# Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)

Joint Doctrine Publication 3-90

# JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 3-90

# CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION (CIMIC)

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# PREFACE

1.   **Background**.  Work under way within the UN, NATO and the EU with respect to Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is at various stages of development and agreement.  MOD Policy for CIMIC was agreed by the Chiefs of Staff in February 2006 and this JDP provides detailed guidance for the conduct of CIMIC by UK operators and commanders.

2.   **Purpose**.  The purpose of JDP 3-90 '*Civil-Military Co-Operation*' is to articulate the UK military approach to CIMIC and to help shape multinational CIMIC doctrine.

3.   **Context**.  The principles of CIMIC apply across the entire spectrum of tension and conflict and at each level of war and command.  This JDP is focused at the operational level as the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and his staff are responsible for the coherence of CIMIC in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).  Recent initiatives to optimise broader civil-military co-operation to meet political objectives include the adoption of a wider effects-based, Comprehensive Approach.  This will be documented in an updated British Defence Doctrine in 2006.

# LINKAGES

4.   This JDP takes account of NATO CIMIC Policy (MC 411/1), UK Defence Policy for CIMIC and AJP-9 '*NATO Civil-Military Co-operation Doctrine*'.  It amplifies the basic tenets of CIMIC put forward in JDP 01 '*Joint Operations*' and JWP 3-00 (2nd Edition) '*Joint Operations Execution*'.  It should be read in conjunction with JWP 3-50 (2nd Edition) '*The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*', JWP 3-51 '*Non-combatant Evacuation Operations*' and JWP 3-52 '*Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations Doctrine*'.

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# CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION

## CONTENTS

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# JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS

The successful conduct of Joint operations requires intellectually sound, clearly understood and accepted doctrine that can be exploited by a nation and its likely partners, particularly in those situations associated with crisis and conflict.  It is UK policy that national doctrine should be consistent with NATO doctrine, terminology and procedures (other than when the UK has elected not to ratify NATO doctrine).  However, national doctrine should always cater for those areas not adequately covered by NATO doctrine, as well as influence the development of Allied doctrine.  These requirements are met by the hierarchy of Joint Doctrine/Warfare Publications (JDP/JWPs).[1]

Interim Joint Doctrine/Warfare Publications (IJDP/IJWPs) are published to meet pressing new short to medium-term requirements for fully staffed and agreed Joint doctrine, often to deal with unexpected or unfamiliar circumstances and gaps in guidance.  More short-term, urgent requirements for doctrine are published in Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs).  JDNs do not represent an agreed or fully staffed position, but are raised in short order by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) to establish and disseminate current best practice.  They also establish the basis for further development and experimentation and provide a doctrinal basis for operations and exercises.

The Joint doctrine development process and the associated hierarchy of JDP/JWPs are explained in extant DCIs,[2] and in future, will be in Defence Instructions and Notices (DINs).

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[1] JWPs will shortly be renamed JDPs, as part of the review cycle.
[2] DCI GEN 307 2004.

# RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

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# CHAPTER 1 – OVERVIEW

'*As a major contributor to UK Government objectives, the UK Armed
Forces and MOD must work closely with other Government
Departments, with the private and the voluntary sectors in the UK,
and with allies abroad, to integrate the military, diplomatic, economic
and social components of crisis resolution.*'[1]

101.    The post-Cold War and post '9/11' security environment has been characterised by an increase in intra-state conflict and inter-state conflict associated with global counter-terrorism strategies.  There has also been an increased readiness to intervene in the form of Peace Support Operations (PSOs).  The operational environment in areas of crisis encompasses an increasing range of civil actors, including Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), International Organisations (IOs), commercial interests (including private security companies), local authorities and local populations.  Together with increased Media influence, this presents more complex challenges to operations, most of which will have a critical civil-military dimension.  The civil-military interaction within operations is termed Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC).  Although a core element of military operations for many years, CIMIC has gained in prominence with increased UK involvement in complex PSOs.  CIMIC is a command led process.

## SECTION I – THE OPERATIONAL CONTEXT

102.    **A Multi-Dimensional Environment**.  Any operational environment is likely to be complex, unstable and unpredictable.  When planning and conducting operations, intolerance of collateral damage (casualties and materiel), damage to the environment and legal issues will be constraining factors, as will social, political, cultural, religious, economic and humanitarian considerations.  Military success alone will achieve little beyond containment of a situation unless the conditions for the pursuit of civil objectives by civil actors are created.[2]

103.    **Harmonisation of Effort**.  The civil actors engaged in a conflict or crisis situation will have varying mandates, competencies and capacities.  The harmonisation of civil and military efforts will increase coherence and synergy in generating the effects required by the strategic objectives.  CIMIC is the process by which this harmonisation is achieved, the nature and extent of which will vary depending on the specific operational circumstances.

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[1]  Defence Strategic Guidance 2005 '*The Defence Vision*'.
[2] The term '*civil actors*' may be taken to include IOs, donor organisations (for example, International Monetary Fund (IMF)), other security forces (for example, civil police), NGOs, the corporate sector (including private security providers), national and local authorities, and local populations.

## SECTION II – THE UK APPROACH TO CIMIC

104.    **Definition**.  The UK has accepted the NATO definition of CIMIC:

> '*The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission,
> between the [NATO] Commander and civil actors, including the
> national population and local authorities, as well as international,
> national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.*'[3]

105.    **UK Approach**.  The UK approach, as articulated in UK CIMIC Policy,[4] is that CIMIC allows military operations to make a coherent contribution to UK and international political objectives.  The UK emphasises the need for a more comprehensive and long-term view of the strategic environment.  Collaboration across government and beyond, in accordance with the principles of the Comprehensive Approach[5], will harmonise all contributions, enabling better identification and achievement of desired outcomes.  This approach is supported at the operational and tactical level by integrating CIMIC staff and the CIMIC process into the chain of command.

106.    **UN Definition**.  The UN uses the term Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCoord) and emphasises the humanitarian aspects.  CMCoord is defined as:

> '*the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and
> military actors…. to protect and promote humanitarian
> principles, avoid competition, minimize conflict, and when
> appropriate pursue common goals*'.[6]

107.    **US Model**.  The US Armed Forces refer to Civil Affairs (CA) as those activities that enhance the civil-military relationship.  Civil-Military Operations (CMO) establish, maintain, influence or exploit civil-military relations in support of US operational objectives.  CMO may include the performance by military forces of functions normally the responsibility of local, regional or national government, and may occur in the absence of other military operations.[7]  The US may deploy separate CA headquarters with command and control across subordinate CA sub-formations, although in recent operations the preferred method has been to integrate CA resources into the mainstream command structures, similar to the UK approach.

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[3] AAP-6 '*NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*'.
[4] UK Defence Policy for CIMIC endorsed by Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments), February 2006.
[5] The Comprehensive Approach is articulated in Joint Discussion Note 4/05.  It does not represent a fully agreed or staffed position but establishes the basis for further development.  The Comprehensive Approach will be incorporated into British Defence Doctrine when sufficiently mature.
[6] 'Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies' dated March 2003.
[7] US Joint Publication 1-02 '*Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and associated Terms*', 31 August 2005.

# SECTION III – THE PURPOSE OF CIMIC

108.    **Purpose**.  CIMIC is a function of operations conducted to allow the Commander to interact effectively, on a day-to-day basis, with the civil environment in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).  It provides for co-operation, co-ordination, mutual support, joint planning and information exchange between military forces and in-theatre civil actors.  It thereby assists the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) with the achievement of the *military* mission and maximises the effectiveness of the military contribution to the *overall* mission.[8]  CIMIC can be a force multiplier where it releases military resources for other operational tasks or increases the effectiveness or efficiency of military activity.

109.    **Applicability**.  The co-ordination of civil and military planning is a basic tenet of the Comprehensive Approach.  CIMIC is a practical application of the Comprehensive Approach at the operational and tactical levels.  It is necessary throughout the spectrum of tension and conflict, shaping the operational environment to the mutual benefit of both military and civil actors.  Hence CIMIC should be an integral part of the Campaign Plan from the outset of the planning process.

110.    **Utility**.  CIMIC contributes to:

    a.    **Planning**.  Military liaison with civil agencies provides a fundamental input to military planning processes and contributes to the setting of conditions for mission success.

    b.    **Support to the Force**.  By influencing the attitudes and conduct of civil agencies and populations, CIMIC can maximise support to operations, minimise interference, increase Campaign Authority and enhance force protection, thereby maximising freedom of manoeuvre for the JTFC.  In addition CIMIC contributes to fulfilment of the JTFC's obligations to ensure that operations are conducted within all applicable law (see paragraph 413).

    c.    **Support to the Civil Community**.  Support to the civil community can involve information, personnel, materiel, equipment, communications, specialist expertise or training.  Any support given should contribute to the military mission, although civil objectives may be supported where civil authorities and agencies would otherwise be unable to carry out their tasks.  Hence the military mission may be expanded to include the conduct of tasks normally the responsibility of civil authorities.

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[8] A distinction should be drawn between the military mission and overall mission.  The military mission is the objective or objectives to be achieved by military forces in support of the overall mission.  The overall mission will usually be specified by UNSCR or by coalition nations operating under a UN or other legitimising mandate.

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# CHAPTER 2 – THE CIVIL PERSPECTIVE

## SECTION I – THE CIVIL CONTEXT

201.    The nature of civil-military relationships varies at each level of command.[1]

a.    **Strategic**.  Operations by UK forces are conducted in accordance with national political objectives and direction from Cabinet and Ministerial levels.  Intra-government and inter-agency relationships, including the interface between the Ministry of Defence (MOD), senior military commanders and their national and international political and policy decision-making bodies, should be governed by the principles of the Comprehensive Approach.  Such an approach at the strategic level ensures that planning is consistent with the wider political objectives and strategy.  This consistency must be maintained at the operational and tactical levels.

b.    **Operational**.  CIMIC at the operational level facilitates the relationship between military commanders and national authorities, International Organisations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the civilian population within the Joint Operations Area (JOA), necessary to ensure effective planning, preparation, support and execution of operations.  This level of CIMIC is the concern of deployed formation headquarters.

c.    **Tactical**.  This is the level at which interaction between the military and civilian sectors takes place on the ground and hence is the concern of all military personnel.  It is the level at which the CIMIC process and activity have the most immediate effect and may have implications through to the strategic level.

## SECTION II – CIVILIANS AND CIVIL ORGANISATIONS

202.    **Civilians and Civil Organisations**.  A complex civil sector will be a feature of all operations and should be considered as much part of the solution as part of the problem.  The degree of co-operation and co-ordination between military and civil organisations will vary depending on the type of organisation.  Civil organisations are categorised broadly as:

a.    **Other Government Departments**.  Whilst various Other Government Departments (OGDs) may become involved in the management of crises, the most critical are the Cabinet Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DFID).  DFID

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[1] The term CIMIC is only applied to the operational and tactical levels.  Inter-agency co-operation at the strategic level is encompassed within the Comprehensive Approach.

works with a wide range of implementing partners in the civil sector and may work with armed forces to facilitate the efficient delivery of humanitarian assistance, or to promote a secure environment (for example, security sector reform) so that economic, social and political development can take place. If requested by MOD, DFID may second a Humanitarian Advisor to the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC).[2]

b.     **Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit**. To improve inter-departmental co-operation and co-ordination, the Government has established the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), an inter-departmental team mandated to increase the UK's capacity to deal with immediate post-conflict stabilisation. The PCRU will:

(1)     Develop strategy for post-conflict stabilisation, including linking military and civilian planning and working with the wider international community.

(2)     Plan, implement and manage the UK contribution to post-conflict stabilisation, including practical civilian capabilities needed to stabilise the environment in immediate post-conflict situations.

The PCRU is a developing organisation which, as it becomes established, will have implications for the way in which military activity (including CIMIC) is conducted.

c.     **International Organisations**. IOs are established by inter-governmental agreements and include the various United Nations (UN) organisations and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The UN Development Programme (UNDP) administers and coordinates most developmental technical assistance. The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) is likely to be responsible for co-ordinating the activities of relief agencies including the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP).

d.     **International Committee of the Red Cross**. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, neutral and independent organisation. It has an important humanitarian role in armed conflict, protected by international law. It is responsible for operating the Central Tracing Agency (maintaining records of prisoners of war, inspecting their camps and providing relief), providing humanitarian assistance to the civilian population and for monitoring the protection of cultural property. It also works to settle disputes and help states to comply with the law of armed

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[2] Under certain circumstances, if DFID is represented within the country, a Development Adviser may also be made available.

conflict.  Parties to any conflict are under a legal obligation to give ICRC all possible facilities to enable it to carry out its humanitarian functions.  As far as possible, similar facilities should be granted to national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

e.      **Non-Governmental Organisations**.  The generic title of NGO encompasses a wide range of organisations with varying mandates, roles and priorities.  Some may have been operating in the crisis region for a long time prior to the deployment of military forces.  Many may be willing to co-operate with the military, through the exchange of information and the co-ordination of resources, when working towards a common purpose.  Others, especially those providing humanitarian assistance or protection to vulnerable populations, will be constrained by their mandate or principles as to the level of co-operation they are willing to have with the military.  Establishing mechanisms for co-operation is essential, and regular peacetime liaison will help the military and NGOs to understand each other better.  Some NGOs operate under umbrella organisations to provide greater coherency.[3]  The existence and utility of NGOs is acknowledged in Article 71 of the UN Charter.  They fall into one of 2 categories:

> (1)      **Mandated**.  A mandated NGO has been recognised officially by the lead IOs in a conflict or crisis and authorised to work in the affected area.

> (2)      **Non-Mandated**.  A non-mandated NGO has no official authorisation but may be sub-contracted by an IO or a mandated NGO. In other cases they obtain funds from private donors.  There are examples of non-mandated NGOs created to support certain factions in a conflict, often as a means to deliver external support.  Contact with such NGOs should be avoided or handled with caution as contact may undermine Campaign Authority and obstruct the mission.  It is the role of CIMIC staff to determine the status of NGOs and to advise the Commander.

f.      **Donor Organisations**.  Donors may include national agencies such as DFID or the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and international bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. As these organisations may control much of the funding for humanitarian, reconstruction and developmental activities, they will have an important role in long term planning.

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[3] For example VOICE (Voluntary Organisations in Co-operation in Emergencies) represents about 90 European NGOs.

g.    **The Commercial Sector**.  Commercial organisations are likely to be established already in the crisis region or become engaged in the early stages of emergency relief and post-conflict reconstruction.  Indigenous businesses may be a useful source of information, as well as playing a critical role in the reintegration of demobilised armed forces into society.  External commercial organisations may provide investment thereby creating opportunities for the local population.

h.    **Private Security Companies**.  Increasingly, private security companies (PSCs) are being engaged to provide services such as area security, close protection, escort and guard duties.  The activities of PSCs may complement or hinder the mission, and it is the role of CIMIC staff to assess the impact and to advise the Commander accordingly.  Provided they take no direct part in hostilities, the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) affords PSC personnel protected civilian status.  However, in complex situations, the JTFC may have to assess the activities of such companies and their personnel to determine whether they remain within or have breached their protected status.  Positive engagement with PSCs may influence and moderate their behaviour and may offer advantages such as access to Intelligence.

i.    **Local Authorities and Populace**.  Commanders should develop an understanding of traditional laws and customs as they apply to civil communities and should incorporate local perceptions of security and need into their planning, gaining insight from existing local solutions.  Liaison should be established as early as possible with government and non-governmental authorities and with local representatives, without whose co-operation the military mission is unlikely to succeed.

j.    **Dislocated Civilians**.  Crisis and conflict may lead to the unwilling movement of civilians from their homes.  Specific terminology to describe such people includes:[4]

   (1)    **Internally Displaced Person**.  Any person who has been forced to flee their home as a result of conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human rights, fear of such violation, or natural or man-made disasters, and who has not crossed an internationally recognised state border.

   (2)    **Refugee**.  Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside his or her home

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[4] AAP-6 '*NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*'.

country and is unable or unwilling to seek the protection of his country
or return to it.

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# CHAPTER 3 – HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

## SECTION I – HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS

301.    **Characteristics**.  Although CIMIC involves interaction with the whole of the civil community, it is the relationships with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and International Organisations (IOs) within the humanitarian sector that can be the most demanding.  Humanitarian issues are likely to be most pressing during the early phases of an operation and are likely to be the subject of intense media interest.  IOs, such as United Nations relief agencies, and a number of humanitarian NGOs, are likely to be present in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).  Effective CIMIC will require close liaison with these organisations and it is important that their generic characteristics are understood.  These include:

>    a.    **Lack of Uniformity**.  Humanitarian organisations range from major IOs and NGOs to minor organisations with limited resources, each with its own mandate and agenda.  The former are sophisticated, better funded, often multi-national organisations whilst the latter are smaller, independent national bodies that often operate in isolation.

>    b.    **Independence**.  NGOs are independently motivated and determine their own priorities.  They are usually non-profit making and answerable only to their directors and donors.  They are reluctant to be controlled by other organisations.  In most situations they rely on their neutrality and impartiality as a means of promoting their own security and are often reluctant to be associated with the military.

>    c.    **Longer-Term Responsibilities**.  Compared to the military, many humanitarian agencies have more enduring commitments and longer-term investments in the countries in which they work.  Thus it is likely that their perspective on the operational requirements for the area in crisis may be very different to that of the military.

## SECTION II – THE LEGAL BASIS

302.    There is provision within the Geneva Conventions of 1949[1] authorising the presence of impartial humanitarian organisations within conflict regions.  The legal basis for the provision of humanitarian assistance by NGOs will be determined by the nature of the conflict and the existence or not of a functioning host government.

303.    **Stable or Fragile States**.  As a general principle, international humanitarian assistance is only provided at the request, or with the concurrence, of the host nation

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[1] GCI, Art 9; GCII, Art 9; GCIII, Art 9 and GCIV, Art 10.

(HN) government, with whom IOs and NGOs may enter into legal agreements. Such agreements often take the form of official registration with and accountability to a particular government ministry. UN organisations and staff are often afforded certain privileges and immunities as a result. Many NGOs operate as 'implementing' or 'operational' partners of UN agencies and may receive similar immunities, funding and protection from the UN.

304. **Failed States**. Where the HN government has ceased to function, NGOs may operate on the basis of their legal agreements with UN agencies or as independent agencies. Such a situation may cause difficulties for the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), as organisations may not abide by established security agreements or in accordance with established UN co-ordination processes.

# SECTION III – CO-ORDINATION

305. **Special Representative of the Secretary General**. The UN Secretary General may appoint a Special Representative (SRSG) to coordinate the activities of all humanitarian actors working under UN auspices.

306. **Humanitarian Coordinator or Lead Agency**. If an SRSG is not appointed, co-ordination will usually be the responsibility of a Humanitarian Co-ordinator (HC) from OCHA. Alternatively the Secretary General may nominate a Lead Agency. This is usually a major UN agency such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP) or UNICEF. Specific responsibilities of the HC/Lead Agency are to:

    a.    Act as a point of contact for all agencies in the emergency, particularly for planning and information sharing.

    b.    Co-ordinate field activities to avoid duplication of effort.

    c.    Act as an interface with the military.

307. **Resident Co-ordinator**. The Resident Co-ordinator (RC) is the head of the in-country UN team and is the Designated Official for Security. As such, the RC is responsible for the security and protection of all UN staff in country and their eligible dependants. A successful working relationship between the JTFC and the RC/HC is critical.

308. **Head of Agencies Meeting**. The Head of Agencies Meeting is a key event in the co-ordination process; the JTFC should attend. It is chaired by the HC, Lead Agency or SRSG and includes representation from all UN agencies, the International Organisation for Migration and mandated NGOs. The ICRC has observer status.

309.    **Non-Governmental Organisation/Military Contact Group**.  Long-term relationships between the UK military and domestic and international humanitarian NGOs are fostered through an informal NGO/Military Contact Group aimed at developing mutual understanding and facilitating education and training opportunities between the military and humanitarian sectors.  Military representation includes staff from the Joint CIMIC Group (Jt CIMIC Gp), Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC).

## SECTION IV – HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES

310.    **Core Humanitarian Principles**.  Humanitarian organisations need to maintain their independence and freedom of action in order to achieve their objectives. Humanitarian assistance by civilian aid organisations is rendered in accordance with 3 principles:[2]

>       a.      **Humanity**.  Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and the elderly.  The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.

>       b.      **Impartiality**.  Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating with respect to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinion, race or religion.  Relief of suffering must be guided solely by needs, and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.

>       c.      **Neutrality**.  Humanitarian organisations must not assist, condone or justify hostilities or take sides in political, religious or ideological disputes.

311.    **Humanitarian Space**.  An important consideration for humanitarian agencies is the establishment and maintenance of a humanitarian operating environment, termed *the humanitarian space*.  Maintaining a distinction between the role of humanitarian actors and that of the military is crucial for creating a safe environment in which humanitarian organisations can operate effectively.  Commanders should ensure that the importance of preserving the humanitarian space is understood at all levels and that relationships with organisations are managed accordingly.  However, recent operational experience indicates that humanitarian organisations are increasingly unable to rely on their neutrality as the basis for their security.  In extremis, they may seek military protection, but prefer the military to provide area security rather than direct protection.  Humanitarian space will vary according to:

>       a.      The particular humanitarian organisation, its mandate and principles.

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[2] UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182.

b.      The nature of activity undertaken, ranging from immediate humanitarian relief through to long-term development.

c.      The level of security within the JOA and the extent to which the security of the humanitarian organisation is perceived to be threatened.

d.      The mission of the Joint Force.

e.      Third party perceptions.

f.      The phase of an operation.

312.    **Information Exchange**.  Notwithstanding the need to maintain an appropriate degree of separation, there will be a need for information exchange between the military and humanitarian sectors.  Without this, the provision of a secure environment in which NGOs and IOs can operate will be difficult to achieve.

313.    **Humanitarian Assistance by Military Forces**.  Any perception by IOs and NGOs that military forces are becoming involved directly in the provision of humanitarian assistance is likely to raise concerns unless conducted in accordance with UN guidelines.[3]  These state that the involvement of military forces in humanitarian activity is inappropriate as it may compromise humanitarian principles and put the lives of aid workers at risk, and/or prejudice the success of the humanitarian operation.  However, where humanitarian agencies are unable or unwilling to provide the necessary assistance, direct military support is acceptable.  In these circumstances the military should act in support of the most appropriate humanitarian agency and should hand over responsibility as soon as suitable humanitarian resources are available.

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[3]'*Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*', March 2003.  Available at http://ochaonline.un.org/mcdu/guidelines.

# CHAPTER 4 – CIMIC IN PRACTICE

## SECTION I – PRINCIPLES

401.    There are 2 key CIMIC activities undertaken either to generate civil support to the force, or in support of the civil environment.  These are:

   a.    **Civil-Military Liaison**.  This provides the necessary interaction to support the planning and conduct of coherent activity.  Liaison should take place early in the planning process and continue throughout the conduct of an operation.

   b.    **Civil-Military Operations**.  Civil-military operations may be undertaken using Joint Force resources alone, or in combination with civil resources.  Such operations will benefit from the specialist advice and co-ordination provided by civil-military liaison.

402.    Activities should be conducted in accordance with 9 guiding principles:

   a.    **Compliance with the Law**.  The Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) is under a continuing obligation to ensure that operations are conducted within the law, including international humanitarian law, the law of the territory in which operations are taking place and UK domestic law.  While fulfilling these, commanders must seek to reduce the effect of military operations on non-combatants and, where possible, facilitate maximum support to them.  Legal advice must be sought at an early stage in planning and should remain available throughout operations.[1]

   b.    **Understanding Civil Actors**.  The JTFC must understand the structure, interests, mandates, methodologies and capabilities of the key civil agencies involved.  This will enable the JTFC to determine what can and cannot be achieved, what will and will not be undertaken, by whom and under what circumstances.  The most effective way for military forces to understand the skills, knowledge and capabilities of International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) is to establish relationships before entering an area of operations.

   c.    **Cultural Awareness**.  An understanding of diversity, civil values, customs, ethnicity, religion, culture and cultural property[2] is fundamental.  In a sensitive operating environment, an unintentional violation of a local law or custom may seriously alter the local perception of the Joint Force.  Similarly a

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[1] See JWP 3-46 '*Legal Support to Joint Operations*'.
[2] With specific reference to the 1954 Hague Convention protocols on cultural property.

lack of sensitivity towards the values of an IO or NGO could impair effective co-operation. Lack of cultural awareness has the potential to break international humanitarian law, seriously undermine mission success, create unfavourable media coverage and adversely affect Campaign Authority.

d. **Differentiated Relationships**. It will be neither practical nor necessary to have the same degree of co-operation or co-ordination with all civil agencies at all times. There are those organisations with whom it is appropriate to conduct co-ordinated planning, whereas for others it may be more appropriate to engage primarily through liaison. These relationships are likely to vary as the operation proceeds.

e. **Co-operation, Respect and Trust**. The traditional military concept of command will be alien to many civilians; hence the JTFC will best achieve the necessary relationships through co-operation and consensus. While every effort should be made to secure the willing co-operation of civil actors with which the Joint Task Force interacts, there can be no obligation or military control of civil organisations.

f. **Effective Communication**. Effective communication with civil actors will be vital to maintain consent and generate understanding and co-operation. The establishment of special facilities to meet this requirement needs to be considered carefully. There is a balance to be struck between accessibility, force protection and operations security.

g. **Situational Awareness and Transparency**. The JTFC's situational awareness can be improved through CIMIC. Therefore dialogue with the civil sector should emphasise information sharing. Tension between political, military, humanitarian and other components of the operational environment may lead to confusion and misunderstanding and may be aggravated by political bias, Media inaccuracy and poor communications. Every effort should be made to pass timely and relevant information to the appropriate civil actors and not to classify information unnecessarily. Civil actors will also have information that they are unable to share. The perception that CIMIC is supporting Intelligence gathering or is propagating disinformation should be guarded against.

h. **Dependency and Transition Management**. When planning support to the civil community, it is important to encourage a culture of ownership and 'self help' within the local population. Tasks conducted merely to employ spare capacity or generate a 'feel good' factor can create false perceptions of the military mission. Inadequate infrastructure or materiel may result in dependency on military resources, rendering military disengagement and follow-on civil activity more difficult. This situation in turn may retard the

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growth of civil authority, jeopardise security and cause lasting damage to public confidence in the Joint Force. Before committing military resources, the Commander must have a plan for transition of responsibility, including key milestones, measures of effectiveness, and when and to whom responsibility will transfer.

i. **The Incorporation of Local Perceptions**. There are often marked differences between the perceptions of peace and security held by the indigenous communities and those of the military forces and international agencies present. Commanders require a realistic interpretation of the security needs of the affected societies and of specific communities within them. Particular effort should be made to include the views of those who might otherwise be silent (such as women, the elderly or certain ethnic groups or castes) but who might have a significant impact on post-conflict reconstruction and long term stability. The JTFC should incorporate local perceptions into the operational planning processes or, as a minimum, should attempt to balance military perceptions with those of the local communities and international civil agencies.

# SECTION II – ORGANISATION

403. The Commander should have the capacity within his headquarters to identify and analyse civil issues and influences, and have the assets within his force to conduct resulting civil-military activity. The JTFC will typically employ 3 components to conduct CIMIC:

a. Organic CIMIC staff embedded within operational headquarters.

b. Trained CIMIC augmentees in headquarters and unit formations.

c. All-arms force elements.

404. The size, structure and composition of the JTFC's CIMIC staff will vary depending on the specific operational circumstances. The Jt CIMIC Gp is likely to be the principal source for staff augmentation and the training of organic and assigned personnel. It will also provide CIMIC education and awareness to force elements. Augmentees may include:

a. **CIMIC Advisers**. CIMIC Advisers are officers from the Jt CIMIC Gp, familiar with the capabilities, motivation and limitations of civil actors and with a detailed understanding of their processes, to enhance the JTFC's CIMIC planning and management capability.

b. **CIMIC Support Team**. A CIMIC Support Team (CST), typically 4 specialists from the Jt CIMIC Gp, may be provided to conduct field assessments of the civil environment, assist in the establishment of CIMIC Centres (see paragraph 415), and to identify, manage or supervise designated tasks within the civil environment.

c. **Functional Specialists**. Civilian or military functional specialists may be called forward as required to provide expert advice on specialist civil functions to meet short-term military objectives or wider civil-military objectives within the Joint Operations Area (JOA).[3]

d. **Liaison Officers**. Liaison Officers (LOs) may significantly enhance understanding at the civil-military interface, facilitate more effective civil-military co-operation and may be crucial in the building of trust and respect. It is important to establish a clear liaison architecture at every level of command. LOs may be drawn from the Jt CIMIC Gp or elsewhere.

e. **Humanitarian Adviser**. A Humanitarian Adviser may be seconded from the Department for International Development (DFID) to provide the JTFC with specialist advice on the effects of military action on the humanitarian sector. The Humanitarian Adviser may also provide links to humanitarian actors who would normally be inaccessible to the Joint Force. Such advice will have utility throughout the operation and will complement the work undertaken by CIMIC staff and the Political Adviser (POLAD).

f. **Stabilisation Adviser**. The Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) may augment the Joint Task Force Headquarters with a Stabilisation Adviser to advise the Commander on the co-ordination of military activity with the requirements for reconstruction and stabilisation of civil society. The Stabilisation Adviser is likely to co-ordinate the provision of Deployed Civilian Experts (DCE) into the JOA.

405. **Operations Focus**. In order to maintain a coherent approach to CIMIC and to achieve the necessary operational linkages, (particularly with J5 (Plans), Information Operations (Info Ops), Media Operations (Media Ops), and Targeting) headquarters CIMIC activity should be conducted within the J3 (Operations Support) staff function. However, close liaison between all staff branches involved in the civil environment will be necessary. Figure 4.1 illustrates the key inter-branch links necessary to ensure coherence. A more detailed listing of inter-branch CIMIC considerations is at Annex 4A.

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[3] Functional specialists can be drawn from the Jt CIMIC Gp, but may also be drawn from the Engineer and Logistic Staff Corps (V). Alternatively, this expertise may be available from Deployed Civilian Experts provided by the PCRU. (See sub-paragraph 404 f.)

Legal implications:
International Humanitarian
Law, SOFAs, MOUs,
Hague Conventions

Personnel issues

Information sharing on
matters of mutual interest

Co-ordinate CIMIC aspects of
current ops, including target
deconfliction

Deconflict use of local
resources, including medical.
Support to assess impact on
civil environment

Co-ordinate CIMIC aspects of
future ops and particularly the
'post-conflict' phase of
campaign plans. Measures of
Effectiveness

Political advice

Humanitarian
advice

Support to the
civil environment

Coherence with
Media & Info Ops

Funds for CIMIC
Projects and QIPs

LEGAD

POLAD

HUMAD

Engineers

J1

J2

J3

J4

J5

CIMIC

Info Ops

Civil
Secretary

**Figure 4.1 – CIMIC Linkages to other Staff Branches**

406. **Provincial Reconstruction Teams**. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1510, adopted in October 2003, authorised the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan to operate beyond Kabul in the form of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). A PRT is a combination of military and civilian personnel deployed with the aim of extending the authority of the central Afghan Government and helping to facilitate development and reconstruction by contributing to an improved security environment. PRTs also aim to support security sector reform, disarmament and demobilisation of militias, the building of democratically accountable national army and police, tackling of the drugs trade and the building of a legal system. The PRT model is a logical extension of the aims of CIMIC and is part of the in-theatre expression of the Comprehensive Approach. Although to date only employed within Afghanistan, the PRT model may prove to be an enduring feature of PSOs.

## SECTION III – PLANNING

407. **Stakeholder Analysis**. The CIMIC Estimate should include a stakeholder analysis evaluating the potential planning contributions of:

    a.    DFID.

    b.    Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).

    c.    PCRU.

    d.    UN Lead Agency, Resident Co-ordinator (RC)/Humanitarian Co-ordinator (HC)/Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) or individual UN agencies.

    e.    Allied or coalition forces (such as US Civil-Military Operations Task Forces).

    f.    Donor organisations such as European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

    g.    Host Nation (HN) security forces.

    h.    HN national and local government.

    i.    Local population and civil society institutions

    j.    Major NGOs.

    k.      IOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and International Organisation for Migration (IOM).

408.    **CIMIC Planning Considerations**.  In common with overall military planning, CIMIC staff should understand the Commander's Intent and any specific direction that has been given from higher authority such as Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) Directives.  It is essential that CIMIC staff gain a thorough understanding of civil plans for the operational theatre and that CIMIC planning is fully integrated with that of other staff branches.  Suggested CIMIC planning considerations are:

    a.      Geography.

    b.      Cultural factors (for example, ethnicity, religion, gender, cultural property).

    c.      Humanitarian and health needs.

    d.      The availability of funding.

    e.      Civil emergency planning and preparedness.

    f.      Local perceptions of the security imperatives.

    g.      Infrastructure security.

    h.      Public Affairs, Media Ops and Info Ops.

    i.      Specific requirements for women in the Joint Force.[4]

    j.      National and international plans for economic development and commerce.

    k.      The effectiveness of civil society organisations and their leaders.

    l.      Indigenous civilian resources and management skills.

    m.    Legal aspects.

409.    **Funding**.  Proper funding is essential and limitations on funding are likely to be one of the key planning constraints.  CIMIC activity in support of the military mission, such as assistance to the local community that has a force protection objective, will usually be funded from the operations budget.  Military activity which

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[4] Indigenous cultural concerns may dictate the use of female personnel to conduct searches, enter certain properties, question female civilians or to conduct medical treatment.  Alternatively, in other circumstances, it may be inappropriate to use female personnel.

supports humanitarian assistance or reconstruction should be funded from elsewhere (often from DFID but other funding sources may be available) and specific criteria for this will apply.[5] It is the responsibility of the CIVSEC/J8 staff to establish a mechanism for the disbursement of, and accounting for, funds from internal sources and external organisations. This will require a close relationship with both CIMIC staff and DFID (via the Humanitarian Adviser if assigned).

410. **Legal Aspects**. CIMIC, and indeed all other lines of operation, are frequently underpinned by complex legal arrangements. For example, the implications of the applicable national law can range from contract negotiations through criminal justice and determination of property disputes as well as the Status of Forces Agreement. International law, for example the terms of the UN mandate, international humanitarian law and UK and coalition partners' domestic laws, are also key considerations demanding early consideration with legal advisers.

## SECTION IV – CONDUCT

411. **Civil-Military Operations**. CIMIC facilitates the planning and execution of civil-military operations. These elements of the Campaign Plan are often grouped under headings such as Governance and Participation, Economic Development, Humanitarian Assistance or Security Sector Reform. Specific activities include:

> a. **Population and Resource Control**. Population and Resource Control provides security for the population, denies personnel and materiel to the enemy, mobilises population and materiel resources and reduces the effectiveness of enemy infiltration. Population controls include movement of refugee/displaced persons, curfews, civilian movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, relocation and resettlement. Resource control measures include licensing (for example, of production, purchase or consumption), checkpoints, ration controls, amnesty programmes and inspection of facilities.

> b. **Humanitarian Assistance**. Humanitarian Assistance is defined: 'as part of an operation, the use of available military resources to assist or complement the efforts of responsible civil actors in the operational area or specialised civil humanitarian organisations in fulfilling their primary responsibility to alleviate human suffering.'[6] (see paragraph 313). Such activity should only be considered in consultation with DFID or the appropriate civilian agencies.

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[5] Examples of criteria can be found in the DFID Quick Impact Project Handbook (currently in draft, to be issued 2006).
[6] AAP-6 '*NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*'.

c.      **Support to Civil Administration**.  In the case of a failed or failing state, there may be a requirement to ensure public order, safety and effective administration in the absence of a competent authority.  In such circumstances the military may be required to support or substitute for the civil administration.  This will place particular demands on the JTFC, and CIMIC staff should be prepared to advise the Commander, in close co-ordination with the POLAD.  Subject to the specific requirements of the situation, the imperative is to restore responsibility for civil administration to a legitimate (permanent or interim), competent, civil authority at the earliest opportunity.

d.      **Support to the Civil Society**.  Military activities or projects in direct support of civil society should be agreed with the appropriate civil authority but should also take account of the views of the local population.  They should contribute to the creation of a more normal and secure environment and may, by shaping local perceptions, generate force protection benefits and other support to the force (see paragraph 413).  Referred to as Quick Impact Projects (QIP), this type of support should meet urgent stabilisation and reconstruction needs and contribute to the resumption of normal life in post-conflict societies.

412.    **Influence Activity**.  CIMIC has utility in facilitating 'hearts and minds' activities.  These are targeted at the local population, or at particular groups within it, with the aim of gaining the acceptance of (and even support for) the military presence. At the core of a successful 'hearts and minds' campaign are activities that lead to a real and demonstrable improvement in the lives of the target population.  While there is a potential overlap between these activities and the support to civil society described above, 'hearts-and-minds' activities are undertaken to achieve political and military objectives.  They should be properly coordinated with the appropriate civil actors. Neither neutral nor impartial, 'hearts and minds' activity should not be described as humanitarian but, if properly targeted can add to Campaign Authority.  The CIMIC contribution to 'hearts and minds', and other forms of influence activity, highlights the close relationship between CIMIC and Info Ops.[7]

413.    **CIMIC Support to Commanders**.  The CIMIC process provides support to commanders by:

a.      Reduction of civilian interference with military operations (enhanced freedom of manoeuvre).

b.      Development of the CIMIC components of operation plans and contingency plans.

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[7] For example CIMIC staff may provide the initial civil links for Info Ops staff.  Detailed guidance is in JWP 3-80 '*Information Operations*'.

c.     Promotion of civilian co-operation to achieve economy and unity of effort.  This includes transition planning for hand-over of responsibilities.

d.     Advice to commanders of the civilian impact on military operations.

e.     Augmenting information on the political, cultural,[8] and socio-economic situation in the JOA.

f.     Development of the Protected Target List including potential targets that could be critical to post-conflict recovery or protected cultural property.[9]

g.     Management of the CIMIC contribution to Info Ops (for example, by facilitating key leader engagement).

h.     Development of Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) to measure campaign progress.

i.     Co-ordination with J1/J4 on the military use of civilian facilities and materiel.

j.     Assistance to J1/J4 regarding the employment of local labour resources.

k.     Co-ordination with the LEGAD concerning advice to commanders on Rules of Engagement (ROE) for dealing with civilians in the area of operations.

414.     **Civil-Military Operations Centre**.  CIMIC staff at the operational level may establish and operate a civil-military operations centre (CMOC) to provide a physical interface and to co-ordinate activity with governmental agencies, IOs and NGOs.  A centre with similar functions may also be established and run by civilian organisations,[10] in which case the military plays a supporting role.

415.     **CIMIC Centre**.  Units may establish CIMIC Centres (sometimes called CIMIC Hubs) as a primary interface with the civilian population and civilian organisations in their area of responsibility.  Unlike a CMOC, a CIMIC Centre is open to the public.

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[8] Including cultural property.

[9] The UK is a signatory to the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property.  See also Additional Protocol 1 Art 53 of the Geneva Convention.  The Department of Culture, Media and Sport is the lead UK Government Department on matters relating to cultural property.

[10] There are a number of expressions that have been used to describe such a centre, Humanitarian Operations Centre is one.

# SECTION V – MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND NORMALITY INDICATORS

416.    Monitoring the effectiveness of military activity in the civil domain is an essential element of the CIMIC process.  The JTFC will require the means to assess the civil environment and to judge progress.  To ensure that a valid and comprehensive assessment is made, the collection of a range of military and non-military data is required.  The local population can assist and support the collection of data and, where appropriate, should be informed of results.  Positive results will be a boost to the morale of civil authorities and the population.

417.    Two categories of measuring effectiveness are available:

   a.    **Measures of Effectiveness**.  MOE assess operational effectiveness in carrying out the mission and associated tasks.  MOE do not measure the end result of an operation (such as the condition and quality of life of dislocated civilians following humanitarian assistance) but the degree of success of military activity within the civil environment.

   b.    **Normality Indicators**.  Normality Indicators (NIs) serve to measure trends and progress in the recovery of a civil society to provide an acceptable quality of life.  They are intended to track a reducing dependency on the military presence by the civil population and authorities.

418.    The JTFC must exploit all sources of data measuring the quality of life and recovery of the local population in the JOA, as well as the effectiveness of military operations that assist in this recovery.  Direct and indirect MOE and NIs should be developed jointly with civilian agencies to reinforce unity of purpose and effort in civil-military activities.  The CIMIC staff interface with the civilian sector often provides the means for collecting data that contributes to MOE and NIs.  MOE and NIs should be objective and trends identifiable over time.  Robust information management systems and support are required to deliver MOE and NI data effectively.[11]

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[11] Detailed guidance on the use of MOEs and NIs will be contained in '*The CIMIC Practitioner's Handbook*' due to be promulgated by the Jt CIMIC Gp in 2006.

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# ANNEX 4A – INTER-BRANCH AND INTER-SERVICE CIMIC CONSIDERATIONS

4A1.   Whilst CIMIC staff are the advisers to the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), CIMIC matters are an integral part of all Branch activity.  This table suggests considerations and activity to be undertaken by other branches.

| BRANCH | CIMIC LINKAGES |
|---|---|
| J1 | • The requirements for the emergency burial of civilians.<br>• Liaison over real estate for Prisoner of War camps, and burial sites.<br>• Terms and conditions of service for locally employed civilians.<br>• Identification and provision of specialist manpower (such as linguists). |
| J2 | • Requests for Information (RFI).<br>• Input and advice to the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Support Group. |
| J3<br>Current Operations | • Advice on the effect of current operations on the civil population and environment.<br>• Inclusion of civil factors in Joint Operations Area (JOA).<br>• Passage of CIMIC information to and from subordinate HQs. |
| J3/J5 Current Plans | • The consideration of both short and long term civil factors that will affect the Joint Campaign Plan.<br>• Planning civil-military operations. |
| J3 Operations Support Target/Battle Damage Assessment | • Target suitability and de-confliction, in conjunction with LEGAD.<br>• Reconnaissance possibilities. |
| J3 Information Operations (Info Ops) | • Synergy and coherence with Info Ops.<br>• Contribute to Measures of Effectiveness for Info Ops. |
| J3 Media | • Synergy and coherence with Media activities affecting the civil environment. |
| Engineers | • Liaison with host nation (HN) authorities on infrastructure support matters.<br>• Impact assessment of the use of local resources/access to facilities.<br>• Specialist advice such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) awareness. |
| Geographic | • Battlefield Area Evaluation to reflect civil factors.<br>• Assistance in preparing CIMIC maps/products/overlays. |

| BRANCH | CIMIC LINKAGES |
|---|---|
| Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) | • Identification of sites (including research facilities) that present a potential environmental industrial hazard (EIH).<br>• Liaison with CBRN Cell over the impact of an EIH threat on civil actors.<br>• Assessing the CBRN capability of the civilian population and the facilities likely to be available to them and UK forces for CBRN purposes.<br>• Location of water sources to be used for decontamination. |
| J4 Logistics | • Liaison with HN police, emergency services and planning authorities.<br>• Marking and policing of routes for military or civilian use (such as refugee flow).<br>• Host-Nation Support (HNS)/Civil-Military Resource Management.<br>• Real Estate Management in the rear area, including de-conflicting sites of cultural significance.<br>• Customs duties.<br>• Possible use of transportation and other resources where necessary to support CIMIC tasks. |
| J4 Medical and Environmental Health | • Use of HN medical support facilities.<br>• Medical Intelligence Assessments. CIMIC staff may provide a useful source of information on matters including local industrial hazards, and the spread of endemic diseases. (JDP 4-03 refers)<br>• Advice on civilian medical support, disease control and provision of water. |
| J4 ES | • Support to vehicle recovery and route clearance to maintain freedom of movement. |
| J5 | • Contribution to all operational and contingency planning groups to ensure that civil factors are properly accounted for and that military operations are coherent with the activities of friendly or neutral civil agencies wherever possible.<br>• Preparation of CIMIC inputs to long term plans, such as post conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction. |
| J6 | • Advice on balancing the need to communicate with civilian agencies versus Operations Security (OPSEC) requirements. |
| J7 | • Training and theatre orientation of newly arrived personnel. |

| BRANCH | CIMIC LINKAGES |
|---|---|
| J8 | • The coordination of financial and contractual matters between force elements and the HN or other civil agencies. |
| J9 LEGAD | • Advice on International Humanitarian Law, Refugee Law and Human Rights Law.<br>• Legal interpretation of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) and Memoranda of Understanding (MOU). |
| J9 POLAD | • Advice on the political implications and sensitivities of civil-military liaison and operations. |

4A2. Although CIMIC considerations are most applicable in the Land environment, possible CIMIC links with other environments include:

| ENVIRONMENT | CIMIC LINKAGES |
|---|---|
| Maritime | • Civil-military co-ordination for Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations.<br>• Non-combatant Evacuation Operations.<br>• Port and Harbour Control.<br>• Management of Sea Ports of Debarkation.<br>• Coastal and riverine issues.<br>• Infrastructure security (for example, oil terminals).<br>• Environmental considerations. |
| Air | • Civil-military liaison over siting and use of Deployment Operating Bases, Forward Operating Bases and Air Ports of Debarkation.<br>• The military management of airports and airspace, particularly in cases of failed or failing states. |

4A2. In addition to the linkages within the military/MOD, humanitarian advisers and stabilisation advisers from the Department for International (DFID) and the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) respectively, may be present. Each of these organisations may engage Deployed Civilian Experts (DCE).

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# LEXICON OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

The primary reference for the terms and their definitions used in this Lexicon is indicated in parentheses.[1]  All new terms first defined in this publication will be submitted as candidate terms for incorporation into JWP 0-01.1 '*UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*' following ratification of this publication.

**Campaign Authority**
Campaign Authority comprises 4 inter-dependent factors (JWP 3-50):

> 1.     The perceived legitimacy of the international mandate that establishes the PSO.
>
> 2.     The perceived legitimacy of the freedoms and constraints, explicit or implicit in the mandate, placed on those executing the PSO.
>
> 3.     The degree to which factions, the local population and other actors subjugate themselves to the authority of those executing the PSO; from active resistance, through unwilling compliance to freely given consent.
>
> 4.     The degree to which the activities of those executing the PSO meet the terms of the mandate and the expectations of factions, local populations and others.

**CIMIC**
CIMIC is the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and Non-Governmental Organisations and agencies. (AJP-9)

**CIMIC Support Team**
A team of  (usually) 4 CIMIC personnel from the Joint CIMIC Group that supports the command by conducting field assessments of the civil environment, establishing and managing CIMIC centres and planning and supervising designated tasks (such as Quick Impact Projects) in support of the civil environment.  (JDP 3-90)

**Civil Affairs (US)**
Those activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities.  (US definition JP1-02)

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[1] JWP 0-01.1 '*United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*', AAP-6 '*NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*'.

**Civil-Military Operations**
Tasks and activities conducted in support of the military mission either to generate civil support to the force or provide support to the civil environment.  Such tasks can be conducted using military resources alone, or in combination with civil resources. (JDP 3-90)

**Civil-Military Operations (US)**
Planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities and population.
(US definition JP1-02)

**Civil-Military Co-ordination (UN)**
The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals.  (UN OCHA Guidelines dated March 2003)

**Civil-Military Operations Centre**
The operational level interface with government agencies, IOs and NGOs.  This facility may be established either by military or civilian component to enable co-ordination of plans, and may come under a variety names.  (JDP 3-90)

**Complex Emergency**
A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme.
(UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee definition)

**Comprehensive Approach**
The Comprehensive Approach is an emerging conceptual framework used to coordinate the objectives and activities of Government Departments (and other actors) in identifying, analysing, planning and executing national responses to complex situations.  (JDN 4/05)

**Force Protection**
Force Protection is the means by which operational effectiveness is maintained through countering the threats from adversary, natural or human hazards, including fratricide, in order to ensure security and freedom of action.  (JDP 3-90)

**Host-Nation Support**
Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and/or other forces and NATO organisations which are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nation's territory.
(AAP-6)

**Humanitarian Assistance**
As part of an operation, the use of available military resources to assist or complement the efforts of responsible civil actors in the operational area or specialised civil humanitarian organisations in fulfilling their primary responsibility to alleviate human suffering. (AAP-6)

**Humanitarian Co-ordinator**
The country-director of the nominated lead agency whose primary function is to facilitate and ensure the quick, effective, and well co-ordinated provision of humanitarian assistance. (OCHA Orientation Handbook on Complex Emergencies)

**Humanitarian Space**
The establishment and maintenance by deployed humanitarian agencies and organisations of a conducive humanitarian operating environment.
(UN OCHA Guidelines dated March 2003)

**Impartiality**
Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of suffering must be guided solely by needs, and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.
(UN General Assembly resolution 46/182)

**Influence Activity**
Influence Activity comprises any activity whose primary purpose is to influence will, and is achieved by the promotion of identified themes to target audiences through messages. Influence Activity seeks to predispose, persuade, convince, deter, disrupt, compel or coerce target audiences to adopt a particular Course of Action or to assist, encourage and reassure those that are following a desired Course of Action.
(JWP 0-01.1)

**Internally Displaced Person**
A person who, as part of a mass movement, has been forced to flee his or her home or place of habitual residence suddenly or unexpectedly as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human rights, fear of such violation, or natural or man-made disasters, and who has not crossed an internationally recognised State border. (AAP-6)

**International Organisation**
An organisation established by intergovernmental agreement and operating at the international level. IOs include the various UN organisations and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). (JDP 3-90)

**Joint CIMIC Group (UK)**
A tri-service CIMIC unit with the capability to provide CIMIC trained regular and reserve staff to augment deployed headquarters, including CIMIC advisors, Functional Specialists and CIMIC practitioners to form CIMIC Support Teams at the tactical level. The Jt CIMIC Gp will also assist with the training of individually assigned personnel and provide CIMIC education and awareness to force elements. (JDP 3-90)

**Lead Agency**
An agency may be designated to take the lead in policy making, planning and information sharing, and acting as the main point of contact for other UN agencies, the military and political components, NGOs and for the parties to the conflict. The lead agency may also allocate tasks and coordinate activity, but it does not have any command responsibility or overall authority.
(UNHCR Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations)

**Neutrality**
Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.
(UN General Assembly resolution 46/182)

**Non-Governmental Organisation**
A voluntary, non-profit making organisation that is generally independent of government, international organisations or commercial interests. The organisation will write its own charter and mission. (JDP-3-90)

**Quick Impact Projects**
Quick Impact Projects are DFID led activities conducted in support of the civil environment, characterised by the ability to create an immediate effect. When conducted in collaboration with the military, they may help to shape local perceptions, and contribute to the achievement of a more secure environment. (JDP 3-90)

**Refugee**
Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (AAP-6)

# LEXICON OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| AOR | Area of Responsibility |
| APOD | Airport of Debarkation |
| | |
| CA | Comprehensive Approach |
| CA | Civil Affairs (US) |
| CBRN | Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear |
| CIMIC | Civil-Military Co-operation |
| CIVPOP | Civilian Population |
| CJO | Chief of Joint Operations |
| CMCO | Civil-Military Co-operation (EU) |
| CMCoord | Civil-Military Co-ordination (UN) |
| CMO | Civil-Military Operations |
| CMOC | Civil-Military Operations Centre |
| | |
| DCE | Deployed Civilian Expert |
| DFID | Department for International Development (UK) |
| | |
| ECHO | European Community Humanitarian Aid Office |
| EIH | Environmental Industrial Hazard |
| Engr | Engineer |
| EOD | Explosive Ordnance Disposal |
| ES | Engineering Support |
| EU | European Union |
| | |
| FCO | Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK) |
| | |
| GEO | Geographic |
| | |
| HC | Humanitarian Co-ordinator |
| HDRO | Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations |
| HN | Host Nation |
| HNS | Host-Nation Support |
| | |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IFRC | International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| Info Ops | Information Operations |
| IO | International Organisation |
| IOM | International Organisation for Migration |

| | |
|---|---|
| JOA | Joint Operations Area |
| JDP | Joint Doctrine Publication |
| Jt CIMIC Gp | Joint CIMIC Group |
| JTF | Joint Task Force |
| JTFC | Joint Task Force Commander |
| JTFHQ | Joint Task Force Headquarters |
| | |
| LEGAD | Legal Adviser |
| Log | Logistics |
| LO | Liaison officer |
| | |
| Med | Medical |
| MOD | Ministry of Defence |
| MOE | Measure of effectiveness |
| | |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organisation |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NI | Normality indicator |
| | |
| OCHA | Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| ODIHR | Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights |
| OGD | Other Government Department |
| Ops Sp | Operations Support |
| OPSEC | Operations Security |
| OSCE | Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe |
| | |
| PCRU | Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit |
| POC | Point of Contact |
| POLAD | Political Adviser |
| PRC | Population and Resource Control |
| PRT | Provincial Reconstruction Team |
| | |
| QIP | Quick Impact Project |
| | |
| RC | Resident Co-ordinator |
| | |
| SMART | Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Results-oriented, Time-based |
| SPOD | Sea Port of Debarkation |
| SRSG | Special Representative of the Secretary General |
| | |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNOCHA | United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |

UNDSS      United Nations Department for Safety and Security
UNHCHR     United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR      United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF     United Nations International Children's Fund
UNSCR      United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAID      United States Agency for International Development

WFP        World Food Programme

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