

论文选题：五分钟地球假说（认识论）：罗素提出过一个思想实验。这个实验假设地球实际上是五分钟前刚刚创建的，然而，所有的证据、记忆和经验都让我们相信地球已经存在了数十亿年。在这个情景下，我们无法证明地球不是五分钟前才诞生的，因为我们所依赖的证据和记忆都可能是虚假的。一般来说，如果我们采取怀疑论的立场，那么这个场景就是可能。请你回答：这个场景是可能的吗？请你基于这个场景做出一个支持或反对怀疑论的论证。

## （1）维特根斯坦确定性理论对极端怀疑论的反驳

### （2）引言

罗素于 1921 年提出的“五分钟地球假说”是对笛卡尔恶魔假说的现代延续，属于怀疑论的一个极端表达。该假说设想地球可能在五分钟前才被创造，而我们所有关于过去的记忆和证据都是随之产生的。这一假说引发了关键的认识论问题：我们是否能够确知过去的存在？我们的记忆和经验在多大程度上是可靠的？

面对这一极端怀疑论，维特根斯坦的哲学思想提供了独特的反驳视角。在早期《逻辑哲学论》<sup>[1]</sup>中，他通过“世界是一切发生的事情的总和”(Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 5)的逻辑分析表明，完全虚假的记忆将无法与现实保持必要的逻辑对应关系。而在其后期著作《论确定性》<sup>[2]</sup>中，维特根斯坦则转向关注语言的实际使用和实践中的基础信念，从根本上质疑怀疑论立场的意义性而非通过逻辑和语言的结构来确定真理<sup>[3]</sup>。本文将主要基于维特根斯坦的确定性理论，论证为何我们应当拒绝罗素的五分钟地球假说，说明这种极端怀疑论立场是没有意义的。

### （3）论证提纲

本论证基于以下三个前提：

前提 1：经验命题是可怀疑的，但对世界图景的怀疑是没有意义的

前提 2：“世界一直存在”这一信念不是经验命题，而是世界图景的一部分

前提 3：五分钟地球假说怀疑了“世界一直存在”这一信念

结论：五分钟地球假说是没有意义的

### （4）论证细节

首先我们对第一个前提展开论证。

维特根斯坦在《论确定性》中区分了经验命题和世界图景，他认为世界图景并非通过经验验证获得，而是我们区分真假的前提条件(Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 23)。经验命题，如“外面在下雨”，是可以通过怀疑和验证的，因为它们依赖于我们的感官经验。然而，世界图景，如“外部世界存在”或“我有身体”，则构成了我们理解和组织所有信念的框架。这些信念虽然未经具体证明，却不可被怀疑，因为它们是所有知识和经验的基础，而怀疑必须建立在

某些确定性之上(Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 18), 则我们无法对世界图景进行普遍怀疑。因此, 尽管经验命题可以被怀疑, 但世界图景的怀疑是不成立的。

在理解了经验命题与世界图景的区分后, 我们需要进一步判断“世界一直存在”这一命题属于哪一类。根据维特根斯坦的观点, 要判断一个命题是否属于世界图景, 关键在于考察它在我们的语言实践中是否扮演着基础性的角色。

然后我们对第二个前提展开论证。

“世界一直存在”必然属于世界图景而非经验命题, 这一点可以通过分析其在语言游戏中的实际运作得到证明。在《论确定性》中, 维特根斯坦提出了“铰链命题”的概念, 指那些在我们的疑问和调查中起着基础性作用的命题, 这些命题不是通过经验证据建立的结论, 而是使得证据和怀疑成为可能的框架(Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 44), “世界一直存在”正是一个铰链命题。当我们谈论任何历史事件、因果关系或时间连续性时, 都预设了这一基础信念。从语言学习的角度看, 这一点更为明显: 儿童在学习语言时并不先验证世界的存在, 而是在这一前提下习得关于世界的知识(Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 62)。此外, 从实践逻辑来看, 怀疑世界的持续存在会导致怀疑活动本身的瓦解。正如维特根斯坦所言, “如果你试图怀疑一切, 你将无法怀疑任何东西”。这是因为怀疑游戏本身预设了某些基本确定性, 而世界的持续存在正是这样的基本确定性之一。它不同于“这张桌子存在”这样的经验命题, 而是构成了我们“区分真假的背景”(Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 15)。因此, 通过考察这一信念在语言实践中的运作方式, 我们可以确认它属于使经验判断和怀疑成为可能的世界图景, 而非经验命题。

这一观点与罗素的立场有别。罗素试图通过归纳和推理来证明外部世界的存在, 而维特根斯坦则认为这种独立存在的信念是我们理解和组织经验的基础, 而非通过经验命题直接获得的知识。

我们再来分析第三个前提。

罗素的五分钟地球假说设想地球可能在五分钟前才被创造, 而我们关于过去的所有记忆和证据都是随之产生的。这一假说直接挑战了“世界一直存在”这一信念, 试图动摇我们对世界图景的基本信念。然而, 根据维特根斯坦的理论, 对世界图景的怀疑是没有意义的。

基于以上三个前提, 我们可以得出结论: 作为一种试图动摇基础信念的怀疑论立场, 五分钟地球假说是没有意义的。

## (5) 反驳

可能的反驳: 维特根斯坦的“铰链命题”理论可能过于依赖语言使用的现状。即使在日常语言中我们预设了“世界一直存在”, 这种使用习惯本身并不能证明该信念的必要性。完全可以设想一种新的语言游戏, 在其中世界的持续存在是可疑的。

## (6) 回应

这一反驳误解了维特根斯坦的论点。较链命题的必要性并非仅仅源自语言使用习惯，而是来自怀疑活动本身的逻辑结构<sup>[4]</sup>。任何怀疑活动都预设了某些确定性，试图创造一个完全没有这种预设的语言游戏，等于试图创造一个自我否定的系统。维特根斯坦明确指出，“如果你试图怀疑一切，你将无法怀疑任何东西”。这里需要理解的关键在于，说不能怀疑世界图景并非一个规范性主张，而是对语言游戏运作方式的基本描述。怀疑必须在某个框架内进行，否则就失去了意义。正如维特根斯坦所说，“怀疑本身只依赖于无可怀疑的事物” (Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 68)。这种观点不应被理解为独断论，而应被视为对怀疑活动本身逻辑的揭示。因此，即使我们能够想象一种新的语言游戏，也无法摆脱基础确定性的需求——这种基础确定性不是来自语言习惯，而是源于怀疑活动的内在逻辑结构。

## (7) 结论

本文通过维特根斯坦的确定性理论，论证了五分钟地球假说是不成立的。世界图景中的基础信念是一切怀疑活动的前提条件，而“世界一直存在”正是这样的基础信念。五分钟地球假说试图怀疑这一基础信念，实际上否定了怀疑本身赖以存在的基础，因此在逻辑上是自相矛盾的。

这提示我们：虽然理性怀疑是哲学探究的重要方法，但它并非无限制的。某些基础信念的确定性不是来自经验证明，而是源于它们在人类认知和语言实践中的根本地位，认识到这一点，有助于我们更准确地把握理性怀疑的边界和本质。

## (8) 参考文献

- [1] 维特根斯坦, 路. ([1921] 2009). 逻辑哲学论(贺绍甲, 译). 商务印书馆.
- [2] Wittgenstein, L., Anscombe, G. E. M., von Wright, G. H., Paul, D., & Anscombe, G. E. M. (1969). On certainty (Vol. 174). Oxford: Blackwell.
- [3] 蔡祥元. (2016). 语言游戏确定性的根源——对维特根斯坦“家族相似”概念的再澄清. 现代哲学(06), 94-98.
- [4] 陈嘉明. (1997). 维特根斯坦的“确定性”与“生活形式”. 哲学研究(01), 63-70.

## (9) LLMs 使用情况

本文使用 Claude 生成初始论文框架，随后笔者对内容进行了大幅删减和重构论证框架，修改和撰写了全文。文中所有引用的专业文献均由笔者独立检索和研读，GPT-4 用于两个辅助性工作：（1）协助在已选定的专著中定位相关段落；（2）检查并规范化引用格式。

## (10) 附件：参考文献的引文截图

### (1) 《逻辑哲学论》

1<sup>1</sup> The world is all that is the case.  
1<sup>2</sup> 世界是所有发生的事情。  
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.  
1.1 世界是事实的总和，而非事物的总和。  
1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts.  
1.11 世界是由事实规定的，是由此诸事实即是所有的事实这一点规定的。  
1.12 For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case.  
1.12 因为事实的总和既规定了发生的事情，也规定了所有未发生的事情。  
1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.  
1.13 逻辑空间中的诸事实就是世界。  
1.2 The world divides into facts.  
1.2 世界分成诸事实。  
1.21 Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same.  
1.21 一件事情可以是发生了的或未发生的，而其余的一切仍保持不变。  
2 What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.  
2 发生的事情，即事实，是诸事态的存在。  
2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things). /5/  
2.01 事态是诸对象（物，事物）的一种结合。  
2.011 It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs.  
2.011 能成为事态的构成部分，是事物的本质。  
2.012 In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.  
2.012 在逻辑中没有任何东西是偶然的：如果一事物能在一事态中出现，那么这一事态的可能性必已预先设定于这一事物中。  
2.0121 It would seem to be a sort of accident, if it turned out that a situation would fit a thing that could already exist entirely on its own.  
If things can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning.  
(Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible. Logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are its facts.)  
Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others.  
If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine them excluded from the possibility of such combinations.  
2.0121 如果一个事况是在事后才去适合一个能独立自在的事物的，【189】那么这似乎就是一种偶然出现的事情了。  
如果事物能够在事态中出现，那么这种可能性必已存在于事物之中。  
(逻辑的东西不会仅仅是可能的。逻辑研究每一可能性，一切可能性都是它的事实。)  
正如我们根本不可能离开空间去想像空间的对象，离开时间去想像时间的对象，我们也不可能在其与其他对象联系的可能性之外去想像任何对象。  
如果我能在事态的联系中想像一个对象，那么我就不可能在这种联系的可能性之外去想像这个对象。

<sup>1</sup> The decimal numbers assigned to the individual propositions indicate the logical importance of the propositions, the stress laid on them in my exposition. The propositions n.1, n.2, n.3, etc. are comments on proposition no. n; the propositions n.m1, n.m2, etc. are comments on proposition no. n.m; and so on.

<sup>2</sup> 书中各命题的十进制数码表示这些命题在逻辑上是重要的，我要着重加以阐述。n.1, n.2, n.3等等是对属于数码n.m的命题的评注；n.m1, n.m2则是对属于数码n.m的命题的评注；如此等等。



## (2) 《论确定性》

154. There are cases such that, if someone gives signs of doubt where we do not doubt, we cannot confidently understand his signs as signs of doubt.

I.e.: if we are to understand his signs of doubt as such, he may give them only in particular cases and may not give them in others.

155. In certain circumstances a man cannot make a *mistake*. ("Can" is here used logically, and the proposition does not mean that a man cannot say anything false in those circumstances.) If Moore were to pronounce the opposite of those propositions which he declares certain, we should not just not share his opinion: we should regard him as demented.

156. In order to make a mistake, a man must already judge in conformity with mankind.

157. Suppose a man could not remember whether he had always had five fingers or two hands? Should we understand him? Could we be sure of understanding him?

158. Can I be making a mistake, for example, in thinking that the words of which this sentence is composed are English words whose meaning I know?

159. As children we learn facts; e.g., that every human being has a brain, and we take them on trust. I believe that there is an island, Australia, of such-and-such a shape, and so on and so on; I believe that I had great-grandparents, that the people who gave themselves out as my parents really were my parents, etc. This belief may never have been expressed; even the thought that it was so, never thought.

160. The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes *after* belief.

161. I learned an enormous amount and accepted it on human authority, and then I found some things confirmed or disconfirmed by my own experience.

162. In general I take as true what is found in text-books, of geography for example. Why? I say: All these facts have been confirmed a hundred times over. But how do I know that? What is my evidence for it? I have a world-picture. Is it true or false? Above all it is the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting.

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nounced, what the colour of human blood is called, that other human beings have blood and call it "blood".

341. That is to say, the *questions* that we raise and our *doubts* depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are *in deed* not doubted.

343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just *can't* investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

344. My *life* consists in my being content to accept many things.

345. If I ask someone "what colour do you see at the moment?", in order, that is, to learn what colour is there at the moment, I cannot at the same time question whether the person I ask understands English, whether he wants to take me in, whether my own memory is not leaving me in the lurch as to the names of colours, and so on.

346. When I am trying to mate someone in chess, I cannot have doubts about the pieces perhaps changing places of themselves and my memory simultaneously playing tricks on me so that I don't notice.

15.3.51

347. "I know that that's a tree." Why does it strike me as if I did not understand the sentence? though it is after all an extremely simple sentence of the most ordinary kind? It is as if I could not focus my mind on any meaning. Simply because I don't look for the focus where the meaning is. As soon as I think of an everyday use of the sentence instead of a philosophical one, its meaning becomes clear and ordinary.

348. Just as the words "I am here" have a meaning only in certain contexts, and not when I say them to someone who is sitting in front of me and sees me clearly,—and not because they are superfluous, but because their meaning is not *determined* by the situation, yet stands in need of such determination.

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115. If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.

116. Instead of "I know . . .", couldn't Moore have said: "It stands fast for me that . . ." And further: "It stands fast for me and many others. . . ."

117. Why is it not possible for me to doubt that I have never been on the moon? And how could I try to doubt it?

First and foremost, the supposition that perhaps I have been there would strike me as *idle*. Nothing would follow from it, nothing be explained by it. It would not tie in with anything in my life.

When I say "Nothing speaks for, everything against it," this presupposes a principle of speaking for and against. That is, I must be able to say what *would* speak for it.

118. Now would it be correct to say: So far no one has opened my skull in order to see whether there is a brain inside; but everything speaks for, and nothing against, its being what they would find there?

119. But can it also be said: Everything speaks for, and nothing against the table's still being there when no one sees it? For what does speak for it?

120. But if anyone were to doubt it, how would his doubt come out in practice? And couldn't we peacefully leave him to doubt it, since it makes no difference at all?

121. Can one say: "Where there is no doubt there is no knowledge either"?

122. Doesn't one need grounds for doubt?

123. Wherever I look, I find no ground for doubting that. . .

124. I want to say: We use judgments as principles of judgment.

125. If a blind man were to ask me "Have you got two hands?" I should not make sure by looking. If I were to have any doubt of it, then I don't know why I should trust my eyes. For why shouldn't I test my *eyes* by looking to find out whether I see my

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realize that these words connect up with his thoughts about me. And now they do not strike me as meaningless any more.

470. Why is there no doubt that I am called L. W.? It does not seem at all like something that one could establish at once beyond doubt. One would not think that it is one of the indubitable truths.

5.4.

[Here there is still a big gap in my thinking. And I doubt whether it will be filled now.]

471. It is so difficult to find the *beginning*. Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not try to go further back.

472. When a child learns language it learns at the same time what is to be investigated and what not. When it learns that there is a cupboard in the room, it isn't taught to doubt whether what it sees later on is still a cupboard or only a kind of stage set.

473. Just as in writing we learn a particular basic form of letters and then vary it later, so we learn first the stability of things as the norm, which is then subject to alterations.

474. This game proves its worth. That may be the cause of its being played, but it is not the ground.

475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination.

6.4.

476. Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc. etc.,—they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc. etc.

Later, questions about the existence of things do of course arise. "Is there such a thing as a unicorn?" and so on. But such a question is possible only because as a rule no corresponding question presents itself. For how does one know how to set

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Everything that I have seen or heard gives me the conviction that no man has ever been far from the earth. Nothing in my picture of the world speaks in favour of the opposite.

94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. Nor is it the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.

95. The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules.

96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.

97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.

98. But if someone were to say "So logic too is an empirical science" he would be wrong. Yet this is right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing.

99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited.

100. The truths which Moore says he knows, are such as, roughly speaking, all of us know, if he knows them.

101. Such a proposition might be e.g. "My body has never disappeared and reappeared again after an interval."

102. Might I not believe that once, without knowing it, perhaps in a state of unconsciousness, I was taken far away from the earth

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over my most fundamental judgments? (Whether rightly or wrongly is beside the point.)

518. Could I imagine observing this in another person?

519. Admittedly, if you are obeying the order "Bring me a book", you may have to check whether the thing you see over there really is a book, but then you do at least know what people mean by "book"; and if you don't you can look it up,—but then you must know what some other word means. And the fact that a word means such-and-such, is used in such-and-such a way, is in turn an empirical fact, like the fact that what you see over there is a book.

Therefore, in order for you to be able to carry out an order there must be some empirical fact about which you are not in doubt. Doubt itself rests only on what is beyond doubt.

But since a language-game is something that consists in the recurrent procedures of the game in time, it seems impossible to say in any individual case that such-and-such must be beyond doubt if there is to be a language-game—though it is right enough to say that as a rule some empirical judgment or other must be beyond doubt.

134.

520. Moore has every right to say he knows there's a tree there in front of him. Naturally he may be wrong. (For it is not the same as with the utterance "I believe there is a tree there".) But whether he is right or wrong in this case is of no philosophical importance. If Moore is attacking those who say that one cannot really know such a thing, he can't do it by assuring them that he knows this and that. For one need not believe him. If his opponents had asserted that one could not believe this and that, then he could have replied: "I believe it."

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521. Moore's mistake lies in this—countering the assertion that one cannot know that, by saying "I do know it".

522. We say: if a child has mastered language—and hence its application—it must know the meaning of words. It must, for

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### (3) 《语言游戏确定性的根源——对维特根斯坦“家族相似”概念的再澄清》

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受的东西、给与我的东西，乃是——人们可以说——生活形式。”<sup>①</sup> 我们不会去质疑生活形式的一致性。人们会争论姚明的身高是不是2米26，但是我们不会争论，谈论姚明的身高应该精确到厘米、毫米还是微米，这是我们的生活形式决定的。人们会对别人所说的内容（“意见”）提出异议，但是人们不会质疑其说话方式本身（“语言”）。 “那么你就是说，人们的一致决定了何者为真，何者为假？”——为真和为假的乃是人类所说的东西；而他们相互一致的则是他们所使用的语言。这不是意见上的一致而是生活形式的一致。”（241节）正如数学家可能会对某个加法运算是否算错了提出质疑，但是他们不会就加法规则本身提出异议。（240节）

生活形式的一致性组成一个体系，成为我们能够有所知的前提或参照系。这个体系构成了我们进行论证的脚手架，一切给出理由的游戏（无论是肯定或怀疑）都只有在这个体系内才是可能的，才是有意义的，而这些脚手架本身却不能够被肯定也不能被怀疑。<sup>②</sup> 甚至怀疑的游戏也必须在这个确定的脚手架之中才可能进行，因为怀疑是需要“理由”的、需要“支点”的，因此也必须事先假定生活形式的一致性。“如果你想怀疑一切，你就什么也不能怀疑。怀疑这种游戏本身就预先假定了确定性。”（《论确定性》第115节）

语言游戏的确定性就来自这种生活形式的一致性。它处在信念体系的根基处，本身就带有一种“不容怀疑”的确定性。“但是更正确地：我在我的句子里不假思索地使用‘手’这个词以及所有其他的词，实际上如果我甚至想去怀疑这些词的意义，我便会面对着虚无的深渊——这表明不容怀疑属于语言游戏的本质……”（《论确定性》第370节）

#### 四、结 语

通过以上分析可以看到，维特根斯坦通过家族相似来反对本质主义的同时，并不会因为抹去一切“区别”而沦为怀疑主义、虚无主义，而是提出了一种新的“本质”观、新的语言观，即任何“本质”只有在具体的语境中、在相互交错的

上下文才能得到规定。在维特根斯坦看来，语境中的确定性才是更为原本的、更真实的确定性，它植根于我们生活形式的一致性。我们不可能再为语言游戏提供更加确定的根基，无论是外在的观察，还是内在的反省。我们也无需去担忧语言游戏的确定性到底由什么来保障，也不会对此提出进一步的质疑，因为这就是我们的“生活”。

你必须记住，语言游戏可以说是某种不可预测的事情。我的意思是说：语言游戏不是建立在理由基础之上的东西。语言游戏不是合乎道理的（或者说是没有道理的）。

语言游戏就在那里——就像我们的生活一样。（《论确定性》559页）

（责任编辑 任 之）

① [奥] 维特根斯坦 《哲学研究》，李步楼译，第345页。

② Ludwig Wittgenstein “有关一种假设的一切检验，一切证实或否定都早已发生在一个体系之中。这个体系并不是我们进行论证时所采用的多少带有任意性或不太可靠的出发点，而是属于我们称之为论证的本体。这个体系与某说是论证的出发点，不如说是赋予论证以生命的活力。”（105节）（*On Certainty*, Wiley-Blackwell, 1991.）中文文引自 [奥] 维特根斯坦：《论确定性》，张金言译，桂林：广西师范大学出版社，2002年。原译文中的“确定性”根据原文这里统一改译为“确定性”。



#### (4) 《维特根斯坦的“确定性”与“生活形式”》

手后，并不比看之前有更多的确定性。在这个例子中我们应当注意的，一是维特根斯坦区分知识与主观确定性的不同。“我知道”(i know)既然是“知”，就不会是一种主观确定的东西，它必须能够提供真实的证明。二是为什么维特根斯坦说在我看了我的两只手后，并不比看之前有更多的确定性，这是由于他把这类摩尔的常识命题与知识区别开来。这类常识命题不属于通常哲学上所说的经验命题或真值命题（这里我用“真值命题”一语，仅限于借用它的有真、假之两种可能之义）。维特根斯坦将这类命题界定为知识的基础。它们与经验命题的关系，就像河床与河水的关系一样。这类常识命题具有另一种确定性，我们马上会谈及这一点。

其次，客观确定的是一些普遍的经验命题。维特根斯坦举例说，假如某人的手臂被砍断了，它就不会再长出来；某人的头被砍掉了，他就死了，再不会活过来。这类普遍的经验命题之所以具有客观的确定性，关键在于它们能够被提供出关于这种确定性的根据。“对于我的确信，我有令人信服的根据。这些根据使这种确信成为客观的。”(OC, § 270) 前面我们已经提到，知识的一个特征就是它的根据性。维特根斯坦指出存在着无数的具有这种客观确定性的命题。

再次，最后一类确定性是超出确证或不确定证的范围之外，即具有这种确定性的命题本身既不真也不假，它们就是上面提到的摩尔的“常识命题”。维特根斯坦之所以说它们超越真假与确证的范围，原因在于它们构成经验命题的基础。维特根斯坦这方面的思想完整说来是这样的：

a. 他把经验知识看成是一个完整命题的系统。在这一系统里，前提与结论是相互支持的。我们把此系统中的命题分为两个部分，一是有待确证的经验命题，二是作为确证基础的“常识命题”。上面提到，维特根斯坦把它们比作河床与河水的关系。这里值得特别提及的是，维特根斯坦又把“常识命题”本身看作是一个系统，认为某一假设的所有的验证，所有的证实与否认，都已经在这一个系统里进行。对于我们的所有论证来说，这一系统不是某个或多或少任意的、或可怀疑的出发点，而是属于我们称之为论证的本质。

b. 之所以说它们属于“论证的本质”，理由在于维特根斯坦将它们看作是某种“世界图画”(OC, § 95)。它们是我们从小通过学习而承继下来的知识文化背景。我们根据它们来区分出经验命题的真与假。因此它们虽然在形式上是经验命题，但在我们的经验命题系统中，却具有“特殊的逻辑作用”(OC, § 136)。这种作用就像“游戏的规则作用一样”(OC, § 95)，即起一种“描述的规范”的作用，使我们以从小学得的知识作为规范来从事研究。因为不论我们检验什么事物，我们已经预先以某些不受检验的事情为前提。这类规范来自于我们通过实践行为所掌握的“事物的稳定性”。例如，通过书写的练习，我们掌握了写信的一些基本格式。因此这些“常识命题”，作为“先决命题”，作为认识的基本框架，是免受怀疑的。它们就像是一些铰链一样，有待确证的命题是围绕它们旋转的。它们稳固地存在着，构成所有思想与判断活动的基础。这类“常识命题”与有待确证的命题的关系，在维特根斯坦看来，就像是“河床”与“河水”的关系一样。虽然维特根斯坦认为，这种关系是可以改变的。也就是说，哪些经验命题作为“河床”，哪些作为“河水”，这随着时间的推移可以改变。不过，不论何时，总是存在着“河床”，作为判定经验事实的真假的根据，这是毫无疑问的。这里，维