MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Joint Doctrine Note 6/11

Partnering Indigenous Forces

DCDC

JOINT DOCTRINE NOTE 6/11

PARTNERING INDIGENOUS FORCES

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

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PREFACE

1. The term *embedded partnering* and the words *partner* and *partnership* have taken on significant importance in the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, despite their familiarity, they are not well defined which can act as both a freedom, and a constraint. It is important that we know what these terms mean and the specific context in which they should be used.

2. The purpose of this Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) is to clearly define what is meant by partnership and partnering in a national, joint inter-agency and military context. This JDN uses a framework based upon building the capacity and capability of indigenous military forces during a deliberate intervention to stabilise a fragile or failed state. It is generic by design and applicable to all services and military arms, as well as to some civilian agencies. The JDN also aims to provide some broad operating principles and a framework for partnering indigenous forces based on historical analysis. It is not definitive, or fully authoritative doctrine. Rather, it is intended to create debate in order that we can produce definitive doctrine in the near future.

3. Some of the core ideas have already been tested over the last 12 months by the NATO Training Mission in Iraq based on the original discussion paper; their feedback has been incorporated in this publication. JDN 6/11 is written in support of the body of work in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40: *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, Army Field Manual, Volume 1, Part 10: *Countering Insurgency*, JDN 6/10: *Security Transitions*, and US Field Manual 3-07: *Stability Operations*. It is not designed to re-invent the wheel, but to provide a coherent theory and definitions that link existing elements together. It is intended to develop the ideas in this JDN further and produce a JDP as a subset of JDP 3-40.

4. JDN 6/11 comprises 2 parts. Part 1 (Chapters 1-3) covers the current doctrinal thinking on partnering while Part 2 (Chapters 4-5) provides practical lessons, maxims and guidelines from British historical experience of partnering indigenous forces for all levels of commanders. In detail:

   a. Chapter 1: *Partnerships and Partnering in Context* covers the fundamentals including defining key terms and places them in context.

b. Chapter 2: *Partnering, Intervention, Stabilisation and Stability* explains how partnering is conducted during intervention, stabilisation and stability.

c. Chapter 3: *The Military Contribution to Partnering,* considers understanding, military strategy and planning, the allocation of resources, the generation of host-nation capability, the employment of, and transition to, host-nation capability, and finally how they are then sustained.

d. Chapter 4: *Training and Operating with Indigenous Forces: Lessons from History*, the first chapter in Part 2, provides practical lessons and guidelines extracted from historical experience.

e. Chapter 5: *Maxims and Guidelines for Military Partnering* provides useful maxims and guidelines for partnering indigenous forces drawn from many sources.

LINKAGES

5. JDN 6/11 is intended to be read in conjunction with JDP 0-01, *British Defence Doctrine* (which it supports), JDP 3-40 *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution,* and JDN 6/10: *Security Transitions.* It should also be read in conjunction with JDP 04: *Understanding* and JDP 2-00 (3rd Edition) *Understanding and Intelligence in Support of Joint Operations.* It is strongly linked with JDPs 01, *Campaigning*, 3-00 *Campaign Execution* and 5-00 *Campaign Planning*. Elements of this publication also draw on work conducted at Brunel University's Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies by Dr Kristian Gustafson. Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Development, Concepts and Doctrine) would like in particular to thank him for: his support to the historical case studies in this publication; his original work on the FACES[1] of mentoring and advising; as well as for compiling and editing the maxims and guidelines in Chapter 5.

[1] FACES is a model and acronym used in this publication to describe the 2, distinct, characteristics of potential mentors.

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PARTNERING INDIGENOUS FORCES

Part 1

‘Partnering is a means to an end, not an end in itself’

Major General Nick Carter

CHAPTER 1 – PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERING IN CONTEXT

The purpose of Chapter 1 is to define the terms partner, partnership and partnering and place them in a national, joint inter-agency, and military context. It also provides 5 enduring principles for developing and maintaining partnerships.

If you do not seek out allies and helpers, then you will be isolated and weak.

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

The forces of a powerful ally can be useful and good to those who have recourse to them... but are perilous to those who become dependent on them.

Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*

Partnering is a means to an end, not an end in itself.'

Major General Nick Carter CBE, DSO[1]

SECTION I – THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

101. In the context of politics, international security and co-operation, the UK prefers to work with its many friends and allies to maintain the international order, and the UK's position within it. The basic premise is that stated by Aesop: *united we stand, divided we fall*.[2] Membership of like-minded communities of interest often provides a more authoritative, and legal, baseline than unilateral action when dealing with current as well as emerging threats and opportunities. As Sun Tzu further describes it, being isolated can lead to being in a position where we cannot achieve our national objectives because others will seek to see that we do not. If the cause is unerringly right, being in

[1] Major General Nick Carter, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 6 Post-Operational Presentation, Headquarters Land Forces, Andover, 8 November 2010.

[2] *Aesop*, Greek slave and fable author (620 BC - 560 BC*, The Lion and the Four Oxen: a* lion used to prowl about a field in which 4 oxen used to dwell. Many a time he tried to attack them; but whenever he came near they turned their tails to one another, so that whichever way he approached them he was met by the horns of one of them. At last, however, they fell a-quarrelling among themselves, and each went off to pasture alone in a separate corner of the field. Then the lion attacked them one by one and soon made an end of all 4. **United we stand, divided we fall**.

a group can also put it firmly on the moral high ground. The UK is a long-standing and committed member of the UN, NATO, EU and the Commonwealth of Nations among others. Within these groups the UK has partners who are friends and allies.

102. Maintaining our existing relationships with our friends and our allies (*strategic partners)* – and developing relationships with new potential partners – *partnering* – is therefore important to the UK. This is the fundamental difference between these 2 words in this context: a *partner* is generally somebody that we already trust and have an established habitual strategic relationship with, whether that is more informal (*friends*) or formal (*allies*). Partnering is an approach to relationship-building founded on a common framework of co-operation and assistance to develop shared interests and trust over time that potentially results in a full partnership. Partnering is therefore not an end in itself, but a means to achieving this joint undertaking.

103. The words partner and partnership are generally used interchangeably throughout this JDN – partnership being the act or state of being a partner. Nevertheless, it is possible to be a partner without being in a full partnership. This is essentially the case with the partnering approach – a potential partner is effectively undergoing a probationary period after which the sponsor partner will confirm final suitability subject to mutually agreed conditions being met. We may refer to them as partners from the beginning of our mutual engagement, but they then go through a long-term transformation from *partner in name* to *partner in spirit*, and finally *partner in deed* when a full mutual partnership is realised. This is described in more detail in Section III.

104. Partnering and partnerships, in the international context, are therefore essentially about politics and the agreement to co-operate with other nations. The national interests involved will determine the levels of commitment, co-operation and assistance that will shape the nature and character of the final partnership. Chapter 1 accurately defines what we mean by these terms, identifies their parameters, and then sets them in the strategic context of intervention, stabilisation and stability.

SECTION II – DEFINITIONS

105. **Partner**. In a security context, a partner is defined as: a nation agreeing to commit to a joint undertaking with 2 or more other nations including sharing the risks and opportunities that arise.[3] Partners working together through this arrangement are in a partnership.

106. **Partnership**. There is no common definition of a partnership in a security context. A proposed new definition for partnership is: *a formal relationship based on a sound legal arrangement, trust and mutual respect, where the partners are otherwise independent bodies who agree to co-operate and share risks to achieve common goals that are mutually beneficial*.[4] It highlights 3 important areas which are explicit to a political partnership:

- True strategic partnerships must have a sound legal basis to underpin them.
- The basis of the relationship is mutual cooperation to achieve common goals of benefit to both partners.
- The relationship must be built on a solid foundation of mutual trust and respect.

107. **The Characteristics of a Partnership**. Partnerships have at least 6 overarching characteristics:

a. **Political Nature**. The decision to pursue the development of a true partnership is a political one which will depend upon the success, or perceived potential of the engagement with the host nation, and the meeting of certain agreed conditions during the partnering phase of the relationship. In other words, it is a political decision and conditional.

b. **Strategic Patience**. It takes time to develop a partnership and strategic patience is required. Developing a partnership is an aspiration until the stated conditions are met. It may be that a full partnership cannot be achieved in the long term, but it is important to try and build

[3] Proposed new definition derived from the *Concise Oxford English Dictionary*, 11th Edition.
[4] Based on the definition of the South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service, website, www.syfire.gov.uk, updated 3 October 2008.

some form of relatively cordial enduring relationship that can be potentially developed into a full partnership at a later date. It may be many years before a full partnership is realised.

c. **Each Partner is Different**. Each of the 2 or more partners is different. The strengths and weaknesses of each should be moulded into a cohesive whole. This will inevitably lead to some compromises, but it is the common ground which must be identified. It is important that each partner clearly knows and can defend their own particular *'lines in the sand'* and also know where they can compromise.

d. **The Importance of Culture**. One of the key differences between aspiring partners is culture and it is important that whatever assistance is provided must be done so with respect for the nature and character of the cultures in the operating environment.

e. **Self-Reliance**. True partners are self-reliant for their own internal security, governance and economy and should not be dependent on the partnership to deliver this. They may require support with their external defence which is provided in conjunction with their partners (i.e. NATO).

f. **Humility**. It is important to have a sense of humility when dealing with indigenous forces. Our view is not always necessarily right; UK service personnel should respect it is their country.

108. **Definition of Partnering**. As has been stated, partnering is not the same as a partnership. There is also no commonly agreed definition for partnering. In this JDN, partnering is defined as: *an approach to relationship-building through direct assistance and shared endeavour that creates the right conditions, spirit and capabilities to achieve a formal and enduring strategic partnership.* It is effectively the approach by which a partnership is built over time through the provision of direct assistance. Direct external assistance is provided through mentoring, advice, support and training by all of the sponsor government's agencies. They physically work with them and share the same experiences. This assistance is provided voluntarily in the spirit of the anticipated future partnership, but there are limitations to how much assistance can be provided. This depends upon the sponsor nations' competing priorities

for national resources and the perceived importance of the commitment. Types of assistance are described in more detail in Chapter 2. From a strategic perspective, the key point is that the deployment of national capabilities to assist the host nation indicates clear political intent to develop a relationship beyond the initial engagement. The incentive for the host nation is the benefit of being a strategic partner in the long-term with all that a true partnership entails. Partnering is, however, a risky business because it is effectively an exploratory journey with no guaranteed outcome. The relationship may flounder because of mutual incompatibility or the host nation failing to reach the conditions set.

Summary

- A partner is a member of a partnership.
- A partnership is a formal agreement between 2 or more nations based on common goals and shared risks of mutual benefit.
- Partnering is an approach to relationship building with another nation by providing assistance to enable it to enter a formal partnership with the sponsor nation/nations.

SECTION III – THE STAGES OF DEVELOPING A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

The Goal – Long Term Strategic Partner

- Shared long-term strategic goals
- Legal framework
- Spirit of friendship and co-operation
- Common national interests

109. During the development of a partnership the underlying theme is one of change or transition.[5] While this is mostly change for the aspirant partner, change also occurs for the sponsor or sponsors because developing a partnership concerns achieving mutually agreed goals, and their approach and views are likely to change as the relationship develops. Negotiation, compromise and consensus form an important part of achieving these goals and change is therefore inevitable between all parties. There are 3 broad stages in the development of a strategic partnership.

Stage 1 – Initial Engagement

110. The initial engagement may be as a result of historical ties, national interest or because of a sudden imperative to connect in the form of a crisis. It could be a mix of all of them. The important factor is that engagement is necessary because not to do so will either impact on our own national interest in the short-term, we are obligated by treaty to assist, or we have identified that a long-term partnership will be in our national interest in the future. At the beginning of the engagement it is important to understand the context, and to ascertain what the relationship/roles between the host nation and the assisting, or intervening, nations will be. This will depend upon whether the potential partner is at peace (most of the Partnership for Peace nations), emerging from conflict, or in conflict.

a. **Developing a Partnership with a Nation at Peace**. The most common reason for developing a partnership with another nation at peace is that it is in our own, and that of the aspirant nation's, national interest. National interests will probably be based around common security and defence in the form of a military alliance (for example, NATO), or a political necessity based on trade and common interest (for example the Commonwealth of Nations or the UN), or a combination including common borders (for example the EU). Conditions are set, objectives given, and the aspirant nation is supported by the existing partners in the form of assistance (partnering).

[5] Both terms are used interchangeably throughout this JDN based on the Oxford English Dictionary, 11th Edition. For the purposes of this JDN, transition is: *the process or a period of changing from one state or condition to another* which aligns and is synonymous with the definition of change: *to move from one system or situation to another*.

Partnership for Peace

The NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme is an excellent example of strategic partnering. Started on the 11th January 1994, at the NATO summit in Brussels, it gives former Warsaw Pact countries and other non-NATO European nations (for example, Malta), the opportunity to become full partners in NATO, subject to reaching common goals of political accountability, economic development and military capability. Partnering takes place with NATO countries that sponsor and mentor them, as well as providing the assistance they require to meet the goals expected of them. Once the preset conditions have been reached, a true partnership has developed. Ratification of full membership happens shortly afterwards.

b. **Developing a Partnership with a Nation Emerging from or in Conflict**. Developing a partnership with a nation in, or emerging from, conflict implies some form of intervention. Intervention may be, with the consent of the host nation or without, both of which have significant implications. These are considered in more detail in Chapter 2. The key questions are; who will be leading on what aspects of trying to stabilise a complex situation; and what is the legal basis for intervention? The *US Government Counter-insurgency Guide* provides a useful list of considerations/conditions prior to deciding whether or not to engage, subject to there being a legal basis for intervention. Listed below are some considerations that have been paraphrased, with some additions.

Some Factors to Consider When Deciding Whether or Not to Engage

- What is the character of the affected government? What are the moral and ethical consequences and implications of supporting an oppressive or abusive regime?
- What is the bias of the government? Does it side with a particular faction that may be against our goals?

Some Factors to Consider When Deciding Whether or Not to Engage (Continued)

- What is the level of corruption?
- The countries entering the partnership must identify further common key conditions that need to be achieved before the partnership is fully achieved. These will include:
  - Defence obligations.
  - Political standards to be achieved within a certain timeframe.
  - The rule of law, justice and human rights.
  - Economic burden sharing.
  - Mutual respect.
  - Trust and co-operation.
- What is the state of civil-military relations within state?
- How economically viable is the state?
- Are there any severe negative influennmces such as terrorists or transnational criminal groups within the state?
- How effective is the nation's Border security and outreach to its ungoverned spaces?
- What is the relationship with its neighbours?[6]

[6] *US Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, US Government Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, pages 37-40, January 2009.

111. It is important to conduct a thorough assessment during the engagement stage before deciding to become involved. Once we have committed to partnering the host nation it is largely a *partner in name* only. We have an unproven relationship, but the intent to develop a full partnership is there, subject to certain conditions being met over time.

Stage 2 – Partnering

112. Once the decision has been made to assist, the sponsor nation(s) will provide resources to enable the host nation to achieve the conditions set. This is achieved through partnering – effectively assistance indicating commitment to developing the relationship and providing some of the means of achieving it. As the commitment levels and resources increase, and some success is achieved, confidence and trust are established. At this stage the sponsor nation(s) are effectively the dominant partner(s). The host nation is a *partner in spirit* but will fall short of being able to reach the goals and objectives set on its own. It is dependent on external support. It now needs to become self-reliant within a specified timeframe which will allow the sponsor nations to reduce their commitment. As the host nation takes on more responsibility for its own security, governance and economy, it transitions to become a *partner in deed* because it has demonstrated commitment to achieving a full partnership through self-reliance and working towards the common goals of the partnership.

Stage 3 – Strategic Partner

113. As the relationship develops over time, it can transition into the third stage of a true strategic partnership. This is formalised through an alliance or treaty imposing mutually-agreed obligations upon all parties based upon a sound, and further refined, legal framework. Being a full strategic partner is not guaranteed. In times of conflict, or when intervening in a fragile or failing state, it is the success of the initial engagement and the development of a sound relationship through partnering that will determine whether or not the intervention forces will agree to progress on to a strategic partnership. Partnering can sour relations between the participating nations and it may be that the parties depart acrimoniously and admit failure, or that a cordial relationship remains, but with most conditions having not been met. At this stage, they remain *partners in name or spirit* only. If the first 2 stages are

proving to be problematic, or the mission is failing, (and there is no obvious way of resolving the differences between the parties concerned), there are only 3 options available: review the game plan; withdraw; or seek assistance from an interlocutor, such as the UN, or regional bodies like the African Union, to try and identify another path to assistance. Once a full strategic partnership is reached, the incentive exists to develop even greater co-operation between the participating countries. It is important to understand that a partnership is a long-term commitment and will require a significant resource outlay. The 3 stages of partnership development are shown in Figure 1.1.

<table>
<tr><th>Engagement</th><th colspan="2">Partnering (Relationship-building)</th><th>Partnership</th></tr>
<tr><td>• Crisis
• National Interests
• Legal Obligation
• Moral Imperative
• Prior Historical Ties
• Cost-benefit Analysis</td><td colspan="2">• Developing Common Goals and Objectives
- Security Sector Reform
- Political Reform
- Economic Reform
- The Development of Self-reliance
• Political Accommodation
• Developing the Legal Framework for Assistance
• Transition to Host Nation Lead for Security
• The Perceived Level of Commitment</td><td>• Shared Long-team Strategic Goals
• Legal Framework
• Spirit of Friendship and Cooperation
• Common National Interests</td></tr>
<tr><td>Partner in Name</td><td>Partner in Spirit</td><td colspan="2">Partner in Deed</td></tr>
</table>

Figure 1.1 – The Stages of Partnership Development

SECTION IV – PRINCIPLES

114. There are 5 enduring principles which are applicable to partnerships, partnering and security transitions, in general.[7]

a. **Political Primacy**. Partnering and partnerships are intrinsically political. The goal to be a partner, and allocating the resources to conduct partnering, are political decisions. Political primacy in both the host nation and the coalition is the key to effective security transition because it sets the conditions for co-operation and co-ordination across agencies. All plans and operations, both civil and military, must, therefore, be reviewed in relation to the emerging political settlement.

[7] Based on the 4 principles outlined in Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 6/10, *Security Transitions*, pages ix and 1-6 to 1-14, with the addition of political primacy and flexibility.

For example, in the case of intervention in a fragile or failing state, the provision of overall security is not just the role of the military. It relies upon a truly comprehensive interagency approach that applies all of the elements of national power to achieve success. The military must therefore understand its role within the overall strategy. While its focus is on the security aspects of any intervention, it may also be able, and willing, to assist in other areas, but must temper this against fulfilling its main role.

b. **Legitimacy**. Legitimacy, in both the eyes of the host nation population, and those of the partner or partners with whom partnering is being conducted, is paramount. Without legitimacy, the transition to a full partnership will lack popular support and the broader political process will be undermined. There are 3 sources of legitimacy: through performance (doing the job and doing it well); through process (the legal mandate or political agreement to provide that function); and social legitimacy (being the right person or organisation to be the right source of authority through popular sovereignty and moral authority).[8]

c. **Building Comprehensive Capacity**. Building comprehensive capacity is a long-term and complex process. It is not just about the growth, and training of security forces, but rather the development of the wider national infrastructure to develop, sustain and deploy them in the interests of the nation under civilian control. This requires the creation of a holistic and integrated approach among host-nation government agencies in order to value, and integrate, security concerns and forces within overall government policy.

d. **Sustainability**. The success of the partnership in the long-term relies on the development of a sustainable legal framework, efficient institutional models and organisations (government machinery), and the maintenance of trust and confidence in the relationship. This must deliver effective day-to-day security, governance and rule of law, and a robust economy for the people. Sustainability should therefore be examined with regards to politics, organisations, processes and resources.

[8] *Ibid*.

e. **Flexibility**. Flexibility allows the re-direction of effort to meet changing circumstances. Partnering is a difficult process, particularly during an intervention, and it requires the primary actors to maintain an open mind and be versatile. Taken to excess, it would contradict the requirement for selection and maintenance of the aim, but applied correctly, it enables new approaches to solve intractable problems and exploit unforeseen opportunities.

CHAPTER 2 – PARTNERING, INTERVENTION, STABILISATION AND STABILITY

Not in his goals but in his transitions is man great.

Ralph Waldo Emerson[1]

The purpose of Chapter 2 is to explain how partnering is conducted during intervention, stabilisation and stability. It provides an overview of intervention, stabilisation and what is meant by stability. It also describes the relationship between partnering and security transition provides a framework for strategy formulation.

SECTION I – INTERVENTION

201. The UK is a stable state with a powerful democracy. It has effective internal and external security for its population, sound governance and rule of law, and a functioning economy and infrastructure which has the potential to grow. Democracy is achieved through political accommodation and settlement which allows different political views to be expressed without fear of violence. The UK also has relatively balanced societal relationships between different communities and ethnic groups that are generally in harmony. This is represented by the model of a stable state in Figure 2.1.



Figure 2.1 – Elements of a Stable State[2]

[1] Ralph Waldo Emerson, American Poet, Lecturer and Essayist, 1803-1882.
[2] Source Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, 2009.

202. Other states throughout the world are not as fortunate and may be involved in serious conflict. Conflict is a persistent part of human history. It can occur between or within States, or between groups, organisations and individuals. There are many causes as to why conflict may occur. One of the biggest causes is when a state becomes fragile or is failing. Fragile states may be those that have emerged from a recent conflict or are about to enter one. Their governments are still viable but have a reduced capacity to secure, protect and govern the population. In a failed state, there may be some form of government but they have lost the monopoly on the use of force and are competing with other armed opposition. The mechanism and tools of governance have effectively largely collapsed. Failing and fragile states are therefore the opposite of stable states.

Fragile and Failing States – Definitions[3]

A Fragile State is defined as: *a state that still has a viable host nation government, but is has reduced capability and capacity to secure, protect and govern the population. Without intervention, it is likely to become a failed state*.

A Failed State is defined as: *a state is where remnants of a host nation government, or some form of potential host nation government, may still exist. However, in such states, the government does not have monopoly on the use of force, cannot provide security or simple basic services, and is not sufficiently legitimate or effective to protect its borders, citizens or even itself. It may exert a very weak level of governance and rule of law in all or part of the state but, overall, the mechanisms and tools of governance have largely collapsed*.

203. **National Interest and Intervention**. It may be in our national interest to assist a fragile or failing state to achieve stability. This may be by invitation, or the UN may decide that we need to do so using force against the will of the host nation. We are likely to intervene as part of a coalition under a UN mandate which gives us our political and campaign authority to do so. The purpose of intervention is to stabilise a fragile or failing state in order for it to regain its national sovereignty and become self-reliant in providing its own:

[3] *Ibid,* definitions extracted from JDP 3-40.

security; governance and rule of law; and economy and infrastructure. Intervention is therefore a journey for the host nation from failure through a period of stabilisation to long-term stability.

Why Providing Assistance to Fragile and Failed States is Important to the UK

In the long term, our prosperity and security is intertwined with peaceful development and security across the globe. The cost to the UK of managing conflict that has an impact on our national interests once it has broken out is high; as a matter of last resort we may need to deploy our Armed Forces, with the human and financial costs that entails. Instability and conflict inhibit economic development, damage trade and cause commodity price shocks. Levels of productive economic activity in conflict-affected countries and regions drop: trade levels after major episodes of violence can take 20 years to recover. Political and economic instability discourages or destroys external investment. Pirates, often operating from unstable or conflict-affected states, undermine trade and cost the world economy up to £7.6 billion a year.

Extracted from the UK Government's *Building Stability Overseas Strategy*, July 2011, page 8, paragraph 2.6.

204. **The Decision to Intervene**. The decision to intervene in the affairs of another state is not an easy one and sits firmly in the realms of national (grand) strategy: the politically directed and controlled use of national power to achieve national objectives. There are many reasons that may compel us to intervene: it may be because of a crisis in another nation that affects us in some way; there may be a legal obligation to support a long-standing strategic partner or ally; there may be a moral imperative such as preventing genocide; or there may be historic ties between us and the host nation. The baseline is normally whether or not intervention is in our national interest.[4] The case for intervening in fragile or failing states has to be considered carefully and is one of the most significant strategic challenges in the 21st Century. The UK is unlikely to make this decision alone. In the contemporary operating environment the UK is realistically most likely to be a junior partner in a US-led

[4] This term is open to interpretation therefore almost anything can be justified as being in our national interest. Strategic planners must understand the parameters of what is in our national interest very clearly.

Coalition, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. Whatever the reason for intervening, the fact is that intervention, based on historical analysis, has a tendency to be an enduring commitment that is costly in blood and treasure. It is therefore imperative that we try and identify the likely full extent of the problem and the commitment involved before we engage. Constant and effective understanding is critical to enabling effective planning.

205. **Factors for Consideration**. Intervention relies on a truly comprehensive approach and the application of all of the elements of national power (Diplomatic, Military and Economic (DME)). Assuming that there is a prior legal justification for intervention, many factors need to be considered across the key government departments and agencies before making the political decision to intervene. There are 6 essential questions that must be asked:

Factors to be Considered Prior to Intervention

- **Is it in the national interest?**[5] JDP 3-40, *Security and Stabilisation, The Military Contribution*, highlights 3 possible reasons for intervention:
  - The crisis impacts on UK national security or international policy objectives.
  - The crisis has significant economic implications for the UK.
  - There is significant impact on British Forces already deployed to theatre.
- **Does the UK have sufficient capacity to assist either alone or in a coalition?**[6]
  - What is the likelihood and ability of others in the international community to act and support the mission, and in what capacity?

[5] JDP 3-40, page 2-3.
[6] *Ibid*.

Factors to be Considered Prior to Intervention (Continued)

- Does the UK have the ability to provide sufficient resources for the required duration and therefore credibility to get the job done?

- What is the impact of intervention on other crises and interests running concurrently, on the UK's ability to react to the unexpected?

- **What is the moral imperative to act?**

  - If the UK is not obligated under treaty, is their a friendship obligation to assist?

  - Is there an extant or developing humanitarian crisis – possibility of Mass atrocities/organised genocide – that necessitates a response?

  - Do we have the national resources to do it properly?

- **Is the environment permissive, semi-permissive or non-permissive?** This will have and affect on:

  - Public opinion.

  - National resources.

  - Political resolve.

- **What is the cost/benefit analysis of intervention?**

  - What are the risks and opportunities?

  - What is the potential cost in blood and treasure?

  - Is intervention morally and politically justified?

  - Is there a solid legal basis for the intervention?

- **Who are our most likely partners?**
  - Who, or what, political groups will we be partnering with?
  - Are they representative of the nation?
  - Can we succeed by with and through them?

206. **Types of Intervention**. There are several types of intervention:[7]

a. **Consensual/Preventive**. This is normally by invitation to prevent the conditions from deteriorating to a level where effective security is lost, or based on a request from the host nation to provide specific specialist assistance to improve a particular functional area (for example, civil police). This is usually in a permissive environment based on a clear legal framework through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Activities will usually be restricted to diplomatic, economic and limited military assistance such as training teams (for example, the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) in Zimbabwe in the 1980s). This is the UK-preferred basis for intervention and is encapsulated in the current National Security Strategy: *the most effective way to tackle all the major threats and risks to our security involves early engagement*.

b. **Focused Intervention**. A focused intervention is usually aimed to achieve a short to mid-term objective such as an imminent threat. Examples may include: terrorist training camp or weapons of mass destruction; emerging humanitarian crisis to extract UK non-combatants from a deteriorating security situation (non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO)); or an invitation to assist by a host nation to help with a specific problem. The reason for intervention is normally conducted in a semi-permissive environment, but can also be non-permissive. It is a short-term deployment for a specific purpose.

[7] *Ibid*, JDP 3-40 reiterates focused and deliberate intervention from previous doctrine.

c. **Deliberate Intervention**. Where the UK will deploy in support of allies and partners to protect either our own national interests, maintain international security, or uphold international law by intervening directly with all of the national elements of power (Diplomatic, Military and Economic) to contribute to either the defeat of a state adversary that poses a significant threat, or support the stabilisation of a fragile or failing state. Deliberate intervention is a long-term commitment which requires political will and diplomatic and economic effort, particularly resources, long after military operations have ceased.

207. **Partnering and Intervention**. It is imperative when intervening to engage with the host nation at all levels as soon as is practicably possible. Ideally this will be before direct political and military action. If it is a consensual intervention with the host nation the questions posed in Chapter 1 need to be addressed with them. If the intervention is non-consensual, it will be very difficult to identify who to deal with to start the process of engagement. Long-term enduring commitments within the territory of another nation require credible partners to develop a joint approach to enable the host nation to be self-reliant again. They must also palpably be seen to protect and provide for their population. Partnering is critical to this process, but it is often difficult to identify the long-term political partner at the beginning. Political partners will undoubtedly change over time as political accommodation is achieved, and the host nation political parties compete to lead. While identifying the most suitable political partner is critical for long-term success, true partnering must involve all aspects of society in the host nation. They have to believe that supporting the intervention is in their self-interest.

SECTION II – FORMULATING A PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY

208. There are at least 8 basic considerations that should be adhered to when formulating a partnership strategy before, and during, an intervention.

Understand the environment
Determine the requirement
Reiterate that the commitment is long-term
Joint enterprise
Maintaining vision
Legal framework
Culture of non-dependency
Fundamental requirements

209. **Understand the Environment**. The first is to understand the environment that you will be operating in. As Clausewitz so brilliantly explains: '*the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature*. It is essential to gain a deep understanding of the geography, history, culture, ideology and ethnicity of the country if we are to understand if a strategic partnership is plausible and how to develop an effective campaign. In the absence of personal knowledge, expert advice on the region must be sought and balanced before deciding on the appropriate action.

210. **Determine the Requirement**. The second is to determine the requirement, the costs (in blood and treasure) and the benefits of developing a partnership. JDP 3-40, *Security and Stabilisation, the Military Contribution*, provides some useful guidance on this subject, which is included in the simple strategic framework on page 2-11.

211. **Reiterate that the Commitment is Long-term**. The third is to reiterate that the commitment is a long-term one, and must be regarded as such from the beginning. Based on this premise, the identification of partnering with an

eventual exit strategy is therefore problematic. The long term aim of mentoring and training indigenous forces is to build up sufficient capacity for them to replace external forces. A political timeline must therefore be set for the withdrawal of the majority of the military force, but there must also be a guaranteed *'after-care'* package of genuine political, military and economic support post withdrawal to cement the political importance of the relationship. This support will, of course, be conditional, and there must be the political will to ensure that this happens.

The UK-Malaysian Strategic Partnership Since 1957



Sometimes the real lessons from our national historical experience are ignored. One of the key lessons from the much-referenced (and often erroneously) British experience in Malaya is that it provides an excellent example of how a long-term strategic partnership develops over time. Political and economic support occurred in parallel and still does today. British forces conducted a Counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign in Malay from 1948-1960.

Malaya was granted independence in 1957 and control of the forces in Malaya was transferred from British to Malaysian control. The Malaysian Armed Forces were able to successfully end the emergency but they were still vulnerable to external threats. President Sukarno of Indonesia initiated a policy of *Konfrontasi* (confrontation) with the newly federated Malaysia between 1962-1966, and Britain intervened in support of Malaysia, ending the Brunei Revolt in 1962 and defeating Indonesian regular and irregular activity in Sarawak and Sabah between 1963 and 1966. Post this second conflict, the last British forces left Malaysia in 1975, where one battalion had remained as a security guarantee.

To this day, the key players in the events of 1948-66, UK, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, are still united in strategic purpose through the provisions of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). The 5 partners train together under these arrangements annually.

212. **Joint Enterprise**. The fourth is that because it is a partnership, it is a joint enterprise. As Colonel Richard Iron so succinctly explains it: '*we build Iraq and Afghanistan forces not just to exit successfully, but also to win together*'.[8] It is this sense of joint enterprise that will determine how committed the host nation is to achieving a strategy that, while it is in their interests to support it, they will be sceptical of its value, or of the commitment of foreign troops, unless they are physically operating and sharing the risk together. The achievement of observable success will be a significant boost to building trust and belief.

213. **Maintaining Vision**. The fifth is that the vision of the eventual partnership must pervade all levels of civil authority and military command as the fundamental approach and ethos to achieving success. A truly comprehensive interagency approach is required for success both within the intervention forces and with the host nation. The overarching strategy therefore lays out the goals and terms of the partnership, and then everyone within the external force in theatre must conduct all of their activities within the spirit of partnership between the 2 countries or alliances. This applies equally to the top of the chain of command as it does to the sailors, soldiers and airmen on the ground. The overarching strategic framework must therefore be kept simple. For example, a good strategy is based on 8 main elements: understanding; vision; clear objectives; resources; credibility; (political will, capability and resources), strategic communications; energy and timing.[9] This is illustrated in the simple strategic framework and in the case study at Annex A to this Chapter.

[8] Col Richard Iron CMG OBE, former advisor to the Iraqi Commander in Basra and the Basra Operations Centre.
[9] Based on the original concept developed during the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) Strategic Leadership Workshop, Seaford House, November 2008.

A Simple Strategic Framework

Understanding

Understanding the strategic context of the operating environment and the nature of the problem; all strategy is contextual.

Vision

A clear and unambiguous vision statement explaining the desired outcome. The strategic vision is to achieve a steady-state of a long-term strategic partnership between the intervention forces and the host nation, but what do we mean by this? In his speech at Camp Lejeune on 27 February 2009, President Barrack Obama outlined his strategic vision for Iraq and this provides a good model:

> *Forging a true and lasting partnership with an Iraq that is sovereign, stable and self-reliant. With a Government that is just, representative and accountable, that provides neither support nor safe haven to terrorists, and in developing independent, competent, responsive and accountable government institutions that secure the Iraqi people and their national infrastructure, deliver essential services, and govern in a just, and non-sectarian manner while confidently contributing to regional peace and stability.*

This statement clearly enunciates where the US and the Government of Iraq would like to be, sets some pre-conditions (representative government, secure population and no safe havens for terrorists), and highlights the aspiration of developing regional peace and stability together.

Objectives

Clear strategic objectives that support the vision. JDP 3-40[10] outlines 3 key strategic objectives when intervening in a fragile state:

- Building human and national security – creating the environment for success.

[10] JDP 3-40, pages 2-20 to 2-21.

A Simple Strategic Framework (Continued)

- Fostering host-government capacity and legitimacy – governance and participation.
- Stimulating economic and infrastructure development – social and economic well-being.

An Example – The US Iraq Strategic Objectives 2009/2010[11]

The US Joint Campaign Plan 2009 focused on 5 key cross-cutting pillars as its key strategic objectives: (1) develop representative and accountable Government; (2) develop a robust and diverse economy; (3) develop strong regional diplomatic relations; (4) develop respect for the Rule of Law; and (5) create a peaceful security environment.

Resources and Credibility

Credibility is achieved through demonstrated political will, diplomatic, military and economic capability, long-term commitment, and the allocation of sufficient resources to get the job done. Once committed, there is the requirement to maintain unwavering political will for the duration of the mission, however long it takes. This must permeate all aspects of the intervening nation's defence and security strategy, and not just those who are deployed. General Sir David Richard's insistence that the MOD make Afghanistan its priority focus is a good example of this.[12] A second requirement is to employ sufficient capability and resources to enable the failed or failing state to develop legitimately. This means that the diplomatic, military and economic assistance and capabilities provided must be capable of achieving the lion's share of the mission initially, and of being able to influence other international agencies and non-governmental organisations to help fill the gaps that will enable the host nation to succeed on its own in the long-term.

[11] Extracted from *2009 Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq Unclassified EXSUM Version 2,* published in July 2009.
[12] Chief of the General Staff, General Sir David Richards GCB,CBE, DSO, ADC Gen, 2009.

A Simple Strategic Framework (Continued)

Energy and Strategic Communication

Placing sufficient energy to see the strategy through to fruition, whatever the obstacles, is critical in intervention and assistance. Energy is about leadership, determination, strength, vitality, willpower and dynamism without which meaningful success cannot be achieved. There should be a single point of political focus and the determination to succeed in the face of internal and external opposition and media pressure. Most importantly, it requires excellent strategic communication to ensure that the public understands why their armed forces have deployed into a dangerous and volatile environment. The key, however, is effective leadership.

Timing

Identifying the timeframe within which to make key decisions and having the strategic patience to pursue long-term strategies is paramount. It effectively sets the objectives, operating parameters and life of the narratives throughout the campaign. There is seldom a perfect time to engage and intervene, but it is important to strive to create the best conditions and timeframe by considering the real and potential threats and opportunities. Thereafter, timings must be realistically matched to host nation and one's own conditions and resources, but must also remain flexible to meet the unanticipated challenges. Deploying national power to assist a fragile or failing state is a long-term commitment and requires a long-term political approach be taken. Strategic patience is essential. It underpins the development of the conditions to achieve success, provides the continuity of thought and resources to support the overall goal, and takes advantage of opportune timing.

214. **Legal Framework**. The sixth is the legal basis for such an arrangement. The legal framework must be effective and flexible as it will transition over time as the relationship develops. A recent excellent example of this is the development of the US-Iraqi Security and Strategic Framework Agreements.

215. **Culture of Non-dependency**. The seventh is to avoid developing a culture of dependency by the host nation on the partnering nations. The host

nation is unlikely to be self-reliant for its security and defence against external threats for some time but it must not rely entirely on the intervention coalition or nation. The intervening nations must plan for security transition from the start of the intervention and must make it clear to the host nation that one of the conditions of becoming a partner is that the host nation must be self-reliant for its own internal security as soon as is practically possible.

South Vietnam's Military Dependency on the US 1965-1972

Although Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had characterised the war in Vietnam as a struggle that only the South Vietnamese themselves could win or lose, the military forces of the Saigon regime had played only a minor role on the battlefield since 1965. American tactical units, with their tremendous firepower, mobility, and logistical support, were best suited to operations against large conventional Communist combat units; South Vietnamese forces, largely infantry, seemed best employed in local security operations directed against small, locally recruited Viet Cong guerilla groups. But this division of tasks began slowly to change in 1967 when restrictions of the number of American troops committed… forced General Westmoreland to reconsider the role of the South Vietnamese Forces (ARVN) and selectively increase their part in conventional combat operations. This process was accelerated in 1968. However, there was still no basic change in military roles and missions; American forces still played the major part in the war effort.

Comment: In 1964 the South Vietnamese forces consisted of 250,000 regulars and 264,000 territorials supported by 23,300 US and 467 personnel from allied nations. By 1969, after the Tet offensive, South Vietnamese Forces mustered 493,000 regulars and 404,000 territorials. While this appears to be large, the bulk of the fighting was still being conducted by US Forces who mustered 542,400 supported by 68,109 personnel from her allies.[13] The South had become dependent upon the US to a degree that doomed their transition to effective host nation lead.[14]

[13] Republic of Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand,Republic of the Philippines, Taiwan and Spain
[14] Text and figures extracted from, Clarke Dr Jeffrey J, *Vietnamization: the South Must Save Itself*, in *The Vietnam War*, Salamander Books Ltd, 1979.

216. **Fundamental Requirements**. The eighth is to consider a number of fundamental requirements that need to be addressed when developing a partnership strategy. They are:

a. The inherent differences between 2 or more partners should always be factored into the development of a partnership agreement and activities; partners have a vote.

b. The requirement to develop organisational structures to enable joint co-operation.

c. The requirement to jointly plan the overall approach (strategy).

d. The need to share information.

e. The need to jointly share risks and rewards. There should be a positive cost/benefit for each of the nations involved and the ability to be resilient in times of difficulty.

f. The need to constantly work at the relationship and avoid complacency and retain a sense of humility.

SECTION III – UNDERSTANDING THE JOURNEY OF THE HOST NATION

217. We have a tendency to look at intervention from our own perspective, but intervention is best considered as a transformational journey for the host nation. If we are to conduct partnering effectively we need to understand their journey in detail. Concurrent with their central journey are the parallel, but linked journeys, of the other actors, and each have their own narrative which we also need to understand. In the case of the host nation, we are effectively forcing (if intervention is non-consensual) or assisting (if consensual) a fragile or failing state to transform itself into a stable and secure state over a flexible timetable that may or may not have been agreed with the host nation. The desired transformation is, in fact, a national transition from an old system that has failed to one that delivers a better future for all. This is fundamental; the host nation has to be responsible for the completion of their journey. Ultimately, only they can restore and regenerate themselves to self-reliant full

sovereignty. The national narrative therefore changes through this transition process from one of state failure, to working with external assistance in some form of partnership, to becoming self reliant. This is illustrated in figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2 – National Transition: A Transformational Journey

218. **Defining National Transition**. National transition is not clearly defined. While most nations have a view and understand what is meant by transition, there is no common, internationally-agreed definition and this is essential if we are to understand the national journey. The change envisaged for a fragile or failing state is to: terminate and resolve conflict by identifying the root causes; provide security for the population; transform its national institutions to govern effectively within the law; and rebuild the economy to provide jobs, opportunities and prosperity. In terms of security, the host nation must take full responsibility and accountability for the use of force from the intervention force as soon as it has the capability and institutional mechanisms to do so. Therefore, in the context of fragile and failing states, national transition is the transformation, aided by external intervention, of a fragile or failing state from conflict to a stable, self-reliant sovereign state. This process is enabled through the progressive transfer of power and the development of professional

and competent institutions to restore full sovereignty, authority and accountability to the host nation and their monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Partnering is the main approach to achieving this progressive transfer of power and achieving and maintaining security will be the greatest challenge.

219. Within this overall national transition there will be a large number of other transitions which have to take place along the way. In doctrinal terms we tend to group these transitions into the 3 elements that are the bedrock of a stable state: security, governance and the rule of law, and economic infrastructure and development.[15] When these are in harmony, they lead to balanced political settlement and societal relationships. While this is good framework, it oversimplifies the enormity of the challenge. General Sir Michael Jackson's rope model better illustrates the complexity of the problem as shown in Figure 2.3. Even this model does not, however, cover the full scope.[16]



Figure 2.3 – Constituents of a Nation or Society

220. Furthermore, each of these constituents has many different layers to consider. For example, in the rule of law, there is civil law, criminal law, common law, international law, and even military law. Many of the actors in these environments are interlinked, but also fulfil distinctly different functions.

[15] JDP 3-40, page 1-5.
[16] Designed by General Sir Mike Jackson GCB, DSO, ADC, DL, when he was Commander Multi-Division South West in the NATO–led Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1995. This is included in UK doctrine in Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*, (2nd Edition), 2004.

221. **Providing Security**. Security transition requires clear priorities on what are the most important strands to deal with to form the catalyst for other changes. In addition, a nation or society is shaped more than just by history and culture, but also the physical environment in its many manifestations (*maritime, land, air, space, climate and resources*), as well as by cyberspace. All of these combined not only shape a nation's institutions, but also how they develop technologically. What we need to understand in detail during national transition is how each of these constituents are linked to each other. For example, security transition cannot occur without the host nation political and financial institutions to control and support it, or without a robust economy to enable them to pay for the appropriate security capability. The reality is that within all of these areas are many other sub-transitions that need to take place to achieve the overall transformation required.

222. **The Journeys of the Other Actors**. The host nation is not the only player. The parallel journeys of the intervening force and other actors must also be considered in detail. Once we intervene we significantly change the dynamics of the extant situation. The intervention force has moved from being a neutral observer to an active observer once it expresses an interest or feels compelled to become involved. The decision to intervene changes the dynamics completely because we then become an active participant and this is, in effect, the first major transition. A good analogy is throwing pebbles in a pond. Throwing pebbles in a still pond creates turbulence. When entering a conflict situation, the intervention force, in the form of a coalition, is the pebble. The reality is, however, that the pond is already very turbulent because the other actors have already been thrown in. If the coalition is of one voice, the dynamics of the turbulence will change once they enter. Some actors will align with the coalition, others will align together in opposition, and some will remain neutral. If the coalition pebble is not heavy enough, either on its own or with those host nation actors who align with them, it will fail to have an effect will sink without trace. If the coalition is divided in it own strategic aims and conduct it will have the same effect as throwing in a handful of pebbles into the pond, thus significantly increasing the turbulence and the complexity of the actor alignment. It will also undoubtedly prolong the turbulence. Being an active participant therefore presents some real challenges and understanding is critical to achieving success.

SECTION IV – PARTNERING CONSIDERATIONS WHEN TRANSFORMING FRAGILE AND FAILING STATES

223. **The Operating Environment**. If partnering is our chosen approach to providing assistance, it is essential to understand the environment that we will be working in, and it will be highly complex. We will be operating in a single highly competitive (knowledge is power) information and intelligence space to which we will only ever have partial access, and that space is the totality of the world that we live in. There will be multiple actors each with identities shaped by multiple ties, loyalties and personalities. These will, in turn be manifested in many different narratives, social and psychological pressures, and norms. There will be irregular activity in the form of crime, corruption, insurgency, piracy and gangs, as well as competing elites. The battle is therefore over influence in its many incarnations and understanding is the key to achieving it. This mosaic must then be set against the actual problem – how we assist the host nation to transition from intervention through a stabilisation process to enduring long-term stability.

224. **Stabilisation Operations**. UK doctrine defines stabilisation as*:*

> *the process that supports states which are entering, enduring or emerging from conflict, in order to prevent or reduce violence; protect the population and key infrastructure; promote political processes and governance structures, which lead to a political settlement that institutionalises non-violent contests for power; and prepares for sustainable social and economic development*.[17]

Stabilisation operations focus on the provision of security to create and maintain the conditions required for improvements in economic development and governance to take place. Security in stabilisation operations may be threatened by a range of adversaries including violent criminals, terrorists and insurgents.

225. The military will be required to conduct a range of stabilisation operations and tasks as part of the overall political stabilisation process. Military responsibilities for the provision and maintenance of security endure throughout all environments. In semi or non-permissive, however,

[17] JDP 0-01.1, *UK Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database*, 8th Edition, 2011.

environments where civilian government officials are unable to deploy, the military should be prepared to assist in other areas which would normally be conducted by civilian agencies. Figure 2.4 illustrates the generic military contribution to the stabilisation tasks required to achieve stability.



Figure 2.4 – The Military Contribution to Stabilisation Operations

226. **Campaign Themes**. The primary mission of military forces within the stabilisation process is to provide security. How security is delivered is dependent upon the nature and character of the situation that we are facing. If facing an insurgency, the focus of the military campaign will be COIN. Insurgency is classified as irregular activity which is defined as:

> *the use, or threat, of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority*.[18]

Insurgency is, however, only one form of irregular activity. Other forms of irregular activity include warlords, narco-traffickers, piracy, smugglers and criminals. If we are engaged on a UN mission to separate 2 or more states that are fragile or failing, we may be conducting a peacekeeping mission along

[18] JDP 0-01.1.

an agreed ceasefire line, and this becomes our campaign theme. It is likely that the campaign theme will change over time. For example, in Iraq, the theme changed from regime change (major combat operations) to COIN and then support to state-building, although COIN has remained the dominant theme.

227. **Deciding the Shape and Size of the Intervention**. In the case of preventive intervention, this may be a very small team under civilian control which could include military capability to assist with security sector reform. In the case of deliberate intervention, it very much depends on the nature of the conflict. If we have to fight to achieve conflict termination, military mass will be important. Whether or not this mass is provided by some form of coalition, or whether most of it can come from the host nation, depends on whether the military are part of the overall problem (which may well be the case) and the effectiveness of their military capability. This has important ramifications for the longer term security transition in terms of how much effort we need to place on training and equipping the host nation force and for what, and in what, shape. As a minimum, we will need to ensure that they are at least capable of maintaining their own internal security, and that they are trained and equipped to operate in their own environment, not a mirror image of the intervening coalition. The coalition will then have to decide how it is going to guarantee the defence of the host nation from external threat until such time as they develop their own capability. This is a very long-term commitment.

228. **Unity of Purpose and Effort within the Coalition**. Without a politically driven and maintained single purpose, the coalition will find extreme difficulty in executing its mission effectively. Again, the reality is that coalition members will all define what is in their national interests differently, and will have different views on how the problem should be dealt with. Knowing how to negotiate from a political and military perspective with allies, and understanding how to achieve influence are critical skills in attempting to achieve alignment of purpose. Political will is, however, perishable and must be constantly worked at.

229. **Optimum Vehicle for Achieving Transition**. If we are intervening, we are intervening for a purpose. Intervention is normally for self-interest and there must be some benefit from it. Developing a long-term strategic

partnership through partnering both the government institutions and the security forces is an effective method of doing this.

230. **A Target for Adversarial Actors**. By intervening, we become a target for adversarial actors, especially as we are likely to be aligned with the host nation government. Whenever the host nation government acts against the interests of their people, we are considered to be part of that decision and regime. This means that we have to choose our partners very carefully, and ensure that there are clear caveats to our assistance. These caveats will include standards of governance, rule of law and economic conditions that must be met to provide overall security for the population to meet their basic needs. If we do not get this right, the conduct of the security transition between the intervention force and the host nation will be, at best, problematic and, at worst, fail and the opposition will prevail. This is, in effect, the third parallel journey, that of the opposition. There are many others which need to be taken into account. Some of these are shown in Figure. 2.5. The journey of the host nation's security forces is considered in more detail in Chapter 3.

Figure 2.5 – A Multitude of Actors, Journeys, Narratives and Perspectives

231. **Summary**. Therefore, having considered the strategic implications, and made the decision to intervene, we have made 4 broad assumptions that: intervention is in our national interest; there is a legitimate reason for doing so;

our interventions is likely to be in some form of coalition with our allies and partners, and that the aim will be to transition the responsibility for security, governance, rule of law and economic infrastructure and development, to the host nation as soon as is practically possible. These assumptions, therefore, provide our mandate and the moral authority to prosecute the mission. This is critical as to how we will be perceived by the actors within the operating environment. This last assumption must be based on a moral obligation to help develop effective security institutions, mechanisms and forces that are appropriate for the nation that we are assisting (not a mirror image of our own system); all of which are sustainable by the host nation. Significantly divergent permutations on any of these assumptions will shape how our actions are perceived at home and abroad. This will have a marked effect on how we interact with the key actors, conduct the mission, or achieve long-term success.

SECTION V – PARTNERING AND SECURITY TRANSITION

232. Partnering is ultimately about helping or persuading another nation to change – the process of national transformation described previously. From a military perspective our main responsibility is reform of the security sector. Nevertheless, the military is part of a joint inter-agency team and will always work under political control. In the context of intervention and stabilisation, security transition concerns the transfer of power and responsibility from one security mechanism to another which will involve all of the UK's key government agencies. The UK currently defines security transition as:

> *the progressive transfer of security functions and responsibilities between actors in order to reach a durable level of stability for the host nation that is not dependent on a significant operational international military contribution.*[19]

233. The salient points from this definition are that: security transition is not just one transition but a series of transitions (*progressive transfer*); that it is by agreement and design a dialogue between the intervening force and the host nation (*best met through some form of partnership*); and that the intent is to develop a durable capability that does not develop into dependency by the

[19] Combined UK Stabilisation Unit and Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 6/10, *Security Transitions*, 2010, page 1-1. Further highlighted in UK Stabilisation Unit, *Responding to Stabilisation Challenges in Hostile and Insecure Environments: Lessons Identified*, London, November 2010.

host nation on its sponsor. Although logical, it often proves challenging to understand, co-ordinate and action.

Seven Characteristics of the Nature of Security Transitions

234. **Security Transition is Only One Part of the Overall National Transition**. The first is that security transition is only one line of activity, although a decisive one, in the overall national transition. It is often the most important part of that process because, without security political accommodation, the development of strong non-violent societal relationships is impossible.

235. **All Security Transitions are S*ui Generis* (Unique) in Character**.[20] Each time we plan and conduct security transition, different international and local factors will shape the final outcome. While there may be some superficial similarities with other historical examples, underneath the dynamics will be different. This does not mean that historical analysis of security transitions in other conflicts is invalid. On the contrary, case studies allow us to identify, and construct, enduring principles from history, but we have to apply judgement to them based on the context for each new situation.

236. **Security Transitions Take Place in a Highly Competitive and Dynamic Environment**. Competition is not just between the actors in the host nation, but also within the coalition that forms the intervention force. There will always be a divergence of views between actors. The only way to attempt to align them, is by effective strategic communication and the narratives that flow from it. The reality is that security transition requires detailed situational understanding, constant negotiation between the key actors, and the ability to react fluidly to shocks and surprises.

237. **Security Transition Concerns the Transfer of Real Power**. Security transitions are ultimately about how we transfer power, and particularly the monopoly on the use of force, back into the hands of the host nation. This is a significant moral responsibility and very firmly a political lead. Transfer should only occur after political accommodation has been achieved and a representative government is in place. Not representative in our eyes but in the eyes of the people of the host nation. There must be a secure enough

[20] JDN 6/10, page v.

environment that the people can go about their daily business without undue fear, and that any remaining internal security issues can be dealt with by the host nation security forces to a standard that is acceptable to the international community.

238. **Shaping the Environment for Transition**. How we plan, and conduct, intervention operations shapes the strategic and local environment and this, in turn, affects the options that we have to conduct transition. The key strategic decisions before intervention include: whether to deploy military capability; within what context; how to use it; to what effect; and how to extract it. Campaign design springs from these decisions. It determines what needs to be understood to prosecute the intervention, and how we command, deploy, plan, fight, exploit, co-operate, sustain, recover and support our own forces and those of the host nation. It is also important that we understand that transition is inherently about multiple activities at different levels sometimes sequentially and/or concurrently. They must be coordinated and security transition must therefore be planned from the beginning of a campaign.

239. **Conducting a Security Transition is Not a Uniform Set of Activities on a Single Trajectory**. The progressive transfer of functions between key actors identifies that there is no single transition, but rather a series of transitions, over a specified period of time. To complicate matters further, what can physically be achieved within the specified time period is usually unpredictable. The conduct of security transitions must be flexible enough to adjust to emerging events. Although the core principle of security transitions is political focus, unrealistic political timeframes given before obvious progress in host-nation security capability can only ever be aspirational. The conduct of security transition can helpfully be divided into big **T** and little **t** transitions. Big **T** transitions are those that must be achieved to attain the final campaign goal and objectives. They are politically set, critical to overall success, and relate to achieving decisive conditions in a campaign. They are also normally linked to a political agreement. For example, in the recent drawdown in Iraq, the big **T** transitions were been, and are:

a. The implementation of the Security Agreement and the Strategic Framework Agreement on 1 January 2009.

b. The withdrawal of US troops from cities, towns and villages by July 2009.

c. The cessation of combat missions from 31 August 2010.

d. The reduction of US Force-Iraq to 50,000 from 154,000 by 31 August 2010.

e. The withdrawal of all US Forces from Iraq by 31st December 2011.

Little **t** transitions are those which occur naturally on the path to achieving a big **T** transition. In other words, for every big **T** transition, there may be many small **t** transitions. Linked to the Iraq example of big T transitions above, some of the small **t** transitions between the withdrawal of US troops from cities, towns and villages and the cessation of combat missions were: ensuring that the Iraqi Security Forces had reached the standard to operate on their own with limited support; the handover of US bases to them; ensuring that the Iraqi MOD was paying its own troops; and finally how overwatch would be conducted.

240. **The Lead for Delivering the Key Aspects of Security Transitions at the Local Level is Context Dependent**. While the overall lead must remain political, at the local level, it depends highly on the security situation. In the early stages of intervention, it is likely to be the local military commander who has the lead for security and the other agencies work within his framework. As the security situation improves, the other agencies come to the fore and take the lead. The military commander changes from being the supported body to create security, to supporting them to achieve the wider mission.

241. **Summary**. The journey of the host nation, intervention forces and adversaries, linked to the provision of assistance and big T and small t transitions is summarised in Figure 2.6.



Figure 2.6 – Big T/Little t Transitions

Annex:

A. Case Study 1 – Developing A Strategic Partnership: The US Approach In Iraq 2008-2011.

ANNEX A – THE US APPROACH IN IRAQ 2008-2011 CASE STUDY: DEVELOPING A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

The Iraq National Vision 2008

To fulfil the Iraqi people's aspirations for establishing a unified, democratic, federal state, in which both security and stability prevail; all citizens have equal rights and responsibilities under a constitutional government; all look forward to building a prosperous economy opened wide to the world; and the country is an active member in regional and international organizations.[1]



2A1. The US-Iraq strategic partnership is developing to a level that is now a mix of partnership in spirit, and in deed. While it will take many years for the full partnership to succeed as envisaged, there are firm building blocks in place which were started during the period when Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus were at the helm working with Prime Minister Maliki to achieve it. In 2008, General Ray Odierno became the Commanding General of US Forces in Iraq. Working closely in partnership with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and his successor Ambassador Chris Hill, he took joint, inter-agency planning to a new level during his tenure. Together with other US Government, international agencies and the Iraqi Government, and under the political control of the Department of State in theatre, he helped to create an enduring strategic framework for taking the partnership with Iraq forward.

[1] The Iraq National Security Strategy, *Iraq First*, page 5.

2A2. In the context of the US relationship with Iraq, it is committed to a long-term strategic relationship. General Ray Odierno effectively argued that achieving a partnership is not about reaching an end-state but of achieving a steady-state relationship with the host nation.[2] While a military deployment may have a defined end-state for the withdrawal of US troops as the partnership develops, the partnership will not end when US forces withdraw. The steady-state is an enduring, habitual relationship that remains mutually beneficial. As with all relationships, this does not mean that it will not have to be worked at to sustain it, and the appropriate political mechanisms are, therefore, being developed to ensure a constant dialogue.

2A3. The long-term strategic vision in Iraq is contained in the US Joint (Inter-agency) Campaign Plan for Iraq championed by General Odierno. It translated President Obama's vision into an actionable plan. The plan aims to achieve a steady-state partnership with an Iraq that is *sovereign, secure, stable and self-reliant, and that is at peace with its neighbours and contributing to regional peace and stability*, and this captures the very essence of what partnership is about; it is both the goal of the overall strategy and a strategic commitment in resource terms to attain the goal.[3] All other forms of assistance such as supporting, mentoring, training, advising and come under this partnership umbrella.

2A4. The emerging US-Iraq partnership is effectively a joint undertaking with shared risks and outcomes enshrined in a sound legal framework consisting of a Security Agreement and the Strategic Framework Agreement.[4] The Secuity Agreement is effectively a Status of Forces Agreement 'with teeth'. It sets the conditions and rules of engagement for the employment of US Forces within Iraq, including the ability to conduct combat missions until August 2010, and subsequently, for what US forces can do post the cessation of combat missions between August 2010 and 31 December 2011. The Status of Forces Agreement sets the framework for the long-term development of the strategic partnership based upon 7 areas of co-operation: political; defence and security; law enforcement and judicial; cultural; health and environment; economic and energy; and finally information technology and communications. These broadly replicate the functional areas and expertise of a US Embassy.

[2] Headquarters Multinational Force-Iraq and United Sates Force-Iraq, *Joint Campaign Plans.*
[3] Headquarters Multinational Force-Iraq 2008 and 2009 Joint Campaign Plans (JCP), Version 1, 25 December 2008 and Version 3, 15 November 2009.
[4] Paraphrased from the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Edition 11, 2004.

It is a mutually beneficial and promissory engagement. It implies that the countries concerned are broadly strategically aligned through the sharing of common strategic goals.

The US-Iraq Security and Strategic Framework Agreements

The 2009 Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq Unclassified EXSUM Version 2, published in July 2009, summarises the 2 agreements as follows:

The Security Agreement. The Security Agreement signed on the 4 December 2008, this historic document is an agreement between the US and the Republic of Iraq on the withdrawal of US Forces from Iraq and the organization of their activities during their temporary presence in Iraq. The agreement lasts for 3 years from 1 January 2009.

The Strategic Framework Agreement. The Strategic Framework Agreement is based on the envisioned long-term strategic partnership and engagement between Iraq and the US There were 4 principles:

- A relationship of friendship.
- A strong Iraq, capable of self-defence.
- The temporary presence of US Forces in Iraq, at the request of the Government of Iraq, with respect for the full sovereignty of Iraq.
- The US shall not use Iraqi land, air, or sea as a launching pad/transit for attacks against other countries, nor seek to request to have permanent military bases in Iraq. Seven areas of co-operation:

Political	Health and Environment
Defence and Security	Economic and Energy
Law Enforcement and Judicial	Information Technology and Communications
Cultural	

CHAPTER 3 – THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO PARTNERING

The purpose of Chapter 3 is to outline the military contribution to partnering. It considers understanding, military strategy and planning, the allocation of resources (including types of military assistance), the generation of host-nation capability, the employment of, and transition to, host-nation capability, and how they are then sustained.

301. It is a long-established concept that to be sovereign, a state needs to gain, and hold, *the monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its territory*.[1] No conflict is solved by violence alone, and ultimately, it is the case that a legitimate and effective government (a political concept) will be the core goal of any UK intervention. Yet, it is equally clear that no political entity can be effective if it does not have capacity and competence to manage its own physical security. If UK forces and their allies are intervening in a state, or region, it is likely due to that state having lost their capability, or competence to function as a state. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the UK, and its allies to assist them to redevelop that competence. The presence of intervening forces, by definition, compromises the host-nation's monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and thus compromises their sovereignty. It is, therefore, critical that their capacity is rebuilt to exercise that monopoly and their competence in its execution, as swiftly as possible.

302. Essentially, the military contribution to partnering is focused on the provision of security and capacity-building. The US Security Force Assistance (SFA) Field Manual (FM 3-07) articulates 5 Phases: **plan and resource, generate, employ, transition and sustain**.[2] This JDN has used the framework to develop guidelines for the military contribution to partnering.

[1] Weber M, *Politics as Vocation*, 1922.
[2] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Security Force Assistance, Field Manual (FM) 3-07, May 2009, page 2-8.

SECTION I – UNDERSTAND

303. **Understanding the Operating Environment**.[3] Planning and resourcing the re-building, reorganisation, or reconstruction, of a nation's military capability requires a joint, inter-agency approach with the host nation. From a security forces perspective, there are a number of critical factors that must be understood before training and operating with indigenous forces:

a. **Understand the environment** that you are operating in by relentlessly pursuing information and speaking to subject matter experts and local partners.

b. Understand that by partnering we are **assisting, or persuading, the host nation to go on the transformational journey** described in Chapter 2. Partnering is the approach that is used to achieve an effective security transition. We must understand the journey of the host nation, and particularly, the host nation's security forces to the highest degree of granularity possible.

c. **Understand that influence is central** to all political, military and economic effort. Whether soft, or hard power, is applied to coerce, deter or defeat a threat, all action is taken to achieve influence to force the other actors to change their path. Not all means of exerting power are equal in all environments.

d. **Understand your unit/organisation's role** within the overall strategy. Remember that the overall solution must be a political one.

e. **Know your own capabilities and those of your allies**. Determine who will be the lead for security force assistance and ensure that the other nations work within this envelope.

f. **Match the capabilities** of your allies to their rules of engagement and political restrictions.

[3] Understanding is defined as: *the perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision-making*. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01 8th Edition, *UK Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database*, 2011.

g. **Learn to understand the indigenous forces** that you will be training and operating with.

h. **Match the construct of the newly-created indigenous armed forces to the requirements of the host nation** to meet the challenges that they face. Realistically jointly identify what the actual requirement is and recognise that a 'sub-optimal' home-grown solution actually may be superior to your 'perfect' import. **The aim is to build self-reliance and not dependency.**

304. **Understanding the Host Nation Security Forces**. As previously mentioned, Chapter 2 explains the journey of the host nation and its many actors. It is critical for military planners to understand the host nation's security forces' journey in as much detail as possible. This can be highly sensitive when planning to approach them in the spirit of a partnership. If the security situation is poor, the host-nation security forces are clearly failing. We need to understand why that is. Is it them, is it the regime they are supporting, or a combination of many factors? As a minimum, the following questions should be asked:

- When was the military established?
- What were/are their roles and traditions?
- What are the main security threats that they face: internal or external? In what form: terrorism, insurgency or state-on-state?
- Are they feared, or respected, by the general population?
- How are they linked to government's rule of law and economy?
- Is there corruption, and to what level, within the government and the current host-nation security forces?
- Are they officer-led, or NCO[4]-led?
- What is the ethnic and tribal make-up of the security forces?

[4] NCO: Non-Commissioned Officer.

- Are there any serious ethnic, or religious, problems and divisions?

- If the security forces have been re-built previously after other conflicts, which groups are dominant within them and who are the key leaders? For example, in Afghanistan, are they former Mujaheddin, Taliban or Soviet-sponsored Government Forces? Which units did the former warlords command, and where are their own, former, subordinate commanders now?

- How is their morale? They are likely to be losing the current conflict.

- Which is the dominant service? Is it the Air Force or Navy because of the higher levels of education? Is it the Army because it was favoured by the former regime? Is it the Police? Which elements of the police and other security forces were complicit in war crimes?

The answers to these will allow us to understand the human terrain within the security forces; how they are seen and fit into their society. It will also enable us to identify key problem areas and priorities for further action.

SECTION II – PLAN

305. **The Challenges of Capacity-Building**. There are a number of difficult challenges that must be addressed, and overcome, when conducting capacity-building operations in another country. The approach to partnering is developed around meeting these challenges.

a. The first challenge is ensuring that any knowledge imported from the outside is adequately adapted, or tailored, to specific, local conditions. The substance of the training needs to be rooted on local norms and culture if it is to be sustainable over time. For example, the use of the *Loya Jirga* in Afghanistan is a compelling case of drawing on

a society's traditions in support of a post-conflict objective, like establishing and enduring democracy.[5]

b. The second challenge is what form of assistance should be provided, and what key capabilities, will be required in support?

c. The third challenge: what should be taught?[6] You have to know the operating environment and match the training syllabus to their anticipated tasks. As Lieutenant Colonel Nick Ilic recently stated about Afghanistan: *we are not trying to create a British Army – ours has been hundreds of years in the making. What the Afghan National Army needs to be able to do is to take on, and defeat, the Taliban. They can achieve that because they are better trained, better equipped and better motivated with a long term future. In time, quantity and quality will tell.*[7] The primary consideration is what organisation, command and control, planning skills, intelligence, and tactics, techniques and procedures do they require to have to achieve internal security. What niche capability support will they never grow themselves that will have to be provided by the intervening forces? If external security can be guaranteed by the intervention forces, the development of the host-nation's ability to defend itself from external aggression can be determined the longer that the partnering continues post transition towards a full partnership.

d. The fourth challenge is understanding the competing narratives. In Hanoi in 1956, paraphrasing Mao Tse Tung, Ho Chi Minh stated that "*The people are like the fish in the sea, they swim with the current.*"[8] Making the people swim in the right direction, the legitimate authority's current, is the key to winning in counter-insurgency, and in unifying a fragmented state. This is achieved through influencing the direction that people will take by understanding the competing narratives at play within the operating environment, and to learn how to exploit their strengths and weaknesses. Identity and narratives are big ideas in

[5] Flournoy M, *Training for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, Chapter 8 in Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, *Winning The Peace – An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, edited by Orr R C, 2004, pages 130-131.
[6] *Ibid*.
[7] Ilic N Lieutenant Colonel, MBE QGM, quoted on the Defence Intranet in the article, *Training the Afghan Army to Take on the Taliban Themselves,* 27 January 2010.
[8] The original Mao quotation is: *the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea*. It is difficult to find the exact source of this quote as he uses it and similar phrases in several of his writings. It is normally attributed to his essay *Problems of Strategy in Guerilla War against Japan, (May 1938),* included in his book *Six Essays on Military Affairs, Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1972.*

effective nation- and state-building. The key is to build a common narrative in the indigenous peoples. There are those who will see external intervention as an affront.[9]

e. The fifth challenge is building security forces in combat. Building foreign security forces is a challenge at any time due to political and cultural barriers, but it is even more so during active combat.[10] In a combat situation, troops are required urgently and training time is often cut down to create sufficient capacity. The end result is inadequately trained soldiers in active combat with limited support. Mass is important; this includes training enough soldiers to meet the security requirement and to develop an effective training and reinforcement margin.

f. The sixth challenge is identifying what type of forces to build and what their primary purpose should be. In the case of a dominant insurgent threat, the main effort should be to build the host nation's security forces so they can conduct their own internal security. The core of this should be civil and paramilitary police underwritten by the host-nation's armed forces. Having the capability to protect themselves against an external threat will take longer for the host nation to deliver and this can be underwritten by the intervention forces through overwatch. Overwatch will be withdrawn when the host nation has developed the capability themselves. This is represented in Figure 3.1.

[9] *Ibid*.
[10] Dubik J M, Lieutenant General (US Army Retired), *Accelerating Combat Power in Afghanistan – Best Practices in Counterinsurgency: Report 2*, Institute for the Study of War, www.understandingwar.org, USA, 2009, page 4.



Figure 3.1 – The Division of Responsibilities between Host Nation and Intervention Security Forces Over Time

306. **End-State**. In regard to capacity-building, what is the desired end-state? Unlike the overall steady-state partnership that the strategic vision espouses, to which there will be a military element, there must be an end to the capacity-building mission, and in political philosophical terms this would be defined by the restoration of the host-nation's monopoly on the legitimate use of force. So, we might best articulate the **end-state** as being: **self-reliant, competent and professional security forces that are representative of the people and the nation, and capable of providing for their internal and external security**. The bulk of any intervening forces should be withdrawn after the host nation is capable of providing for its own internal security. Small elements would remain to assist in the development of the external defence capability, but this would be guaranteed by standby forces at readiness provided by the original intervention forces until such time as full capacity had been achieved. This commitment is likely to last for some years.

307. **Security Transition Planning Framework**. As stated, partnering is about assisting the host nation through its national transition or transformation. Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 6/10, *Security Transitions* proposes 5 key questions as the foundation of security transition planning for a joint, inter-agency

team.[11] These questions are designed to help the planners think about the critical aspects of security transition.

a. **Why is the transition taking place?** This question is aimed at developing common situational understanding in order that we can define the negotiating space.

b. **What functions are critical enablers of the security?** This question aims to identify 4 things: the technical security functions required (internal security of the people and the state, external defense of the nation, provision of rule of law); the geographic area and scale over which the security transition will take place; the organisational levels at which security transitions take place (policy, resource, management and delivery level); the main oversight and accountability mechanisms (executive control, parliamentary oversight, independent bodies, media and civil society groups) required.

c. **Who are the potential partners and stakeholders in the transition?** What are their interests in the transition? Are they perceived as legitimate? Can they develop the required accountability mechanisms? Do they have, or can they develop, the required capacity and motivation to perform the function? Can they perform and sustain the function.

d. **When should the security transition take place?** This question aims to set the timeframe and conditions to be achieved trough the use of milestones (big **T** and small **t** transitions), and determine the sequence and duration of activities within the overall plan.

e. **How will transition options be developed, negotiated and implemented?** This question focuses on how we articulate our outcomes and the options to deliver them, how we negotiate and influence key events, how we manage the effective drawdown of military assistance and how we monitor and evaluate progress.

[11] Combined UK Stabilisation Unit and Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) Joint Doctrine Note(JDN) 6/10, *Security Transitions*, November 2010, pages 2-2 to 2-13.

308. **Military Planning**. Detailed military planning is based on understanding and answering these broad, strategic and operational questions developed by the joint, inter-agency team. The military do, however, have significant input to, and influence over, the overall joint, inter-agency planning process. In fact, although it is civilian-led, the military logically is the major player in supporting its development due to their ability to plan and distribute it. Nonetheless, it is not a typical military plan, and there are some 'golden rules' that must be adhered to:

a. All campaign planning is in support of an overall political goal.

b. The military decision-making process does not work in the joint, inter-agency environment without significant revision. This may include developing a common theatre-wide taxonomy jointly with civilian partners, thereby avoiding entrenched military jargon to ensure a common understanding. For example, *ends, ways and means* translates well across all agencies. *End-state* and *centre of gravity* may not.

c. The campaign objectives are jointly owned by the political leader, and the military commander. The political leader,however, has the final say.

d. There must be an effective monitoring and evaluation system to support decision-making. During security transition, the focus of monitoring and evaluation will be with our partners, the politics of the host nation, the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the people, the capacity, capability and professionalism of the security and justice sectors, and whether or not the transition is sustainable in the long term.[12]

e. There should be an effective co-ordination and synchronisation mechanism identifies key strategic issues and provides political and military leaders with the information that they require to make key decisions on time.

[12] *Ibid*, pages 2-12 to 2-13.

SECTION III – RESOURCES

309. **Types of Military Assistance**. Irrespective of whether or not a strategic partnership is eventually achieved, there are 4 key assistance tools for capacity-building in the security sphere. Although focussed on the military, these same tools can be used across all of the elements of national power: **mentoring, advising, supporting and training (MAST)**. In terms of building security capability and capacity, these 4 tools are the same in either developed states who are expanding their armed forces, or in failed, or failing states, who lack credible security forces to deal with insecurity. In the case of the latter, all forms of assistance from one sovereign state, or coalition, to another sovereign state.

310. Initially, there may be the requirement for direct leadership by external forces until such time as a strong cadre of indigenous leadership has been trained to replace them. This direct leadership is dependent on the level of capacity and capability that already exists. For example, in Afghanistan, there is a clear requirement for direct leadership in the less-developed Kandaks, and also in the combat support and combat service support functions. There are also units that are capable of working without direct leadership but who require advice and capability support. The main issue with this approach is political aversion to allowing direct leadership, but it has formed the key part of the British approach in the past and generally works. An excellent example is the training of the Sultanate of Oman's Armed Forces during the Dhofar War (1970-1976). This is covered in more detail in Chapter 4.

The MAST Concept – Mentoring, Advising, Support, and Training

311. The MAST concept is based on a simple precept: the core of all assistance to the host nation revolves around, and is underpinned by, support and training. Support includes financial assistance, logistics, infrastructure development, communications, airlift and airpower, and naval support among many others. Training assistance is focused on military and civilian academies, as well as specialist and operational training. Mentoring and advising are roles that can only be undertaken by chosen military and civilian personnel who are appropriately trained. All mentors and advisors can access and provide support and train their charges. All mentors are advisors and all advisors are mentors; the difference is in the level of empowerment. The

reality is that mentors and advisors are essentially the same people and will switch between mentoring and advising depending on who they operating with, and based on the host nation's level of competence in that area. Not all of those providing support and training are capable of being effective mentors and advisors.

312. **Mentoring**. Mentoring is ultimately about leadership and relationships. A mentor is defined as:

> *an experienced and trusted advisor who provides counsel and leadership to another person, or organisation, by agreement*.[13]

313. Mentoring is the highest form of advising because a mentor is empowered to take the lead when appropriate. It is, therefore, the role of the mentor at whatever level, to help deliver the leadership functions of achieving the mission, building the team and sustaining the individual *by, with and through the indigenous forces*.[14] The mentor has to develop a relationship with the individual, or team, that he is mentoring which must be based on mutual respect and trust. This should then lead to recognition between the 2 parties of the need to reach a common goal and the empowerment, through knowledge and confidence, to achieve it. He also has to represent his own chain of command with its aims, and influence his team to achieve them. This can be done through a soft, or coercive approach, dependent upon the urgency of the task. He is, therefore, involved in all aspects of operational planning, including the provision of external assistance if required such as countering-improvised explosive devises and medical support, training and development. He is a trainer in his own right; and must also be prepared to lead if the indigenous leadership fails. It is important to note that this is not a meeting of equals at this stage. The mentor has the superior military or specialist knowledge which he must impart to his charges. His charges will, in turn, be mentoring and advising him on their culture and environment. His overall role is to coach the indigenous forces to develop into a self-sufficient, professional, competent and respected force in their own environment through personal example and leadership. By fostering, and nurturing his charges, he is able to develop key individuals to replace the original mentors and take the lead for all decision-making. Once the indigenous force leadership has

[13] Based on the definition in the *Concise Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, 11th Edition, 2004, page 893.
[14] XVIII Airborne Corps, Iraq, September 2008.

reached this stage, the mentors revert to an advisory and support role only. The responsibilities of a mentor are, therefore, summarised as: **lead, influence, coach, empower, support and train**.

314. **Advising**. As stated, mentors and advisors are the same people. The advisory role is different to that of mentoring only in terms of empowerment. Put simply, mentors are empowered to take the lead and override their charges where appropriate because they are not yet full developed. Advisors are defined as:

> *someone who can recommend a course of action, offer advice, or inform another party, about a fact or situation*.[15]

315. Advisors support indigenous formations, units and individuals that have reached a set standard of capability, competence and self-sufficiency jointly decided by the host nation and the external intervention force. They have already been mentored to a level where the host nations' security forces are now the lead element. They should be capable of operating with external coalition forces, but require advice on how to operate together, how to improve their operating procedures, or how to attain additional niche assets, such as air support, to achieve their mission. In the case of the latter, the advisor is empowered to request support if it is legitimately required. The advisor, and the individual or team that he is advising, are therefore equals. Advisors have the power to make recommendations of their own, based on their experience, and through their chain of command, but not to enforce them. They can, for example, recommend courses of action, or inform about a fact or situation, but the final decision must be with the indigenous force commander and the chain of command that he is working to. Advisors need to use their influence developed through trust and teamwork, to explain to their charges that their advice could be a viable alternative and is worthy of consideration. Once a course of action is about to be enacted, the advisor fulfils the functions of an observer, provider of capability support, and official representative of his own chain of command. The responsibilities of an advisor are, therefore,

[15] Based on the definition in the *Concise Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, 11th Edition, 2004, page 19.

summarised as: **inform, recommend, influence, observe, represent, support and train**.[16]

316. **Support**. This publication uses the term support as opposed to assist. Assisting is simply defined as the provision of money, resources, or information to help someone.[17] This JDN takes the view that all mentors, advisors and trainers have been provided to *assist* a failing state's transition to a viable, and self-reliant, state. Therefore all of the 4 activities described are forms of assistance. The word support, by contrast, provides much greater emphasis on the specific provision of resources and niche capabilities that the host nation does not possess. The support function is likely to change over time. In the initial engagement, and relationship-building stages of an intervention, the host-nation security forces will be heavily reliant on external support. The intervening forces need to help them develop their own forces to be self-reliant in all but niche capabilities that they will never own themselves. These will continue to be provided until such time as the host-nation security forces attain full control and may, on request, be provided post transition (for example, intelligence and special forces assistance). The main responsibilities of the support staff are summarised as: **support, provide, enable and deliver**.

317. **Training**. Education and training is the bedrock of all assistance, but particularly of military assistance. In simple terms, the aim of training is to teach a person, or organisation, a skill, or type of behaviour, through regular practise and instruction.[18] Training takes place through all phases of a deliberate intervention but will devolve to the full responsibility of the host-nation security forces during the transitional phase. Some specialist training may continue beyond transition by special arrangement with the host nation in niche capability areas. Training is also about leadership and influence, as well as building confidence, developing ethos, and professional pride. Trainers have the responsibility to set standards and evaluate them, and to coach future host-nation trainers. The main responsibilities of the training staff are summarised as: **lead, coach, direct, observe and evaluate**.

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[16] Interestingly, the US FM 3-07.1, May 2009, page 2-9 states: advising – the use of influence to teach, coach and advise while working by, with and through FSF. US advisors are not partners; US forces act as partners. Advising and partnering are inherently different activities. Advising requires relationship building and candid discourse to influence development of a professional security force. Note: this JDN argues that advisors are, in many ways, the real face of the overall partnership.

[17] Based on the definition in the *Concise Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, 11th Edition, 2004, page 79.

[18] Based on the definition in the *Concise Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, 11th Edition, 2004, page 1529.

318. Both mentors and advisors must have priority reach-back to their own chains of command. Clearly, though, command relationships and lines-of-control need to be established. Just as clearly, these will be sensitive issues, ones which speak both publicly, and privately, to the nature of the relationship between intervening and indigenous forces. The rolls of advisor and mentor, therefore, need to be placed within the twin concepts of embedding and integrating. Examples of MAST in practice are at Annex A and include: Iraq – Royal Navy Training Mission from 2003-2008 and Afghanistan – Regional Command South Advisory Group-Kandahar from 2003-2005 (Annex 3B).

Embedding and Integrating

319. Embedding and integrating cover 2 distinct concepts. The first is the position of UK personnel within the indigenous force at the point they provide their assistance. The second is the relationship of that unit, or force, to formed UK, and host nation, units. Both concepts are loaded with political implication and harbour risk.

320. Embedding is where selected personnel are formally lodged within an indigenous governmental, or security force organisation. This provides consistent, constant and informed leadership, advice or mentoring within a framework which can build trust and help ensure that the UK aims are maintained. Similarly, local personnel are embedded within our organisations as advisors. At a basic level embedding may provide ‘stiffening’ to a weak, indigenous unit, and at the other end of the spectrum, it may simply provide an opportunity for indigenous leaders to take advice. At all levels, it provides a structured path for the provision of direct UK support in the form of communications, logistic, supporting fires, or other specialist skills necessary for operations or co-operation; essentially, all aspects of MAST.

321. Embedding is primarily about the transfer of skills through *personal* connections between our forces and theirs. This personal factor recommends that embedded personnel are chosen carefully for their interpersonal skills and are in place for periods of time which allow the growth of key relationships and trust. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. The transfer of skills should be viewed as 2-way: the personnel we embed with indigenous forces should be placed into indigenous units with a view to increasing their knowledge of the environment, culture and language, and impart their own

military knowledge through their command, control, advisory and mentoring tasks. Through this procedure, we achieve the 'individual understanding' necessary for solid peer-to-peer co-operation.[19]

322. The practice of embedding (or 'embedded partnering') may happen at different scales. At one end, it may be as little as a few key individuals or a supporting team embedded within the headquarters of an indigenous organisation to provide advice and critical support. This can be increased to include something similar to what we have called an *Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team*, or indeed an entire sub-unit within an indigenous unit. The main feature of embedding should be that the embedded personnel must live, train and operate alongside the indigenous unit. In the most difficult situations, embedding, to be effective, should happen across all levels of command, '*from the ministries down to the squad level.*'[20] As the host nation gains competence and capacity, however, it is inevitable that they would no longer require, or wish, to have mentoring at all levels, and so the specifics of embedding need to be an ongoing negotiation. Within this framework, it is clear that embedding is, therefore, not the same as integration; the latter can happen without the former.

323. Integration of indigenous units into our command structures and operational frameworks allows UK forces to generate higher-level operational skills amongst indigenous forces, while allowing UK forces to more directly provide command, control, communications, combat support, and logistic support within the joint environment; a key hallmark of our military sophistication. The aim should be to develop common understanding as defined in JDP 04, *Understanding*:

> *the ability to comprehend perceptions of groups other than our own and to establish a common baseline for communication, interpretation and action.*[21]

324. Without this common understanding, we are very likely to work at cross-purposes to the indigenous forces we are meant to support and develop. Integration of units within our command structures works both ways. Initially,

[19] JDP 04, *Understanding*, page 2-3.
[20] Afghan COIN Centre, Land Warfare Development Group (LWDG), Information Note 09, *Embedded Partnering in Afghanistan*, page 2.
[21] JDP 04, page 2-3.

we will integrate indigenous forces while we control operations. When the indigenous forces take command and control from the intervention force, the intervention forces will still have its own forces integrated within the host nation's structures but their role will be reversed, they will be in an advisory and support capacity rather than in the lead.

325. Beyond this provision of support and increased mutual understanding, integration provides a key venue for the bolstering of indigenous force legitimacy. Even when indigenous forces are not of the standard which would be expected of British, or other western forces, mistakes made by indigenous forces may actually be less serious to them, and firmly outweighed by the political legitimacy confirmed by the host nation exercising their own growing control over the legitimate use of force within their own territory.

326. Another aspect of integration is the necessity to operate consistently within a single operating picture with indigenous forces. Our means of warfare are based on the carefully chosen, but decisive, application of violence to achieve particular effects on the enemy. To achieve this, we rely on robust collection and analysis systems and doctrine, with intelligence disseminated to all, via sophisticated communications systems. Yet despite all our advanced systems and practices it should be recognised that indigenous personnel will almost certainly have a better idea of what is going on in their native environment (especially within the *human domain*[22]) than the intervening force, a benefit nonetheless wasted if not disseminated. It is, therefore, necessary to have a common communication system and operating picture delivered through shared systems, and shared intelligence, a point of particular risk which we must be able to take-on.[23] This development of understanding, through shared intelligence, is clearly in line with the principles of intelligence, which demands 'alternating perspectives' that are timely, collaborative, and maintains continuity. This needs to be balanced against the risk to security.[24]

327. The relationship between the types of partnering, and the assistance tools, can best be summarised up in the Figure 3.2.

[22] *Ibid*, page 3-5.
[23] LWDG Information Note 09 and Commander International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF)'s Partnering Directive.
[24] JDP 02, *Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, Chapter 2, August 2011.



Figure 3.2 – Types of Partnering and Assistance

328. **The Range of Military Mentoring and Advisory Tasks**. Chapter 2 highlights the areas where military officers and soldiers of all services may find themselves supporting other government and host nation agencies and actors. While the primary focus of military mentoring and advising is on host nation military actors, there are many instances where military personnel will find themselves advising civilian agencies and host-nation ministers. For example, qualified military engineers may be advising the minister for highways and roads. Military personnel must be prepared, and trained for, these tasks. As these tasks rely on excellent relationships between the various parties personnel should deployed into these posts for at least 12 months. Preparatory training should include an attachment to a similar government organisation in the sponsor nation. An example of ministerial level mentoring and advising in Afghanistan, is at Annex 3B.

Risks of Embedding and Integrating

329. Embedding troops, and integrating our operations with those of the indigenous forces, is an inherently risky endeavour. It is fraught with issues such as physical and informational security, and there is room for frictional misunderstanding and conflict. In this environment, the chances of committing operational mistakes with political implications can increase dramatically. Nevertheless, embedding and partnering offer the surest route to developing an indigenous force capable of independent operation. Commanders should weigh the risks carefully, in a number of different categories, against the benefits of full co-operation. This judgement is ongoing, and under continuous review, across different categories, including:

a. **Force Protection**. Force protection is a critical risk to embedding. To maximise the benefits of embedding means UK forces lodging, and living, in close proximity to indigenous troops. This exposes our troops to violence from subverted, or rogue, elements within the indigenous forces. Incidents in Afghanistan confirm this. Yet the benefits of embedding should be viewed, in the long term, to outweigh the risk. Commanders should assess the level of force protection required and at what level would it erode trust with the indigenous force.

b. **Information Security**. It is equally clear from operations in Afghanistan, that indigenous force personnel will be a vector of information to adversaries, either through witting collaboration, or through cultural habits of gossip and braggadocio. Without trampling upon any growing bonds of trust, UK forces must work carefully towards securing vital information, while at the same time sharing as much as possible: intelligence sharing is always based on *quid-pro-quo* bilateral agreements, either formal or informal. The decision to use compromised indigenous force intelligence personnel, as a vector of disinformation to the enemy, is attractive, but must be judged against the risk of alienating other indigenous allies. Interpreters, while they may become very familiar to you, are a constant threat to information security.

c. **Operational**. Indigenous forces will, despite all the training and goodwill in the world, operate in a different manner to UK, and other western armies. Commanders require a detailed understanding of how indigenous personnel are likely to behave in certain situations, and adjust their exposure to them appropriately, but sensitively. vRules of engagement may be different, or perhaps even missing entirely, which chances UK association with counter-productive brutality or possibly war crimes. Yet by the same token, the operational behaviour of the indigenous forces may be more widely applicable than our own. For instance, a Mosque destroyed by UK troops for perfectly legal and proportionate operational reasons, will nonetheless be a source of potential public embarrassment to the UK, and indeed may prove a strategic liability in terms of adversary information operations. Conversely, the same Mosque destroyed by indigenous Muslim soldiers for the same reasons, may not merit mention. In many instances, getting indigenous troops to conduct a mission of particular sensitivity, or criticality, may be a better choice.

d. **Cultural**. Cultural differences are a rich vein of potential conflict and embarrassment. What is viewed as appropriate behaviour in nation's armed forces may cause deep offence in another. As the level of integration increases the chance of an unsuitable, or unthinking, UK soldier causing a rift through some unwitting cultural offence grows. For example, the reported use of pork and beef lard on cartridge cases sparked the horrors of the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny by offended Hindu and Muslim troops of the East India Company. Commanders may have to make key, operational and manpower decisions, with these factors in mind. Just as clearly, many UK soldiers find Afghan sexual practices puzzling and offensive, and this puts a premium on choosing the right personnel to place in mentoring positions.

Freedoms and Constraints

330. **Operating within a Multinational Environment**. Working in a multinational environment can bring both freedoms and constraints. The key is having a plan with common goals and then matching the capabilities of the contributing nations to where they fit best. Capacity-building goals must be matched by common standards to be achieved, and a common methodology

for achieving it. The following vignette illustrates some of the constraints and freedoms of operating within a multinational environment.

Creating the Perfect Horse

Joining a multinational operation (especially one which contains a lesser-developed host nation) can be like trying to create a perfect horse to enter a race and ending up with a camel. The camel, it is said, is a horse built by committee, with many associated issues.[25] A camel, although imperfect, has strengths and weaknesses. The object is to complete the race to win and survive. We can do 4 things with the camel:

- Flog it to death in the hope that it will last just sufficiently long enough to get to the finishing line, but it will die at the end.
- Understand the capabilities of the camel: it is not a horse (never will be a horse) but can do things a horse can't. If we understand what those capabilities are, we can adjust our planned race route to maximise our chance of winning and ensure that it lives afterwards.
- We can sell it on to somebody else as their problem. We will get little for it, but we avoid the ignominy of entering the race only to lose.
- We can shoot the camel, cut our losses, and buy a horse (the Bremer Model in Iraq) which then needs breaking-in. The horse may be even more unreliable than the camel that has just been shot.

331. Crude as this analogy may be, the environments in which UK Forces enter to partner with indigenous forces will provide undoubtedly more bizarre, and perhaps perverse, analogies than fiction could ever likely imagine.

[25] This phrase is often attributed to Sir Alexander Arnold Constantine Issigonis, the British-Greek designer of the BMC Mini.

The Horse Designed by Committee – Training the ANSF 2003-2005

In the early years of building the Afghan National Security Force (2003-2005), the training structure was a very difficult hybrid. At the Kabul Military Training Centre, the US selected, and recruited, 600 personnel at a time to form Kandaks (battalions). These were put through an effective 6 week, US-led 'boot camp'. During the boot camp, the US trainers selected those personnel that they believed would make good officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO)s. The officers were extracted from their initial Kandak and were sent to the French forces to train. Similarly, the NCOs were sent to the British forces to train. After their respective courses, they were placed back into another Kandak and given a US Embedded Training Team (ETT) with whom to conduct Kandak training before being put through a Canadian-led collective training package, and subsequently deploying to an operational area with their US ETTs. Continuity was provided by the US ETTs but the methodology of being trained by different nations, with differing perspectives and agendas, was problematical. The current NATO Training Missions in Iraq and Afghanistan provide good examples of how we need to work together as a single organisation and evolved from the original model.[26] The key lesson is that there must be a lead nation from beginning to end of the deployment who takes overall responsibility for delivering this capability. All other nations embedding staff within this structure, must follow the common plan and goals of that lead nation, and not pursue their own independent national agendas.

332. **Host Nation Governmental Institutions**. Capacity-building includes the concurrent reform of host-nation governmental institutions. This requires a co-ordinated and integrated approach. Reforming the host nation, the MOD for example, also requires reformation of the treasury to allocate resources and pay the bills, the justice system to develop the legal basis for the operation of the security forces, and the Ministry of the Interior for developing police powers and jurisdiction in relation to the military. Where there are gaps, (and there will be many in a fragile or failing state) the intervention coalition must meet the shortfall while developing the host-nation capacity to become self-reliant. As stated earlier, the biggest challenges are trust and confidence. Are we backing the right leader? Do we have the right host nation leaders in the institutions to succeed? If not, what is the timeframe in which these

[26] Commanding Officer 2RGR, *Post-Operational Report*, November 2005.

leaders can be chosen, and developed, through the national political process? While you may have a politician who is a reliable partner, and who shares your vision, is he supported by an administrative system and administrators who are capable of efficiently implementing his intent? The western model of the 'instrumental state' with apolitical, and professional, civil servants is not as common as we may wish.[27]

333. **Balance of Resources**.[28] Resources will always be an issue and there will never be sufficient. Like all conflicts, where fighting is likely, military campaigns are expensive in terms of 'blood and treasure'. It is, however, the treasure element that is often the most lacking. Military campaigns are often the most expensive to conduct and some, like counter-insurgency campaigns, generally take much longer than conventional warfighting campaigns to conclude. There is, however, a balance to be struck between resources and ingenuity. The nature and character of the operating environment will determine the size of the deployed force and its profile. In a failing state, this will be a high signature deployment but, in a semi-permissive environment, or one where the weakness, or lack of professionalism, of the host nation security forces are not necessarily the real problem, a lower signature deployment could be contemplated. Too many physical resources can be problematic and worsen the situation by limiting innovation and confusing the peripheral with the real issues of governance, justice and economic improvement. Counter-insurgency is manpower intensive, over a potentially long period of time, and this needs to be considered during the early analysis of the problem.[29] However, the real resources issue is nearly always a lack of funds for the non-military support to the campaign which is a critical factor in winning hearts and minds. The appropriate, and realistic, level of resources must be envisioned, and allocated, before the campaign starts. This requires political will to make it happen and within a coalition, this burden must be shared.

334. **Women and Operations**. Experience of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has shown the British military the advantages gained by employing female soldiers, police and translators in highly gender-segregated societies. Where

[27] Max Weber and/or Marx.
[28] Extracted and re-edited from Rigden I, Colonel Ian OBE, *The British Approach to COIN; Myths, Realities and Strategic Challenges*, US Army War College, April 2008, pages 28-29.
[29] For example, during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), the Boers had only 83,000 males of military age. The Boers had a maximum of 40,000 men in the field at any one time. Imperial Forces started with 25,000 but this figure had risen to 365,593 Imperial and 82,742 Colonial soldiers by the end of the war.

actions conducted by a male soldier may lead to irretrievable offence, those same actions by females are acceptable, and even highly beneficial. As David Kilcullen noted '*in traditional societies, women are hugely influential in forming the social networks that insurgents use for support. Co-opting neutral, or friendly women, through targeted social and economic programs, builds networks of enlightened self-interest that eventually undermine the insurgents*.'[30] Similarly, the training of women in highly traditional, or gender-segregated societies, will likely be a point of friction, perhaps even open discontent with the indigenous population or leadership. The clear operational (and perhaps even moral) necessity to recruit, train and deploy female indigenous police, and military personnel, will thus have to be carefully managed against domestic social factors which may pin such actions as antagonistic to their way of life.

SECTION IV – GENERATE

Build and Train

335. One of the problems often faced in building indigenous forces is the nature of the conflict. In the face of an ongoing insurgency, for example, there is often an urgency to build forces and to put them quickly into combat. The end result is that not all of the necessary functional areas are in place and there is insufficient mass within the already tired, and often dispirited, host-nation security forces to enable training and respite from the battlefield. Training indigenous forces requires both a 'top down and bottom up' approach. We work with what we have at the bottom end, while organising the top end to provide the policy, pay, equipment, resources as well as time and space to create effective, competently led, and administered, security forces. The requirement for a clear strategy has already been discussed in this JDN. It is this strategy which underpins all of the operational plans for capacity-building. In terms of building, and training, host-nation security capacity, command and control (C2), intelligence, security force balance, developing maritime and air capabilities, policing, recruiting and selection, should all be considered.

336. **Command and Control**. The strategy will determine the size and shape of the assistance to be given. From this, the coalition C2 must be determined. Who is the lead nation? What are the common goals and

[30] Kilcullen D, *28 Articles*, Small Wars Journal, Volume 1, 2006.

objectives? Who is the paymaster? Who is providing the physical manpower and equipment resources? Concurrently, the host nation C2 and infrastructure needs to be tackled with the long-term aim of replacing the intervention forces. Most importantly, the host nation construct must ensure full civilian control, and the accountability of the military and police, to the host-nation government.

337. **Intelligence**. The indigenous force has a much better chance of understanding the local environment (their environment) than the intervening force ever will. What they are unlikely to have is an intelligence-gathering system which fits our normal requirements for sharing. They are unlikely to have a system imbued with the appropriate concepts of collection tasking, source validation, structured analysis and drafting, and systematic dissemination. It is highly likely that they will be *leaky*, and just as inevitably, this will put off intelligence professionals from sharing, and trusting, the material they receive. MAST will, therefore, have to be devoted to developing an indigenous intelligence system that is capable of structured and systematic intelligence analysis. In the early stages of co-operation, indigenous intelligence provision should be directed towards supporting the commander's understanding of the human terrain. As their competence develops, they should be more closely integrated into operational intelligence functions. The tendency will be to lock-out all indigenous intelligence personnel as a security risk. Systems must be found to actively co-operate, without compromising, secure systems or information. Ultimately, full and frank co-operation, will provide one of the best sources of information, and knowledge of indigenous intelligence personnel, will assist greatly in UK forces ability to conduct source-validation and to refine collection. That this may come at the cost of some information security must be accepted. In the field of intelligence, one cannot aspire to risk elimination, only risk management.

From the Archives – US Mentoring in Vietnam

From: MACV for Briefing of President Diem

Date: 14 Aug 1963

Subject: Intelligence Collection Effort

Background. Continuing improvement in intelligence operations in the Vietnamese Army has been noted over the past year. Despite US intelligence support, practically all of our information concerning the Viet Cong comes to the US Military Assistance Command (MACV) from Vietnamese Government sources. Reporting delays caused by translation difficulties, untrained Vietnamese intelligence personnel, and the need to obtain definitive information are gradually being overcome.

Discussion. The necessity for accurate, and timely, intelligence is perhaps the greatest military deficiency in the war against the Viet Cong. Considerable progress has been made to overcome this weakness, primarily through US efforts to train the Vietnamese in the importance of intelligence. This problem, however, cannot be solved overnight.

338. **Security Force Balance**. The host-nation security forces must be developed with the right force mix, and balance. This means that the intervention forces must also balance their own assistance to enable this. For example, if the host nation has a significant coastline and/or disputed territorial waters, it will require the right maritime capability developed to protect this. If piracy is the main campaign theme for the intervention, the force balance must be focused on neutralising it and being able to sustain it long after the intervention force has withdrawn. Checks and balances should be put in place to ensure that there is civilian political control over the rival military services, forcing them to work to a common purpose rather than pursuing their own agendas.

339. **Developing Maritime and Air Capabilities**. Maritime and air capabilities require time to develop. Unlike training most land based forces, the training bill for pilots and naval officers, and the infrastructure to support their services and platforms, is large. It is also likely to require key personnel training facilities and courses outside the host nation. The key point is that maritime and air MAST teams will be assisting the host nation long after the

withdrawal of land forces. This has a significant advantage in that they are often seen as the acceptable face of defence diplomacy; they have a more discrete footprint that their land counterparts, and the technology that they teach, and offer, has other benefits for the host nation outside its pure military employment. The development of maritime and air capabilities should be built-up to meet the immediate need to achieve, and maintain, sufficient levels of security to enable the intervention force to withdraw. The focus, as with land, is therefore initially on internal security. Air for example, may see an emphasis on troop lift and close air support. Maritime may be focused on counter-mine measures, anti-piracy and littoral (including riverine) operations. Developing the capability to project force externally, and be responsible for the host nation's internal and external security, will probably take decades.

Building The Sultan of Oman's Air Force in Dhofar, 1970-1976

Although Oman had a fledgling Air Force at the start of the Dhofar War, the pilots were British and their capabilities of their aircraft very limited. They flew 2 ex-RAF *Scottish Aviation Pioneer* aircraft which were used for casualty evacuation and communications. Later the *Percival T-52* training aircraft were used. In 1968, the Omani Air Force took delivery of 24 BAC *Strikemaster* aircraft (pictured above) which were to be the main aircraft used against the insurgents in Dhofar until 1974, coming to prominence at the battle of Mirbat in 1972. In 1974, 32 Ex-Jordanian Air Force Hawker *Hunter's* were added to the mix for strike missions, and 8 Shorts *Skyvans* and 8 *Augusta Bell 205* transport helicopters for troop lift. They were supported by a flight of RAF Westland *Wessex* helicopters. These capabilities were critically important in defeating the insurgency, and for preventing it from resurging. Over the last 4 decades, the Omani Air Force has grown into a highly capable and professional, national Air Force. RAF as well as contract officers and airmen still support the Royal Air Force of Oman at the request of the Sultan. Oman and the UK remain long-term strategic partners in name, spirit and deed.

340. **Policing**. As the experience in post-invasion Iraq has established, the collapse in domestic law and order is a cause of great concern to the intervening power. Indeed, the collapse of law and order is very likely to be either the ultimate, or proximate, cause of intervention in the first place. Policing duties cannot be viewed as outside the interest of military forces in the case of intervention in an unstable or collapsed state: in part because the indigenous police force will be an outstanding source of intelligence for the intervening force, and more significantly because the restoration of host-nation sovereignty depends on the resumption of their monopoly over the legitimate use of force. The latter is a police function assumed only by the military *in extremis*. Indeed there is growing international agreement that it is the intervening power's legal responsibility to do so.[31] As the US Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual* noted in 1940,

> '*upon arrival within the foreign country, the [intervening] Government immediately becomes responsible for the protection of life and property of all the inhabitants of the foreign country. In order to discharge this responsibility, it may become necessary for the [intervening] forces to assume the functions of the national armed forces of the foreign country, in addition to the duties of the local and municipal police*.'[32]

341. JDP 3-40, Security and Stabilisation: the Military Contribution echoes this, and notes that 'where a functioning civil authority does not exist, the military may be required to help establish an interim government' to include the police.[33] It is insufficient to construct a police solely for the purpose of counter-insurgency duties. In Iraq, initially, the aim of the US forces was to produce militarised gendarmes and this resulted in an Iraqi national police force which was 'a patchwork organisation of commando-style, counter-insurgency units that harbour sectarian death squads.'[34] It took several years to rectify this. If the intervening force does not contain the specific expertise to help establish local police forces, assistance should be sought as a matter of strategic priority. Military mentoring may lead on police basic training, leaving

[31] Shiner P, and Williams A (editors), *The Iraq War and International Law*, London: Hart Publishers, 2008.
[32] US Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*, 1940, page 12-1.
[33] JDP 3-40, *Security and Stabilisation: the Military Contribution*, page 4-11.
[34] Perito R M, *Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police, and Facilities Protection Service,* United States Institute for Peace, February 2007.

specialist training, (such as evidence handling and forensic investigation) to others. Police primacy should be the ultimate goal of any security transition.[35]

Extract – Policing In Iraq

Pre-war planning for the reconstruction of Iraq is now generally considered to be woefully inadequate. The little that took place was focused on humanitarian issues such as food, water and refugees rather than security and the rule of law. The failure to grasp the importance of the rule of law in security and development manifested itself in a number ways. At the time, membership of the Baath party was ubiquitous because career progression in public service depended upon it. When the decision was taken to outlaw the Party, this meant that most officials involved in Iraq's policing, legal and penal system suddenly became outlaws. The effective disbandment of the police, the freeing of criminals from jails, and the tacit approval of looting established an atmosphere of lawlessness and a vacuum of authority. Extra-legal groups such as criminal gangs, militias and insurgents proved to be speedier than the coalition-backed state authorities. Creation of this void, on top of the socially corrosive effects of the international sanctions, dramatically increased crime. This generated the need for increasingly invasive police powers and tactics; both of which ran counter to the coalition aspiration of a policing system based on democratic norms.

Although work on police reform began within weeks of the formation of the Coalition Provisional Authority, serious planning, training and equipping of the new Iraqi police did not take place until the establishment of the Civilian Police Advisory Training Team in 2004. By this stage, the Iraqi police was on the back foot and its failure to effectively tackle crime and security, discredited it and emboldened criminals and terrorists. During 2004/5 it was common for new police stations to be attacked by better armed and organised insurgents. Newly supplied cars, weapons and equipment would be seized, and police officers either killed, or recruited, by the insurgents. In this way, the disparity of equipment, experience and the will to win progressively shifted in favour of the terrorists. Much of this could have been avoided with the involvement of police and security sector reform specialists early in the planning process and in post-invasion strategic decision-making.[36]

[35] JDP 3-40, pages 5-10 and 6-14.
[36] Extracted from Ashraf M A, *The Lessons of Policing in Iraq: A Personal Perspective* in *Policing,* 2007, 1, (1), pages 102-110

342. **Recruiting and Selection**. Effective recruiting and selection is key to building successful host-nation security forces. Incentives (normally financial) are required to encourage potential sailors, soldiers and airmen to join as well as a robust screening process that ensures recruits are medically, mentally and physically meet the required standard. Once again, it is important to have from the onset, one set of common standards for the recruiting and selection process. The stages of recruiting process are:

a. Develop common standards.

b. Decide an annual, or 6 monthly, quota.

c. Establish recruiting centres.

d. Conduct recruit selection (including education, medical and physical assessments and security vetting).

e. Dispatch recruits to the training establishment.

Training

343. Training must be fit for purpose. Initially, the main concern is training indigenous forces that are capable of conducting effective internal security operations. The old adage of *time, space, force and resource* will determine what assistance is required, and for how long, until the host-nation security forces are self-sufficient at this task. External defence can be developed over a longer timeframe if the intervention forces provide overwatch post transition. The host-nation security forces must be trained to operate and become self-reliant in their own environment. There is no requirement to train them to become the mirror of the intervention forces. This is unachievable in terms of resources, and the money would be better spent on improving governance and other key areas required to achieve stability. There are 4 main training lines of development: manpower; equipment; collective training; and sustainability.

344. **Manpower**. Manpower can be broken down by environmental service (maritime, land, air and police) and, for each of these environments; into officer

training, NCO training and specialist training. Specialist training will follow on from initial employment training.

345. **Equipment**. Effective training on issued equipment is critical for success. This is not just in terms of the physical operating of the equipment, but its safe handling and maintenance. Weapons and vehicle fleets should be easy to maintain and from as few sources as possible. One of the problems of a coalition intervention force is that every nation wants to play its part by donating equipment. Unfortunately, the side effect of delivering, for example, a hybrid vehicle fleet, is that it is almost impossible to maintain and causes problems for the logistics chain.

346. **Collective Training (Performance)**. It is vitally important to build sufficient mass in the indigenous security forces, particularly when at war, to enable the provision of proper collective training and a period of respite from operations. This training should be away from the operations area in, as neutral territory as can be organised. An important part of this process is the lessons-learned process which needs to be adaptive enough to provide officers and NCOs in the current fight, assist those being trained, and about to deploy. A rudimentary training cycle is shown in Figure 3.3.



Figure 3.3 – Rudimentary Training Cycle

347. **Sustainability**. The logistics system needs to be capable of giving the security forces enough supplies and on time. It is critical that the intervention forces start to design this capability from the beginning of the campaign. As new weapons, vehicles and other equipment are introduced, the old must be withdrawn as quickly as possible, in order to simplify the supply chain. Permanent barrack accommodation, welfare for the families of the soldiers and leave are also key components of maintaining and sustaining effectiveness. The host-nation forces must not become dependent on logistic and administrative support from the intervention forces. Sometimes hard measures need to be taken to ensure that this is the case. In Iraq in Anbar province in September 2008, USMC Military Transition Teams stopped providing fuel for their mentored units. Within 2-3 weeks, the Iraqi forces in the area were being supplied with fuel through their own system. The situation had been forced them to make it work.[37]

Developing Standards and Measuring Effectiveness

348. It is important to develop a common set of standards and a method of measuring operational effectiveness that is inculcated in every trained unit and sub-unit. A simplified, and theatre-specific, version of the UK's original measurement of fighting power is a useful model.[38] The model breaks down the UK's fighting power concept (shown in Figure 3.4) into 4 areas of measurement for each of the 3 components, conceptual, physical and moral.



Figure 3.4 – Fighting Power as a Model for Measuring Effectiveness

[37] Interview with Colonel Cromwell, USMC, in Anbar Province by Colonel I A Rigden, British Army, 22 March 2009.
[38] Original concept developed between Military Operations (MO)1 (operational effectiveness) in the MOD and G3 Operations 1 (Plans/Rest of the World) Headquarters Land, between 1994 and 1996.

349. The 12 areas of measurement are:

a. **Conceptual**. Ethos, doctrine, planning and direction.

b. **Physical**. Manpower, equipment, collective performance (on operations and in training) and sustainability.

c. **Moral**. Motivation, leadership, management and administration.

Against each were a series of questions; some subjective, others objective using basic empirical questions. For example, under manpower, the key question was: is the unit manned at: A) >95% strength, B) between 75-95% strength, or C) <75%. This was then colour-coded with answers to A being green, B – amber and C – red. This enables commanders to focus on the areas where action is required.

350. It is important to keep the system of measurement simple. The original measurement of fighting power had a total of only 30 questions for all 12 areas and could be completed in a couple of hours. For busy mentoring and advisory staff, a system that is effective and time-resource efficient is crucial.

Building and Training in Contact

351. This is the most difficult scenario for capacity-building. Troops already in combat will often be tired, dispirited and in need of a rest, but the fight must continue. It will take time to build sufficient host nation forces to replace them. Once replaced they will also need to be re-trained to form a core part on the new force. There are two major implications from this: First: the intervention forces must take the major part of the fight until such time as sufficient capacity can be built. Second, embedded mentors will be required in the existing forces from the beginning of the campaign as an operational priority.

Societal Challenges to Training

352. The preceding paragraphs represent an idealised template of how a training programme ought to be built. While it might take, for instance, 8 weeks to train a western soldier to a basic standard, an indigenous soldier may take longer for societal reasons, which should be accounted for. Many of

the characteristics described below may prove wrong, but the debate about moral, and cultural, equivalency is not one to be raised here. Right or wrong, these are deeply, rooted factors in some societies, and conscious decisions will have to be made to either: change them; accommodate them; or ignore them.

353. **Education**. Illiteracy, quite simply, makes training an indigenous soldier to western standards impossible. Recruits to an indigenous army are unlikely to come from anything but the lowest social strata, and thus will be the least likely to have any formal education. Basic literacy and numeracy may be prized commodities. An uneducated person will not, for instance, understand the 'germ theory of disease' and therefore education in hygiene may be a highly sensitive issue. Planning a military training course may need to include what might be considered basic education. Training soldiers to use technologically sophisticated equipment (as may be common in naval or air service) may be difficult if they have never handled any advanced electronics in their life. Technology 'soak-in' periods may be required.

354. **Ethos**. Just as western crusaders of the 12th century were too involved in their concepts of bravery and chivalry to fight with any type of forethought or sophisticated organisation, a deep social ethos of machismo (or alternately diffidence to physical work) may mitigate against the ability to conduct training. A society-wide view of soldiers as licensed ruffians, or an ingrained belief in some racial warrior characteristic, may militate against a western-style training package. British concepts of soldier self-discipline and NCO 'grip' may be utterly absent, and officers may have trouble absorbing (or indeed, may reject) the concept of 'serve to lead' at the core of British officership.

355. **Caste and Social Stratification**. The concepts of officership, senior NCO leadership, as well as aspirational junior JNCOs and soldiers common in Commonwealth armies will not likely be a pattern that will fit all societies. The 'natural officer class' of a particular society may not wish to interact with that army's (socially inferior) NCOs in a way we expect, or view, as efficient. Additionally, their interaction with other ranks may hover only slightly above disdain and brutality. As the British Army has learned with regards to its Fijian soldiers, traditional caste power structures may act against formal rank structures at a level an outsider would not likely observe until it became a problem.

356. **Ethnic Division**. It was common practice during the British Empire (and in the Indian Army to this day) to recruit from 'martial races', or ethnic-cum-tribal groupings which authorities perceived to have particular qualities suited for service (the Sikhs, Gurkhas, Pathans, Garwhalis and Rajputs were all identified as such). Yet the policy (with its 19th century racist overtones) has proved disastrous in other instances, such as the recruitment of a majority Turkish police force in Cyprus in the 1950s, which only further fanned the flames of the Greek-based EOKA[39] uprising, or the favouring of the Kikuyu in Kenya, which led to further inter-tribal violence. Yet the need to recruit may work against the best-laid plans for racial or ethnic equality. For example, despite representing 25% of the population, Tajiks in 2011 account for 41% of all Afghan National Army troops who have been trained. Pashtuns remain underrepresented not by active policy, but by their refusal to join in the first place. Thus the 'indigenous' army deployed in Helmand is an increasingly Dari-speaking force which, in some ways, is as alien to the countryside as are British forces.

357. **Drug Use**. Some cultures have integrated certain psychoactive compounds into their quotidian life in a way that can incomprehensible to a westerner (despite our common usage of caffeine, nicotine and alcohol). Marijuana and opiates are commonly consumed in Afghanistan and neighbouring states. In East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, the narcotic leaf *khat* is chewed regularly, as coca leaf is chewed in Latin America. Levels of usage, and its effect, must be calculated and adjusted for. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to stop.

358. **Socio-Cultural Mores**. Treatment of women, views on sex and propriety, differing views on social relations between age groups, etc., are all complex issues within the cultural terrain which may need to be accounted for. These issues can be especially difficult ones to communicate to domestic audiences, who may be shocked at the way women are treated in some societies, and why the British may willingly conform to (or ignore) these domestic imperatives. A key example is the training of female police officers and military personnel in Afghanistan.

[39] National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters.

SECTION V – EMPLOY AND TRANSITION

359. There are 3 stages to the employment and transition phases of capacity-building: mentored employment, enabled employment, and self-employment. This process should be viewed as a progressive programme whereby increasing leadership of operations is handed over to the indigenous force as their sovereign capability is rebuilt and legitimised. As the US Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual* described succinctly in 1940:

> '*During the earlier field operations of the [indigenous force], it is usually advisable to employ mixed units composed of members of the United States forces and the [indigenous force]. Later, the US forces are used only as a reserve available to support the [indigenous force] in emergencies. The [indigenous force] gradually assumes full responsibility for the maintenance of law and order.*'[40]

360. The 3 steps described in the *Small Wars Manual* define a broadly applicable principle which can be refined, and reused, in UK practice with the terms: mentored employment, enabled employment, and self-employment.

a. **Mentored Employment**. This is the critical stage of building capacity. During this stage, indigenous forces deploy with embedded mentoring teams whose job is to lead by example and direct their charges in battle. At this stage of the campaign, the mentors will have the superior tactical, technical and operating knowledge, but they will be almost blind to the environment and will be reliant on the host-nation forces to build the picture for them.[41] From the beginning, it is a symbiotic relationship with each side being reliant on the other. The mentors must identify the right indigenous personnel to eventually replace their mentors as well as must coach, train and develop them accordingly to the same level of knowledge and practical experience as their mentors in the operational environment they face.

b. **Enabled Employment**. When the indigenous forces have reached the stage where they are capable of deploying on operations

[40] US Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual,* 1940, pages 12-23.
[41] Carter N, Major General, *Interview with BBC Radio 4*, 1 February 2010.

under their own leadership and command and control, the embedded mentors switch to an advisory capacity. They will still enable support, and conduct training, where appropriate, but the indigenous unit is very much under indigenous leadership. Determination of when the switch occurs from mentoring to advising is when the indigenous leadership effectively has equal knowledge to the mentors in the particular battlespace they face. This is judged on careful measurement of their performance. At a local level, this is the start of the development of a true partnership. The advisor can advise, but is not empowered to dictate, and is integrated within the overall host-nation command and control structure. The indigenous commander is in the lead. During the transitional phase there will be units and formations that are being both mentored, and enabled, and this will remain uneven depending upon the capability being developed. More technical capabilities will take longer.

c. **Self-Employment**. This is the final stage of employ and transition, and is usually just prior to the intervention forces leaving theatre. The indigenous forces command structure is now fully in the lead and their forces are capable of providing internal security in their own environment. Some specialists from the intervention forces may remain to continue to develop highly technical skills and trades such as: explosive ordnance disposal; naval command or weapons skills; or pilots and aircrew at the invitation of the host nation.

361. **Operational Induction**. For newly-raised indigenous forces, it is critical that they are given some form of operational induction for 3 main reasons, it:

a. Allows them to bond with their mentors;

b. Enables them to bond with each other; and

c. Provides them with some experience that will give them confidence.

The best form of induction is based on deployment into a less demanding operational district for a few months, where they are mentored by not only their

own mentors, but additional mentors and trainers from the formation that they will be assigned to. This allows them to build Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) while conducting operations, and preparing properly for deployment.

SECTION VI – SUSTAIN

362. Self-deployment must be underwritten by the intervention forces post-withdrawal with an overwatch commitment to support the host nation in its external defence should such a threat exist. There will certainly be a long-term financial commitment. The key areas that need to be underwritten during the sustain phases are:

a. Diplomatic and economic.

b. Procurement of the appropriate military equipment (for example, there is no point in persuading the host nation to buy large numbers of tanks for a jungle environment).

c. If the campaign is ongoing, but in its final throes: enabling, or providing, key capabilities that the host nation requires to defeat the opposition but will not require itself post-conflict.

d. Continuing to build host nation capacity in key areas that will continue to require time and investment such as naval training and aviation/air training.

e. External defence of the host nation which should be brokered by either a treaty or agreement but which must be within a formal legal framework.

363. The full model of plan and resource, generate, employ, transition and sustain is summarised in Figure 3.5. This also shows some of the big T transition points which must be identified during planning.



Figure 3.5 – The Partnership Development Model

Annexes:

A. Case Studies 2 and 3 – MAST in Practice. .

B. Case Study 4 – Mentoring and Advising at Ministerial Level: The Creation of the Afghan National Police Strategy.

ANNEX 3A – CASE STUDIES 2 AND 3, MAST IN PRACTICE

CASE STUDY 2: ROYAL NAVY TRAINING MISSION, IRAQ, 2003-2008

3A1. The Iraqi Training and Advisory Mission-Navy (Umm Qasr), or ITAM-N (UQ), was based in Umm Qasr in the Al Basrah province of Southern Iraq. Umm Qasr was developed as Iraq's deep water port to reduce the country's dependence on the disputed Shatt al-Arab waterway that marks the border with Iran. It is situated on the Khawr Abd Allah waterway which leads to the North Arabian Gulf, sharing a common border with Kuwait.

3A2. The mission was a combined UK/US team of 150 coalition personnel drawn from the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, British Army, United States Navy, United States Coast Guard and United States Marine Corps. Originally established after the last Gulf War, it was formerly known as the Coalition Naval Advisory Training Team. Post the UK withdrawal, ITAM-N (UQ) was integrated within United States Forces-Iraq.

3A3. It was commanded by a Royal Navy Captain, and existed to mentor, advise, train, support and develop the officers and sailors of the Iraqi Navy and Marines. Team members worked alongside their Iraqi counterparts on a daily basis, building relationships and working to ensure that the Iraqi Navy and Marines were in a position to assume full responsibility for the security of Iraq's ports, territorial waters and maritime infrastructure, including its 2 major offshore oil platforms, which generate 85% of the country's income. As well as the daily responsibility for mentoring, advising and supporting their Iraqi counterparts, the team trained 1,800 Iraqi personnel on 50 different courses

ranging from oil platform defence to handling small arms over the 8 years since 2003.

3A4. Although the team was small, its task was vital. This is an excellent example of focused MAST, enabling the development of a key Iraqi military capability tasked to protect the assets critical for achieving the Iraqi oil revenue. Without this revenue, Iraq would be unable to rejuvenate its economy, national infrastructure or maintain its security forces – all conditions for its own autonomy, self-reliance and partnership with the US.

Source: Royal Navy Website – www.royalnavy.com, and post-operational reports.

CASE STUDY 3: US EMBEDDED TRAINING TEAMS IN KANDAHAR AND HELMAND, 2004/5

3A1. The US deployment in Kandahar and Helmand in 2004/5 is an excellent case study of how to physically implement the MAST concept and the problems caused by being under-resourced for the task. The strategic context of fighting 2 concurrent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan meant that the forces deployed were under-resourced for the task at hand, even though they had excellent troops, the right plan, mindset and approach.

3A2. **US Embedded Training Teams in Kandahar and Helmand 2004/ 2005**.[1] From July 2004 – July 2005, 76 Brigade of the US National Guard deployed to Helmand Province as the Regional Command and Advisory Group-Kandahar (RCAG-K). They were supported by a highly capable Task Force Bayonet strike group of enhanced UK battlegroup. 76 Brigade provided Embedded Training Teams (ETT) in support of the Afghan 1/205 Bde.[2] RCAG-K's mission was:

[1] Based mainly on the recce report by Commanding Officer 2RGR after 10 days spent observing US Embedded Training Teams (ETT)s in Helmand. 2 RGR had also provided the NCO Training Wing of the Afghan National Army Training Team (ANATT) from September 2003-March 2004 and from March 2005-October 2005. Details from the two 2 RGR post-operational reports have also been included in this assessment.
[2] ETTs performed the MAST functions.

To deploy in the vicinity of Kandahar to train, mentor and advise the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) Corp's Regional Command Headquarters in the Permanent establishment of the Regional Command, in order to project a strong Central Government through a viable ANA presence.

3A3. In addition they were given a number of specific tasks:

a. The provision of advisors and trainers to assist the ANA Regional Command Headquarters' Staff to ensure that they are trained to assume their responsibilities.

b. Train, advise and assist the ANA Regional Command Headquarters initial formation and organisation, to include the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) of follow-on ANA elements, in order to support their continued fielding.

c. Establish and maintain positive command and control (C2) of elements in the Area of Operations (AO) SOUTH, to include regional command staff, security forces and contractors.

d. Synchronise and execute a concept of support to facilitate site establishment and development, contractor oversight, and operations integration of ANA as directed by the MOD within AO SOUTH.

3B4. **Lines of Development**. The framework for achieving the mission included 4 lines of development.

a. **Command**. Develop command C2 of Corps, Garrison, Brigade and all Kandaks.[3]

b. **Operations**. Develop functional Tactical Operations Centres. Independently plan, execute and track company-level missions.

[3] Kandak: battalion.

c. **Personnel**. Develop: functional medical care system; personnel accountability; pay operations; and replacement operations.

d. **Logistics**. Develop: requisition processes; property accountability; and maintenance procedures.

3B5. **Threat**. There was a considerable threat to US personnel. Compared to the force size at the time, more soldiers were being killed proportionately in Afghanistan than in Iraq. The main threats were improvised explosive devices and small arms fire. The largest area of risk being in Paktia Province, but Helmand also had a significant number of attacks.

3B6. **Structure**. 76 Brigade (Bde) provided a total of approximately 69 personnel for each ANA Bde (Kandahar and Helmand), based on 8 at Bde Headquarters, 15 with each Infantry Kandak, 8 with combat support units and 8 with the combat service support Kandaks. Each team was equipped with HUMVEES, at least one of which was an up-armoured HUMVEE. All of the HUMVEES were equipped with the excellent NATO Friendly Force Tracker communications package.

3B7. **Method of Operating**. The US model in Kandahar and Helmand was based on the provision of trainers and mentors/advisors at each level. In the longer term it was intended that the emphasis would switch from mentoring and training to advising and training as the standard of the ANA improved. The RCAG provided mentoring, leadership, advice and training concurrently through all activities up to, and including, deployment on combat operations. Due to the limited numbers of personnel, all of the staff covered 3 to 4 appointments within the Kandak. They provided mentoring, advice and training to their counterparts on all aspects of operations, training and logistics. They deployed on operations and effectively led the ANA when required, (which was often) and helped to steer them in the right direction. They provided critical administrative and logistic support on a daily basis and called for additional logistic, air and firepower assets when required. There was considerable responsibility delegated to the junior officers and NCOs of the ETTs.

3B8. **Effectiveness**. The ETTs were exceptionally professional, motivated and determined to do a good job. A large number of the National Guardsmen were ex-regular soldiers with a few former marines. They had considerable previous experience both military and civilian. Their ages varied from early twenties to sixty. There were even a number of Vietnam veterans filling important posts such as vehicle mechanics and pay staff, who were in their late fifties but still very fit. Despite their quality and experience, they were hampered by a lack of US manpower and a lack of ANA resources. For example, the ANA was reliant on captured mortar and anti-tank ammunition to use for its own weapon systems. The ETTs were constantly involved in contacts with what was then termed the Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) and were often based at isolated detachment posts. Morale among the US troops was very high and they were having a significant impact on their ANA charges, but ANA morale could change rapidly, particularly when pay was not delivered on time. The ETT system worked very well because of the quality of the individual soldiers but it was beset with manning difficulties, largely because of the manning priority afforded to Iraq. None of the teams were at full strength throughout their deployment, and there were signs of significant overstretch. The US effectively led the ANA on operations with a maximum of 2 US personnel only at company level. When rest and recuperation was factored in, there was often only one US ETT soldier with a company leaving them vulnerable. As an example, in June 2005, a US Army captain was deployed on his own with an ANA Company who were contacted by the ACM. 9 x ANA were killed immediately and he had no assistance in the local vicinity. He courageously took command of the company, suppressed the ACM in what became a very heavy contact, called in a close air support mission, managed to organise the extraction of the 9 dead soldiers, and conducted a fighting withdrawal in co-ordination with reinforcements being flown in. This is only one illustration of the quality of the soldiers deployed in the ETTs, but it also exposes the difficulties of undermanning a mission and the risks involved. In the combat service support companies, there was significant undermanning with only 8 man teams with each Kandak. All this enabled them to do was to provide the real-time logistic support to operations. It did not allow for any training.

Problems with the ANA in 2004-2005

3B9. **General**. In 2005, the ANA was being grown very quickly with particular emphasis being placed on the teeth arms at the expense of logistics. Without excellent US support, the ANA would not have functioned effectively in the G1/G4 areas. In most cases, the brigade combat support and combat service support battalions were being used as infantry kandaks on deployment, largely because of a lack of specialist equipment. This was a particular relevant issue for the Helmand Province where the combat support and combat service support battalions were seen as key battle winners due to the long lines of communications.

3B10. **Officers and NCOs**. Although it was quickly identified that many officers and NCOs in the ANA had combat experience, they lacked any real experience in planning, training and logistics. Officers and NCOs came from a wide variety of backgrounds including ex-government forces, ex-Mujhaheddin, and ex-Taliban. This lack of experience was complicated by the way that they had been trained initially. Trained centrally in Kabul, in one of the oddities of working in a multinational coalition, the officers were trained by the French and the NCOs by the British before being put back into a Kandak under a US ETT. RCAG-K identified early, that there was an urgent need for continuation training in Brigades, and for a proper staff and leadership course that melded this mishmash together.

3B11. **Manning and Retention**. Manning and retention was a big issue in the Kandaks. In Helmand in 2005, for example, the 1st Kandak, 1st Brigade of 205 Corps, one of the oldest in the new ANA at the time, was approximately 40% of its established strength at best. This was due to combat attrition, road traffic accidents, soldiers going absent without leave and those simply finishing their 3 years basic contract and not being replaced.[4] The Afghan MOD did not at the time have a coherent manning policy and no retention programme. This underlines the importance of a holistic approach to capacity-building.

3B12. **Pay**. The US provided the pay for the ANA, but the policy for how much was decided by the Afghan MOD. There was a lack of coherence to the pay system. In one example, 1st Battalion, 205 soldiers were promised the

[4] In 2004/5 the ANA was losing approximately 60 soldiers a month either killed in action or through road traffic accidents.

newly introduced combat pay by the MOD but they then changed their position at the last minute. The US pay teams from Kandahar then found that they were ordered to pay less than had been promised, putting them in a very difficult position.

3B13. **Logistics**. Logistics was seen as the biggest problem area for the ANA. The vehicle fleets that existed were in a terribly poor state of repair and had been donated by a number of different nations. The effect on the ground was a mixed fleet of unreliable vehicles, a lack of spare parts, insufficient drivers and only a very small number of vehicle mechanics. The medical facilities were at best rudimentary, with Afghan doctors being trained to a much lesser level than their UK, US or European counterparts. Effectively, most of the logistic support to the ANA was provided by the US engendering a high degree of dependency.

3B14. **Lessons**. The key lessons that come out of this study are that mentoring and advisory teams:

a. Must operate within, and to, a clear national C2 structure, even when embedded within a host nation organisation.

b. Must have the most appropriate standard force protection available for theatre.

c. Must be mutually supporting for their own force protection within their teams.

d. Must be able to communicate to their own chain of command, to each other, and within the host nation C2 system.

e. Must be able to call on coalition and host nation fire as well as air support.

f. Must be able to call for coalition and host nation aviation and helicopter support.

g. Must be able to call on an intervention force, or national quick reaction force, in an emergency.[5]

h. Must be logistically sustainable by intervention forces.

i. Must have medical support.

j. Must have sufficient equipment and personnel to prosecute the mission effectively.

k. Understand that a holistic approach is required to achieve effective mentoring. MOD, force, brigade and unit structures, logistics and administration (pay, leave and welfare) must be developed simultaneously if we are to develop an effective force that feels valued in its own environment.

[5] Maritime, land or air.

ANNEX 3B – CASE STUDY 4, MENTORING AND ADVISING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL: THE CREATION OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE STRATEGY

Developing the Afghan National Police is like building a plane while it is in flight.

Brigadier Anne McDonald, US Army,
Kabul December 2009

Failure to plan is planning to fail.

Anon

3B1. During 2009, in Afghanistan, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) aimed to create a competent, professional and effective Afghan National Police in service to the people. This was conducted using 3 types of partnering activity: **ministerial development, force generation and force development**. Ministerial development was designed to develop strategic capability by the active partnering and personal interaction at all levels within the Ministry of Interior. This development work was undertaken by military personnel, civilian police officers and contractors. The leader of the NTM-A CJ5 Team was a RAF police officer with responsibility for the development of the Ministry of Interior Strategy and Policy Directorate. However, the remainder of the team consisted of military personnel from a variety of corps/branches of the Royal Navy, US Navy, US Air Force and US Army personnel who had no police experience. Thus, the specialist input had to be provided by the team leader with advice from the European Union Police Mission. The lack of police specialists within CJ5, was a constraining factor when partnering with the Ministry if Interior, and required careful *on-the-job* training to enable the commitment to be met.

3B2. By late 2009, the campaign strategy devised by the Commander International Security Assistance Force, (ISAF), General McChrystal, in partnership with the Government of Afghanistan, required significant growth in the Afghan National Police (ANP) from 80,000 to approximately 160,000 within 4 years. This was a complex undertaking that required a complete re-organisation of the ANP, a considerable increase in recruitment, retention and training, plus a reduction of 60%

in ANP attrition. In addition, the ANP were to be re-equipped and re-structured to improve their force protection and to enhance their operational capabilities.

3B3. The Afghan Minister of Interior was responsible for the delivery of the revitalised ANP, with the support of NTM-(A). He articulated his vision: *in 5 years the people of Afghanistan will consider their police to be honest, accountable, brave, impartial and striving to create a secure and lawful society*.[1] To achieve such radical improvements required the creation of a National Police Strategy with the details expanded further in the National Police Plan. Both these documents had been in production for a number of years, but required the decision to increase the size of the ANP to provide the political support to complete the documents. This became the priority the Strategy and Plans Directorate and CJ5.

3B4. Delivering the National Police Strategy and Plan required 3 levels of mentoring and advisory support between the NTM-A and the Ministry of Interior. The first level was mentoring and advising the drafters of the strategy. The team worked together shoulder-to-shoulder on the document using interpreters to translate documents from English to Dari and back again. Symbolically, the document was written in 2 columns with the English and Dari versions matching. The head of the Afghan Strategy Department, a Major General, worked in partnership with the RAF Police Officer to write the documents supported by specialists from within the Ministry of Interior, NTM-A and the European Police Mission to provide the technical details. This work not only built greater trust and understanding between the drafters, but also provided *on-the-job* training in strategic police planning for the Ministry of Interior.

3B5. The second level of mentoring and advice was in support of the Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy. Appointed based on his proven record in business, the Deputy Minister was a well-educated and experienced business entrepreneur. He did not require training in his role, but he did require mentoring on how to get the plan written and on how to create consensus to get the documents approved. This work was very political and involved the Deputy Minister and the RAF Police Officer working at ambassador level within the international community, non-government organisations and with international bodies.

[1] *Afghan National Police Strategy*, March 2010, page 10.

3B6. The third, and highest level of advice, was to the Minister himself. Educated in the UK, the Minister was capable and politically perceptive, but was not a career police officer, or a strategic planner. He required CJ5 advice on the specialist aspects of plan development, police skills and strategic police management. The RAF Police Officer effectively became a personal staff officer to the Minister, providing advice when requested, and assisting with briefings to the international community.

3B7. The National Police Strategy and Plan were created in the face of considerable cynicism concerning the ability of the Ministry of Interior to produce and implement them. However, with the support of NTM-A, the Ministry of Interior achieved producing them within 6 months. These documents were circulated to the Afghan President, and the national capitals of nations that were part of the International Police Co-ordination Board (including Washington, Berlin, Ottawa and Paris). Once implemented, the documents provided the guidance that directed the successful reorganisation and the ANP growth to 109,000 by July 2010 and 118,800 by February 2011, ahead of the scheduled growth rate.[2] The plans directed the capital investment in the ANP and resulted in a more effective ANP who were able to start to take greater responsibility for regional security from ISAF.

[2] *Afghanistan: Deployable Facts*, 3 May 2011.

Part 2

Understand why things are done the way they are. Although some local practices may seem strange, they generally have good reasons behind them.

CHAPTER 4 – TRAINING AND OPERATING WITH INDIGENOUS FORCES: LESSONS FROM HISTORY

We must do things dramatically differently – even uncomfortably differently – to change how we operate and how we think. Our every action must reflect this change of mindset: how we traverse the country, how we use the force, and how we partner with the Afghans.[1]

General Stanley McChrystal

Chapter 4 provides practical lessons and guidelines from the British historical experience of training indigenous forces. Annex 4A brings the salient points of this Chapter together by examining the Indian Army and the Gurkhas experience.

401. Training and operating with indigenous forces is not easy. As General McChrystal states, it requires a different mindset from when working with British, US, or service personnel from other western nations and our allies. Determination, cultural awareness, patience and humility are all characteristics needed to achieve success. Most importantly, it is the spirit of partnership that is required to achieve success jointly, encapsulated by the slogan *'succeeding together.'* History provides numerous examples of how, and how not, to operate with other cultures, and how to build and train indigenous forces. The purpose of this chapter is to provide useful insights from the study of selected historical examples. It offers an overview of the UK's long history of building and training indigenous forces to highlight both positive and negative lessons. Each instance of partnering, either within a campaign or between them, will require a different approach. The thoughts and guidance given here are not meant to be campaign specific, and the reader should refer to Army Field Manual (AFM) Volume 1, Part 10, for tactical-level tips on Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) in Afghanistan. At the other end of the spectrum, the US Army Field Manual, 3-07.1, offers useful theoretical guidance on the broadly-applicable concepts of culture and communication, working with counterparts, and cross-cultural influencing and negotiating.

[1] General Stanley McChrystal, Commander International Security Assistance Force, in his *Initial Assessment Report* on Afghanistan, 30 August 2009, in response to the Secretary of State's (the Honourable Robert M Gates) Memorandum dated 26 June 2009.

SECTION I – AN OVERVIEW OF THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE

402. In nearly all of the British colonial and post-colonial campaigns, local indigenous forces have played a key role. It is important, however, not to draw false lessons from this experience. The British experience should be placed in the context of the time. During the colonial era prior to 1945, the British were the legitimate power in their colonies and the military and police forces that were locally recruited were led by British officers. Prior to 1945, British imperial and colonial forces were categorised as:

- Local police;
- Local forces (militia);
- Imperial forces (from the colony);
- Crown forces (from Great Britain); and
- Commonwealth forces (from all dominions and colonies).[2]

403. Post 1945, Britain had to contend with a number of key security concerns as it began the process of de-colonisation, and this period provides many examples of training, employing and transitioning to control by indigenous forces. An example of some of the indigenous units and militia still under British control in 1945 is given below. With further study, each of these can provide rich examples of good and bad practice. Most were transferred to the service of their host nation, some were disbanded.

[2] Jackson A, Dr, *British Counterinsurgency in History: A Useful Precedent?,* British Army Review, 139 (Spring 2006),16.

Examples of Indigenous Units and Militias Under British Control in 1945	
India The Regular Indian Army, Navy and Air Force Frontier Forces including: • Corps of Guides • The Gilgit Scouts • The Chiltral Scouts • The Khyber Rifles • The Kurrem Militia • The Tochi Scouts • The South Waziristan Scouts • The Zhob Militia • The Pishin Scouts	**Middle East** • Iraq Levies • Trans-Jordan Frontier Force • Arab Legion • Trucial Oman Scouts • The Sultan's Armed Forces • Aden Protectorate Levies • Hadhrami Bedouin Legion
Africa • The Royal West African Frontier Force • West African Regiment • King's African Rifles • Somaliland Camel Corps and Somaliland Scouts • Sudan Defence Force • Northern Rhodesia Regiment	**Asia** • Hong Kong Regiment • 1st Chinese Regiment • Burma Rifles • Malay Regiment • Royal Brunei Malay Regiment

404. Since the end of the World War II, the British have been involved in 72 military campaigns, 17 of which can be classified as counter-insurgency.[3] Of these 17, 15 were conducted during the withdrawal from Empire. These campaigns in particular, if used selectively in context, offer valid lessons today in terms of partnering and training indigenous forces, particularly in regard to

[3] Army Staff College Camberley, *Counter-Revolutionary Warfare Handbook*, (published internally, the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 1988), Annex H, pages H1-4. This excellent précis highlights the following as COIN Campaigns: Greece (1945-1946), Palestine (1945-1948), Egypt (1946-1956), Malaya (1948-1960), Eritrea (1949), Kenya (1952-1956), Cyprus (1954-1958), Aden (1955), Aden (1956-1958), Muscat and Oman (1957-1959), Togoland (1957), Brunei (1962), Malaysia (limited War with elements of an insurgency) (1963-1966), Radfan (1964), Aden (1965-1967), Northern Ireland (1969-2007) and Dhofar (Oman) (1970-1976).

the raising, training and employment of the local police, militia and indigenous forces.

405. As mentioned considerably in this Joint Doctrine Note (JDN), it is the development of indigenous forces to the level that they are capable of taking ownership of their own security that is essential to building enduring peace for the nation concerned. During both the heyday of Empire and, more importantly, the withdrawal from Empire, they acted as the backbone of intelligence gathering organisations, police forces and the local military. The importance of their use is 3-fold. Firstly, it involves them in the long-term solution in that they represent the government as well as the population and, therefore, provide positive interface between with civil control (governance), the people, and hopefully progress. Secondly, it enables the external security forces to understand the nature of the conflict that they are involved in. Thirdly, once trained and well led, they are generally more effective in their own environment. Understanding, emphasised strongly in Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, is critical to success. It is the only way of truly achieving influence to achieve the desired outcome of a lasting peace.

406. The British generally, although not always, saw this as a joint endeavour, and what this JDN refers to as a strategic partnership. Of the 17 COIN campaigns, for example, the United Kingdom can still be said to have true strategic partnerships with Malaysia, Kenya, Brunei and Oman. In the case of Oman, British officers still serve on secondment in the Sultanate of Oman's Armed Forces in all 3 services, in addition to the very strong diplomatic and economic ties.

407. Successful transitions were largely because of a guarantee of assistance for external defence (for example, the Five Powers Defence Arrangements)[4] until such time as the host nation was capable of: developing its own capability; a jointly-planned endeavour to develop the security forces; continued diplomatic, military and economic assistance; forces and standards tailored to the specific needs of the country.[5] Clear standards were set which

[4] Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) are a series of defence relationships established by a series of bilateral agreements between the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. It was signed in 1971, whereby the 5 states will consult each other in the event of external aggression, or threat of attack, against Peninsular Malaysia or Singapore.

[5] For example, the Malaysian Armed Forces still has a jungle focus to its organisation and structure for land forces, and a coastal defence and shipping/island protection/anti-piracy role for its Navy.

had to be achieved while under external leadership and mentorship. Once a unit, and its officers and Non-commissioned Officers (NCO)s, had reached the professional targets set, the indigenous leadership would take the lead and the external forces switched to a supervisory and mentoring role (for example, the Sultanate of Oman's Armed Forces). The stage that indigenous forces are capable of standing operating independently is normally synonymous with the general withdrawal of external forces, and a significant improvement in the overall security situation. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The British approach traditionally, has been to either, leave training and advisory teams in the key military and police institutions as part of the long term commitment, or provide a planned annual programme of assistance. Additionally, it has also maintained official affiliations with between British and Commonwealth or former colonial units. For example, British units are still affiliated to many Indian and Pakistani units. This network is very powerful and reciprocal visits are often conducted to keep traditions alive.



Figure 4.1 – Partnering Indigenous Forces: Transition of Responsibility Over Time

408. Every British campaign has a litany of mistakes made in the early stages of operations. What delineates a successful campaign, is how quickly the external and indigenous security forces have learned from their mistakes. Adaptability is an essential component of success. In the Irish Civil War of 1920-22, Mockaitis concludes that the British learned valuable lessons but too late to affect the outcome of the campaign which led to a victory for the Irish Republicans.[6] It is often forgotten that the Malayan Emergency did not start well. The initial approach to the insurgency was not dynamic and a number of mistakes were made before the British realised the seriousness of the threat.[7] It was really only after the assassination of the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, on 6 October 1951, that Britain started to react to the situation effectively and activated the Briggs Plan.[8] In Kenya, the first year of the campaign was the bloodiest, when the British let the indigenous Kikuyu-led police conduct many of the operations without appropriate supervision.[9] The campaign was very nearly lost, but the British forces learned quickly enough to reverse the process and achieve eventual success. The learning stage suggests that it is better to start with small, measured steps until the full nature of the situation faced is apparent. Thereafter, make best use of what has been learned to gain the advantage.[10]

409. **Police and Intelligence**. The role of the police has been central to all of Britain's counter-insurgency (COIN) successes and central in its failures. The Army could only fight the insurgents if it had good intelligence about them; it could only secure good intelligence if it maintained good relations with the police; and in turn, the police could only gather information about the insurgents if it kept close to the population.[11] This closeness was predicated on constructing and mentoring a reliable civil police force which was trusted by the population and viewed as legitimate. Sophisticated military technological systems for gathering intelligence is only a partial solution to providing the political intelligence that is required in order to pursue a COIN campaign, or to maintain law and order in the face of domestic unrest. The police (in the form of a 'Special Branch') or a solid law-abiding domestic security organisation is needed. Colonial intelligence occupied the unstable 'shifting middle ground

[6] Mockaitis T R, *British Counter-Insurgency 1919-1960*, St.Martin's Press, New York, 1990, page 74.
[7] *Ibid*, page 113.
[8] Thompson R, Sir, *Make for the Hills*, Leo Cooper, London, 1989, page 92.
[9] Jackson A, Dr, *Op. cit*.
[10] Extracted from Rigden I A, Colonel OBE, Strategy Research Paper, *The British Approach to COIN: Myths, Realities and Strategic Challenges*, USAWC, March 2008. Also published in the Carlisle Papers 2010.
[11] Popplewell R, *Lacking Intelligence*: *Some Reflections on Recent Approaches to British Counter-insurgency, 1900-1960*. Intelligence and National Security, Volume 10, Number 2, 1995, page 337.

between domestic and foreign, between statehood and dependence, on an external power.'[12] In the case of Britain's exit from its colonies, the establishment of an indigenous police force with a Special Branch capability was key to its successes; Malaya is the most cited example of this. But, negative examples are abound. In Aden, the lack of a domestic Special Branch was brought to light by the near simultaneous murder of the British police officers posted to the colony.[13] In Cyprus, General Harding cash-starved the police and, rightly fearful of insurgent infiltration, stacked the service with Turkish-Cypriots, thus alienating the largely Greek-Cypriot population and denying the colonial government any useful political intelligence.[14] The campaign against Grivas and his EOKA[15] organisation floundered because of this.

Malayan police officer and escort talking to a villager during the Malayan Emergency, 23 April 1949

410. We have used history, especially the case of Malaya, very dangerously. Our recent campaigns have been heavily militarised, and by retrospective extension, it is often assumed by that it was the British *Army* that won these campaigns. This is hugely misleading. Rather, it should be noted that in Malaya the Army played a largely secondary role, with the lead firmly being political, and the intelligence largely provided by a civilian Special Branch. Military intelligence was focused on the tactical, whereas police intelligence dealt with the more important political operational/strategic issues. In a post-colonial Britain, there exists no colonial office through which intelligence-trained police can be dispatched to advise and mentor local police forces in theatres where we have intervened. This raises the possibility, as seen in Afghanistan, that British military personnel will be advising and mentoring the police. They are not best suited for this task by any means. If it is the case,

[12] Thomas M, *Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder After 1914*, London: University of California Press, 2008, page 300.
[13] Balfour-Paul G, *The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain's Relinquishment of Power in her Last Three Arab Dependencies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, page 86.
[14] Gentry J A, *Intelligence Learning and Adaptation: Lessons from Counterinsurgency Wars*, Intelligence and National Security, Volume 25, Issue 1, 2010, page 57.
[15] EOKA: National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters

however, military personnel need to keep in mind that what is **not** needed is a lightly-armed and poorly-trained military force called 'the police', but a police service respected (or at least, not feared) by the local population, through whom stability may be maintained and intelligence gathered. While British national and military intelligence, alongside its allies, has tremendous capability in counter-insurgency, this is not left behind nor does it help the host-nation build its own capacity and restore is legitimacy or sovereignty. At the most basic level, British experience has shown that where emphasis was placed on indigenous intelligence gathering capacity, through military units but especially through the police, this has led to greater success in COIN; and a more successful transition to host-nation authority.

The Right Man, The Right Plan – Planning a Joint Endeavour

The Dhofar Campaign (1970-1976), was won because of the clear vision of His Majesty, Sultan Qaboos Bin Said (opposite), and the foreign officers and NCOs (many of whom were British) who built and trained his Army. Taking the Sultan's vision of a united Oman, and the importance of securing Dhofar as part of the whole, the British Special Forces advisors developed the Five Front Plan for the Dhofar campaign.[16] The particular situation of Dhofar as an underdeveloped region of Oman meant that it needed economic development if there was to be any chance of under- mining the Marxist *adoo* (enemy) operating in Dhofar, and out of Yemen. The campaign end-state was, therefore, to secure Dhofar for development and the 5 fronts to achieve this were:

- To clearly identify enemy and friendly forces by establishing an effective intelligence collection and collation system.

[16] Mockaitis T R, *British Counter-Insurgency in the Post-Imperial Era*, Manchester University Press, 1995, page 74. Mockaitis outlines the 4 original principles, but then elaborates on the recruiting of Dhofaris into the security forces which became the third point in the plan. The plan was formulated by Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Johnny Watts of 22 SAS.

- To communicate clearly the intent to the insurgents, population, and government agencies and forces.To provide security by helping the Dhofaris to protect their own province by involving them in the overall provision of security.

- To provide medical aid to the people of Dhofar in a region that had none.

- To provide veterinary services for the cattle in the Dhofar region which are the main source of wealth.

This plan indicates an excellent understanding of the needs of the people of Dhofar set against the context of the campaign, and the need to win *hearts and minds* to ensure an enduring peace. It was tailored to the operational environment to meet cultural expectations by British loan service officers who had considerable experience in-country and may of whom were Arabists. It can be easily followed, and provides latitude to individual commanders as well as guidelines on how to operate. Finally, in terms of communication, it is accessible to all agencies and simple to understand. The message is unambiguous to all audiences – local, international and domestic.

SECTION II – LESSONS FROM THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE

411. **Capacity-Building**. When building the capacity and capabilities of the indigenous security forces, it is absolutely essential to determine early the end-state required as part of the overall strategy. This will be dependent on the degree of fragility of the state both internally and externally. The key will be to develop strong forces that are capable of being at least self-reliant in terms of their own internal security. The level of capacity and capability required for developing self-reliance for external defence will depend on the bellicosity or instability of their surrounding neighbours. Developing the military capability to defend against external threats takes considerably more time and resources. If the external threat is minimal, this is an area that can be developed over time as part of the overall strategic partnership. Defining a nation being self-reliant is, in itself, also problematical and has been ‘muddied’ by frequent use of the words ‘good enough’. What needs to be developed is security forces that are sufficiently self-reliant, professional and competent to be able to deal with any internal security problem in a manner that meets the international requirement of a humane and balanced approach. This must be

realistically tailored to their own aspirations, environment and resources. They must, however, be self-reliant enough to get the job done without large scale external support before external forces can withdraw. This does not mean that mentoring, advising and training will cease. On the contrary, these functions remain important for the long-term. Where a large external threat exists, the partnering country, or countries, must provide a guarantee to meet this liability until such time as their partnership has developed the security forces of the subject country to enable them to be of self-reliant against these external threats.

412. **Develop the Indigenous Capability for their Environment**. Linked to the first lesson, it is nearly impossible to mould indigenous forces into a mirror image of their foreign partners, unless they are removed from their own environment and are not subject to its complexities. Realistic, achievable capacity and capability targets must be set. Understanding the mindset of the indigenous forces, and their environment, is essential for success. To paraphrase T E Lawrence, '*it is better to let them do it imperfectly, rather than do it perfectly ourselves, for it is their country*.'[17] This is not to say, however, that the standards attached to the targets are not robust. They must be based on the criteria of developing professional forces, yet tailored to the environment in which they are going to operate.

413. **The Right Stuff**. '*The fortunes of a campaign* [successor or failure] *rest in the hands of only a few people*.'[18] Those who are tasked with building capacity and capability need to be the right people, well prepared and be in situ long enough to ensure sufficient continuity. For example, officers with the Malay Scouts and loan service officers in Oman usually spent 2 years on secondment. The Oman-bound officers also spent 42 weeks conducting language training at Beaconsfield prior to deployment.[19] They were nearly all single, and experienced platoon commanders; some had been company commanders. Most of their training was done 'on the job'. They were not necessarily officers who fitted within the confinement of the conventional British approach, and shone when faced with a challenge. The same importance in selecting the right individuals is particularly important when

[17] Lawrence T E, Colonel, DSO, 27 Articles, 1917, Article 15: '*do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are there to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very peculiar conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.*'
[18] Salmon A, Major General, CMG OBE, Commandant General Royal Marines and Commander UK Amphibious Forces in his DCDC Operational Experience Group (OEG) Interviews 23 September and 5 October 2009.
[19] Gardiner I, Brigadier, *In the Service of the Sultan – A First Hand Account of the Dhofar Insurgency*, October 2006.

identifying future indigenous leadership capable of transitioning to full indigenous control.

> *A knowledge of the language of the country is, of course, a great advantage, and, although complete mastery of a foreign tongue can only be attained by years of study and practice, yet the smallest acquaintance with the language of the enemy, or of the country in which operations take place, is useful in war*.
>
> **Lieutenant Colonel David Henderson DSO, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 1904**[20]

414. **The Importance of Cultural Awareness and Understanding**. As Kipling stated, '*Asia is not going to be civilised after the methods of the West. There is too much Asia and she is too old*.'[21] The importance of cultural awareness in developing understanding of the operating environment is crucial. There are 3 distinct elements: awareness; understanding; and assimilation. Awareness is developing the basic skills to survive and operate in the environment effectively in the short-term by understanding basic cultural rules such as: how to greet, what not to say, what to eat and not to eat. Understanding is to gain, and have, an in-depth knowledge that allows you to influence the direction of events significantly. This implies a deeper cultural knowledge and some language skill. This is a skill that cannot be achieved with any real effect without careful study and immersion. Assimilation is total immersion in a culture inasmuch as someone from another culture can be part of a different culture. This implies language fluency and a passion for the culture under study Few deploying troops will be able to achieve this, but identifying who has the aptitude is critical, as is developing a network of true experts who can be called upon to assist. The following vignette highlights some insights from the Dhofar campaign that show a higher level of cultural understanding.

[20] Henderson D, Lieutenant Colonel, *Field Intelligence: Its Principles and Practice*, 1904.
[21] Attributed to Rudyard Kipling.

The Different Dhofari Logic to the Western Mind

'*Quite apart from the different logic, which usually stemmed from an improbable amalgam of Islamic faith, natural politeness, rules of hospitality and naked greed, they were able at once to spot an unprofitable line. Never ones to reinforce failure, they switched almost imperceptibly from that line to another. This could continue indefinitely, which usually meant interminably*.'[22]

Influence Through Indigenous Cultural Knowledge

'*The Sultan was prepared to pay, but turned down my suggestion that the tribe should act first, and then be paid or rewarded. 'Give them the money now,' he said, 'and don't mention what it is for. They will know that by accepting the cash they have made a commitment. When I tell them what that commitment is they will express surprise and argue like mad, but they will do it.*'[23]

415. **Social Structure and Culture**. Society is composed of both social structure and culture. Social structure refers to the relations among groups of persons within a system of groups and is persistent over time. By contrast, culture provides meaning to individuals within the society. Social structure can be thought of as a skeleton with culture being the muscle on the bones. They are inter-dependent and mutually reinforcing. Culture influences an individual's range of action and ideas, including what to do and not do, how to do or not do it, and whom to do it with or not to do it with It is neither, a random jumble of customs, nor a laundry list of accepted practices and taboos that an advisor should know. It influences judgments about what is right and wrong, and what is important and unimportant. Cultural rules are flexible in practice; the customs and actions that an individual practices are based largely on that particular environment.[24]

416. **What is Important to Indigenous Forces?** Having considered the operating environment, it is necessary to extract what is important to indigenous forces and what motivates them, in order to develop the higher level of cultural understanding required in a long campaign. This can

[22] Akehurst J, *Op. cit*, page 8.
[23] *Ibid*, page 9.
[24] US Field Manual (FM) 3-07.1 *Security Force Assistance*, 2009.

determine that what they are being asked to do is worthwhile and in their own interests.

417. Maslow's *hierarchy of needs* identifies that we all have basic needs in our daily lives which will vary by cultural and social upbringing. While Maslow's hierarchy is pertinent for most societies, it is the order of their importance that may differ.[25] For example, what are the main interests of most soldiers around the world? They are probably remarkably similar and based on the following:

- Money
- Family
- Clan
- Tribe
- Regiment/Unit
- Food
- Sex
- Security
- Faith
- Honour

418. British Gurkha soldiers, for example, talk about the 5Ps (or P5): Pariwar (family), Paltan (the Regiment), Paisa (money), Piet (stomach – the next meal) and Putiley (butterflies – women). In Helmand Province, the Pashto-speaking Pakhtuns follow the honour code of Pukhtanwali, which makes dealing with them complicated. The code is based around a number of key elements, the most important of which are:

a. **Badal**. Badal (vengeance) must be exacted at any risk and cost, for an insult or injury done to a Pakthun, his family, his clan, or his tribe. If he dies, then they must take up the quarrel. The main reasons for blood feuds: *Zan, Zar, Zamin* (women, gold and land).

b. **Nanawati**. Badal may be modified by the right of nanwati (coming-in). A Pakthun must extend asylum and protection to anyone who asks for it, even to an enemy. Nanawati sought within the Koran is never refused, but to seek it from an enemy is indelible disgrace.

[25] North R C, *Towards a Framework for the Analysis of Scarcity and Conflict* in International Studies Quarterly, Volume 21, Number 4, December 1977, pages 569-591.

c. **Melmastia**. Melmastia (hospitality) must be offered to any who seek it, invited or uninvited, Pathan or foreigner, Muslim or unbeliever. It includes food, lodging, entertainment, protection often far beyond what the host can afford. The host is responsible for his guest's safety so long as he remains in the tribal area, to the extent of providing a badragga (escort), who should protect the guests even at the cost of their own lives.[26]

419. Loyalty is not to the nation or to the unit, but to one's own sense of honour and the honour of one's own family and tribe. This means that allegiances can easily be lost and have to be constantly worked at. This requires cultural understanding and developing methods for maintaining allegiance such as respect, money and personal security. Being a Pakhtun comes even before Islam.

420. **The Application of Cultural Knowledge**. During the Dhofar War, as with the Afghan National Army today, there was a very high rate of absence without leave cases. To deal with this, infantry Rifle Companies were lined and a roll-call taken of those who were about to depart on leave. The mostly British Company Commanders then read out the names of the next batch who would be going on leave, but stated that they would only be allowed to go once all of the first group had returned. It was in effect putting the first group on their honour to return to allow the others to go in their turn. It proved to be highly effective.[27]

421. **The Importance of Leadership**. John Adair's theory of leadership, which is widely accepted in the British Armed Forces, identifies 3 key functions of leadership; achieving the mission, building a well trained team and looking after, and sustaining, the individuals within that team. As servicemen and women, the first of these functions represents the fundamental and consistent task of any military leader; to achieve the mission that he/she has been set.

[26] Chenevix Trench C, *The Frontier Scouts*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1985, pages 3-4.
[27] Davies G, Major (Retired) MBE, former member of 6GR and RGR, Company Commander in Dhofar 1975 and 1976 in conversation 1 February 2010.

However, all 3 of these functions are inter-linked and must be co-ordinated to achieve success. When partnering indigenous forces, effective leadership by example, is the bedrock of success linked to shared experiences. This builds trust and confidence between both parties. When partnering, there are five 5 particular areas of leadership that require specific emphasis:

5 Key Areas of Leadership in Partnering
Effective decision-making
Use of judgement
Delegation of responsibility
Knowledge
Courage

422. **Innovative Training**. At the end of the Falklands War in 1982, the then Commander of 3 Commando Brigade, Brigadier Julian Thompson CBE, was asked what had enabled him to win his part of the campaign. He replied, "*3 things enabled us to win; training, training and training*.' Effective training is the key to operational success. The old Army Doctrine Publication, *Training* provided definitive guidance on the British approach to training.[28] There were 4 key areas to highlight:

a. **Relevance**. Training must be relevant to the role and task.

b. **Challenging and Interesting**. The harder we train, the easier it will be on operations, but training should be well-planned, imaginative and challenging for it to have real impact. When training indigenous forces this will not be easy. Lack of language skills on behalf of the trainers, mentors and advisors, having to work through interpreters, and having to work with soldiers who cannot read/write will present significant challenges.

[28] DGD&D/18/34/65, Army Code Number 71621.

c. **Realistic**. Training needs to be realistic. Training for combat operations should simulate the conditions of war as realistically as possible within our peacetime constraints. This should be conditioned towards the war that is being fought, rather than the one the intervening army normally trains for; and this is likely to be different.

d. **Allow for Mistakes**. Mistakes during training should be allowed, less those pertaining to safety. There is, however, a fine line between a genuine mistake, and those made through idleness or negligence. Allow for mistakes, but make sure you know why they have occurred. Some cultures will react badly when they make mistakes because of the issue of 'face'. The impact of making a mistake must be handled diplomatically with advice from the senior indigenous officer present.

423. **The British Approach to Training Indigenous Forces**. The British approach to training indigenous forces is based on standard British military practice, but relies even more heavily on demonstrations, repeat practice and walk-through/talk-through as summarised in Figure 4.2.



Figure 4.2 – The British Training Process

Clearly, this may be adapted by commanders as befits the purpose of the package that they are teaching.

424. **Profile**. The issue of profile is a moral one and revolves around a basic question: should mentoring and advisory forces where the same uniforms as their charges and use the same key equipment? Prior to Bosnia, for most British campaigns, this was the case. There were some small differences such as headgear, but uniforms and equipment were largely the same. For example, on the North Western Frontier, between the early 1900s and 1947, British officers and their soldiers wore the same uniform that blended in with each other and the environment:

> *Scouts were lightly armed with a .303 rifle, bayonet and .45 Webley Pistol. All dressed the same in baggy shalwar trousers and a kamiz long shirt. The shirt was worn outside the trousers and hung down almost to the knees. . . The grey mazri material of the clothing blended in with the hillsides, and the style of dress was similar to that worn by local tribesmen*.[29]

425. Officers and NCOs on loan service in Oman also wore the same uniform as their men whether it was the informal dress of the *firqat*, or the formal uniform of the regular Omani Army. The ideal solution is for all forces to be provided with appropriate clothing and equipment that affords the same level of force protection, but this may not be feasible. This may lead to a moral dilemma when mentors and advisors are operating in heavily armoured vehicles with body armour, when their charges do not have the same equipment. Is it leading by example? Does it aid, or hinder, assistance? Being distinctly different, however, also makes the mentoring and advisory teams instantly recognisable and easy targets. There is no easy answer, but taking the risk of being the same, or at least providing the same equipment for everyone for specific operations, may provide a better vehicle for trust and bonding and achieve force protection at the same time. UK Forces assuming completely, or substantially, the uniform of the indigenous force enters into the legal realm as it may infringe on the concept of ‘perfidy’, so should not be undertaken without substantial command consultation. Below this point, however, evening-out the differences in force profile and protection, between

[29] Richards L, *Scouting on the Afghan Frontier*, 1945-47, a personal essay posted on the internet 2008.

mentor and mentored, is an important command decision that comes with risks, but also potentially significant benefits.

426. **The Two Faces of Mentoring and Advising**. Not all of your soldiers and officers will be well suited to mentoring and advising. The life of the mentor or advisor is one that marries the worst parts of the loneliness of command with social, cultural and moral confusion: the mentor is lost in culture, lost in translation, and often lost in space. It takes a strong person, with a good degree of self-awareness, to operate in this environment. A broad number of thinkers and practitioners (past and present) agree that it takes a specific kind of personality to be; embedded within a foreign organisation; survive that immersion and separation from one's own culture; and retain the ability to exert influence over the host organisation. There are personality traits that work well with others, and are able to bridge the cultural gap in understanding, expectation and outcome which can be expected when operating with different cultures. This JDN refers to this as the **2 FACES[30] of mentoring**. One 'face' presents a friendly, adaptable, calm, empathetic and self-assured individual who is able to build, and maximise, his own credibility with the local force. He can accept failure, and then still get the best out of the people with whom he is working. The other 'face' is this person's antithesis, a fixed, argumentative, critical and emotionally-distant character, whose snobbishness, or stubbornness breaks down the links of understanding and friendship. He may be resented by his charges, and may even become an object of scorn, or fun.

[30] FACES is also the acronym used to describe the 2, distinct characteristics of potential mentors.

The Good and Bad Faces of Mentoring and Advising[31]

The character traits of good and bad mentors and advisors both fall under the acronym FACES

The Good Face: Characteristics that succeed	The Bad Face: Characteristics that fail
F Focused, flexible, friendly, faith in others	**F** Fixed, finicky
A- Adaptable, able to deal with others, ambiguity, able to get along	**A** Argumentative, absolutist
C Calm, culturally adept, communicative, credible, courageous	**C** Critical, cruel, culturally uninterested
E Empathetic, enthusiastic, easygoing	**E** Exceptionalist, emotionally distant
S Sympathetic, sense of humour, strong, self-reliant, self-assured	**S** Superior, snobbish, sullen, stubborn

This is not a checklist; it a series of indicators. One is unlikely to find a character that ticks all of the traits in one particular box. More likely, one will find a mix of these characteristics from both. And not one characteristic predominates in a way that can be singled out as the key indicator of likely success. One may be courageous, adaptable and have a sense of humour, but that might not outweigh their argumentative, or superior nature.

[31] Gustafson K, Dr, Brunel University's Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, July 2011.

432. This JDN is not suggesting that some form of psychometric test could identify potential mentors or advisors. Rather, it recommends that characteristics of individuals should be considered when choosing who should do what post. Further, it is argued that it is does not necessary follow that any well-trained soldier, or even the most highly-trained soldiers, will be make a good mentor. Many commentators have noted the average UK service personnel's lack of experience outside of the UK military context makes them poorly suited to dealing with people who have no military context at all. Private Tommy Atkins' habits and attitudes towards drink, women (including pornography), homosexual practices, home comforts, foreign food and even flatulence[32] may predispose him to fall out with those of substantially different cultures. Many reserve soldiers and officers, however, who may not be trained to the same level as their regular counterparts, may come with excellent interpersonal skills by dint of their exposure to civilian, professional, working environments. The latter may be more multi-cultural and varied than the British military working environment.[33]

427. Alternatively, it is certainly the case that a poorly-prepared soldier will make a poor mentor: he/she will not have the skills necessary to earn credibility amongst those that he mentors or advises. As one British mentor noted, '*unless we dramatically improve the quality of the mentors and their teams, we are in danger of actually harming relations between British troops and the indigenous force*.'[34] At the time of publication, there are no courses whose sole purpose is that of training mentors and advisors. In lieu of such a course, pre-deployment training for advisors and mentors should focus on 3 broad spectrum categories: **military skills; culture and language; and communication/negotiation skills**. A trained mentor/advisor needs to be a proficient soldier who knows enough about the culture to start, and who can communicate and negotiate to achieve the objectives he or she has been set.

[32] Gardiner I, *In the Service of the Sultan*.
[33] Goleman D, *Leadership That Gets Results*. Harvard Business Review, March-April 2000.
[34] Cartwright J, Captain, RGR, *Operational Mentor and Liaison Team on Operation Herrick 8 – Experiences and the Way Forward* in British Army Review, volume 146, 2009, page 14.

ANNEX 4A – THE INDIAN ARMY AND THE GURKHAS

Riflemen of the 3rd Gurkhas in Waziristan 1930

Sikh Soldiers in the Western Desert 1942

4A1. In the modern British Army, the last vestiges of the British colonial experience, and particularly of the old British Indian Army, can still be seen in the way that Gurkha units operate. On the surface, Indian Army units had a similar organisation to their British counterparts, but the internal workings were quite different and provide a useful insight into life in an indigenous unit.

4A2. **The Environment**. In the 19th and early 20th Centuries, life in Nepal and India was tough. Both were endemically corrupt societies (at least from a British viewpoint), and nepotism was rife. This is not much different from Afghanistan in the 21st Century. Sepoys in Indian Army units were, therefore, very different than their civilian counterparts. They lived in a new family, based around their Regiment and were led by British officers. They were effectively a unique martial society which was both part of Indian life and outwith it. The role of the British officer was to provide an environment based on fairness. Individuals were recognised for their achievements based on their own merit. The British officer was expected to offer guidance, direction and advice; he was to remain impartial and provide innovation as well as leadership. Critically, he was responsible for setting the military standards to be achieved and having the knowledge to teach it. This was only one half of the equation. Without cultural knowledge of his sepoys he was blind. The most effective way to do this was through mutual cultural assimilation and the development of trust where British and Indian/Gurkha officers and soldiers guided each other through the intricacies of serving in the Indian Army together. Seven important lessons can be indentified which are of use to the modern mentor and advisor.

Lesson 1 – Officer/Mentor and Advisor Induction

4A3. **Historical Note**. In the British Indian Army, British officers destined for Gurkha or Indian units were made to spend one year with a British unit based in India. The purpose of this attachment was 3-fold: to learn about India in the company of fellow Britons; to undertake compulsory Urdu language training with a munshi (teacher) on a one-to-one basis; and finally, to gain some operational experience before arriving in their parent unit which would give some credibility.

4A4. **Lesson 1**. Ideally, mentors and advisors should have previous operational experience in theatre or a similar environment before they take on their mentoring role. This provides them with operational credibility to the host nation unit, and gives them prior knowledge of what it is like operating alongside indigenous forces. As a mentor or advisor they will be embedded within them and will develop a different perspective, being able to see the problem from 2 sides – from that of the intervention forces and the indigenous unit.

Lesson 2 – Developing an Informal Information Network

4A5. **Historical Note**. An important factor in the nurturing of British officers in the Indian Army was the *British officer orderly* system. While this may now appear archaic, each British officer was given a new orderly every 6 months. This rifleman had a normal position within the platoon or company as a radio operator, runner or section rifleman but he also taught his officer Urdu, Hindi or Nepali, as well as helping him to prepare his kit. This entailed long hours of frank, and open, discussion where an officer not only practised his language skills and learned about the culture, but also received an unvarnished view of life in the Battalion. Everything that was discussed was *in confidence*, and it represented was a good way of floating ideas both ways. Most were an orderly only once, and remained totally loyal to their officer, depending on how well they were treated. When it worked well, it helped British officers to develop an informal information network across the Battalion. The Adjutant, for example, on appointment after 8-10 years service had between 16-20 soldiers he could speak to, who could give him a very open, and honest, view of what was going on.

4A6. **Lesson 2**. Developing an informal network within the units is essential to understanding. Identifying good soldiers of all ranks, and developing a sound relationship with them, is very important for success. One method is appointing one of the best indigenous soldiers to be a trainee radio operator, or medic within the mentoring team, working direct to the mentoring team commander. This individual should be a potential junior NCO selected with advice from the senior indigenous officer/NCO and would provide a useful conduit to the indigenous soldiers. It is, however, critically important to understand the cultural implications of doing this, which will differ for each operational environment.

Lesson 3 – Develop a Human Terrain Map of Your Unit

4A7. **Historical Note**. The Indian Army contained many different ethnic groups and castes. For example, in the Queen Victoria's Own Corps of Guides, there were sub-units consisting entirely of Sikhs, Gurkhas and Pathans. Each of these groups contained individuals with many different caste relationships and family loyalties. Commanders had to know who was related to who, and identify where the real power lay. This enabled them to be fair and impartial, as well as to know who to influence to achieve a particular effect. It was particularly important for preventing nepotism and corruption.

4A8. **Lesson 3**. It is important to develop a sound understanding of the horizontal and vertical relationships within a host nation unit as the basis for achieving advantageous leverage.

Lesson 4 – Language Ability

4A9. **Lesson 4**. Not everyone is a linguist and, in most cases being a fluent speaker of another language is highly desirable, and preferred, but not necessarily essential. When partnering it is vitally important to try and learn the language – showing the commitment to learn, even if you cannot master it completely, is as important as being perfect. The key is being interested in the culture that you are working alongside, developing a mutual relationship with your hosts and being professional. Indigenous forces need access to the professional skills and advice of mentors and advisors. This is the overriding

factor when choosing personnel to fulfil these roles. The indigenous forces have the role of ensuring that their mentors understand their culture to a workable level.

Lesson 5 – Continuity

4A10. **Historical Note**. British Indian Army Officers spent many years in the company of their sepoys and most grew to know them well. They developed a deep trust and mutual respect for each other and a level of understanding that made the Indian Army one of the greatest military forces in history. Much of this was based on shared operational experience and cultural interest in one another developed through proximity and immersion in a unique military culture. Continuity of approach, and relationships, were the essential ingredients of success.

4A11. **Lesson 4**. It is not possible or desirable to replicate exactly what was achieved in the Indian Army. There must be an end-state to the military role within a national intervention mission. Nevertheless, the requirement for continuity, particularly the transfer of knowledge between rotating mentoring and advisory groups, is still essential. This is not new. In Dhofar, British Officers and NCOs spent 2 years on secondment to the Sultan's Armed Forces. Embedded mentors and advisors should ideally be in place for no less than 12 months. There should also be sufficient overlap between teams (no less than one month) where the new team understudies the other.

Lesson 6 – Developing and Nurturing Officers/NCOs

4A12. **Historical Note**. It is important to understand where the real power lies within an indigenous unit. It is a critical element to being able to get things done, and understanding where the main emphasis should be on education and training. The British experience of training indigenous forces in Africa, for example, saw a focus on developing a strong, NCO corps at the expense of the development of an effective officer corps. This was to have a detrimental effect during the various post-colonial independence struggles. In the Indian Army, the power lay firmly with the native Indian and Gurkha officers, rather than the Warrant Officers and senior NCOs which, although effective, had lesser status.

4A13. **Lesson 5**. Developing strong indigenous leadership, both in officers and NCOs, is essential for success. Mentors need to have a strong indigenous officer, or NCO, with them who fulfils the cultural guardianship and advisory role. Mentoring is a 2-way process. Mentors can mentor on skills and tactical procedures, but the indigenous forces are the only ones who can really bring us close to the culture. Mentoring teams who are rotating out of theatre, have a duty to select an appropriate indigenous officer to be the cultural mentor to the new team. This may not necessarily be the senior indigenous officer as it will depend on communication skills. He must, however, be selected with his approval to prevent loss of face. Balancing cultural needs, with professional development, is difficult but must be achieved.

Lesson 7 – Host Nation Operational Induction

4A14. **Historical Note**. Indian Army recruits, fresh out of training, conducted at least another month's group training when they reached their new unit. This was aimed at ensuring that they could take their place with the unit within its given role. The units themselves were then inducted by each formation they served with. For example, units posted to the North West Frontier, understudied and deployed alongside other units with more experience, gradually facing tasks of greater complexity until they were deemed operationally ready for the most difficult tasks.

4A15. **Lesson 6**. New host nation sub-units, units and individual recruits must be inducted properly into the unit or formation that they are joining. This will require organisation and the provision of training facilities, initially conducted by the MAST[1] teams. Likewise, mentors and advisers must spend at least one month working alongside the outgoing team to gain a broad understanding of their mission and charges before assuming their role.

[1] MAST; mentoring, advising, support, training.

CHAPTER 5 – MAXIMS AND GUIDELINES FOR MILITARY PARTNERING

Chapter 5 provides useful maxims and guidelines for partnering indigenous forces drawn from many sources. Some appear to be contradictory, but this highlights how difficult partnering can be. All are observations from practical experience.

501. Warfare is, and always has been, somewhere between an art, and a science. It is impossible, therefore, to give fixed rules that cover all eventualities. Good mentoring and advising can only be advanced so far by set processes. General maxims and guidelines, from practitioners past and present, can, however, be distilled. While some are drawn from famous leaders, others are from working officers of recent and past operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. We have attempted to be generalist. These are not meant for a specific culture (hence why including T E Lawrence's articles wholesale would not make sense) or operational theatre, but rather sound guidance on the art of mentoring and advising with lesser-developed indigenous forces in general.

On Study

502. '*The beginning and ending of the secret of handling [of indigenous personnel] is unremitting study of them. Keep always on your guard; never say an unnecessary thing: watch yourself and your companions all the time: hear all that passes, search out what is going on beneath the surface, read their characters, discover their tastes and their weaknesses and keep everything you find out to yourself. Bury yourself in [their] circles, have no interests and no ideas except the work in hand, so that your brain is saturated with one thing only, and you realize your part deeply enough to avoid the little slips that would counteract the painful work of weeks. Your success will be proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote to it*.'[1]

[1] Lawrence T E, DSO, *27 Articles*, 1917.

On Them Versus Us

503. '*Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the [indigenous personnel] do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd [local] conditions… your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is*.'[2]

From the Archives – US Mentoring and Advising in Vietnam

From: Commander, US Military Assistance Command Vietnam

To: Commander-in-Chief Pacific

Subject: Cross-Border Operations

DTG: 16 0943Z Aug 1964

It would be essential for US advisors to accompany the Civilian Irregular Defence Groups [or CIDG, largely composed of Montagnards], Vietnamese Ranger, Airborne Ranger and Airborne troops. Air strikes would be conducted by Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), US Army, Marines, and VNAF Helicopters would have to be used in supporting role.

Considering the forces which could be made available this is an overly ambitious scheme. However, the desirability of getting such a [heavily Vietnamese] program underway, coupled with Government of Vietnam (GVN) apparent willingness to get started now, argues for US encouragement and endorsement of the first phase of concept.

[2] *Ibid*.

Although an effort will be made to build in US controls, it should be recognised that once this operation is initiated by the GVN, US control may be marginal. While they would no doubt be willing to attack targets suggested by us or to mount intelligence and reconnaissance operations in areas desired by us, they may undertake operations at their own initiative and against targets of their own choosing without our knowledge or consent. In other words, our control over their military actions in a combat situation could not be expected to change from the present advisory pattern.

Comment. These short paragraphs capture many of the inherent problems encountered in partnering with indigenous forces. It can be seen that US technical support, in the form of airpower, was still needed to support the operation and that the role of US advisors would still be key. More tellingly, however, we see that the US think the Vietnamese plan was too ambitious, but simultaneously that Vietnamese keenness to move on their own was important enough that the US should not oppose the plan, even if it was flawed. Last, the author puts in the key caveat that the US commanders should be under no illusion that this was an operation under Vietnamese control: the Vietnamese here are not proxies, but an autonomous force that would undertake its own actions, with or without US advisors. The US presence was there to get the South Vietnamese to defend themselves, and that meant accepting imperfection and the release of overall control.

On Language and Culture

504. '*The first thing an officer must do on joining is to study our men's language and get to know them and their traditions, manners and customs. In studying the language, interest should be taken in the men's marriage ceremonies, family relationships, their religious festivals, with some knowledge also of their religion*.'[3]

[3] 2nd King Edward VII's Own Goorkhas, (The Sirmoor Rifles), Notes for Officers, *To Officers on First Appointment to 2nd Goorkhas*,1938.

On Local Habits

505. '*Understand why things are done the way they are. Although some local practices may seem strange, they generally have good reasons behind them. Advisors can discover these reasons with careful observation and a creative imagination. Food habits, family traditions, folk cures, and festive celebrations almost always have a great deal of human experience at their root. The advisor also needs to be aware that many villages contain rival subgroups and factions*.'[4]

On the Local Character

506. '*The [locals], far from being indolent, simply had priorities which reflected the prevailing circumstances. It was a hot, poor country. Hard labour and rushing about was energy consuming and rarely cost effective. How much easier it is for us western Protestant capitalists to exert ourselves a little, knowing that by so doing we will see a directly related benefit in terms of money, goods, status or fulfilment*.'[5]

On Being British

507. '*Being a member of a professional, well-respected, 'famous' army is what gives you your credibility as a mentor. So you must preserve this status by always conducting yourself as a member of the British army should, whilst at the same time resisting the temptation to create the unit you mentor in your own image… [likewise], respect their culture: but do not let this become too much of a constraint on what you want to achieve*.'[6]

On Selecting the Right People

508. '*Arguably even greater care is required in this sphere. The patience and tolerance to live harmoniously in an unfamiliar culture; the fortitude to be content with less than comfortable circumstances for prolonged periods; an understanding of an sympathy for a foreign history and religion; a willingness to learn a new language; the flexibility imagination and humility necessary to*

[4] US Field Manual 3-07.1, page 9-6.
[5] Gardiner I, *In the Service of the Sultan*, *A First-Hand Account of the Dhofar Insurgency*, London: Pen and Sword, 2006, page 57.
[6] Browne S, Lieutenant Colonel, *One Size Ever MiTT All?*, British Army Review, number 147.

climb into the head of people who live by a very different set of assumptions; none of these are found automatically in our modern developed Euro-Atlantic culture.'[7]

On Culture Shock

509. '*In such isolated outposts as ours one could quickly lose the psychological underpinnings that supported his normal personality. There were no friends, family… no electricity, no English language, no neighbourhoods as we know them, no American or European music, no radio, no television, no people who thought like us, looked like us, sounded like us, or even ate like us. Since all previous background and culturisation had been suddenly rendered worthless, it was very difficult to establish any personal direction, purpose, or even hope... It seemed to me that the best remedy for culture shock was hard work, so I made sure everyone stayed busy*.'[8]

On the Prominence of Advisors

510. '*Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed. Do not be too intimate, too prominent, or too earnest. Avoid being identified too long or too often with any [local political leader], even if CO of the expedition. To do your work you must be above jealousies, and you lose prestige if you are associated with a tribe or clan, and its inevitable feuds*.'[9]

On the Relationship between Advisor and Advisee

511. '*Win and keep the confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others when you can. Never refuse or quash schemes he may put forward; but ensure that they are put forward in the first instance privately to you. Always approve them, and after praise modify them insensibly, causing the suggestions to come from him, until they are in accord with your own opinion. When you attain this point, hold him to it, keep a tight grip of his ideas, and push them forward as firmly as possibly, but secretly, so that to one but himself (and he not too clearly) is aware of your pressure*.'[10]

[7] Gardiner I, *op. cit*., page174.
[8] Donovan D, *Once a Warrior King*, pages 104-105.
[9] Lawrence, T E, *op.cit*.
[10] *Ibid*.

On When to Intervene.

512. '*Pick your fights for when it really matters, for when you really do have to risk the personal relationships you have built up – such as about abuse of prisoners or human rights issues.*'[11]

513. '*My own measure for mentor intervention in [indigenous] decision-making was if I believed life was at stake… or if the [indigenous] commander's decision would cede the initiative decisively and irretrievably to the enemy*.'[12]

On Perspective

514. '*…I began to accept a growing list of duties… military operations were performed as I directed; people were imprisoned or freed on my word; food and clothing…was distributed where I said, when I said; aircraft bombed or strafed at my command… The [locals] recognised the power I wielded, and after a while I began to expect the almost fawning courtesy with which I was treated. With no one around to give me my true measure, I began to accept my elevated status, and I began to use the powers in my hands as if they were mine by right*.'[13]

On Walking Before You Run

515. '*Go easy for the first few weeks. A bad start is difficult to atone for, and the [indigenous forces] form their judgments on externals that we ignore. When you have reached the inner circle in a tribe, you can do as you please with yourself and them*.'[14]

516. '*Be content with small beginnings. As civilians begin to see successes from their joint efforts and begin to have new hope, they naturally want a larger hand in their own matters. The advisor may sometimes feel they want to assume more responsibility than they can carry. These evidences of growing pains should be appreciated, for they are a necessary part of becoming able to*

[11] Browne, *op.cit*.
[12] Cartwright, *op.cit.,* page 18.
[13] Donovan, *op.cit.*, page 134.
[14] Lawrence T E, *op.cit.*,

assume responsibility. The advisor needs to adjust to the growing desires of the people to help themselves.'[15]

On the Look of Local Forces

517. '*The natural tendency is to build forces in our own image, with the aim of eventually handing our role over to them. This is a mistake. Instead, local indigenous forces need to mirror the enemy's capabilities, and seek to supplant the insurgent's role. This does not mean they should be irregular in the sense of being brutal, or outside proper control. Rather, they should move, equip and organise like the insurgents, but have access to your support and be under the firm control of their parent societies*.'[16]

518. '*In the organisation of the constabulary, consideration should be given the form of warfare to which the troops are accustomed. No attempt should be made to impose entirely new forms of tactics unless a long period of training and indoctrination is available. In emergencies, or when only a limited time is available for training, it may be better to organise the troops according to native methods*.'[17]

On Human Intelligence

519. '*The [indigenous force] soldiers have a generally untapped ability to gather information, especially from the local population, that far outstripped our own*.'[18] If one is not in place, build a system to harness, assess and disseminate intelligence from indigenous personnel.

On Intelligence

520. '*You will never completely get the intelligence wing of an agency, such as the army or the police, to relinquish its independence. After a number of mistakes, we got people to agree that we were all on the same side, and, therefore, would share intelligence*.'[19]

[15] US Field Manual 3-07.1, page 9-6.
[16] Kilcullen D, *28 Articles*, Small Wars Journal, Volume 1, 2006.
[17] US Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual,*1940, pages 12-23.
[18] Cartwright J, *op.cit*., page 15.
[19] Assistant Chief Constable Albiston, formerly Head Special Branch, Police Service of Northern Ireland, cited in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, 2009.

On Security

521. '*We learned to trust no one, not even children.... We wore our weapons constantly, even to a friend's house. We never went anywhere alone, always in pairs. We survived by being suspicious, a trait I have found difficult to set aside*.'[20]

On Generalisation

522. '*You must judge every situation on its own merits… each sub-unit had to be treated in a very specific way, once size did not [fit] all. One battalion was developed using a G7 heavy approach, another by focusing on ops, yet both units reached pretty much the same level of development*.'[21]

On Thanks

523. '*Expect little gratitude from those whom you help. People who benefit from assistance sometimes feel defensive. In accepting assistance they are, in a sense, admitting their own insufficiency. The self-esteem of a person, community, or a nation as a whole is delicate. The advisor's team should not, therefore, expect thanks. Rather, the team should approach the people in a spirit of fraternity and humility, taking satisfaction in their forward progress*.'[22]

On Handing Over

524. '*The hard work undertaken by UK commanders at all levels in developing relationships with key local Afghans is lost at the Relief in Place*.'[23] So*, 'prepare for handover from day 1*.'[24]

On Small Talk

525. '*If you cannot discuss religion with knowledge, sensitivity and genuine interest – avoid talking about it at all. Differences of faith create ample*

[20] Donovan D, *op.cit*., page 105.
[21] Browne S, *op.cit*.
[22] US Field Manual 3-07.1, p. 9-8.
[23] Lewthwaite D, Lieutenant Colonel Andy Gladen RE, DSTL/WP42798, Land Operational Research for Science and Technology (LORST) Interview: Op HERRICK 10. 2 MERCIAN Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team Battlegroup, 31 March 2010.
[24] Kilcullen D, *op.cit*.

opportunity for misunderstanding and unintentional slights, greatly exacerbated by any historic tensions. Therefore, particularly if you are secular or atheist/agnostic, you will need to be exceptionally careful about discussing religion.'[25] Likewise*, 'avoid too free talk about women. It is as difficult a subject as religion, and their standards are so unlike our own that a remark, harmless in English, may appear as unrestrained to them, as some of their statements would look to us, if translated literally*.'[26]

On Wit and Humour

526. '*Cling tight to your sense of humour. You will need it every day. A dry irony is the most useful type, and repartee of a personal and not too broad character will double your influence with the chiefs. Reproof, if wrapped up in some smiling form, will carry further and last longer than the most violent speech. The power of mimicry or parody is valuable, but use it sparingly, for wit is more dignified than humour*.'[27]

On Local Leaders

527. '*The surest way for an activity to be continued after the advisor leaves is for it to have been launched and carried forward within the local organisational and leadership framework. People respond best when their local organisations are recognised as important and useful. Advisors consult and encourage recognised local leaders to contribute as they can. A well-conceived technical activity reflects credit on the local leaders associated with it. Advisors give attention not only to officials and family heads of local groups, but also to the quiet, behind-the-scenes leaders*.'[28]

On Rank

528. '*Military forces around the world approach rank and prestige in completely different ways. In some cultures, rank equals experience; in others, it is nobility or education. Often many militaries have rewarded loyalty with promotions, which results in rank-heavy armies. Some [indigenous forces] recognise talent, while others recognise rank. Advisors likely advise*

[25] Army Field Manual (AFM) Volume 1, Part 9, *Tactical Guidance for Operations Other Than War (OOTW*), Chapter 21-4.
[26] Lawrence T E, *op.cit*.,
[27] *Ibid*.
[28] US FM 3-07.1, page 9-7.

counterparts much more senior in rank. They must understand that rank on the uniform is important to many armies.'[29]

On Interpreters

529. '*Better to have a good interpreter than a single member of force protection*.'[30]

530. '*Many of the [locally hired] interpreters will be members of the local elite, often respected professionals who, in local comparative terms, believe themselves to be better educated and of higher social status than many of the UK military personnel they encounter. This can be a source of great interest, but is also potentially a problem. Do not expect such interpreters to understand the entire range of their own society. They will know their social strata well, but may be less familiar with others*.'[31]

531. '*Your interpreter is a window to the native culture. A two-way window*.'[32] You will see the local cultural world through their eyes, and they will see you through theirs. While your interpreter will be an important colleague and companion, do not let them know everything that you think. Too loose talk may lower you in their esteem, and get back to other indigenous personnel where it may offend or compromise your integrity.

On Local Helpers

532. '*Selected young people in the villages can be trained and used as sub-professional, multipurpose village workers. Otherwise, advisors' influence is restricted to where they are standing and the immediate vicinity… paid local workers have proven quite helpful as they serve as a liaison between villagers and advisors*.' But, *be as careful of your servants as of yourself*.'[33]

[29] US FM 3-07.1, page 7-3.
[30] Cartwright J, *op.cit*., page 14.
[31] AFM Volume 1, Part. 9, *op.cit*., page 21-3.
[32] Conversation, Major Andre Prudent, 3 PWRR.
[33] Lawrence T E, *op.cit*.

On the Police

533. '*The police are not soldiers*.'[34] The role of a policeman is to keep the peace by ***preventing*** escalation of violence in a society; the soldier's job is to restore peace **by escalating violence as quickly and decisively as possible**. If military personnel find themselves training civil police (as opposed to Gendarmes or national police) they must recognise the fundamental difference in the nature of the organisation.

534. '*…The sooner law and order are established the better. This requires a body of law, a police service, the collection of evidential information, courts and all such. Until these are in place, and functioning adequately, the society and the individuals in it are not secure, and until they are secure the military cannot leave. The main point is this: the military can establish order but it is not a law enforcement agency, particularly in a different state to its own. Nonetheless, it is still incumbent upon the commander to ensure security, unless he is prepared to fail to discharge his duty to the non combatant on his objective*.'[35]

Maintaining Perspective: Excerpt from *Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes*

Historically, imperial crisis and emergency stimulated a rediscovery of culture and the attempt to weaponise cultural knowledge. For example, the Indian Mutiny of 1857 led British officers to produce a genre of tribal taxonomies. In 1940, after wars with 'strange people' from Nicaragua to China, the American Marine Corps produced its *Small Wars Manual*, urging the study of natives' 'racial characteristics.'

9/11 marked only the third post-war 'wave' of interest in non-Western strategic cultures. Scholars once debated the nature and mindset of the Soviet elite and its attitudes towards nuclear war and deterrence. After the Cold War, policymakers and pundits widely depicted the eruption of ethnic and communal conflicts in the Balkans, Africa and the Caucuses as 'medieval struggles over blood and culture.' Now, the 'war on terror' has revived fascination with war and the exotic. In the wars unleashed since 9/11, images

[34] Maj Andre Prudent.
[35] General Sir Rupert Smith, JDP 3-40, *op.cit*., page 4C-2.

of the brutal fanatic, the inscrutable Eastern genius, or the noble savage have returned to impress military minds, civilian academics and popular culture. In different forms and intensities, an idea has again taken hold: of the Primordial East driven by visceral or pre-modern urges, against the West, rational and modern.

It is wildly simplistic to argue that non-Westerners fight out of primal and pathological urges, without instrumental or political purpose. Does instrumentality not occur to Afghan insurgents who want to expel foreigners from their land? Do Hezbollah not care about political results, declaring victory over Israel as they do? Did Plains Indians think that hunting rights, land and power were irrelevant to their wars? When he declared war against the US, Osama bin Laden justified his 'guerrilla war' tactics not only as an expression of sacred violence, but as a necessary method against the 'imbalance of power' created by his enemies' overwhelming military might. Al-qaeda's chief theoretician, Ayman al-Zawahiri, also cares about translating violence into political outcomes, writing that successful operations against Islam's enemies will be wasted if they do not result in a muslim nation in the heart of the Islamic world. Far from being a strategic non-Clausewitzians, Al-qaeda left behind annotated copies of the *Prussian's On War* in their hideout in Tora Bora.

Unless we are careful, we may slip from saying that the foreigners are intrinsically different and cultural, to saying they are archaic and barbarous. The very term 'human terrain' is potentially misleading. Terrain geographically visualises humans as a space to be mapped and mastered. In effect, the battlespace is imagined as populated by peoples of separate worlds who can be known as part of a 'comprehensive cultural information research system.' Montgomery McFate, an architect of the human terrain system, defines the theatre of anthropologised war as a 'tribal zone', a monoculture of 'blood feuds.' This approach may lose sight of the agency of the human subjects being surveyed and the reciprocity of the war relationship. A good pedagogy of culture should be attentive to the crossovers and interconnectedness of war, so that culture is not reducible to a discourse of difference and separation. To deny modernity and strategic calculation to the enemy, in effect to portray Eastern war as war with politics left out, could be the greatest cognitive error of all.

Dr Patrick Porter, 2009

LEXICON

This lexicon contains acronyms/abbreviations and terms/definitions used in this publication. Terms and their definitions detailed in Part 2 are either *new* or *modified*. For fuller reference on all other UK and NATO agreed terminology, see the current edition of JDP 0-01.1, *The UK Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database*.

PART 1 – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACM	Anti-Coalition Militia
AFM	Army Field Manual
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
AU	African Union
BMATT	British Military Advisory and Training Team
C2	Command and Control
COIN	Counter-insurgency
DCDC	Development, Concept and Doctrine Centre
DME	Diplomatic, Military and Economic
ETT	Embedded Training Team
FPDA	Five Powers Defence Arrangements
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ITAM-N (UQ)	Iraqi Training and Advisory Mission-Navy (Umm Qasr)
JDP	Joint Doctrine Publication
JDN	Joint Doctrine Note
JWP	Joint Warfare Publication
MACV	Military Assistance Command
MAST	Mentoring, Advising, Support and Training
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding

NCO	Non-commissioned Officers
NEO	Non-combatant Evacuation
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
OMLT	Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
RCAG-K	Regional Command and Advisory Group-Kandahar
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
RCDS	Royal College of Defence Studies
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Advisor
someone who can recommend a course of action, offer advice, or inform another party, about a fact or situation. (JDN 6/11)

Irregular Activity
the use, or threat, of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Failed State
a failed state is where remnants of a host nation government, or some form of potential host nation government, may still exist. However, in such states, the government does not have monopoly on the use of force, cannot provide security or simple basic services, and is not sufficiently legitimate or effective to protect its borders, citizens or even itself. It may exert a very weak level of governance and rule of law in all or part of the state but, overall, the mechanisms and tools of governance have largely collapsed. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Fragile State
a fragile state still has a viable host nation government, but is has reduced capability and capacity to secure, protect and govern the population. Without intervention, it is likely to become a failed state. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Mentor
an experienced and trusted advisor who provides counsel and leadership to another person, or organisation, by agreement. (JDN 6/11)

Partner
In a security context, a nation agreeing to commit to a joint undertaking with 2, or more other nations, including sharing risks and opportunities that arise. (JDN 6/11).

Partnering
In a security context, an approach to relationship-building through direct assistance and shared endeavour that creates the right conditions, spirit and

capabilities to achieve a formal, and enduring, strategic partnership. (JDN 6/11).

Partnership
In a security context, a formal relationship based on a sound legal arrangement, trust and mutual respect, where the partners are otherwise independent bodies who agree to co-operate and share risks to achieve common goals that are mutually beneficial. (JDN 6/11).

Stabilisation
The process that supports states which are entering, enduring, or emerging from conflict, in order to prevent or reduce violence: protect the population and key infrastructure: promote political processes and governance structures, which lead to a political settlement that institutionalises non-violent contests for power: and prepares for sustainable social and economic development. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Security Transition
the progressive transfer of security functions and responsibilities between actors in order to reach a durable level of stability for the host nation that is not dependent on a significant operational international military contribution. (JDN 6/10)

Understanding
the ability to comprehend perceptions of groups other than our own, and to establish a common baseline for communication, interpretation and action. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS

The successful conduct of military operations requires an intellectually rigorous, clearly articulated and empirically-based framework of understanding that gives advantage to a country's Armed Forces, and its likely partners, in the management of conflict. This common basis of understanding is provided by doctrine.

UK doctrine is, as far as practicable and sensible, consistent with that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The development of national doctrine addresses those areas not covered adequately by NATO; it also influences the evolution of NATO doctrine in accordance with national thinking and experience.

Endorsed national doctrine is promulgated formally in JDPs.[1] From time to time, Interim JDPs (IJDPs) are published, caveated to indicate the need for their subsequent revision in light of anticipated changes in relevant policy or legislation, or lessons arising out of operations.

Urgent requirements for doctrine are addressed through Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs). To ensure timeliness, they are not subject to the rigorous staffing processes applied to JDPs, particularly in terms of formal external approval. Raised by the DCDC, they seek to capture and disseminate best practice or articulate doctrinal solutions from which this can be developed for operations and training.

Details of the joint doctrine development process and the associated hierarchy of JDPs are to be found in JDP 0-00 *Joint Doctrine Development Handbook*.

[1] Formerly named Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).