

The Economics of Skyscrapers: A synthesis

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- Urban economics traditionally concerned with *horizontal* structure of cities
 - Cities have grown vertically since the turn of 19th to 20th century
 - Empirical research only recently gained momentum
- Develop a simple open-city GE model of *vertical* and *horizontal structure*
 - Incorporates vertical costs and benefit in horizontal land use model
 - Endogenous wages, rents, heights, population, horizontal land use
- Use the model to speak to first-order questions of skyscraper economics
 - Rationalize city-internal building height gradients
 - Explore how skyscrapers are *cause* and *effect* of urban growth
 - Distortionary effects of height regulation (in open-city)

Stylized evidence

Height decisions

- Skyscrapers emerge when there are innovations in construction technology
 - Elevator and steel frame
 - Mainframe computing and buttressed core Record buildings
- Skyscrapers emerge where there is high demand Determinants Diffusion Count
 - Population, GDP per capita, GDP growth are determinants of vertical growth
 - Shift in gravity of vertical growth from North America to Asia
- Evidence for ‘too tall’ buildings limited #1, #2, #3 tallest ESB
 - #2 (#3) building (very) good predictor for #1 (#2) building height
 - ESB—led height rankings longer than any other building—was profitable

Consistent with profit-maximization driving height decisions

Model

Model I

- Linear city with exogenous historic center at $x = 0$
- Consumption amenity varies in horizontal (x) and vertical (s) space

$$U(x, s) = A^R(x, s) \left(\frac{g}{\alpha^R} \right)^{\alpha^R} \left(\frac{f^R(x, s)}{1 - \alpha^R} \right)^{1 - \alpha^R}$$

- Productivity depends on x and s and agglomeration (population N)

$$g(x, s, N) = A^C(x, s, N) \left(\frac{l}{\alpha^C} \right)^{\alpha^C} \left(\frac{f^C(x, s)}{1 - \alpha^C} \right)^{1 - \alpha^C}$$

- Developers face per-unit construction costs that increase in height (S)

$$\pi^U(x, S^U(x)) = \bar{p}(x)S^U(x) - \bar{c}^U(S^U(x))S^U(x) - r^U(x)$$

Model II

- Workers **maximize utility**, firms and developers maximize **profits**
- **Zero firm profits and perfect mobility** → bid-rents
- Bid-rents and convex construction cost → optimal building height
- **Zero developer profits** → use-specific land rent
- Land goes to the **highest bidder** → horizontal land use pattern
- General equilibrium conditions
 - Commercial and residential **markets clear** (at all locations)
 - Labour **market clears**
 - **Population** must **adjust** to maintain reservation utility

Floor space rents, land rent, commercial and residential area, height, wage, population are endogenous

Parameter values

Parameter	Value	Further reading
$1 - \alpha^C$	Share of floor space at inputs	0.15 Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002)
$1 - \alpha^R$	Share of floor space at consumption	0.33 Combes et al. (2019)
β	Agglomeration elasticity of production amenity	0.03 Combes and Gobillon (2015)
θ^R	Commercial height elasticity of construction cost	0.5 Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2018)
θ^R	Residential height elasticity of construction cost	0.55 Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2018)
ω^C	Commercial height elasticity of rent	0.03 Liu et al. (2018)
ω^R	Residential height elasticity of rent	0.07 Danton and Himbert (2018)
τ^C	Production amenity decay	0.01 Ahlfeldt et al. (2015)^a
τ^R	Residential amenity decay	0.005 Ahlfeldt et al. (2015)





Notes: These parameter values are not taken from individual papers and do not necessarily correspond to our own estimates. Instead, they represent what we view as canonical values that are suitable for stylized presentations and simple counterfactual analysis. The last column provides a references for the interested reader for further reading, but not necessarily the source of a point estimate. ^aThe parameter value is consistent with the commercial rent gradient estimated for a large set of global cities, assuming $\alpha^C = 0.15$ (see Appendix Section N.1.1). We set the following scale parameters arbitrarily to generate a plausible land use pattern: $\bar{a}^C = 2, \bar{a}^R = 1, \bar{c}^C = 1.4, \bar{c}^R = 1.4, r^a = 30, \bar{U} = 1$. There are no binding height limits in the baseline parametrization ($\bar{S}^C = \bar{S}^R = \infty$).

Cost of height

Return to height


Internal city structure

Gradients




- Slope of height gradient across *global cities* **constant over time**
 - Distance elasticity about -0.29 in 1900 and 2000
- **Commercial height gradient steeper** than residential gradient [Table](#)
 - Driven by substitution in use and construction (in model)
- North American height gradients steeper than European or Asian gradients
 - Role for regulation?
- Evidence for **height discontinuity** at land use border [Discontinuity](#)
 - Discontinuous change of 0.2 log points at CBD boundaries of North Am. cities

Height gradient in data



$$\begin{aligned}\text{dln}(y)/\text{dln}(|x|) &= -.29^{***} \\ \text{dln}(y)/\text{dln}(|x|) | \text{year} \leq 1900 &= -.282^{***}\end{aligned}$$

Fuzzy height gradient









Skyscrapers as cause and effect of urbanization








Counterfactuals

- Solve for endogenous objects given primitives
 - Exogenous parameters: $\{\alpha^U, \beta, \omega^U, \theta^U, \tau^U, \bar{a}^U, \bar{c}^U, \bar{S}^U, \bar{U}, r^a\}$
 - Location-specific endogenous objects $\{L(x), n(x), \bar{p}^U(x), r^U(x), \tilde{S}^U(x)\}$
 - City-specific endogenous objects $\{y, N\}$
- Pick one exogenous parameter and consider a **series of alternative values**
 - Change all use-specific values at a time, maintaining relative size
 - Generate a vector of equilibrium values for each endogenous outcome
- Explore vector of equilibrium values of endogenous outcomes
 - Outcomes vs. "forcing" parameter
 - Endogenous outcome vs. other endogenous outcomes (e.g. population)







GE effects of variation in agglomeration elasticity



GE effects of variation in transport cost



GE effects of variation in cost of height




— Commercial - - - Residential

Summary

- Height positively correlated with various outcomes
 - Rent, productivity, wage, population
- Skyscrapers are cause and effect of urbanization
 - **Demand channels**, e.g. agglomeration gains, reduction in transport cost
 - Urbanization causes skyscraper development
 - **Supply channel**, reduction in cost of height
 - Skyscrapers cause urbanization, deserves more attention in literature
- Model generates **empirically relevant elasticities that vary by channel**
 - Population elasticity of rent: 0.1-0.3 (in line with Ahlfeldt & Pietrostefani, 2019)
 - Population density elasticity of height: 0.1-1







Height and city size



Population elasticity of height ≈ 0.25 | pop. $> 1m$
Likely from a mix of demand and supply channels

Regulation

GE effects of height regulation



Summary

- Regulation causes **large incidence (cost)** on immobile factor (land)
 - 5.8% of GDP of a city similar to Houston, TX, equiv. to \$23 bn per year
 - \$210k per-capita terms
- Implications **differ** from standard **closed-city** model
 - Regulation increases horizontal size of CBD, but reduces size of residential zone
 - Population shrinks, wages fall (lower agglomeration gains)
 - **Rents must fall** to restore equilibrium (reservation utility)
 - Migration offsets affordability gains from liberal land use regulation

Mind positive effects of height regulation
(less shadowing, congestion, coherence of fabric, etc.)


Scope for future research

- Positive and negative externalities of skyscrapers
 - Agglomeration effects, signaling, tourism, etc.
 - Shadowing, congestion, loss of coherent (historic) fabric
- Costs and returns to height
 - Explore heterogeneity, non-linear and threshold effects more fully
 - Use-specific costs to be incorporated into quantitative models
- Non-economic motives
 - Evidence for height competition?
 - Direct systematic evidence on profitability of skyscrapers

Worth accounting for use-specific vertical costs and heights in QSMs

Additional material


Tallest buildings in history




Height decisions

Vertical growth


Completions by height




Completions by world region




Determinants





Diffusion



Skyscraperization



Tallest buildings in cities





Height decisions

Few tall buildings are suspiciously tall




Empire State Building



Height decisions

ESB beats stock market over its (first lifetime)

Discontinuity




Height gradients

	(1) Ln(height)	(2) Ln(height)	(3) Ln(height)	(4) Ln(height)	(5) Ln(height)	(6) Ln(height)	(7) Ln(height)
Distance from CBD center (km)	-0.069*** (0.01)	-0.042*** (0.00)	-0.052*** (0.00)	-0.036*** (0.00)	-0.024*** (0.00)	-0.023*** (0.00)	-0.048*** (0.00)
City fixed effects	Yes						
$d \ln(y) / d \ln(x)$	-.23	-.27	-.33	-.26	-.12	-.12	-.35
Building Sample	$t^a \leq 1900$	All	Comm. ^b	Residential	Asia	Europe	North A. ^b
Observations	344	3469	1294	1185	2081	662	419
R^2	.494	.559	.679	.647	.427	.331	.376


Notes: ^a: Completion year. ^b Commercial. ^c: North America. Unit of observation is city-distance bin (1 km). Height is the height of the tallest building within a one-km distance bin. Building data from Emporis. CBD definitions (global prime locations) for 125 global cities from Ahlfeldt et al. (2020). Elasticities computed at the sample means. Data from Empiris (see Ahlfeldt et al. (2020) for details). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Back

Cost of height




(a) Unit cost vs. height





(b) Usable floor area vs. height

Cost of height over time



Return to height



Back

Return to height over time

