



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

A Guide to Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40

Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution



Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre

A GUIDE TO JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 3-40

SECURITY AND STABILISATION: THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

A Guide to Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 (JDP 3-40) dated April 2010
is promulgated
as directed by the Chiefs of Staff

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'MP Colley', with a large, sweeping horizontal stroke underneath.

Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Development, Concepts and Doctrine)

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS

The successful conduct of military operations requires an intellectually rigorous, clearly articulated and empirically-based framework of understanding that gives advantage to a country's Armed Forces, and its likely partners, in the management of conflict. This common basis of understanding is provided by doctrine.

UK doctrine is, as far as practicable and sensible, consistent with that of NATO. The development of national doctrine addresses those areas not covered adequately by NATO; it also influences the evolution of NATO doctrine in accordance with national thinking and experience.

Endorsed national doctrine is promulgated formally in Joint Doctrine Publications (JDPs).¹ From time to time, Interim Joint Doctrine Publications (IJDPs) are published, caveated to indicate the need for their subsequent revision in light of anticipated changes in relevant policy or legislation, or lessons arising from operations.

Urgent requirements for doctrine are addressed in Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs). JDNs do not represent an agreed or fully staffed position, but are raised in short order by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) to establish and disseminate current best practice. They also provide the basis for further development and experimentation, and a doctrinal basis for operations and exercises.

Details of the Joint Doctrine development process and the associated hierarchy of JDPs are to be found in JDP 0-00 *Joint Doctrine Development Handbook*.

¹ Formerly named Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).

RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

[illegible]

INTRODUCTION – WHY READ THIS GUIDE?

1. This Guide has been developed from the UK's recent Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40 *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*,² a book of reference. This Guide is not an alternative to JDP 3-40, it is complementary, one of a suite of associated publications.³ It provides a short overview of the key themes and ideas, and is designed so that it can be read cover-to-cover in about 2 hours. It also provides the civilian reader with insight into how the military thinks about stabilisation. Throughout, the use of *military* is synonymous with *the Armed Forces of the UK*.

THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO STABILISATION

2. In its most demanding form, the military contribution to stabilisation will need to counter a virulent insurgency, not because this is an end in itself, but because security is a precondition for the effective spread of governance, the rule of law and economic development. At the outset, the weight of emphasis may lie with the military as it attempts to seize the initiative from the insurgent, a precondition for security. But this does not mean that the military should be in charge. Military effect will not be decisive on its own. Instead, a comprehensive approach is necessary that addresses the root causes – the lack of a sustainable political settlement and the separation of the government from its people. This requires a political or diplomatic lead. Stabilisation places demands on bureaucracies to work together.

3. Consent-winning activity may reinforce initial perceptions of success, but it is investment, economic growth, governance, the rule of law and sustainable development that will allow the population to re-build and develop their livelihoods. The security effort must be planned with this in mind and wherever possible, it should set the conditions for it. Where integrated structures or a single institution are not achievable, the minimum requirement is integration through an *effective dialogue* in which parties share a *common vision* and a *unity of purpose*. This is what is meant by a comprehensive approach.

4. Although governance and stabilisation is most successfully built from the bottom up, the international and multi-agency nature of stabilisation demands both a bottom-up and top-down approach. The survival requirement for a state is a base level of functionality – sockets – into which international development agencies can plug. At the same time, contributing nations, international organisations and military coalitions need their own sockets into which to plug; a host government. Where this

² JDP 3-40 was published by DCDC in November 2009. It is available through the publications section of DSDA or the internet at www.mod.uk/dcdc

³ Four publications: A5 loose-leaf version of JDP 3-40 *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution* promulgated in November 2009; A4 bound version of JDP 3-40 promulgated in April 2010; this Guide; Stabilisation Unit tri-department planning guidance due for publication in Summer 2010.

does not exist, it may have to be built. Indeed, it may be necessary to create both local and national governance structures that can endure. This is not, however, a model for regime change, which is explicitly not the purpose of stabilisation.

5. Instability occurs in many forms and demands as many types of response. Engagement is an issue of political choice, a matter for governments not militaries. However, unlike humanitarian activity, any response to instability will be predicated on a combination of national interest and the susceptibility of the problem to intervention. Although some risks may be mitigated by early action to *prevent*, this assumes a degree of foresight and willingness by the international community for which history so far provides little evidence. Stabilisation might prove less discretionary than we hope.

6. In its most demanding form, stabilisation will require a level of commitment that is difficult to predict. It is likely to be lengthy, and require significant investment. It may require governments to allocate resources that will not only test their resolve, but may also push the boundaries of their constitutional authority. International forces may suffer casualties on a scale that causes anguish among domestic audiences. Civilian contractors and aid workers will find themselves as a party to the conflict and a target for criminals and insurgents. And since efforts to combat insurgency take place amongst the people, civilian casualties are inevitable. Media opportunities to reinforce narratives with images may drive a scale of violence that can resonate with immediate and global reach. Notions of wining or victory are inappropriate, and tangible progress may be difficult to demonstrate. In security terms, success will be measured by the degree with which adversaries accept the futility of their cause and seek alternative recourse to violence; this will be a protracted process. To achieve this, although resources and military force may be applied incrementally, the declared commitment to intervention – though conditional – should appear unequivocal and unwavering. Equally there needs to be a clear understanding that when the security situation is such that force is required, that force needs to be applied robustly. Limited force has limited utility.

STRUCTURE

7. The Guide covers much of the span of JDP 3-40, but clearly not the detail. Readers will need to exercise their own discretion and judgment on when to refer to the main publication. To assist, the contents pages of JDP 3-40 are included in this Guide at Annex A. Given its audience, the Guide does not dwell on the role and capabilities of Other Government Departments, but emphasises instead the military approach. Elements excluded from this publication include classical Counter-insurgency (COIN) and Peace Support Operations (PSO); command and control challenges; operational art; governance and economic effort; social and political analysis; detailed planning considerations; campaign execution; and learn and adapt cycles. If you seek guidance in these areas, refer to the main publication.

8. The Guide is split into this Introduction, which includes the 9 security principles for stabilisation, 3 chapters and a short conclusion. They cover:

a. Chapter 1 sets out the context for stabilisation. It describes what stabilisation is and how the character of conflict that accompanies it has evolved to blend ‘*the lethality traditionally associated with state conflict and the fanatical and protracted fervour of irregular warfare*’.⁴ It then explains the problems of fragile states, what instability is and its causal relationship with the political order. It identifies a model where insecurity, failure in rule of law and governance, and a lack of economic development can cause a downward spiral that must be arrested and reversed if stability is to be delivered. At the heart of this model lies a political settlement which is achieved through re-balancing the conflict relationship between host government, wider population and competing elites.

b. Chapter 2 articulates the UK approach to stabilisation as viewed by the military, the need for an integrated approach, and the role of the military within it. In particular, it describes how everything that we do exerts an influence on the conflict relationship, and that influence can be used to rebalance this relationship. In order to operationalise an integrated approach, it describes a framework for stabilisation activity that allows stabilisation actors to share an understanding of what and when activity must occur.

c. Chapter 3 describes some additional considerations for the military in planning and managing stabilisation campaigns, an aspiration for integrated planning, how to develop understanding of the conflict relationship and move parties within it, and how the military force will need to learn and adapt in order to retain the initiative.

d. Finally, a short conclusion describes the provenance of stabilisation, reiterates the key messages and encourages debate with a view to further development of practice and doctrine.

SECURITY PRINCIPLES OF STABILISATION

9. Principles serve as the foundation for action, but they are not inflexible rules. They provide a way of thinking about a particular problem from a particular perspective, in this case the inherent political and multinational requirements of stabilisation at the theatre level. The following security principles of stabilisation are derived from analysis of UK and Allied doctrine, recent operational experience and lessons learned, and history. They encapsulate the issues articulated in the main

⁴ Frank G Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century; The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Arlington, Va: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007.

chapters of JDP 3-40 and should be used to guide military planning and execution. They are included also to help civilian readers better understand the military approach.

- **Primacy of Political Purpose.** Political aims dictate the desired outcome and drive the planning and conduct of the campaign.
- **Understand the Context.** A shared understanding of the context within which insecurity and instability has arisen, and the relationship between the UK military and their immediate partners, is essential to provide a basis for focused and coordinated action.
- **Focus on the Population.** The needs of the population, whose expectations will vary from one situation to another, must be met to promote human security and encourage support for the political settlement.
- **Foster Host Nation Governance, Authority and Indigenous Capacity.** Host nation ownership of, and responsibility for, security and stabilisation requires the development of sufficient governance, authority and indigenous capability.
- **Unity of Effort.** Military force is but one element required for the delivery of security and stabilisation. The collective contribution of all actors is required and must be coordinated to ensure unity of effort in every facet of the mission.
- **Isolate and Neutralise Irregular Actors.** By isolating those who oppose the government from their cause and the source of their support they can be made irrelevant.
- **Exploit Credibility to Gain Support.** Consent is the minimum requirement, but it is not enough. Credibility must act as a lever to shift tacit consent into active support for the campaign. UK forces must be perceived to be both legitimate and credible locally (especially amongst opinion-forming elites), regionally and with UK audiences.
- **Prepare for the Long Term – Perseverance and Sustainability.** The stabilisation of a failed or failing state will tend to take a long time. It will require the provision of significant cross-government resources, immersion in the problem, and demonstration of resilience in the face of short-term setbacks.
- **Anticipate, Learn and Adapt.** Complex, uncertain and dynamic operating environments demand continuous anticipation, learning, and adaptation (without detriment to the maintenance of the aim). Adversaries will adapt; so must the UK forces if their adversaries are to be outwitted.

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One of the defining features of state fragility and failure is a diminished capacity of the government to contribute to security. Where international military forces are required as part of a multi-agency stabilisation effort, it is highly likely that the host government will be unable to provide adequate security for its population. Hostile groups may exploit this by inflicting further violence to discredit government security forces and destroy the confidence of the population in the governments ability to protect them. This task is made easier for hostile groups by the fact that such societies are often heavily armed.

CHAPTER 1 – THE CURRENT CONTEXT

Introduction

101. This chapter describes the context for the military contribution to stabilisation. It identifies what the military consider stabilisation to be, and what it is not. It examines how the character of conflict – rather than the nature of conflict – has changed, and what this means for the contemporary operating environment. The international system is described along with the impact of globalisation upon it and the functions and norms of the state. What constitutes a fragile state and how the contest for political order impacts fragility is also explained. Measures to address instability are identified and the stabilisation model is introduced as an approach to reversing a downward spiral of instability. It also argues that in the contest for political order it may be necessary to rebalance the conflict relationship between the host nation government, wider population and a number of competing elites.

SECTION I – THE EVOLUTION OF STABILISATION

The Long and the Short of Stabilisation

102. Stabilisation has explicitly political aims and is primarily a political activity. The military contribution is foremost an enabling one. Security will be a significant factor where there is a violent insurgency raging in the country. It will be less so where instability has at its root a political or economic problem which has not yet been exploited by those who might profit from insecurity. The military describe stabilisation as:

‘The process that supports states which are entering, enduring or emerging from conflict in order to prevent or reduce violence; protect the population and key infrastructure; promote political processes and governance structures, which lead to a political settlement that institutionalises non-violent contests for power; and prepares for sustainable social and economic development.’¹

103. The military have been accused in the past of a narrow view, a failure to recognise the contribution that other civil agencies make, and being naive over the ease with which a shared understanding and vision can be established. Some of this criticism is fair, some not. We are still adapting to the multinational and multi-agency environment, learning to supplant tempo with patience, to inculcate followership as a more relevant notion than leadership and to recognise that unity of purpose rather than unity of command is the touchstone in this shared endeavour.

¹ JDP 3-40 *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*.

104. There will probably never be an ideal comprehensive formula. Stabilisation is a creative process, not a science. But there are some keys to success. First is the need to create a single integrated team. This does not seek to neuter departmental or agency liberties, but rather bring together the individual parts to deliver an effect beyond their sum. Recent work to establish an integrated civil-military mission in Lashkar Gar to join military, governance and economic development effort is a good example.

105. Stabilisation is likely to require a range of activities to be conducted simultaneously. Multi-agency partners will be required to support one another. Where they cannot bring their effect to bear directly, they should use it to reinforce each other. A comprehensive approach is not just a technical matter; cooperation is necessary, but not sufficient. Measures to address the effects of instability will be most successful where their delivery is decentralised.

The Evolving Character of Conflict

106. The nature of conflict is enduring; it is a violent contest, fundamentally human and, at times, apparently irrational, a mixture of chance, risk and policy. Its character, however, is volatile. As forms of conflict evolve, its character changes.² It evolves as societies change, as technology impacts and adversaries adapt. Previous models of a spectrum of conflict increasing by level of violence now seem overly simplistic, primarily because they do not express adequately the concurrency and overlap of the operational themes. In the future, conflict will blend some of the characteristics of state-on-state industrial warfare with those of irregular conflict, terrorism, extremist activity, peace support and humanitarian assistance. This complexity demands an alternative, non-linear model:




Figure 1.1 – Fusion of Concurrent Activity

107. Stabilisation will require the military to transition between combat, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance rapidly; what Krulak described as 3-Block

² *Future Character of Conflict*, DCDC Strategic Trends Programme, February 2010.

War.³ Opponents will be diverse, but inter-linked, and include both state and non-state actors such as insurgents, terrorists and criminals. They will come together for mutual benefit and, because they are unencumbered by bureaucracy, they may be highly agile and adaptive. They are unlikely to share or be constrained by our legal or ethical framework, and will therefore challenge us in ways we might not anticipate. They are also likely to share local and indigenous cultures; cultures that we struggle to understand. This will afford them a natural and early advantage. Their aims may not be victory in a traditional binary sense, but more limited and equivocal. Also, since insurgency is typically no longer bounded by the aim of self-determination, as was the case with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation or Irish Republican Army, reintegration through a partial accommodation of their goals may be more challenging.

A Flavour of What's New and What's Not

108. Even allowing for the changed strategic landscape and current operational environment, previous writings by the likes of Kitson, Thompson and Galula still provide some useful guidance. Equally, 30 years of internal security operations in Northern Ireland provided us with a pool of experience; for example, the strength of having a fully integrated intelligence system which allows you to share information with the local police and security services is something we knew well in the past. Similarly, the need to carry with us both the local population and the population at home; the use of the terms *message* and *narrative* may be new, but the ideas are not, and we have known for a long time that perceptions matter as much as facts. The reach of modern global communications simply highlights the importance of influence – the ability to effect someone's beliefs or actions.

109. What is new is the reduced size of western conventional forces at a time when the demand upon highly capable, agile international forces is greater than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The need for police and paramilitary expertise is also greater than ever, all of which argues for building the capacity of indigenous forces as an urgent priority. Multinational operations are now the default, and multi-agency increasingly common. The complexities of both add new dimensions. In addition, host nations not only form part of the coalition, but their sovereignty will constrain the military and our diplomatic partners alike. Finally, the facts that our attempts at stabilisation will all take place under the scrutiny of international media, that those who oppose military action within it are free to challenge the actions of government, and that campaigns can be subjected to scrutiny in courts of law, are more pertinent than ever.

³ Gen Charles C. Krulak, *The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War*, Marines Magazine, January 1999.

SECTION II – THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND THE STATE

The International System

110. An increasing number of transnational non-state actors seek to influence global affairs: Inter-governmental Organisations; International Organisations; Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs); and Multinational Corporations. Even so, while many International Organisations and Multinational Corporations have resources at their disposal on a par with many nations, states remain central to the international system. Political communities continue to seek legitimacy and validation through statehood. Although internationally recognised borders convey the notion of statehood, some communities choose to define themselves through nationhood instead (the Kurds, for example). In these cases, instability is not caused by a challenge to the political settlement; it is inherent in the society.

111. Crises and conflicts are addressed through an international system that is based on the centrality of the state, set and codified through the UN. This includes a responsibility of a state to deliver basic human security⁴ – freedom from want and fear. The post-1945 international organisational structure – originally just 51 states – which was designed to meet inter-state challenges has struggled to adapt to the complexity of intra-state violence and instability, where state sovereignty clashes with a need to address internal security challenges. This has led to cumbersome, delayed or absent responses to intra-state conflict and instability. In part this is because international frameworks have limited resonance with affected populations. For example, the UN Charter matters little to the tribespeople of Afghanistan. Of the 192 states now members of the UN, 38 are classified as failed or at serious risk of failure.⁵

Globalisation

112. Globalisation is a collective term for the processes characterised by accelerating inter-connectedness. It is not viewed universally as positive since some of its effects exacerbate economic inequality, magnify opportunities for criminal greed and allow those with grievances to spread disaffection and grow power. A consequence of globalisation is that economies have become more dependent on national and global financial information and communication networks, which themselves provide additional vulnerabilities. Simultaneously, these networks connect diasporas and communities of interest enabling communication and conspiracy. Coupled with weapons proliferation, this can provide non-state actors with a destructive power and reach previously confined to states.

⁴ Human Security includes: economic security, food security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. *New Dimensions of Human Security*, UN Development Report, 1994.

⁵ States classed as *alert* in the Fund for Peace think tank and Foreign Policy magazine 2009 State Instability Index.

113. Globalisation has 3 key consequences for the military in consideration of a stabilisation effort. First, the complexity of actors is likely to render unity of command unachievable. Instead, establishing and maintaining unity of effort is a better aim, but it requires a robust, inter-agency planning and decision-making process. Second, interested local actors will use trans-national communications and media networks to feed insecurity. Third, interventions designed to have a local effect can impact events with outcomes well beyond the immediate theatre of operations.

114. These consequences of globalisation make purely localised conflict increasingly unlikely. They challenge traditional organisational concepts such as the bounded Joint Operations Area which attempts to isolate and contain threats in order to focus and coordinate activity. Instead, globalisation suggests a network of threats that will require a more sophisticated, agile and networked response.

Functions and Norms of the State

115. A stable state can be considered to comprise 3 elements: security; economic and infrastructure development; governance and the rule of law:




Figure 1.2 – Elements of a Stable State

Although these elements can be analysed individually, it may be distorting to view them separately. Stability is determined by how these elements interact. This interaction is governed by a political settlement. Where the political settlement is effective, it facilitates an interaction that is mutually beneficial. As a result, society can flourish. Of course, some states fail to do this, but still retain a form of stability, but they are liable to have ungoverned spaces that harbour and provide havens for threats; the Democratic Republic of Congo from the 1970s to 1990s is one example. Other states achieve stability through ruthless oppression, nepotism and patronage, but stability here is usually temporary and likely to be exploited by those actors with an interest in threatening global security.

116. **Security.** A stable state must be able to protect the most basic survival needs of both itself and its people. This includes the provision of human security for the population in addition to the control of territory, borders, key assets and sources of revenue. The term Security embraces several more specific terms: National Security and Physical Security, which are most readily addressed through intervention; and Human Security and Personal Security which are better addressed through stabilisation, but which are more difficult to guarantee and require an understanding of culture.

National Security is the traditional understanding of security as encompassing the safety of a state or organisation and its protection from both external and internal threats.

Physical Security is that part of National Security that relates to national assets and infrastructure.

Human Security is defined as security '*characterised by: freedom from persecution, want and fear; adequate provision of essential commodities to sustain life; broader environmental security; and the provision of cultural values*'.⁶

Personal Security is that part of Human Security which ensures protection of an individual from persecution, intimidation, reprisals and other forms of systematic violence.

117. **Economic and Infrastructure Development.** The economic infrastructure, level of natural resources, degree of technological development, industrial base, communications network and level of government revenue shape the ability of the state to provide stable governance. These elements will be less well defined and developed in a fragile state. In a stable, prosperous state, decisions affecting wealth creation can be made on the basis of calculated risk assessments. This gives confidence to investors. The degree of predictability in the economic environment is a major element in shaping the decisions of international and domestic commercial investors, from the multinational corporations to the modest market stall holder. Given the increasing mobility of international capital, economies that become fundamentally unpredictable can rapidly lose their viability.

118. **Governance and the Rule of Law.** A stable state has a sustainable political structure that permits the peaceful resolution of internal contests for power, although a brittle form of stability can exist using brutality and corruption, for example, Iraq under Saddam Hussein. However, such states require a constant demonstration of the power of the state in order to keep their populations in thrall. The prospect of genuine long-term stable governance only occurs when influence is exercised over a population and territory by methods viewed as broadly legitimate by the

⁶ Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01 *British Defence Doctrine* (3rd Edition) paragraph 102.

overwhelming majority of the governed. The rule of law is fundamental to legitimate governance, but will be institutionalised in varying forms dependent upon the social, cultural and political mores of the particular society. Legitimacy is ultimately defined by the local population rather than by externally imposed criteria.

119. **Societal Relationships.** The 3 elements of a stable state described above capture the substantive functionalities and competencies of the state. However, the context is also determined by the societal relationships that underpin and are interwoven with these elements. In a stable state the social, cultural and ideological factors that bind society are broadly consistent with the manner in which state institutions discharge their responsibilities and gain consent from the population.

120. **The Importance of the Political Settlement.** The structures of a state are determined by a stable political settlement forged by a common understanding, usually among elites, that their interests or beliefs are served by a particular way of organising political power. It is the achievement of this common understanding, more than anything else, which is the most important marker of progress in stabilisation.

‘In essence political settlements are in place wherever those with the power to threaten state-structures forego that option either for reward (which may simply be personal security), for the sake of belief, or to wait an opportunity to become the government overseeing the existing structures.’⁷

The political settlement is the mechanism by which states are, ultimately, able to undergo non-violent transformations. This understanding of political settlements helps define the role of elites in stabilisation. Elites are those individuals or groups with the power to undermine existing political settlements and prevent the establishment of new ones. They can achieve this through their ability to mobilise resources, decisive groups or broad swathes of the population.

SECTION III – INSTABILITY

State Instability

121. Although many states are in decline, fragile states are characterised by their inability to cope with shocks.⁸ Shocks can generate a further decline in all, or any single element of the state. In turn, weakening elements may erode others. Where insecurity and conflict are not already present, this erosion sets the conditions for it. This may cause, or be caused by a fracture in the political settlement that regulates key

⁷ *States in Development: Understanding State-Building*, a Department for International Development (DFID) working paper, 2008, page 7.

⁸ A *shock* is a high-impact, low-probability occurrence that results in a discontinuity or rapid alteration in the strategic context, i.e. the 9/11 terrorist attacks or collapse of the Berlin Wall. (See DCDC *Global Strategic Trends – out to 2040* (4th Edition))

societal and state relationships. In spite of contextual variations – every situation is different – there may then be a downward spiral of state fragility and failure. Figure 1.3 opposite illustrates this.⁹ The purpose of stabilisation, through timely engagement, is to reverse this spiral.

122. The factors that may lead to instability can include: disease epidemics; natural disasters; chronic economic decline; demographic pressures; climate change; scarce resources; mass population movements; government weakness; corruption; as well as a fragmented sense of identity and nationhood that undermines societal bonds. The biggest driver of instability is conflict and its associated violence. These factors undermine the existing political settlement, open the space for hostile groups, and attract external actors motivated by profit, ideology or greed.

123. **Insecurity.** One of the defining features of state fragility and failure is a diminished capacity of the government to contribute to security. If the situation has deteriorated to a point where international military forces are required as part of a multi-agency stabilisation effort, it is highly likely that the host government will be unable to provide adequate security for its population. Hostile groups may exploit this by inflicting further violence to discredit government security forces and destroy the confidence of the population in the government's ability to protect them. They may also attempt to undermine the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence by setting up parallel security and governance structures. This task is made easier for hostile groups by the fact that such societies are often heavily armed.

124. **Economic Decline.** In fragile or failed states the government's ability to raise and distribute revenue effectively is often severely compromised. This can be caused by a combination of: corruption; poor border control; disincentives to invest; diversion of human and other capital to the security challenge; poverty; and an absence of the appropriate mechanisms and tax systems. Thus basic functions, normally provided by the state, may depend upon substantial international assistance. Even where significant natural resources exist, these may prove to be a driver of instability. They can provide motivation for destabilising actors, both internal and external, who seek to control and exploit such resources, for example, the trade in conflict diamonds. Where long experience of poverty generates low expectations of quality of life, even minor progress can boost governmental legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Conversely populations with high expectations may challenge the authority of the state and aspirations will have to be managed. In either case, it will be important that the host nation government receives credit for any positive developments. The host nation delivering projects and services tolerably is likely to have more positive, long-term political impact than external actors delivering them well.

⁹ The diagram shows a clockwise, downward spiral in 2D for simplicity. The defining issue is *downward spiral* rather than direction. Clearly, it could spiral in either a clockwise or anti-clockwise direction.




Figure 1.3 – Fragile States: The Downward Spiral

125. **Weak Governance and the Rule of Law.** In conjunction with a functioning judicial system, the security sector¹⁰ is crucial to effective governance and the maintenance of law and order. Within a population's hierarchy of needs, physical security is essential for effective and durable development and requires well-managed and competent personnel operating within an institutional framework defined by law. By contrast, a poorly managed security sector hampers development, discourages investment and helps perpetuate poverty. Aspects of the conflict which impact the structure and functioning of the security sector include:¹¹

¹⁰ The security sector is inherently linked to the Justice Sector and includes: state and non-state armed forces, police and paramilitary units and private military and security companies; intelligence and security agencies; the judiciary, prisons, prosecution and defence legal authorities as well as traditional (e.g. tribal) justice mechanisms; civil management and oversight bodies (including President/Prime Minister, Defence, Interior, Justice and Foreign Affairs Ministries and the legislature). (See page 2-7 to page 2-9)

¹¹ This is considered further in the DFID publication, *Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform*.

- a. Remnants of a national army or interior forces that are opposed to foreign intervention. These need to be reconciled (or, where this is not possible, defeated), noting that they may subsequently become the foundation for re-building a national security force.
- b. A broad-based insurgency comprising multiple groups that threatens the survival of the state. This can become a magnet for foreign insurgents, as in the case of Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan. It may be trans-national.
- c. The proliferation of predatory armed groups and militias for whom war and criminal activity are their main livelihood.
- d. The emergence of criminal networks, often with regional and international dimensions, protected by armed groups.
- e. The disappearance of the structures of governance, and the emergence of security voids, which provide opportunities for competing forms of political authority.
- f. Institutionalised corruption as the primary means of interaction between groups and individuals.

Contesting the Political Order

126. The contest for political order lies at the heart of the societal conflict. It may be between identifiable sides, or more likely a kaleidoscope of indistinct groups with an array of motivations, goals and tactics. Causes and motivations will vary. Some may be truly political, altruistic and positive. Others, resentment, victimhood, clan loyalty, ideology or criminality to name but a few, are more negative and destabilising. Developing a good understanding of these, the tactics and allegiances of groups, and placing them in the correct local and regional context – not our own – is critical to designing a successful campaign. Decisions on models of governance and leadership are not military ones, but they are critical to campaign success. It will be important to prioritise them appropriately. The nature of governance is a more pressing and fundamental question than who, if anyone, should be in charge.

127. Boundaries between groups in a contest for order are usually blurred, with fluid membership and multiple allegiances which may not be aligned with national boundaries.¹² For this reason, specific labelling can be misleading. Even members of the host nation government may also transition in and out of irregular groups. Such linkages between political power and illicit activity undermine the development of effective governance and the rule of law. However, their fluidity also provides

¹² An idea explored in David Kilcullen's *The Accidental Guerrilla*, Hurst and Company, London 2009.

opportunities to change the campaign strategic geometry, as in the case of the *Sons of Iraq* programme.¹³

128. Local elites usually seek to adopt persuasive causes to mobilise support, often based on real problems or unresolved contradictions inherent to any society. They seek to situate their activities within a compelling *narrative* that attempts to explain and justify their actions while simultaneously de-legitimising the motivations and behaviours of opponents. For example, such groups may inflict punishment on petty criminals and pass judgement on disputes within the community to establish themselves as alternative providers of justice (as the Taliban has done in Afghanistan, for example). This is designed to both gain favour from the population and illustrate the failure of state justice mechanisms. Building a narrative often involves the strategic manipulation of identity in order to create belief in an *us* versus *them* story. As a security force operating in support of a host government, the military would expect to conduct operations in the context of that government's narrative. This must chime with the aspirations of the population, it must be more compelling than that of competing elites and groups, and most crucially, it must be enacted and be seen to be enacted; word and deed need to be aligned.

SECTION IV – ADDRESSING INSTABILITY

The Stabilisation Model

129. There are some generic tenets that underpin stabilisation effort to stop and reverse the downward spiral of state fragility and failure. In addition to the essential requirement for a political settlement, effort is required in the elements of security, governance and development. Figure 1.4, overleaf, illustrates some of the key tasks that fall within these areas.

130. The Department for International Development prioritises further by introducing the concept of survival functions. This is a base level of functionality across all elements which provides the sockets into which the international community, aid and development agencies can plug. Building capacity in this way should allow states to achieve precursors for stability such as: a monopoly on the use of violence; the ability to raise revenue; and the ability to rule through law.

¹³ Sons of Iraq was a US funded programme, stated in 2007, to give responsibility for local security to groups of concerned local citizens in the fight against al-Qaeda Iraq.




Figure 1.4 – The Stabilisation Model

The Key Conflict Relationship

131. At the same time as military operations are conducted to establish security, competing elites and groups need to be brought to an accommodation with the government in order to achieve the political settlement that is so vital. These accommodations are not about support, they are about an understanding of legitimacy, an acceptance of government authority, and a willingness to abide by rule of law. The stabilisation campaign needs to reshape and stabilise a number of relationships, but the primary one is the triangular relationship between the host nation government, competing (often violent) elites (of which there may be several) and the wider

population. Although international opinion and the domestic audience of international military force contributors matter too, it is this set of host nation relationships that holds the key to a sustainable political settlement. Figure 1.5 illustrates this central relationship in societal conflicts. All stabilisation activity should be planned, executed and assessed in terms of the influence brought to bear on this relationship.




Figure 1.5 – The Key Conflict Relationship

132. **Competing Elites.** Elites are those individuals and groups with the power (including capacity for significant violence) to undermine existing political settlements and prevent the establishment of new ones. The accommodation of competing elites, sometimes referred to as *elite consolidation*, is likely to be predicated on the self-interest of elites. This makes *understanding* of these elites and groups critical. Although negotiation and peace agreements may be a part of a political settlement, they are not synonymous. A clear cut victory of one set of actors over another could lead to a political settlement if the losers believe that the chance of improving their position through further conflict is limited; personal security can be a strong motivation for accommodation. However, unequivocal victories in complex societal conflicts are rare. Usually, success is based on including elements of hostile groups in the political system. Those seemingly unwilling to reach an accommodation, known as *irreconcilables*, must be persuaded by other means, captured, expelled, isolated or killed. The relationship elites have with the population is a human, fluid one. It will ebb and flow depending on the aspirations of each. This means that in spite of efforts to force consolidation, elites will not always carry the population with them.

133. **The Wider Population.** Although a distinct and necessary military effect may be to kill or capture irreconcilables, in general terms the population should be the focus for the military contribution. But, this is not about hearts and minds to build the

relationship between the international military force and the community. Rather, it is about connecting the population with their government, about spreading government authority and about demonstrating the benefits of a relationship with, and support for, that government. Since the population is unlikely to be content with a prolonged foreign military presence, it will be important to demonstrate that such forces are deployed to bring security to the people on behalf of their government, not those of the international contributors. A government face will therefore be required to this security provision. Where possible, the connection of the people with government should be made through existing local governance structures, i.e. tribal, clan, village council. The aim is to develop a confidence in the population that, ultimately, the host nation government can sustain adequate security provision, as set out in a credible narrative.



There are hard choices to be made between allocating UK troops for concurrent capacity building and allocating them for operations to isolate and neutralise adversaries, recognising that the demands of these separate tasks require different skills and structures. Ultimately, success will involve recruiting, training, possibly equipping indigenous security forces, and embedding with them. It may also entail the creation of non-standard security structures, such as village or neighbourhood guards and tribal police forces in order to attain the critical mass which is required in order to protect the population.

CHAPTER 2 – AN APPROACH TO STABILISATION

Introduction

201. This chapter explores why previous approaches to Counter-insurgency (COIN) and Peace Support Operations (PSO) do not meet the challenge of stabilisation. It explores the role of the military in developing stability, primarily through the delivery of security. In addition to countering adversaries, military effort may also be required for security force capacity building and reform of the Security and Justice Sectors. The chapter explains the need to act with legitimacy and describes a model for doing so. The centrality of influence is reiterated and how it is achieved within the campaign discussed. Finally, a framework of stabilisation activity, Shape-Secure-Hold-Develop is described.

SECTION I – POLICY CHOICES: THE RANGE OF RESPONSE

202. The UK contribution to stabilisation will be determined by the UK's strategic interests, obligations and national security imperatives. These are choices of policy, primarily for those outside the MOD. The department's principal contribution to this will be to articulate the range of alternative contributions that the military could make. Depending on the timeframe, these vary. Early on, routine regional engagement or International Security Cooperation, such as military capacity-building, helps states avoid insecurity. Alternatively, it may be appropriate to deploy a force to deter sponsors of instability, or contain the export of threats from one country to another. In the worst case, where instability and insecurity has taken hold, it may be appropriate to deploy a Joint Force to intervene. Usually this will be as part of a coalition effort to support wider stabilisation and state-building initiatives, such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Thus, responses might range from: a single specialist adviser who deploys to advise on military training; a single unit – such as a warship – possibly already in the region to assist capacity-building or provide deterrence; or a sizeable Joint Force to impose order and bring security as part of a wider multinational, multi-agency stabilisation effort.

203. Clearly, an early commitment to help *prevent* a downward spiral in a fragile state will be considerably less onerous for international forces than the scale necessary to facilitate *restoration*. International Security Cooperation activity to *prevent* will normally demand at least a coordinated if not comprehensive effort. The least intrusive form of response, consistent with the achievement of national objectives and policy imperatives, should be the goal and intervention operations requiring significant resources and persistence are invariably the choice of last resort. Activity to *restore* will always require a comprehensive approach.




Figure 2.1 – The Graduated Range of Military Commitment

SECTION II – A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Stabilisation: The Need for a New Approach

204. British experience of COIN and PSO in the 20th Century have shaped our thinking on the military contribution in stabilisation. However, although that experience is valuable, there are a number of key differences which demand a different approach in contemporary campaigns. No longer is the UK buttressing its own, colonial, political order. No longer are we likely to operate nationally, or even lead an alliance. And no longer are our adversaries likely to be easily isolated, poorly informed or poorly equipped.¹

205. Stabilisation involving UK Forces will be conducted in the sovereign territory of a fragile, conflict-affected state where success may require an element of stabilisation and state-building. But instability may result from other forms of activity besides insurgency. These include warring factions (e.g. South Sudan), large-scale criminality (e.g. Somalia), cartels (e.g. Mexico) or foreign fighters (e.g. Yemen). Known as *irregular activity*, this is likely to be at the heart of any threat to the stability of a state. A capable insurgency is but one form of irregular activity, but is likely to be its most threatening form. Countering these threats will be central to the stabilisation effort. This is illustrated at Figure 2.2.

¹ See *The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism*, March 2009, page 29 for the example of Hezbollah and Taliban.




Figure 2.2 – Stabilisation, Irregular Activity and COIN

The UK Approach

206. While UK Forces will be deeply involved in the provision of security and countering irregular activity, they will also need to contribute to the wider stabilisation effort. The political context will be dynamic; rapidly changing events can quickly render previous judgements and analysis obsolete. The military must be engaged as part of a continual strategic and operational review that relates changing conditions on the ground to the political purpose of operations. There will be different perspectives; the situation will look different when viewed from capitals, strategic headquarters or in-theatre. The challenge will be to align them.

207. A stabilisation campaign can appear mired in strategic stalemate since demonstrable progress takes time. This can make domestic populations and policymakers uncomfortable. The military should contribute to the effort to shape domestic understanding of the ebb and flow of these conflicts. It will be important to retain focus on campaign shifts, not tactical incidents. They are protracted, because shaping the political settlement within a conflict-riven society is inherently difficult and groups hostile to that effort have a vested interest in prolonging the conflict to wait out the intervention.

An Integrated Approach

208. In war the military aims to overwhelm the enemy by integrating manoeuvre with fires. In stabilisation, we strive to achieve a similar effect on a wicked problem by integrating all the levers that our society can muster. A comprehensive approach is broader than cross-government, it is also a multi-agency and usually a multinational response. Mutually-supporting cross-departmental and multi-agency effort should enable comprehensive tactical activity to deliver overwhelming campaign effect. The military will set the security conditions and lead on aspects of Security Sector Reform (SSR) such as military capacity-building. Civilian state and non-state institutions lead on: governance; engagement and reconciliation; police and justice sector reform; restoration of basic services and infrastructure; economic and financial development;

and longer-term social and infrastructure development. Some of these may require a supporting contribution from the military.

209. Our opponents understand the importance and the fragility of a comprehensive approach and therefore are likely to use tactics that deliberately target and drive away vulnerable civil actors. The notion of impartiality or neutrality has limited relevance. Civilian participants will automatically become part of the conflict. By exploiting this fracture-point adversaries can undermine the collective will and perseverance of the coalition. Reducing our delivery of comprehensive effect is an area where our opponents seek to generate freedom of manoeuvre, both to spoil the authority and credibility of the host nation and to supplant it with their own. This can be countered by reinforcing the notion of a shared endeavour between the military, Other Government Departments (OGDs) and multi-agency partners.

SECTION III – THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

210. The role of the UK military will be to contribute to the provision of security on behalf of the host nation government. Dependent on the nature of the state and the stabilisation challenge, this may range from advice, military assistance and training, SSR, combat operations to contain or deter, or a full-scale intervention to combat a violent insurgency. In the latter case, the military force will need to engage in combat with the insurgent in order to suppress him, to wrest the initiative from him in order to dictate terms, and to demonstrate the host government's authority. This will mean killing some people who challenge that authority, and will almost certainly also mean the military taking casualties in the process. Where the insurgent chooses to contest authority in populated areas, civilians, including those from the international community, may also be killed. In spite of the most strenuous efforts to minimise it, civilian casualties are often a tragic inevitability, primarily because the insurgency will deliberately target the population and internationals in order to demonstrate the government's inability to provide security. By killing, the insurgent also seeks to spread fear and dissuade the population and international community from supporting the government's efforts.

211. **Permissiveness.** The intensity of the contest for security will dictate permissiveness. Over time, increasing security will spread permissiveness. Where this exists, the military will expect to conduct only its core roles. In non-permissive areas, the military contribution may have to be wider in order to begin to demonstrate the potential effects and benefits of governance and potential development. Figure 2.3 uses the stabilisation model to illustrate the relationship between permissiveness and the military contribution.

212. The diagram shows how, in addition to establishing a robust security framework, the military may, in non-permissive circumstances, be required to

contribute to wider stabilisation tasks, although this is a contentious issue. It is important that every effort is made to get multi-agency support.² Where this is lacking, commanders need to be clear as to the potential benefits and risks of such activity.




Figure 2.3 – The Military Contribution to Stabilisation Tasks³

213. Where conditions preclude development, local measures to reinforce security effect may be possible through Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). For UK forces, the principal source of funding for this is the centrally funded Conflict Pool. US funding through the Commander's Emergency Response Programme (CERP) may also be available. Where possible, these short-term, high-impact projects should support longer-term development effort and be consistent with the needs and priorities of the local population and Stabilisation Unit guidelines.⁴

214. **Money for Security Effect.** Money may both enable and magnify the delivery of immediate security effects. In particular, money can be used for direct security

² Agency is defined as a 'distinct non-military body which has objectives that are broadly consistent with those of the campaign', i.e. World Bank or US AID. (See JDP 0-01.1 UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions)

³ Permissive, semi-permissive, and non-permissive should be seen as relative points on a continuum rather than absolute conditions. If the environment was entirely permissive the Joint Force would not be engaged at all.

⁴ Gordon, S. (2009) *Stabilisation Quick Impact Projects*, Stabilisation Unit, London, UK.

programmes such as the funding of indigenous forces, or indirect consent-winning initiatives such as the settling of specific grievances before they become sources of disaffection and resentment. The controls placed upon its use by accounting procedures should reflect the requirement for agility and risk, as with all Rules of Engagement. Existing targeting mechanisms⁵ can be easily adapted to make them more comprehensive in composition.

Establishing Human Security

215. Where the state lacks the capability or will to meet human security needs, individuals tend to transfer loyalty to any group that promises to meet those needs, including adversarial groups. These groups can exploit human insecurity by providing money, basic social services and a crude form of justice. Winning the contest for human security therefore, is fundamental to the development of host nation government authority and, ultimately security of the state.

216. Human security may include protection from deprivation and disease as well as protection from violence. Conflicts can generate large scale population movement which, in turn, can trigger a famine or an epidemic. On occasion military forces may need to provide emergency shelter, medical or food aid within the limits of their existing capacity. However, UK forces should only undertake humanitarian assistance in close consultation with the FCO and DFID, or with International Organisations working through these departments.

Security Force Capacity Building

217. Trained indigenous forces lower the profile of intervening actors, reinforce the security capacities of the state and help connect the government with its people. In contrast, sectarian or poorly disciplined forces may fuel the conflict. Failed states tend to have plentiful supplies of men, but lack administrative, technical, combat and service support capacity. The host nation government may require firm advice, as well as financial support, to develop and sustain the capabilities required. Building up indigenous security forces, both police and military, through training, mentoring, partnering and embedding requires different skills and force structures from conventional activities. This requires detailed planning at the force design stage and hard choices may have to be made between allocating UK troops for concurrent indigenous security force capacity-building and other security tasks. However, building up and training indigenous forces will be necessary to generate the force mass that ultimately will be required for success and transition.

218. Integrating host nation security forces into the campaign provides a vehicle for on the job training and mentoring. However, care should be taken to ensure that they

⁵ The process by which targets are selected and prioritised for engagement, either by fires, or through other military non-kinetic means.

are not over-faced before they are demonstrably capable. Joint enablers, such as joint fires, airborne surveillance and combat search and rescue, will be required to underpin the indigenous capability to conduct operations and will probably need to be provided by international forces.

219. The generation and subsequent training of indigenous security forces should be conducted in a coordinated manner with broader SSR initiatives (see below). These include the development of civilian oversight bodies, judiciary and detention institutions, as well as transitional justice mechanisms and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes.

Security Transitions

220. Once an acceptably secure environment is established and public order restored, the international military force commander should consider moving to an indigenous lead. This will be a political as well as security judgement. There are at least 2 options: transition from international forces to an indigenous military security lead; or transition direct to a civil (police) lead, i.e. police primacy. Police primacy should be the ultimate goal as it can bolster the perception of progress and reinforce the impression of hostile groups as criminals rather than freedom fighters. It demonstrates the host nation government's commitment to governing through the rule of law. However, police primacy will often be un-achievable until relatively late in the campaign and may even be an alien concept in some societies. Premature police primacy can be counter-productive.

Reform of the Security and Justice Sectors

221. The security and justice sectors deliver a fundamental function of government and are a cornerstone of state sovereignty. In addition to military forces, intelligence services, militia and police, the security sector includes: judicial and penal systems; oversight bodies; the Executive; parliamentary committees; government ministries; legislative frameworks; customary or traditional authorities; and financial and regulatory bodies. When functioning effectively the security and justice sectors contribute to a generally safe environment for the population. These sectors also contribute to wider regional security, for example through effective coastal and border protection.

222. For the stabilisation campaign to succeed, it will be essential to show progress towards a security sector that is effective, legitimate, transparent, just and subject to the rule of law. The UK contribution is likely to be determined by a team drawn from DFID, FCO, MOD and the Home Office, and may range from providing temporary training teams to rebuilding whole areas of defence and national security.




Figure 2.4 – The Security and Justice Sectors

223. **Military Tasks.** Likely military tasks include: the demilitarisation of society; reform of the defence ministry; and the initial generation and subsequent development of the armed forces. However, the military contribution may expand to include the initial development of indigenous policing and support to the promotion of judicial and law enforcement institutions. In some instances, UK military may need to rely on non-state security forces to support the campaign, such as private contractors. Parallel development of basic support structures for indigenous forces is essential. The operational capability of local indigenous forces is likely to reflect the quality of basic administration: pay, feeding and equipment husbandry. International training teams should establish the fundamentals of effective administration parallel to operational training, unless a conscious decision has been made to resource these functions as part of the operational design. A programme of education will also help to ensure that both the population and their new security forces understand their role and responsibilities. The programme should emphasise a culture of service to the people and an understanding of the relationship between the armed forces and the state.

224. **Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.** Significant armed groups or a disproportionately large military are likely to impact upon security. While some of these groups could be put to work on behalf of the state to generate mass and bolster local security, other groups will require inclusion in an arms management programme and their members will need to be re-trained and reintegrated back into civil society.

225. **Developing Indigenous Police Services.** The responsibility for on-going internal security should ideally be provided by a demilitarised police force with a mandate for law enforcement and strong links to the judiciary. Ideally, this sees the creation of a community-based police service, with a clear separation between the roles of the police and the military. However, while police primacy for internal

security remains an aspiration, community policing models assume a level of consent which is unlikely to be achievable in the midst of violent conflict. The policing model must be realistic. Coalition military forces may need to lead on police basic training, leaving specialist training, such as evidence handling and forensic investigation, to others who may be private contractors.

226. Other Security Sector Reform Tasks. In conjunction with OGDs, agencies and the host government, the UK military may be required to contribute to: the reform of host government ministries; restoration of judicial institutions; development of border security forces; intelligence services; and the provision of an enduring partnership with the host nation primarily through the Security Sector Development Advisory Team.⁶ As with earlier activity to provide a presence, advice and generate understanding, these soft power strategies can be highly effective, but in the interests of brevity are not covered in this Guide.

Countering Adversaries

227. Direct military action against adversaries is likely to be a central component of a stabilisation campaign in which the military are involved. In this case, setting the conditions for a negotiated political settlement will entail breaking the ideological, financial or intimidatory links both within and between different adversarial and belligerent groups, as well as between them and the broader population.

228. The Use of Force. Operations will be required to wrest the initiative from the insurgent. This will require the use of force, particularly where resistance comes from committed, irreconcilable and well organised adversaries. Such resistance may set up a fierce contest for the initiative, freedom of movement, authority, the provision of security and the popular support of the local people in areas of symbolic, political, economic and security significance. Failure to wrest the initiative can undermine the campaign fatally. Offensive air, land, maritime and special operations in a targeted, measured and highly discriminate manner, supported by the full range of comprehensive effects, will be needed. Such operations are likely to be designed to: decapitate adversarial command structures by killing or capturing key leaders; defeat adversarial armed groups where they hold something that has particular operational or political significance; disrupt or destroy adversarial offensive, support, and propaganda capabilities; and deny adversarial groups safe havens from where they may launch attacks or challenge legitimate governance.

229. Offensive operations should minimise civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. If not, they risk undermining the broader influence effort. An operation that kills 5 low-level adversaries is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the

⁶ The Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT) is HMG's provider of choice for advice and operational expertise on security sector reform. It comprises a staff of 13 drawn from FCO, DFID and MOD, and is located in DFID's head office in London.

recruitment of 50 more. Sometimes the more force used, the less effective it is. The dilemma is that adversaries will often choose to fight amongst the people for just this reason. Since a contest of force should play to our advantage, creating the opportunity to use force decisively and minimise collateral risk will be a key challenge.

230. There is a risk that operations to secure an area simply displace an adversary to a new safe haven beyond the commander's control. If this happens, they can regroup, possibly gaining strength, and strike where the host government and international forces and agencies are less able to respond. An alternative may be to isolate adversarial groups, seek to gain information and disrupt their activities. In some circumstances it may be better not to strike but to gather intelligence for later decisive actions, including accommodation.

231. **The Use of Detention.** Arrest, detention, trial and imprisonment will ideally be conducted by the host nation judicial system. However, as will often be the case, when the host nation government lacks an effective police force, an independent judiciary or a penal system with the capacity or resolve to be effective, it may be necessary for the UK to conduct military detention operations. A well-coordinated screening and interrogation mechanism can have the added bonus of providing a valuable source of actionable intelligence and a direct channel to the adversary. This, in turn, enables more precise targeting and stimulates the perception of progress, restraint and legitimacy.⁷

SECTION IV – LEGITIMACY

Legal Requirements

232. Strict adherence to the fundamental principles of the Laws of Armed Conflict (military necessity, humanity, distinction (or discrimination) and proportionality⁸) is essential to promote legitimacy in stabilisation campaigns. There may also be good political or military reasons for exercising a greater degree of self-restraint in the use of force than is legally required.

233. **Corruption.** Corruption takes many forms. For example, it can be a factor in local procurement, to bribes being demanded on the street for safe passage or security, and to non-meritocratic awards of jobs. The military's very presence can change the situation in unforeseen ways and provide opportunities for corruption in the local community. Citizens have a pragmatic sense of what is corrupt and what is culturally acceptable. Where corruption on a grand scale is occurring under the cover of the security provided by our forces, the military commander will need to make it clear to the host government that our *cultural norms* are being flouted.

⁷ JDP 1-10 *Prisoners of War, Internees and Detainees* provides guidance and is currently under revision.

⁸ See Chapter 5 Joint Service Publication (JSP) 383 for a more detailed discussion.

234. **The Mandate.** The mandate provides the legal framework to conduct operations. It also provides direction on freedom of action and constraints. The commander may find it helpful to list the activities that he intends to conduct and consider whether the mandate he has to operate under supports them. Where it does not, he should seek amendments to ensure that it provides him with the maximum freedom of action, while limiting that of the adversary.

235. **Status of the Force.** It is key to establish the legal responsibility for the force and ensure rapid, transparent measures are in place to deal with adverse incidents. Any perception that international forces are above the law and can act with impunity will erode legitimacy, both in the eyes of the host nation and the international community, and promote the wrong attitude amongst troops in theatre. Thus the legal status of coalition forces and relationships with indigenous military and police forces and the host nation legal system is vital and must be clearly established, at all levels from governmental to tactical. Recognition of where primacy in law enforcement rests is critical, as is an understanding of the local legal system. Wherever possible, UK actions must support the host nation rule of law and legal system. UK support should be conditional upon adherence to accepted norms and encourage the host nation to abide by and enforce its international obligations. For example, the UK would be unable to support any legal system that condones the use of torture.⁹

The Authority of the Host Government

236. The use of the military instrument in support of the host government, or to help establish one, should be conditional. In order to alter the conflict relationship in favour of the host government, that government must establish and sustain authority and legitimacy. This authority – sometimes referred to as *Campaign Authority* – is dependent upon the successful amalgamation and interplay of 4 factors:¹⁰

- a. **Mandate.** The perceived legitimacy of the mandate that establishes a state authority, whether through the principles of universal suffrage, or a recognised and accepted caste/tribal model.
- b. **Manner.** The perceived legitimacy of the way in which those exercising the mandate conduct themselves, both individually and collectively.
- c. **Consent.** The extent to which factions, local populations and others consent to, comply with, or resist the authority of those exercising the mandate. Consent, or its absence, may range from active resistance, through unwilling compliance, to freely given support.

⁹ *The Convention against Torture and Other Cruelty, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), Article 1(1).*

¹⁰ See also JDP 3-50 *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (2nd Edition), dated June 2004, page 214.

- d. **Expectations.** The extent to which the expectations and aspirations of factions, local populations and others are managed or are met by those exercising the mandate.

SECTION V – APPLYING INFLUENCE

237. All activity, military and civilian, kinetic or non-kinetic has an influence. Whether it is a conversation held by a military patrol with the local population, a 500lb bomb dropped from an aircraft, or a specifically funded QIP, all have an influence on the population. Through a sound understanding of target audiences, activity should be focused to achieve the desired influence. Military action should be assessed by its contribution toward influencing the key conflict relationship and shaping the eventual political settlement.

238. The desired outcome of cross-government activities is to change or maintain the character or behaviour of agreed audiences through physical and psychological means. All multi-agency capabilities can contribute to this process. To achieve the desired outcome, activities need to be coordinated and focused. Psychological effects on specific target audiences, rather than physical attacks on capability, are likely to be the lasting and decisive elements in stabilisation. But this is not easy. Human beings are neither benign nor passive; they will respond to influence in different ways. The inherent risk is that we cannot control how actions, words and images are received and processed. But good analysis and understanding will mitigate this risk.

239. Misunderstanding can lead to mistrust and increased tension. Foreign Area Officers¹¹ (FAOs), deployed cultural advisers and locally employed civilians can provide invaluable advice and the skills to decode and understand cultural nuance. Messages delivered by foreign spokesmen typically lack credibility and, regardless of content, are not as well received as those from familiar, trusted sources. International forces should seek to use established channels for messaging. Where these are absent or insufficient, they will need to build relationships with key leaders and the population in order to establish viable channels.

240. Influence is achieved when we change the behaviour of the target audience through the coordination of all military actions, words and images. It is not just about messages or media, but about how the combination of the word and the deed are portrayed, interpreted and understood by audiences through a lens of their own culture, history, religion and tradition. Influence is challenging, requiring subtle understanding of target audiences that is difficult to achieve. It will be contested with adversaries who may have a significant cultural advantage.

¹¹ The US Defense Intelligence Agency deploys a cadre of long service FAOs to provide a pool of contextual understanding and to enable partnership and capacity-building operations.

241. Adversaries usually have a comparative advantage over intervening forces and agencies because they share religion, ethnicity, culture, history and geography with the people. Even in Northern Ireland where UK forces shared a common language and ethnicity (allowing every member of a foot patrol to read the graffiti, talk and listen to the population) the culture of the Republican movement was still not well understood. This is made much harder where we do not share a language and all communication with the population has to be conducted through an interpreter.

Narratives

242. The narrative seeks to explain the actions of the main protagonists. The military will use a narrative to explain the purpose of their presence in theatre and develop an appropriate narrative for each audience. The narratives that resonate best are those which embrace the concepts and language of target audiences, known as the *stickiness* of the message. International forces should all understand the narrative of their activities. All actions should be planned and executed to support this narrative, and not the other way around.

243. Narratives should be flexible so that they are not undermined by local messages designed to respond to contemporaneous events. They should also be consistent with both the cross-government Information Strategy, any strategic communication strategy and, where possible, narratives of the host government. Strategic level narratives set out broad themes which are reinforced by tailored, flexible local messages, creating a hierarchy of related messages. They should be: clear, credible and explain the campaign; acceptable to all intervening parties and the host government; linked to the UK's political objectives; support local messaging; able to be backed up by coherent physical activity and imagery; and have a positive impact on a variety of target audiences. They must also be realistic and chime with peoples' expectations. It will be better to under-promise and over-deliver, than over-promise and be seen to fail.

Military Influence Tools

244. The military will establish the effects necessary to exert influence, then derive the activities required to realise those effects, and subsequently orchestrate them during execution. Activities will be brigaded by type and all capabilities and types of activity are considered and, where appropriate, employed to realise both physical and psychological effects in the most efficient and effective manner, although such effects are not mutually exclusive. Fires and manoeuvre, for example, clearly achieve psychological, as well as physical effects. Additionally, the military has a range of non-lethal tools specifically tailored to manage perceptions of information once received. These include: Information Operations; Media Operations; Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC); and Operations Security. During planning they should be fused into an approach that is coherent with both fires and manoeuvre.

SECTION VI – FRAMEWORK FOR STABILISATION ACTIVITY

245. Chapter 1 lays out a model for stabilisation based on: security; economic and infrastructure development; and governance and rule of law. All 3 elements contribute towards achieving an appropriate political settlement. When trying to describe how the campaign should progress, it is useful to have a framework to describe activity. In stabilisation, the framework must provide a shared lexicon for the multi-agency community. The commander and his civilian counterparts should be able to use it to articulate to the key elements of the plan, what is to be conducted, where and by whom. In this sense it helps to *operationalise* the plan.

246. Although a number of frameworks already exist: Clear – Hold – Build;¹² Shape – Secure – Develop;¹³ Understand – Shape – Secure – Hold – Build,¹⁴ the precise framework is less important than the integrated approach and shared understanding derived from it. UK Joint doctrine describes a framework for stabilisation activity of:

<p style="text-align: center;"> Shape Secure Hold Develop </p>

247. This builds on proven COIN theories and enables closer conceptual linkage to governance and development of capacity. It has an obvious and necessary relationship to the US approach of Clear-Hold-Build, but reflects the importance the UK place on *Shape* in order to develop both understanding and plans as well as cueing civilian agency support for subsequent *Develop* activity. *Secure* is used to reflect a focus on the population rather than just terrain or enemy. *Hold* seeks to highlight the critical transition from military-led security to civilian-led development and articulates the risk in this period of consolidation and transition. *Develop* is used because it describes more intuitively the development of capacity, primarily by civilians. Security progress should be seen not just as a sequential series of steps into whose footprints civil actors can move, but rather as the creation of conditions and windows of opportunity through which others must be ready to move, to exploit and develop campaign momentum.

¹² The most demanding of 3 approaches to counter-insurgency described in the US Army and US Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24.

¹³ See Chapter 4 of AFM Volume 1, Part 10 *Countering Insurgency*, dated January 2010.

¹⁴ Used by ISAF in Afghanistan: Julian Alford and Scott Cuomo, *Operational Design for ISAF in Afghanistan, A Primer*, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 53, 2nd Quarter 2009.




Figure 2.5 – An Illustrative Campaign Progression Showing Changes of Emphasis

248. A key in stabilisation is aligning military and civil effort so that neither is wasted. A large military force will require a large civilian effort to conduct development. CIMIC effort under *Shape-Secure-Hold* will not be sufficient. The purpose of the military contribution is to set the security conditions for cross-sector exploitation with the necessary momentum. Where the civilian force is missing or lacks momentum, there can be little or no *Develop* and the strategic initiative will swing back to the adversary. In this case, a new plan will be required.

249. The apparently sequential articulation of the framework – *Shape, Secure, Hold, Develop* – must not be confused with its application and execution. At theatre level it is definitely not a sequential process. There is overlap and concurrency, as Figure 2.5 illustrates. The higher the level of the operation at which the activity is being described, the more concurrency and overlap there is likely to be. The framework provides for a span of activity to enable a comprehensive approach in which, at any one given moment, one or all of its components may be enacted. To do otherwise would be to cede space, time and ultimately the initiative to the adversary. There are a number of constants that run throughout the campaign, such as engagement, analysis, assessment and an aim towards transition, most probably through numerous lesser transitions in discrete areas. Most importantly of all, influence is the overarching outcome that all the elements of a stabilisation campaign will seek to achieve. The framework can be described as sitting within a sphere of influence that is the net effect which security, governance and development activity seek to deliver together.

Shape - Secure - Hold - Develop as a Framework for Stabilisation Activity

250. **Shape.** *Shape* starts the process of understanding the problem and sets the conditions for subsequent activity. Drawing upon all the expertise and contacts created during earlier engagement, *Shape* is where multi-agency planning begins. *Shape* activity initiates the contest for security with the adversary. The aim is to build a coalition for joining up security, governance and development activity, and to design a military force that is complemented by an appropriate weight of civilian effort. It envisages wide engagement with multi-agency actors in order to shape and influence them, and in turn to influence and shape its own plans. It includes offensive operations such as raids and special forces strike operations, designed to disrupt the enemy, denying him safe havens and gaining intelligence. Elements of *Shape* (liaison and key leadership engagement, for example) continue throughout the campaign. At the strategic level it will define objectives and secure resources; at the operational level it will achieve comprehensive campaign design. At the tactical level it will improve understanding and help build local governance structures to meet the needs of the population.



Shape - Linking tactical key leader engagement to strategic engagement. This 2007 Iraq image shows the Commanding Officer of a US Battalion alongside a former insurgent commander of a *Concerned Local Citizens* group (orange vest) with whom he has come to an accommodation to help *Hold* the local area. The local commander is briefing a senior Iraqi Government adviser, escorted by a UK major general, in a coalition bid to build confidence and reconnect the local citizens with the central Government and to facilitate *Develop*.

251. **Secure.** *Secure* describes activity to deliver security in a defined area. It is focused on the population, but it may also include the securing of the UK's own lines of communication and vital infrastructure. As international forces may be deployed after the campaign has reached a critical point, adversaries may have identified key terrain and vital ground, such as the national capital. This will be a priority for early *Secure* activity. In operations where there is an insurgency, security forces will need to neutralise and isolate insurgents and irregulars in order to create the space and conditions for *Hold* and *Develop* activity. *Secure* is the point at which the adversary is confronted throughout his depth and made to fail, where international forces seize the security initiative in order to deliver enduring security to the local population. Violence should be expected to spike as adversaries fight to protect their footholds. Both military force and civilian comprehensive measures need to be fused to support the commander in his task of isolating the adversary from popular support. Resources (both military and inter-agency) will invariably be a constraint on concurrency – in Iraq in 2004/5 the tempo of security operations was limited by the availability of American funding for rebuilding homes damaged in battle. At this stage there may be little opportunity for major development initiatives due to a lack of permissiveness, however money can be used successfully to enhance persistent security effect.

252. **Hold.** After securing an area it will usually be necessary to *Hold* it. Failure to do so may impact the ability to maintain the initiative. Operational design should match the aspirations to *Secure* with the availability of forces to *Hold*. This necessitates close coordination between offensive operations and SSR strands of the campaign plan. It is possible that discrete military activity will be required to *Hold* only temporarily, for instance to buy time and space for other activity, but this is likely to be rare. *Hold* is the critical point at which OGDs, International Organisations and Non-governmental Organisations begin to invest significant effort in a semi-permissive environment, and is the point at which the emphasis of being the *supported* element shifts from the military to the civilian organisations. Typically, it is also at this point where indigenous forces deploy in greater strength in order to provide security, perhaps raising non-standard security forces (village militias etc) and generate the mass necessary for progress towards transition. Additionally, it is at this stage the rule of law is restored and the government is physically re-connected to its population via local elections and visits by ministers. This will create the vital links necessary between the people and their legitimate government. The adversary is likely to be investing his resources in protecting critical areas and his networks. Simultaneously, he may adapt to discredit and undermine progress, for example, through intimidation and mass-casualty terrorist attacks. Indigenous forces will need sufficient training and capability to carry out the security tasks, thereby releasing international forces to move on to *Secure* elsewhere. *Hold* is an act of tangible commitment that should start to inculcate in the population a sense of hope based upon demonstrable progress. This confidence should be apparent through increasing intelligence tips. Engagement with reconcilable adversaries should be sought from a

position of advantage, and this may be the moment to exploit discreet links generated through *Shape* to fracture the opposition and bring them into the process to achieve a political settlement.

253. **Develop.** The term *Develop*, rather than ‘build’ is used because it focuses on the wider aspects of capacity building, rather than on infrastructure alone. This activity includes investment and the development of governance structures and functions such as customs and excise, the legislature and the judiciary. Its benefits will usually be delivered by civilian actors operating within an increasingly permissive environment. The security initiative, now gained, must be consolidated and further strengthened during *Develop*. It is for this reason that *Hold* without being ready to *Develop* risks dislocating the campaign.



Technical cooperation between civilian and military organisations will not be sufficient. An integrated approach is required. This does not always mean integrated staffs, but it does mean integrated thought. Military planning models are likely to provide a framework for interagency planning effort. The aim must be a comprehensive plan, not a military plan that acts comprehensively. The critical requirement for success is not the planning process, but the shared understanding, vision, commitment and contribution of civilian and military partners.

CHAPTER 3 – STABILISATION PLANNING AND CAMPAIGN MANAGEMENT

Introduction

301. In this chapter the requirement for integrated planning is explained and some potential models and guidance discussed. Specific military considerations for campaign management such as the design, generation, integration and preparation of the force are explored. The use of intelligence and the analysis of adversaries is examined, particularly with a view to using influence to move groups and their elites within the conflict relationship. Finally, the chapter looks at the requirement for assessment (known by some civilians as evaluation) and the need for the force to anticipate, learn and adapt.

SECTION I – INTEGRATED PLANNING

302. A winning military strategy hinges on the successful union of ends (outcomes and objectives), ways (the paths to them) and means (resources, which includes time).¹ A successful strategy for stabilisation will require the means to be weighted. As the campaign develops, so weight of effort will shift between the instruments of power. Resources will be multinational and interagency, and should be brought to bear at the right time and sequence and in the right place. The management of this is made more difficult in stabilisation because *effects* within a comprehensive approach occur at different rates.

303. Planning will be conducted at all levels and in different locations. There will be a profusion of plans which, while linked, will rarely form a neat hierarchy. There can only be, however, one *campaign plan*. At the point of production of this Guide, the UK approach to cross-government, *comprehensive* planning is evolving. The Stabilisation Unit *Guidance on Strategic Planning and Execution* seeks to formalise a cross-government process, but it is not yet endorsed across Whitehall. Previous attempts at cross-government planning have failed to be truly comprehensive and resulted in a broad government strategy and a number of departmental plans beneath it. Even where attempts by the FCO, DFID and MOD have been made to join up an approach, such as the Helmand Road Map, the plan has arguably failed to take full account of the direction of the Alliance campaign plan which sets the higher theatre direction; multi-nationality brings its own challenges of followership and cooperation.

304. There is currently no universal template for collaborative planning at the operational or theatre level. Existing models described in Joint doctrine suggest several variations in inter-departmental collaboration. Three illustrative scenarios are

¹ See JDP 01 (2nd Edition) *Campaigning*, paragraphs 216 and 321.

described in which the military either acts: first alone (Model A); second in loose cooperation with national agencies as part of a multi-agency operation (Model B); or finally with close inter-agency collaboration under a unified cross-government strategy (Figure 3.1, Model C). However, in complex stabilisation tasks, not even Model C goes far enough in ensuring that the theatre campaign plan is knitted into the cross-government strategy and supports Other Government Departments' (OGDs') plans. As a result, an additional Model D is offered. This envisages a theatre integrated campaign plan which provides for the operational level design and campaign management of a complex stabilisation task that includes a challenging level of insecurity.²




Figure 3.1 – Models of Comprehensive Planning at the Operational Level

305. This approach, however, may not be appropriate in a multinational coalition operation such as Iraq or Afghanistan, where a coalition authority (i.e. NATO) will design and own the campaign plan. In this case, it is the coalition's campaign plan that provides for the operational level design and campaign management of the complex stabilisation task, including the theatre-integration of national and multi-agency activity.³ Complementary to it, the UK might choose to develop its own sub-theatre national plan to articulate the national critical path; the Helmand Plan is an example. Whatever its form or name, the purpose of a theatre integrated campaign plan is to articulate how strategic objectives can be achieved through a combination of tactical military, governance and development activity; the *ways*. Its golden thread is the

² In spite of the introduction of an additional model and a single, theatre-integrated campaign plan in JDP 3-40, the campaign planning guidance and planning tools described in JDP 5-00 *Campaign Planning* remain valid and authoritative, even if they require some adaptation and judgement in their application to stabilisation.

³ Although led by a single nation, the US' planners Joint Campaign Plan, notably the General Petraeus – Ambassador Crocker Plan in Iraq in 2007, is an example of a theatre integrated campaign plan.

coordination, cooperation and, where appropriate, integration of the political, diplomatic, economic and military instruments.

SECTION II – UK STABILISATION PLANNING

306. In the absence of a cross-government planning process, the normal Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) process can provide a framework for inter-agency planning. The Stabilisation Unit along with MOD facilitate planning, but the Cabinet Office will own the plan, or at least approve it. MOD, OGDs and agencies contribute to it as part of an inclusive process. The output should be a single comprehensive plan, rather than a number of departmental plans that act comprehensively.

UK Stabilisation Planning

307. **Leadership.** The Stabilisation Unit *Guidance on Strategic Planning and Execution* proposes that where a significant military contribution is required, the Cabinet Office will take the lead in initiating planning. The Stabilisation Unit will provide advice and expertise on how to coordinate cross-government planning, but it has no executive authority nor owns any plans. Instead, the plan should be owned by the Cabinet Office, although its lack of resources compared to its many responsibilities may lead it to delegate day to day ownership to the FCO or MOD. Planning and management structures should aim as close as is possible for integration and unity of command, although this is challenging and unity of purpose and effort may be all that is achievable. Planning teams should collocate, in spite of the limited numbers of desk officers available from the FCO and DFID. Structures will need to be adapted as the situation changes.

308. **Outputs.** The highest level output of cross-government planning should be a *Stabilisation Plan*. This should comprise a common analysis, common strategic aims and objectives, departmental targets and a sequence and priority of activity. It will describe a critical path through the numerous tasks that different government departments, including MOD, need to undertake. It does not replace any single departmental planning process, but is designed to achieve integration and coherence at the strategic and operational levels. In a coalition or Alliance operation, the Stabilisation Plan should reflect coalition or Alliance objectives, not purely national ones. Ideally it should be nested within an integrated plan for the theatre. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2. There should only be one Theatre Campaign Plan which will be either an Allied or coalition plan, or a national plan on the rare occasions we are conducting a national operation.

309. **Coalition Campaigns.** The UK strategic aim and objectives will both shape and be shaped by the international view. National departmental plans should be integrated and these must be consistent with integrated multinational plans if we are to

achieve unity of effort. Ideally, planning teams should be collocated, but at the start of operational planning this may be unrealistic. However, as the campaign matures and develops authority, the UK should look to disaggregate national planning to better support and draw upon coalition in-theatre planning.




Figure 3.2 – Her Majesty’s Government Planning Process

310. **Planning Initiation and Coordination.** Cabinet Office will initiate planning where significant contributions are required from more than one department, otherwise it will usually be the FCO. In Whitehall, a steering group of key government departments will direct a Strategic Planning Team comprising representatives of the FCO, DFID’s Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE), MOD, Cabinet Office, Stabilisation Unit and others as required. This should include input from FCO, DFID and MOD in-country teams. The role of this Strategic Planning Team is to: propose a strategic aim; agree a common analysis of the problem; identify

stabilisation objectives, their priority and sequencing; and identify lead responsibilities as well as measure and report success against the strategic plan. The steering group will agree the aim, objectives and responsibilities, and are accountable to Ministers for the delivery of the plan. The single strategic aim will be a compromise between political ambition, resources and susceptibility of the problem to solutions. It is likely to identify an end-point several years in the future. The Strategic Planning Team may use the framework of a Joint Stabilisation Assessment (JSA) to conduct its analysis. This is shown in Figure 3.3.




Figure 3.3 – Cross Government Strategic Planning: Joint Stabilisation Assessment

311. **Strategic Objectives, Outputs and Tasks.** In a similar methodology to military campaign planning, the strategic aim will be broken down into lines of outcome. These identify dependencies and priorities, but there is no set format. Typically, but not exclusively, lines of outcome may be established for security, economic, social development, governance and strategic communications. Strategic objectives are set for these outcomes and a critical path derived in order to sequence and prioritise them. An Operational Planning Team may be formed to derive stabilisation outputs and tasks, and to manage and measure success of the plan at the operational level. It will deploy into theatre and either integrate fully into the J5 element of the military headquarters, or where there is only limited military

involvement, into an Embassy or DFID Office. The planning cycle from initiation to operational management may look like Figure 3.4. The cycle should be re-visited during strategic reviews.




Figure 3.4 - Stabilisation Planning Cycle

Campaign Planning Guidance

312. **Purpose.** The purpose of a campaign plan is to develop, synchronise and sequence all the lines of military, political, economic and development activity necessary to achieve strategic objectives. It should be as broad as possible, taking into account factors such as the influence from neighbouring states, culture, religion, history and politics. The planning team should be drawn from a broad spectrum also. It should include military, government, academics, regional experts, business, partner nations and alliance members amongst others.

313. **Output.** The output from the campaign plan should be a framework from which other work flows and from which clear missions and tasks can be easily derived. The key *takeaways* should be a few big ideas that set the tone for subsequent

operations and activities. Having provided context for the conduct of future work, the campaign plan should designate effect or time based leads for subordinate tasks; for example, security sector reform, anti-narcotics, agricultural reform and infrastructure development. Since the cross-government strategy looks out to a strategic aim that may be several years away, a theatre integrated campaign plan may need to set a lesser horizon. A 6-month period is probably appropriate.

314. **Campaign Review.** While progress towards objectives will require monitoring, a full campaign review should only be conducted once a suitable time period has elapsed. This in-depth review of the plan should only occur at major intersections; for example, where there has been a recognisable shift in the strategic geometry and the future direction of the whole campaign needs further refinement. Reviews carried out too frequently may not reflect the real effects of activity and could skew the overall direction of the campaign. Progress checks, however, should be carried out at regular intervals – every 6 weeks is the battle rhythm commonly adopted in US headquarters.

315. **Influence and Strategic Communication.** One of the most important outputs of planning is a shared and agreed understanding of how activity will exert influence. Specifically, planning must identify the principal tenets of the UK narrative and establish how strategic communication, narrative and influence will be stitched together with objectives, outputs, activity and risks. Influence should become the guiding reference point for activity, and strategic communication should set out clearly and simply the narrative. It explains the stabilisation mission, the purpose and role of its participants and is aimed at supporting the operational and tactical activities undertaken by the deployed forces. Influence and strategic communication must also be capable of dynamic adjustment since the effects sought will not just happen. They will only be realised through constant effort and refinement of the means.

Setting the Parameters – Kitson’s Box

316. Kitson provides additional guidance for the conduct of a campaign. He conceived 4 parameters which formed a generic *frame*⁴ or box within which operations could be successfully conducted. By working within this box, a government and its supporting allies should be able to use force successfully in support of stabilisation objectives, without damaging their position; *generating a freedom to operate*. While not excluding the possibility of operating outside of the box, Kitson suggested that by doing so, it would be ‘*highly probable that the use of force will do more harm than good.*’⁵ This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 3.5.

⁴ Kitson, *Bunch of Five*. Faber & Faber Ltd. (1997) page 284.

⁵ Kitson, *Practical Aspects of Counter-insurgency*, Kermit Roosevelt Lecture delivered May 1981, Upavon: Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell: Annex A to DCinC 8109 dated 11 June 1981, page 5.




Figure 3.5 – The Parameters of the Freedom to Operate: *Kitson's Box*

SECTION III – CAMPAIGN MANAGEMENT

Force Design

317. Currently, western standing military forces are optimised for state-on-state industrial warfare. As a consequence, at the start of any stabilisation campaign it is likely that the force will have to be adjusted and new capabilities created. This is in contrast to conventional warfare where force packages are assembled from already-trained force elements held at readiness. Commanders and staff will find that the levels of command become blurred. Tactical and operational commanders may find themselves pulled upwards by virtue of the inherently political nature of the problem, and the need to coordinate the military, diplomatic and economic instruments.

318. Force design will effect how military activity is conducted and may trigger changes in individual and unit roles. These changes will only deliver the operational effect sought if the force design is right. If the initial deployment of the force is on the basis of a contingent intervention operation which then transitions to a stabilisation campaign (e.g. Iraq 2003 – 2004), then the force may have to adapt its approach, structures, equipment, and composition in contact. Equally, since the operational context will evolve, so the security force will need to adapt; force design and force adaptation are separate, but linked activities.

Force Integration

319. The military force will need to contain a combination of: framework forces to conduct the bulk of the security operations (primarily population and infrastructure security); strike forces against high-value targets or to disrupt safe-havens; surge forces to reinforce a specific activity or effect, such as elections; capacity-building forces such as Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs); special forces for strategic level intelligence and strike operations; and Joint enablers including Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) or specific focus task forces such as Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED).

320. Since stabilisation activity is likely to take place within a state with weak or inadequate infrastructure, this complicates logistics. It also places greater demand on the planning process since logistic decisions, such as basing, will have an impact on the military freedom of action. The logistic architecture will be shaped by a wide variety of factors that may be outside of military control. Some issues, (for example clearances for over-flights, basing issues and access to port facilities), will require considerable cross-government effort to resolve and will be complicated by host nation factors. Once decisions in these areas have been made, they are difficult to reverse and can prove very costly to change later on. Early logistic decisions will have a long-lasting impact on the campaign, the structure of the force and the conduct of operations.

Integrated Headquarters

321. Headquarters structures are likely to require adjustment. As a minimum headquarters will need to integrate a number of liaison officers, multi-agency partners, and advisers such as Stabilisation or Cultural Advisers. There is likely to be an increased emphasis on J5 and J3/5, and the tempo of staff activity is likely to be reduced since military activity will need to be synchronised with governance and development effort which takes time to develop and assess. In areas of limited permissiveness, military headquarters may need to host other government departments and agencies. The aim must be to promote coherence across civil and military activity, but it is worth noting that there is unlikely to be a civilian organisation that matches up with a military divisional headquarters.⁶ Full integration may only to be necessary in the most complex of tasks, and even then may be difficult to achieve. Exchanging empowered planning staff or simply collocating headquarters are viable alternatives in less demanding scenarios. The guiding mantra for headquarters design should be ‘form follows function’. This requirement drives the trend towards larger and better

⁶ This is because civilian organisations tend to plug in at the theatre (strategic/operational) or local (tactical) levels, and because civilian organisations tend not to adopt such hierarchical or manpower-heavy structures as the military, nor do they control such as wide span of activity.

integrated planning branches (notably J2, J5, J35 and J9),⁷ whose precise composition needs to reflect their expanded responsibilities and which will change shape over time.

Force Preparation

322. Force preparation must not become separated from the operational environment; it must replicate the complexity and challenges of it. The demands of the operational environment and the growing range, reach and adaptability of adversaries requires an agile, adaptive approach. Anticipation and learning is necessary to prepare and adapt the force accordingly – conceptually, physically and morally – in order to identify and respond to emerging threats, and to exploit opportunities.

323. Force Preparation will need to include tailored individual, collective and mission-specific preparation. It will need to establish the culture and mindset within a force for the stabilisation and security task. Mechanisms will need to be developed and institutionalised for planning and executing comprehensive activity. Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) need to be inculcated across the range of military operations which will require an agile *Lessons* organisations with good connectivity and understanding between the operational theatre and the UK.

324. Training should be conducted as forces operate. This will require units to train with a wide range of military, civilian and multinational capabilities. It may therefore challenge traditional models of force generation where Joint and multinational preparation is reserved for the final stages only. Training and exercises should also replicate the complexity, intensity and scale that can be expected on operations. Finally, training should develop familiarity and proficiency in operating with coalition forces, resulting, as far as possible, in cultural understanding, interoperability and procedural alignment⁸ to develop the cohesion required.

SECTION IV – INTELLIGENCE, ADVERSARIES AND GROUPS

325. Stabilisation demands of the J2 community a far wider span of expertise than conventional operations. Military intelligence has traditionally focused on analysis, based upon doctrinal models and equipment capability; for example, where and when a tank regiment may cross a river. In stabilisation, understanding is about unique human dimensions. A J2 is as likely to be required to advise on the intricacies of applied sociology or economics as on the adversary Order of Battle. This is the expanded *terrain* pertinent to stabilisation.

⁷ Military Staff functions are categorised J1, J2 etc through to J9. J2 is Intelligence; J3 is Current Operations, J5 is Future Plans, and their amalgam J35 is Current Plans; J9 is Civil-Military (CIMIC) activity.

⁸ Through the appropriate alignment of Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), which will be practised during Joint Training.

Developing Understanding

326. The natural dynamic in warfighting is to acquire targeting intelligence to engage and defeat the enemy through faster decision-action cycles. The ISTAR effort is synchronised by the J3, which by definition, is focused on the current battle. However, in these operations it is necessary to shift the balance between collection effort for immediate targeting and that for longer-term intelligence to develop understanding. Understanding is the accurate interpretation of a particular situation, and the likely reaction of groups or individuals within it. It ensures that timely, appropriate measures are developed to influence competing elites and the wider population. Understanding is derived from continuous analysis and engagement with the decisive actors; it requires a progression through shared knowledge and awareness, and an intuitive feel for the behaviour of local individuals and groups; J2 continuity is crucial. Intelligence staff and others in key appointments must become immersed in the theatre. Good understanding and decision-making in stabilisation require both *proximity* and *duration*.

327. In stabilisation, commanders should assume that they will deploy with an incomplete understanding of the situation. In order to develop timely knowledge, awareness and understanding, intelligence structures (and networks between intelligence communities) need to be established early. Important insights can be gained by establishing strong channels to multinational partners, OGDs, International Organisations, possibly some Non-governmental Organisations and from open source material.

A Single Intelligence Environment

328. Intelligence should be available to those who need it, in usable form. This makes the centralised coordination of collection and processing resources and the sharing of intelligence through a single intelligence environment vital. Accessibility must be a characteristic of intelligence and any tendency to over-classify or compartmentalise intelligence product must be addressed. However, military commanders will need to ensure that trust with intelligence agencies is maintained. The intelligence community is one based on norms that emphasise trust and discretion; a balance must be struck between the *need to know* and *the need to share*.

Understanding Adversaries

329. Describing adversaries is difficult. Different terms and definitions are used for insurgents, irregulars, terrorists and criminals. Furthermore, different nations and organisations derive different meanings from these terms depending on the context. Understanding the motivation of adversaries in a particular operational context is a prerequisite to designing measures to counter them. Military action to counter

adversarial groups is usually required when normal law enforcement agencies cannot contain the level of routine violence.

330. Numerous adversarial groups can affect the campaign simultaneously. They may come from diverse states and ethnic groups, and include foreign fighters and warlords. In most cases, adversarial groups will pursue specific objectives, be they economic or political. Groups mobilise, unify and define themselves around an aim or goal. This will shape the organisational structure and approach that the organisation adopts to both politics and the use of violence. It can be helpful to categorise adversarial groups although it is not always straightforward to do so. Four broad categories may be identified:

- a. **Indigenous Insurgents.** Indigenous insurgents' groups require popular support and are probably nationalist. They are usually motivated to gain some state control and are therefore often amenable to reconciliation or accommodation.
- b. **Global Insurgents.** Global insurgents exploit conflict for wider political purpose. Their aim is typically regional autonomy or the destruction of an existing political order; reconciliation is unlikely.
- c. **Local Power Brokers.** Local power brokers may be tribal or criminal. Their aim is usually to maintain local autonomy and their power base. They can be exploited by insurgent groups.
- d. **Adversarial Opportunists.** Adversarial opportunists are arms dealers, pirates, people traffickers and narco-criminals motivated by greed and criminal activity. The absence of effective rule of law allows them to flourish.

331. Adversaries will usually be motivated by a clear cause that they will use to mobilise support based on grievances or unresolved contradictions with the host nation government. They will use a compelling narrative to justify their actions, while simultaneously depicting the motivations and behaviours of their opponents as illegitimate. In addition to a cause, they are likely to have the following critical requirements: figurehead, such as Osama bin Laden; leadership to exert control; freedom of movement through consent or an ability to blend in with the local population; recruits; safe havens, in order to rest and train; logistic support including arms, ammunition and food; intelligence; and finance.

Applying Pressure to Adversarial Groups

332. Pressure can be applied to adversarial groups through the focused and systematic application of intelligence assets and the refinement of tasking and analysis. The paranoia that successful intelligence and wider operations induce in adversarial groups can be advantageous. Not only may it reduce their freedom of

manoeuvre and cause paralysis; it can have destructive effects within their organisations. It can cause them to increase intimidation on the population (thus losing them support) or create panic that forces them to take greater risks, exposing them to further security force action. However, direct action may have unintended consequences to wider intelligence operations or cause the groups to mutate into something more dangerous.

Focusing on Political Analysis

333. A detailed political and social analysis should identify the decisive social groups and the source of their political authority, their interactions – including their political alliances – interdependencies and rivalries, and the critical economic and political resources over which these groups compete and cooperate. No social group exists in isolation. All are affected by their interaction and competition with other groups; they are likely to be mutually interdependent and reactive. This is what is meant by a *conflict eco-system*. As a result of globalisation, this eco-system may have wider regional and even international consequences.

334. Western culture is heavily individualist and tends to emphasise the propensity for individual, rational decision making. In other cultures, the group identities may be shaped by shared objectives or tribal links. Identifying the decisive groups and their identities, and then persuading them to support the government through focused influence campaigns may be more effective than killing and capturing adversaries.

335. Social groups constitute a network of networks. The different strategies and aims of each group affect the others. The military may attempt to map the geography of the social and political network, identifying the relations between groups and their mutual interaction; this will benefit from a multi-agency contribution. The networks may not be confined to the specific province or country since many networks are transnational. Political analysis may also identify the elites through which we might most effectively work and wish to empower.

The Output of Analysis

336. Traditional tools such as *Centre of Gravity* can be used to help our analysis of groups. A Centre of Gravity (CoG) is a moral, political or physical centre of power, characterised by what it can do and the influence it can exert. This influence is the sum of its critical capabilities. Critical capabilities might include its ability to challenge government authority, or a tribal dominance in an area of natural resources with strategic importance. But, a CoG also has critical vulnerabilities and critical requirements. For example, typical critical requirements are popular support, finance and recruits. Critical vulnerabilities include contradictions in ideology, a departure from the group's narrative, or the support of other groups. Where critical requirements can be attacked, they are also vulnerabilities. A CoG analysis on the principal groups

(or their leaders) in a conflict relationship should help identify the linkages and interdependencies between them, as well how they threaten the existing political order, and how they might be attacked or influenced. This is a key output of analysis.




Figure 3.6 – Political Progress through Effects on Decisive Groups

337. Figure 3.6 is an illustration of the attitude of a number of groups to the host government determined by analysis over time, and the effects that might be used on them. This technique may help to generate shared understanding and approaches (both military and non-military) to determine how to influence the behaviour of groups. However, it is important to recognise that attitudes evolve with time and shifts can be leveraged both directly and indirectly. Continuous analysis and assessment is critical.

SECTION V – ASSESSMENT

338. There are 2 factors to consider in the design of campaign assessment. First, determine the effects (outcomes) of activity and their impact on the wide range of audiences. Second, the time-lag between cause and effect. The rush to measure the outcome of activity before its effects can be determined can distort decision-making. Some of the effects, particularly the most important ones which are designed to affect people's perceptions, may take considerable time to mature. Assessment is a feature of military campaigning and has a role to play both in making better sense of the chaos of a state in crisis and justifying resources. However, at worst it has driven pointless

tactical activity simply to feed that process - and become an industry that consumes staff effort.

339. Assessment is *the evaluation of progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement in order to inform decision-making*.⁹ It combines art and science. Specific metrics should be designed, collected and subsequently analysed – that is the science part. Interpretation demands judgement, intuition, imagination and insight – art.

Designing Assessment

340. Assessment must be based on agreed metrics. They will usually be defined by the senior coalition partner but must cover the political, security, economic and social aspects of any activity. They should be: mission related; comprehensible; meaningful; measurable (to include perceptions); timely; cost effective to obtain, and appropriate to cultural norms and expectations. Consistency in their use is essential. They should allow a test to be applied to the theory of change – the campaign big ideas, but in trying to ascertain *ground truth* it is commander's judgement that is critical. To test the hypothesis, a Red Team¹⁰ can be used to explore different interpretations of the accepted operating picture. This will avoid the pit-falls of *group-think*.

341. Although J5 traditionally designs and implements assessment, a separate cell in the headquarters may be required to provide a shared, comprehensive assessment of campaign progress. However, planning a campaign based on assessment can be like driving with both eyes on the rear-view mirror. Even the most valid of assessments represent an historical snapshot and do not forecast the future. The principle for the design of assessment conducted at the campaign level should be to record *tidal movements, not wave patterns*. These movements have to be selected in advance, and studied for long enough to derive strategic patterns.

342. Assessment must be made upon both the key outputs and activities of the campaign; the decisive conditions and supporting effects in a traditional military campaign plan. It should also gather evidence across the physical, virtual and cognitive domains. Although results of activities conducted in the physical domain will generally be easier to measure, measuring psychological effects in the cognitive domain may deliver greater insights. How people feel and what people think, for example, will be vital indicators of campaign progress. OGDs can also provide much useful information, although care must be taken to ensure consistency of reporting criteria.

⁹ JDP 01 *Campaigning* (2nd Edition), December 2008.

¹⁰ The Red Team should enjoy a degree of autonomy. Answering to the chain of command, its membership should be separate from it. It should be made up of both civilian and military planners/analysts, and report to the mission lead. See DCDC Guidance Note *A Guide to Red Teaming* dated February 2010.

Assessment Categories

343. There are 3 broad categories of assessment which should produce the answers to the following 3 questions: first, *did we do, properly, the things that we set out to do?*; second, *was what we set out to do, the right thing?*; and finally, *is the combination of things that we are doing getting us to where we want to be?* Answers to the first question are provided by Measurement of Activity (MOA), defined as ‘assessment of task performance and achievement of its associated purpose’.¹¹ Answers to the second question are provided by Measurement of Effect (MOE) defined as ‘the assessment of the realisation of specified effects’.¹² Finally, answers to the third question are provided by Campaign Effectiveness Assessment (CEA) which is based on subjective and objective measurement to inform decision-making. It is concerned with the timely progress of the campaign, and is predominantly the concern of the commander. CEA is likely to occur on a monthly (or longer) basis,¹³ and all branches and cells will contribute towards it.

SECTION VI – ANTICIPATE, LEARN AND ADAPT

To Anticipate

344. A force which is able to anticipate is better prepared than one which is simply responsive. Anticipation involves looking ahead and predicting what may happen in the future, and then instigating pre-emptive measures to shape and exploit events; it is key to seizing and maintaining the initiative. This requires a sophisticated understanding of the operational environment and competing groups. The aim is to derive a position whereby it is possible to assess how these target groups are likely to react to a given situation. Anticipation is an attribute that should be common in all military thinking and present from pre-deployment planning to tactical action. To achieve it, commanders will need to apply a continuous process of learning and a refinement of understanding.

To Learn

345. Although learning is a collective activity, individual leaders can play a crucial role in its development. The responsibility for learning rests with commanders, who will need to drive the process and overcome institutional inertia to it. To achieve this, innovation should be instilled into all officers through education, training and through the conduct of operations.

¹¹ JDP 01 (2nd Edition).

¹² JDP 01 (2nd Edition). MOE are most often developed for supporting effects. Decisive conditions are then monitored through the aggregation of MOEs related to their subordinate supporting effects. The commander may elect, however, to assign MOE specific to a decisive condition.

¹³ During TELIC 1, a daily campaign review-cycle was employed initially. ISAF IX reviewed the campaign every 2 months.

346. The ability to learn within a military organisation is tightly linked to the MOE process – to act, to measure, to learn. Within stabilisation, the desired effects are principally focused on changing the perceptions of target audiences. The identification of assessment criteria is essential and requires a balance of judgement and empirical evidence supported, but not driven, by statistical evidence. Traditional MOE, such as equipment destroyed or enemy dead, is unlikely to be appropriate within a stabilisation environment.

To Adapt

347. In order to become adaptive, it is necessary to develop the organisational structures, mechanisms and procedures that facilitate rapid conceptual and physical modification, and innovation. The challenge this poses for the armed forces of a western democratic state are significant. While a non-state adversary's primary focus is only the current conflict at hand, UK Armed Forces are also prepared and structured for a range of other tasks. The traditional focus on inter-state warfighting, combined with the level of political and procedural accountability involved in major conceptual or structural change can restrain adaptation.

348. The fostering of an adaptive environment is not risk-free. By constantly seeking change, the need for persistence becomes neglected. Judgement is needed to weigh up potential risks before implementing change. It will be necessary, for example, to strike a balance between adaptation and persistence in order to ensure that effects are given chance to be properly realised. It may also be necessary to withdraw forces from contact in order to adapt, in which case the risks of doing so will need to be carefully considered.

Levels of Anticipation, Learning and Adaption

349. Anticipation, learning and adaptation are relevant at all levels of command. At the strategic level, the end state and campaign objectives are defined within the wider comprehensive plan – these may need to be revised if earlier assumptions are disproved. At the operational level, as commanders learn more about the environment and their own force's effectiveness within it, the campaign objectives may need adapting. Within the force, commanders must establish responsive mechanisms that not only encourage and facilitate learning at the operational and tactical levels, but also adaptation at the necessary tempo; for example, Counter-insurgency Academies used in Iraq and Afghanistan. Mechanisms to question assumptions and to share best practice will need to be established not only between levels of national command, but also across levels of command at both the multinational and inter-agency levels.

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CONCLUSION

1. Stabilisation is arguably a newer term than idea, although globalisation and sovereignty have clearly had an impact over the last 50 years. Our most recent weaknesses can probably be put down to a failure to implement what we already knew. In fact, some of the objectives, characteristics and activities of what we now call stabilisation can be traced back to the first century BC and the romanisation of Gaul. The experiences of Napoleon's army on the Iberian Peninsula attempting to establish control in Spain and deal with Spanish guerrillas echo similar themes. Our own experiences of Empire and the creation of such mechanisms as the Indian Civil Service provide further insight. Classical COIN through the 1950s and 60s – Malaya, Borneo, Kenya – taught us many lessons, Northern Ireland too. And even though the most contemporary lessons relate to Iraq and Afghanistan, the doctrine we have crafted is not revisionist. We have attempted to capture that which is good and enduring from the British experience and weave in more contemporary insights. We recognise failings as well as success, Aden and Vietnam for example. And we recognise that verdicts are not yet delivered on Afghanistan and Iraq. In part therefore, our doctrine is aspirational, and also a lever for change.



Early *Develop*? The Pont du Gard, Roman Aqueduct, built between 60-40 BC, Nîmes, France.

2. We cannot expect to operate in the future with the autonomy and primacy that Templer had in Malaya. Host nation sovereignty will continue to impact all that we

do, but the actions and objectives of that government must remain broadly consistent with those of the international contributors. Since the challenge of stabilisation is a political one, enabled by security, an enduring political engagement and lead will be necessary. The strategy will not only need to align ends, ways and means, but also provide an appropriate weighting to them. Its execution will need to align word and deed. Its objectives will need to be attainable. The multi-agency effort will need to be integrated if it is to produce a truly comprehensive approach and a single comprehensive plan. In spite of some departmental and organisational reticence, this must be the aim. Any lesser aspiration will invite failure. It will also be critical to enable better our understanding of the problem and the environment. This may require us to bend current structures and re-prioritise effort.



UK soldiers brief Mr Mark Sedwill, then the British Ambassador to Afghanistan, and Lindy Cameron, the UK civil servant who is the senior UK civil-military representative in Helmand and leader of the UK & International PRT in Lashkar Gar, 2009-10

3. JDP 3-40 *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution* is a significant piece of work that only the professional military are expected to read in detail. This Guide is intended to provide a quick source of key ideas in order to generate a framework of understanding of JDP 3-40 and a start-point for engagement. Suitably armed, readers are encouraged seek out further detail and knowledge wherever they can find it, engage in the debate, and provide feedback whenever they can. (DCDC-AHFuncDoc@mod.uk)

ANNEX A TO A GUIDE TO SECURITY AND STABILISATION: THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

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¹ Page numbering refers to the A5 loose-leaf version of JDP 3-40.

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