REQUEST: This message has been generated automatically from the Marine Accident Investigation Website.

XXXX has sent the following comment:

Postal address: XXXX
Postcode: XXXX
Country: Monaco
Telephone: XXXX
Facsimile:
Email Address: XXXX

Website Address:
Company:
Job Title: Sales Manager
Industry Sector:

How did you reach our website? website

Enquiry: I would like to know the recorded accidents within the North Sea concerning tandem offloading vessels (i.e. like the Schiehallion collision. If you have records or statistics for the last 10 or 15 years or any records concerning this I would be interested.

Comment: Looks very good.

This email was received from the INTERNET and scanned by the Government Secure Intranet anti-virus service supplied by Cable&Wireless Worldwide in partnership with MessageLabs. (CCTM Certificate Number 2009/09/0052.) In case of problems, please call your organisation's IT Helpdesk.
Communications via the GSi may be automatically logged, monitored and/or recorded for legal purposes.

RESPONSE: Dear XXXX

Our reference: F0007193

I am writing to confirm that the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) of the Department for Transport has now completed its search for the information which you requested on 16 December 2010.

We have reviewed all collisions and contacts involving a Drilling Rig, Platform or Floating Production Storage & Offloading vessel and supply details of those, in addition to the Schiehallion collision, where we can identify that loading or offloading was taking place. We also expanded the search to look for collisions and contacts between ships where text describing the incident indicated that there was a ship to ship transfer in process.

One of these cases resulted in a full investigation report:
http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2010/saetta_conger.cfm
Details of the others are in the attached document.

Please note that MAIB's remit is limited to UK vessels and accidents in 12 mile territorial waters. We have included several cases that were outside the remit of MAIB but were reported to us anyway. More comprehensive data may be available from the World Offshore Accident Database operated by Det Norske Veritas (DNV)
http://www.dnv.com/services/software/products/safeti/safetiqra/woad.asp

In keeping with the spirit and effect of the Freedom of Information Act, all information is assumed to be releasable to the public unless exempt. The Department may, therefore, be simultaneously releasing to the public the information you requested, together with any related information that will provide a key to its wider context.

If you are unhappy with the way the MAIB has handled your request or with the decisions made in relation to your request you may complain within two calendar months of the date of this mail by replying to me at the above address. Please see attached details of the Department for Transport's complaints procedure and your right to complain to the Information Commissioner.

If you have any queries about this letter, please contact me. Please remember to quote the reference number above in any future communications.

Yours sincerely
XXXX
Freedom of Information Officer
Marine Accident Investigation Branch
Mountbatten House
Grosvenor Square
Southampton
SO15 2JU
Tel +44 (0)23 XXXX XXXX
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maib@dft.gsi.gov.uk

Collisions contacts between ships or ships and platforms etc identified as occurring during loading/unloading 1991 to 2010

Case Number **0249/2010** **01/03/2010** **Contact**

Regulation **Outside MAIB Regulations** Status **Closed**

Location **High seas** **Non UK** **6019.0 N** **417.0 W**

Natural Light **Light** Sea State **Moderate**

Visibility **Good (5 - 10)** Wind force Range **4-6**

Other commercial Dead **0** Injured **0**

Associated with offshore industry Flag **Bahamas**

Offshore supply **3017.00** gt

When: **Other offshore operations** **0.01** Reg. L **82.88** LOA

Machinery

Main machinery

Main engine control system

Other

Other commercial Dead **0** Injured **0**

Associated with offshore industry Flag **Bahamas**

FPSO **43279.00** gt

When: **Other offshore operations** **0.01** Reg. L **250.20** LOA

An offshore supply vessel was discharging fuel oil by cargo hose to a FPSO when the dynamic positioning system (DP) failed. The supply vessel transferred back into manual control but before it could clear, the starboard handrail was crushed under the transom of the FPSO. The fuelling operation was stopped and the hose recovered. There appeared to be no damage to the FPSO. Once clear the supply vessel returned to port where it is planned for an electronics engineer to examine the DP system.

Collisions contacts between ships or ships and platforms etc identified as occurring during loading/unloading 1991 to 2010

Case Number **0409/2002** **17/03/2002** **Contact**
Regulation **Accident** Status **Closed**
Location **High seas** **Unknown** **5758.0 N** **151.0 E**
Natural Light **Light** Sea State
Visibility **Good (5 - 10)** Wind force Range **4-6**
Other commercial Dead **0** Injured **0** **Minor Damage**
Associated with offshore industry Flag **U.K.**
Offshore supply **1399.00** gt
When: **Other offshore operations** **0.01** Reg. L **65.21** LOA
Deck
Contact
Manoeuvrability
Safety
General shipboard activities
Cargo/stores/catch handling
Location: **Navigation/communication control space**
Operator error
Human factor
People
Fatigue and vigilance
Technical factor
Design & construction
Characteristic defect
Other commercial Dead **0** Injured **0**
Associated with offshore industry Flag **U.K.**
Drilling **0.01** gt
When: **Unknown** **0.01** Reg. L **0.01** LOA
While discharging cargo at a platform, the second officer was in control of the supply vessel was reporting the last lift up to the platform and the chief officer was trying to make contact with the deck operations, they saw that the vessel was closing one of the legs of the platform. The second officer went full ahead on the joystick and cleared the leg. Instead of the joystick being in zero thrust it was set with slight stern thrust.

Collisions contacts between ships or ships and platforms etc identified as occurring during loading/unloading 1991 to 2010

Case Number **0631/1997** **29/04/1997** **Collision**

Regulation **Accident** Status **Closed**

Location **High seas** **Non UK** **6048.0 N** **126.0 E**

Natural Light **Light** Sea State

Visibility **Good (5 - 10)** Wind force Range **4-6**

Other commercial Dead **0** Injured **0** **No Damage**

Associated with offshore industry Flag **Barbados**

Offshore supply **2145.00** gt

0.01 Reg. L **68.70** LOA

Deck

Collision

Contact

Machinery

Other commercial Dead **0** Injured **0**

Associated with offshore industry Flag **Unknown**

Drilling **0.01** gt

0.01 Reg. L **0.01** LOA

Deck

Collision

Contact

Machinery

WHILST ALONGSIDE BOW THRUST UNIT CONTROL WAS LOST CAUSING CONTACT WITH OIL RIG LEG. MINOR DAMAGE SUSTAINED. INVESTIGATION SHOWED THAT FEEDBACK CONTROL LINKAGE HAD VIBRATED LOOSE LEAVING THRUSTER IN PREVIOUS POSITION. POWER CONTROL RETAINED BUT NO DIRECTIONAL CONTROL. CONTROL LINKS RE-CONNECTED & VESSEL CONTINUED IN SERVICE.

Collisions contacts between ships or ships and platforms etc identified as occurring during loading/unloading 1991 to 2010

Case Number **0905/2010** **08/07/2010** **Collision**
Regulation **Accident** Status **Closed**
Location **High seas** **Non UK** **7018.0 N** **5932.0 W**
Natural Light **Light** Sea State **Calm <2 ft**
Visibility **Good (5 - 10)** Wind force Range **0-3**
Other commercial Dead **0** Injured **0** **Minor Damage**
Associated with offshore industry Flag **U.K.**
Drilling **58294.00** gt
When: **Replenishment at sea operations** **0.01** Reg. L **228.34** LOA
Other commercial Dead **0** Injured **0** **Minor Damage**
Associated with offshore industry Flag **Norway**
Offshore supply **4260.00** gt
When: **Replenishment at sea operations** **0.01** Reg. L **85.00** LOA

Deck
Contact
Bridge procedures
Location: **Navigation/communication control space**
Navigation/communication-equipment
Bridge Control Equipment
Location: **Navigation/communication control space**
Operator error
Human factor
People
Competence
Training which itself is inadequate
System - Crew Factors
Procedures inadequate
System - Equipment
Personnel unfamiliar with equipment/not trained in use

A Norwegian registered platform supply ship was carrying out replenishment duties with a UK registered drilling ship off Greenland and was in dynamically positioning (DP) mode. The 63 year old relief master, who was trained in the operation of DP vessels, was in the wheelhouse at the time of the accident. He had been on board for 4 days familiarisation with the outgoing master.

Towards the end of the replenishment a higher priority was identified and the supply ship was asked to stand off. The master was in the middle of transferring control positions while about 40m off the drill ship. He selected 'DP Standby' which effectively switched off the DP control. The effects of wind and tide caused the supply ship to drift towards the drill ship. The master realised his mistake and eventually selected joystick control to take his ship away from the drill ship. Unfortunately this was too late to prevent a light contact with the drill ship.

Although he was DP qualified and his ticket was DP endorsed he had not served in a vessel with this particular type of system. The master indicated that the cause of the contact was due to a problem associated with the DP control system. The subsequent technical investigation failed to find any defects with the DP control system. The master eventually conceded that he made a DP control selection error and by the time he realised his mistake the contact could not be prevented. The error was also established by interrogation of the DP electronic records.

The relief master held a DP endorsement but was not familiar with the particular DP model fitted to TA. It is intended to carry out Type Specific familiarisation training before a master takes command of the particular vessel. In addition the company are investigating all senior staffs who use the DP system to ensure they are correctly trained and, if not, training will be provided.

The relief master has since had his contract terminated.

Collisions contacts between ships or ships and platforms etc identified as occurring during loading/unloading 1991 to 2010

Case Number **1125/2007** **31/07/2007** **Contact**
Regulation **Outside MAIB Regulations** Status **Closed**
Location **High seas** **English** **5336.0 N** **109.0 E**
Natural Light **Light** Sea State
Visibility **Good (5 - 10)** Wind force Range **0-3**
Other commercial Dead **0** Injured **0**
Associated with offshore industry Flag **Vanuatu**
Platform **7179.00** gt
When: **Unknown** **0.01** Reg. L **74.60** LOA
Other commercial Dead **0** Injured **0**
Associated with offshore industry Flag **Netherlands**
Tug/anchor handling vessel **2311.00** gt
When: **Loading/discharging cargo** **0.01** Reg. L **69.70** LOA
An offshore supply vessel made contact with an offshore installation during unloading.

Collisions contacts between ships or ships and platforms etc identified as occurring during loading/unloading 1991 to 2010

Case Number **1239/1997** **27/07/1997** **Collision**

Regulation **Accident** Status **Closed**

Location **High seas** **Non UK** **5757.0 N** **150.0 E**

Natural Light **Light** Sea State **Calm <2 ft**

Visibility **Good (5 - 10)** Wind force Range **4-6**

Other commercial Dead **0** Injured **0** **Material Damage**

Associated with offshore industry Flag **U.K.**

Drilling **13002.00** gt

0.01 Reg. L **0.01** LOA

Deck

Collision

Contact

Other commercial Dead **0** Injured **0** **Material Damage**

Associated with offshore industry Flag **Bahamas**

Offshore supply **1292.00** gt

0.01 Reg. L **63.89** LOA

Deck

Collision

Contact

CONTACT WITH DRILLING SHIP WHEN MANOEUVRING TO DISCHARGE CARGO. NO SERIOUS DAMAGE. CAUSE: ERROR OF JUDGEMENT BY OFFSHORE SUPPLY VESSEL. ACTION: WILL NOT ATTEMPT MANOEUVRE IN SIMILAR WEATHER/TIDAL CONDITIONS IN FUTURE.

Collisions contacts between ships or ships and platforms etc identified as occurring during loading/unloading 1991 to 2010

Case Number **1384/2008** **05/10/2008** **Contact**
Regulation **Accident** Status **Closed**
Location **High seas** **Non UK** **5417.0 N** **220.0 E**
Natural Light **Light** Sea State **Moderate**
Visibility **Good (5 - 10)** Wind force Range **0-3**
Other commercial Dead **0** Injured **0** **Material Damage**
Associated with offshore industry Flag **U.K.**
Standby safety vessel **1492.00** gt
When: **Loading/discharging cargo** **0.01** Reg. L **60.99** LOA
Machinery
Auxiliary machinery
Thrusters/nozzles
Location: **Engine room**
Hydraulic failure
Technical factor
Material/mechanical defect
Fatigue
Main machinery
Hydraulic system
Location: **Engine room**
Lack of oil
Other commercial Dead **0** Injured **0** **No Damage**
Associated with offshore industry Flag **Liberia**
Drilling **12460.00** gt
When: **Unknown** **0.01** Reg. L **90.50** LOA

On Sunday 5th October 2008 a supply vessel was working deck cargo supplying a jack up platform. This operation required the vessel to hold station in the working radius of the crane. At approximately 13.50hrs, the vessel lost control of the bow thruster and collided with the bow leg of the rig, which resulted in significant damage to the starboard bow of the vessel, forward of the collision bulkhead. No persons were injured in the incident nor was there any loss of containment or pollutants to the sea.

The vessel had been requested to work deck cargo by after one o'clock in the afternoon of the 5th October. Before the vessel re-entered the 500M zone, all the critical equipment was checked. These checks include the operation of the main engines and bow thruster, all was functioning correctly. This final 335° heading was determined by the master to be a satisfactory heading on which to work cargo. The vessel was then manoeuvred astern so as to lie in a suitable position under the crane and thus work cargo. During these manoeuvring operations the vessel movements were controlled utilising the ship's position control system (poscon); this control brings together the main propulsion, bow thruster and steering elements into one control joystick. At the time of the incident the vessel was drifting off to port in an approximate south westerly direction. The master applied opposing thrust via the Poscon to bring the
vessel back to its working position.

Having initially applied the trust and eased off to 50% the vessel master very quickly realised that even though control/command had been reduced the movement to starboard continued. The master registered the continued movement, and noted that there had been no reduction of engine noise from the bow thruster or, loss of vibration, which are both normally experienced as thrust comes off the bow thruster. No audible alarm sounded, in particular the off course alarm which is an integral feature of the Poscon. Important to note that Poscon alarm may not have operated as when the Poscon is selected the heading is automatically corrected. The master changed control to manual, switching out of Poscon, and applied opposing thrust manually to the bow thrust control and engines were placed ahead in an attempt to clear the vessel away from the location. Neither of the actions by the master had the desired affect as the bow continued to move to Starboard and towards the ENSCO 100 bow/fwd leg. Cause of the incident was the failure of a pressure gauge sited on the top of the bow thruster hydraulic control system tank. The failure of the gauge resulted in hydraulic oil leaking from the system under pressure. As the oil level dropped the pressure reduced resulting in the control function of the bow thruster being lost. Bow thruster controls located upon the vessel's bridge have no clear visual or audible warnings indicating that a failure of the bow thrust had occurred.

Collisions contacts between ships or ships and platforms etc identified as occurring during loading/unloading 1991 to 2010

Case Number **1490/2010** **09/10/2010** **Contact**
Regulation **Accident** Status **Closed**
Location **High seas** **Non UK** **5626.0 N** **200.0 E**
Natural Light **Light** Sea State **Moderate**
Visibility **Mod. 2 - 5 nm (3)** Wind force Range **4-6**
Other commercial Dead **0** Injured **0** **Minor Damage**
Associated with offshore industry Flag **Marshall Islands**
Drilling **13451.00** gt
When: **Other offshore operations** **0.01** Reg. L **108.20** LOA
Machinery
Main machinery
Main engine control system
Location: **Navigation/communication control space**
Electrical fault
Other commercial Dead **0** Injured **0** **Minor Damage**
Associated with offshore industry Flag **U.K.**
Offshore supply **2650.00** gt
When: **Other offshore operations** **0.01** Reg. L **81.90** LOA
Machinery
Main machinery
Main engine control system
Location: **Engine control room**
Electrical fault
Technical factor
Design & construction
Design Inadequate
Other
Human factor
People
Time pressures
System - Equipment
Equipment poorly designed for operational use

While discharging at a drilling platform, a supply vessel lost control when the joystick control failed and subsequently the aft console position main engine and thruster controls. Once control of the main engines was taken at the forward console full control of the main engines was attained. The loss of control caused the vessel to make contact with the platform, damaging the rig and the vessel.

An investigation commissioned by the owners found that when the master moved the joystick to port to manoeuvre the vessel away from the rig he noticed that the vessel was not responding and changed over from joystick to manual control immediately. When this didn't respond the master instructed the 2/O to take command on the forward console and apply 50% pitch on the main engines to free the vessel from the rig.

It was concluded that loose connections in the joystick microprocessor cabinet caused a partial failure of the joystick. The master seeing that he had lost control of the vessel activated manual control by pressing a touch pad on the joystick control station; this touch pad does not provide a definitive on/off action. The partial failure of the joystick system appears to have prevented the complete transfer of control to manual, thus the reason why the master reported that he had no control over the thrusters or main engines.

In the confusion that ensued it is likely that the master did not fully take control of all manual systems, only when the 2/O pressed the main engines in command buttons on the forward console did full control of the main propellers take effect allowing him to manoeuvre the vessel away from the rig.

The recommendations in the report include the fitting of load indicators at the aft consol to give positive indication of thruster effect, more frequent checks of critical systems, an examination of the vibration within the control boxes and the touch control buttons to be replaced with positive control buttons

Collisions contacts between ships or ships and platforms etc identified as occurring during loading/unloading 1991 to 2010

Case Number **1515/1993** **30/08/1993** **Collision**

Regulation **Accident** Status **Closed**

Location **High seas** **Non UK** **5826.0 N** **117.0 E**

Natural Light **Light** Sea State **Moderate**

Visibility **Good (5 - 10)** Wind force Range **4-6**

Other commercial Dead **0** Injured **0**

Associated with offshore industry Flag **U.K.**

Offshore supply **1399.00** gt

0.01 Reg. L **65.21** LOA

Deck

Collision

Other commercial Dead **0** Injured **0**

Associated with offshore industry Flag **Panama**

Drilling **26500.00** gt

0.01 Reg. L **82.30** LOA

Deck

Collision

ON 30/08/93 THE SUPPLY VESSEL WAS MANOEUVRING INTO POSITION TO LOAD FROM THE SEMI-SUBMERSIBLE DRILLING RIG. THERE WAS LOSS OF JOY STICK CONTROL OF THE AFTER BRIDGE CONSUL, THUS RESULTING IN LOSS OF STEERING BY THE TWO AFT AUAMASTER THRUSTERS. THE RESET SWITCHES TO REVERT TO JOY STICK CONTROL COULD NOT BE OPERATED IN TIME TO PREVENT THE VESSEL DRIFTING INTO THE LEG OF THE RIG. NO REPORTED INJURIES. THE REASONS FOR THE LOSS OF CONTROL HAVE NOT YET BEEN DETERMINED BY THE MANUFACTURERS.

Collisions contacts between ships or ships and platforms etc identified as occurring during loading/unloading 1991 to 2010

Case Number **0890/2009** **03/07/2009** **Collision**

Regulation **Accident** Status **Closed**

Location **Coastal waters** **English** **5216.0 N** **158.0 E**

Natural Light **Light** Sea State **Moderate**

Visibility **Good (5 - 10)** Wind force Range **4-6**

Tanker/combination carrier Dead **0** Injured **0** **Minor Damage**

Chemical tanker Flag **Gibraltar**

2262.00 gt

When: **Replenishment at sea operations** **0.01** Reg. L **88.42** LOA

Deck

Bridge procedures

Environmental

Conditions had greater effect than expected

Collision

Manoeuvrability

Location: **Navigation/communication control space**

Tanker/combination carrier Dead **0** Injured **0** **Minor Damage**

Oil tanker Flag **Liberia**

Products **57325.00** gt

When: **At anchor** **235.80** Reg. L **243.96** LOA

Deck

Collision

Two tankers had completed ship to ship bunkering operations at the anchorage. As the vessel supplying the bunkers cast off, she made contact with her starboard side stern railing with the hull of the other vessel, as she came under the influence of a strong wind and tide effect. The contact caused a slight indent into the water ballast tank of the other vessel. Both vessels departed the anchorage on confirmation of no serious damage and reported it to the coastguard.

Collisions contacts between ships or ships and platforms etc identified as occurring during loading/unloading 1991 to 2010

Case Number **1019/2009** **25/07/2009** **Collision**
Regulation **Accident** Status **Closed**
Location **Coastal waters** **English** **5218.0 N** **205.0 E**
Southwold
Natural Light **Light** Sea State **Moderate**
Visibility **Good (5 - 10)** Wind force Range **4-6**
Tanker/combination carrier Dead **0** Injured **0** **Material Damage**
Oil tanker Flag **Greece**
Crude/products **66919.00** gt
When: **Mooring operations** **0.01** Reg. L **249.90** LOA

- **Deck**
  - **Collision**
    - **Manoeuvrability**

  Location: **Navigation/communication control space**
- **Ship**
  - **Manoeuvrability**
    - **Vessel does not respond to the helm**
      - **Interaction**
        - **Technical factor**
          - **External Causes**
            - **Other Vessel**
      - **Veers off course**
        - **Human factor**
          - **Working environment**
            - **Hazardous natural environment**
        - **Technical factor**
          - **External Causes**
            - **Other Vessel**

Tanker/combination carrier Dead **0** Injured **0** **Minor Damage**
Oil/bulk/ore carrier Flag **Bahamas**
Bulk/oil **45593.00** gt
When: **Mooring operations** **0.01** Reg. L **246.82** LOA

- **Deck**
  - **Bridge procedures**
    - **Communications/Orders**
      - **Communication failure, master/pilot**
    - **Poor Decision Making**
      - **Incorrect or insufficient action taken**
  - **Collision**
    - **Manoeuvrability**

  Location: **Navigation/communication control space**
- **Ship**
  - **Manoeuvrability**
    - **Vessel does not respond to the helm**
      - **Interaction**
        - **Human factor**
          - **Working environment**
            - **Hazardous natural environment**
      - **Veers off course**
        - **Human factor**
          - **People**
            - **Situational awareness or communication inadequate**
          - **Working environment**
            - **Hazardous natural environment**

During mooring operations in a Ship to Ship transfer the manoeuvring vessel developed an un correctable swing towards the stand on vessel, resulting in contact and moderate damage to the stand on vessel.

Collisions contacts between ships or ships and platforms etc identified as occurring during loading/unloading 1991 to 2010

During the approach the stand on vessel was told to maintain course and speed, which she did so throughout the incident - until instructed by the mooring master to go full ahead and "get out of the way". The mooring master was stationed on the manoeuvring ship and the intention was to bring this vessel alongside the other and make fast. During the approach the vessel swung away to starboard - to 192. The mooring master requested hard a port. When the head was 173 he ordered steer 170. The helmsman may have confused by this order and kept the wheel on until 170 was reached, at this time the rate of turn was 15 deg / min to port. This was 3 min before contact. 1 min 40 sec before contact the mooring master realised there was still a considerable swing to port and head 165. He ordered hard to starboard but the helm was already on hard to starboard. Speed was increased in an attempt to avoid contact. This was insufficient and the vessels touched. The was little damage to the manoeuvring vessel but the stand on vessel suffered a penetration into a ballast tank and the operation was aborted.

The mooring master was unsupported by the bridge team on the vessel, there was a masters relief in progress and both masters were discussing hand over matters during the incident and seemed unaware or the deteriorating situation until just before the vessels touched. the helmsman and OOW should have provided more feedback to the mooring master and the mooring master was unaware of the helm and vessel swing until it was too late.

Collisions contacts between ships or ships and platforms etc identified as occurring during loading/unloading 1991 to 2010

Case Number **1192/2009** **27/08/2009** **Collision**
Regulation **Accident** Status **Closed**
Location **Coastal waters** **English** **5220.0 N** **148.0 E**
Natural Light **Light** Sea State **Calm <2 ft**
Visibility **Good (5 - 10)** Wind force Range **4-6**
Tanker/combination carrier Dead **0** Injured **0** **Minor Damage**
Oil tanker Flag **Singapore**
Crude oil **164251.00** gt
When: **Replenishment at sea operations** **320.69** Reg. L **334.21** LOA
Deck
Collision
Manoeuvrability
Tanker/combination carrier Dead **0** Injured **0** **Minor Damage**
Oil tanker Flag **Greece**
Crude oil **61724.00** gt
When: **Replenishment at sea operations** **0.01** Reg. L **244.60** LOA
Deck
Bridge procedures
Communications/Orders
Location: **Navigation/communication control space**
Communication failure, master/pilot
Human factor
People
Inattention
Collision
Bridge procedures
Location: **Navigation/communication control space**

A 244m long tanker, with fenders made fast along the port side, was the manoeuvring ship and approaching a 334m long tanker, which was the constant heading ship, before making fast to one another and carrying out ship to ship transfer of cargo. The STS superintendent was on the port bridge wing of the manoeuvring ship with the master, who was relaying orders to the OOW and helmsman inside the bridge. When the two ships were parallel and 10m apart, the superintendent asked for stop engines. Shortly after the engine order, the master talked to the chief officer on the focsle by hand-held radio during which time the superintendent asked for dead slow ahead. However, the master misinterpreted the order and relayed dead slow astern. It was only when the ship's stern was moving towards the other ship that the superintendent realised that something was amiss and ordered hard to port and slow ahead, at which time he was told that the engine was dead slow astern. The superintendent ordered half ahead but before it could take effect, the corner of the boat deck made contact with the other ship's hull. The ships were then parted as it was agreed to abort the manoeuvre.
The manoeuvring ship's company was currently preparing its own STS procedures, which will contain requirements for bridge manning and communications as a result of this case.

Collisions contacts between ships or ships and platforms etc identified as occurring during loading/unloading 1991 to 2010

Case Number **1433/2009** **12/10/2009** **Pollution**
Regulation **Accident** Status **Closed**
Location **Coastal waters** **Scottish**
Cromarty
Natural Light **Light** Sea State **Sheltered Waters**
Visibility **Good (5 - 10)** Wind force Range **0-3**
Tanker/combination carrier Dead **0** Injured **0**
Flag **Bahamas**
58911.00 gt
When: **Loading/discharging cargo** **0.01** Reg. L **246.86** LOA
Machinery
Deck machinery
Windlass
Hydraulic failure
Tanker/combination carrier Dead **0** Injured **0**
Oil tanker Flag **Marshall Islands**
Crude oil **62775.00** gt
When: **Unknown** **0.01** Reg. L **250.00** LOA
A ship to ship transfer operation was being carried out between two vessels while alongside an oil terminal. During the transfer the mooring ropes were being adjusted by the crew of the outbound vessel using a hydraulic windlass. During the operation a hydraulic pipe connection failed and hydraulic oil was sprayed over the deck. The scuppers were plugged and held the oil on the deck, but less than an estimated 1 litre went over the side and caused sheen on the surface. The Scottish Environmental Protection Agency also investigated.

Collisions contacts between ships or ships and platforms etc identified as occurring during loading/unloading 1991 to 2010

Case Number **1659/2009** **01/12/2009** **Collision**
Regulation **Outside MAIB Regulations** Status **Closed**
Location **Coastal waters** **Non UK** **5216.0 N** **157.0 E**
Natural Light **Semi-dark** Sea State **Unknown**
Visibility **Unknown** Wind force Range **4-6**
Tanker/combination carrier Dead **0** Injured **0** **Material Damage**
Flag **Hong Kong**
60193.00 gt
When: **Other offshore operations** **0.01** Reg. L **243.00** LOA
Deck
Collision
Manoeuvrability
Tanker/combination carrier Dead **0** Injured **0** **Minor Damage**
Oil tanker Flag **Marshall Islands**
Products **26113.00** gt
When: **Other offshore operations** **0.01** Reg. L **171.81** LOA
Deck
Bridge procedures
Communications/Orders
Location: **Navigation/communication control space**
Communications failure, master/watchkeeper/rating
Verbal order or instruction not understood/misinterpreted
Human factor
People
Diminished motivation
Manning
Lack of role monitoring
Human factor
People
Vigilance
Poor Decision Making
Location: **Navigation/communication control space**
Incorrect or insufficient action taken
Human factor
People
Inattention
Collision
Bridge procedures
Location: **Navigation/communication control space**

Before cargo ship-to-ship transfer (STS) operations at sea could begin, two tankers had to make fast to one another while under way and making way.

The STS superintendent was on the manoeuvring ship and had the con, while standing at the outboard end of the port bridge wing. The master was close by him relaying orders by voice and by a hand-held radio to the third officer and helmsman inside the bridge. The third officer was relaying the ship's speed and acknowledging the helm orders by hand-held radio to and from the master and was also operating the telegraph as instructed. The helmsman had been at the wheel for an hour and a half and had been steering course orders rather than specific helm orders.

The exterior bridge wing helm indicator illumination was very poor and could not be seen from the superintendent's position.

When the manifolds of the two ships were in line, the superintendent began giving specific helm orders to bring the tankers closer to one another so that mooring lines could be passed between them. Initially, he gave a 'port 10' rudder order. As the bow began to swing to port and towards the other ship, the superintendent ordered 'midships' and then 'starboard 10' to counter the swing. However, the port swing did not stop. The superintendent then ordered the helm to 'starboard 20' and then to 'hard to starboard', and an increase in speed but the rate of turn to port increased. Realising that something was wrong, the master repeated the orders to the third officer and helmsman. The bridge wing indicator was checked at this time and found to be reading 'port 20'. The helmsman

then applied starboard helm and the rate of turn to port decreased, stopped and then the ship began to swing to starboard.
However, after having made an alteration of course of nearly 30 degrees to port, the port side of the focsle inevitably made contact with the other ship, causing structural damage.