The Impact of Democratic Exposure on Immigrant Political Engagement

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Abstract

Applying economic literature on cultural transmission to the field of political theory, this paper shows that exposure to democratic institutions plays an important role in motivating political engagement. This paper utilizes a two-way fixed effects model that estimates the effect of exposure to democracy amongst European immigrants. This approach controls for observable individual characteristics in addition to destination country fixed effects, allowing for variation in the country of origin to explain differences in political engagement amongst individual immigrants. I find that origin country democracy is only significant amongst individuals who immigrated as adults. Building on Acemolgu et al. (2024), I find similar effects when using regional waves of democratization as an instrument for democracy in the immigrant's origin country.

1 Introduction

Why do citizens vote? This question is integral to the health of a democratic country. It has troubled many political and economic theorists who have tried to understand the rational motivations for this decision. Citizens face real costs in going out to vote, both in terms of travel costs and the opportunity cost of time spent away from either work or leisure. However, the benefits of voting are infinitesimally small. The probability that the individual's vote will influence the election outcome for the party he or she favors is negligible. Since the costs outweigh the benefits, voter turnout must be driven by the psychological benefits gained by voting (Tullock, 1967). Studies that analyze these psychological benefits emphasize the important role democratic countries serve in socializing and motivating civic responsibilities, political engagement, and political participation (Riker & Ordeshook, 1968) (Tullock, 1967). If socialization is an important avenue for encouraging citizens to vote, then how does voter behaviour differ for citizens born and raised in a democratic country compared with non-democratic countries?

This paper explores the role democratic institutions have in influencing an individual's interest in political participation and the democratic process. As outlined by Alesina and Giuliano (2015), institutions—defined as legal systems, rules, and regulations imposed on a society— have a strong

relationship with culture, defined as the set of values and beliefs held by the individual. Identifying a causal relationship between institutions and culture is inherently difficult. Immigrants serve as a valuable group to study in that once they immigrate, the only way through which their origin country's institutions influence their behaviour is through the effect it has on their internal beliefs and values. We can therefore measure the level of democracy the immigrant was exposed to in the origin country to test how this exposure influences their political engagement in their destination country. By using destination country fixed effects, survey year fixed effects, and observable individual controls, I hold constant variation in the destination country and characteristics known to influence political engagement.

Of course, focusing my analysis on immigrants introduces its own set of concerns. Most notably, as described by Alesina and Giuliano (2015), immigrants do not constitute a random sample. There is the potential concern of selection bias due to migration. Those who are willing to leave their environment and relocate to a new country may demonstrate a stronger drive for political change. Some immigrants from nondemocratic countries may immigrate for the opportunity to participate in a democratic country. They may also be more likely to pursue greater opportunities, have higher incomes, and therefore be more politically engaged compared to their peers in their country of origin. It is therefore important to keep in mind that the sample of immigrants will not completely reflect the behaviour of the origin country's population. As a result, it is common in the literature on cultural transmission to sample children of immigrants, as they are less likely to encounter this selection bias (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015). This logic extends to those who immigrated as children. Thus, I additionally estimate the effect of democratic exposure for different age groups. This allows me to mitigate the effect of selection bias, as well as compare the effects of varying lengths in origin-country exposure.

I find that the effect of origin country's democracy only affects an individual's political engagement if the individual immigrated as an adult. More specifically, I find that, amongst those who immigrated as adults, a one-point increase in the origin country's participatory democracy score leads to a 0.2 percentage point increase in the probability of being interested in politics, all else constant. Within the sample of immigrants, I find that, between the lowest democracy score and the highest democracy score an immigrant was exposed to, there is a 78.6 point difference. Assuming

a linear probability model, living in the most democratic country compared to the least democratic country is associated with a 15.7 percentage point increase in the probability of being politically interested. When employing my instrumental variable approach, I find that the effect decreases to a 0.1 percentage point increase in probability per unit of democracy. This implies that living in the most compared to the least democratic country is associated with a 7.82 percentage point increase in the probability of being politically interested.

Another source of concern is that what may be driving the individual's behaviour is not the democratic institutions, but rather economic factors, due to the high correlation between democracy and GDP per capita (Acemoglu et al., 2019). Furthermore, if immigrants are migrating due to economic downturn or political instability, this would introduce heterogeneity in the type of immigrants within the sample that is unaccounted for. To address this concern, I rely on an instrumental variable approach developed by Acemoglu et al. (2019) and adapted to the individual level in Acemoglu et al. (2024) that uses regional trends in democratization as an instrument for origin country democracy. I find that my estimates using the instrumental variable approach are similar, although now only the oldest age group (21+) is statistically significant. For robustness, I also employ this approach to test the effect of democratic exposure on support for a list of political actions, namely signing a petition, participating in a boycott, attending a protest, and attending an unofficial strike. I find that a one-unit decrease in a country's democracy score is associated with a 0.3 to 0.5 percentage point increase in the probability that an individual opposes taking any form of political action. Conversely, a one-unit increase in the democracy score is associated with a 0.2 to 0.5 percentage point higher likelihood of having previously participated in most forms of political action.

This paper contributes to the literature on cultural transmission to analyze voter behaviour and determine the role democratic institutions play in shaping an individual's political engagement. In addition, this paper is the first, to my knowledge, that directly compares the effect of democratic exposure on political interest amongst immigrants for different age groups. By comparing the length of democratic exposure to different age groups, my findings offer insight into how this affects political engagement, a key factor in voter turnout. This, in turn, provides insight into the relationship between democratic institutions and political culture, a critical relationship for a

healthy democracy.

2 Literature Review

The Voter's Paradox is a prevalent study in political economy and rational choice theory, formally outlined by Tullock (1967) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968).

$$R = (Pr)(B) - C + P \tag{1}$$

Where R represents the reward for voting, B represents the benefits the individual receives from their chosen candidate winning, Pr represents the probability of their vote influencing the outcome of the election, C represents the real cost of voting, and P represents the psychological satisfaction from voting. Because the probability that an individual's vote will influence their candidate winning is infinitesimally small, $(Pr)(B)$ is practically zero, implying the real benefits will always be outweighed by the non-zero costs. Therefore, for the individual to be motivated to vote, P must outweigh C. If the psychological benefits outweigh the real costs, then a citizen will deem it worthwhile to vote despite the costs incurred. The factors that shape these psychological benefits are extensively explored (Harder & Krosnick, 2008), with a key explanation being "socialization" into the democratic tradition (Riker & Ordeshook, 1968) (Tullock, 1967). Essentially, democratic societies instill the importance of voting into their citizens by promoting a sense of civic responsibility, political interest, and political engagement.

Understanding voter behaviour is extensively explored in the political science literature. Voicu and Comsa (2014) explore the effects of the country of origin on immigrant voter turnout within a European context. They find that exposure in the host country, not democracy in the country of origin, is the explanatory factor behind immigrant voting behaviour. Cho and K. (1999) explore how socialization affects immigrants and non-immigrants belonging to visible minority groups. They find that socialization in terms of years since the individual immigrated is a prevalent factor, however, this effect differs depending on the individual's minority status. Zingher and Thomas (2012) find that political interest is lower among non-European immigrants compared to native

and European immigrants in Australia.

In the political economy literature, Acemoglu et al. (2024) explore how exposure to democracy affects an individual's likelihood to support democratic governance. While their analysis focuses on citizens who were raised in the country of study, they also analyze the effect on immigrants who were exposed to the political institutions of their origin country. In addition, they distinguish between the effects of exposure to successful and non-successful democracies, where successful democracies are defined as democratic countries that experience successful GDP growth, controlled corruption, political stability, public expenditure, and inequality. They additionally analyze exposure to successful and non-successful autocracies (non-democracies). Exposure is measured as the number of years an individual has lived in a democratic country since the age of six, the approximate age at which a child becomes cognizant of their surroundings. They find that it is exposure to successful democracies, not democracies in general, that results in increased support amongst individuals. Their empirical strategy here exploits variation across age groups, countries, and surveys, controlling for country, age, cohort, and year of interview fixed effects. While within-country variation is accounted for, the authors take additional measures to address endogeneity concerns. First, they conducted a placebo test on exposure to democracy before the individual was born, for which they found no significant impact. Next, they show that exposure to democracy has no effect on other non-political attitudes, which disproves concerns that these results are driven by other sources of social change. Finally, they construct an instrumental variable strategy that estimates regional trends in democracy (excluding the origin country itself) as an instrument for the origin country's level of democracy as used in Acemoglu et al. (2019). They argue that regional democratization only affects the origin country's democracy through a regional "demand for democracy" which is independent of the origin country's economic and political shocks.

In addition to political theory on immigrant voting behaviour, my analysis builds upon economic theory regarding cultural transmission. While not politics-oriented, Alesina et al. (2013) investigate the economic origins of cultural differences concerning the roles of women within a society. Their research focuses on the source of gendered culture, and how this culture shapes institutions, which in turn influence women's economic outcomes. Of note to this study is their approach to differentiating the role of cultural persistence from institutional barriers. They exploit

the fact that the first channel is internal to the individual, while the second channel is not. Therefore, children of immigrants will maintain the internalized cultural norms through their families while living in a country no longer subject to the same institutional and market barriers. This allows the authors to analyze variations in cultural beliefs at the individual level while holding the external factors constant. They specifically focus on estimating the impact of historic gender inequality on the children of immigrants living in the United States and Europe. They employ a fixed-effect regression that controls for both the destination country and origin country fixed effects. By including destination country fixed effects, they can control for state-varying differences in laws, markets, regulations, and institutions. It also accounts for the potential selection of immigrants to different states. In addition, they also include a vector of individual-level controls, a vector for current country-level controls, and a vector of historical country-level controls. Alesina and Giuliano (2015) highlight the importance of using second-generation immigrants compared to first-generation immigrants. They argue that second-generation immigrants constitute a more appropriate sample for measuring cultural transmission compared to first-generation immigrants. The main concerns associated with first-generation immigrants are disruption and selection bias due to migration, the latter of which is alleviated in the children of immigrant samples. First-generation immigrants may possess certain characteristics or traits that enable them to migrate or be accepted by the destination country, which may also influence their economic outcomes. Nonetheless, concerns regarding self-selection are not completely alleviated even among a sample of second-generation immigrants, as the reasons for an immigrant family migrating may also persist and influence the outcomes of their children. It is therefore important to keep in mind that both immigrants and the children of immigrants are not a random sample of the origin country's population.

An additional issue with using a sample of second-generation immigrants is that we lose the ability to analyze how direct exposure can persist and influence an individual's outcome, even once environmental barriers are removed. As Chetty and Hendren (2018) illustrate, environmental exposure during one's youth plays a significant role in influencing future outcomes. Focusing on American households that relocate to different neighborhoods, they find that neighbourhood-level variation plays an important role in explaining the economic outcomes of children who move to new neighborhoods. They find that accumulated childhood exposure to the new neighbourhood

serves a causal role in the child's future outcomes, whereas this effect is not prevalent for adults. This highlights an important aspect of analysis that is frequently ignored in these immigrant studies, which is measuring the length of exposure of the origin country.

There is currently a gap in linking the study on cultural transmission to the political economy literature as it applies to voter behaviour. However, some studies have sought to link the two strands of literature. Bilodeau (2016) explores the effect of origin country gender inequality on female immigrant political participation. More recently, Hur and Jung (2024) explore the impact of historical political culture on an individual's democratic preferences. This paper builds on Alesina et al.'s (2013) findings by illustrating a new dimension through which historical institutions can shape cultural preferences. By applying a political economy lens, Hur and Jung (2024) similarly explore the origins of democratic institutions and how these institutions can create a political culture that persists across generations and environments. Similarly, it extends Acemoglu et al.'s (2024) findings by differentiating between contemporary institutions and historical institutions, and by incorporating inter-generational transmission into their analysis.

3 Empirical Strategy

3.1 Estimating the Effect of Exposure to Democracy

While it may be beneficial to analyze voting behaviour directly, this approach has a few empirical limitations. The first is that voters face varying cost barriers to voting that are unobservable. The second is that among a sample of immigrants, many are unable to vote even if they were willing to due to legal barriers. Therefore, I focus on understanding the factors that influence the psychological benefits of voting, the variable P in equation 1. In particular, I focus on estimating the role of political interest as it serves an important role in increasing the psychological benefits of voting.

This paper aims to identify the causal relationship between democratic culture and political participation within the individual. More specifically, how does the level of democratic participation in an immigrant's origin country influence their willingness to vote in their destination country?

This involves parsing out channels not related to democratic culture that could influence an individual's level of political participation, including the political institutions in the destination country, time effects, and observable individual characteristics.

To this end, I adopt a model based on Alesina et al. (2013), adjusted to exposure to democratic institutions. My empirical model is:

$$P_{i,d,c,t} = \alpha_{d,t} + \beta \text{Exposure}_{c,i} + \mathbf{X}_i \Pi + \mathbf{O}_c \Psi + \varepsilon_{i,d,c,t} \tag{2}$$

In equation 2, $P_{i,d,c,t}$ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if immigrant i is interested in politics, and 0 otherwise. The term $\alpha_{d,t}$ denotes destination country fixed effects for the year the survey was conducted. $\text{Exposure}_{c,i}$ refers to the average level of electoral democracy in the origin country c (using the V-Dem Participatory Index, scaled from 0 to 100) that individual i was exposed to. The term $\mathbf{O}_c \Psi$ represents a vector of origin country control variables, including the level of social welfare and education in the origin country. These controls help account for differences between origin countries that both shape their democracy levels and influence immigrants' political behavior in their destination country. $\mathbf{X}_i \Pi$ includes a vector of individual-level controls based on Harder and Krosnick's (2008) literature on individuals' voting behaviour. These include income, age, gender, marital status, level of education, and occupation status. Similarly, reflecting the empirical approach used in Alesina et al. (2013), I will also control for current observable country characteristics. Due to concerns of unobservable heterogeneity at the destination country level as well as the survey year, my research uses a two-way fixed effects approach. This allows for comparison of immigrants within the same destination country and year of the study. This means holding constant the quality of democratic institutions in the destination country, allowing us to focus on variation within the origin country's democracy level.

$$\text{Exposure to democracy}_{c,i} = \frac{1}{m_i - (b_i - 1)} \sum_{t=b_i}^{m_i} Democracy_{c,t} \tag{3}$$

Where $Democracy_{c,t}$ denotes the level of participatory democracy in country c at time t, b_i represent the year of birth of individual i, and m_i the year of immigration of individual i. The denom-

inator $m_i - (b_i - 1)$ ensures that the average is taken over all the years the individual resided in their country of origin, including both the year of birth and the year of immigration.

3.2 Measuring Length of Exposure to Democracy

By taking the average level of democratic exposure, I apply Chetty and Hendren's (2018) approach to measuring exposure, which bins individuals by the age at which they moved to their new neighborhood. Due to sample size limitations, I bin individuals into 5 age ranges that are roughly equal in sample size while maintaining consistency with economic theory. The first age range, 0-5, is based on Acemoglu et al.'s (2024) argument that an individual experiences socialization at the age of 6. They argue that before this, individuals are too young to be aware of their surroundings and are not typically enrolled in school. This is consistent with Cho and K.'s (1999) argument that a major source of socialization into the democratic tradition occurs through the education system. Therefore, the effect of origin country democracy is expected to be zero for this age group.

The second age group I analyze is ages 6 to 16. This age range represents individuals from the average age of enrollment in primary school to the oldest likely age an individual migrates alongside their parents, coinciding with the end of secondary school. Therefore, this represents the oldest age an individual can immigrate while avoiding the self-selection bias involved with adult immigrants highlighted by Alesino and Giuliano (2015). The effects of the origin country's democracy are theoretically ambiguous. On one end, the school system is a major source of socialization, and we could thus expect a stronger development of political interest within this age group. At the same time, Chetty and Hendren (2018) find that destination region effects are influential on movers until their early 20s. Applying the inverse of these findings indicates that origin country institutions may not affect the outcomes of an individual relative to the destination country.

The third age range is those who immigrated between the ages of 17 to 21. This represents the sample of immigrants subject to the selection bias described by Alesina and Giuliano (2015) and Alesina et al. (2013). Since immigrants at this age are presumably accepted by the destination country due to their own ability and qualifications, they likely demonstrate certain characteristics, such as higher education or ability, relative to their countrymen, that allow them to immigrate. This

selection bias would thus represent a downward bias if we assume that those with higher ability, education, and qualifications to immigrate would also demonstrate higher political engagement. This is consistent with Harder and Krosnick's (2008) finding that education and income are associated with higher voter turnout. For the selection bias to bias upwards, it would require a differential effect of ability between individuals from low democracies and high democracies on political engagement. In addition, this sample represents individuals who could still have destination country institutions play a more prominent role in shaping their outcomes relative to their origin country. At the same time, these individuals also represent those who have most likely spent most of their education in their country of origin, thereby having received a significant source of socialization. The final group represents the sample of immigrants who immigrated as adults. Considering that these individuals experienced the entirety of their youth in their country of origin, we would expect origin country effects to be strongest within this sample.

3.3 Instrumental Variable Approach

A notable concern with this current measure of exposure to democracy is that what I attribute as the effect of democratic institutions is instead the effect of other factors in the origin country that are correlated with democratic institutions. A major concern is that, rather than democratic institutions, economic trends are what explain variation in behaviour. As argued by Acemoglu et al. (2006), Alesina and Giuliano (2015), and Acemoglu et al. (2019), political institutions and economic institutions are highly correlated and endogenous. Therefore, conditioning on GDP when estimating democratic exposure leads to issues of multicollinearity. While there are a few measures for addressing endogeneity, I employ an instrumental variable approach recently developed by Acemoglu et al. (2019), which uses regional trends in regime change to predict the origin country's democracy level, a concept they refer to as "regional waves of democracy."[1] They demonstrate that democratization occurs at the regional level, as demand for regime change in a country will have spillover effects to the surrounding region. Historical evidence for this includes the fall of the Soviet Union and its effect on regime change in neighbouring countries, the Arab

[1]While Acemoglu et al. (2019) refer to this as regional waves of democracy, this phenomenon refers to both democratization and democratic backsliding. It would thus be more accurate to refer to this as regional waves in regime change. Henceforth, I use the two terms interchangeably.

Spring, and waves of democratization and democratic backsliding in Latin America throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. While current literature is divided on the causes of these regional regime changes, they find that these regional political trends are not explained by parallel economic trends within the region (Acemoglu et al. 2019). As a result, we can attribute these changes to a regional "demand for democracy" or, more broadly, a "demand for regime change".

Since the regional demand for regime affects the origin country's democracy level while being exogenous to economic trends, we can use it as an instrument to predict the origin country's level of democracy. As per Acemoglu et al. (2019), this can be defined as:

$$Z_{ct} = \frac{1}{|I_c|} \sum_{c' \in I_c} D_{c't} \tag{4}$$

Where c represents the origin country in a given region, c' represents countries that share the same region and initial regime type[2], and I_c represents the number of countries belonging to the same region and initial regime type, excluding country c. Therefore, Z_{ct}, the predicted value for country c at time t, is the jackknifed average of democracy amongst countries within the same time period.

From this, I construct an instrument that predicts the level of exposure to democracy an immigrant from origin country c would have experienced:

$$\text{Exposure to democracy}_{i,w,c,s} = \frac{1}{p} \sum_{j=1}^{y} Z_{c,s,j} + \pi' X_{i,w,c,s} + v_{i,w,c,s} \tag{5}$$

Where $Z_{c,s,j}$ can be defined as:

$$Z_{i,c,s,j} = \frac{1}{m_i - (b_i - 1)} \sum_{t=m_i - b_i}^{s} Z_{c,t-j} \tag{6}$$

[2]either democracy or autocracy, before the wave of democratization occurred

and where $Z_{i,c,t-j}$ is similar to equation 4 when $j = 0$, but at the individual level. At $j = 0$, equation 3.3 can be understood as the average democracy immigrant i would have been exposed to had they instead been born in a different country from the same region with the same regime as their actual birth country y years prior. To capture regional trends, I also instrument exposure for the same individual had they been born j years prior. This amounts to assuming that regime changes amongst the c' countries from the prior years influence the trajectory of democracy in the origin country, and only through this channel does it affect the immigrant's political engagement. This is a very similar approach to the one used by Acemoglu et al. (2024), except I again average the predicted democracy scores in equation 5 and equation 3.3 to better allow for comparison amongst age groups. For the sake of computational simplicity, I limit y to 15. In other words, I calculate the regional waves of democratization amongst countries that shared the same regime classification 15 years before the individual was born. This also means that I include the average exposure to democracy for individuals up to 15 years older than immigrants i. I argue that 15 years is sufficient time to capture regime trends amongst countries with shared political histories, while still being relevant to immigrant i's actual exposure to democracy.

3.4 Political Action

While political interest has proper theoretical and empirical justifications, it also carries some weaknesses. The first is that by limiting the variable to a simple binary that may be open-ended, I may be analyzing a variable with limited variation. This is particularly a concern considering that many people may report being interested relative to those who say they are not. In addition, political interest may be inconsistent across time and may not capture consistent political engagement by the individual.

To address these concerns, I additionally test the effect of democratic exposure on the individual's sentiments towards a list of political actions, namely signing a petition, joining in a boycott, attending a protest, and participating in an unofficial strike. These variables provide an attractive source of analysis since they are more direct measures of political engagement within a democratic system. These each represent avenues through which an individual can express their political opinions beyond the electoral cycle, and unlike voting, do not exclude non-citizen immigrants. In

addition, these measures are still divorced from specific political leanings. Analysis is split into 2 sections, the first analyzes whether the individual would be supportive or opposed to participating in such acts. These represent the individual's theoretical willingness to take political action, removed from any political context. The second analyzes the probability that an individual has taken political action in the past, relative to those who would be willing to participate in such activities but have not yet. A fundamentally different measure of political engagement as it captures realized political behaviour, and whether political attitudes translate into action. This provides strong evidence of how democratic institutions can influence behaviour. However, taking political action does not necessarily mean higher political engagement, due to a lack of opportunities and higher costs. Including both measures provides complementary insight and offers a robustness check on the effects of democratic exposure.

4 Data and Methodology

I primarily rely on two datasets for my analysis. The first is the European Value Study, which is a cross-national, longitudinal survey research project asking European questions on beliefs, values, religion, and politics. While the survey does not target immigrants specifically, the 2008 and 2018 survey waves ask for the respondent's citizenship, country of birth, parents' country of birth, and year of immigration. It includes data on how often an individual votes (always, usually, never, not allowed to vote) and their level of political interest (very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, and not at all interested), as this allows for straightforward fixed-effect regressions compared to ordinal rankings. For simplicity, I reduce political interest into a binary (interested, not interested). It also contains additional questions on whether the individual has ever, or would ever, commit any of the following political actions: sign a petition, join a boycott, join an unofficial strike, and attend lawful/peaceful demonstrations. For each of the political actions, respondents can respond with "would never do", "might do", and "have done". From these responses I construct two binary variables, the first for "would never do" and "might do" and the second for "might do" and "have done". This approach allows me to account for differences in distance between the three categories while still allowing for fixed-effect regressions. The major advantage of such

an approach is that it allows me to account for the distance between the ordinal categories while allowing for fixed-effect regressions. Utilizing these political action variables provides robustness to my main dependent variable by providing alternative forms of political engagement beyond simple interest.

EVS also contains information on sociodemographic characteristics, such as age, gender, year of birth, income level (in terms of relative wealth within countries), education level, occupational status, and marital status. Based on the literature for voting behaviour, these characteristics are all important variables to control for.

To measure democracy, I will rely on measures provided by Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). V-Dem provides various indices that measure the annual level of democracy within a country. Since my research is interested in democratic institutions that encourage voter turnout, I focus on the participatory democracy index. This index considers the degree to which citizens participate in their government through local democratic institutions, civil society organizations, and direct democracy. It also considers whether elections were free and fair, as well as the prevalence of a free and independent media. Since the index operates on a 0-1 scale, I multiply the variable by 100 for ease of interpretation. Looking at Figure 4, we can see that the majority of European immigrants in this sample originate from very low democracy scores and very high democracy scores. An additional variable I rely on is V-Dem's regime type classification, which categorizes countries into liberal democracies, electoral democracies, electoral autocracies, and closed autocracies. I convert these classifications into a Democracy Regime variable and the latter two into an Autocracy Regime variable, which I then use in my instrumental variable for regional waves of democracy for countries with similar initial regime class. V-Dem also provides other country-level variables, including the level of educational equality within a country (which I proxy for human capital) and an income inequality index.

Finally, I rely on the United Nations M49 region coding in order to attribute region codes to each country. While Acemoglu et al. (2019) uses the 7 continents as the region classifications, I use a more granular definition of regions, which uses the region codes (Northern Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America, Central Asia, Eastern Asia, South-Eastern Asia, Southern Asia, Western Asia, and Oceania). I also use intermediate region

codes as well, which further break down Sub-Saharan Africa, Oceania, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

5 Results

5.1 Main Results

This paper is interested in understanding how exposure to democracy influences an individual's likelihood to vote by motivating their political engagement. Figure 1 makes it clear that political interest is highly correlated with the individual's likelihood to vote in national and local elections. This demonstrates that higher political engagement is associated with higher voter turnout, consistent with the theory outlined by Riker and Ordeshook (1968). By viewing Figure 2, we can see that higher democracy levels in the country of origin are associated with higher political interest. These results are consistent with the baseline OLS regression in Table 1.. Figure 3 illustrates this with greater depth by separating democracy by quintiles. While political interest is most prevalent for the upper quintile of democracies, it is not necessarily a linear relationship, as the lowest quintile is also more likely to demonstrate political interest.

Table 1 presents the estimated effect of exposure to the average level of democracy in an immigrant's country of origin for the full sample. I find that the average level of exposure is statistically significant at the 1% level under my linear probability estimates and at the 5% level when I include destination country and survey year fixed effects. In all cases, a 1 unit increase in one's origin country's democracy is associated with a 0.1% increase in the individual's likelihood to vote. I also find that many of the observable characteristics, such as age, education, income, and gender, are also correlated with political interest as described by Harder and Krosnick (2008).

A major element missing from these regressions is accounting for the length of exposure amongst immigrants. This is addressed in Table 2, which builds upon the fixed effect regression results in column 4 of Table 1 by separating the sample into 4 different age groups. All four regressions have small standard errors below 0.001, which is encouraging. I find that the statistical significance found in Table 1 is entirely explained by the sample of immigrants who immigrated

above the age of 17. I find that the groups that received the lowest length of exposure lack any statistical significance. The very small coefficient, alongside similarly small standard errors relative to columns 3 and 4, the 17+ indicate that we cannot confirm an effect of origin country institutions on political interest for those who immigrated as children. These results are consistent with theory on childhood exposure as outlined by Chetty and Hendren (2018). Notably, it also shows that socialization is not prominent for individuals between the ages of 6 and 16, which is contrary to Acemoglu et al.'s (2024) claim that socialization becomes prevalent around the age of 6.

Amongst the sample that immigrated as adults, we find that a one unit increase in their country's democracy score is associated with a 0.2% increase in democracy. This effect is statistically significant at the 10% level for those who immigrated between the ages of 17 and 21, and statistically significant at the 1% for those who immigrated above the age of 21. This effect is particularly noteworthy since I expect the selection bias associated with immigration to result in a downward bias on political interest as described in Section 3.2. This indicates that the length of origin country exposure plays a more prominent role in explaining the individual's political interest than the downward bias would indicate.

5.2 IV Results

One major concern with these results is that the effect of variation in democracy between origin countries may also be attributed to economic factors within the country of origin. I thus employ my instrumental variable approach to isolate the effect of democratic institutions on political behaviour. Table 3 presents my estimation results using a 2SLS linear probability model with destination and survey year fixed effects for the full sample. Column 1 uses regional waves of democratization, while column 2 uses intermediate regional waves of democratization, which uses a smaller selection of countries within a region. I find that both instruments demonstrate similar effects and are both consistent with my OLS fixed effect regressions. The respective first-stage regressions can be found in Table 4. Since the subregion IV provides stronger statistical power, I use it in my age group comparisons for Table 5. My results are largely the same as in Table 2, with the exception of column 3, which now loses its statistical power. I also find that the effect of exposure to democracy is lower amongst those who immigrated above the age of 21 when compared

to the baseline case. Now, a one-unit increase in the average level of participatory democracy is associated with a 0.1% increase in political interest, with this effect now only being significant at the 5% level. This indicates that economic trends also affected political engagement, and were biasing my baseline results upwards.

5.3 Robustness Check: Exposure to Democracy and Political Action

To test whether exposure to democracy affects alternative measures of political engagement, I investigate the effect it has on an individual's likelihood to participate in petitions, boycotts, protests, and strikes. Figure 5 illustrates that immigrants from non-democracies are most likely to oppose participating in any form of political action. Meanwhile, immigrants from high participatory democracies are more likely to have either participated, or be willing to participate, in all forms of political action. Table 6 shows the effect of democratic exposure on the likelihood that an individual would support such actions, while Table 7 shows the probability that an individual has taken political action as opposed to simply being willing to. These results are based on the full sample. Under a baseline linear probability model with fixed effects in Table 6, we see that results tend to be mixed, although Table 7 shows that higher democracy in an immigrant's origin country is shown to have a statistically significant effect for all measures of political action except strikes. When we include the 2SLS estimates using sub-regional waves of democracy as seen in Table 8, we find that democratic exposure in the origin country explains an individual's willingness to participate in all channels of political action. While the magnitudes vary from 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points increase for every point increase in participatory democracy, all four results are statistically significant at the 1% level. Table 9 shows similar results to Table 7, with 3 of the 4 measures demonstrating statistical significance in the right direction.

Overall, my estimates demonstrate that exposure to democratic institutions significantly influences political engagement. Through an instrumental variable approach, I find that these results are consistent across different measures of political engagement. I similarly find that exposure to democratic institutions only influences individuals who have immigrated as adults, and that there does not appear to be an effect of origin country democracy on political engagement for those who immigrated as youths.

6 Conclusion

This paper explores the relationship between democratic institutions and culture. Extending on works by Alesina et al. (2013) and Alesina and Giuliano (2015), I explore how cultural transmission occurs in the context of exposure to democratic institutions and political engagement. By applying a recently developed instrument for estimating country of origin effects, I can measure democracy exogenously from economic factors within the origin country. In doing so, I find that the average level of participatory democracy an immigrant was exposed to before immigrating does affect their level of political engagement. Those who were exposed to high levels of participatory democracy in their origin country are more likely to have an interest in politics, less likely to oppose taking political action, and are more likely to have taken political action in the past. Similarly, those who originate from non-democracies and low democracies are less likely to exhibit political interest, are more likely to oppose taking political action, and are less likely to have taken political action in the past. However, this effect is only statistically significant for immigrants who immigrated as adults. When we look at those who immigrated as youth, I am unable to find any origin country effects on political behaviour.

This paper addresses a central question at the crux of democratic theory and voter behaviour: Do democracies socialize their citizens into voting? This paper finds that this is the case; Strong democracies build political engagement and a more politically activated citizenry, while less democratic countries do not. Building political engagement is a key factor in voter turnout, and an activated voter base is critical for maintaining a healthy democracy.

In addition, this paper finds evidence that exposure to strong democratic institutions has a causal effect on political culture as it pertains to their citizens. Unsurprisingly, undemocratic countries would seek to suppress political engagement and disincentivize political action compared to democracies. However, even when individuals relocate to environments and no longer face such external barriers, we still see lower political engagement amongst those who originate from non-democracies. This illustrates that political institutions do influence the individual's internal beliefs, highlighting the causal mechanism between political institutions and political culture. However, this paper also finds that these cultural transmissions are relatively weak. Whereas many studies

on cultural transmission focus on origin country effects on children of immigrants, this paper finds that these cultural transmissions are limited in their effect on even first-generation immigrants. I find that the effects of origin country institutions are conditional on the length of exposure and are statistically insignificant for those who immigrated before their early twenties. This indicates that cultural transmission weakens significantly across generations, and that destination countries may serve a more influential role in socializing individuals. However, to conclusively determine either effect would require further research. Nonetheless, these results contribute important findings in the literature in political economy, cultural transmission, and the role institutions play in shaping individual behaviour.

7 Limitations and Future Extensions

Having completed this research design, one important avenue worth exploring further is the gendered effect in my results. I found that amongst the sample of those who immigrated as adults, my results were primarily driven by female migrants. This could indicate that what I was attributing to democratic exposure may in fact be related to gendered institutions that are highly correlated with democracy level. More work will need to be done in this aspect. I would be interested in applying a similar model, but instead of focusing on participatory democracy, I would rely on one of the gendered indices VDEM provides alongside a gender interaction.

An additional major limitation with my results is the relatively small sample size of individuals who immigrated below the age of 17. Considering that this sample is less affected by the selection bias associated with immigration, more granular analysis on the effect of socialization in the school system would also be beneficial.

Finally, while this paper focused on average exposure, I would also be interested in exploring the effect of a change in democracy, conditional on the regime type of the country of origin. I believe this approach would make proper use of the same instrument to capture the effect of a change in democracy across the region.

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8 Appendix

Table 1: Comparison of OLS and Fixed Effects Models

	Dependent variable: Political Interest		
		OLS	*Fixed Effects*
	(1)	(2) w/Controls	(3)
Democracy Exposure	0.001***	0.001***	0.001**
	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)
Individual Controls			
Gender (Female)		-0.122***	-0.114***
		(0.013)	(0.013)
Has a Partner		-0.015	-0.023
		(0.015)	(0.015)
Age		0.006***	0.006***
		(0.0005)	(0.001)
Education		0.064***	0.065***
		(0.005)	(0.005)
Income		0.016***	0.021***
		(0.003)	(0.003)
Unemployed		-0.020	0.005
		(0.027)	(0.027)
Full-Time		-0.010	-0.004
		(0.018)	(0.018)
Student		0.180***	0.162***
		(0.038)	(0.037)
Part-Time		0.096***	0.080***
		(0.027)	(0.027)
Self-Employed		0.034	0.033
		(0.032)	(0.032)
Country Controls			
Equity		-0.178***	0.014
		(0.068)	(0.083)
Education Equality		0.026**	-0.005
		(0.012)	(0.015)
Constant	0.450***	0.062	
	(0.008)	(0.053)	
Observations	7,795	6,215	6,215
R^2	0.002	0.091	0.084
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.089	0.075
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 2: Fixed Effects Estimates by Age Group

	Dependent Variable: Political interest			
	Age at Immigration			
	0 - 5	6 - 16	17 - 21	21+
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democracy Exposure	−0.0003	−0.0001	0.002*	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Individual Controls				
Gender (Female)	−0.160***	−0.071**	−0.112***	−0.105***
	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.018)
Has a Partner	−0.060	−0.007	−0.040	−0.010
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.023)
Age	0.006***	0.006***	0.008***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.053***	0.068***	0.065***	0.063***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.007)
Income	0.026***	0.009	0.023***	0.024***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Unemployed	−0.078	0.005	0.082	0.014
	(0.068)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.038)
Full-Time	−0.104**	0.043	0.063	−0.017
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.025)
Student	0.109	0.123	0.264***	0.217***
	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.084)	(0.078)
Part-Time	0.062	0.153**	0.205***	0.006
	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.038)
Self-Employed	−0.067	−0.017	0.009	0.070
	(0.084)	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.044)
Country Controls				
Equity	0.133	0.073	−0.275	−0.029
	(0.178)	(0.191)	(0.223)	(0.126)
Education Equality	−0.015	−0.025	0.050	0.005
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.023)
Observations	1,012	1,203	1,121	3,124
R^2	0.098	0.069	0.093	0.091
Adjusted R^2	0.043	0.021	0.044	0.074

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3: 2SLS Estimates of Democracy Exposure (Full Sample)

	Dependent variable:	
	Political Interest	
	Region IV	Subregion IV
	(1)	(2)
Democracy Exposure	0.001*	0.001**
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Individual Controls		
Gender (Female)	−0.123***	−0.122***
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Has a Partner	−0.017	−0.016
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Age	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
Education	0.065***	0.064***
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Income	0.017***	0.017***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Unemployed	−0.023	−0.022
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Full-Time	−0.010	−0.010
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Student	0.182***	0.183***
	(0.038)	(0.038)
Self-Employed	0.034	0.034
	(0.032)	(0.032)
Part-Time	0.098***	0.097***
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Country Controls		
Equity	−0.166**	−0.170**
	(0.068)	(0.069)
Education Equality	0.027**	0.027**
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Observations	6,213	6,206
R^2	0.090	0.090
Adjusted R^2	0.088	0.088
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 4: First-Stage Fixed Effects Estimates of Democracy Exposure

	Dependent variable:	
	Exposure to Democracy	
	Region IV	Subregion IV
	(1)	(2)
Regional Democratization Wave	1.047***	
	(0.014)	
Subregional Democratization Wave		0.831***
		(0.012)
Gender (Female)	−0.211	−0.485
	(0.295)	(0.304)
Has a Partner	−0.859**	−0.727**
	(0.356)	(0.368)
Age	0.095***	0.083***
	(0.012)	(0.013)
Education	0.046	0.081
	(0.113)	(0.117)
Income	0.186***	0.124*
	(0.067)	(0.069)
Unemployed	0.298	−0.566
	(0.625)	(0.644)
Full-Time	−0.396	−0.980**
	(0.414)	(0.427)
Student	0.561	0.530
	(0.877)	(0.906)
Self-Employed	0.726	−0.036
	(0.748)	(0.772)
Part-Time	−0.555	−1.054
	(0.637)	(0.657)
Equity	−9.145***	−18.962***
	(1.984)	(2.086)
Education Equality	1.403***	4.823***
	(0.363)	(0.372)
Observations	6,213	6,206
R^2	0.619	0.594
Adjusted R^2	0.616	0.590
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	
	Note: p¡0.1; p¡0.05; p¡0.01	

Table 5: 2SLS Estimates of Democracy Exposure by Age Group

	Dependent variable: Political Interest			
	Age at Immigration			
	0–5	6–16	17–21	21+
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democracy Exposure	−0.0002	0.0005	0.001	0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Individual Controls				
Gender (Female)	−0.163***	−0.067**	−0.128***	−0.119***
	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.018)
Has a Partner	−0.050	0.011	−0.060	−0.005
	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.023)
Age	0.006***	0.006***	0.007***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.048***	0.067***	0.055***	0.064***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.006)
Income	0.026***	0.004	0.020***	0.019***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Unemployed	−0.107	0.000	0.050	−0.016
	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.038)
Full-Time	−0.101**	0.035	0.051	−0.027
	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.025)
Student	0.118	0.148**	0.329***	0.273***
	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.082)	(0.078)
Self-Employed	−0.049	−0.007	−0.000	0.076*
	(0.082)	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.044)
Part-Time	0.091	0.161**	0.247***	0.017
	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.038)
Country Controls				
Equity	−0.074	−0.069	−0.198	−0.257**
	(0.153)	(0.161)	(0.162)	(0.101)
Education Equality	0.019	−0.003	0.019	0.055***
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.018)
Observations	1,003	1,203	1,121	3,124
R^2	0.109	0.069	0.097	0.101
Adjusted R^2	0.098	0.058	0.086	0.098

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: Fixed Effects Estimates: Transition from 'Would Never Do' to 'Might Do'

	Dependent variable: Political Action			
	Petition	Boycott	Protest	Strikes
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democracy Exposure	0.001	0.002***	0.001	0.001***
	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0004)
Individual Controls				
Gender (Female)	−0.057***	−0.080***	−0.085***	−0.046***
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.011)
Has a Partner	−0.012	−0.021	−0.017	−0.048***
	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.013)
Age	−0.001**	−0.001**	−0.002***	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)
Education	0.040***	0.041***	0.047***	0.021***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Income	0.011***	0.010***	0.008**	0.006**
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Unemployed	−0.016	−0.001	0.028	0.008
	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.024)
Full-Time	0.025	0.022	0.038*	0.036**
	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.016)
Student	0.175***	0.129***	0.187***	0.069**
	(0.051)	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.033)
Part-Time	−0.011	0.090***	0.074**	0.088***
	(0.039)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.024)
Self-Employed	0.060	0.014	0.047	0.007
	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.029)
Country Controls				
Equity	0.068	−0.014	0.006	0.139*
	(0.112)	(0.087)	(0.096)	(0.074)
Education Equality	−0.016	0.003	−0.010	−0.027**
	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.014)
Observations	3,583	5,235	4,686	5,607
R^2	0.041	0.053	0.054	0.033
Adjusted R^2	0.025	0.042	0.042	0.023
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
				p¡0.1; p¡0.05; p¡0.01

Table 7: Fixed Effects Estimates: Transition from 'Might Do' to 'Have Done'

	Dependent variable: Political Action			
	Petition	Boycott	Protest	Strikes
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democracy Exposure	0.003^{***}	0.001^{***}	0.002^{***}	-0.0003
	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Individual Controls				
Gender (Female)	0.038^{**}	0.007	-0.033^{**}	-0.017
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.020)
Has a Partner	-0.050^{***}	-0.062^{***}	-0.056^{***}	0.013
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.024)
Age	0.004^{***}	0.003^{***}	0.004^{***}	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.046^{***}	0.032^{***}	0.051^{***}	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Income	0.013^{***}	0.014^{***}	0.009^{**}	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Unemployed	-0.020	0.013	-0.021	-0.026
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.046)
Full-Time	0.046^{**}	-0.009	0.029	-0.012
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.031)
Student	0.071^{*}	-0.018	0.082^{*}	-0.018
	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.055)
Part-Time	0.125^{***}	-0.018	0.010	-0.0005
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.043)
Self-Employed	0.030	0.075^{*}	0.031	0.056
	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.052)
Country Controls				
Equity	-0.123	0.176^{*}	0.180^{*}	0.091
	(0.097)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.130)
Education Equality	0.019	-0.047^{**}	-0.048^{**}	-0.026
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.024)
Observations	4,211	2,744	3,535	1,519
R^2	0.054	0.036	0.045	0.011
Adjusted R^2	0.041	0.015	0.029	-0.028
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: 2SLS Estimates of Democracy Exposure on Political Action (Would Never to Might Do)

	Dependent variable: Political Action			
	Petition	Boycott	Protest	Strikes
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democracy Exposure	0.005***	0.005***	0.003***	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0003)
Individual Controls				
Gender (Female)	−0.062***	−0.083***	−0.086***	−0.041***
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.011)
Has a Partner	−0.006	−0.014	−0.010	−0.047***
	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.014)
Age	−0.001*	−0.001*	−0.002***	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Education	0.040***	0.045***	0.047***	0.026***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Income	0.012***	0.012***	0.011***	0.007***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Unemployed	0.022	0.038	0.049*	0.051**
	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.024)
Full-Time	0.038*	0.040**	0.056***	0.038**
	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.016)
Student	0.179***	0.159***	0.205***	0.087**
	(0.052)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.034)
Self-Employed	0.067	0.021	0.057	0.008
	(0.044)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.029)
Part-Time	0.033	0.123***	0.103***	0.095***
	(0.039)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.025)
Country Controls				
Equity	0.383***	0.415***	0.219***	0.375***
	(0.091)	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.061)
Education Equality	−0.115***	−0.110***	−0.073***	−0.082***
	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Observations	3,576	5,226	4,677	5,598
R^2	0.096	0.112	0.091	0.058
Adjusted R^2	0.093	0.110	0.088	0.056
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 9: 2SLS Estimates of Democracy Exposure on Political Action (Might Do to Have Done)

	Dependent variable: Political Action			
	Sign	Boycott	Protest	Strikes
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democracy Exposure	0.005***	0.002***	0.002***	−0.0005
	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.0005)	(0.001)
Individual Controls				
Gender (Female)	0.040***	0.006	−0.033**	−0.008
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.020)
Has a Partner	−0.045**	−0.054***	−0.049**	0.020
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.024)
Age	0.004***	0.003***	0.003***	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.044***	0.034***	0.052***	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Income	0.014***	0.013***	0.007*	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Unemployed	−0.015	0.016	−0.035	−0.020
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.045)
Full-Time	0.046**	−0.004	0.031	−0.015
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.030)
Student	0.060	−0.009	0.080*	−0.034
	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.055)
Self-Employed	0.018	0.078*	0.029	0.050
	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.051)
Part-Time	0.127***	−0.017	0.021	−0.010
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.043)
Country Controls				
Equity	−0.115	0.086	−0.195**	−0.075
	(0.081)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.106)
Education Equality	−0.018	−0.040**	0.010	−0.008
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.020)
Observations	4,205	2,739	3,530	1,517
R^2	0.091	0.044	0.054	0.012
Adjusted R^2	0.088	0.040	0.051	0.004
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



(a) Vote in Local Elections

(b) Vote in National Elections

Figure 1: Comparison of Political Participation at Local and National Levels



(a) Petition

(b) Boycott

(c) Protest

(d) Strikes

Figure 5: Distribution of Democracy Exposure by Political Action Type



Figure 2: Correlation Between Political Interest and Origin Country Democracy



Figure 3: Political Interest by Democracy Level



Figure 4: Number of European Immigrants by Participatory Democracy Index