

## CSEN1001: Computer and Network Security

### Spring Term 2019

### Tutorial 8

#### Problem 1 - Needham-Schroeder

Consider the following protocol for secret-key exchange

1.  $A \rightarrow S : A, B, N_A$
2.  $S \rightarrow A : \{N_A, B, K_{A,B}, \{K_{A,B}, A\}K_{B,S}\}K_{A,S}$
3.  $A \rightarrow B : \{K_{A,B}, A\}K_{B,S}$
4.  $B \rightarrow A : \{N_B\}K_{A,B}$
5.  $A \rightarrow B : \{N_B-1\}K_{A,B}$

a) What is the benefit of using  $N_A$ ?

In step 1 we use a nonce  $N_A$  to prevent a replay attack i.e. A checks that  $N_A$  appears in the token returned by S in step 2.

b) Which phase of the protocol implements mutual authentication?

In steps 4 and 5, A and B perform mutual authentication i.e. they prove to each other that they have the session key and that they are participating in this run of the protocol.

#### Problem 2 - Public-Key Authority

"Eve generates a Public, Private key pair, and sends the Public key  $PU^e$  to Bob, claiming that she is Alice." How can this problem be avoided?

#### Answer

This can be avoided by using a Public-Key authority, the following would happen:

- (a) Alice requests Bob's public key  $PU^b$  from the authority, sending along the timestamp of the request.

- (b) The authority replies back with Bob's public key  $PU^b$ , and the timestamp it received from Alice, both encrypted with the authority's private key  $PR^{auth}$ .
- (c) Alice uses Bob's public key  $PU^b$  to encrypt a message to Bob that carries a nonce  $N_1$ .
- (d) Bob gets Alice's public key  $PU^a$ , the same way as in step (a) and (b).
- (e) Bob replies to Alice with  $N_1$  and  $N_2$ ,  $N_1$  assures Alice that Bob is the one who received the message, not Eve, because Eve wouldn't have been able to find  $N_1$ .
- (f) Alice replies to Bob with the  $N_2$  it received, which assures Bob that it is Alice, because Eve cannot find  $N_2$ .
- (g) Now Alice and Bob have a secure channel between them




Figure 1: Public-key authority

### Problem 3 - Session keys

Communicating with an authority provides more security, at the expense of more wasted time, for this reason, simple session keys were proposed as an alternative. What kind of problems can arise when using Session keys? How can they be avoided?

### Answer

Session keys are symmetric keys, and thus much faster to compute an encryption using it than using a public key.

The idea of session keys, is that Alice would send Bob her public key  $PU^a$ , and Bob would reply with a session key  $K_s$  encrypted with  $PU^a$ . See Figure 3.




Figure 2: Session-key exchange

The problem here, is that Eve can make a “Man in the Middle” attack.

- (a) Eve can intercept the message sent by Alice to Bob, which is  $PU^a || ID_A$ .
- (b) Eve then sends  $ID_A$  along with her own Public key  $PU^e$ .
- (c) Bob, thinking that he got the message from Alice, will reply with the session key  $K_s$ , encrypted with  $PU^e$ .
- (d) Eve can decrypt this message to get  $K_s$ , and can now forward it to Alice after encrypting it with Alice's public key  $PU^a$ .
- (e) Alice will think that everything went as expected. And start sending the messages encrypted with  $K_s$ .
- (f) Since Eve knows  $K_s$ , she can read all the exchanged messages.

A possible solution, is to first establish a public key, by using two related values  $N_1$  and  $N_2$ , the steps proceed as follows (See Figure 4):

- (a) Alice sends Bob  $N_1$  and  $ID_A$  encrypted with his public key  $PU^b$ .
- (b) Bob replies with  $N_1$ , that he got from Alice, and  $N_2$ , that is computed from  $N_1$ , encrypted by Alice's public key  $PU^a$ .
- (c) Alice then sends  $N_2$  back to Bob, encrypted with his public key  $PU^b$ , to assure him it's her.
- (d) Then Alice sends a session key  $K_s$ , encrypted with her private key, and Bob's public key.
- (e) Now that Alice and Bob are sure that the  $K_s$  is secured and known only to the two of them, they can both use  $K_s$  for encryption and decryption (symmetric key).




Figure 3: Session-key exchange

### Problem 4 - Certificate Authority

Public-Key authority provides greater security, since Alice and Bob deal with a Trusted-Third-Party, rather than directly communicating with each other. However, such communication places a big burden on the authority, because anyone who wants to communicate with Alice, will have to get her Public key  $PU^a$  from the authority first. How can this be improved?

### Answer

By using a Certificate Authority (CA). In this case, the following would happen:

- (a) Alice sends her Public Key  $PU^a$  to the CA.
- (b) The CA takes care of ensuring that this is the actual Alice and replies back to Alice with  $C_A = PR^{CA}\{PU^a\}$  which is her Public Key and a timestamp, both encrypted by the CA's Private key.
- (c) Whenever Alice would like to communicate with Bob, she would send the  $C_A$  to Bob, Bob can use the CA's Public key  $PU^{CA}$  to get decrypt  $C_A$  and get Alice's Public key  $PU^a$ . The timestamp is used to assure Bob that the certificate isn't old.




Figure 4: Public-key authority

## References

- BINF711 & CSEN1001 Spring 2014
- Questions from the book