marginalised in the planning process. Competition for resources, deconfliction and cooperation with the relief responses of other nations and organisations will be important considerations during planning.

320. **Multifunctional Issues.** Depending on the capacity of the stricken state's coping mechanism and the degree of humanitarian coordination, it may be necessary for the JTFC to establish direct liaison in separate areas of government, including local security forces, airspace control and port authorities, as well as with individual centres of humanitarian coordination and other nations' military forces. However, wherever possible, coordination should be done through DFID and the international system, normally headed by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) or UN OCHA.

321. **Communications.** Successful integration will hinge on good communication. While operational security will not normally be paramount in permissive operations and the majority of information will be from public source, there may be a need to pass sensitive data, particularly in less stable conditions. In addition to military communications, there will be a critical need to communicate with the civilian sector in order to achieve integrated support to the relief effort. PJHQ should not rely on commercial bearers, particularly within the stricken state, as the primary means of communication. PJHQ will coordinate the identification and provision of military communications in support of DROs, supported by the FLCs.

322. **Influence Activities.**¹⁰ The majority of Influence Activities conducted in support of a DRO will be conducted at Government level, in order to promote the assistance and acquiescence of neighbouring and other participating nations in the

¹⁰ See JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition – programmed for promulgation in 2008.

disaster area. Influence Activities in theatre will be focused on Information and Media Operations, and Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) aimed at keeping the local population informed, eliciting the assistance and cooperation of other actors, and promoting the UK military contribution as a 'force for good'. The Operations Support representative in the OLRT should be prepared to carry out basic Target Audience Analysis during the initial reconnaissance, in the context of the UK's support to the HN and the wider relief effort. Influence Activities should be included in the operational planning from the outset and include the following considerations:

- a. Reassurance of the local population that the situation is under control, while ensuring that the national authorities can take the appropriate level of credit.
- b. Reassurance of the local population that military intervention does not have hostile intent.
- c. Encouragement of regional cooperation and involvement in reconstruction efforts.
- d. Dissuasion of criminal or destabilising activity, for example looting or political opportunism.
- e. Delivery of relief activities information to news media to promote understanding and support for the military operations, within the context of the civilian led relief effort.
- f. Coordination of Influence Activities with other participating relief-delivering nations and organisations.
- g. Preparing Target Audiences to accept the exit strategy.
- h. Participation of CIMIC and Media Operations staff in engaging and liaising with OGDs, media, local authorities, International Organisations (IOs), and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

323. **National Information Strategy.** The National Information Strategy, formulated by the cross-Government Information Strategy Group, must consider the points of view of the stricken state or regional population, of the international community, and of the UK domestic audience. All involved Departments, including the Cabinet Office, should agree media lines that set out the Government's policy on the disaster response; in most cases, DFID will lead this process, unless there are specific aspects of UK interest which dictate a Cabinet Office lead. Regular inter-Departmental contact and dissemination of these lines throughout the chain of command will be necessary to ensure that a coherent message is communicated to the

media. In particular, experience has shown that MOD and DFID respective funding responsibilities can be misreported as a source of tension between Departments. Therefore, the financial charging regime should be made clear to the media. DROs are dynamic and agreed media lines will need to evolve with the operation to enable personnel to react appropriately. Changes to media lines will also need to be communicated. Notwithstanding this, the lead Department, normally DFID, must clear other Department's press statements before release.

Media Reporting of Funding Issues

In February 2000, Cyclones CONNIE and ELINE resulted in catastrophic flooding in Mozambique. DFID initially chartered 5 helicopters in the region and subsequently requested additional MOD resources, including 4 RAF Puma helicopters and RFA FORT GEORGE with Sea King helicopters. However, the deployment was carried out under the shadow of media criticism due to confusion over inter-Departmental funding mechanisms. Newspaper headlines such as '*Political disputes mar military rescue response*', '*Whitehall feud put off helicopter relief*' and '*Mozambique aid hit by rows*' may have been avoided had the financial charging regime been clarified between Departments and briefed to the media as part of a cross-Government Information Strategy.

324. **Transition and Termination.** Commanders should formulate a transition and termination plan¹¹ early. Ideally, this should be based on the humanitarian gap, namely the difference between humanitarian emergency/disaster needs and the relief resources available to meet them, and should take into account the rate at which the shortfall is being ameliorated. The termination criteria may be expressed as a date estimated from progress towards bridging the humanitarian gap or the achievement of certain criteria. However, the transition and termination plan will need to be reassessed as the operation progresses, taking account of international expectations and the damage that a perceived premature withdrawal could cause to the UK's reputation. MOD and DFID will need to consider funding and concurrency issues should an extension to the operation be proposed.

SECTION IV – MILITARY CAPABILITIES

325. **Effects and Capabilities.** The composition of a JTF will depend on the available assets to meet the required effects identified. To achieve these effects a range of military capabilities with potential DRO utility are listed at Annex E and include:

¹¹ See JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition - programmed for promulgation in 2008. The transition and termination plan was previously known as the exit strategy.

- a. Air, land or sea survey/assessment, including geospatial information.
- b. Movement of relief items, personnel or equipment supplied by donor countries to the stricken state. Given the time imperative the military contribution will in many instances involve strategic airlift.
- c. Movement of relief items, personnel or equipment into or around the affected area.
- d. Search and Rescue.
- e. Emergency support or repairs to vital infrastructure, including emergency bridging capability.
- f. Advice on logistics or service provision.
- g. Specialist equipment or capabilities in logistics, maritime or air safety, engineering, etc.
- h. Additional capacity in planning, management or organisational skills.
- i. Emergency medical treatment for victims and casualty evacuation.
- j. Communications support and links, including strategic and secure communications.
- k. Coherent and Coordinated Media/Information Operations.
- l. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities which may have utility in building a picture of the disaster's extent and in the location of survivors.
- m. Intelligence and Threat advice.
- n. Life Support to OGDs in the field.

326. **Specialist Personnel.** There are a number of specialist personnel and niche capabilities which may have particular value in DROs and where relevant should be drawn to the attention of DFID at the earliest opportunity. These include the following (this list is not exhaustive and is for illustrative purposes):

- a. **Engineering Troops.** Including Geospatial Teams to aid analysis and assessment, and Specialist Trained Royal Engineers (STRE) including water and electricity specialists.

- b. **Medical Staff.** Including Aeromedical Teams from Tactical Medical Wing, specialising in the movement of patients by air, and Environmental Health Technicians.
- c. **CIMIC Staff.** Joint CIMIC Group (JCG) hold a lead staff officer in support of JFHQ and a CIMIC Support Team in support of JRRF, on very high readiness.
- d. **Joint Media Operations Teams.** Joint Media Operations Teams (JMOTs) from the Defence Media Operations Centre (DMOC) can deploy and run a Press Information Centre and provide stills and broadcast-quality video.
- e. **Logistical Planning Staff.** For example, may be offered to augment UN Joint Logistic Centre Staff.
- f. **Air Movements Personnel.** Personnel from 1 Air Movements Wing,¹² specialise in the loading and unloading of personnel and freight from the RAF Air Transport Fleet.
- g. **Helicopter Support Teams.** Mobile Air Operations Teams (MAOTs) provide the reconnaissance for, and support the establishment and operation of helicopter landing sites. Joint Helicopter Support Unit (JHSU) specialise in helicopter handling and underslung load operations.
- h. **Specialist Communications Personnel.** Including the provision of secure strategic communications.

Specialist Personnel and Niche Capabilities

During Operation MATURIN, some niche military capabilities were offered, through DFID, in response to specific UN requests for support. Four UK military logisticians worked in the UN Joint Logistics Centre, helping to provide a Recognised Humanitarian Picture and synchronisation matrix that informed situational awareness and planning. A 2-man MAOT, deployed in response to a request from the UN Humanitarian Air Service, providing a detailed survey and report for proposed helicopter landing sites, including a major hub capable of handling up to 40 UN chartered helicopters.

In the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami, 4 RAF dentists, trained as forensic odontologists deployed to Thailand to assist in body identification.

¹² Previously, UK Mobile Air Movements (UK MAMs).

307. **Cultural, Historical and Political Considerations.** In matching resources to effects it is necessary to consider cultural, historical and political implications. HN Defence Attachés in London, or members of the relevant diaspora may be useful sources to provide comment and advise on local perceptions and potential reactions.

Cultural, Historical and Political Considerations

In 1997, the UK Government's offer of a Canberra reconnaissance aircraft to identify the seat of forest fires, which were sweeping across Borneo, was turned down by the Indonesian Government. There was speculation that this was due to the political sensitivities of inviting such an asset into sovereign airspace.



The aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami

Following the 2004 Tsunami, the Indonesian Government once more turned down an offer of assistance from the UK Government, this time for a Company of Gurkhas. The Indonesian authorities expressed gratitude but said that it did not need more troops. The offer may have been culturally insensitive, due to the 4 year Borneo campaign during the 1960s, when Gurkhas fought Indonesians.

During Operation MATURIN a soundbite that the 'UK's involvement was a chivalrous act' was misinterpreted by some in the region as the genesis of a Christian crusade. Also the participation of 59 Independent Commando Squadron Royal Engineers was initially unwelcome locally, as in Pakistan the term 'Commando' is used to identify Special Forces.

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CHAPTER 4 – EXECUTION OF DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

401. **Disaster Response.** Disaster response has 3 principal stages:
- a. **Immediate Life Saving.** Search, Rescue and Medical First Aid.
 - b. **Relief Operations.** Life preserving relief operations such as the delivery of aid to prevent the situation deteriorating.
 - c. **Recovery.** Rehabilitation and reconstruction.

From the outset military planners must give consideration to the transition from the initial response to the relief and recovery phases. However, these stages are likely to overlap requiring a flexible response. Both the relief operations and recovery stages are likely to include work on preparedness to withstand future similar disasters. However, preparedness projects are unlikely to involve UK military personnel deployed on a Disaster Relief Operation (DRO).

Disaster Preparedness



HMS SCOTT

Although disaster preparedness projects are rarely undertaken by the UK military, there are exceptions. As part of Operation GARRON, HMS SCOTT, an ocean survey vessel, was tasked with the agreement of the Indonesian Government to undertake a survey of the seabed at the epicentre of the earthquake. This survey provided the 'base map' for future research to improve understanding of tsunamis.

SECTION I – MILITARY SUPPORT TO DISASTER RESPONSE

402. **Military Involvement in Disaster Response.** The military contribution to an international disaster relief effort can be split into 5 phases:

- a. Reconnaissance and assessment (military analysis).
- b. Mounting and deployment.
- c. Support to the relief efforts to meet basic needs.
- d. In extreme circumstances and if requested, restoration of stricken state capacity and infrastructure sufficient to enable the state to resume full responsibility.
- e. Transition and termination, including the collation of Post Operational Lessons.

403. **Scope of the Military Role.** Under all but exceptional circumstances, UK Forces will be deployed in a supporting role and will not assume leadership of the overall response. This does not preclude UK Forces supporting civil Command and Control (C2) or providing C2 infrastructure when necessary. However, wherever possible, maximum use of established infrastructure should be made in order to preclude UK Forces becoming a hub upon which other agencies become reliant, thereby creating dependency and making it more difficult to redeploy. The Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) will consult with the senior Department for International Development (DFID) representative to determine the effects required from military activities on the ground. Should circumstances require a substantial review of the envisaged operation or if significant extra costs are likely to be incurred, then the JTFC should seek guidance from DFID and Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ)/Ministry of Defence (MOD) in London.

404. **Deployment.** Appropriate air/sea platforms, possibly including civilian charter assets, will be required to deploy the force to and from the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Given the time imperative, this is most likely to be strategic airlift, particularly when forces are deployed from the UK.

405. **Mobility.** Mobility assets will be force multipliers, particularly air lift, helicopters and maritime assets;¹ the latter including ships for bulk transfer, amphibious units, small craft and hovercraft in littoral or riverine environments.

¹ There are occasions when the inherent capability of all ships to support humanitarian disaster relief efforts needs to be enhanced by the carriage of additional Emergency Relief Stores (ERS). There are 2 scales of ERS, large and small, and these are allocated to ships based on the operational requirement and perceived risk of disaster in the operating area. The point of contact for any queries relating to ERS is SO2 N4 Operational Logistics in CINCFLEET.

406. **Influence Activities.** Influence Activities, in the DRO context, can be described in 3 categories:

a. **Information Operations.** In disaster situations there may be the potential for underlying tensions to be exacerbated by the intervention of UK Forces and the Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP)² of a Joint Task Force (JTF) must be considered. To reduce this risk it is essential to communicate and repeat a clear and simple intent for the JTF which will ensure that the purpose of UK actions are understood by all involved including: the stricken state government; local population; humanitarian actors; and JTF personnel. The delivery of assistance must be, and be *perceived* to be, impartial. The impartial distribution of assistance, by needs criteria only, should enhance the perceived legitimacy of the deployed forces amongst the beneficiary population and humanitarian actors. Failure to act and be seen to act impartially is likely to impact adversely on the credibility, and perhaps security, of the wider relief effort.

Perceived Impartiality

During Operation BUSHEL, the DRO in response to famine in Ethiopia in 1984/85, the UK sought assurances that RAF Hercules aircraft would not be fired upon when dropping aid within an area largely controlled by the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF). The dire needs of the local population was the necessity for the airdrop, but the TPLF made safe passage conditional upon specific demands which, if accepted, would have damaged the perceived impartiality of the mission. The conditions were rejected and hence assurance of safe passage not received. The drops were carried out nonetheless, thankfully with no incident.

b. **Media Operations.** It is important that the military contribution to a disaster response is presented in the context of a comprehensive UK Government approach. Media handling in theatre should emphasise that UK military assets are present in support of other agencies responding to the relief effort. Media operations staff should consider the dignity of the stricken population at all times (see paragraphs 115, 309 and 323).

c. **Civil-Military Co-operation.** Effective Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) will be pivotal to the successful integration of civil and military elements. In large relief operations UN OCHA will deploy a Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCOORD) Cell, therefore there should be little or no need to establish separate CIMIC Centres. The key to successful cooperation and

² See Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-00, 3rd Edition '*Campaign Execution*' - programmed for promulgation in 2008.

coordination is for UK military operations centres to integrate into existing civil coordination infrastructure, enhancing the ability of leaders to prioritise, allocate, and undertake tasks, with a view to withdrawing military forces as soon as coping mechanisms have recovered. This will help to maintain unity of effort and preclude the inadvertent creation of a parallel military relief effort setting its own priorities.

407. **Do No Harm.** All involved in humanitarian interventions must be guided by the principal to do no harm. The JTFC, in consultation with DFID, should ensure that activities will not exacerbate any existing conflict or tensions, nor harm or endanger the beneficiaries of assistance, nor undermine other response mechanisms.

Unintended Consequences

Following an earthquake in Guatemala in 1976, US helicopters shuttled the injured to hospitals in the capital. Of over 700 evacuated, 70% were children. Few of the villagers knew where the children were being taken, complicated by the language barriers, and assumed the helicopters would bring the children back. Months later parents were still searching for their children in city hospitals. In Mozambique, Save the Children and the Red Cross helped reduce the problem by photographing children to help with the reuniting of families. Military personnel could aid this process at the point of pick up with a digital camera and a record sheet. Even in the United States (US) in 2005, it was months after Hurricane KATRINA had hit New Orleans that the last evacuated child was finally reunited with its parents.

SECTION II – COMMAND AND CONTROL

408. **Operational Chain of Command.**³ Once Ministers have authorised preparations for a Disaster Relief Operation (DRO), the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) will appoint a Joint Commander (Jt Comd), who will exercise Operational Command (OPCOM). This will normally be the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO), particularly when PJHQ is the operational Headquarters (HQ).⁴ However, there may be occasions when it is appropriate to give responsibility to a Front Line Command (FLC) Commander-in-Chief (CinC). The Jt Comd will then appoint a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), or National Contingent Commander (NCC) if it is a multinational operation, who will exercise Operational Control (OPCON) and will command forces allocated to the operation, normally from a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) deployed in the designated Joint Operations Area (JOA). The size and location of the JTFHQ will depend on the situation.

³ See JDP 01, 2nd Edition '*Campaigning*', and JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition - programmed for promulgation in 2008.

⁴ Within PJHQ the Joint Mounting Cell (JMC) is responsible for deploying, sustaining and recovering UK Joint Forces.

409. **Tactical Command.** Normally UK military support to the DFID disaster response effort will be of sufficiently small scale that the JTFC will elect to exercise direct command over assigned forces. However, there may be occasions when individual Components are required.

410. **Advance Force Command and Control.** Assigned UK Forces already deployed close to the disaster region prior to the initiation of a DRO should normally be placed under OPCON of the JTFC as soon as he has the capability to take command of them.

411. **Military Command and Control.** The Military C2 relationships for a DRO, where PJHQ has the MOD lead, is shown at Figure 4.1:




Figure 4.1 – Military C2 for a DRO: MOD lead with PJHQ

412. In certain circumstances, such as when DFID only require strategic sea or air transport or when a FLC has responsibility, the military tasking chain will shorten as shown at Figure 4.2. FLCs must keep PJHQ informed in case the requirement escalates and the commitment becomes a Joint Operation.




Figure 4.2 – Military C2 for a DRO: MOD lead with FLC

413. **Department for International Development Representative/Joint Task Force Commander Relationship.** The senior DFID representative will be responsible for passing advice to the JTFC on the provision of support to the DFID disaster response effort. Whenever possible, either the JTFC or his deputy should collocate with the senior DFID representative⁵ to ensure detailed coordination of the military input to the wider relief effort. However, the JTFC remains responsible for the execution of the UK military operation.

SECTION III – MONITORING AND EVALUATION

414. The monitoring and evaluation of the humanitarian response to a disaster, including the military contribution, is necessary to gauge the effectiveness of the relief effort in meeting victims' needs and to provide a baseline for progress. In military terms this is known as assessment.⁶ However, to avoid confusion with the civilian assessment process described in Chapter 3, it is described here as monitoring and evaluation.

415. **Standards.** Awareness of and adherence to consistent standards in response to humanitarian emergencies will increase effectiveness of the overall relief effort. Standards will simplify the task of evaluation, eliminate anomalies such as varying quality and quantity of humanitarian relief, and enable greater unity of effort and more efficient resource allocation. A set of minimum standards for the delivery of humanitarian relief exists in the form of the Sphere Standards (see paragraph 306d), which should be used as the basis for the provision of support to the relief effort, particularly if involved in the direct delivery of aid to a stricken population.

⁵ The senior DFID representative should have the appropriate security clearances.

⁶ See JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition - programmed for promulgation in 2008.

Minimum Standards: Temporary Camps



Refugee Camp in Macedonia, 1999

Temporary camps may appear to be an attractive option for the provision of shelter to the victims of a disaster. A camp brings economies of scale, a focus for logistical effort and simplified security. However, such concentrations may imply a solution with more help on the way, making a population passive, delaying agricultural recovery and reconstruction and with the risk of populations becoming dependent on aid, prolonging the relief effort. There may also be cultural issues, for example the disruption of social structures and even detailed issues such as the siting of female and male latrines. Additionally, camp environments may increase the risk of disease. The military should only be responsible for the construction and administration of temporary camps in extremis and the responsibility handed over to an appropriate civilian agency at the earliest opportunity. In anticipating this handover knowledge of the Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response⁷ is useful.

416. **Measurement of Activity and Effect.** The JTFC should ensure that Measurement of Activity (MOA) and Measurement of Effect (MOE) are agreed with DFID, where possible standardising reporting formats. Suitably crafted MOA/MOE can help to put a humanitarian emergency into perspective by comparing pre and post-disaster states. For example, changes in morbidity/mortality rates, if available, are good indicators of progress in relieving human suffering. The amount of water supplied to a refugee camp versus the total requirement, or the number of tents erected versus people without shelter, are good indicators of the sufficiency of support toward

⁷ The standards can be accessed at <http://www.sphereproject.org>

overall relief effort objectives. MOA/MOE may also expose emerging problems, permitting early decisions on when and where to shift effort during the iterative planning process. Against the military contribution alone the commander may wish to establish his own, supplemental, MOA/MOE to assist him in managing the military contribution. MOA/MOE can assist in establishing and assessing exit criteria and the JTFC should ensure that measurements are tied into campaign effectiveness assessment.⁸

⁸ The standards can be accessed at <http://www.sphereproject.org>

ANNEX A – SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENT BETWEEN DFID AND MOD REGARDING UK MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS¹ (DRO) FOLLOWING NATURAL OR MAN-MADE DISASTERS

Preamble

1. The use of military resources in DFID led humanitarian relief efforts can, deployed appropriately, make a valuable contribution after rapid-onset natural and man-made humanitarian disasters. Lessons identified from recent Disaster Relief Operations² (DRO) confirm the utility of an inter-departmental MOD/DFID framework to determine whether and how military resources or capabilities should be best used in such situations. This is to ensure that future deployments are as swift and effective as possible, and needs to be underpinned by ongoing relationship-building at all levels as advocated in the cross-Government Comprehensive Approach.
2. This Service Level Agreement (SLA)³ is concerned with national considerations, and not multilateral issues such as NATO or EU operations. Its principles apply anywhere in the world. It will be reviewed regularly every twelve months (see ‘Liaison’ below) but can be reviewed at any other time at the request of either department.

Humanitarian principles, and principles for the use of military resources

3. As the lead department on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief overseas, DFID is responsible for coordinating the UK Government’s humanitarian response to rapid-onset disasters. A humanitarian response may be undertaken by the UK Government when the affected population’s basic needs overwhelm the local authorities’ capacity to meet them and international assistance is sought. This is most often in poor or developing countries, although it can apply anywhere (e.g. in the U.S. hurricane Katrina).
4. All operations of this nature are therefore to be managed under a DFID policy lead and the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality,⁴ calling on military assistance from MOD when appropriate.

¹ A Disaster Relief Operation (DRO) is a Primary Military Task and contribution to disaster response. It provides specific assistance to an afflicted overseas population.

² And also identified in DOP(IT) (R)(04) 08.

³ A Service Level Agreement (SLA) is the correct terminology for an intra governmental agreement. This document replaces the earlier incorrectly termed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

⁴ JDP 3-52, 2nd Edition ‘Disaster Relief Operations’ - paragraph 105 & DFID’s Humanitarian Policy ‘Saving Lives, Relieving Suffering & Protecting Dignity’.

5. In most instances DFID policy will reflect the existing UN guidance,⁵ which makes clear that drawing on military capabilities for tasks with humanitarian objectives should be the exception. DFID will therefore not call upon military resources for every response⁶ but will use civilian assets whenever possible, in accordance with humanitarian principles and optimal cost-effectiveness. DFID will request UK military support where it will form a necessary component of DFID's response, for example when there is no civilian alternative, when the scale or urgency of the needs have overwhelmed the civilian response efforts, or when the military option is judged likely to lead to the greatest humanitarian effect. All military assets deployed as a result of DRO will only be used for that purpose.

Cross-Government Objectives

6. Past experience has shown that there may be instances when, in addition to humanitarian aims, HMG also has wider considerations (such as political, domestic, consular). In these instances, the Cabinet Office will convene a meeting of relevant Departments at an early stage and on a case by case basis, to discuss how to address these wider-ranging issues and communicate most effectively with relevant stakeholders.

7. The event of a natural disaster occurring in a UK Overseas Territory (OT) may be one such instance where DFID do not consider the situation sufficient to overwhelm local capacity but HMG nevertheless feels it has a duty to assist. In such instances the MOD will retain the capacity to act separately or at the request of other Government Departments.

8. Should the disaster affect both an OT and another DFID priority country concurrently, any resulting difficulties over prioritisation or allocation of HMG resources/effort will be referred to Cabinet Office or Ministers for resolution as quickly as possible.

Assessment and decision-making

9. Consideration of the use of military resources, whether for humanitarian or other purposes, should begin with an assessment of the desired effects and outcomes, before determining the specific assets or capability required to deliver them. This needs to be done as soon as possible and DFID will contact MOD at the earliest opportunity. In order to support consideration of the options for military support the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) agrees to have some of its key staff ready to move at short notice (normally within 24 hours) at DFID's request, either to be liaison

⁵ UN OSLO Guidelines (May 1994) & IASC Reference Paper (Jun 2004).

⁶ In the first instance, the relevant Policy and Defence Relations (PDR) geographical desk would take the lead within the MOD but, depending on the scale of the disaster or likelihood of committing future military effect, the lead for co-ordinating a MOD response may pass from PDR to the Directorate of Joint Commitments (DJC) and/or Directorate of Strategic Plans (DSP); PDR will remain as the MOD country experts.

officers in DFID and/or to travel to the affected region to work with DFID's representatives (typically the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE)). In this case they will form part of the DFID deployment, would wear civilian clothes (unless it would be more beneficial to wear military uniform as may be the case in some countries or in some circumstances) and will normally follow DFID operating procedures and security regulations in conjunction with normal MOD operating procedures. Overall 'command' of the individual(s) would be retained by the MOD and their deployment would need to be approved by MOD Ministers on the basis of a request from DFID.

10. Any military representation should be low-profile at this stage so as not to create any expectation of military involvement, although it will be important to make sufficient declaration of their presence to the host nation. No assumption should be made at this stage that there should or will be a military contribution. Any deployment into country will rather seek to ensure a swift and effective contribution should military assistance prove appropriate and necessary.

11. The assessments and advice which are sent back to UK by the joint team in theatre should adhere to a timetable set by the terms of reference of the mission and should aim to reflect agreement about whether the use of military resources will be appropriate. If there is a difference of opinion the decision will be referred to DFID (CHASE or others as appropriate) and MOD (normally DJC).⁷ Any deployment which will incur a cost must be requested and approved by DFID.

12. Any decision to request the deployment of military capabilities will take into account appropriateness, feasibility, the implications for the civilian population and agencies, the security situation and the cost-effectiveness of using military rather than civilian assets.

13. Given that all military assets work within particular readiness criteria DFID will provide MOD with as much advance warning of a request for assistance as possible, even before the requirement for military involvement is confirmed.

Liaison mechanisms

14. Strong communications and information-sharing will be necessary. Aide-memoirs accompanying this arrangement give details of key individuals in DFID and MOD who should be copied in on any key documents, as well as of organisational structures in HMG and international bodies. The Battle Rhythm or frequency of meetings will be determined at the start of any operation, though it is likely that initially these will be at least daily and will involve video-conferences with key players from DFID, MOD, FCO, PJHQ (and others as appropriate), as well as the temporary exchange of Liaison Officers.

⁷ Or relevant PDR desk if, unusually, DJC do not have the MOD lead at that juncture.

15. DFID teams in theatre will liaise closely with any military units, which may include a Military Intelligence Liaison Officer (MILO)⁸ or an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT),⁹ if they have been deployed in support of a DFID operation. To this end, communications should be declassified as much as possible in order to facilitate information sharing at all levels.

16. MOD and DFID will also meet at regular intervals to provide briefings to new staff on each side, update on any developments, and review existing arrangements and aide-memoirs. Joint Civ/Mil training, exercising and liaison is encouraged at all levels in support of collaborative cross governmental working and understanding.

Types of effects which DFID might request

17. These include:

- a. Air, Land or sea survey/assessment, including geospatial information.
- b. Movement of relief items, personnel or equipment supplied by donor countries to the stricken state. Given the time imperative the military contribution is likely to be strategic airlift.
- c. Movement of relief items, personnel or equipment into or around the affected area.
- d. Search and rescue.
- e. Emergency support or repairs to vital infrastructure, including emergency bridging capability.
- f. Advice on logistics or service provision.
- g. Specialist equipment or capabilities in logistics, maritime or air safety, engineering etc.
- h. Additional capacity in planning, management or organisational skills.
- i. Emergency medical treatment for victims and casualty evacuation.
- j. Communications support and links.

⁸ Military Intelligence Liaison Officer (MILO): a trained Defence Attaché, normally on short-notice to move, who is able to provide assistance to HM Rep and possibly granted temporary diplomatic status. No formal FCO request to MOD is required.

⁹ Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT): a small military trained team to gather specialist information, to inform the planning process, formulate joint / military options and keep HM Rep abreast of current military thinking and planning.

- k. Coherent and coordinated media/information operations.
- l. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities which may have utility in building a picture of the disaster's extent and location of survivors.
- m. Intelligence and Threat advice.
- n. Life support to Other Government Departments (OGDs) in the field.

Examples of assets which have been or could be used¹⁰

18. These include:
- a. Airlift (Inter and Intra Theatre, Fixed and Rotary Wing).
 - b. Royal Naval warships and auxiliaries.
 - c. OLRT or MILO teams.
 - d. Engineering Troops including Geospatial Teams to aid analysis and assessment, and Specialist Trained Royal Engineers (STRE) including water and electricity specialists.
 - e. Medical Staff including Aeromedical Teams from Tactical Medical Wing, specialising in the movement of patients by air and Environmental Health technicians.
 - f. CIMIC Staff, Joint CIMIC Group (JCG) has a lead staff officer in support of JFHQ and a CIMIC Support Team in support of JRRF, on very high readiness.
 - g. Joint Media Operations Teams (JMOTs) from the Defence Media Operations Centre (DMOC). JMOTs can deploy and run a Press Information Centre and provide stills and broadcast quality video.
 - h. Logistical Planning Staff.
 - i. Air Movements personnel from 1 Air Movements Wing, who specialise in the loading and unloading of personnel and freight from the RAF Air Transport Fleet.
 - j. Mobile Air Operations Teams (MAOTs) for the reconnaissance, establishment and operation of helicopters landing sites and Joint Helicopter

¹⁰ This is for illustrative purposes. In practice, the provision of MOD resources will be effects-driven.

Support Unit (JHSU) who specialise in helicopter handling and underslung load operations.

- k. Specialist communications personnel.

Military constraints

19. If DFID specifies a requirement for military assistance MOD will make every effort to respond. However, the following constraints should be borne in mind.

- a. Any contribution will depend on the availability of assets or staff, which cannot be guaranteed, and will need to be weighed against other priorities at the time (including current and planned commitments, NATO Reaction Force (NRF) allocations and so on). Unless political direction is received to do otherwise, the MOD will assess capabilities that might be made available in line with the emphasis that provision of capability should not have a direct impact on current and future operations.
- b. MOD will retain the right to withdraw assets or staff from the operation to conduct more urgent UK military operations.
- c. Any military assets involved will be commanded and operated by UK military personnel. Military commanders in charge of assets used will retain the right to accept or refuse any tasking for reasons of safety or security.
- d. Force Protection, including carriage of weapons, will need to be considered before forces are deployed, as part of the MOD's duty of care.
- e. Military personnel will normally wear uniform for easy identification except when attached to the DFID team or another direct secondment (where civilian clothing should be the norm).
- f. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) / Bilateral MOU will need to be established by FCO/MOD with the Host Nation Government as soon as possible to avoid any delays or hindrance with the deployment of military personnel.
- g. Any military deployment is dependent on Ministerial approval.

20. The FCO holds overall political responsibility for engagement with other nations and should therefore be consulted on the issue of appropriateness of UK military deployment in-country and in order to obtain political approval for the MOD to deploy any UK military capabilities to other nation states, including the stricken state.

Process for MOD to approve deployments

21. The following steps will be necessary for military deployments, over and above initial PJHQ liaison team, to get underway:

- a. Foreign Posts, DFID (normally CHASE, ACHU - Africa, Conflict and Humanitarian Unit) or in-country advisers and PJHQ LOs make early assessment in theatre of desired ends/needs.
- b. In case of a request for military assistance from DFID, PJHQ Liaison Officers feed assessment back to PJHQ Contingency Planning Team to determine potential solutions, availability of assets, impact statements and estimation of costs for differing courses of action. It will also be important jointly to consider coordination mechanisms and transition strategies at this stage, since it is likely that DFID would remain in the disaster area longer than any military resources.
- c. DJC consult PJHQ, Front Line Commands (FLCs), OGDs, and others in MOD and submit advice to MOD Ministers. Where appropriate, the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) procedure should be followed.
- d. If approval from MOD Ministers is received MOD makes a formal offer of a contribution to DFID ('cc' FCO). On receipt of DFID's acceptance of this offer MOD will resource the deployment (deploy, sustain, recover), usually under PJHQ command.
- e. MOD/DFID intent throughout will be on speed of response and both parties will move as fast as process allows. In cases of extreme urgency flexibility in the bureaucratic process can be agreed, on a case by case basis, in order not to delay a life-saving response.

Finance

22. DFID, as lead Government department, will fund the UK's contribution to disaster operations and will agree in advance to reimburse MOD's costs, including those associated with reconnaissance visits. It is MOD repayment policy to seek full cost recovery in accordance with HM Treasury guidelines.¹¹ However, when military assistance is provided in respect of disaster relief operations MOD will recover marginal costs where DFID has first investigated that the use of military resources is the only viable or effective solution.

23. To aid planning only, MOD will advise DFID of its estimated figure for costs before the deployment begins and will track costs incurred in theatre as far as possible

¹¹ 'The Fees and Charges Guide' HM Treasury.

during the operation. DFID will, however, reimburse MOD's actual marginal costs, and MOD will aim to present its final invoice to DFID not later than three calendar months after the recovery from the deployment. If, during the course of the operation, a significant variation in cost is indicated, DFID is to be advised without delay. In the unlikely event that the deployment is over an extended period (>6 months), it may be preferred by DFID to receive claims for reimbursement on a quarterly basis.

24. Marginal costs are defined as the net additional costs which would not have been incurred had the activity/operation not taken place and might include, but are not limited to:

- a. Travel (including vehicle hire), accommodation, catering and allowances for all personnel.
- b. Material and consumable items.
- c. Equipment which has to be left in place, or which DFID asks (and MOD agrees) to be donated.
- d. Fuel, oil and lubricants.
- e. Repairs and a contribution to minor servicing and support costs of aircraft and other capital assets used.
- f. Overtime, where applicable, for civilian staff.
- g. Pay and allowances for any military reservists or civilian agency staff engaged due to an operation (e.g. possibly for backfilling).
- h. There may also be costs associated with reducing the notice to move of assets in anticipation of a potential deployment.

25. Cost recovery for the MOD in situations where humanitarian need is not the primary reason for intervention, and military support has not been requested by DFID (but rather by another Department), will be dealt with in a separate agreement with that Department. This should be established at the first Cabinet Office briefing in advance of any deployment of military resource.

Press and Public Relations

26. DFID will set the overall communication strategy in consultation with the MOD's Director General Media and Communications (DGMC), Cabinet Office and FCO. A single document of lines to take managed by DFID Press Office will be produced and include not only the over-arching lines to take but also department-specific lines where appropriate (this is in lieu of any individual department's briefing material and will help to ensure message consistency and avoid message deviation).

This document should be disseminated down the chain of command to those in the field. The various Departments' press offices should coordinate press dissemination and keep key operational contacts informed.

27. DFID Press Office should be consulted and copied into any media handling advice/orders; additional press lines and statements. DFID will also coordinate, produce and disseminate a regular public information bulletin on the operation's progress on behalf of HMG. This will include DFID's activities and those of other Government Departments, including the MOD where appropriate. Depending on the scale of the response, DFID and/or MOD may wish to send media professionals to the field. In this case close coordination will be required under the overall guidance of the DFID media strategy (agreed with DGMC).

28. Should DFID seek media operations support in the field (media handlers/ media material production, etc) then DFID may request the support of a Joint Media Operations Team (JMOT) which would then be tasked by DFID Press Office through DGMC and liaise with the DFID Press Officer/spokesperson in the field.

Disputes

29. Any disagreement/dispute that cannot be solved locally (in the field) will be referred through the command chain to DFID (normally CHASE) and PJHQ or MOD's Directorate Joint Commitments (DJC) as appropriate to the operation for resolution by negotiation.

General

30. This Arrangement will come into effect on the date of last signature.

31. Amendments may be made to this Arrangement if accepted, in writing, by MOD and DFID.

Jon Day (for MOD)

Jim Drummond (for DFID)


June 2008

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MOD



OUT OF WORKING HOURS



ANNEX B – TYPES OF DISASTER

Some common disaster types are listed below. This list is not exhaustive, but is illustrative to aid planning and decision making:

1. **GEOLOGICAL:** Earthquake, Landslide, Tsunami and Volcanic Eruption.
2. **CLIMATIC:** Drought, Flood, Tropical Cyclone/Hurricane and Wildfire.
3. **MAN-MADE:** Chemical and Industrial Accident.
4. **SECONDARY EFFECTS:** Mass Population Movement (caused by Geological, Climatic, Man-Made Disasters or Conflict).

GEOLOGICAL HAZARDS

| | Factors Contributing to Vulnerability | Typical Adverse Effects | Typical Needs Post-Disaster Onset |
|-------------------|--|---|---|
| Earthquake | a. Location of settlements in seismic areas. b. Rigid structures not resistant to ground motion. c. Dense collections of buildings with high occupancy. | a. Casualties – often high, particularly near epicentre or in highly populated areas. Fracture injuries most widespread problem. Secondary threats of communicable diseases due to flooding, contaminated water supply, or breakdown in sanitary conditions. b. Physical Damage – damage to key structures and infrastructure. c. Water Supply – severe problems likely due to damage to water systems. | a. Search and rescue. b. Medical assistance. c. Disaster assessment. d. Provision of food, water and shelter. e. Repair and reconstruction. |
| Landslide | a. Settlements built on steep slopes, soft soils and cliff tops. b. Settlements built at the base of steep slopes and on mouths of streams from mountain valleys. | a. Casualties – fatalities or injuries due to landslide. b. Physical Damage – anything on top of or in the path of landslide will suffer damage. | a. Search and rescue. b. Medical assistance. c. Provision of food, water and shelter. |

| | Factors Contributing to Vulnerability | Typical Adverse Effects | Typical Needs Post-Disaster Onset |
|---------------------------------------|--|---|--|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> c. Roads and communication lines in mountain areas. d. Buildings with weak foundations. e. Buried pipelines and brittle pipes. | | |
| Tsunami (Seismic Sea Wave) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Location of settlements in low-lying coastal regions. b. Lack of tsunami resistant buildings. c. Lack of timely warning systems and evacuation plans. d. Lack of public awareness of destructive forces of tsunamis. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Casualties – deaths principally by drowning and injuries from debris. b. Physical Damage – resulting from the initial force of water and follow on flooding. c. Water Supply – contamination by salt water and debris or sewerage may make water non-potable. d. Crops and Food Supply - harvest, food stocks, livestock, farm implements and fishing boats may be lost. Land may be rendered infertile due to salt-water incursion. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Warning and evacuation. b. Search and rescue. c. Medical assistance. d. Disaster assessment. e. Provision of food, water and shelter. |
| Volcanic Eruption | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Settlements on the flanks of volcanoes. b. Settlements in historic path of lava or mud flows. c. Structures with roof designs not resistant to ash accumulation. d. Presence of combustible materials. e. Lack of evacuation plan or warning systems. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Casualties – death from pyroclastic flows, mud flows, lava flows and toxic gases. Injuries from falling rocks, burns, respiratory difficulties from gas or ash. b. Physical Damage – complete destruction of everything in path of pyroclastic, mud and lava flows; collapse of structures under weight of wet ash, flooding, blockage of roads or communication systems. c. Crops and Food Supply - destruction of crops in path of flows, ash may break tree branches, livestock may inhale toxic gas or ash; grazing lands may be contaminated. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Warning and evacuation. b. Search and rescue. c. Medical assistance. d. Provision of food, water and shelter. e. Relocation of affected population. |

CLIMATIC HAZARDS

| | Factors Contributing to Vulnerability | Typical Adverse Effects | Typical Needs Post-Disaster Onset |
|----------------|---|---|--|
| Drought | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Location in an arid area where dry conditions are increased by drought. b. Subsistence farming. c. Lack of seed reserves. d. Lack of agricultural inputs to improve yields. e. Area dependent on rainfall weather system. f. Area of low soil moisture retention. g. Lack of resources to cope with drought. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Casualties – deaths principally from deterioration of nutritional status. Secondary threat of disease. b. Water Supply – reduction in drinking water sources. c. Crops and Food Supply – reduced income of farmers. Reduction of spending on agriculture. Increase in price of staple foods. Increase in inflation rate. Loss of livestock. d. Migration. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Measures for maintaining food security; price stabilisation, food subsidies and food distribution. b. Develop livestock programme. c. Develop supplementary feeding programme. d. Develop complementary water and health programmes. |
| Flood | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Location of settlements on floodplains. b. Lack of awareness of flooding hazard. c. Non-resistant buildings and foundations. d. High-risk infrastructure elements. e. Unprotected food stocks, livestock and standing crops. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Casualties – deaths from drowning and deaths/injuries from debris. Secondary threats of communicable diseases due to flooding, contaminated water supply, or breakdown in sanitary conditions. b. Physical Damage – structures damaged by washing away, impact by floating debris and collapsing. Landslides from saturated soils. c. Water Supply – contamination of wells and ground water possible. d. Crops and Food Supply - harvests and food stocks may be lost to inundation. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Search and rescue. b. Medical assistance. c. Disaster assessment. d. Evacuation/relocation. e. Provision of short-term food, water and shelter. f. Water purification. g. Epidemiological surveillance. |

| | Factors Contributing to Vulnerability | Typical Adverse Effects | Typical Needs Post-Disaster Onset |
|--|--|--|--|
| Tropical Cyclone/ Hurricane | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Settlements located in low-lying coastal and adjacent areas. b. Poor communications or warning system. c. Lightweight structures, old construction and poor quality masonry. d. Poorly protected infrastructure elements, fishing boats and maritime industries. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Casualties – deaths from drowning/debris but relatively few serious injuries. Secondary threats of communicable diseases due to flooding, contaminated water supply, or breakdown in sanitary conditions. b. Physical Damage – structures lost and damaged by wind force, flooding, storm surge and landslide. c. Water Supply – ground water may be contaminated. d. Crops and Food Supply - standing crops, food stocks and tree plantations ruined. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Evacuation and emergency shelter. b. Search and rescue. c. Medical assistance. d. Water purification. e. Re-establish logistical and communications networks. f. Disaster assessment. g. Provision of seeds for planting. |
| Wildfire | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Location of wildfire prone areas. b. Wildfire threat tends to be seasonal. c. Speed of onset may vary depending on the climatic conditions. d. Evacuation of communities may be difficult and dangerous in the face of a major fire front. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Casualties – effects of smoke and burns. b. Physical Damage - can be very destructive, especially in loss of buildings, timber and livestock. c. Recovery - the effects on the environment may take several years to recover. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Provision of fire fighting resources. b. Provision of temporary shelters in safe havens. c. If required the provision of smoke masks. d. Provision of fire spotting transportation. e. Evacuation. |

MAN-MADE HAZARDS

| | Factors Contributing to Vulnerability | Typical Adverse Effects | Typical Needs Post-Disaster Onset |
|---|---|--|--|
| Chemical and Industrial Accident | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Proximity of population, structures, livestock and crops. Large-scale releases of airborne pollutants may spread for hundreds of kilometres. b. Lack of safety features or lack of evacuation plan. c. Lack of awareness by vulnerable persons of the potential danger. d. Reluctance of vulnerable populations to leave homes and livelihoods, especially if danger is not immediately apparent. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Casualties - many people may be killed or injured and require medical attention. Industrial fires may spread toxic contaminants. b. Physical Damage – may occur to structures and infrastructure. c. Contamination - of the air, water supply, land, animal life may occur. | <p>Highly variable but may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Medical assistance. b. Disaster assessment. c. Evacuation/relocation. d. Short term food and water supplies. e. Water purification. f. Epidemiological surveillance. |

SECONDARY EFFECTS

| | Factors Contributing to Vulnerability | Typical Adverse Effects | Typical Needs Post-Disaster Onset |
|---------------------------------|---|---|---|
| Mass Population Movement | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Unwillingness of authorities to take measures to mitigate vulnerability. b. Inability to act to mitigate their own vulnerability. c. Limited acknowledgement of their plight by International Community. d. Limited self-sufficiency. e. No supporting infrastructure. f. Limited means to generate income. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Casualties - increased mortality rate due to poor food, sanitary and health conditions. Secondary diseases as a result of conditions. b. Local destabilisation - due to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Overburden on infrastructure. - Increased tensions as a result of ethnic imbalances. - Civil unrest and inter-communal violence. - Impact on economy and staple food supply. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Provision of food, water and shelter. b. Medical assistance. c. Support to host infrastructure. d. Amelioration of impact on host population. e. Medium-term food security measures. f. Medium-term feeding programme. g. Medium-term water and health programmes. |

ANNEX C – DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT - HUMANITARIAN ASSESSMENT: INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS¹

| General Information | |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Type of disaster (earthquake, cyclone etc)? • Are there expected developments or secondary hazards (landslides, floods, fire, release of toxic substances, civil unrest, conflict, landmines)? • At what time did the disaster occur (local)? • What areas affected? Geographic coordinates? Geographic Information System (GIS) data? • Estimated total population in affected area? • Does the Department for International Development (DFID) have any programmes in the affected area? If so what are they, and are all UK and local staff accounted for? • What population density/settlement pattern and building type in that area? • What are the current and forecasted local weather conditions? • Has the Host Nation (HN) Government formally requested international assistance? | |
| Key In-country Contacts | |
| Details of all relevant in-country contacts among HN Government, International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). | |
| Initial Estimate of Impacts | |
| Population affected | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How many reported: deaths, injured, missing, displaced, homeless? • What is situation of those affected: coping mechanisms, accommodation, etc? |
| Public health | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What diseases are endemic, any outbreaks reported? • What percentage of hospitals are functioning, what clinical capabilities do they possess and what is their capacity? |
| Shelter | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What extent of housing/shelter damaged? • What housing type is specific to the affected area? (mud, stone, high-rise etc). |
| Water and sanitation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What effects on water supply and availability of drinking water? • What effects on waste disposal and sanitation? Consider public health implications. |

¹ Incorporating minor amendments.

| | |
|---|--|
| Transport infrastructure | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What means of access to affected areas, road bridge damage? • Which is the nearest functioning airport(s): what is the handling capability (type specific)? • Which is the nearest functioning seaport(s): what is the handling capability (type specific)? |
| Food | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What impact on food availability and access? |
| Power supply | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the impacts on power supply? • Do local facilities (hospitals/water pumping stations etc) have back up generators etc? |
| Communications | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are satellite/fixed/mobile communications functioning? • Are satellite/local television or radio available? |
| Search and Rescue requirements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has the disaster caused structural collapse (percentage)? • What type of structures have collapsed (for example, hospitals, schools, government buildings, multi-storey housing units)? • What types of materials are they constructed from (concrete/brick etc)? • Are the local authorities requesting assistance with Search and Rescue (SAR)? • Who is conducting/coordinating the present rescue effort, and for how long has this been underway? |
| Law and Order | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has the disaster created law and order issues?² |
| Information on Initial Responses | |
| Assessments | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What assessments have been made/planned? • By whom, what outcome? |
| HN Government response | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What has been the HN Government response so far? • Which is the lead HN Government ministry/body? • Is there a well-established in-country emergency response mechanism? Was it effective in previous disasters? • What is the role of other relevant structures (Military, Emergency Committee, Civil Defence Structure)? • What are capabilities of above to respond? |
| Other responses | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the response to date of the humanitarian community (United Nations (UN))/International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)/Donors/other IOs/NGOs/Other)? • What are the capabilities of those responding? What are the gaps (food, water, shelter, and clothing)? |

² For the MOD: What are the implications for Force Protection and Rules of Engagement?

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the response of regional states and organisations? • Which is the lead UN agency? • Is the UN Disaster Management Team (UN DMT) present/have they met/is a disaster plan in place/has it been activated? • Have any 'situation reports' been issued? Has any other information on the disaster been shared? |
| Coordination | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What coordination structures are in place for the disaster (HN Government/UN/local community)? |
| Factors affecting response | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the security situation? Is the disaster site(s) safe for personnel to operate in? • What other country specific factors may affect response (for example, public holidays)? • How is the situation being reported in the local and national media? Are they reliable? |

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ANNEX D – DISASTER RELIEF PLANNING CHECKLIST

| | Question/Consideration | Supplementary |
|------------------|--|--|
| Situation | What information is available? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has an assessment been conducted? • Is the information complete? • On what is it based (substantive or anecdotal)? • What information gaps are there? |
| | What is the nature of the disaster? | |
| | Are the stricken state response mechanisms coping with the impact of the emergency/disaster? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the state of civilian administration, infrastructure, and national organs? • Is there a lead ministry/body? • What in-country contingency plans exist and what is the degree of their implementation? • What is the role of national military and civil emergencies services? |
| | What is UK's overall response? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What assistance can be provided by the British High Commission/Embassy (including briefs, facilitating accommodation, Host-nation Support (HNS), communications, interpreters etc)? • Has the Department for International Development (DFID) a country-office in the embassy or elsewhere? |
| | What is UK Armed Forces role in supporting this response? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are there UK military assets in the immediate vicinity? • Are there national or local sensitivities to foreign military involvement? |

| | Question/Consideration | Supplementary |
|----------------|---|---|
| | Have budgetary and financial planners been consulted from an early stage? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are planned actions within the budgetary limitations of the DRO? • Are they delivering the most effective ‘value for money’? • What are the financial freedoms and constraints? |
| Mission | What is the DRO mission? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is it stated in terms of working towards pre-emergency/disaster status? • Is the desired end-state sustainable by the stricken state and remaining humanitarian organisations contributing to the international relief effort? • What are the criteria for mission accomplishment, and transition and termination strategy (sensitive)? |

| | Question/Consideration | Supplementary |
|-----------------------------|--|---|
| Disaster Environment | What are the environmental impacts on the DRO? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Where and how big is the disaster area? • What is the level of continuing or emerging hazards? • What is the accessibility to and within the disaster area? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Roads/bridges? ➤ Airfields/Helicopter Landing Sites? ➤ Sea-ports? ➤ Anchorages, beaches and inland waterways? ➤ Satellite/fixed/mobile communications? • What are the impacts of weather and climate? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ On the humanitarian emergency/disaster situation? ➤ On aviation and air movement? ➤ On maritime operations? ➤ On deployed equipment? ➤ On logistics? |

| | Question/Consideration | Supplementary |
|--|---|--|
| Factors/ Impacts/ Needs | How has the disaster impacted in relation to coping capacities? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the effect on/situation with respect to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The population? ➤ Law and order? ➤ Public health? ➤ Housing/shelter? ➤ Water and sanitation? ➤ Transport infrastructure? ➤ Food? ➤ Communications and power supply? |
| | What is the perceived need? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has a formal request for international assistance been lodged? • What has been requested? |

| | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|
| Disaster Response | What are International Community interests/aims? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What other agencies are responding? • What is their capability and level of response? • Is there a lead United Nations (UN) agency? • What coordination mechanisms and hierarchy are in place? • What centres/operations rooms and meetings schedules have been established? • Is there a UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) or UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team present? • Are there any identifiable capability gaps? • What is the impact of the disaster on neighbouring countries and what is the degree of cross border cooperation? |
| | Have the involved civil actors been engaged to offer appropriate and relevant advice? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who is setting relief priorities? • Who is tasking responding assets to meet the set priorities? • How can UK military assets best be integrated into the overall effort? • How are contributing actors communicating? • How well is the international relief effort complementing national efforts? |

| | Question/Consideration | Supplementary |
|-------------------------|---|---|
| | What in-theatre coordination is required? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the humanitarian coordination mechanisms, hierarchy and responsibilities? • What are the liaison requirements – with the stricken state, other nations Headquarters (HQ), humanitarian mechanisms? • Are interpreters required? |
| | What other nation's military assets are deployed/deploying. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent would other nation's military capabilities compliment or duplicate a UK military response? • Is there likely to be critical competition for resources, including real-estate? |
| | How will military forces get into theatre? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can the stricken state infrastructure support the force? • Is a regional Forward Mounting Base (FMB) necessary? |
| | What HNS is available? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can HNS be achieved regionally (from the FMB)? • How self-sufficient will the force need to be? • How long will the logistics pipeline be? |
| Force Protection | What are the Force Protection issues? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What needs to be protected and to what level? • What threat advice is available? • Is the carriage of weapons required and are the Rules of Engagement (ROE) appropriate? • Whilst a nominally permissive environment, do ROE reflect any civil tensions caused by the disaster, criminality and take account of stricken state security capabilities? • What are the potential health risks to deploying forces? |

| | Question/Consideration | Supplementary |
|-----------------------------|---|---|
| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What medical support is necessary for own forces? • What is the requirement for immunisations (potentially time critical)? • Are there any residual risks from previous conflicts in terms of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)? |
| Influence Activities | How can Influence Activities best support the mission? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have all Target Audiences been considered? |
| | Is the Influence being considered coherent? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has the activity of the UK military element been deconflicted/coordinated with that of UK Other Government Departments (OGDs) to achieve coherence in approach? • Are our Influence Activities coherent with that of the Host Nation (HN)? |
| | What additional Force Elements are required to conduct Influence Activities? | |
| Time and Space | What are the necessary timelines to meet the humanitarian emergency/disaster response requirements? | |

| | Question/Consideration | Supplementary |
|----------------------------|--|---|
| Legal and Political | <p>What is the legal status of the DRO?</p> <p>What are the political constraints?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the legal basis (or mandate) for the DRO? • Is there a Status of Force Agreement (SOFA)? Is there a need for an exchange of letters? • What are the Regional requirements, for example, FMB, SOFA? • What are the rules governing the use of force? • What are the security implications for the DRO? • What HN or other legal constraints will operate? • Is there provision of adequate, informed legal advice to commanders? |
| Media | What are the media handling principles and procedures? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are these agreed with DFID? • Have coherent press lines been agreed? • Has the media-handling requirement been assessed? |
| Comms | What are the communication requirements to support the operation? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are secure communications required? • Is UK equipment compatible with other key actors? |
| Life Support | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What the Joint Task Force's (JTF) own life support requirements? (Drives location, force package and HNS). |

ANNEX E – MILITARY CAPABILITIES

The following UK military capabilities are examples of potential military contributions to a disaster response:

| Sector/ Assets | Assessment/ Command and Control (C2) | Communications | Search & Rescue (SAR) | Infrastructure Support | Transport, Supply & Distribution | Public Health/Medical |
|--------------------------|--|--|--------------------------|---|--|--------------------------|
| Joint/ Common | a. Operational Liaison Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) deployment. b. C ² Capability. c. Liaison teams. d. Intelligence and information, including geospatial / geographic information and assessments. | a. Media Operations support. b. Information Operations support. | | a. Set-up shelter and emergency repairs to accommodation. | a. Movement Control. b. Contract Management. c. Logistic Planning. | |

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|-----------------|--|--|---|---|--|--|
| Maritime | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Small boats coordination. b. Diving capability. c. Hydrographic support. d. Airspace Coordination. e. Aerial survey and Reconnaissance. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Strategic Comms Link. b. Small scale provision of field comms. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Coordination and conduct of SAR. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Life support repairs to power, water and sewage treatment plants. b. Limited supply of potable water. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Tactical bulk transport of relief stores and aid. b. Small boats capability, both integral and specialist. c. Limited supply of emergency rations. d. Helicopter Transport. e. Helicopter Landing Site preparation/control. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Small scale medical assistance and triage capability. b. Casualty evacuation. c. Environmental Health Advice. |
| Air | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Airspace/Air Traffic Control. b. Aerial Survey and Reconnaissance. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Airborne comms link. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Coordination and conduct of SAR, both fixed and rotary wing. | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Tactical delivery of relief stores and aid. b. Strategic delivery of relief stores and aid. c. Airhead Management. d. Helicopter Transport. e. Helicopter Landing Site preparation/control. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Casualty evacuation. b. Aeromedical evacuation. |

| | | | | | | |
|-------------|--|---------------------------------------|----------------|---|--|--|
| Land | a. Engineer survey and Reconnaissance. b. Geospatial support. c. Aerial Survey and Reconnaissance. | a. Provision of comms infrastructure. | a. Rotary SAR. | a. Provision of potable water, either by well drilling or purification from source. b. Route improvement and maintenance. c. Repairs and support to airhead/seaport infrastructure. d. Limited provision of power. e. Limited Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) capability. f. Repairs to power, water and sewage treatment plants. g. Emergency bridging capability. | a. Aid distribution b. Stockholding of aid. c. Port management. d. Route marking and traffic control. e. Small boats capability. f. Helicopter Transport g. Helicopter Landing Site preparation/control. | a. Medical assistance and triage capability. b. Casualty evacuation. c. Environmental Health Advice. |
|-------------|--|---------------------------------------|----------------|---|--|--|

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PART 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-----------|---|
| ACHU | Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit |
| AJP | Allied Joint Publication |
| APT(N) | Atlantic Patrol Task (North) |
| AusAID | Australian Agency for International Development |
| BHC | British High Commission |
| C2 | Command and Control |
| CCP | Civil Contingency Plan |
| CDS | Chief of Defence Staff |
| CHASE | Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department |
| CinC | Commander in Chief |
| CIMIC | Civil-Military Cooperation |
| CJO | Chief of Joint Operations |
| CMCOORD | Civil Military Coordination |
| COBR | Cabinet Office Briefing Room |
| COG | Current Operations Group |
| COS | Chiefs of Staff |
| DCDC | Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre |
| DCMO | Defence Crisis Management Organisation |
| DFID | Department for International Development |
| D Fin Pol | Director Finance Policy |
| DIS | Defence Intelligence Staff |
| DJC | Directorate of Joint Commitments |
| DMOC | Defence Media Operations Centre |
| DOps | Director of Operations |
| DP | Defence Profile |
| DRO | Disaster Relief Operation |
| DSCOM | Defence Supply Chain Operations and Movements |
| DSG | Defence Strategic Guidance |
| DSP | Directorate Strategic Plans |
| EADRCC | Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre |
| EADRU | Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit |
| EAPC | Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council |
| ECHO | European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office |
| EOD | Explosive Ordnance Disposal |
| ERS | Emergency Relief Stores |

| | |
|---------|---|
| EU | European Union |
| FCO | Foreign and Commonwealth Office |
| FLC | Front Line Command |
| FMB | Forward Mounting Base |
| GIS | Geographic Information System |
| HC | Humanitarian Coordinator |
| HM | Her Majesty's |
| HN | Host Nation |
| HNS | Host-nation Support |
| HQ | Headquarter |
| IBM | Infrastructure Briefing Memoranda |
| ICG | Intelligence Collection Group |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IFRC | International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies |
| IJDP | Interim Joint Doctrine Publication |
| IO | International Organisation |
| ISAF | International Security Assistance Force |
| ISTAR | Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance |
| J2 | Intelligence |
| J3 | Operations |
| J4 | Logistics |
| J5 | Plans |
| J8 | Finance |
| JCG | Joint CIMIC Group |
| JCP | Joint Contingency Plan |
| JDN | Joint Doctrine Note |
| JDP | Joint Doctrine Publication |
| JFC | Joint Force Commander |
| JFHQ | Joint Force Headquarters |
| JHF | Joint Helicopter Force |
| JHSU | Joint Helicopter Support Unit |
| JMC | Joint Mounting Cell |
| JMOT | Joint Media Operations Team |
| JOA | Joint Operations Area |
| JPG | Joint Planning Guide |
| JRRF | Joint Rapid Reaction Force |
| JSP | Joint Services Publication |
| Jt Comd | Joint Commander |

| | |
|--------|--|
| JTF | Joint Task Force |
| JTFHQ | Joint Task Force Headquarters |
| MAOT | Mobile Air Operations Team |
| MIC | Monitoring and Information Centre |
| MILO | Military Intelligence Liaison Officer |
| MOA | Measurement of Activity |
| MOD | Ministry of Defence |
| MOE | Measurement of Effect |
| MOU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| MSE | Military Strategic Estimate |
| NA5CRO | Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organisation |
| NCC | National Contingent Commander |
| NEO | Non-combatant Evacuation Operation |
| NGO | Non-governmental Organisation |
| NSID | National Security, International Relations and Development |
| NRF | NATO Response Force |
| NTM | Notice to Move |
| OGD | Other Government Department |
| OLRT | Operational and Liaison Reconnaissance Team |
| OPCOM | Operational Command |
| OPCON | Operational Control |
| OT | Overseas Territory |
| PDR | Policy and Defence Relations |
| PEP | Post Emergency Plan |
| PJHQ | Permanent Joint Headquarters |
| PME | Political Military Estimate |
| POC | Point of Contact |
| PPP | Presence, Posture and Profile |
| PSA | Political Strategic Assessment |
| PSO | Peace Support Operation |
| RC | Resident Coordinator |
| ROE | Rules of Engagement |
| SAR | Search and Rescue |
| SIC | Subject Indicator Code |
| SLA | Service Level Agreement |
| SOFA | Status of Forces Agreement |

| | |
|---------|--|
| SOP | Standard Operating Procedure |
| SPG | Strategic Planning Group |
| SRSg | Special Representative of the Secretary General |
| TLB | Top-level Budget |
| UIN | Unit Indicator Number |
| UKEP | United Kingdom Eligible Person |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDAC | United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination |
| UN DMT | UN Disaster Management Team |
| UNHCR | UN High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | UN Children's Fund |
| UN OCHA | UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| UN RC | UN Resident Coordinator |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| UXO | Unexploded Ordnance |
| WHO | World Health Organisation |
| WFP | World Food Programme |

PART 2 – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the Military Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies. (JDP 3-90)

Disaster Relief

The organised response to alleviate the results of a catastrophe. (JDP 3-52)

Note:

1. The aims are to save life and relieve suffering, limit damage and restore essential services to a level that enables local authorities to cope.

Disaster Relief Operations

A Disaster Relief Operation (DRO) is a primary Military Task and contribution to a disaster relief response. It provides specific assistance to an afflicted overseas population. (*Modified Humanitarian Disaster Relief Operations (HDRO) definition*) (JDP 3-52)

Emergency Life Saving Relief

The provision of small scale supplies and services which are needed as a matter of extreme urgency to save life or to limit physical damage and prevent serious suffering. (JDP 3-52)

Notes:

1. Supplies and services would likely comprise food, clothing, medical and subsistence stores, rescue, urgent works, transport and necessary equipment.
2. These may be resourced from available Service sources provided that Service requirements are not compromised, should not exceed one week's supplies and be provisioned from on-the-spot stores.

Forward Mounting Base (also Deployed Operating Base)

A base established within the operational area, to support operations at Forward Operating Bases. It will be resourced to a greater level than a Forward Operating Base, including C2, logistics and administration support elements. (JDP 0-01.1)

Front Line Command

Front Line Commands (FLC) are the single-Service Commands (Fleet, Land or Air) responsible for operating, administering or training its forces outside the requirements of joint operations. (JDP 3-52)

Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian Assistance is a secondary Military Task, which is the provision of relief aid by military forces conducting operations other than Disaster Relief Operations. (JDP 3-52)

Humanitarian Disaster

A catastrophe the consequences of which put lives and/or livelihoods at risk, and exceed the ability of the affected society to cope using only its own resources. (JDP 3-52)

Humanitarian Gap

The difference between humanitarian emergency/disaster needs and the relief resources available to meet them. (JDP 0-01.1)

Humanitarian Space

Humanitarian space is the access and freedom for humanitarian organisations to assess and meet humanitarian needs. (ECHO)

Joint Operations Area

An area of land, sea and airspace, defined by a higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Task Force Commander

The operational commander of a nominated Joint Force. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Task Force Headquarters

A purely national deployable joint headquarters of variable size commanded at the operational level by a Joint Task Force Commander. (JDP 0-01.1)

Measurement of Activity

The assessment of task performance and achievement of its associated objectives. (JDP 3-52)

Measurement of Effect

The assessment of the realisation of specified effects. (JDP 3-52)

Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation

An operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety. (JWP 3-51)

Rapid Onset Disaster (Sudden Onset Disaster)

Any disaster that has not been predicted or if predicted the scale of the disaster is far greater than anticipated. For example: cyclones, earthquakes and floods. (UNOCHA)

Sector (humanitarian)

Humanitarian Relief activities within a functional area. (JDP 3-52)

Notes:

1. Examples of functional areas are: Water and Sanitation; Shelter; Medical; Food; Logistics and Communication.
2. Each functional area comprises a 'Sector'.

Stricken State

Any state within which a humanitarian emergency or disaster has occurred.
(JDP 0-01.1)

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