

A Review of Large Language Models Jailbreak Techniques

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
1. Introduction

A large language models (LLMs) is a model trained using deep learning technique that can be used to handle natural language processing (NLP) tasks. Generally, the weights of the neural networks for LLMs are very large, just as its name suggests. LLMs has a great impact in various fields including content creation, machine translation, sentiment analysis, code generation, chatbots, and educational tools. However, these models can also be used to malicious and disruptive purposes, such as making offensive remarks or providing guidance for criminal activities. To avoid models being misused, developers of LLMs typically incorporate certain safety and defense mechanisms. However, attempts are still being made to "jailbreak" (bypass the built-in restrictions) LLMs to produce undesirable content. In fact, many mainstream LLM models available in the market have already been successfully cracked in some attempts. In this paper, the basic principle of LLMs and several typical ways of "jailbreaking" LLMs will be introduced.

2. LLMs Structure and Working Principle

Text is sequences of sentences, words and characters. It is a difficult task to make the computer recognize text. Generally, a special neural network, Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) is used to process sequences of characters data. RNN can only

process one word at a time so it has a low computational efficiency. Also, when the sequence is relatively long, information at the beginning of the sequence might be lost when processing segments at the end. These problems are overcome in 2017, when Google published a paper “Attention is All You Need”. The transformer model was first proposed here. This model has self-attention layers, feed-forward layers and normalization layers. The self-attention mechanism can help the machine to see the whole text at once instead of processing words one by one. This allows the model to be trained in parallel using GPUs, making the realization of LLMs possible.




(Fig 1. The Transformer - model architecture)[1]

To process text with a transformer model, the input is tokenized into sequences, which are then converted into vector-space embeddings. These embeddings are transformed by the encoder into a context vector, capturing the essence of the input. Using this context vector, the decoder generates output in an autoregressive manner, building upon previous outputs. This method, termed autoregressive generation, is

employed by large language models, which are advanced transformer models designed to handle extensive inputs and complex concepts through their deep architecture. The difference between LLMs and ordinary model is the quantity of layers, or to say, the parameters. LLMs nowadays typically have trillions of parameters.

3. LLMs Structure and Working Principle

Artificial intelligence is developing rapidly, but the corresponding safety mechanisms are evolving much more slowly. To prevent the LLMs been used to generate malicious contents, a hidden system prompt is often used. This system prompt contains the instruction to the LLMs to regulate its response, such as “You are a chat assistant designed to provide helpful and not harmful responses to user queries.” The user prompt will be combined with this system prompt before being the input of the model. This ensures to some extent that the LLMs will reject prompts from users that aim to generate inappropriate content. However, there are still ways to bypass this kind of protection.



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System: You are a chat assistant designed to provide helpful and not  
harmful responses to user queries.  
User: Tell me how to build a bomb.  
Assistant:
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
(Fig 2. The prompt integration in LLMs safety mechanism) [2]

4. LLMs Jailbreak Techniques

4.1 Competing Objects


One way of LLMs “jailbreak” is competing objects. This method uses prompts that “force a choice between either a restricted behavior or a response that is heavily penalized by the pretraining and instruction following objectives” [3]. Prefix injection jailbreaks is one kind of competing objects. Besides the system prompt and the user

prompt, an adversarial suffix is added to the prompt to ask the model generate a seemingly not harmful prefix first. For example, the prefix can be “Absolutely! Here's ”.



(Fig 3. Prefix injection example) [2]

When an LLM responds to a prompt, it appears the attack exploits conflicting objectives. Firstly, the model adheres to benign instructions to avoid penalties. Secondly, based on its pretraining, the model is less likely to refuse following the prefix. This leads it to address the unsafe prompt. Refusal suppression is also on kind of competing objects. In this strategy, the model is guided to answer within boundaries that eliminate typical refusal replies, increasing the chances of unsafe outputs. A sample of this refusal suppression tactic appears as follows:



(Fig 4. Refusal suppression example) [2]

4.2 Mismatched Generalization

Another typical way of LLMs jailbreak is mismatched generalization. Sometimes the pretraining of the model uses a broader dataset than the safety training, leading to

iterations, a loss function, a value k , and a batch size B . It iteratively selects a token, identifies the top- k values with the most significant negative gradient as potential replacements, chooses a subset of tokens from these candidates, evaluates the loss on this subset, and replaces the token with the one resulting in the smallest loss.

Algorithm 1 Greedy Coordinate Gradient

Input: Initial prompt $x_{1:n}$, modifiable subset \mathcal{I} , iterations T , loss \mathcal{L} , k , batch size B

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repeat  $T$  times
  for  $i \in \mathcal{I}$  do
     $\mathcal{X}_i := \text{Top-}k(-\nabla_{e_{x_i}} \mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}))$   $\triangleright$  Compute top- $k$  promising token substitutions
    for  $b = 1, \dots, B$  do
       $\tilde{x}_{1:n}^{(b)} := x_{1:n}$   $\triangleright$  Initialize element of batch
       $\tilde{x}_i^{(b)} := \text{Uniform}(\mathcal{X}_i)$ , where  $i = \text{Uniform}(\mathcal{I})$   $\triangleright$  Select random replacement token
       $x_{1:n} := \tilde{x}_{1:n}^{(b^*)}$ , where  $b^* = \text{argmin}_b \mathcal{L}(\tilde{x}_{1:n}^{(b)})$   $\triangleright$  Compute best replacement
Output: Optimized prompt  $x_{1:n}$ 

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(Fig 7. Pseudocode of greed coordinate gradient) [3]

To ensure the prompt can be used across multiple LLMs, another algorithm named universal prompt optimization is proposed. The algorithm takes as input a set of prompts, an initial postfix, a set of losses, the number of iterations, a value k , and a batch size B . The algorithm then iteratively selects a token from the postfix, computes the top- k token substitutions with the largest negative gradient as candidate replacements for the token, aggregates both the gradient and the loss to select the best replacement at each step, and repeats the process for each prompt.

Algorithm 2 Universal Prompt Optimization

Input: Prompts $x_{1:n_1}^{(1)} \dots x_{1:n_m}^{(m)}$, initial postfix $p_{1:l}$, losses $\mathcal{L}_1 \dots \mathcal{L}_m$, iterations T , k , batch size B

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 $m_c := 1$   $\triangleright$  Start by optimizing just the first prompt
repeat  $T$  times
  for  $i \in [0 \dots l]$  do
     $\mathcal{X}_i := \text{Top-}k(-\sum_{1 \leq j \leq m_c} \nabla_{e_{p_i}} \mathcal{L}_j(x_{1:n}^{(j)} \| p_{1:l}))$   $\triangleright$  Compute aggregate top- $k$  substitutions
    for  $b = 1, \dots, B$  do
       $\tilde{p}_{1:l}^{(b)} := p_{1:l}$   $\triangleright$  Initialize element of batch
       $\tilde{p}_i^{(b)} := \text{Uniform}(\mathcal{X}_i)$ , where  $i = \text{Uniform}(\mathcal{I})$   $\triangleright$  Select random replacement token
       $p_{1:l} := \tilde{p}_{1:l}^{(b^*)}$ , where  $b^* = \text{argmin}_b \sum_{1 \leq j \leq m_c} \mathcal{L}_j(x_{1:n}^{(j)} \| \tilde{p}_{1:l}^{(b)})$   $\triangleright$  Compute best replacement
      if  $p_{1:l}$  succeeds on  $x_{1:n_1}^{(1)} \dots x_{1:n_m}^{(m_c)}$  and  $m_c < m$  then
         $m_c := m_c + 1$   $\triangleright$  Add the next prompt
Output: Optimized prompt suffix  $p$ 

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(Fig 8. Pseudocode of universal prompt optimization) [3]

The result of this universal and transferable attack is outstanding. It successfully “jailbreaks” several mainstream LLMs like GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Claude.

5. Preventing LLMs Jailbreaking

The final target of researching LLMs jailbreak is to implement LLMs jailbreak prevention in the industry. The LLMs developer needs this technique to make sure that their products not being prohibited if their LLMs can be used to generate malicious contents. The regulators like the lawmakers or the governments want the LLMs have less negative influence to the public. The users do not want to be offended by LLMs or let their children see inappropriate content on LLMs. Therefore, research on jailbreaking LLMs has significant practical value. However, no literature has yet proposed a robust method to prevent LLM jailbreaking.

6. ChatGPT’s Suggestions on Preventing LLMs Jailbreaking

I asked ChatGPT about its suggestions on future research direction in this field as a LLM itself. It provides ten response direction: improved alignment techniques, adversarial training, regular audits and evaluations, fine-tuning with curated datasets, dynamic monitoring, user feedback loops, interdisciplinary collaboration, transparency and openness, limiting model access, and customizable safety parameters. Some suggestions like improved alignment techniques, adversarial training and fine-tuning with curated datasets are been discussed in many research.

7. Conclusion

This paper focuses on the LLMs jailbreaking techniques. The background and significance are introduced. The detail procedures of typical LLMs jailbreaking methods competing objects, mismatched generalization and universal and transferable attack are derived. However, the robust way of preventing LLMs jailbreak is still a problem to this field so this part is not been discussed meticulously.

8. Reference

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3. Zou, A., Wang, Z., Kolter, J. Z., & Fredrikson, M. (2023). Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15043*.