

The characteristics of the mind are two-fold, the conscious (or patent Paridṛista) and the unconscious (or latent, A-paridṛista). Of these the patent are those that appear in consciousness as notions. The latent are those that are but the substance itself. They are seven only and it is by inference that their existence itself has been established. 'Suppression, characterization, potentialization, constant change, physical life, movements, power are the characteristics of the mind, besides consciousness.'

Hereafter is introduced the subject of Samyama to be performed by a Yogi with the object of obtaining the knowledge of any desirable subject, when he has mastered all the means of obtaining knowledge as described. -121.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

'The distinctness of succession is the reason for distinctness of modifications.' Is one substratum subject only to one change, which may be described as characteristic, secondary quality, or condition, as the case may be? Or, are the changes of characteristic, secondary quality and condition more than one? What does it come to then? It comes to this that the change must be one because the substratum is one. A cause which has but one form, cannot produce a variety of effects, because the variety in that case would be causeless.

This being the suggestion, it is said:—Distinct changes are posited, because the orders of succession are different.

Observers of the world have plainly observed that an order obtains in the succession of the changes of one clay into dust, kneaded lump, jar, half-jar and sherds. It is also seen that the sequence between powdered clay and kneaded lump is independent of the sequence between kneaded clay and jar: the sequence between a jar and a half-jar is quite another. The sequence between a half-jar and pot-sherds is again quite different. In each of these one of the elements precedes another. The difference of order existing in one succession of changes establishes the distinctness of the changes. Although the substratum of clay is one, it puts on a succession of changes, whose order is established by allied characteristics appearing in succession to each other in due order. The appearance is not, therefore, causeless. This is the meaning.

As is the case with the changes of characteristics, so also is the distinctness of the succession the reason for the distinctness of the changes of secondary qualities and the changes of condition.

The same is illuminated by the Commentary :—'It comes to this that there can be but one modification for one substratum, &c.'

'The succession of characteristic, &c.' :—The word 'succession' is used here to denote that which succeeds, looking upon the one to be nothing distinct from the other.

'Such is also the succession in the case of the change of condition.' And so it happens that the barley grain, even though kept with great care by a cultivator in a grain-pit is, on the lapse of a large number of years, reduced to a condition, such that the cohesion of its particles gives way to the mere touch of hand, i.e., of being reduced to an atomic condition. This is not possible to take place all at once causelessly in the case of new grain. It is, therefore, by a succession of different states appearing one after the other in moments of time as being small, smaller and smallest on the one side, and large, larger and largest on the other, that the specific condition appears.

This distinctness of succession exists only in the case of distinctness being conceived as between the characteristic and the substratum. So he says :— ' All these successions find their being, &c.'

The state of the characterized and the characteristic are relative down from the undifferentiated phenomenal to the products, and vice versa, inasmuch as the solids, clay, etc., are also characteristics in correlation with the ultimate atoms (the tanmâtras, or divine measures). So he says :— ' The characteristic also sometimes becomes the characterized object in relation to the nature of another characteristic.'

When, however, the conception of the unity of the substratum and the characteristic is entertained with reference to the real substratum, the noumenal, i.e., when ' by virtue of that conception,' of the substratum being common to all its states, the characterized object itself is considered as the characteristic, then there is but one change, the change, that is to say, of the characterized object alone. Characteristic, secondary quality and condition enter then into the very being of the characterized.

It is to be considered as having been said by this that the substratum is far removed from the state of constant independent eternity (Kûṭastha nityatâ).

Speaking of the change of characteristic, the Commentator takes up in the context, the distinctions of the modality of the characteristics of the mind :— ' The characteristics of the mind, &c.'

The conscious (patent) characteristics are those that come into our consciousness, of which we are conscious. The latent are those of which we have no direct knowledge. Those that appear, in consciousness as notions are the real cognitions, &c. Suppression, etc., are those that are but the substance itself. This explains that they are not of the nature of illumination.

Well, but if characteristics are latent, they certainly do not exist at all. For this reason he says :— ' And it is by inference that their existence as substance itself is established.' The knowledge that comes through authority is also spoken of here as inference by the similarity of their coming into existence after other knowledge. He mentions the seven characteristics by a verse :— ' Suppression, &c.'

Suppression is the ultra-cognitive state of mental modifications. It is known by authority as well as by inference to be a state of residual potency.

By the word 'characterization' the author suggests virtue and vice. The reading in some places is 'Karma' (action) instead of 'Dharma' (characterization). There too virtue and vice caused by action are to be understood. Virtuous and vicious tendencies of the mind (or, which is the same thing, good and bad character) are known by authority or inferred by the existence of pleasure and pain.

Potentialization or the power which generates mental potencies, is inferred by memory.

Similarly is the constant change of the mind in evolution inferred from the fact of the mind being made up of the three 'qualities' and of the function of the qualities being changeful.

Similarly physical life, the specific action of the mind which sustains physical life, is inferred as a characteristic of the unconscious mind by expiration and inspiration.

Similarly are the movements of the mind, i.e., the acts which set the different organs and parts of the body into motion, inferred by these very movements following thought in that direction.

Similarly is power the subtle state of all the effects of thought which manifest in action (It is the idea of all actions). That this also as a characteristic of the mind, is inferred by seeing the gross appearances due to the mental images thereof.—15.

Sûtra 16.

परिणामत्रयसंयमादतीतानागतज्ञानम् ॥१६॥

परिणाम-त्रय Pariṇāma-traya, the three fold change. संयमात् Samyamât by Samyama over. अतीत Atîta, of the past. अनागत Anâgata, of the future. ज्ञानम् Jñânam, knowledge.

16. By *Samyama* over the three-fold change, comes the knowledge of the past and the future.—122.

परिणामत्रयसंयमादतीतानागतज्ञानम् । धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामेषु संयमाद्योगिनां
भवत्यतीतानागतज्ञानम् । धारणाध्यानसमाधित्रयमेकत्र संयम उक्तस्तेन परिणामत्रयं
साक्षात्क्रियमाणमतीतानागतज्ञानं तेषु सम्पादयति ॥ १६ ॥

VYÂSA.

By *Samyama* over the changes of characteristic, secondary quality and condition, comes to the Yogis the knowledge of the past and the future. The triad of concentration, meditation and trance together has been termed *Samyama*. When direct knowledge of the three-fold change is obtained by means of *Samyama*, knowledge of their past and present is obtained.—122.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Henceforward up to the end of the chapter, the objects of *Samyama* and the attainments which indicate mastery over them, are discussed. Of these, the first object of the *Samyama* of a Yogi, familiar with all the accessories of Yoga, that is introduced, is the triad of changes itself, whose modality has already been described :—‘By *Samyama* over the three-fold changes, comes the knowledge of the past and the future.’

The question is that inasmuch as direct knowledge is obtained only of the object with reference to which *Samyama* is performed, how is it that the *Samyama* on the triad of changes will become the cause of the direct knowledge of the past and the future ? For this reason the Commentator says :—When direct knowledge of the three-fold change has been obtained by means of *Samyama*, the knowledge of the past and the future, having as they do the relation of co-existence with these changes, is also brought about. The direct knowledge of the triad of changes itself, is the direct knowledge of the past and the present which it comprehends. The very essence of the one being the essence of the other, the object of *Samyama* and direct knowledge are not different (in the aphorism). This is the meaning.—16.

Sûtra 17.

**शब्दार्थप्रत्ययानाभितरेतराध्यासात्सङ्करस्त्विभागसंयमा-
त्सर्वभूतकृतज्ञानम् ॥१७॥**

शब्द Śabda, the word. अर्थ Artha, the meaning, the object. प्रत्यय Pratyaya the idea of all these. इतरेतरा Itaretara, of each with the other. अध्यासात् Adhyâsât, because of the coinciding. सङ्करः Saṅkaraḥ, becoming one, appearing as one. तत् Tat, their. प्रविभाग Pravibhâga, distinctions. संयमात् Samyamât, by Samyama over. सर्वे Sarva, all. भूते Bhûta, of living being. रूप Ruta, of the sounds. ज्ञानम् Jñânam, knowledge.

understanding) all at once, having taken up a unified appearance just as the last literal sound ceases. Literal sounds, from the impossibility of being expressed simultaneously, have not the nature of giving support to each other. They appear and disappear showing no connection with the particular word, nor bringing it into consciousness. It is, therefore, said that each of them is not the word (itself).

The letter, however, is singly a constituent of the word ; it has the potentiality of supplying a name for all objects ; it is, as it were, of universal application, inasmuch as it appears in combination with every conjoined letter, it takes different places in different combinations, sometimes being placed before and sometimes after another letter. Thus there are many literal sounds, which being placed in different orders, help in denoting, by convention, certain different sounds according to the difference in the order of their positions. For example, the literal sound of g, au, and h, possessed as they are of the potentiality of giving names to all objects, denote in this particular order (gauh) the particular object which is possessed of udders, &c., (a cow).

A word is that single manifestation of consciousness, which appears just as the succession of literal sounds limited to a particular conventional meaning ceases ; it is a conventional sign for the thing signified.

Thus a single word is perceived as a single manifestation of consciousness ; it is brought into existence by a single effort ; it has no parts and no order ; it is not a whole of separate and distinct literal sounds. It is a phenomenon of the will-to-be (buddhi) ; it is brought into consciousness by the operation of the notion of the last literal sound ; it is understood by the mind of the world, as having come into existence by conjunction of letters) on account of the eternal habit brought about by its ever having been with the help of literal sounds, separately named, uttered and heard, that the power of speech has functioned for the purpose of transferring the complete verbal thought signs from one mind to another. (And this being so), the ordinary mind distinguishes a word from another by conventional meaning, saying that such and such a succession of so many letters, so ending, denotes such and such an object.

Convention, however, is a manifestation of memory showing the mutual correlation of word and meaning, in the shape of coincidence. 'This object is the same as this word, and this word is the same as this object'—such is the convention showing the one correlated to the other.

Thus do word, meaning and idea run into each other on account of mutual correlation of coincidence. Take, for example, the word cow

the object cow and the idea cow. Whoever knows their distinction knows all.

And in all words lies the power of a sentence. If you say "A tree," the word 'is' is understood, inasmuch as the object signified by a word never fails of existence.

Similarly no action is possible without its means. Thus on pronouncing the word 'cooks,' all the appliances necessary for the act of cooking are meant to be understood. It is only for the purpose of specialization that the object, the subject and the instrument such as Chaitra, fire and rice are expressly mentioned.

Then is also seen the combination of words in sentences for expressing meanings by the entire sentences. 'The Vedic student reads the hymns, lives, bears life.' In a sentence like this the words and the meanings of words are both expressed in consciousness. Hence should words be etymologically divided as expressing actions or nominal cases. Otherwise how would it be possible to construe a word, a noun or a verb, when one cannot be known from the other on account of external similarity. For example, take the words Bhavati, Asvah, Ajapâyah.

The words, the meaning and the idea of the sentence are distinct from each other. Thus *svetate prâsâdah* (The mansion shines white) means an action. The words *sretah prâsâdah* (A white mansion), signify a noun.

Both forms of speech denote both a noun and an affirmation of an action and also the meaning and the idea thereof. How? By the correlation, 'this is that.' The notion puts on but one appearance, the same as the conventional sign. As to the white object, it is the support for both the word and the idea. It changes its state, but goes neither with the word nor with the idea. Such is a word and such an idea; none goes with the other. Another is a word, another its meaning and another the idea. By performing Samyama in this way on their mutual distinction, a Yogi obtains knowledge of the sounds of all living beings.—123.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS

This is another subject for Samyama, here discussed :—'The word, the object and the idea appear as one, because each coincides with the other ; by Samyama on their distinctions comes knowledge of the sounds of all living beings.'

Here with the object of explaining the sound (verbal) which denotes a meaning, the commentator first mentions the province of the operation of the power of speech (VÂK). Now the power of speech, Vâk, manifests literal sounds in eight places. As it is said :—'There are eight seats of literal sounds, the chest, the throat, and the head, and also the root of the tongue, the teeth, the nose, the lips and the palate.'

This VÂK, the power of speech, is purposed to operate in literal sounds only, such as they have come into existence by the recognition of the world. It does not operate to express the sign as such of a thing signified. This is the meaning.

He ascertains the sphere of the operation of the power of hearing :—The auditory power, again, operates to change itself into the particular form of a literal sound, which is a distinct modification of the manifested inarticulate sound striking against the organs of speech. Its operation is limited to that much ; it does not as such signify the thing signified. This is the meaning.

He distinguishes the verbal sign signifying an object as such, from literal sounds as they have come into existence by the recognition of the world :—‘A word, however, (that is to say, the sign signifying a thing) is taken by the understanding all at once, having assumed a unified appearance, just as the last literal sound disappears.’ Each of the literal sounds is first taken in according as the sounds are familiar to the world ; and after they have been taken into the mind, they are brought together into a single manifestation of consciousness, and thus as a sign signifying an object it is taken in by the understanding all at once. The single verbal sound ‘cow’ is a word, and is taken in as such by the understanding. Although each of the preceding sounds of component letters tends to bring into the field of consciousness the sound of the whole verbal sign, yet until the last literal sound is added to the sound-image that is being formed, the whole is not made distinct and clear. When the last literal cognition has, however, come into operation, the entire sound-image constituting the word becomes clear. For this reason it is said that ‘a word is taken in by the understanding all at once, having assumed a unified appearance, just as the last literal sound ceases.’

‘Literal sounds from the impossibility, &c.’ This is said in reply to him who does not recognize on account of the distinctions obtaining among the different classes of letters, that words are taken in as entire single concepts all at once, but establishes on the contrary that the letters themselves singly have the power of signifying the object.

It may be in one of two ways that the literal sounds may generate the mental impression of the signified object as each is being pronounced as a part of a complete word. They may carry the capacity of signifying the object, each of them, either as pegs which give support to a basket hung therefrom ; (Thus whenever the peg goes, the basket would go too) or, they may give support to the meaning as several stones placed together and made into a platform give support to a stool.

The first theory does not hold. The pronouncement of one letter only does not carry the object to the mind, for if it did, the uttering of the other letters would be quite useless. When a work has been completed, the employment of an effort for its achievement, such as is not calculated to give the completed work any extra quality, would take the effort out of the category of the means of achievement.

If this does not hold, the other remains. It is certainly possible in this case, as was not possible in the case of many pegs placed separately, that stones placed together to make a single platform should hold a stool, because in this case the capacity of giving support to the stool is being employed at one and the same time. Letters, however, cannot all be pronounced simultaneously, and for this reason they cannot carry the meaning to the mind even when brought together, because each of them does not take after the other, and the pronouncement of the one does not suggest the other. They do not attach to the form of one word only as if they were of its very nature. They, therefore, do not suggest the word, as each is being pronounced and passing into latency. Each maintains itself in separate and independent existence like a rod of steel. It is, therefore, said that each of them is not of the nature of a word.

Inasmuch as this defect would not arise, if the letters forming parts of a word constituted as such the word itself, he says :—‘Each letter, however, singly is a necessary constituent of a word : it has the potentiality of supplying a name for all objects.’ All the potentialities of making all names are present in it. Thus the letter, G, is found to

exist in the words GAU, GANA, GAURA, NAGA, etc., which signify different objects (a cow and others respectively). It has, therefore, the potency of supplying names for each and all of these objects. Similarly is the letter, O, found in the words, SOMA, SOCHI, etc., which means God and other things, and that too has, therefore, the capacity of naming all these objects. Similarly should it be understood everywhere else. Each of these letters G, etc., appears in combination with, i.e., in contact with other conjoined letters, such as, O, etc. On account of there being such contact, it becomes, as it were, of universal application, i.e., each of these letters becomes, at it were many, and does not remain, as it is, one only. It does not of course, actually become many. Therefore the words, 'as it were,' have been added. The letter, of course, remains the same.

The letter, G, placed before and the letter, O, placed thereafter distinguish the consequent sonorous impression from the words GANA, etc. Similarly does the letter, O, placed after G, distinguish it from the words SOCHI, etc. A specific sonorous impression is thus established in the mind as the succession of literal sounds appearing in the word ceases. This specific mental impression is the single image of the word, GAU, as manifested in the mind (sphota). It is this sonorous image that denotes the specific quality of the species COW.

This is the meaning. It is impossible that the notion of an object be caused by literal sounds on account of there being a fixed order of their succession in a word: because they do not come into existence simultaneously. Nor is it proper to hold that notwithstanding the order of the succession of literal sounds in a word being fixed they come together to manifest the notion of an object by the operation of their residual potencies, in the same way as there is absence of antecedence and postcedence in the purificatory potencies brought about by oblations of combustibles, etc.; or in the same way as the heavenly state of existence is brought about. This is so, because option is inadmissible.

Knowledge of an object is not, therefore, caused by literal sounds. It is necessary that there should be perception of a single word as the means of calling it forth.

This, however, is not the case with a word. A word is expressed by sounds which differ from each other in the effort which is put forth in pronouncing them (prayatna). These constituent sounds which go to form this and that word, each differing from the other, are similar to each other in having their place of formation in the mouth and the effort requisite for their pronunciation, always the same. For this reason they make up a word similar to the others in some respect, although dissimilar in reality. The similarities here and there differ from each other by the difference caused by the relative positions of the letters. It is by this complacement that words appear as possessing different parts and composite natures, although in reality they are single and without parts. This happens in the same way as a face possessing a constant tinge of colour and fixed features and dimensions show more reflections than one, each possessed of different colour, dimensions and features, when placed differently with respect to a mirror, a dagger and a jewel. The difference is not real.

A verbal sign is single and partless. The letters are taken to be its parts by virtue of the difference of the contiguity of similar letters in different words. The difference of words being thus due to the conception of there being constituted by letters conceived as such a single and partless sonorous image (sphota). Having no distinctions in itself, it is kept up in the mind, as it were, distinct and possessed of parts. It is for this reason that the specific sonorous image of the word Gau is not determined by its part G, because therein it is similar to the sonorous images of such other words as GAURA, etc. It, however, determines the whole verbal image when qualified by the literal sound O. Similarly the letter O is not competent to determine the single whole, the sonorous image of

the word GAU, on account of its similarity therein with the words 'OCHI, etc. It, however, does so, being qualified by the literal sound G. Although they do not co-exist, yet one can be qualified by the other by means of residual potencies coming to co-exist. And the two residual potencies have not different spheres of action, because two percepts of two different parts and the potencies born therefrom, have one word as the sphere of their operation. By the perception of the parts alone, the whole word is not manifested; but it is manifested as the succession of literal sounds ceases: and it should be added that the consciousness of the cessation of this succession manifests by virtue of the residual potencies of the perceptions of the different parts. It is a matter of observation that the past unmanifested impressions strengthen the present manifested impression by means of the successive storage of their residual potencies. Thus the notion of the existence of a tree at a distance is at first dim, but by and by becomes distinct. It is not, however, possible that this may be the method of the literal sounds bringing about the perception of the object. Because the rule of dimness and clearness applies only to perceptive cognitions; and it is not by perceptions that literal sounds bring about the consciousness of an object. It cannot, of course, be that each of the constituent literal sounds of a word should produce an indistinct image of the object which becomes distinct only in the end. If the image is raised by the letters it must be quite distinct. Or, it may be said that it is never born at all. It can never be said that it remains indistinct and dim (asphuta). The dissimilarity is that in the case of the sonorous image the distinctness and indistinctness are fancied after the perceptibility is established. Thus when the notion of the cessation of literal sounds takes its place in the mind through the auditory sense, along with the residual potencies left therein by the perception of each literal sound in succession, the literal sounds come together into the manifested sonorous image of a single word. This manifestation is brought about by a specific output of energy. The speciality of this energy depends upon the fixity of a particular order of the succession of literal sounds. When, therefore, the order of the succession changes, the specific energy which is competent to bring about the particular verbal manifestation no longer exists, and the particular manifestation is not brought about. Literal sounds are thus limited to the expression of a particular meaning by their dependence upon the order of their succession. They, therefore, show the conventional limitation as it appears in the world, to be the sphere of the operation of a word having more parts than one. So many as two, three, four, five or six literal sounds possessing the power of naming all objects denote the particular object which is possessed of udders, &c., when they appear as G, AU and the aspirate H.

Well, then, is it the letters alone which by virtue of distinct orders of succession denote an object? Is not a word independent of its constituent letters? For this reason he says:—'Thus a single word, &c.'

'The succession of literal sounds' is the succession brought about by literal sound.

'The succession of literal sounds limited to a particular object ceases':—Such are the letters of a word at the time when the successive pronouncement of the literal sounds is over.

'Manifestation of consciousness' means the shining out of the Will-to-know (the buddhi) in the shape of a particular image.

'Limited to a particular conventional meaning':—The literal sounds limited to a particular conventional meaning are, as has been said, the sounds of G, AU and H, in accordance with the conceptions of superficial observers. The meaning is that G, &c., are also taken to be the signifiers of an object, being as they are the parts of a word and thus its necessary constituents. In reality, however, it is a single mental phenomenon which, as a word, signifies an object. He renders the same plainer:—'Thus a single word

is a single manifestation of consciousness, &c. All this related to it is understood by the mind of the world, &c.'

But why a single manifestation of consciousness? For this reason he says :—'It is the object of a single effort of consciousness.' A cow: This single word is the object of a single phenomenon of consciousness; it is, therefore, spoken of as a single manifestation.

He mentions the cause of its manifestation :—'It is brought into existence by a single effort.' The effort which manifests the word RASA is different from the effort which manifests the word SÂRA. And it is single, inasmuch as it is possessed of the quality of the individuality of the word RASA from the beginning, is differentiated by the fruit thereof, and has a determinate order of the antecedent and postcedent (literal sounds thereof). The different parts of the word which are understood to be existing as such by differences in similarity and order of contiguity, do not exist as such in reality, and a word is, therefore, said to be without parts. For this reason it has no order, because there is no existence in it of parts which may exist either before or after each other.

The question arises, that literal sounds appearing in order before and after one another in a word and being therefore its parts, how is it said under the circumstances that a word has no order and no parts? For this reason he says :—'It is not a whole made of separate and distinct literal sounds.' Literal sounds are not parts of a word; but by means of differences in similarity and order of contiguity, the word puts on of itself different forms and appears as it is in reality. The faces appearing in a jewel, a dagger, a mirror, &c., are not parts of the real face. 'It is a manifestation of the Will-to-know (buddhi). This means that the collective appearance at the cessation of a succession is known by the buddhi, is found in the buddhi. The operation of the notion of the last literal sound means the residual potency of the cognition of that sound. This residual potency when it is thrown in with the residual potencies of the cognitions of the previous literal sounds, brings the whole word into consciousness, that is, renders it to the object of cognition. And it is shown below that the residual potencies left in the mind by the cognitions of sounds, coincide in space with the sphere of the word they make up.

Well ; but if a word has no parts, no order and no constituent literal sounds, why does it never appear as such? A white crystal may appear to be red when besmeared with molten shellac ; but it is not that it will not appear pure white even when the colour has been removed. Literal sounds are, therefore, parts of a word. For this reason he says :—'It is understood by the mind of the world, &c.' The eternal functioning of the power of speech has gone on through the articulation into words of different literal sounds. This has been carried on with the help of literal sounds, separately named. uttered and heard by the hearers for the purpose of transferring them from one to other minds. Eternal habit is secured by the operation.

'On account of eternal habit' means that the mind which has perceived thus, is possessed of the habit thus acquired ; the habit, that is to say, of understanding the whole word as coloured by separate literal sounds. 'As having come into existence' (Siddhavat) means 'as it were, having a real and independent existence.'

By 'conjunction of letters' he means the speech of the older people which has always been so achieved. 'Thus is the word known.' The meaning is this. There is a certain application (upâdhi) which may either be applied to anything or separated from it. Take for example lac or something similar. If it is separated from the crystal it shines out in its white purity. This is proper. As to the notion of a word, however, it is never produced except by a particular sound which is brought about by a particular effort. Further a word is always marred by similarity, and its notion is generated in the mind only as being made up of literal sounds. How then is it possible that a word may also be spoken

or known as pure and independent of literal sounds? As they say :—‘ Sounds being similar in their nature becomes causes of wrong impressions. The cause of wrong impression takes them in as such; in the sight of those who know the word, it is fixed with reference to its means of production. This certain confusion in the world is but the contradiction of knowledge.’ Because the body of a word shows itself as always made up of articulated sounds; the world being superficial observers, believe that the literal sounds themselves are words; and they think that the literal sound only appearing in different combinations give different meanings. He says this :—‘ Distinguished by conventional meaning, etc.’ The meaning is that for the benefit of the ordinary mind to whom the real word is unknown as such, a word is divided into literal sounds by an act of the mind which is called convention. He describes the division into article sounds :—‘ Of so many letters,’ neither more nor less.

‘ Such and such a succession’ means one having a particular order of uninterrupted succession. ‘ Succession so ending,’ is that which is taken in by a single act of the understanding. He illustrates such and such an object :—‘ Such as the generic quality of a cow, &c.’

‘ Well; but if convention means that a particular word is to denote a particular object, then there is no confusion between word and meaning. For this reason he says :—‘ Convention, however, &c.’

‘ A manifestation of memory’ :—The existence of this conventional relation is due to the function of memory. The convention which determines the meaning is not only this, that such and such a meaning has been given to such and such a sound; it is also that such and such a sound is remembered as correlated to such and such a meaning. This is the meaning,

‘ Whoever knows their distinction performs Samyama thereon and thereby knows all,’ that is, understands the sounds of all living beings. The genitive case used, ‘ their distinction’ is used only with reference to convention in which the forms are not distinct.

A word has thus been established to be a single partless and jointless output of sound in which the literal sounds are only fancied to be articulations. Now he establishes that a sentence also is a single complete notion in the mind and that the words are simply fancied to be parts thereof. So he says :—‘ And in all words lives the power of a sentence.’ This is the explanation. A word is used to convey information to another. It is only what they are intended to convey that is conveyed to the other. The same is intended to be conveyed by them which is the field of any action, &c., with reference to them. It is not the object alone that is signified by them, but the entire meaning of a sentence. All words are meant to complete the meaning of a complete sentence. Hence the same is their meaning. For this reason, where even a single word is used, even there the meaning is understood to be what it would be, if it were used together with another word. The whole meaning is not conveyed by one word alone. Why? Because that such alone has not the power to convey the whole meaning. Therefore in such places it is the sentence alone that conveys the meaning not the separate words. Because however the words are parts of a sentence, they too have the power of denoting the meaning of a sentence, in the same way as literal sounds have the power of conveying the meaning of a word on account of appearing as articulations thereof. For this reason just as every literal sound is possessed of the power of forming all means, so every word also is as such possessed of the power of forming all sentences and thus denoting the meaning intended to be conveyed by all sentences. This is what is meant by saying, ‘ And in all words lives the power of a sentence.’ When some one says, ‘ A tree,’ it is understood, that a tree exists. The word, ‘ tree,’ together with the word, ‘ is,’ understood, give the meaning of a sentence, and hence the word, tree, exists as part of a sentence.

But then how is it that the word, 'is,' is understood? For this reason he says:—'The object signified by a word never fails of existence.' In the world, words are the means of ascertaining the existence of objects; and a word, always joining the object signified to the word 'is,' everywhere gives the meaning of a sentence. This is the meaning of an object never failing of existence. It is for this reason the practice of those who know the usage of words, that wherever there is no other verb, the word 'is' and 'becomes' are to be considered understood, and are to be supplied.

Having described the nominal bases as never failing of a particular action he now shows that a particular-action never fails of a noun;—Thus on pronouncing the word 'Cooks' the appropriate agents of the action signified are always understood. And the word excludes other inappropriate agents. It is thus that the meaning of a sentence is differentiated.

Similarly are words found existing in a sentence although they are not required there: and for this reason all the more is it that words possess the power of giving the meaning of a sentence. For this reason he says:—'Then is also seen the combination of words in a sentence.' Not even thus the words 'Vedic student,' &c., used independently would convey such a meaning if they were not understood as conjoined to the words 'is,' &c. Thus the meaning is that this too has been fancied to be a part of a sentence.

Let that be. But if the words themselves have the power of conveying the meaning of a sentence, there is no use of making sentences. The meaning intended to be conveyed by a sentence is conveyed by the words themselves. For this reason he says:—'In a sentence like this, &c.' It has been said that the meaning intended to be conveyed by a word is not conveyed by a word alone, until it is conjoined to another word understood. Hence are words separated from a sentence and fancied as separate from them; and hence also are words separated from the meaning of a sentence, and are distinguished as either verbs or nominal bases. Thus are words to be etymologically explained by introducing the divisions of cases.

But then why should so much trouble be taken to explain them? For this reason he says:—'Otherwise how, etc.'

In the sentence GHATO BHAVATI, BHAVATI BHAKSÂM DEHI, BHAVATI TISTHATI, the nouns and verbs appear to be similar in external shape. The word BHAVATI in the first sentence is a verb and means 'exists.' In the other two sentences it is a noun and might be translated as 'Your ladyship.'

Similarly in the sentences, Âsvastvam and Âsvas Ysti, the former Âsvas is a verb and means 'be appeased.' The second Âsvas is a noun and means a horse.

Similarly in the sentences, Ajâpayah Piva and Marayajapaya Shat-rûn. In the former sentence it means the milk of a she-goat, and in the second it means 'kill.'

Thus names and verbs being similar in external appearance, they would not be known as nouns and verbs if they were not to be separated from the sentence. How could they otherwise be explained as either verbs or nominal bases? Hence words should be separated from a sentence and explained. It is not that, merely by thus explaining words after having taken them out of the sentence, they would really become different in nature.

Having thus ascertained the nature of words, he now begins the discussion of the absence of real confusion (saikara) among word, meaning and idea, upon which confusion has been fastened by convention:—'These are the word, the meaning and the idea among which obtains a distinction.'

Thus, Svetate Prâsâdah, (white shines the mansion) means an action. It is very plain here that the action of looking white which has to be established, comes first,

and then arises the consciousness of the purpose of the action having been established. The word 'Śveta' is a separate thing. Even where the word and meaning have their forms established, there exists a difference between word and meaning. He says this :— 'Śvetah Prâśâdah iti' (the place is white). The word here has the meaning of a noun. The absence of the case-ending is because the word is intended to express its own meaning. He divides the meaning :—'These are words denoting both a noun and an action. The meaning of both these words is both of the nature of a noun and an action.' He divides the idea :—'And also the meaning and the idea thereof.' It is the word 'CHA' in the original which gives the meaning of the words, 'the meaning of the idea thereof.' The relation shown here is with another object which is signified.

The question is that if word, meaning and notion are known as single on account of confusion (saṅkara, coming together) whence does the distinction come? He puts the question with this object :—'How?' He gives the answer :—'By the correlation, this is that, &c.'

The meaning is that the cause of the notion of unity is the qualification of the convention; it is not real, however. The use of words 'In the conventional sign' in the locative case shows that convention is the cause thereof. He shows the reality :—'And the white object, &c.' The 'states' are newness and oldness. 'Goes with' means becomes confused.

By performing Saṃyama in this way with reference to the distinctions of word, meaning and idea, the sounds of all animals, insects, &c., become distinctly intelligible to the Yogî. The Saṃyama performed with respect to the speech of man is equally performed with respect to their sounds also, inasmuch as both are of the same class. The Yogî knows their different sounds, their different meanings and their notions. Thus is it proved.—17.

Sûtra 18.

संस्कारसाक्षात्करणात्पूर्वजातिज्ञानम् ॥१८॥

संस्कार Samskâra, of residual potencies. साक्षात्करणात् Sâksât Karanât, by the bringing of into consciousness. पूर्व Pûrva, of previous. जाति Jâti, life : status. ज्ञानम् Jñânam, knowledge.

18. By bringing residual-potencies into consciousness, the knowledge of previous life-states (Jâti)—124.

संस्कारसाक्षात्करणात्पूर्वजातिज्ञानम् । द्वये खल्वमी संस्काराः । स्मृतिक्लेशहेतवो वासनारूपा विपाकहेतवो धर्माधर्मरूपास्ते पूर्वभवाभिसंस्कृताः । परिणामचेष्टानिरोधशक्तिजीवनधर्मवदपरिहृष्टादिचत्तधर्मास्तेषु संयमः संस्कारसाक्षात्क्रियायै समर्थः । न च देशकालनिमित्तानुभवैर्विना तेषामस्ति साक्षात्करणम् । तदित्थं संस्कारसाक्षात्करणात्पूर्वजातिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते योगिनः । परत्राप्येवमेव संस्कारसाक्षात्करणात्पूर्वजातिज्ञानम् । अत्रेदमाख्यानं श्रयते । भगवतो जैगीषव्यस्य संस्कारसाक्षात्करणादशसु महासर्गेषु जन्मपरिणामक्रमनुपश्यते विवेकजं ज्ञानं प्रादुरभूत् । अथ भगवानावद्यस्तनुधरस्तमुवाच । दशसु महासर्गेषु भव्यत्वादनभिभूतबुद्धिसत्त्वेन त्वया नरकतिर्यग्भासंभवं दुःखं सम्पश्यता देवमनुष्येषु पुनः पुनरुत्पद्यमानेन सुखदुःखयोः किमधिकमुपलब्धमिति । भगवन्तमावद्यं जैगीषव्य उवाच । दशसु महासर्गेषु भव्यत्वादनभिभूतबुद्धिसत्त्वेन मया नरकतिर्यग्भवं दुःखं संपश्यता देवमनुष्येषु पुनः पुनरुत्पद्यमानेन यत्किंचिदनुभूतं तत्सर्वं दुःखमेव प्रत्यवैमि । भगवानावद्य उवाच । यदिदमायुष्मतः प्रधानव-

शित्वमनुक्तम् च संतोषसुखं किमिदमपि दुःखपक्षे निःक्षिप्तमिति । भगवान् जैगीषव्य
उवाच । विषयसुखापेक्षयैवेदमनुक्तम् संतोषसुखमुक्तम् । कैवल्यसुखापेक्षया दुःखमेव ।
बुद्धिसत्त्वस्यायं धर्मस्त्रिगुणस्त्रिगुणश्च प्रत्ययो हेयपक्षे त्यस्त इति दुःखरूपस्तृष्णातन्तुः
तृष्णादुःखसन्तापापगमात्तुप्रसन्नमबाधं सर्वानुकूलं सुखमिदमुक्तमिति ॥ १८ ॥

VYÂSA.

Residual potencies are two-fold,—those appearing as habits and causing memories and afflictions; and those appearing as virtue and vice and causing fruition. These are the unconscious characteristics of the mind-change (parinâma), activity (cheṣṭâ), suppression (nirodha), ideation in action (śakti), physical life (Jîvana), characterization (dharma), now appearing along with them as they have been potentialized in previous births. Samyama over these has the power of achieving the direct knowledge of the residual potencies. And their direct knowledge is not possible without the knowledge of space, time and operative cause. Thus is it that a Yogi brings into consciousness the previous life-states by obtaining direct knowledge of residual potencies. Similarly is obtained the knowledge of the life-states of others by obtaining direct knowledge of their residual potencies.

The following story is heard in this connection:—Bhagavân Jai-
giṣavya obtained the knowledge of the distinction between the real and the unreal after he had seen the direct succession of live-changes during ten great creations by having obtained direct knowledge of his residual potencies. The holy Āvatya, having taken a body asked him: ‘You have lived and thereby become chastened through ten Great Kalpas. The essence of your Will-to-know has not been overpowered. You have experienced the troubles of life in hells, among animals and in wombs. You have been born again and again among men and gods. Have you through all this life experienced the greater quantity of pleasure or of pain,—which?

Jaigisava replied to Bhagavân Āvatya:—‘I have lived through ten great creations. My mental essence has not been overpowered. I have experienced the troubles of hell and animal life. I have been born again and again among men and gods. I consider all that I have experienced as pain only.’

Said the revered Āvatya:—‘This mastery of your reverence over the First Cause and this invaluable joy of contentment of yours,—do you place these too to the credit of pain?’

The revered Jaigisavya said—‘The joy of contentment is invaluable only in comparison with the pleasures of sensation. Compared to

the bliss of absolute freedom (Kaivalya) it is pain only. The possession of the three qualities is of the nature of the essence of the Will-to-know and whatever is possessed of the three qualities is thrown to the side of avoidable pain. The chain of desire is of the nature of pain. It has been said that when the anxiety of the pain of desire is removed, then comes joy, calm, undisturbed, all-embracing.'—124.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The residual potencies born of cognitions are the causes of memories. The potencies of Nescience, &c., are the causes of the fruition of the afflictions of Nescience, &c. Fruition has the form of life-state, life-experience and life-period. The causes have the forms of virtue and vice.

'Potentialized in previous births':—Brought about their causes in previous life-states. The characteristics of the mind are change, activity, suppression, active ideation, physical life and characterization. Like them are these potentializations too unconscious. The characteristics have been heard about and inferred. Samyama performed over these along with their sub-heads has the power of producing the direct knowledge of both the residual potencies.

Well; if this be so, the two residual potencies may be directly known. But how can the previous life-states be known in this way? For this reason the Commentator says:—'And their direct knowledge is not possible without the knowledge of space, time and operative cause.' Operative cause is the former body and the organs of the powers of sensation and action. The meaning is that the knowledge of the residual potencies together with the circumstances of their fruition, is not different at all from the direct knowledge of life-state, &c. Now he says that the Samyama over one's own potencies applies to others also:—'Similarly is obtained the knowledge, &c.'

For the purpose of creating faith in this he relates the story of the dialogue between the revered Âvâtya and Jaigisavya:—'The following story, &c.' The great Kalpa is the Great Creation.

'Having taken a body':—This means possessed of the glory of a Nirmânkâya. 'Chastened' denotes the state from which the dirt of Rajas and Tamas has been removed.

'Mastery over the First Cause' is godhead. It is by the possession of that, that he sets the Pradhâna, the First Cause, into motion and gives to whomsoever he pleases such powers of body and sense as he wishes; and having made for himself thousands of bodies and powers he goes about as he pleases in heaven, midheaven and earth.

Contentment is the destruction of desire, the characteristic of calmness of the essence of the Will-to-be.

Sûtra 19

प्रत्ययस्य परचित्तज्ञानम् ॥१६॥

प्रत्ययस्य Pratyayasya, of the notions. पर Para, of other (minds). चित्त Chitta, of minds. ज्ञानम् Jñânam, knowledge.

19. Of the notions, the knowledge of other minds —125.

प्रत्ययस्य परचित्तज्ञानम् । प्रत्यये संयमात्प्रत्ययस्य साक्षात्करणात्तः । परचित्त-
ज्ञानम् न च तत्सालम्बनं तस्याविषयीभूतत्वात् । रक्तं प्रत्ययं जानात्यमुष्मिन्नालम्बने
रक्तमिति न जानाति । परचित्तस्य प्रत्ययस्य यदालम्बनं तद्योगिचित्तेन नालम्बनोकृतं
परप्रत्ययमात्रं तु योगिचित्तस्यालम्बनोभूतमिति ॥ १६ ॥

VYÂSA.

By Samyama over the notions and thus by obtaining the direct knowledge of the notions, comes the knowledge of other minds. But not of its object, that not being the direct object of the Yogi's mind. He knows the mental emotion of love, but does not know the object of love. Because that which has been the object of the other man's mind has not been the object of the Yogi's mind. It is only the other's mental state that has been the object of the Yogi's Samyama.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Of the notions, the knowledge of other minds.

Because the mind of the other only becomes directly known, the notion only is known.

As the direct knowledge of the potencies brings about the knowledge of the previous life-states also, by causing the direct knowledge of the environments, so also it follows that when the mind of another is known, the object which is responsible for the existence of any particular state of the mind should also become known. This being the suggestion, the Commentator says :—‘But not along with its object.’ The former Samyama was with reference to all the environments : this is with reference to the mind of the other only. This is the meaning.

Sûtra 20.

**कायरूपसंयमात्तदग्राह्यशक्तिस्तम्भे चक्षुःप्रकाशसंप्रयो-
गेऽन्तर्धानम् ॥२०॥**

काय Kâya, of the body. रूप Rûpa, over the form. संयमात् Samyamât, by Samyama. तद् Tad, that (form). ग्राह्य Grâhya, capable of receiving (that). शक्ति Śakti, the power. तदग्राह्यशक्ति Tad Grâhya Śakti, Of perceptibility. स्तम्भे Stambhe, on the checking of. चक्षुः Chakṣuh, of the eye. प्रकाश Prakâśa, with the light. असंप्रयोगे Asamprayoge, there being no contact. अन्तर्धानम् Antardhânam, disappearance.

20. By Samyama over the form of the body, on perceptibility being checked, and thus there being no-contact with the light of the eye, comes disappearance.—126.

**कायरूपसंयमात्तदग्राह्यशक्तिस्तम्भे चक्षुःप्रकाशसंप्रयोगेऽन्तर्धानम् । कायस्य रूपे
संयमादूपस्य या ग्राह्या शक्तिस्तां प्रतिष्ठभनाति । ग्राह्यशक्तिस्तम्भे सति चक्षुःप्रकाशा-
संप्रयोगेऽन्तर्धानमुत्पद्यते योगिनः । एतेन शब्दाद्यन्तर्धानमुक्तं वेदितव्यम् ॥ २० ॥**

VYÂSA.

By Samyama over the form of the body, he checks the perceptibility of the form. On perceptibility being checked, and thus there no longer being contact with the light which carries it to the eye, disappearance of the Yogi is brought about. By this the cessation of the perception of sound, &c., must be understood as explained.—126.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

"By Samyama over the form of the body, on perceptibility being checked, and thus there being no contact with the light of the eye, comes disappearance."

The body is made of the five tattvas. It becomes an object of perception to the eye on account of its possession of colour (for form). It is by colour that the body and its form becomes objects of perception. When the Yogi performs Samyama with reference to the form of the body, then is checked the operation of the perceptibility of colour, which is responsible for causing the ocular perception of the body. For this reason when the power of being perceived is checked, the Yogi is no longer visible. Thereby the light of sensation which is born in the eye of another, does not come into contact with the body that has disappeared. The meaning is that the body of the Yogi does not become the object of the other's knowledge. Disappearance is to be brought about when it is desired that the Yogi should not be seen by anybody. By this should also be understood another aphorism to the following effect: -By Samyama over the sounds, touches, tastes, smells of the body, their perceptibility being checked, there is no contact with the tympanum, skin, tongue and nose; and hence these disappear.

Sūtra 21.

**सोपक्रमं निरुपक्रमं च कर्म तत्संयमादपरान्तज्ञान-
मरिष्टेभ्यो वा ॥२१॥**

सोपक्रमम् Sopakramam, fast in fruition. निरुपक्रमम् Nirupakramam, slow. च Cha, and, or. कर्म Karma, action, Karma. तत् Tat, over these. संयमात् Samyamât, by Samyama. अपरान्त Aparânta, of death. ज्ञानम् Jñânam, the knowledge. अरिष्टेभ्यः Arîstebhyah, by portents. वा Vâ, or.

21. Karma is either fast-in-fruition or slow; by Samyama over these comes knowledge of death; or, by portents.—127.

**सोपक्रमं निरुपक्रमं च कर्म तत्संयमादपरान्तज्ञानमरिष्टेभ्यो वा । आयुर्विपाकं
कर्म द्विविधं सोपक्रमं निरुपक्रमं च । तत्र यथाद्र्द्वं वर्त्त्वा वितानितं रूसीयसा कालेन
शुष्येत्तथा सोपक्रमम् । यथा च तदेवं समिपण्डितं चिरेण संशुष्येदेवं निरुपक्रमम् । यथा
वाग्निः शुष्के कक्षे मुक्तो वातेन समन्ततो युक्तः क्षेपीयसा कालेन दहेत्तथा सौपक्रमम् ।
यथा वा स एवाग्निस्तुरणराशौ क्रमशोऽवयवेषु न्यस्तश्चिरेण दहेत्तथा निरुपक्रमम् ।
तदैकभविकमायुर्कर कर्म द्विविधं सोपक्रमं निरुपक्रमं च । तत्संयमादपरान्तस्य प्राय-
णस्य ज्ञानमरिष्टेभ्यो वेति त्रिविधमरिष्टमाध्यात्मिकमाधिभौतिकमाधिदैविकं च ।
तत्राव्यात्मिकं घोषं स्वदेहे पिहितकर्णो न शृण्णाति ज्योतिर्बा नैत्रेऽवष्टुव्ये न पश्यति ।
तथाधिभौतिकं यमपुरुषान्पश्यति पितृनतीतानागतानकस्मात्पश्यति । तथाधिदैविकं
स्वर्गमकस्मात्सद्भान्वा पश्यति । विपरीतं वा सर्वमित्यनेन वा जानात्यपरान्त-
मुपस्थितमिति ॥ २१ ॥**

VYÂSA.

The Karma which fructifies as life-period is two-fold, that which is fast-in-fruition and that which is slow-in-fruition. Thus, for example,

a wet piece of cloth, well spread, dries in a short time. Similarly the fast-in-fruition.

The same cloth when gathered up, however, will take a long time to dry. Similar is the slow-in-fruition.

Further fire, thrown into dry hay and accompanied by wind in every direction, burns it in a short time; such is the fast-in-fruition. The same fire, however, applied to detached pieces of straw out of a heap, burns them in a very long time. Similarly the slow-in-fruition.

Thus the one-birth Karma which is responsible for the period of life is two-fold, the fast-in-fruition and the slow-in-fruition. By Samyama over these comes the knowledge of death, the smaller end of life.

'Or, by the portents':—A portent is three-fold:—Personal (*âdh-yâtmika*), elemental (*âdhibhautika*) and divine (*âdhidaivika*). Of these, the personal:—He hears not the sound in his own body on stopping the passage of the ears. He sees not the light in the eyes on pressing them.

And the elemental:—He sees the messengers of Yama. He sees suddenly and without thought the ancestors that have passed away.

Similarly the divine:—He sees the heavenly worlds and the Siddhas suddenly. Or, he sees everything contrary to what he has been seeing the whole of his life.

It is by these that a Yogi may optionally know the proximity of death.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

'Karma is either fast-in-fruition or slow; by Samyama over these comes the knowledge of death; or, by portents.'

The Karma which fructifies into life-time is two-fold, the fast-in-fruition and the slow-in-fruition. The one-birth Karma certainly which is the cause of life-time, life-state and life-experience, fructifies into life-period. The fast-fructifying Karma is that which is going on fructifying without any reference to what time it may take to finish by causing experience, of which more has been over and a little only remains, whose operation is going on but whose fruitage is impossible to enjoy during life by one body and which, therefore, delays the Yogi, keeping him in the bondage of births.

The same when but a small portion of the fruit has been enjoyed and which is operating to produce the remaining fruit with reference to the time that has been taken by the enjoyment of the past, works but slowly and, now and then, is slow to fructify.

The Commentator renders this plain by two illustrations:—'As for example.' He gives an illustration to render the same plainer still:—'Or, as fire.'

The words 'smaller end of life' (*aparânta*) mean death with reference to the Great Latency which is the ultimate end. By Samyama over that Karma, that is, over virtue and vice, accrues the knowledge of death. By this the Yogi knows his fast-fructifying Karma, and then makes many bodies for himself and thereby enjoys the fruit thereof as fast as he likes and dies whenever he pleases.

He takes up the context:—'Or by portents.' The indications are three-fold. They are called portents (*arishtas*), because they frighten like an enemy.

'Or sees everything contrary, &c.' :—This excludes the trick of jugglers. But otherwise he begins to see heaven in villages and towns; he begins to see also that the world of men only is the world of gods. - 21.

Sûtra 22.

मैत्र्यादिषु बलानि ॥२२॥

मैत्र्यादिषु Maitrî adisū, over friendliness, &c. बलानि Balâni, the powers.

22. Over friendliness, &c., the powers.—128.

मैत्र्यादिषु बलानि । मैत्रीकरुणामुदितेति तिस्रो भावनात्तत्र भूतेषु सुखितेषु मैत्रों भावयित्वा मैत्री बलं लभते । दुःखितेषु करुणां भावयित्वा करुणाबलं लभते । पुण्यशीलेषु मुदितां भावयित्वा मुदिताबलं लभते । भावनातः समाधिर्यः स संयमस्ततो बलान्यवन्ध्यवीर्याणि जायन्ते । पापशीलेषूपेक्षा ननु भावना । ततश्च तस्यां नास्ति समाधिरित्यतो न बलमुपेक्षातस्तत्र संयमाभावादिति ॥ २२ ॥

VYÂSA.

Friendliness, compassion and complaisance are three feelings. Of these he gets the power of friendliness by habituating the mind through conscious volition to sympathy towards happy beings. He gets the power of compassion by habituating the mind to compassion towards sufferers. He gets the power of complaisance by habituating the mind to complaisance towards the virtuous. By conscious habituating volition comes trance which is Samyama. Thereby are born the powers which know of no obstacle in their working.

It is indifference that is practised towards the sinful, not conscious habitual volition. Hence there is no trance here; and hence by reason of there being no Samyama, there is no power of indifference.—128.

VÄCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

'Over friendliness, &c., the powers.' By the performance of Samyama over friendliness, &c., the powers of friendliness, &c., come to him. Of these the power which comes by the practice of the feeling of friendliness, is that by which he can make the whole living world happy, and hence becomes the well-wisher of all.

Similarly, by the power of compassion he lifts suffering creatures out of pain and the causes of pain.

Similarly, by the power of complaisance he becomes just to all the world.

Now the Commentator describes that the conscious practice of habituating volition is the cause of trance, as this will be of use further.

'By conscious habituating volition comes trance which is Samyama.'

Although Samyama means concentration, meditation and trance, and not only trance, still because trance is their immediate effect and is, therefore, the chief of the three, therefore the word is used here as applying to the same.

In some places the reading is—

'Conscious habituating volition is trance.' There conscious habituating volition and trance would become the causes, i. e., the limbs of Samyama taken as whole.

Power (vîrya) is effort. For this reason the man who possesses the power of friendliness, &c., puts forth an effort to render people happy, &c., and his effort is not checked.

Indifference, however, means absence of effort. There can be no volition with respect to that; nor does there exist anything such as happiness, &c., which might thereby be brought into existence.—22.

Sûtra 23.

बलेषु हस्तिबलादीनि ॥२३॥

बलेषु Baleṣu, over the powers. हस्ति Hasti, elephants. बल Bala, power. आदीनि Adîni, and the others.

23. Over the powers, the powers of elephant, &c.—129.

बलेषु हस्तिबलादीनि । हस्तिबले संयमाद्वस्तिबले भवति । वैनतेयबले संयमा-
द्वैनतेयबले भवति । वायुबले संयमाद्वायुबले भवतीत्येवमादि ॥ २३ ॥

VYÂSA.

By Samyama with reference to the strength of an elephant he comes to possess the strength of an elephant.

By Samyama over the power of the king of birds, one gets the power of the king of birds.

By Samyama over the powers of Vâyu, one gets the power of Vâyu—129.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

'Over the powers, the powers of elephant, &c. He gets the strength of whomsoever he performs Samyama over.—23.

Sûtra 24.

प्रवृत्त्या लोकन्यासात्सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टज्ञानम् ॥२४॥

प्रवृत्त्या Pravṛittyâḥ, of the higher sense-activity. लोक Loka, of the light. न्यासात् Nyâsât, by the directing. सूक्ष्म Sûksma, of the subtler. व्यवहित Vyavahita, of the veiled. विप्रकृष्ट Viprakriṣṭa, of the remote. ज्ञानम् Jñânam, the knowledge.

24. The knowledge of the subtle, the veiled, the remote, by directing the light of higher sense-activity towards them.—130.

प्रवृत्त्या लोकन्यासात्सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टज्ञानम् । ज्योतिष्मती प्रवृत्तिरूक्ता
मनसस्तस्यां य आलोकस्तं योगी सूक्ष्मे वा व्यवहिते वा विप्रकृष्टे वार्थे विन्यस्य तर्मर्थ-
मधिगच्छति ॥ २४ ॥

VYÂSA.

The higher sense-activity of lucidity has been described. It is that higher sight which the Yogi's mind directs towards the subtle, the veiled or the remote and thereby knows the object.—130.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Throwing that sight by Samyama over the subtle, the veiled and the remote, the Yogi thereby knows the object.—24.

Sûtra 25.

भुवनज्ञानं सूर्ये संयमात् ॥२५॥

भुवन-ज्ञानम् Bhuvana-Jñânam, the knowledge of the regions. सूर्ये Sûrye, on the sun. संयमात् Samyamât, by Samyama.

25. By Samyama on the sun, knowledge of the regions.—131.

भुवनज्ञानं सूर्ये संयमात् । तत्प्रस्तारः सप्तलोकास्तत्रावीचेः प्रभृति मेरुपृष्ठं यावदित्येवं भूर्लोकः मेरुपृष्ठादारभ्य आध्रुवाद् ग्रहनक्षत्रताराविचित्रोऽन्तरिक्षलोकः । ततः परः स्वर्लोकः पञ्चविधो माहेन्द्रस्तृतीयो लोकः । चतुर्थः प्राजापत्यो महर्लोक खिविधो ब्राह्मणः । तद्यथा जनलोकस्तथो लोकः सत्यलोक इति । ब्राह्मखिभूमिको लोकः प्राजापत्यस्ततो महान् । माहेन्द्रश्च स्वरित्युक्तो दिवि तारा भुवि प्रजा इति संग्रहश्लोकः । तत्रावीचेहपर्युपरि निविष्टाः पण्महानरकभूमयो घनसलिलानलानिलाकाशतमःप्रतिष्ठा महाकालाम्बरीषरौरवमहारौरवकालसूत्रान्धतामित्ताः । यत्र स्वकर्मपार्जितदुःखवेदनाः प्राणिनः कष्टमायुदीर्घकालमाक्षिप्य जायन्ते । ततो महातलरसातलातलसुतलवितलतलातलपातालाख्यानि सप्त पातालानि । भूमिरियमष्टमी सप्तद्वीपा वसुमती यस्याः सुमेरुमध्ये पर्वतराजः काञ्चनस्तस्य राजतवैदूर्यस्फटिकहेममणिमयानि शृङ्गाणि । तत्र वैदूर्यप्रभानुरागान्नीलोत्पलपत्रश्यामो नमस्तो दक्षिणभागः श्वेतः पूर्वः स्वच्छः पश्चिमः कुरण्टकाभ उत्तरो दक्षिणपाश्वें चास्य जम्बूर्यतोऽयं जम्बूद्वीपस्तस्य सूर्यप्रचाराद्रात्रिंदिवं लग्नमिव वर्तते । तस्य नीलश्वेतश्शृङ्गवन्त उदीचीनाख्ययः पर्वता द्विसाहस्रायामास्तदन्तरेषु त्रीणि वर्षाणि नवनवयोजनसाहस्राणि रमणकं हिरण्मयमुत्तराः कुरव इति । निषधहेमकूटशैला दक्षिणतो द्विसाहस्रायामास्तदन्तरेषु त्रीणि वर्षाणि नवनवयोजनसाहस्राणि हरिवर्षं किंपुरुषं भारतमिति । सुमेरोः प्राचीना भद्राश्वमाल्यवत्सीमानः प्रतीचीनाः केतुमालगन्धमादनसीमानः मध्ये वर्षमिलावृतम् । तदेतद्योजनशतसाहस्रं सुमेरोर्दिशि दिशि तदर्थेन व्यूढम् । स खल्वयं शतसाहस्रायामो जम्बूद्वीपस्ततो द्विगुणेन लवण्णादधिना वलयाकृतिना वेष्टितः । ततश्च द्विगुणा द्विगुणाः शाककुशक्रौञ्चशालमलगोमेधपुष्करद्वीपाः सप्त समुद्राश्च सर्षपराशिकल्पाः सविचित्रशैलावतंसा इश्वरसुरासपर्दधिमण्डकसप्तसमुद्रपरिवेष्टिता वलयाकृतयोलोकालोकपर्वतपरिवाराः पञ्चाशाद्योजनकोटिपरिसङ्घाताः । तदेतत्सर्वं सुप्रतिष्ठितसंस्थानमण्डमध्ये व्यूढम् । अण्डं च प्रधानस्याणुरवयवो यथाकाशे खद्योत इति । तत्र पाताले जलधौ पर्वतेष्वेतेषु देवनिकाया सुरगन्धर्वकिन्नरकिंपुरुषयक्षराक्षसभूतप्रेतपिशाचापसारकाप्सरो ब्रह्मराक्षसकूर्माण्डविनायकाः प्रतिवसन्ति । सर्वेषु द्वीपेषु पुण्यात्मानो देवमनुष्याः । सुमेरुखिदशानामुद्यानभूमिः । तत्र मिश्रवनं नन्दनं चैत्ररथं सुमानसमित्युद्यानानि । सुधर्मा देवसभा । सुदर्शनं पुरम् । वैजयन्तः प्रासादः । ग्रहनक्षत्रतारकास्तु ध्रुवे निबद्धाः । वायुविक्षेपनियमेनोपलक्षितप्रचाराः । सुमेरोरुपर्युपरि सम्भ्रिविष्टा दिवि विपरिवर्तन्ते । माहेन्द्रनिवासिनः षडेव देवनिकायाः । त्रिदशा अग्निष्वात्तायामास्तुषिता अपरिनिर्मितवशवर्त्तिनश्चेति । ते सर्वे

सद्गुल्यसिद्धाः । अणिमादैश्वर्येऽपपन्नाः कल्पायुषो वृन्दारकाः कामभेगिन औपपादिक-
देहा उत्तमानुकूलाभिरप्सरोभिः कृतपरिचारा महति लोके प्राजापत्ये पञ्चविधा देवनि-
काया । कुमुदा ऋभवः प्रतर्दना अज्जनाभाः प्रचित्ताभा इत्येते महाभूतवशिनो ध्याना-
हाराः कल्पसहस्रायुषः । प्रथमे ब्रह्मणो जनलोके चतुर्विधो देवनिकायो ब्रह्मपुरोहिता
ब्रह्मकायिका ब्रह्ममहाकायिका अजरा अमरा इति । ते भूतेन्द्रियवशिनो द्विगुणा द्विगुणा-
त्तरायुषः । द्वितीये तपसि लोके त्रिविधो देवनिकायः । आभास्वरा महाभास्वरा:
सत्यमहाभास्वरा इति । ते भूतेन्द्रियप्रकृतिवशिनो द्विगुणद्विगुणत्तरायुषः सर्वे
ध्यानाहारा कल्पसहस्रायुष ऊर्ध्वरेतस ऊर्ध्वमप्रतिहतशाना अधरभूमिष्वनावृतशान-
वेषयाः । तृतीये ब्रह्मणः सत्यलोके चत्वारो देवनिकाया अच्युताः शुद्धनिवासाः
सत्याभाः संज्ञासंज्ञिनश्चेति । अकृतभवनन्यासाः स्वप्रतिष्ठा उपर्युपरिस्थिताः प्रधान-
वशिनो यावत्सर्गायुषः । तत्राच्युताः सवितर्कध्यानसुखाः शुद्धत्रयीनिवासाः सविचार-
ध्यानसुखाः सत्याभा आनन्दमात्रध्यानसुखाः संज्ञासंज्ञिनश्चास्मितामात्रध्यानसुखा-
स्तेऽपि त्रैलोक्यमध्ये प्रतिष्ठन्ते । त एते सप्तलोकाः सर्वे सब्रह्मकाः । विदेहप्रकृति
लयास्तु मोक्षपदे वर्तन्ते इति न लोकमध्ये न्यस्ता इत्येतद्योगिना साक्षात्करणीयम् । सूर्य-
द्वारे संयमं कृत्वा ततोऽन्यत्रापि । एवं तावदभ्यसेद्यावदिदं सर्वं दृष्टमिति ॥ २५ ॥

VYÂSA.

Their detail :—There are seven regions. Of these beginning from Avîchi up to the back of the Meru, is the region called Bhur.

Beginning from the back of the Meru up to the pole-star adorned with planets, asterisms and stars, is the starry region, the Antarîkṣa.

Beyond this is the region Svar, having five planes. The third is Mahendra ; the fourth is the Maharloka of the lords of creation ; after this is the three-fold Brahma region. These are the Janaloka, the Tapoloka and the Satyaloka.

‘First comes the triple plane
Of Brahmâ’s region high ;
Creation’s lords have then
Their region ; and then,
Cometh Indra’s region—
Know all these as Heaven ;
Then come the stars above,
And the last cometh Bhur.’

This verse puts all these together.

Then up to the Avîchi, one placed above the other, are the six great hells, the Mahâkâla (1), the Ambarîsa (2), the Raurava (3), the Mahârau-
rava (4), the Kâlasûtra (5), and the Andhatâmisa (6), in which are the excesses of earth, air, fire, âkâsa, and darkness respectively. Here are born beings who are to suffer from the consequences of their stored up Karma.

Then are the seven Pâtâlas, the nether worlds, Sutala, Vitala, Talâ-tala, Mahâtala, Rasâtala, Atala and Pâtâla.

The eighth is this earth, having seven dvîpas and known as Vasumatî. In the middle thereof is the golden king of mountains, the Sumeru. Its peaks are of silver, coral, crystal, gold and pearl. Here, blue like the leaf of the blue lotus, on account of the sheen of the emerald, is the southern region of the heavens ; the eastern is white, the western bright, and the northern yellow.

And on its right side is the Jambu (tree), whence is this called the Jambudvîpa. Its night and day take their round of existence from the motion of the sun.

This has three northern mountain chains having blue and white peaks. Their length is 2,000 yojanas. Surrounded by these mountains are three continents, 9,000 yojanas each. They are Ramañaka, Hirañmaya, and Uttarakuru.

To the south are the three mountain chains, Niṣâda, Hemakûta, and Hemasringa, 2,000 yojanas in extension each. Among these are continents, Harivarṣa, Kimpuruṣa and Bhârata. The eastern regions of Sumeru are bounded by Bhadrâṣa and Malayavat, the western by Ketumâla and Gandhamâdana.

In the middle is the continent of Ilâvrita. All this is one hundred thousand yojanas of Sumeru, each side being half that dimension.

It is to be known that this Jambudvîpa is 100,000 yojanas in dimension. It is surrounded by double its extent of salt ocean.

Each twice as large as the preceding one are the other dvîpas : Saka, Kusa, Krauñcha, Sâlmala, Gomedha, and Puṣkara. So are the seven oceans. There are beautiful mountains looking like mustard seed. The seven oceans which surround these like bracelets, taste as sugar-cane, wine, clarified butter, curds, gruel and milk (besides the salt one). They reach up to the real horizon. They measure fifty crores of yojanas (500,000,000). All this is well arranged in the sphere of phenomenal world.

Here then in the Pâtâlas, the oceans and the mountains are the habitations of the elementals. The *asuras*, *gandharvas*, the *kinnaras*, *yakṣas*, *râksasas*, *bhûtas*, *pretas*, *piśâchas*, *apasmarakas*, *apsaras*, *brahmaṛakṣasas*, *kusmîndas*, and *vinâyakas*, live there.

In the dvîpas live good men and gods. Sumera is the garden of the gods. The gardens are Miśravana Nandana, Chaitrâratha, and Sumânasa. Sudharmâ is the council of the gods. Sudarsana is their city ; Vaijayanta their palace.

Above the Sumeru is the astral region, in which the planets, asterisms and stars move round the pole-star, carried on in their courses by certain motive forces (Vâyus).

In the Mahendraloka live six classes of devas, the tridasas, agnisvât-tâs, yâmyas, tuśitas, aparanirmitavaśavartinas, and parinirmitavaśavartinas. All of them have the power of fulfilment of desires by mere thoughts, and are possessed of the attainments known Anîmâ, &c. Their life-times are measured by a Kalpa. They are very beautiful. They enjoy their desires. Their bodies come into existence without parents, by the mere force of their good actions. They have good and obedient nymphs in their families.

In the great Prâjâpatya regions there are five descriptions of gods ; Kumudas, Ribhus, Pratardanas, Añjanâbhâs, and Prachitâbhâs. They have the Mahâbhûtas in their power. Contemplation is their food. They live on for a thousand Kalpas.

In the first sphere of Brahmâ, the Janaloka, there are four classes of gods, the Brahmapurohitas, the Brahmakâyikas, the Brahmamahâkâyikas, and the Amaras. They have power over the elements and the powers of sensation and action. Each lives twice as long as the preceding one.

In the second, the Tapoloka, there are three classes of gods, the Abhâsvaras, the Mahâbhâsvaras, and the Satyamahâsvaras. They have power over the source of elements and powers, the tanmâtras. Each lives twice as long as the preceding one.

All of them are nourished by contemplation. Their knowledge is not checked in the region above them. There is nothing which is hidden from them on the lower planes.

In the third sphere of Brahmâ, the Satyaloka, live four classes of gods, the Achyutas, the Suddhanivâsa, the Satyâbhâs and the Samjñâsamjñinas. They do not build habitations. They live in themselves, one above the other. They have their power over the Mûlaprakriti. They live on till the end of creations. Of these, the Achyutas enjoy the bliss of the Indistinctive trance (savitarka samâdhi) ; the Suddhanivâsas enjoy the bliss of the Meditative trance. The Satyâbhâs revel in pure bliss, (ânanda). The Samjñâsamjñinas are happy in the Egoistic trance. They live within the three regions (trilokî).

These are the seven regions including the Brahma-lokas. The Vîdehas and the Pakritilayas have reached the state of quasi-freedom, they have therefore not been placed in the phenomenal world.

All this, the yet unseen, the Yogi must see by performing Samyama over the solar entrance and thence over the connected objects. Let him practise until all becomes clear.—131.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

'Knowledge of the regions by Samyama over the sun.'

First, the Commentator describes the seven regions briefly up to the end of the verse which puts them together. Then he takes up in detailed description :—'Then up from Avîchi, etc.' The word 'ghana' is used for Prithivî (earth). These great regions are to be understood as having many sub-divisions. He gives their other names :—'The Mahâkâla, &c.' 'Its night and day take their round of existence from the motion of the sun.' Whichever portion the sun leaves, there is night. Whichever the sun adorns there is day.

He gives the dimensions of the whole of the Jambudvîpa. This is a hundred thousand yojanas. How is this hundred thousand arranged ? Half of it, that is fifty thousand, is placed on either side of the Meru. It is for this reason that the Meru is the middle thereof. The oceans are twice each. They are like heaps of mustard seed. As the heap of mustard seed is neither above the ground like a heap of barley, nor yet level with the surface of the earth, so are the oceans also. They are adorned by mountains as with ornaments. Such are the dvîpas. All this sphere of the earth is very well arranged in the body of Brahmâ's Egg together with the seven dvîpas and all its forests and mountains, cities, oceans, which surround it like a necklace.

Now he shows who live there in different places :—'Here then in the Pâtâlas, &c.'

He mentions the arrangement of the Sumeru :—'Sumeru is the garden of the gods.'

Having described the Bhurloka with its various details, he now describes the Antârikshaloka as well with details :—'Above the Sumeru is the astral region, &c.'

'Operation of motive forces,' means the working of the forces.

He describes the heaven world :—'In the Mahendra loka, &c.'

'Classes of gods' means species of gods. He describes the highest of powers of all the six :—'All of them have the power of fulfilment, &c.' Desirable objects come to them by the mere force of wishing for them. They are very beautiful, adorable. 'They enjoy their desires :' This means that they are fond of the sex-passion.

He describes the Maharloka :—'In the great, &c.' 'They have the Mahâbhûtas in their power.' Whatever they like, the Mahâbhûtas supply them with. The Mahâbhûtas take this and that form in obedience to and in accordance with their wishes.

'Contemplation is their food':—They are satisfied by mere contemplation and grow thereby.

He describes the Janaloka :—'In the first of the Brahmalokas, &c.' 'They have power over the elements and the powers of sensation, &c.' The elements are the Prithivî, &c. The powers are the senses of hearing, &c. Howsoever they desire to employ these, they do so employ them.

Following the order of the above description he now takes up the second region of Brahmâ :—'In the second, &c., they have power over the source, &c.' The source is the five tanmâtras. They have power over them. The Âgamîs say that by their wish the tanmâtras take the form of any body they desire.

'Each lives twice as much as the preceding one':—The Mahâbhâsvaras have twice the limit of the age of the Abhâsvaras ; the Satyamahâsvaras have double their age. This is the meaning.

'Their knowledge is not checked in the region above them':—'Above' means in the Satyaloka. From the Avîchi up to the Tapaloka whatever is there of the subtle and remote, they know.

He describes the third region of Brahmâ, the Satyaloka :—'In the third sphere of Brahmâ, &c.' 'They do not build habitations, houses.' Because they have no place where to support themselves, they live in themselves independent of any support in space.

They have power over the Mûlaprakriti. The three qualities, the Sattva, the Rajas and the Tamas, function in accordance with their wishes. They live up to the end of creation. And so it is heard :—Having reached the performance of a function similar to that of Brahmâ, their spirits are prepared for that, and they accordingly reach the highest state.

Having described the generic function of the gods, he now takes their names and describes the specific functions of each :—‘Of these the Achyutas, &c.’ The gods named Achyutas derive their happiness by the contemplation of gross objects. They are satisfied thereby. The gods known as Suddhanivâsinas find happiness in the contemplation of subtle objects ; they are pleased thereby. The gods named Satyâbhâs derive happiness from the contemplation of the objects of the senses. The Samjñâsamjñinas derive their happiness from the contemplation of egoism alone, and are pleased thereby. All these take up the Cognitive trance.

Why are the performers of the ultra-cognitive trance, the Videhas and the Prakritilayas, not placed within the lokas ? Those whose Will-to-be is active and shows objects to the Puruṣa, carry on the evolution of the universe and are, therefore, within the world. Not so the Videhas and the Prakritilayas, even though their minds have still their duty to fulfil. All this up to the Satyaloka and down to the Avîchi, the Yogî should know in the solar entrance, i. e., the tube called Suṣumnâ.

Even by this much all is not known. For this reason he says :—‘And thence on other objects besides the Suṣumnâ, wherever the teacher of Yoga points out, until all this world becomes visible.’

The essence of the Will-to-know is by its very nature possessed of the power of illuminating the universe. Being however covered by darkness it illuminates only those regions from which the cover is removed by Rajas. When the solar entrance is uncovered, the regions are illuminated. This rule does not apply elsewhere. The Samyama performed elsewhere has only the power of unveiling as much of the Buddhic essence, as the Samyama is performed with reference to. Thus all is plain.—25.

Sûtra 26.

चन्द्रे ताराव्यूहज्ञानम् ॥२६॥

चन्द्रे Chandre, on the moon. तारा Târâ, of the stars, starry. व्यूह Vyûha, of the systems. ज्ञान Jñânam, the knowledge.

26. On the moon, the knowledge of the starry systems.—132.

चन्द्रे ताराव्यूहज्ञानम् । चन्द्रं संयमं कृत्वा ताराणां व्यूहं विजानोयात् ॥ २६ ॥

VYÂSA.

Let him know the starry systems by performing Samyama with reference to the moon.—132.

Sûtra 27.

ध्रुवे तदगतिज्ञानम् ॥२७॥

ध्रुवे Dhruve, on the pole-star. तद् Tad, of their. गति Gati, movement. ज्ञान Jñânam, the knowledge.

27. On the pole-star the knowledge of their movements.—133.

ध्रुवे तदगतिज्ञानम् । ततो ध्रुवे संयमं कृत्वा ताराणां गतिं विजानीयात् । ऊर्ध्व-
विमानेषु संयमं कृत्वा तानि विजानीयात् ॥ २७ ॥

VYĀSA.

Then let him know the movements of the stars by performing Samyama with reference to the pole-star.—133.

Sûtra 28.

नाभिचक्रे कायव्यूहज्ञानम् ॥२८॥

नाभि Nâbhi, of the navel. चक्रे Chakre, on the plexus. काय Kâya, of the body. व्यूह Vyûha, of the system. ज्ञानम् Jñânam, the knowledge.

28. On the plexus of the navel, the knowledge of the system of the body.—134.

नाभिचक्रे कायव्यूहज्ञानम् । नाभिचक्रे संयमं कृत्वा कायव्यूहं विजानीयात् । वातपित्तश्लेष्माणस्त्रयो दैषाः । धातवः सप्त त्वग्लोहितमांसस्नायवस्थिमज्जाशुक्राणि । पूर्वं पूर्वमेषां बाह्यमित्येष विन्यासः ॥ २८ ॥

VYĀSA.

Let him know the system of the body by performing Samyama over the plexus of the navel. There are three humours, gas, bile and phlegm. There are seven substances, skin, blood, muscle, tendon, bone, fat and semen. The previous in order among these is external to the next following. Such is their comparative position.—134.

Sûtra 29.

कण्ठकूपे क्षुत्पिपासानिवृत्तिः ॥२९॥

कण्ठ Kapha, of the throat. कूपे Kûpe, in the pit. क्षुत् Kshut, of hunger. पिपासा Pipâsâ, thirst. निवृत्तिः Nivrittih, the subdual.

29. In the pit of the throat, subdual of hunger and thirst.—135.

कण्ठकूपे क्षुत्पिपासानिवृत्तिः । जिह्वाया अधस्तात्तन्तुस्ततोऽधस्तात्कण्ठस्ततोऽध-
स्तात्कूपस्तत्र संयमात्क्षुत्पिपासे न बाधेते ॥ २९ ॥

VYĀSA.

Below the tongue is the throat; below that the gullet; below that the pit (stomach). By Samyama there, hunger and thirst tease not.—135.

Sûtra 30.

कूर्मनाडयां स्थैर्यम् ॥३०॥

कूर्मनाडयम् Kûrma-nâdyâm, tortoise tube, स्थैर्यम् Sthairyam, steadiness.

30. On the tortoise tube (kurmanâdî), steadiness.—136.

कूर्मनाडयां स्थैर्यम् । कूपादध उरसि कूर्माकारा नाडी तस्यां कृतसंयमः स्थिरपदं
लभते । यथा सर्पो गोधा चेति ॥ ३० ॥

VYÂSA,

Below the throat pit in the chest is a tube of the shape of a tortoise. By performance over that, the Yogî gets firmness of position as that of snake, alligator, &c. (i.e., the power of hibernation).—136.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

26, 27, 28, 29 and 30.

Whatever the Yogî wishes to know, he must perform Samyama with reference to that. Thus Samyama tending to bring about the cessation of hunger and thirst and steadiness have been taught by the words of the aphorism and have been explained by the words of the Commentary already explained.—30.

Sûtra 31.

मूर्धज्योतिषि सिद्धदर्शनम् ॥ ३१ ॥

मूर्ध Murdha, of the head, the coronal. ज्योतिषि Jyotisi, on the light सिद्ध Siddha, of the perfected ones. दर्शनम् Darsanam, the vision.

31. In the coronal light, vision of the Perfected-Ones.—137.

**मूर्धज्योतिषि सिद्धदर्शनम् । शिरः कपालेऽन्तश्चिछ्रदं प्रभास्वरं ज्योतिस्तत्र संयमं
कृत्वा सिद्धानां द्यावापृथिव्योरन्तरालचारिणां दर्शनम् ॥ ३१ ॥**

VYÂSA.

In the skull there is a bright light in the hole. By Samyama there-upon comes vision of the perfected ones, the Siddhâs, moving in space between earth and heaven.—137.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

By the word 'coronal' the Susumnâ tube is indicated. The Samyama is to be there.—31.

Sûtra 32.

प्रातिभाद्रा सर्वम् ॥ ३२ ॥

प्रातिभाद्र Prâti bâd, by prescience. वा Va, or. सर्वम् Sarvam, all.

32. Or, all knowledge by prescience (prâtibha).—138.

**प्रातिभाद्रा सर्वम् । प्रातिभं नाम तारकं तद्विवेकजस्य ज्ञानस्य पूर्वरूपम् । यथो-
दये प्रभा भास्करस्य तेन वा सर्वमेव जानाति योगी प्रातिभस्य ज्ञानस्योत्पत्ताविति ॥ ३२ ॥**

VYASA.

Prescience is also named Târaka. It is the fore-runner of discriminative knowledge, as light is the fore-runner of the sun at sunrise. The Yogî may also know everything by that, (as an alternative means) after the birth of knowledge, called prescience.—138.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Prâtibha, prescience, is the same as self-suggestion (Uha), the coming into consciousness without external aid of anything unknown. When Samyama is performed with the object of attaining the Highest Intellection, then at the time of the height of practice, there takes its rise a power which, as it were, draws in all knowledge. The Yogî knows everything by that. It is called Târaka, (from tri to swim, to cross over), because by bringing about the Highest Intellection it helps in crossing over the world of life and death.—32.

Sûtra 33.

हृदये चित्तसंवित् ॥३३॥

हृदये Hridaye, in the heart. चित्त Chitta, of the mind. संवित् Samvit, the knowledge.

33. In the heart, the knowledge of the mind.—139.

हृदये चित्तसंवित् । यदिदमस्मिन्ब्रह्मपुरे दहरं पुण्डरीकं वेशम तत्र विज्ञानं तस्मि-
न्संयमाचित्तसंवित् ॥ ३३ ॥

VYÂSA.

In the lotus-like cavity, the temple in the city of Brahmâ, lives the Intelligence. By performing Samyama with reference to that, comes the power of knowing the (Chitta).—139.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The Commentator describes the word Heart (Hridaya). The self is called Brahma, being largest of all. His city is that in which he is housed, knowing it as he does to be his own. Cavity means hollow. The same is the lotus too with its face downwards. The same is the temple.

He gives the reason for the mind knowing mind (the Manas knowing the Chitta): 'Intelligence lives there.' By Samyama over that, the Yogî knows the Chitta with its modifications.—33.

Sûtra 34.

सत्त्वपुरुषयोरत्यन्तासङ्कीर्णयोः प्रत्ययाविशेषो
भोगः परार्थत्वात्स्वार्थसंयमात्पुरुषज्ञानम् ॥३४॥

सत्त्व Sattva, of the objective essence. पुरुषयोः Puruṣayoh, and of the Puruṣa. अत्यन्त Atyanta, quite, असङ्कीर्णयोः Asaṅkîrṇayoh, distinct from each other. प्रत्यय Pratyaya, the notion of distinction. अविशेषः Aviśeṣah, the absence. भोगः Bhogaḥ, is experience. परार्थत्वात् Parârthatvât, because it exists for another. स्वार्थ Svârtha, on his own object. संयमात् Samyamât, by Samyama. पुरुष-ज्ञानम् Puruṣa-Jñânam, the knowledge of the Puruṣa.

34. Experience consists in the absence of the notion of distinction between the Puruṣa and Objective-Essence, which are really quite distinct-from-each-other,

because it exists for another. By Samyama on his own object, comes the knowledge of the Puruṣa—140.

सत्त्वपुरुषयोरत्यन्तासङ्कीर्णयोः प्रत्ययाविशेषो भेगः परार्थत्वात्स्वार्थसंयमात्पुरुष-
ज्ञानम् । बुद्धिसत्त्वं प्रख्याशीलम् । समानसत्त्वोपनिबन्धने रजस्तमसी वशीकृत्य सत्त्वपुरु-
षान्यताप्रत्ययेन परिणतम् । तस्माच्च सत्त्वात्परिणामिनोऽत्यन्तविधर्मा विशुद्धोऽन्यश्चि-
तिमात्ररूपः पुरुषस्तयोरत्यन्तासङ्कीर्णयोः प्रत्ययाविशेषो भेगः । पुरुषत्वं दर्शितविषय-
त्वात् । स भेगप्रत्ययः सत्त्वस्य परार्थत्वाद् हृश्यः । यस्तु तस्माद्विशिष्टश्चितिमात्ररूपोऽन्यः
पौरुषेयः प्रत्ययस्तत्र संयमात्पुरुषविषया प्रज्ञा जायते । न च पुरुषप्रत्ययेन बुद्धिसत्त्वात्मना
पुरुषो हृश्यते । पुरुष एव तं प्रत्ययं स्वात्मावलम्बनं पश्यति । तथा ह्युक्तम् । विज्ञातार-
मरे केन विज्ञानीयादिति ॥ ३४ ॥

VYÂSA.

The essence of the Will-to-be is of the nature of illumination ; and when it overpowers the qualities of Disturbing energy (Rajas) and Inertia (Tamas), which are equally related to it by co-existence, it takes up the form of the notion of the distinction between the Puruṣa and Objective Essence. Widely different from that changing Objective Existence also in characteristic is the Puruṣa who appears as pure consciousness. They are quite distinct from each other. Experience consists in the notions of the two not being taken as distinct, because the objects are shown to him. The notion of enjoyment is the knowable, because the Essence of matter exists for another. There is another notion, however, the notion of the Puruṣa, which is quite distinct from this, and which appears as pure consciousness.

By Samyama with reference to this notion is born the knowledge of the Puruṣa. The Puruṣa is not known by that notion of itself, which is the self-same as the Objective Buddhi. The Puruṣa only sees that notion of self by himself. And so it has been said :—‘By what, Oh ! is the knower to be known ?—140.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

When the Essence of the Will-to-be, which is of the very nature of the luminous essence of things, which is extremely pure, and which is on account of the utter suppression of the Rajas and Tamas modified into the phenomenon of the distinction between the Puruṣa and the Objective Essence, is entirely different from the Puruṣa, what to speak of the Rajas and the Tamas ? It is with this in his mind that the author of the aphorisms says, ‘ Distinction between the Puruṣa and the Objective Essence.’

Having the same in mind the author of the Commentary too says :—‘ The essence of the Will-to-be, &c.’ Not only possessing the nature of illumination, but modified too at the same time as the discriminative knowledge, and therefore extremely pure and luminous, it therefore bears extreme resemblance to consciousness. This would mean confusion.

For this reason he says :—‘ Which are equally related to it by co-existence.’ Co-existence is the relation of one not existing without the other. Those which bear the relation of co-existence equally, are the qualities of Disturbing Energy (Rajas) and Inertia (Tamas), ‘ Overpowering’ means controlling. He describes the absence of confusion :—‘ Widely different from the Changing Objective, &c.’

The word ‘ also ’ signifies that it is not only different from the Sattva, but from the Rajas and Tamas also. ‘ Changing Objective existence ’ is used to indicate the distinction of the unchanging Puruṣa.

‘ The notion of these two not being taken as distinctive’:—The Will-to-be is of the nature of either the quiescent, the disturbed, or the forgetful notions. When consciousness is reflected into it, then the quiescence, the disturbance and the forgetfulness are fastened on to the consciousness. (This happens in the same way) as the moon reflected into pure water, looks as if trembling on account of the unsteadiness of the water.

He mentions the cause of experience :—‘ Because the objects are shown to the Puruṣa.’ This has been explained often.

Well ; let the essence of the Will-to-be different from the Puruṣa. But how can experience be different from the Puruṣa ? For this reason he says :—‘ The notion of enjoyment,’ i. e., the notion consisting of enjoyment, ‘ is of the Objective Essence and therefore existing for the sake of another. All that is enjoyable is of the nature of the knowable. Objective Essence is for the sake of another, because it consists of many things brought together ; and because experience is a characteristic. That also is for the sake of another. It becomes the enjoyable of that particular enjoyer for whose sake soever it may be in existence.

Or, it may be said that experience is the feeling of pleasure and pain as being in consonance or dissonance with the prevailing mental trend at any time. This cannot be in consonance or dissonance with itself. No self-contradictory manifestation can exist in itself. Hence it must be the objects that are either in consonance or dissonance ; and it is this that constitutes experience. The self is the enjoyer; the knowable is that which he enjoys.

‘ Which is quite distinct from this’:—The words ‘on account of existence for the sake of another’ are to be supplied here as understood to explain the distinction.

Well ; let that be. But if the Puruṣa is thus the object of knowledge, then there must be posited another intelligence, which this intelligence knows, and so on and on and thus there would be no stability of thought. For this reason he says :—‘ The Puruṣa is not known by that notion of itself, &c.’ This is the construction : The non-intelligent is illuminated by consciousness, not consciousness by the non-intelligent. How could the notion of the Puruṣa (being non-intelligent, as being a modification of the Will-to-be illuminate the conscious self ? It has, however, been said that the conscious self, not depending for illumination upon another, illuminates the non-intelligent. By saying that the notion of the Puruṣa is of the nature of the essence of the Will-to-be, it is meant to be stated that it is of the nature of the non-intelligent, and is therefore unconscious as such. What looks like the objective appearance of the Puruṣa, and becomes as such an object of knowledge, is the reflection of the Puruṣa into the essence of the Will-to-be. This reflection depends upon the Puruṣa as the reflection of the face into the mirror depends upon the face. The Will-to-be becomes the object of the Puruṣa by that reflection and not in its own nature of illumination. The notion of self-knowledge consists in making the object of knowledge, the reflection of the Puruṣa into the Buddhi. He illustrates the same by a Vedic text (Br. Up. II. 4-14 :—) ‘ And so it has been said ’ by īsvara :—‘ By what Oh ! is the knower to be known ? ’ That is, by nothing.—34.

Sûtra 35.

ततः प्रातिभश्रावणवेदनादर्शस्वादवार्ता जायन्ते ॥३५॥

ततः Tataḥ, thence. प्रातिभः Prâtibha, prescience. श्रावण Srâvaṇa, higher hearing. वेदन Vedana, higher touch. आदर्श Ādarśa, higher vision. आस्वाद Āsvâda, higher taste. वार्ता Vârtâ, higher smell. जायन्ते Jâyante, proceed.

35. Thence proceed prescience, higher hearing, touch, vision, taste, and smell.—141.

ततः प्रातिभश्रावणवेदनादर्शस्वादवार्ता जायन्ते । प्रातिभात्सूहमव्यवहितविप्रकृ-ष्टातीतानागतज्ञानम् । श्रावणादिव्यशब्दश्रवणम् । वेदनादृदिव्यस्पर्शाधिगमः । आदर्शादि-व्यरूपसंवित् । आस्वादादिव्यरससंवित् । वार्तातो दिव्यगन्धविज्ञानमित्येतानि नित्यं जायन्ते ॥ ३५ ॥

VYÂSA.

By prescience comes the knowledge of the subtle, the intercepted, the remote and the past and future. By higher hearing comes the hearing of divine sounds; by touch, the knowledge of divine touch; by vision comes the knowledge of heavenly colour; by smell, the cognition of higher odours; by taste comes the cognition of divine tastes. These are born constantly.—141.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Samyama over self-illumination is impossible until the Pradhâna has fulfilled its object of making the whole of herself known to the Puruṣa. Therefore, the author shows all the attainments which precede it:—‘Thence proceed prescience, higher hearing, touch, vision, taste, and smell.’ By this it is also said that mind, hearing, skin, eye, tongue and nose favourably strengthened with the virtues resulting from the practice of Yoga, are the invisible causes respectively of prescience and higher hearing, &c.

The words Srâvana, &c., used in the text are technical terms for denoting the hearing of divine sounds, &c. The Commentary is easy.—35.

Sûtra 36

ते समाधावुपसर्ग व्युत्थाने सिद्धयः ॥३६॥

ते Te, they. समाधौ Samâdhau, to trance. उपसर्गः Upasargâḥ, obstacles. व्युत्थाने Vyutthâne, to the outgoing of the mind. सिद्धयः Siddhayâḥ, perfections.

36. They are obstacles to trance, but perfections to the out-going mind.—142.

ते समाधावुपसर्ग व्युत्थाने सिद्धयः । ते प्रातिभादयः समाहितचित्तस्योत्पद्यमा-ना उपसर्गस्तदूदर्शनप्रत्यनीकत्वात् । व्यूत्थितचित्तस्योत्पद्यमानाः सिद्धयः ॥ ३६ ॥

VYÂSA.

They, the powers of prescience, &c., prove to be obstacles when they appear in a mind which has reached the state of trance; because they oppose the knowledge obtained in that state. When, however, they appear in a mind which is active in going out, they are attainments.—142.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

As it may be that one who has been performing Samyama with reference to the self, may on the appearance of these attainments think that he has achieved what had to be achieved, and thus give up further effort, the author says :—‘They are obstacles to trance, but perfections to the out-going mind.’

It is only he whose mind is active in going out that becomes proud of the possession of these as attainments. A beggar in life may think that the possession of a little wealth is the fulness of riches. The Yogi, however, who is inclined to the attainment of trance must reject them whenever they come. He has vowed the removal of all the three descriptions of pain to their utmost limit. That being the object of the Puruṣa, how can he take pleasure in the attainments which are the opponents of that state of being? This is the meaning of the aphorism and the commentary.—36.

Sûtra 37.

बन्धकारणौथिल्यात्प्रचारसंवेदनाच्च चित्तस्य परशरीरावेशः॥३७॥

बन्ध Bandha, of bondage. कारण Kâraṇa, of the cause. शैथिल्यात् Saithilyât, on relaxation. प्रचार Prachâra, of the passages संवेदनात् Samvedanât, by knowledge. च Cha, and. चित्तस्य Chittasya, of the mind. पर Para, other's. शरीर Śarîra, body. आवेशः Āveśah, entering into.

37. The mind may enter another body, on relaxation of the cause of bondage, and by knowledge of the passages of the mind.—143.

बन्धकारणौथिल्यात्प्रचारसंवेदनाच्च चित्तस्य परशरीरावेशः । लोलीभूतस्य मनसोऽप्रतिष्ठस्य शरीरे कर्मशयवशाद् बन्धः प्रतिष्ठेत्यर्थः । तस्य कर्मणा बन्धकारणस्य शैथिल्यं समाधिबलाद्वति । प्रचारसंवेदनं च चित्तस्य समाधिजमेव कर्मबन्धक्षयात्स्व-चित्तस्य प्रचारसंवेदनाच्च योगी चित्तं स्वशरीरान्निष्कृष्य शरीरान्तरेषु निःक्षिपति निःक्षिप्तं चित्तं चेन्द्रियाण्यनुपत्तिं । यथा मधुकरराजानं मक्षिका उत्पत्तमनूत्पत्तिं निविशमान-मनुनिविशन्ति तथेन्द्रियाणि परशरीरावेशे चित्तमनुविर्भोयन्ति इति ॥ ३७ ॥

VYÂSA.

The mind (chitta) which by nature passes into new states of life and never remains fixed in one state, is bound down to, i.e., comes to stay in a body, because of the power of the vehicle of action. By the force of trance, the vehicle of action which chains it down, slackens its operation. And the consciousness of how the mind acts in the body is also the fruit of trance. By the destruction of the bonds imposed by Karma, and by knowing the method of the mind acting upon the body, the Yogi withdraws his mind from his own body and throws it into the body of another. As the mind is thus thrown into another body, the powers of sensation, &c., follow it. Even as bees follow their king, as he goes on resting or moving on, so do the powers follow the mind as it enters another body.—143.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Having described the power of knowledge, which has its culmination in the knowledge of the Puruṣa, as being the result of Samyama, the author now describes the result of Samyama which takes the shape of the power of action:—‘The mind may enter another body on relaxation of the cause of bondage, and by knowledge of the passages of the mind.’ ‘By the force of trance’:—This means the performance of Samyama on the cause of bondage. Trance alone is mentioned because that is the principal factor of the three. By ‘passages of the mind’ are understood the passages through which and the modes according to which the mind acts in the body. There are nerves in the body by which the mind travels in the body to perform its functions. From the performance of Samyama on the passage of the mind along these nerves, accrues the consciousness thereof, which slackens the bond. Then by destruction of the cause of bondage he no longer remains confined to the body. But it may be that even though he may no longer be confined to the body, he may not know how to get out of the body by the proper passage, and he may thus not be able to go out of the body without injury, and may not also be able to enter another body. For this reason the passages and modes of movement also must be known. As the powers of sensation, &c., follow the mind they take their proper places in the body, as the mind enters therein.—37.

Sûtra 38.

उदानजयाज्जलपङ्ककरटकादिष्वसङ्ग उत्क्रान्तिश्च ॥३८॥

उदान Udâna, over Udâna. जयात् Jayât, by mastery. जल Jala, water. पङ्क Paṅka, mud. करटक Kapṭaka, thorns, with these. आदिशु Ādiśu, and with the others. असङ्गः Asaṅgah, non-contact. उत्क्रान्तिः Utkrântih, ascension. च Cha, and.

38. By mastery over UDÂNA, ascension and non-contact with water, mud, thorns, &c.—144.

उदानजयाज्जलपङ्ककरटकादिष्वसङ्ग उत्क्रान्तिश्च । समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिः प्राणादिभूषणा जीवनं तस्य क्रिया पञ्चतयी प्राणो मुख्यनासिकागतिराहदयवृत्तिः । समं नयनात्समानश्वानाभिवृत्तिः । अपनयनादपान आपादतलवृत्तिः । उद्धयनादुदान आशिरोवृत्तिः व्यापी व्यान इति । एषां प्रधानं प्राणः । उदानजयाज्जलपङ्ककरटकादिष्वसङ्ग उत्क्रान्तिश्च प्रायणकाले भवति तां धर्शित्वेन प्रतिपद्यते ॥ ३८ ॥

VYÂSA.

Life which shows itself as the operations of Prâna and others, is the manifestation of all the powers of sensation and action. Its action is five-fold. The Prâna moves through the mouth and the nose, and manifests itself within the chest.

The Samâna manifests up to the navel. It is so called because it carries equally (Sama) (to all parts of the body, the juice of food, &c.). Manifesting down to the soles of feet (all over) is the Apâna, so called because it carries away (apa). Manifesting up to the head is the Udâna, so called because it carries upward (ut). The Vyâna is so called because it pervades the whole body in every direction. Of these, the Prâna is the chief.

'By mastery over Udâna is secured non-contact with water, mud, thorns, &c., and ascension comes at the time of death. He secures that because he has the power.'—144.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

By mastery over Udâna is secured non-contact with water, mud, thorns, &c. 'Life is the manifestation of the functions of all the powers of sensation, &c.' It functions as Prâna, &c. Prâna and others are indications thereof. The functioning of the indriyas is two-fold, external and internal. The external is indicated by the cognition of colour, &c. The internal function is life. It is a particular effort, which is the common property of all the indriyas (powers of action and sensation) and the cause of the different actions of the Vâyu Tattva, the motive power of the body. As they say:—'Prâna and other motive forces, the functions of the Vâyu Tattva, are the five modifications of the Vâyu Tattva. They are the five modifications of the Indriyas (powers of action and sensation) in common. Because they point to this that 'its action is five-fold,' the action of that effort (prayatna) is five-fold.'

The Prâna has its sphere from the fore-part of the nose down to the heart. The Samâna is that which carries equally, that is, to places where it is properly required and inasmuch as is required, the chyle which is made of foods and drinks. Its sphere of action is down from the heart to the navel. The Apâna is the cause of sending out of the body urine, faeces, fœtus, &c. Its sphere of action is up to the navel and also down to the soles of feet. The Udâna is so called because it carries upwards chyle, &c. Its function is from the fore-part of the nose up to the head. The Vyâna is all-pervading. The Prâna is the chief of all these that have been described, because the Vedic text speaks of all these going out when Prâna goes out.

Having thus described the differences of Prâna, &c., with reference to their functions and the places of their location, the Commentator now introduces the aphorism:—'By mastery over Udâna, &c.' When Udâna is mastered by the performance of Samyama thereupon, he is no longer checked by water, &c.

As to ascension, that takes place by the path which has its beginning in the flame (the Archirâdi, northern path), after death. Having mastered that path, he ascends by that path.

By the performance over Prâna, &c., and by the acquirement of mastery over these, come appropriate attainments too. They should be understood according to the differences of their function, place of manifestation, and mastery, etc.—38.

Sûtra 39.

समानजयाज्ज्वलनम् ॥३६॥

समान Samâna, over Samâna. जयात् Jayât, by mastery. ज्वलनम् Jvalanam, effulgence.

39. By mastery over Samâna comes effulgence.—145.

समानजयाज्ज्वलनम् । जितसमानस्तेजस उपधमानं कृत्वा ज्वलयति ॥ ३९ ॥

VYÂSA.

He who has obtained mastery over the Samâna blows the fire into flame and thus shines.—145.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The fire is of the body. The blowing it into flame means rendering it brighter.—39.

Sûtra 40.

श्रोत्राकाशयोः संबन्धसंयमादिव्यं श्रोत्रम् ॥४०॥

श्रोत्रं Srotra, the power of hearing. आकाशं Akâsa, Akâsa between these two. सम्बन्धं Sambandha, over the relation. संयमात् Samyamât, by Samyama. दिव्यम् Divyam, higher. श्रोत्रम् Sotram, power of hearing.

40. By Samyama over the relation between Akâsa and the power-of-hearing, comes the higher power-of-hearing.—146.

श्रोत्राकाशयोः संबन्धसंयमादिव्यं श्रोत्रम् । सर्वश्रोत्राणामाकाशं प्रतिष्ठा सर्वशब्दानां च । यथोक्तम् । तुल्यदेशश्रवणानामेकदेशश्रुतित्वं सर्वेषां भवतीति । तत्त्वैतदाकाशस्य लिङ्गम् । अनावरणं चोक्तम् । तथामूर्तस्याप्यन्यत्रानावरणदर्शनाद्विभूत्वमपि प्रख्यातमाकाशस्य शब्दग्रहणनिमित्तं श्रोत्रम् । बधिराबधिरयेरेकः शब्दं गृह्णात्यपरो न गृह्णातीति तस्माच्छ्रोत्रमेव शब्दविषयम् । श्रोत्राकाशयोः संबन्धे द्वृतसंयमस्य योगिनो दिव्यं श्रोत्रं प्रवर्तते ॥ ४० ॥

VYÂSA.

In Akâsa abide all powers of hearing and all sounds. As has been said :—‘To all those whose organs of hearing are similarly situated, the situation of hearing comes to be the same.’

And this is a reason for (the existence of Akâsa). Absence of obstruction also has been so spoken of. The Akâsa is also described as all-pervading, seeing that there is absence of obstruction in other places also than where a form may be.

The power of hearing is the means of perceiving sound. Of a deaf and a not-deaf, one senses sound and the other does not. Therefore, the power of hearing only is the sphere for the action of sound. Whoever performs Samyama with reference to the relation between the power of hearing and the Akâsa, evolves the power of higher audition.—146.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

It has been said that the power of higher audition comes to the Yogi who is performing Samyama with reference to the purpose of the self, because there yet remains something of the Pradhâna to be seen. Now the author says that the powers of higher audition and other sense powers come by the performance of Samyama with reference to the powers themselves :—

‘By Samyama on the relation between the power of hearing and Akâsa (the soniferous ether) comes the higher power of audition.’ He describes the sphere of Samyama :—‘The relation between the power of hearing and Akâsa,’ the relation being that of the thing supporting and the thing supported.

All powers of hearing, even though they have their origin in the principle of egoism, reside in the Akâsa, placed in the hollow of the ear. It is this where the power of hearing is located. When soundness or defect is noticed therein, soundness or defect, as the case may be, is noticed in the power of hearing also.

Further, when of the sounds working in unison with the power of hearing, the sounds of solids, &c., are to be taken in, then the power of hearing located in the hollow of the ear, stands in need of the capacity of resonance residing in the substratum, the *Ākāśa* of the ear.

In the perception of the external smells of solids, &c., by the senses of smell, &c., working in unison with the qualities of odour, &c., the operation is seen to be that the senses of smell, taste, touch, sight and hearing are located in physical vehicles only, because the powers of smell, &c., are seen to be working soundly or defectively when the physical vehicles are sound or injured respectively.

This sense of hearing then, having its origin in the principal of egoism, acts like iron, drawn as it is by sound originating and located in the mouth of the speaker, acting as loadstone, transforms them into its own modifications in sequence of the sounds of the speaker, and thus senses them. And it is for this reason that for every living creature, the perception of sound in external space is in the absence of defects, never void of authority. So says the quotation from Pañchasikha :—‘To all those whose organs of hearing are similarly situated, the situation of hearing is the same.’ All those are Chaitras and other organs of hearing are similarly situated in space. The meaning is that the powers of hearing of all are located in *Ākāśa*. Further the *Ākāśa* in which the power of hearing is located is born out of the soniferous Tanmātra, and has therefore the quality of sound inherent in itself. It is by this sound acting in unison that it takes the sounds of external solids, &c. Hence the hearing, i.e., the sound of all is of the same class. (The class is determined by the relative situation in space).

This then establishes that the *Ākāśa* is the substratum of the power of hearing, and also possesses quality of sound. And this sameness of the situation of sound is an indication of the existence of *Ākāśa*. That which is the substratum of the auditory power (*Śruti*) which manifests as sound of the same class, is *Ākāśa*. Such a manifestation of sound cannot be without such an auditory power. Nor is such an auditory power a quality of *Prithvî*, &c., because it cannot be in its own self both the manifester and manifested (*vyaṅgya* and *vyañjaka*).

Further the absence of obstruction is an indication of *Ākāśa*. If there were no *Ākāśa*, the forms would be in such close contact with one another that even a needle-point would not find room between them. Everything would thus be obstructed by everything. It cannot be said that the absence of obstruction is the result only of the non-existence of things possessed of form, because non-existence depends upon existence, inasmuch as there can be no cessation of existence in the absence of existence. Further the power of consciousness cannot be its substratum, because it is immutable and cannot, therefore, be limited. And further space and time, &c., are nothing different from the *Prithvî* and other substances. Therefore such a kind of change can only be of the *Ākāśa*. Thus all is plain.

When it is shown that absence of obstruction is an indication of the existence of *Ākāśa*, then it is clear that wherever absence of obstruction is found, there must be *Ākāśa* in existence, and hence the *Ākāśa* is proved to be all-pervading also. For this reason, the Commentator says :—‘Therefore although having no form, &c.’

He mentions authority for the existence of the power of hearing :—‘The power of hearing is the means, &c.’ Action is found to be capable of performance by means of an instrument only. As a hole can be made by a gimlet only, so here too the action of hearing sound can only be performed by means of some instrument only. Whatever is the instrument of hearing, is the power of hearing. But then why should not the eye and other organs be the instruments of hearing also? For this reason he says :—‘A deaf and a not-deaf, &c.’ The proof is given by the canons of agreement and difference both.

Further this is suggestive of other powers. By Samyama over the relations between the skin and Vâyu, the eye and the light, the taste and the Apas, the nose and Prithvî, the attainment of the higher powers of touch, &c., is also to be understood.—40.

Sûtra 41.

कायाकाशयोः संबन्धसंयमाल्लघुतूलसमापत्तेश्चाकाशगमनम् ॥४१॥

कायाकाशयोः Kâyâkâśayoh, between the body (काय) and the Âkâśa. सम्बन्ध Sam-bandha, over the relation. संयमात् Samyamât, by Samyama. लघु Laghu, light. तूल Tûla, cotton. समापत्तेः Samâpatteḥ, by attaining to. च Cha, and. आकाश Âkâśa, through space. गमनम् Gamanam, passage.

41. By Samyama on the relation between the body and the Âkâśa, or by attaining to (the state of thought transforming as) the lightness of cotton, &c., passage through space (Âkâśa).—147.

कायाकाशयोः संबन्धसंयमाल्लघुतूलसमापत्तेऽचाकाशगमनम् । यत्र कायस्तत्राकाशं तस्यावकाशदानात्कायस्य तेन संबन्धावाप्तिस्तत्र छृतसंयमो जित्वा तत्संबन्धं लघुषु वा तूलादिष्वापरमाणुसमापत्तिं लभ्वा जितसंबन्धां लघुर्भवति लघुत्वाच्च जले पादाभ्यां विहरति ततस्तूर्णनाभितन्तुमात्रे विहृत्य रश्मिषु विहरति ततो यथेष्टुमाकाशगतिरस्य भवतीति ॥ ४१ ॥

VYÂSA.

Wherever there is the body, there is the Âkâśa. The body becomes related to the Âkâśa, because the latter gives room to the former. Having mastered the relation by the attainment of the state of thought transforming into light things such as cotton, &c., down to the atom, the Yogî becomes light. Thence does he get the power of roaming through space and walking over water with his feet. He walks over a spider's web, and then walks over the rays of light. Then does he get the power of roaming through space at will.—147.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

By performance of Samyama on the relation between the body and the Âkâśa, or having attained by Samyama on cotton, &c., the state of the mind transforming itself as such, it becomes the cause of manifesting the qualities present therein. The Commentator mentions the stage of the attainments :—‘ Moves over water, &c.’—41.

Sûtra 42.

बहिरकाल्पिता वृत्तिर्महाविदेहा ततः प्रकाशवरणक्षयः ॥४२॥

बहिः Bahih, actual passing out. अकाल्पिता Akalpitâ, outside the body. वृत्तिः Vrittih, acting. महा-विदेहा Mahâ-videhâ, the great ex-corporeal. ततः Tataḥ, by that. प्रकाश Prakâśa, of light. आवरण Avaraṇa, of the veil. क्षयः Kṣayah, the destruction.

42. Actual-passing-out and acting outside the body is the Great Excorporeal ; by that is destroyed the veil of light.—148.

बहिरकल्पितावृत्तिर्महाविदेहाततः प्रकाशावरणश्यः । शरीराद् बहिर्मनसो वृत्तिलाभे विदेहा नाम धारणा सा यदि शरीरप्रतिष्ठस्य मनसो बहिर्वृत्तिमात्रेण भवति सा कल्पितेत्युच्यते । या तु शरीरनिरपेक्षा बहिर्भूतस्यैव मनसो बहिर्वृत्तिः सा खल्वकल्पिता तत्र कल्पितया साध्यन्त्यकल्पितां महाविदेहामिति । यथा परशरीराण्याविशन्ति योगिनः । ततश्च धारणातः प्रकाशात्मतो बुद्धिसत्त्वस्य यदावरणं क्लेशकर्मविपाकत्रयं रजस्तमोमूलं तस्य च क्षयो भवति ॥ ४२ ॥

VYĀSA.

That form of concentration in which the mind acts upon something outside the body, is named excorporeal concentration.

This excorporeal concentration, if taking place by merely the mind functioning, while yet staying in the body, is called Fancied (kalpita) Excorporeal.

That, however, in which the mind has no need of the body left and passes out of the body and then functions outside the body, is called the Actual Excorporeal concentration.

Of these, the Actual Excorporeal, which is also called the Great Excorporeal, is attained by means of the Fancied Excorporeal. It is by this that the Yōgīs effect their entrance into other bodies. By this concentration the veil of the luminous essence of the Will-to-be, in the shape of the three vehicles of affliction, action and fruition, which has its origin in the Rajas and Tamas, is destroyed.—148.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The author describes another Samyama too, which becomes the means of entering into another body, and also the means of destruction of afflictions, actions and fruitions :—‘Actual passing out of the body and then acting there, is the Great Excorporeal ; by this the veil of light is destroyed.’

The Commentator describes the Excorporeal :—‘That form of concentration in which the mind functions outside the body, &c.’ In order to describe the nature of the Actual Excorporeal and for explaining its means, he describes the Fancied Excorporeal :—‘If that, &c.’ ‘By merely the mind functioning outside the body.’ Fancy means that the presence outside the body has been fancied, although the mind is still in the body and has been acting outside only functionally and not by actual presence.

He describes the Great Excorporeal :—‘That however.’ Now he says that the relation between the Fancied and the Actual Excorporeal is that the former is the means of attaining the other.’ ‘By that concentration.’—By means of that concentration the mental modification of the Great Excorporeal is achieved. The afflictions, the actions and the three-fold fruition thereof in the shape of life-state, life-time and life-experience have all their origin in the Rajas and the Tamas ; because when the Rajas and the Tamas are

destroyed, the manifestation of the discrimination takes place by the quality of essentiality (Sattva) alone. This three-fold fruition having its origin in the Rajas and the Tamas, is of their nature and covers the essence of the Will to-be therewith. It is destroyed with its destruction, and the mind of the Yogi goes about at will and similarly knows also.—42.

Sûtra 43.

स्थूलस्वरूपसूक्ष्मान्वयार्थवत्त्वसंयमाद् भूतजयः ॥ ४३ ॥

स्थूल Sthûla, the gross. स्वरूप Svarûpa, the substantive. सूक्ष्म Sûksma, the astral. अन्वय Anvaya, conjunction. अर्थवत्त्व Arthavattva, purposefulness. संयमाद् Samyamâd, by Samyama. भूत-जयः Bhûta-jayah, mastery over the elements.

43. By Samyama on the gross (sthûla), the substantive (svarûpa), the astral (sûksma), conjunction (anvaya) and purposefulness (arthavattva), is obtained mastery over the elements (bhûtas).—149.

स्थूलस्वरूपसूक्ष्मान्वयार्थवत्त्वसंयमाद्भूतजयः । तत्र पार्थिवाद्याः शब्दादयो विशेषाः सहकारादिभिर्धर्मैः स्थूलशब्देन परिभाषिताः । एतद्भूतानां प्रथमं रूपम् । द्वितीयं रूपं स्वसामान्यं मूर्तिर्भूमिः । स्नेहे जलं बहिरुष्णता वायुः प्रणामी सर्वतो गतिराकाश इत्येतत्स्वरूपशब्देनोच्यते । अस्य सामान्यस्य शब्दादयो विशेषाः । तथा चौक्तम् । एकजातिसमन्वितानामेषां धर्ममात्रव्यावृत्तिरिति । सामान्यविशेषसमुदायोऽत्र द्रव्यं द्रष्टव्यम् । द्वितीयो हि समूहः प्रत्यस्तमितभेदावयवानुगतः शरीरं वृक्षो यूथं वनमितशब्देनोपात्तभेदावयवानुगतः समूहः । उभये देवमनुष्याः । समूहस्य देवा एव एको भागो मनुष्या द्वितीयो भागस्ताभ्यामेवाभिर्धीयते समूहः । स च भेदाभेदविवक्षितः । आप्नाणां वनं ब्राह्मणानां सङ्कु इति । आप्नवणं ब्राह्मणसङ्कु इति । स पुनर्द्विविधो युतसिद्धावयवोऽयुतसिद्धावयवश्च । युतसिद्धावयवः समूहो वनं सङ्कु इति । अयुतसिद्धावयवः सङ्कुतः शरीरं वृक्षः परमाणुरिति । अयुतसिद्धावयवभेदानुगतः समूहो द्रव्यमितिपतञ्जलिः । एतत्स्वरूपमित्युक्तम् । अथ किमेषां सूक्ष्मरूपं तन्मात्रं भूतकारणं तस्यैकोऽवयवः परमाणुः सामान्यविशेषात्मा अयुतसिद्धावयवभेदानुगतः समुदाय इत्येवं सर्वं तन्मात्राण्येतत्तृतीयम् । अथ भूतानां चतुर्थं रूपं ख्यातिक्रियास्थितिशीला गुणाः कायस्वभावानुपातिनैऽन्वयशब्देनोक्ताः । अर्थैषां पञ्चमं रूपमर्थवत्त्वं भेदागापवर्गार्थता गुणेष्वेवान्वयिनी । गुणास्तन्मात्रभूतभौतिकेष्विति सर्वमर्थवत् । तेष्विदानां भूतेषु पञ्चसु पञ्चरूपेषु रूपे संयमात्तस्य तस्य रूपस्य स्वरूपदर्शनं जयश्च प्रादुर्भवति । तत्र पञ्चमतस्वरूपाणि जित्वा भूतजयीभवति । तज्जयाद्वत्सानुसारिण्य इव गावेऽस्य सङ्कुल्यानुविधोयिन्यो भूतप्रकृतयो भवन्ति ॥ ४३ ॥

VYÂSA.

Here the word Sthûla, gross, is used to denote the specific forms of Prithvî, Apas, Tejas, Vâyu and Âkâsa, which appear as sound, colour, taste and odour, and have the qualities of conjoint action, &c. This is the first appearance of the elements.

The second appearance is that which is common to the others too. The Pr̥ithvi has forms, the Apas smoothness, the Tejas heat, the Vāyu impulsion, the Ākāsa motion in every direction. This is denoted by the word substantive appearance (svarūpa), sounds, touches, tastes, colours are the specific manifestations of these common qualities. And so it has been said:—‘These manifested together in one species manifest their own distinguishing characteristics.’ A group of the generic and specific qualities is here considered a substance (dravya).

A group is of two descriptions. The first is that in which the distinction of individuals disappears in the whole, such as the body, the tree, the herd, the forest. The second is where the word shows the distinction between different individuals of the same group, as for example, a group of both gods and men. Of this group the gods are one portion, and the men the other. Both make one group. In this the distinction of individuals may or may not be mentioned; as in a grove of mangoes, a crowd of Brāhmaṇas; a mangoe grove, the Brāhmaṇa class.

This again is of two descriptions; where the parts of the whole are separate from each other and where they are not. A forest and a class are groups where the parts are separate from each other. A body, a tree, an atom are all groups whose parts are not separable from each other. Substance, according to Patañjali, is a group whose parts are not meant to be distinguished from each other, and cannot be separated from each other. This has been called the etheric or substantive appearance (svarūpa).

And now what is their subtle appearance? It is the Tanmātra (the astral atom), the cause of the elements. The atom is one part thereof. It is a group, a composite substance, which consists of generic and specific qualities, and whose parts are not distinguished from each other, and which cannot be separated from one another. All the Tanmātrās are similar to this. This is the third appearance of the elements.

Now as to the fourth appearance of the elements. These are the ‘qualities’ whose characteristics are essence, activity and inertia, and which follow the nature of effects. These are denoted by the word conjunction (anvaya).

And now the fifth appearance of purposefulness (arthavattva). The purpose of experience and emancipation is apparent in conjunction with the qualities. The qualities are to be found in Tanmātrās, in the elements and in things made of elements. Hence all these are full of purpose. Now by Samyama over the five elements, with their five

appearances, the nature of every appearance over which Samyama is performed, becomes apparent and conquest over it is obtained. Having obtained conquest over the five appearances he becomes the Lord of elements. The powers of the elements begin by this conquest to follow his thought, as the cows follow their calves.—149.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

'By Samyama on gross, the substantive appearance, the subtle, the conjunction and purposefulness, is obtained mastery over elements.' Mastery is obtained by Samyama over each separately, the gross, the substantive, the subtle, the conjunction and purposefulness. The Commentator describes the gross:—'The word Sthûla here, &c.' The sounds, the touches, the colours, the tastes, and the odours of Âkâsa, Vâyu, Tejas, Apas, and Prithvî are their specific forms so far as may be.

The notes of the gamud, DO and MA, etc., cold and heat, etc., blue and yellow, etc., sweet-smelling, &c., all these differ from each other in name, appearance and object. For this reason they are specific. Of the qualities, five are the specific forms of the Prithvî; four (except smell) of the Apas; three (besides odour and taste) of the Tejas; two (besides odour, taste and colour) of the Vâyu and only one of the Âkâsa. These specific forms together with the characteristics of conjoint action, &c., are termed Gross in this philosophy.

Among those, the characteristics of the Prithvî are :—Form, heaviness, roughness, obstruction, stability, manifestation (vritti), difference, support, turbidity, hardness, enjoyability by all.

The characteristics of the Apas are :—Smoothness, subtlety, clearness, whiteness, softness, heaviness, coolness, preservation, purification, cementation.

The characteristics of the Tejas are :—Going upward, cooking, burning, lightness, shining, destruction, power; possessed of such qualities is the Tejas different from the previous ones.

The qualities of the Vâyu are :—transverse motion, purification, throwing, pushing, strength, movability, throwing no shadow, roughness; these are the various characteristics of the Vâyu.

The characteristics of the Âkâsa :—Motion in all directions, non-agglomeration, and non-obstruction: these three are said to be the characteristics of Âkâsa, different from the characteristics of the preceding ones.

It is together with these characteristics that they are called gross.

Form (mûrti) is hardness brought about (samsiddhikam), stability of the lines of action and manifestation.

Tejas is heat, stomachic, solar, terrestrial; everywhere heat exists along with Tejas.

The whole of this terminology makes no distinction between the characteristic and the characterized.

The Vâyu is changing; has the nature of constant motion. By movements of straw, &c., and by the movements of the body, the Vâyu is inferred to be everywhere possessed of the quality of motion.

The Âkâsa is motion in all directions, because the perception of sound is found everywhere. It has been established above that the sounds of terrestrial objects, &c., are only perceived on account of the sound-quality of Âkâsa, which resides in the power of hearing.

This is meant by the word Svarûpa, substantive appearance. It is of this generic form that the sounds of the notes DO, &c. heat, &c., Whiteness, &c., astringent and sweet

smell, &c., are the specializations. The generic qualities of form, &c., too, such as Jambīra, Panas and emblic fruit, &c., differ from each other on account of the differences of taste, &c. For this reason these tastes, &c., are specific modifications of these. And so it has been said :—Of those that fall under a common genus, i.e., those each of which possesses one generic quality of form, smoothness or flow, &c., the differences are due to the characteristics possessed by the individual appearances of DO. &c.

Thus the generic qualities of form, &c., and the specific qualities of sound, &c., have been described.

Now he speaks to those who say that a substance (dravya) is the substratum of the generic and the specific : ‘In this philosophy a substance is a collection (samudāya) of the generic and specific qualities.’ Even those who desire to establish that substratum of the qualities, cannot possibly conceal the fact of their existence in one group together. And if they do conceal it, it cannot be that a substratum of theirs may be possible of existence as substance. Hence let even that be the substance. We, however, do not find a substratum separate from the collection of qualities, and existing as substance.

As a collection of stones differs from the stones, and as further a different kind of their collection in the shape of a mountain is called a substance, the doubt arises that a mere collection is a substance. For the purpose of removing that doubt and for establishing that it is only a particular kind of collection that is called a substance, he now describes the variety of groupings :—“ A collection is of two descriptions.” Because of this a substance is not a mere collection. This is the meaning. ‘Two descriptions’ mean two different sorts of collections. He describes the first mode :—‘ The first is that in which the distinction of individuals disappears altogether in the whole.’ They are so called because the distinction between the different parts has disappeared. It is so called because the separation has disappeared. This is the meaning : A collection is understood by the words body, tree, herd, forest. These words denote a collection, but do not denote the different parts of the collections. That is no word denoting these individual parts is used. Hence it is the collection that is understood. Four illustrations are given with reference to the parts being joined or separate and with reference to intelligence and non-intelligence. The meaning of the joined and separate parts will be described further on.

He describes the second mode :—‘A collection, the distinction of whose parts is understood by the words as both gods and men.’

‘Gods and men’: This collection signifies an account of the parts being indicated by separate words, the two separate parts of the group.

But the question is that inasmuch as the distinction of parts is not conveyed by using the word *both*, how is it said that the idea of the collection carries with it the idea of the distinction of parts? For this reason he says :—And it is by these two parts that a collection is signified. The word ‘both’ together with the words signifying the different parts forms the collection, since the sentence as such denotes the meaning to be conveyed by it. This is the meaning.

Again he says that they are two-fold :—‘This again, &c.’ With reference to whether the distinction is or is not intended to be conveyed. He describes where the distinction is intended to be conveyed :—‘A grove of mangoes, a crowd of Brāhmaṇas.’ There must be distinction because the genitive case is actually used (not only implied.) As in the case of the phrase, ‘the cow of the Gargas.’

He describes where the distinction is not intended to be conveyed :—‘Mango grove, Brāhmaṇa class.’ The meaning is that the mangoes are the same as the grove; it is not intended that there should be difference understood between the collection and the individuals that go to make up the collection. They both imply a common object.

He mentions another division :—‘ That again is twofold. Where the parts of the whole are separate from each other.’ This means that there is space between the individuals that go to make up the collection. Such groups are signified by the words, a herd, a forest.

Their parts have spaces between them, the trees and the kine.

The groups whose parts are not separate from each other are such as a tree, a cow, an atom. Their parts have no space between them. Whether they are taken to be the generic or the specific qualities, or the udders, &c., they have no spaces between.

Now he establishes which of these collections is what is called a substance :—‘ Whose parts are not meant to be distinguished from each other, &c.’

Having thus described a substance as the context demanded, he now comes to the subject in hand :—‘ This has been called the substantive appearance.’

He puts a question with the object of describing the third appearance :—‘ And what is their subtle appearance ?’ and gives the answer :—‘ It is the Tanmâtra, &c.’ One of its parts is an atom possessing dimension. The generic quality thereof is form (mûrti). Sound, &c., are its specific qualities. It consists of the generic and specific qualities. It is a group which follows the difference of the generic and specific qualities, its parts existing without any intervening space. Further as an atom has subtlety in appearance, so are the Tanmâtras subtle in appearance. He summarizes :—‘ This is the third.’

Now the fourth appearance of the elements consists of the qualities which have respectively the characteristics of illumination, activity and inertia and whose characteristics too follow the nature of effects. For this reason are they described by the word Conjunction (anvaya). Now he describes their fifth appearance, purposefulness :—‘ The purpose of enjoyment and emancipation is apparent in conjunction with the qualities.’

Well, even if it be so, if the qualities be purposeful, how are the effects of the qualities purposeful ? For this reason he says :—‘ The qualities are to be found, &c.’ The things made of elements are such as a cow or a jar.

Having thus described the Samyama and that upon which the Samyama is to be performed, he now describes the Samyama and its fruit :—‘ Now by Samyama over the elements, &c.’ The powers (prakृtis) of the elements are their natures.—43.

Sûtra 44.

ततोऽणिमादिप्रादुर्भावः कायसम्पत्तद्वर्त्मनभिधातश्च ॥ ४४ ॥

ततः Tataḥ, thence. अणिमादि Aṇimâ-âdi, of attenuation and the other powers. प्रादुर्भावः Prâdurbhâvah, the manifestation of. काय Kâya, of the body. सम्पद Sampad, perfection. तद् Tad, their. चर्म Dharma, characteristics. अनभिधातः Anabhîdhâtah, non-resistance by. च Cha, and.

44. Thence the manifestation of attenuation (aṇimâ) and the other (powers); as also the perfection of the body and non-resistance by their characteristics.—150.

ततोऽणिमादिप्रादुर्भावः कायसम्पत्तद्वर्त्मनभिधातश्च । तत्राणिमा भवत्यरुः । लघिमा लघुर्भवति । महिमा महान्भवति । प्राप्तिरङ्गुल्यग्रेणापि स्पृशाति चन्द्रमसम् । प्राकास्यमिच्छानभिधातः । भूमावृन्मज्जति निमज्जति यथोदके । वशित्वं भूतभौतिकेषु वशीभवत्यवश्यश्चान्येषाम् । ईशितृत्वं तेषां प्रभवाप्ययव्यूहानामीष्टे । यत्र कामावसायित्वं सत्यसङ्कल्पता यथा सङ्कल्पस्तथा भूतप्रकृतीनामवस्थानम् । न च शक्तोऽपि पदार्थविपर्यासं करोति । कस्मात् । अन्यस्य यत्र कामावसायिनः पूर्वसिद्धस्य तथा भूतेषु

सङ्कूल्यादिति । एतान्यष्टावैश्वर्याणि कायसमपद्वश्यमाणा तद्वर्मनभिघातश्च पृथ्वी मूर्त्या
न निरुणद्धि योगिनः शरीरादिक्रियाशीलामप्यनुविशतोति । नापः स्तिंगधाः क्लेदयन्ति ।
नाग्निरुष्णा दहति । न वायुः प्रणामी वहत्यनावरणात्मकेऽप्याकाशे भवत्याकृत्तकायः
सिद्धानामप्यहश्यो भवति ॥ ४४ ॥

VYĀSA.

Of these, attenuation (Aṇimâ) : becomes atomical. Buoyancy becomes light. Enlargement: becomes large. Approach (Prâpti) : touches even the moon by the tip of his finger. Unrestrained will (Prâkâmya) : absence of restraint to his will: merges into earth just as he plunges into water.

Control (Vasitva) :—Obtains power over the elements and objects made thereof, and controls others.

Creative Power (Iśitrittva) :—Controls appearance and disappearance and aggregations.

Fulfilment of desires is the objective reality of one's determination, i.e., the natures of the elements assume such appearances as he thinks of.

Although he possesses the power, he does not interfere to set the objects of the world topsy-turvy. Why not? Because his desire with reference to them is the same always which another Siddha of the same power has formerly willed. These are the eight attainments. The perfection of the body will be described. 'Non-resistance by their characteristics':—The Prithvî does not by cohesion interfere with the action of a Yogi's body. He might even enter a stone in virtue of the use of his powers. The waters with their viscosity do not wet him. The fire does not burn him by its heat. The air moves him not by its motion. Even in Âkâsa, which naturally offers no obstruction, his body might become obstructed to sight. Even the Siddhas may fail to see him.—150.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now the author describes what powers the Yogi attains, when the elements begin to follow his thoughts:—'Thence the manifestation of Attenuation (Aṇimâ) as also the perfection of the body, and non-resistance by their characteristics.'

The Commentator says that by Samyama over the gross states of the elements and thereby mastering them come four attainments. Of these, attenuation is the power of the body's becoming small even though it is large. Buoyancy means the power of its becoming light, even though it is heavy. Having become light it moves in space like a straw or a piece of cotton wool. Enlargement is the power of its becoming large like a mountain or the sky, even though it is small. Approach is the power by which all existences come within the reach of the Yogi; thus he can touch the moon with the tip of his finger, though standing on the earth.

He describes the attainments obtained by the performance of Samyama over substantive appearance (svarûpa). Unrestrained will is the absence of restraint to his will. His

form is not resisted by the substantive qualities of form, &c. He merges into and emerges out of earth, as if it were water.

He describes the attainment to be obtained by Samyama and consequent mastery over the subtle form:—‘Control:—The elements are Prithvî &c.’ Objects made thereof are such as a cow and a jar. ‘Obtains power over them’: acts with reference to them just as he wishes.

As to the objects made of the elements, it is necessary that when their causes, the tanmâtras, and the atoms of Prithvî, &c., are controlled, their effects also should come under control, because they remain in whatever condition or arrangement he places them.

Now he describes the attainments to be obtained by Samyama over and mastery of the conjunction (anvaya):—Creative Power:—Having mastered the Mûlaprakृti he can control the birth, destruction, and present existence, as it is for the time being of the elements and things made of them.

He describes the attainments due to the performance of Samyama over purposefulness. ‘Fulfilment of desires’ means the objective reality of one’s desires. The Yogi who has become the master of the purpose of the qualities, makes everything according to the purpose he thinks they should fulfil. Even if he conceives that poison should act upon the body as Amrita, it would act so, and having taken poison he would still live.

Well, let that be, but if he possessed these powers he would interfere with the order of nature in the world, but why does he not do so? He may transform the moon into the sun: or he may make the day from which the moon is totally absent, one from which she is not at all absent. For this reason he says:—Although he possesses the power, etc., these worshipful ones who have obtained the power of ordering as they desire, do not like to act against the will of Isvara. As to the powers of objects they are changeable according to the difference of class, space, time and condition, and their natures are not for that reason permanent. It is, therefore, proper that they should act in accordance with their desire. These are the eight attainments.

‘Non-resistance by their characteristics:’—The mention of non-resistance of these elements after the attainment of attenuation, &c., even though this is the result of the attainments themselves, is similar to the mention of the perfection of the body even though this is achieved by this very attainment. The reason is that the object of Samyama mentioned in this aphorism may be easily understood together with the fruit to be obtained by the performance of the Samyamas mentioned in the aphorism. The rest is easy.—44.

Sûtra 45.

रूपलावण्यबलवज्रसंहननत्वानि कायसम्पत् ॥ ४५ ॥

रूप Rûpa, beauty. लावण्य Lâvanya, grace. बल Bala, strength. वज्र Vajra, of adamant, adamantine. संहनन Samhanana, the power of striking or of bearing the strokes, hardness, all these embody. कायसम्पत् Kâya-Sampat, perfection of the body.

45. The perfection of the body consists in beauty, grace, strength and adamantine hardness.—151.

**रूपलावण्यबलवज्रसंहननत्वानि कायसम्पत् । दर्शनीयः कान्तिमानतिशयबलो
वज्रसंहननश्चेति ॥ ४५ ॥**

VYĀSA.

Fit to be seen, lovely, possessed of great strength, a body hard as adamant.—151.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The body is said to be adamantine when its build is as hard as that of adamant.

Sûtra 46.

ग्रहणस्वरूपास्मितान्वयार्थवत्त्वसंयमादिनिद्र्यजयः ॥ ४६ ॥

ग्रहण Grahaṇa, the act. स्वरूप Svarûpa, the substantive appearance. अस्मिता Asmitâ, egoism. अन्वय Anvaya, conjunction. अर्थवत्त्व Arthavattva, purposefulness (of sensation). संयमाद् Samyamâd, by Samyama over. इन्द्रियजयः Indriya-jayah, mastery over the senses.

ग्रहणस्वरूपास्मितान्वयार्थवत्त्वसंयमादिनिद्र्यजयः । सामान्यविशेषात्मा शब्दादिर्विषयः । तेष्वन्दियाणां वृत्तिर्ग्रहणम् । न च तत्सामान्यमात्रग्रहणाकारं कथमनालोचितः स विषयविशेष इन्द्रियेण मनसा वानुव्यवसीयेतेति । स्वरूपं पुनः प्रकाशात्मने बुद्धिसत्त्वस्य सामान्यविशेषयोरयुतसिद्धावयवभेदानुगतः समूहे द्रष्ट्यमिन्द्रियम् । तेषां तृतीयं रूपमस्मितालक्षणाऽहङ्कारः तस्य सामान्यस्येन्द्रियाणि विशेषाश्चतुर्थं रूपं व्यवसायात्मकाः प्रकाशक्रियास्थितिशीला गुणा येषामिन्द्रियाणि साहङ्काराणि परिणामः । पञ्चमं रूपं गुणेषु यदनुगतं पुरुषार्थवत्त्वमिति । पञ्चस्वेवैतेष्वन्दियरूपेषु यथाक्रमं संयमस्त्र तत्र जयं कृत्वा पञ्चस्वरूपजयादिनिद्र्यजयः प्रादुर्भवति योगिनः ॥ ४६ ॥

46. By Samyama over the act, the substantive appearance, the egoism, the conjunction and the purposefulness (of sensation) comes mastery over them.—152.

VYĀSA.

Sound, &c., possessed of generic qualities are objects. The act of sensation consists in the functioning of the senses with reference to the objects. And this functioning is not merely the taking in of the generic qualities of an object, because if also the specific qualities of an object were not thus taken in, how would they otherwise be perceived by the mind ?

As to their substantive appearance, a sense is a substance ; it is a collection of generic and specific qualities whose parts are not possessed of intervening space and are not distinguishable as being separate from each other. These generic and specific qualities are of the essence of the Will-to-be whose very nature is illumination.

Their third appearance is the principle of individuality characterized by egoism. The senses are the specialized appearances of that generic appearance.

The fourth appearance consists of the qualities which are of the nature of illumination, activity and inertia and which determine the nature of phenomena. The senses together with the principle of individuality are their manifestations.

The fifth appearance is that of their having the purpose of the Purusa to fulfil. This is inherent in the qualities. Samyama is to be performed over the five appearances of sensation, respectively, one after the other. When all the five appearances have been mastered, then the power of over-mastering sensation is manifested in the Yogi.—152.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The author describes the means of conquering the senses for the Yogi who has mastered the elements :—‘By Samyama over the act, the substantive appearance, the egoism, the conjunction and the purposefulness (of sensation), comes mastery over the senses.’ The meaning is that Samyama is to be performed with reference to the act, the substantive appearance, the egoism, the conjunction and the purposefulness, separately, one after another. The act of sensation consists in the taking in of objects, and this depends upon the objects to be taken in. Hence the determination of the nature of the act depends upon the determination of the nature of the objects to be taken in.

The Commentator describes the nature of the object to be taken in :—‘ Sounds, &c., are possessed of the generic and specific qualities.’

Having described the objects to be taken in he now describes the act of taking in:—‘And the functioning, &c.’ This functioning consists of sensing, i. e., the sense being modified into the form of the object. As to those who hold that the sphere of the function of the senses is the generic qualities alone, he says to them:—‘And it does not consist in taking in only the form of the generic qualities.’ That which is taken in is not only co-existence with the generic qualities of the object. The mind is dependent for its action upon external senses, and works upon the external objects and depends upon them. If this were not so, there would be no blind and deaf people. If, such being the case, the senses were not to have the specific qualities for their sphere of action, the specific qualities would not at all be known. How then would the mind know them in sequence? Hence the act of sensation consists in the taking in of both the generic and the specific qualities.

This act of taking in is the first phenomenon of the senses.

Now he describes the second appearance :—‘As to substantive appearance :—It is the principle of individuality which produces the power of sensation out of its own essence (the Sattva). Hence the instrumentality which is generic nature of the senses and also the action in connection with the appointed sphere of colour, &c., which is the specific quality, both are of the nature of illumination. This is the meaning.

This is their third appearance. The principle of individuality is of course the cause of the senses. Wherever the senses are there must the principle of individuality be. Being thus the common cause of the senses, it is the generic quality of these senses.

The fourth appearance :—The qualities appear as possessing two forms. They are of the nature of things which exist as such ; and they are also of the nature of the power which determines the existence of phenomena. Of these the nature of the things in existence as such consists in their being the objects of knowledge ; and these are the five Tanmâtras, the elements and the things made of the elements. The power again which

determines the existence of the phenomena takes up the form of the instruments of knowledge, and consists of the senses together with the principle of individuality. This is the meaning. The rest is easy.—46.

Sûtra 47.

ततो मनोजवित्वं विकरणभावः प्रधानजयश्च ॥ ४७ ॥

ततः Tataḥ, thence. **मनो-जवित्वम्** Mano-javitvam, quickness (as of the mind). **विकरण-भावः** Vikaraṇa-bhāvah, uninstrumental perception. **प्रधान** Pradhâna, over the first cause. **जयः** Jayah, mastery.

47. Thence come quickness as of mind, un-instrumental-perception and mastery over the Pradhâna (First Cause.)—153.

ततो मनोजवित्वं विकरणभावः प्रधानजयश्च । कायस्यानुक्तमे गतिलाभे
मनोजवित्वम् । विदेहानामिद्धियाणामभिप्रेतकालदेशविषयायेक्षो बृत्तिलाभे विकरण-
भावः । सर्वप्रकृतिवेक्षणविश्वत्वं प्रधानजय इत्येतास्तिस्तः सिद्धयो मधुप्रतीका उच्यन्ते ।
एताश्च करणपञ्चकस्वरूपजयादधिगम्यते ॥ ४७ ॥

VYÂSA.

Quickness as of mind consists in the attainment by the body of very quick motion.

Un-instrumental Perception means the action of the senses at any time or place without the necessity of the presence of the body.

Mastery over the Pradhâna means the power of control over all the modifications of the Prakṛiti. These three attainments are called by the name of Madhupratikâ. These are obtained by conquering the substantive appearance (svarûpa) of the five instruments of sensation.—153.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The author mentions the attainments due to the conquest of the five appearances of the senses :—‘Thence come quickness as of mind, un-instrumental perception and mastery over the Pradhâna.’

Un-instrumental perception is the action of the senses outside the body. Place means Cashmère, &c. Time means past, &c. Sphere means the subtle, &c.

Mastery over the Pradhâna means control of the modification of the Prakṛiti by the conquest of the senses together with the power of conjunction. These are the attainments which are called the Madhupratikâs by the knowers of Yoga.

Well, it may be that by the conquest of the senses they may come under control. But how their causes, the Pradhâna, &c.? For this reason he says: ‘And these, &c.’ The five appearances of the senses are their act, &c.

‘By their conquest, &c.’ The meaning is this: It is not by the mere conquest of the senses that these powers are obtained, but by the conquest of all the five appearances; and the Pradhâna, &c., fall within these.—47.

Sûtra 48.

सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिमात्रस्य सर्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वं सर्वज्ञातृत्वं च ४८

सत्त्व Sattva, pure objective essence. पुरुष Purusa, consciousness. अन्यता Anyatâ, the distinction between. ख्याति-मात्रस्य Khyâti mâtṛasya, to him only who recognises. सर्व-भाव Sarva-bhâva, over all states. अधिष्ठातृत्वम् Adhisthâtrittvam, supremacy. सर्व-ज्ञातृत्वम् Sarva-jñâtrittvam, omniscience. च Cha, and.

48. To him who recognizes the distinction between consciousness and pure-objective-existence comes supremacy over all states of being and omniscience.—154.

सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिमात्रस्य सर्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वं सर्वज्ञातृत्वं च । निर्धूतरज-
स्तमोमलस्य बुद्धिसत्त्वस्य परे वैशारद्ये परस्यां वशीकारसंज्ञायां वर्तमानस्य सत्त्वपुरुषा-
न्यताख्यातिमात्रस्य प्रतिष्ठातृत्वम् । सर्वात्मानो गुणा व्यवसायव्यवस्था-
यात्मकाः स्वामिनं क्षेत्रज्ञं प्रत्यशेषहृश्यात्मत्वेनोपस्थिता इत्यर्थः । सर्वज्ञातृत्वं सर्वात्मनां
गुणानां शान्तोदिताच्यपदेश्यधर्मत्वेन व्यवस्थितानामक्रमेषापारूढं विवेकजं ज्ञानमित्यर्थः ।
इत्येषा विशेषाका नाम सिद्धियां प्राप्य योगी सर्वज्ञः क्षोणक्षेत्राभ्यन्धनो वशी विहरति ॥ ४८ ॥

VYÂSA.

Supremacy over all states of being comes to him who, having the essence of the Will-to-be in the highest state of purity on account of the impurities of the Rajas and the Tamas having been destroyed, and when the consciousness of power is at the highest, takes his stand at the manifestation of the distinction between the Objective Essence and consciousness (Puruṣa). It means that the ‘qualities’ which are the substrata of all phenomena, being of the nature of the things that are in existence, as well as of the power which determines this existence, present themselves before the Lord, the knower of the field, as one whole.

Omniscience means the simultaneously discriminative knowledge of the ‘qualities’ being as they are of the nature of all phenomena, and showing forth as they do separately the quiescent, the disturbed and the unpredictable characteristics. This attainment is known as the ‘Sorrowless’ (visoka).

Reaching this the Yogi moves omniscient and powerful, with all his afflictions ended.—154.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now the author shows the attainments subsidiary to the attainment of the knowledge of the distinction between the Objective Essence and the Purusa, with the object of attaining which are performed the Samyamas which bring about power of knowledge and action, and which by direct knowledge, and one after the other, go on strengthening faith in the object promised, by means of the presents of the attainments that are being made constantly :—‘To him who realizes the distinction between the Objective Existence and consciousness, comes just then supremacy over all the states of being and omniscience.’

Purity comes by the dirt of Rajas and Tamas being removed. Thence comes the consciousness of the highest power. The mental Essence was before the attainment of this state covered by the Rajas and the Tamas. On the removal thereof it becomes subject to the power of the masterful Yogi. When it becomes subject to the Yogi who has just attained to the possession of the knowledge of the distinction between Objective Essence and consciousness then the Yogi becomes supreme over all states of being. The Commentator explains the state :—‘The Guṇas which are the substrata, &c.’ The objects to be determined and the determination mean the intelligent and the non-intelligent phenomena. The power of action is explained by this.

He mentions the power of knowledge : ‘Omniscience, &c.’ and gives a name to this two-fold attainment well-known to the Yogis, with the object of inclining towards desirelessness : “This is named the ‘Sorrowless.’” Such a Yogi is described to be one whose afflictions and bonds, i. e., Karmas have been destroyed.—48.

Sûtra 49.

तद्वैराग्यादपि दोषबीजक्षये कैवल्यम् ॥ ४६ ॥

तद्वैराग्यात् Tadvairâgyât, by desirelessness for that. अपि Api, even. दोष-बीज Doṣa-bija, of the seed of bondage. क्षये Kṣaye, on the destruction. कैवल्यम् Kaivalyam, absolute independence.

49. The seed of bondage having been destroyed by desirelessness even for that, comes absolute-independence (Kaivalya).—155.

तद्वैराग्यादपि दोषबीजक्षये कैवल्यम् । यदास्यैवं भवति क्लेशकर्मक्षये सत्त्वस्यायं विवेकप्रत्ययो धर्मः सत्त्वं च हेयपक्षे न्यस्तं पुरुषश्चापरिणामी शुद्धोऽन्यः सत्त्वादित्येवमस्य ततो विरज्यमानस्य यानि क्लेशबीजानि दग्धशालिबीजकल्पान्यप्रसवसमर्थानि तानि सह मनसा प्रत्यस्तं गच्छन्ति । तेषु प्रलीनेषु पुरुषः पुनरिदं तापत्रयं न भुड्के । तदेतेषां गुणानां मनसि कर्मक्लेशविपाकस्वरूपेणाभिव्यक्तानां चरितार्थानामप्रतिप्रसवे पुरुषस्यात्यन्तिको गुणवियोगः कैवल्यं तदा स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा चितिशक्तिरेव पुरुष इति ॥ ४९ ॥

VYÂSA.

When he comes to think that the discrimination of the distinctive natures, is after all a manifestation of the quality of Essentiality (Sattva) and that the quality of essentiality has been classed with avoidable pains; and that the Puruṣa is unchangeable, pure and other than the quality of essentiality (Sattva) then he begins to lose his desire for that, and then the afflictions having had their seed burnt up, become incapable of sprouting again like the burnt up seeds of rice.

Then all the seeds of afflictions pass, together with the mind, into latency. When they have become latent, the Puruṣa does not then suffer from the triad of pain. This then, the state, that is to say, in which the qualities manifest in the mind as afflictions, actions and fruitions do not, having fulfilled their object, come back to action, is the final separation

of consciousness from the qualities. This is the state of absolute independence, when the Puruṣa remains consciousness alone, as in its own nature.—155.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Because the other Samyamas are all but the semblances of the object of the Puruṣa the author now shows that the Samyama for the attainment of discriminative knowledge is the fulfilment of the purpose of the Puruṣa, inasmuch as its fruit is the attainment of absolute independence by means of the manifestation of desirelessness: 'On the destruction of the seed of afflictions by desirelessness even for that, comes absolute independence.' When on the destruction of actions and afflictions, the Yogi becomes conscious of what he says is knowledge of discrimination as a characteristic of the Sattva, &c.' The rest has been described here and there and is therefore easy.—49.

Sûtra 50.

स्थान्युपनिमन्त्रणे सङ्गस्मयाकरणं पुनरनिष्टप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ५० ॥

स्थानि-उपनिमन्त्रे Sthâni-upanimantrave, on the invitation by the presiding deities. (निमन्त्र) (स्थानि) सङ्ग Saṅga, attachment. स्मय Smaya, smile of satisfaction. अकरणम् Akaraṇam, non-performance of. पुनः Puṇah, again. अनिष्ट Anîṣṭa, with the undesirable. प्रसङ्गात् Prasaṅgât, contact being possible.

50. When the presiding-deities invite, there should be no attachment and no smile of satisfaction; contact with the undesirable being again possible.—156.

स्थान्युपनिमन्त्रणे सङ्गस्मया करणं पुनरनिष्टप्रसङ्गात् । चत्वारः खल्वमी योगिनः प्रथमकल्पको मधुभूमिकः प्रश्नात्योतिरतिकान्तभावनीयश्वेति । तत्राभ्यासी प्रवृत्तमात्र-ज्योतिः प्रथमः । ऋतम्भरप्रश्नो द्वितीयः । भूतन्द्रियजयी तृतीयः । सर्वेषु भावितेषु भावनीयेषु कृतरक्षाबन्धः कृतकर्तव्यः साधनादिमान् । चतुर्थस्त्वतिकान्तभावनीयस्तस्य चित्तप्रतिसर्ग-एकोऽर्थः सप्तविधा अस्य प्रान्तभूमिप्रश्नाः । तत्र मधुमतो भूमिं साक्षात्कुर्वतो ब्रह्मणस्य सानिनो देवाः सत्त्वविशुद्धिपञ्चश्यन्तः स्थानैरुपनिमन्त्रयन्ते भो इहास्यतामिह रम्यता कमनीयेऽयं भोगः कमनीयेयं कन्या रसायनमिदं जरामृत्युं बाधते वैहायसमिदं यानममी कल्पद्रुमाः पुण्या मन्दाकिनी सिद्धा महर्षय उत्तमा अनुकूला अप्सरसो दिव्ये श्रोत्रचक्षुषो वज्रोपमः कायः स्वगुणैस्सर्वमिदमुपार्जितमायुष्मता प्रतिपद्यतामिदमक्षयमजरमर्मं स्थानं देवानां प्रियमित्येवमभिधीयमानः सङ्गदोषान्भावयेद् घोरेषु संसाराङ्गारेषु पच्यमानेन मया जननमरणान्धकारे विपरिवर्त्तमानेन कथंचिदासादितः क्लेशतिमिरविनाशीयोगप्रदीप-स्तस्य चैते तृष्णायोनयो विषयवायवः प्रतिपक्षाः । स खल्वहं लब्धालोकः कथमनया विषयमृगतृष्णया वज्रिचतस्तस्यैव पुनः प्रदीपस्य संसाराग्रेरात्मानमिन्दनीकुर्यामिति । स्वस्ति वः स्वप्नोपमेभ्यः कृपणजनप्रार्थनीयेभ्यो विषयेभ्य इत्येवं निश्चितमतिः समाधिं भावयेत् । सङ्गमकृत्वा स्मयमपि न कुर्यादेवमहं देवानामपि प्रार्थनीय इति । स्मयादयं सुखितंमन्यतया मृत्युना केशेषु गृहीतमिवात्मानं न भावयिष्यति । तथाचास्य छिद्रान्त-रपेक्षी नित्यं यतोपचर्यः प्रमादो लब्ध विवरः क्लेशानुत्तमभयिष्यति ततः पुनरनिष्ट-प्रसङ्गः । एवमस्य सङ्गस्मयावकुर्वतो भावितेऽर्थो हृदीभविष्यति भावनीयइच्चार्थोऽभिमुखी भविष्यतीति ॥ ५० ॥

VYĀSA.

'When the presiding deities invite, there should be no attachment and no smile of satisfaction; contact with the undesirable being again possible.' There are four classes of Yogîs:—(1) The prathama kalpika ; (2) The madhubhûmika ; (3) The Prajñâjyotih ; (4) The atikrântabhâvanîya.

The first is the one who is practising and in whom the light is just appearing. The second is he who has attained the Ritambharâ cognition. The third is he who has attained power over the elements and the senses, who preserves all that has been known and has to be known, who has been doing what has to be done and who is given to practice. The fourth is the Atikrântabhâvanîya. His sole object is to make the mind latent in the Pradhâna. Its stages are the seven-fold in finality.

Of these then the Brâhmaṇa to whom opens up the yet unseen plane of Madhumatî, is invited by the gods from their various places. They tell him, 'Come, sit here; enjoy yourselves here; this is a lovely enjoyment, here is a lovely damsel; this is the elixir of life, which counteracts old age and death; here is a vehicle which moves through the skies; these the kalpa trees; this is the pure stream of Mandâkinî; these the perfected ones, the great seers, and beautiful and obedient nymphs; here are clairvoyance and clair-audience; here a body of adamantine strength. You have earned all these by your virtues. Come, take all this. This is an eternal, unfading, undying position which the gods love.'

Thus addressed, let him contemplate upon defects of attachment. 'It is with difficulty that I have procured the light of Yoga, the destroyer of the darkness of afflictions, after having been long backed by the flames of the world and rolled into the darkness of birth and death. These winds of sensuous enjoyment, brought into sensuous existence by desire, are calculated to put that light out. Having seen all this how should I allow myself to be deluded by the mirage of sensuous enjoyments and put myself as fuel again into the burning fire of the same changeful existence. Farewell then, ye sensuous enjoyments; ye are but dreams, fit only to be enjoyed by weaklings.'

Having thus come upon a fixed resolution, let him practise his meditation. Having thus not allowed himself to become attached, let him not indulge himself in a smile of satisfaction that even the gods begged him. If he indulges in such satisfaction, he will never perceive himself as having his hair in the grasp of death, and resting in fancied

security. Thus forgetfulness ever on the watch for a hole, and ever full of efforts, would find its way into the mind; and once there it will bring the afflictions back to life; and thence will come in contact with the undesirable. Thus avoiding attachment and mental pride, the high mental state will obtain firm hold upon him and the object that is to be attained, will ever keep in front.—156.

VACHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now seeing that there is possibility of obstacle in the way of the Yogi who is practising the means of perfect freedom (kaivalya), the author teaches the cause of its removal :—‘When the presiding deities invite, there should be no attachment and no smile of satisfaction ; there being possibility of contact with the undesirable again.’

The presiding deities are Mahendra, &c., who function in the regions of the powers thus obtained by the Yogi. The invitation comes from them. Attachment and a smile of satisfaction should not be indulged therein, because in that case there is again the possibility of the recurrence of the undesirable. Now with the object of determining the class of the Yogi whom the gods invite from their places, the Commentator mentions all the classes of possible Yogis : ‘There are four classes, &c.’ Now he describes the nature of the Prathama-kalpika :—‘Of these he who practises, &c.’ In him the light of the knowledge of objects, such as the mind of others, &c., has just appeared ; it has not been mastered by him. He mentions the second :—‘He who possesses the truth-bearing cognition, &c.’ The cognition there is truth-bearing (Ritambharâ). It is he who desires to conquer the elements and the senses.

He mentions the third :—‘He who has conquered the elements and the senses.’ By this the elements and the senses have been conquered by Samyama over the gross and other appearances and over the act of sensation and other appearances. He described him further :—In all those that have been achieved by the conquest of the elements and the senses, such as knowing the mind of others, &c., he makes up his mind to preserve, so that they may not be destroyed. In those again which have still to be achieved, such as the ‘Sorrowless, &c.,’ up to the higher desirelessness, he resorts to all the means that should be adopted. The effort of many achieves the object of attainment by resorting to the proper means only.

He mentions the fourth :—‘The fourth, &c.’ This worshipful being absolutely free while yet in life, and possessing only the last body, has the sole object of making the mind latent in the First Cause (Pradhâna).

Out of these he determines the Yogi who is invited by the gods :—‘To whom opens up the yet unseen plane of Madhumati, &c.’

As to the neophyte (Prathama-kalpika) there is not the least suspicion in the mind of Mahendra, &c., that he will get to the end of Yoga. The third also is not to be invited by them, because he has got what they invite him for, by his conquest of the elements and the senses. In the fourth also the suspicion of attachment is removed the farthest on account of his having reached the state of higher desirelessness. He who remains is the second alone, fit to be the object of invitation. It is he alone whose cognition is truth-bearing, that can be the object of invitation. ‘Undying’ is that which is not destroyed. ‘Unfading’ is that which is ever renewed.

He describes the fault of the smile of satisfaction :—‘If he indulges in the smile of satisfaction, &c.’ He will never understand impermanency, being possessed of a false sense of security on account of satisfaction. The rest is easy.

In different places it has been said that omniscience results from Samyama. That, however, does not mean the knowledge of everything without exception. It only describes the nature of the knowledge, as when they say, 'We have tasted all vegetables.' The meaning here is that we have tasted all sorts of sauces, not that there is none left. The word 'all' (sarva) does signify that nothing remains ; as in the word ' The eater has eaten all the food that was given to him.' Here the meaning is that nothing remains.—50.

Sûtra 51.

क्षणतत्क्रमयोः संयमाद्विवेकजं ज्ञानम् ॥ ५१ ॥

क्षण-तत्क्रमयोः Kṣaṇa-tat-kramayoh, (क्षण) over the moments. (तत्) And their. (क्रम) succession. संयमात् Samyamât, by Samyama. विवेकजम् Vivekajam, born-of-discrimination. ज्ञानम्, Jñānam, knowledge.

51. By Samyama over the moments and their succession, comes knowledge born-of-discrimination.—157.

क्षणतत्क्रमयोः संयमाद्विवेकजं ज्ञानम् । यथा अपकर्षपर्यन्तं द्रव्यं परमाणुरेवं परमापकर्षपर्यन्तः कालः क्षणो यावता वा समयेन चलितः परमाणुः पूर्वदेशं जाह्यादुत्तरदेशमुपसम्पद्येत स कालः क्षणः तत्प्रवाहाविच्छेदस्तु क्रमः क्षणतत्क्रमयोर्नास्ति वस्तु समाहार इति । बुद्धिसमाहारो मुहूर्ताहोरात्रादयः । स खल्वयं काले वस्तु शून्योऽपि बुद्धिनिर्माणः शब्दश्चानानुपाती लौकिकानां व्युत्थितदर्शनानां वस्तुस्वरूप इवावभासते । क्षणस्तु वस्तुपतितः क्रमावलम्बी । क्रमश्च क्षणानन्तर्यात्मातं कालविदः काल इत्याचक्षते योगिनः । न च द्वौ क्षणौ सह भवतः । क्रमश्च न द्वयोः सह भुवेरसंभवात्पूर्वस्मादुत्तरस्य भाविनो यदानन्तर्यं क्षणस्य स क्रमस्तस्माद्वर्तमान एवैकः क्षणो न पूर्वोत्तर क्षणः सन्तीति तस्मान्नास्ति तत्समाहारः । ये तु भूतभाविनः क्षणास्ते परिणामान्विता व्याख्येयास्तेनैकेन क्षणेन कृतस्त्रो लोकः परिणामसनुभवति तत्क्षणोपारूढः खल्वमी सर्वे धर्मास्तयोः क्षणतत्क्रमयोः संयमात्तयोः साक्षात्करणं ततश्च विवेकजं ज्ञानं प्रादुर्भवति ॥ ५१ ॥

VYÂSA.

As an atom is a substance in which minuteness reaches its limit, so, a moment is a division of time in which minuteness reaches its limit. Or a moment is that much of time which an atom takes in leaving the position in space it occupies and reaching the next point. The succession of moments is the non-cessation of the flow thereof. The moments and their collection do not fall into a collection of actual things. The Muhûrta, the day and night are all aggregates of mental conceptions. This time which is not a substantive reality in itself, but is only a mental concept, and which comes into the mind as a piece of verbal knowledge only, appears to people whose minds are given to out-going activities, as if it were an objective reality. The moment falls under the head of reality, and is maintained by succession. This succession consists in the sequence of moments. The Yogîs who know time call this by the name of time.

Further two moments cannot co-exist. There can be no succession of two co-existent moments. It is impossible. The uninterrupted sequence of the first moment and of the one which follows, is what is called succession. For this there is but one moment existing in the present ; the antecedent and postcedent moments do not exist. Therefore, there cannot be any collection of them.

Further, the moments that have passed and those that have yet to come, should be described as existing in consequence of universal change in evolution. For this reason the whole world undergoes change every moment, all these characteristics are relatively established in that one moment of time. By Samyama over the moments and their succession, direct knowledge is obtained of them both, and thence is manifested discriminative knowledge.—157.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Here the author describes the samyama which is the means of obtaining the knowledge born out of discrimination:—‘By Samyama over moments and their succession comes knowledge born of discrimination.’ The Commentator gives the meaning of the word ‘moment’ by an illustration :—‘As the atom, &c.’ Wherever in a piece of stone, which is being divided and divided again and again, smallness reaches a point beyond which it cannot go, it is said to reach the limit of minuteness. That is called an atom. Similarly, the uttermost limit of minuteness of time, is a moment, a division of time which is not related to any other division of time as a part antecedent and postcedent.

He describes the same moment in another way :—‘Or, as much as, &c.’ The meaning is that a moment is that much of time in which a mere atom may go off its present place.

He describes the meaning of the word succession :—‘The non-cessation of the flow, &c.’ ‘Thereof’ means of the moments.

Further this sort of succession is not real. It is, on the other hand, a mental concept. Because it is impossible that a collection of them should be contemplated as real, seeing that they do not exist simultaneously, he says this :—‘The moments and their succession, &c.’ Because succession has for its characteristic the existence of a moment not in simultaneity, and because the collective existence of moments is devoid of objective reality, the collective existence of moments and their succession is also void of objective reality. Men without the natural excessive intellection of a Vaibântika, being every moment given to knowledge which consists in out-going activity, and who are, therefore, confused, think that this Time is a reality.

Well then, is the Moment also unreal? He answers in the negative. ‘The moment, however, is classed among realities,’ is a real substance. ‘It is given support to by succession’ :—The succession that gives support to the moments is only a mental concept, the result of imagination (vikalpa).

He gives the reason for the succession giving support to the moment :—‘As to succession, &c.’

He gives the reason for the succession being unreal :—‘And two moments, &c.’ The word ‘and,’ here signifies the reason ‘why.’

He says to him who holds that the moments each belonging to a different class may co-exist :—‘There can be no succession. &c.’

Why is it impossible? For this reason he says :—‘ Succession is, &c.’ He concludes :—‘ For this reason.’

Well, then, are the antecedent and postcedent moments of the nature of the horns of a hare only? He says, No. ‘ The moments that are gone and those that are yet to come, &c.’

Existing in consequence of universal change :—This means followed in sequence similar. Concludes :—‘ Therefore, &c.’ Because the present only has the power over the actions of objects proper to it.—51.

Sûtra 52.

जातिलक्षणदेशैरन्यतानवच्छेदात् तुल्ययोस्ततः प्रतिपत्तिः ॥५२॥

जाति Jâti, genus. लक्षण Lakṣaṇa, differentia. देश Desa, position in space by all these. अन्यता Anyatâ, by separateness. अनवच्छेदात् Anavachchhedât, there being no distinction. तुल्ययोः Tulyayoh, of two similars. ततः Tataḥ, thereby. प्रतिपत्तिः Pratipattiḥ, the distinction.

52. Two-similars are thereby distinguished when not separately distinguishable by genus, differentia and position-in-space.—158.

तस्य विषयविशेष उपक्षिप्यते । जातिलक्षणदेशैरन्यतानवच्छेदात्तुल्ययोस्ततः प्रतिपत्तिः । तुल्ययोदेशलक्षणसारूप्ये जातिभेदोऽन्यतायां हेतुः । गौरियं वडवेयमिति । तुल्यदेशजातीयत्वे लक्षणमन्यत्वकरं कालाक्षी गौः । स्वस्तिमती गौरिति । द्वयोरामलयोर्जातिलक्षणसारूप्याद् देशभेदोऽन्यत्वकर इदं पूर्वमिदमुत्तरमिति । यदातु पूर्वमामलकमन्यव्यग्रस्य इत्युत्तरे देश उपावर्तते तदा तुल्यदेशत्वे पूर्वमेतदुत्तरमेतदिति प्रविभागानुपपत्तिः । असन्दिग्धेन च तत्त्वज्ञानेन भवितव्यमित्यत इदमुक्तम् । ततः प्रतिपत्तिर्विवेकज्ञानादिति कथं पूर्वमलकसहक्षणादेश उत्तरामलकसहक्षणाद् देशाद्विज्ञः । ते चामलके स्वदेशक्षणानुभवमित्वे । अन्यदेशक्षणानुभवस्तु तयोरन्यत्वे हेतुरिति । एतेन हृषान्तेन परमाणेस्तुल्यजातिलक्षणदेशस्य पूर्वपरमाणुदेशसहक्षणसाक्षात्करणादुत्तरस्य परमाणेस्तदेशात्तदेशानुपपत्तादुत्तरस्य तदेशानुभवो भिज्ञः सहक्षणभेदात्तयोरीश्वरस्य योगिनोऽन्यत्वप्रत्ययो भवतीति । अपरे तु वर्णयन्ति । येऽन्या विशेषास्तेऽन्यताप्रत्ययं कुर्वन्तीति । तत्रापि देशलक्षणभेदो मूर्तिव्यवधिजातिभेदश्चान्यत्वे हेतुः । क्षणभेदस्तु योगिबुद्धिगम्य एवेत्यत उक्तं मूर्तिव्यवधिजातिभेदाभावान्नास्ति मूलपृथक्त्वमिति वार्षगण्यः ॥ ५२ ॥

VYÂSA.

Its sphere is defined :—‘ Two similars are thereby distinguished, when not separately distinguishable by genus, differentia and position in space.’ When position and secondary qualities are the same, the genus causes distinction between two similars. Thus ‘ This is a cow,’ ‘ This is a mare.’ When position and genus are common, the secondary quality causes distinction, as is the case with a black-eyed’ cow and an auspicious cow. Between two emblematic fruits in which the genus and secondary qualities are the same, difference of position causes distinction.

This is anterior and this is posterior. When, however, the anterior emblem fruit moves on to the position of the posterior one in space, at a time when the seer may be looking elsewhere, the position becoming the same, it can no longer cause distinction (as to which it was originally), the anterior or the posterior? In the knowledge of truth, however, there should be no doubt. Hence has it been said, 'They are thereby distinguished.' It means, by discriminative knowledge How? The space correlated to the moment of time of the anterior emblem fruit, is different from the space correlated to the moment of time of the posterior emblem fruit. And the emblem fruits are separate in the sequential notions of the movements in time correlated to their distinct positions in space. The sequential notion of space correlated to another moment of time is the means of their distinction.

As in this case, so in the case of atoms which have community of genus, secondary quality and position in space. By discovering the yet unknown correlation of every atomic position in space to a different moment of time, the sequential notion of such a position in space for the anterior atom becomes distinct from such a position in space for the distinction of atoms, on the analogy of this illustration. The powerful Yogi knows this distinction by the correlated moment.

Others however say:—It is the last peculiarities (the Vîsesâ of the Vaiśeṣikas) that cause the notion of distinction. Even there the distinction is the difference of space and secondary quality and the difference of form, distance and genus. The distinction on account of the moment of time can, however, be grasped by the intellect of a Yogi alone.

As has been said by Vârsaganya:—'On account of the absence of the difference of form, intervening space and genus, there is no separation in the root.'—158.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Although this knowledge born of discrimination has all existences for the sphere of its operation, as will be shown further, still being very subtle, one particular sphere is first defined:—'Two similars are thereby distinguished, when not separately distinguishable by genus, differentia and position.' For ordinary men the difference of genus is the cause of the knowledge of distinction. When genus such as the characteristic of a cow is the same; when also space, such as presence in the east, &c., is the same; then the distinction of the black-eyed and the auspicious is the other means of distinction. In two emblem fruits the genus of emblem fruit is the same, the differentiae of roundness, &c., are the same. The difference of space, however, is another means of distinction. When, however, some one desirous of testing the knowledge of the Yogi, takes the anterior fruit when he has his attention turned towards something, and places it in the spot previously occupied by the other fruit, having removed the other fruit from there or having concealed it, then the space also becomes the same, and it can no longer be decided that this is

the former and this is the latter. The ordinary wise man who is clever in the use of the three means of knowledge, will not be able to distinguish the two under such circumstances. The knowledge of realities, however, should be free from doubt. It is not proper that a Yogi who is possessed of discriminative knowledge should remain doubtful. Hence has the author of the aphorism said :—‘Are thereby distinguished, &c.’

Explains ‘thereby.’ It means by discriminative knowledge. The question now is : How can knowledge born by Samyama over moments and their succession distinguish an emblematic fruit from another which is the same with reference to genus, secondary quality and position in space ? The Commentator gives the answer :—‘The space correlated to the moment of time of the anterior emblematic fruit, is different from the space correlated to the moment of time of the posterior emblematic fruit.’ ‘The space correlated to the moment of time of the anterior emblematic fruit, means the space which coincides with the one moment of time of the anterior emblematic fruit ; or in other words, the change which has no interval between itself and the one moment of time. It is different from the position in space correlated to the moment of time of the posterior fruit, i.e., from the un-interrupted change of the posterior fruit.

Let there be the difference of positions in space ; but how does it affect the distinction of the fruit? For this reason he says :—‘And the emblematic fruits are separate in the sequential notions of their moments of time correlated to their positions in space. The moment of time that is correlated to the distinct position in space of the emblematic fruit, is that portion of time which is indicated by the change of anteriority and posteriority in its own position in space. The notion of this moment of time correlated to its distinct position means the knowledge thereof. It is by this knowledge that the fruits are distinguished. The performer of Samyama knows that the two emblematic fruits are different, by the knowledge of their becoming characterized by a moment of time correlated to the change of anteriority and posteriority, in a position other than that in which the changes of anteriority and posteriority in a moment of time existed formerly. Now although the former place has been changed, the Samyama is performed with reference to the moment of time correlated to the present changed position of the same object, qualified by the change of position in space different from the former one. By the performance of this Samyama direct knowledge is obtained of the change in time in the other position. For this reason it has been said :—‘The sequential notion of the moment of time correlated to another position in space, becomes the cause of their distinction.’

Now he says that by the analogy of this very illustration, the same sort of distinction should be believed as existing among atoms, on the authority of a Yogi who alone can conceive of the distinction. ‘On the analogy of this illustration, &c.’

‘Others however say :’ (he cites their opinion) ‘it is the last, &c.’ The Vaisesikas say that there are certain ultimate peculiarities which are manifest in the permanent substances. It is thus argued. The Yogis who are absolutely free do not distinguish between objects whose genus, position in space and secondary qualities are the same, and in which there is no interval ; and cannot specify either by pointing out mutual differences or by defining their realities. There must, therefore, be some ultimate peculiarity (*Visesa*) : and it is that, that they make out to be the differentiating quality of permanent substances, such as atoms, &c.

He refutes this theory :—‘Even there, &c.’ Genus, space and secondary quality have been illustrated. Form is a manifestation of arrangement along certain lines. Thus having removed a thing whose parts are beautifully arranged, another object whose parts are ugly in arrangement, is placed in the same position when the seer is otherwise employed. In this case the knowledge of distinction is obtained by the difference of arrangement.

Or, form may mean the body. It is by relation to the body that the selves whether in evolution or free are distinguished by means of the action of the elements, such as it may be. Thus when the notion of distinction is caused anywhere by other means, it is not necessary to posit a differentia in the shape of ultimate peculiarity (Antya Vîseṣa), as the cause of the distinction. This is similar to the case of the Dvîpas of Kuśa and Puṣkara in their aspect of planes of space.

Inasmuch as it has been said that the differences of genus, position and time, &c., are known by the intellect of the ordinary man, it is said that the difference of moment of time (kṣaṇa) is known by the intellect of the Yogî alone. The word 'alone' signifies the difference of the moment of time, not that of the intellect of the Yogî. It is inferred that the distinction between released Puruṣas also is known by the intellect of the Yogî by their relation to the body moving in the elements (bhûtachara).

The teacher thought that in the case of those who do not possess the means of distinction, there are no distinctions in the case of the Pradhâna. Therefore, he said :— 'Although destroyed with reference to those whose objects have been gained, it is not destroyed with reference to others, being common to the others.'

He says this :—'On account of the absence of form, &c.' The meaning is that the universe has difference indicated by the causes mentioned. But there is no distinction in the root, the Pradhâna.—52.

Sûtra 53.

तारकं सर्वविषयं सर्वथाविषयमक्रमं चेति विवेकज्ञानम् ॥५३॥

तारकम् Târakam, the intuitional. सर्वविषयम् Sarva-viṣayam, having everything (सर्व) for its Sphere of operation (विषय). सर्वथा-विषयम् Sarvathâ-viṣayam, (सर्वथा) having all conditions (विषय) For its sphere of operation. अक्रमम् Akramam, having no succession. च Chia, and. इति Iti, this.

53. And it is the intuitional ; has everything for its sphere-of-operation ; has all-condition for its sphere-of-operation ; has no succession. This is the entire discriminative knowledge.—159.

**तारकं सर्वविषयं सर्वथाविषयमक्रमं चेति विवेकज्ञानम् । तारकमिति स्वप्रतिभेद-
थमनौपदेशिकमित्यर्थः । सर्वविषयत्वान्नास्य । किंचिदविषयीभूतमित्यर्थः । सर्वथा-
विषयमतीतानागतप्रत्युत्पन्नं सर्वं पर्यायैः सर्वथा जानातीत्यर्थः । अक्रममित्येकक्षणोपारूढं
सर्वं सर्वथा गृह्णातीत्यर्थः । एतद्विवेकजं ज्ञानं परिपूर्णमस्यैवांशो योगप्रदीपो मधुमतीं
भूमिमुपादाय यावदस्य परिसमाप्तिरिति ॥ ५३ ॥**

VYÂSA.

It is intuitional :—This means that the knowledge comes by one's own prescience and not by teaching.

Has everything for its sphere of operation :—This means that there is nothing yet known, which might not be made its object.

Has all conditions for its sphere :—The all, as it was or will be, or is with all minor modes of expression. It means that he knows all the conditions of these objects.

Has no succession :—It means that he takes in the ‘all’ as correlated to but one moment.

This is the entire discriminative knowledge :—The light of Yoga is part of this only, beginning with the Madhumatî up to the end of this knowledge.—159.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Having thus described one branch of discriminative knowledge, the author now describes discriminative knowledge :—‘It is intuitive ; has everything as the sphere of its operation ; has all conditions as its sphere ; has no succession ; this is the entire discriminative knowledge.’

‘Discriminative knowledge :’ This is the statement of the thing defined. The rest is the description. Intuition is called Târaka, because it becomes the cause of crossing the ocean of the universe. He distinguishes this from the knowledge by prescience already described :—‘Has all conditions for the sphere of its operation.’

‘Modes of expression :’ means minor modes of differentiation. For this reason the knowledge of discrimination is complete. There is nothing anywhere which may not at any time or in any way be its object. This is the meaning. There may be other knowledge obtained by cognitive trance, but that also is a part of this, and where therefore can there be any knowledge beyond this ? It is for this reason complete. The Commentator says this :—‘The light of Yoga, i.e., the Cognitive Yoga, is a part thereof.’

Now he says what is the beginning and what is the end :—‘Beginning with the Madhumatî, &c.’ The truth-bearing cognition is the Madhu, honey, because it causes, such sweet bliss. The meaning is, ‘having obtained the purity of cognition as described.’ The Madhumatî is that state which is possessed of that and gives sweet bliss. The mind having reached that state, manifests up to the end of that state, passing through seven-fold stages of intellectual progress. It is for this reason that discriminative knowledge becomes intuitional, inasmuch as its branch, the light of Yoga, is intuitional.—53.

Sûtra 54.

सत्त्वपुरुषयोः शुद्धिसाम्ये कैवल्यम् ॥ ५४ ॥

सत्त्व-पुरुषयोः Sattvapurusayoh, of the objective essence and the consciousness. शुद्धि Suddhi, of the purity. साम्ये Sâmye, on their becoming equal. कैवल्यम् Kaivalyam, absolute independence.

54. When the purity of the Objective-Essence and that of the Purusa become equal, it is absolute independence.—160.

प्राप्तविवेकज्ञानस्याप्राप्तविवेकज्ञानस्य वा । सत्त्वपुरुषयोः शुद्धिसाम्ये कैवल्यमिति । यदा निर्धूतरजस्तमोमलं वुद्धिसत्त्वं पुरुषस्यान्यताप्रतीतिमात्राधिकारं दग्धकूशबीजं भवति तदा पुरुषस्य शुद्धिसारूप्यमिवापन्नं भवति तदा पुरुषस्योपचरितभेगाभावः शुद्धिस्तस्यामवस्थायां कैवल्यं भवति । ईश्वरस्यानीश्वरस्य वा विवेकज्ञानभागिन इतरस्य वा । नहि दग्धकूशबीजस्य ज्ञाने पुनरपेक्षा काचिदस्ति सत्त्वशुद्धिरारेणैतत्समाधिजमैश्वर्यं ज्ञानं चापक्रान्तं परमार्थतस्तु ज्ञानाददर्शनं निवर्तते तस्मिन्निवृत्ते न सन्त्युक्ते

क्लेशः क्लेशाभावात्कर्मविपाकाभावाच्चरिताधिकाराश्चैतस्यामवस्थायां गुणा न पुरुषस्य
हश्यत्वेन पुनरुपतिष्ठन्ते तत्पुरुषस्य कैवल्यं तदा पुरुषः स्वरूपमात्रज्योतिरमलः केवली
भवति ॥ ५४ ॥

इति श्रीपातञ्जलभाष्ये सांख्यप्रवचने विभूतिपादस्तृतीयः समाप्तः ॥ ३ ॥

VYÂSA.

In the case of him who has obtained discriminative knowledge as well as in the case of him who has not obtained discriminative knowledge, it is absolute independence (kaivalya), when the purity of the Objective Essence and the Purusa become equal. When the essence of the Will-to-be with the dirt of the Rajas and the Tamas removed, has the notion of the distinctness of the Purusa as its sole remaining object, and all the seeds of affliction have been burnt up, then does it, as it were, assume a state of purity similar to that of the Purusa. In that state the purity of the Purusa consists in the absence of that enjoyment which is attributed to him, as it were, figuratively. In that state comes absolute independence (kaivalya), whether it be to the master or to the ordinary man, to him who is possessed of discriminative knowledge or to him who is not.

He in whom the seed of affliction is burnt up, has no longer any need of knowledge anywhere. It is as the means of purifying the substance of the Will-to-be that knowledge and the powers born of trance have been touched upon. In reality ignorance is removed by knowledge. On its cessation there are no longer any afflictions. When there are no afflictions, there is no fruition of actions. The Guṇas in that state have fulfilled their object. They, therefore, no longer present themselves to be seen by the Purusa. Then the Purusa shining in his own pure light, becomes absolutely independent (kevala)—160.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Having now described the means of absolute independence, the Samyamas together with the attainments, the author now introduces this aphorism in order to show that the knowledge of the distinction between the Objective Essence and the Purusa is the direct means of absolute independence :—‘In the case of him who has obtained, &c.’ The meaning is that the knowledge born of discrimination does, all the same, become the means of absolute independence, whether or not there is the knowledge born of discrimination. ‘It is absolute independence (kaivalya) when the purity of the Objective Essence and that of the Purusa become equal.’

‘The master’ is he who has by the performance of Samyama obtained the power of knowledge and action. The ordinary man is he who has not obtained these powers. To him who is possessed of discriminative knowledge by the performance of Samyama described just before, or, to another who has obtained knowledge otherwise, in either case, the attainments are never under requisition for the purpose. ‘He in whom the seeds of affliction, &c.’

Well, but if they are unnecessary for absolute freedom their teaching is useless. For this reason the Commentator says:—'As a means of the attainment of the purity of the Objective Essence, &c.'

The attainments are not absolutely unnecessary in attaining absolute independence. They are not its direct means. The knowledge born of discrimination and that which is obtained by the successive performance of Samyama is only an indirect cause. The principal cause is the knowledge of distinction. This is the meaning. Ignorance is removed by knowledge. Knowledge means the Highest Intellection.—54.

In this chapter the direct means of Yoga have been described. Also the evolutionary changes have been dilated upon. Also the conjunction with the elements by Samyama. Also the knowledge born of discrimination. This is the third chapter of VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS on Vyâsa's Commentary of the aphorisms of Yoga. The third Chapter, the Chapter on Attainments, is finished.

THE FOURTH CHAPTER.
ON ABSOLUTE INDEPENDENCE (KAIVALYA).

Sutra 1.

जन्मौषधिमन्त्रतपःसमाधिजाः सिद्धयः ॥ १ ॥

जन्म Janma, birth. औषधि Auśadhi, drugs. मन्त्र Mantra, incantations. तपः Tapah, purificatory rites. समाधि Samâdhi, trance. जाः Jâḥ, born. सिद्धयः Siddhayaḥ, attainments.

1. The attainments are by birth, drugs, incantations, purificatory action (tapas) or trance.—161.

**जन्मौषधिमन्त्रतपःसमाधिजाः सिद्धयः । देहान्तरिता जन्मसिद्धिः श्रोपशीभिर-
सुरभवनेषु रसायनेत्येवमादिः । मन्त्रैराकाशगमनमणिमादिसिद्धिः । तपसा सङ्कल्प-
सिद्धिः । कामरूपी यत्र तत्र कामग इत्येवमादिसमाधिजाः सिद्धयो व्याख्याताः ॥ १ ॥**

VYĀSA.

Attainments by birth exist in the body.

By drugs, in the houses of the Asuras, by elixir and such like:

By incantations, motion in space and the powers of attenuation (anîmâ), &c.

By purificatory action (tapas) the achievement of wishes. He takes such forms and goes to such places as he may like, and does other similar things.

The attainments born of trance have been described.—161.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now trance, its means and its attainments, have been described chiefly in the first, second and third chapters. Other subjects which it became necessary to take up by context, or by way of introduction, have also been discussed. Here is to be discussed Absolute Freedom (Kaivalya), which is the ultimate of all these practices, &c. And this is impossible to explain without explaining the nature of the mind inclining towards the state of absolute independence, as also the other world and the self which being something beside knowledge alone (Vijñâna), is related to the other world, and which enjoys through the instrumentality of the mind, pleasurable sound, &c. All this has to be described in this chapter, besides what might become necessary by context or by way of introduction.

First of all, he describes the five-fold attainment, with the object of ascertaining which of the minds possessed of attainments is passing towards the state of absolute independence.

'The attainments are by birth, incantations, purificatory action or trance.' He explains:—Exists in the body:—Some one has the power of attenuation in the body, just as he is born because actions done by him as man, which are calculated to cause the enjoyments of Heaven, have developed them into fruition in some heavenly region.

He describes the attainments due to drugs:—‘In the houses of the Asuras.’ Man passes to the places of the Asuras for some reason. He is met there by lovely Asura damsels, and given an offering of elixir. Using that he comes to possess the attainments of freedom from decay and death, and other attainments. Or, the same may take place even here by the use of elixir, as in the case of the thinker Mândavya, who resided in the Vindhya Mountains and who used the elixir.

He next describes the attainments due to incantations:—‘By mantras.’

He next describes the attainments of purificatory actions:—‘By purificatory action.’

He next describes the attainment of wishes:—Assuming such forms as desired. Whatever does he desire, be it the attainment of Anîmâ or any other, that he attains at once. Whatever he desires to hear or to think anywhere, that he hears or thinks there. By the word, &c., seeing, &c., have been included.—1.

Sûtra 2.

जात्यन्तरपरिणामः प्रकृत्यापूरात् ॥ २ ॥

जात्यन्तर Jâtyantara, to another life-state. परिणामः Parinâmaḥ, change. प्रकृति Prakṛiti, of the creative causes. आपूरात् Âpûrât, by the filling up.

2. Change to another life-state by the filling up of the creative causes (Prakṛityâpura).—162.

तत्र कायेन्द्रियाणामन्यजातिपरिणतानाम् । जात्यन्तरपरिणामः प्रकृत्यापूरात् । पूर्व-परिणामाणये उत्तरपरिणामोपज्ञस्तेषामपूर्वावयवानुप्रवेशाद्भवति कायेन्द्रियप्रकृतयश्च स्वं स्वं विकारमनुगृह्णान्त्यापूरेण धर्मादिनिमित्तमपेक्षमाणा इति ॥ २ ॥

VYÂSA.

Here ‘change to another life-state by the filling up of the creative causes,’ takes place of the life-state into which the body and the powers have already changed and exist. On the former change going out comes the close appearance of their next change by the sequential showing forth of organ and parts which did not exist before; and the creative causes of the body and the powers favour each their own modifications by filling up, which again has the necessity of virtue, &c., as the incidental cause (of removing the impediment).—162.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The attainments due to the trance have, been described in the previous chapter. It is now desirable to say that the change into another life-state brought about by the four classes of attainments due to the use of herbs, &c., is also of the same body and the powers thereof. This, however, does not come about by mere material causes. The material itself, so far as it goes, does not prove to be competent to intensify or weaken the state of the divine and the not-divine, in him. It is plain that a cause having no elements of difference in itself cannot operate to produce different effects. In order to guard against the possibility of the change being taken as due to accident alone, he completes and reads the aphorism:—‘Change to another life-state by the filling up of the creative causes.’

Here it is only the change of the body and the powers as they are in one state, that takes place into those suitable to another state. The change takes place of the body

and the powers as they appear in man, into the life-state of the animals and gods by the filling up of the creative causes.

The creative causes of the body are the elements of Prithvî, &c. The creative cause of the 'powers' is the principle of egoism.

'Filling up' means the sequential showing forth, entrance therein, of these causes. By this comes about the change.

Says this:—'By the former change going out, &c.'

Well, but if the change is favoured by the 'filling up' why does it not take place always? For this reason he says:—'Has the necessity of virtue, &c.'

By this have been described the changes of the state of the body into childhood, boyhood, youth, old age; the change of the seed of the Nyagrodha into the tree; the change of the small piece of fire thrown into a heap of straw, into a large fire throwing out flames by thousand and embracing the sky itself.—2.

Sûtra 3.

निमित्तमप्रयोजकं प्रकृतीनां वरणभेदस्तु ततः क्षेत्रिकवत् ॥ ३ ॥

निमित्तम् Nimittam, incidental causes. अप्रयोजकम् Aprayojakam, are those which do not move into action. प्रकृतीनाम् Prakritinâm, the creative causes. वरण Varâṇa, of the obstacle. भेदः Bhedah, piercing through. तु Tu, but. ततः Tataḥ, from that. क्षेत्रिकवत् Ksetrikavat, like a husbandman.

3. The creative-causes are not-moved-into-action by any incidental-cause; but that pierces-the-obstacle from it like the husbandman.—163.

निमित्तमप्रयोजकं प्रकृतीनां वरणभेदस्तु ततः क्षेत्रिकवत् । नहि धर्मादिनिमित्तं तत्प्रयोजकं भवति प्रकृतीनाम् । न कार्यणं कारणं प्रवर्त्यत इति । कथं तर्हि । वरण-भेदस्तु ततः क्षेत्रिकवत् । यथा क्षेत्रिकः केदारादपां पूर्णात्केदारान्तरं पिण्डावयिषुः समं लिङ्मं निष्पतरं वा नापः पाणिनापकर्षत्यावरणं त्वासां भिनत्ति तस्मन्बिन्ने स्वयमेवापः केदारान्तरमाण्डावयन्ति तथा धर्मः प्रकृतीनामावरणमधर्मं भिनत्ति तस्मन्बिन्ने स्वयमेव प्रकृतयः स्वं स्वं विकारमाण्डावयन्ति । यथा वा स एव क्षेत्रिकस्तस्मिन्ने वे केदारे न प्रभवत्यौदकान्मैमान्वा रसान्धान्यमूलान्यनुप्रवेशयितुम् । किं तर्हि मुद्गवेधुकश्यामाकार्दीस्ततोऽपकर्षति । अपकृष्टेषु तेषु स्वयमेव रसा धान्यमूलान्यनुप्रविशन्ति । तथा धर्मा निवृत्तिमात्रे कारणमधर्मस्य शुद्धशुद्धयोरत्यन्तविरोधात् । नतु प्रकृतिप्रवृत्तौ धर्मा हेतुर्भवतीति । अत्र नन्दीश्वरादय उदाहार्याः । विष्ण्ययेणाप्यधर्मा धर्मं बाधते । ततश्चाशुद्धिपरिणाम इति । तत्रापि नहुषाजगरादय उदाहार्याः । यदा तु योगी बहून्कायान्निर्मिमीते तदा किमेकमनस्कास्ते भवन्त्यथानेकमनस्का इति ॥ ३ ॥

VYÂSA.

The incidental causes in the shape of virtue, &c., do not move the creative causes into action; because the cause is not moved into action by the effect. How then? 'That pierces the obstacle like the husbandman.'

As the husbandman desirous of carrying water from an already well-filled bed to another, does not draw the water with his own hands to places which are on the same or a lower level; but simply removes the obstacles, and thereupon the water flows down of itself to the other bed, so it pierces through vice which is the obstacle to virtue, and that being pierced through, the creative causes pass through their respective changes.

Or, similarly, the same husbandman does not possess the power of transferring the earthy and watery juices to the roots of rice in the same bed. What then? He weeds the 'ring,' the 'Gavendhuka' and the 'Syāmaka' out of the common bed, and when they have been weeded out, the juices themselves enter the roots of rice.

Similarly virtue only becomes the cause of the removal of the vice, because purity and impurity are diametrically opposed to each other. It is not that virtue becomes the cause of the creative causes moving into action. On this point Nandīśvara, &c., are illustrations. On the other side, too, vice counteracts virtue and thence comes the change to impurity. Here too Nahuṣa, the Ajagara, &c., should be taken as illustrations.—163.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

It has been said, 'By the filling up of the creative causes.' Here the doubt arises. Is this filling up of the creative causes natural, or due to some incidental cause such as virtue and vice? What is proved? Well, because the creative causes, notwithstanding existence, fill up only sometimes, and because it is said that virtue and vice are the incidental causes; it is, therefore, proved that virtue, &c., are the incidental causes of the creative causes moving into action. For this reason he says:—'The creative causes are not moved into action by any incidental cause; that pierces the obstacle like the husbandman.'

It is true that virtue, &c., are the incidental causes, but they do not set the creative causes into action; because virtue and vice are themselves the effects of creative causes. And the effect does not move the cause into action, because the birth of the effect depending upon the cause, it is subject to the action of the cause. What is self-dependent can only set an action in something which is dependent on it. The jar which is desired to be made or which has already been made, cannot certainly use the clay, the wheel and water for that purpose without the potter. Nor is it similarly the object of the Puruṣa that sets the creative causes into action. It is only Iṣvara who does this with that object in view. The object of the Puruṣa is said to be the power which sets in action, by virtue of its being the aim thereof. Further, if it were so, the tending of the aim of the Puruṣa towards fulfilment would very properly become the cause of the stopping of the operations of the phenomenal world.—3.

But it is not by this much that virtue, &c., cease to be the means of change altogether. Because they become the means of effecting changes even by removing the obstacles only, like the husbandman. As to Iṣvara, His action too should be understood to be of the nature of the removal of obstacles, so that virtue may be practised. This is what has been commented upon by the Commentary already explained.

Sûtra 4.

निर्माणचित्तान्यस्मितामात्रात् ॥ ४ ॥

निर्माण Nirmâna, of creation, created. चित्तानि Chittâni, minds. अस्मिता Asmitâ, from egoism. मात्रात् Mâtrât, alone.

4. Created minds proceed from egoism alone.—164.

निर्माणचित्तान्यस्मितामात्रात् । अस्मितामात्रं चित्तं कारणमुपादाय निर्माणचित्तानि करोति ततः सचित्तानि भवन्तीति ॥ ४ ॥

VYÂSA.

When however the Yogî makes many bodies, then, are these bodies possessed of many minds or all of one mind only? ‘Created minds proceed from egoism alone?’ Taking as cause the mind which is egoism alone, he makes the created minds. Thence do the bodies become possessed of minds.—164.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now he considers the unity or manifoldness of the minds in the many bodies made by perfected powers, after the attainments have been achieved by the filling in of the creative causes (Prakritis):—‘When however.’

Here if the bodies possessed more than one mind, the desire of each such mind would be different from those of the others; and there would not thus be obedience to the desired of one mind and no mutuality in relationship, just as in the case of two individual selves (Puruṣas). It, therefore, comes to this that it is only one mind which pervades more created bodies than one, just as the light of a lamp is diffused on all sides and illuminates more bodies than one. Says he thereupon:—‘Created minds proceed from egoism alone.’

All living bodies, as long as they live, are found to be possessed of one ordinary mind each. Take, for example, the bodies of Chaitra and Maitra, etc. So are the created bodies (the Nirmânakâyas). Thus is it proved that each of these bodies has a mind of its own.

Says with this in mind:—‘Taking as cause the mind which is egoism alone.’—4.

Sûtra 5.

प्रवृत्तिभेदे प्रयोजकं चित्तमेकमनेकेषाम् ॥ ५ ॥

प्रवृत्ति, Pravritti, of activity. भेदे Bhede, there being difference. प्रयोजकम् Prayojakam, the director. चित्तम् Chittam, the mind. एकम् Ekam, one. अनेकेषाम् Anekesâm, of the many.

5. There being difference of activity, one mind the director of-the-many.—165.

प्रवृत्तिभेदे प्रयोजकं चित्तमेकमनेकेषाम् । बाहूनां चित्तानां कथमेकचित्ताभिप्राय-पुरःसरा प्रवृत्तिरिति सर्वचित्तानां प्रयोजकं चित्तमेकं निर्मितीते ततः प्रवृत्तिभेदः ॥ ५ ॥

VYÂSA.

How may it be that many minds may follow in their activities, the desires of one mind? With this object he makes one mind as the director of all the minds; and thence proceeds the difference of activities.—165.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The aphorism is a reply to what has been said, that in the case of there being more minds than one, there would not be obedience to one mind, nor mutuality of relationship :—‘There being difference of activity, one mind the director of the others.’ This might be a defect if the Yogi did not make one mind to be the director of more minds than one acting in more bodies than one. When that is made, no defect remains.

It should not be said that there is no use in more minds than one that is one for each body, when one such mind is posited; nor should it be said that there is no use in making a directing mind, because one's own mind can serve that purpose. The reason is that that which has been proved to exist by right reasoning, need no more be subjected to the test of being placed in consonant and dissonant positions.

On this says the Purâna :—‘The one Lord becomes many by his power of Lordship. For this reason and because having become many he again becomes one, these are certainly born by the differences of the mind, one-fold, two-fold, three-fold and manifold. The Yogîsvâra makes his bodies in this way and unmakes them. By some he enjoys objects of enjoyment and by other performs hard penances. He again draws in the bodies as the Sun draws in his ray.’ It is with this object that he says :—‘How is it that all these minds act according, &c.’—5.

Sûtra 6.

तत्र ध्यानजमनाशयम् ॥ ६ ॥

तत्र Tatra, of these. ध्यानजम् Dhyânajam, the meditation born. अनाशयम् Anâśayam, is free from the vehicles.

6. Of these the meditation-born is free-from-the-vehicles.—166.

तत्र ध्यानजमनाशयम् । पञ्चविधं निर्माणचित्तं जन्मौषधिमन्त्रतपःसमाधिजाः
सिद्धय इति । तत्र यदेव ध्यानजं चित्तं तदेवानाशयं तस्यैव नास्त्याशयो रागादिप्रवृत्तिः
ततः पुण्यपापाभिसम्बन्धः क्षीणक्षेत्राद्योगिन इति ॥ ६ ॥

VYÂSA.

The created mind is five-fold, as said :—‘The attainments are by birth, drugs, incantations, purificatory action or trance.’ Of these the one that is born of meditation is alone free from the vehicles. It does not possess the vehicles, which cause the manifestation of desire, &c. Thence is there no coming into relationship with virtue and vice, inasmuch as the afflictions of a Yogi have ceased to exist.—166.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now he determines the mind, which tends to emancipation, out of the five descriptions of the minds of the perfected ones (siddhâs), which have been described :—‘The meditation-born is free from the vehicles.’ The vehicles are those that take possession of the mind as the impressions of the actions and the impressions of the afflictions. The mind free from the vehicles is that in which these do not exist. The meaning is that it becomes inclined towards emancipation. Inasmuch as there does not exist in this condition the manifestation of desires, &c., there is no coming into relationship with virtue and vice. But then why do not desires, &c., come into manifestation? For this reason he says :—‘Because the afflictions of a Yogi have ceased to exist.’—6.

Sûtra 7.

कर्मशुक्लाकृष्णं योगिनस्त्रिविधमितरेषाम् ॥ ७ ॥

कर्म Karma, Karma, action. शुक्लः Asukla, neither white. अकृष्णम् Akriṣṇam, nor black. योगिनः Yoginah, of a Yogi. त्रिविधम् Trividham, threefold. इतरेषाम् Itaresām, of the others.

7. A Yogi's karma is neither-white nor-black ; of-the-others it is three-fold.—167.

इतरेषां तु विद्यते कर्मशयो यतः । कर्मशुक्लाकृष्णं योगिनस्त्रिविधमितरेषाम् ।
चतुर्षपात्खलिवयं कर्मजातः । कृष्णा शुक्लकृष्णा शुक्लाशुक्लाकृष्णा चेति । तत्र कृष्णा
दुरात्मनाम् । शुक्लकृष्णा बहिः साधनसाध्या तत्र परपीडानुग्रहद्वारेणैव कर्मशयप्रक्षयः ।
शुक्ला तपः स्वाध्यायध्यानवताम् । सा हि केवले मनस्यायत्तत्त्वाद् बहिः साधनानधीना न
परान्पीडित्यित्वा भवति । अशुक्लाकृष्णा संन्यासिनां क्षीणक्षेशानां चरमदेहानामिति ।
तत्राशुक्ल योगिन एव फलसंन्यासादकृष्णं चानुपादानात् । इतरेषां तु भूतानां पूर्वमेव
त्रिविधमिति ॥ ७ ॥

VYÂSA.

The vehicle of actions exists in the case of others. Hence, 'A Yogi's karma is neither white nor black ; of the others it is three-fold.'

This class of actions has four locations: the black, the black-white, the white, nor white nor black. Of these, the black is of the wicked. The black-white is brought about by external means, as in this the vehicle of actions grows by means of causing pain to, or acting kindly towards others.

The white is of those who resort to the means of improvement of study and meditation. This is dependent upon the mind alone. It does not depend upon external means and is not, therefore, brought about by injuring others.

The one which is neither white nor black exists in the case of those who have renounced everything (the Sannyâsis), whose afflictions have been destroyed, and whose present body is the last one, they will have. It is not white in the case of a Yogi, because he gives up the fruit of action ; and it is not black, because he does not perform actions. Of the other creatures, it is of the three former descriptions only.—167.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Says that the others are possessed of the vehicles, with the object of showing the differences of the other minds from the, meditation-born, which is not possessed of the vehicles :—'In the case of others, &c.'

In the same connection he introduces the aphorism as describing the cause thereof :—'A Yogi's karma is neither black nor white ; of the others it is three-fold.'

'Has four locations'—Location means place (of manifestation). It has four locations because it manifests in four such places.

'Brought about by external means'—In all such cases injury is sure to be caused to others. It is not that even in action done for the preparation of barley, &c., for food, &c., there exists no injury. It is possible that ants, &c., might be killed at the time of pounding them, and finally the arrangement is that trunk, &c., are produced by the destruction of seeds as such.

'Acting kindly' means the favouring of Brâhmaṇas, &c., by giving them presents, &c.

The white is of those who are not Sannyâsîs, but who perform purificatory action, study and meditation. He shows how it is white :—'This is dependent upon the mind alone, &c.'

That which is neither white nor black, is the karma of the Sannyâsîs (those who have renounced everything. He shows who are the Sannyâsîs :—'Whose afflictions have been destroyed, &c.'

Those who have renounced actions (the karma-sannyâsîs) are not anywhere found performing actions which depend upon external means. They have not got the black vehicle of actions, because they do not perform such actions. Nor do they possess the white vehicle of actions, because they dedicate to Isvara the fruits of the vehicle of action brought about by the practice of Yoga. That whose fruit is not bad, is called white. That which has no fruit itself, how can it have any bad fruit ?

Having thus described the four-fold division of karma, now he specifies which refers to which :—'Of these it is not white, &c.'—7.

Sûtra 8.

ततस्तद्विपाकानुगुणानामेवाभिव्यक्तिर्वासनानाम् ॥ ८ ॥

ततः Tataḥ, thence. तद् Tad, their (of residual potencies). विपाक Vipâka, fruition. अनुगुण Anuguṇa, following. विपाकानुगुणानाम् Vipâkânuguṇānām, of those that are competent to bring about their fruition. एव Eva, only. अभिव्यक्तिः Abhivyaktih, the manifestation, proceeding. वासनानाम् Vâsanânām, of the residual potencies.

8. Thence proceed the residual-potencies competent-to-bring-about their fruition alone.—168.

ततस्तद्विपाकानुगुणानामेवाभिव्यक्तिर्वासनानाम् । तत इति त्रिविधात्कर्मणस्तद्विपाकानुगुणानामेवैति । यज्ञातीयस्य कर्मणो यो विपाकस्तस्यानुगुणा या वासनाः कर्मविपाकमनुशेरते तासामेवाभिव्यक्तिः । नहि दैवं कर्म विपच्यमानं नारकतिर्यङ् मनुष्यवासनाभिव्यक्तिनिमित्तं संभवति । किंतु दैवानुगुणा एवास्य वासना व्यञ्जन्ते । नारकतिर्यङ् मनुष्येषु चैवं समानश्चर्चः ॥ ८ ॥

VYÂSA.

'Thence' means from the three-fold karma.

'Competent to bring about the fruition thereof.' Whatever is the fruition of whichever class of karma, such residual potencies only as are competent to bring about the fruition of those actions, are manifested. When the karma relating to the state of the gods is fructifying, the residues which are adequate to the state of the hell-born, the animals and men cannot manifest. On the contrary, it is only the impressions which are

adequate to the state of the gods that are manifested. The operation of the rule is the same in the case of the hell-born, the human and the animal tendencies.—168.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Having ascertained the vehicle of actions, now he describes the developments of the vehicle of afflictions :—‘Thence manifested the residual potencies competent to bring about their fruition.’ He describes the impressions which are competent to bring about the life-state, life-experience and life-period, whether hellish or divine, which are the results of the fruition of good and bad karma :—‘The residual potencies competent to bring about the fruition thereof.’ The residua which are born of divine experience are competent to bring about the fruition of divine karma. It is not possible that in the case of the manifestation of the residua of human experiences, the enjoyment of the fruitage of divine actions should take place. For this reason the impressions whose manifestation is brought about by karma are of the same class as the fruition thereof. This is the meaning of the Commentary.—8

Sûtra 9.

**जातिदेशकालव्यवहितानामप्यानन्तर्य स्मृतिसंस्कारयोरेक-
रूपत्वात् ॥ ६ ॥**

जाति Jâti, of life state. देश Deśa, of locality. काल Kâla, of time. व्यवहितानाम् Vyavahitânâm, these being distinct. अपि Api, even. आनन्तर्यम् Ânantaryam, sequential non-interruption. स्मृति Smṛiti, of memory. संस्कारयोः Sam-skârayoh, and of potential residue. एकरूपत्वात् Ekarûpatvât, because of their being the same in appearance.

9. Memory and potential-residua being the same in appearance, there is sequential non-interruption, even when there is distinction of life-state, locality and time.—169.

**जातिदेशकालव्यवहितानामप्यानन्तर्य स्मृतिसंस्कारयोरेकरूपत्वात् । वृषदंशविपाको-
दयः स्वव्यञ्जकाञ्जनाभिव्यक्तः । स यदि जातिशतेन वा दूरदेशतया वा कल्पशतेन वा
व्यवहितः पुनश्च स्वव्यञ्जकाञ्जन एवोदियाद्रागित्येवं पूर्वानुभूतवृषदंशविपाकाभि-
संस्कृता वासना उपादाय व्यजेत । कस्मात् । यतो व्यवहितानामप्यासां सदृशं
कर्माभिव्यञ्जकं निमित्तीभूतमित्यानन्तर्यमेव । कुतश्च स्मृतिसंस्कारयोरेकरूपत्वात् ।
यथानुभवास्तथा संस्काराः । ते च कर्मवासनारूपाः । यथा च वासनास्तथा स्मृतिरिति ।
जातिदेशकालव्यवहितेभ्यः संस्कारेभ्यः स्मृतिः स्मृतेश्च पुनः संस्कारा इत्येवमेते
स्मृतिसंस्काराः कर्मशयवृत्तिलाभवशाद्यन्यन्ते । अतश्च व्यवहितानामपि निमित्तनै-
मित्तिकभावानुच्छेदादानन्तर्यमेव सिद्धमिति । वासनाः संस्कारा आशया इत्यर्थः ॥ ९ ॥**

VYÂSA.

The rise of fruition in the shape of a cat takes place by virtue of the powers competent to show them forth. Even if that rise is separated even by a hundred life-states, or by distance in space, or by a hundred

kalpas, it will rise whenever it does, by the operation of its own appropriate cause. Thus will it appear again by taking up the residua which are present in the mind on account of the experience of the feline state in some former life. Why? Because even if there be an interval between them, the residua are manifested by the similar manifesting karma becoming the operative cause thereof. Thus there is but sequential appearance. And for what other reason? Because memory and residual potency are but one in appearance. As are the experiences, such are the residual potencies; and they are of the nature of the residua of actions. And memory is similar to the residua. Memory comes by the residual potencies separated therefrom by life-state and by time and space. From memory come again residual potencies. Thus it is that memory and residual potency are manifested by virtue of the vehicle of action coming into manifestation. Thus even though separated in time, &c., there is sequential non-interruption, inasmuch as the relation of cause and effect does not break.

The Vâsanas (aroma) are residual potencies, the vehicles.—169.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Let that be. But, when the state of a cat is put on after the death of a man, it must be due to the manifestation of the residua of the human state of existence, inasmuch as the one immediately follows the other. It is not possible that the experience of the day immediately preceding be not remembered, but that the experiences of another day more distant therefrom be remembered. For this reason he says:—‘There is sequential non-interruption, even when there is separation in time, life-state and space, on account of the memory and residual potency being the same in appearance.’ There may be separation in life-state, &c., from the life of a cat. Still there is non-interruption on account of the fruit thereof, because the same memory is generated when the manifestation is according to its own fruit and in consonance with karma which must fructify into the feline state. ‘The rise of a state’ is the vehicle of action, because it is from this state that the fruition arises. Further it takes its rise in accordance with its own manifesting cause.

‘Manifestation’ means tending towards the beginning of fruition.

‘Thus will it rise again by taking up the residua which are, &c.’ The meaning is that if it does manifest, it would manifest by taking up the residua which manifest its own fruition.

Having established the absence of interruption through the operation of the cause, now he establishes the same through the operation of the effect:—‘And for what other reason?’

‘One in appearance’ means similarity. He says the same:—‘As are the experiences, &c.’

The question is that if the experiences are of the same appearance as the residual potencies, then inasmuch as the experiences are seen disappearing very soon, the potencies also must be taken as disappearing very soon. That being the case, how is it possible that the potencies, being subject to speedy dispersion, should be competent to bring about experiences, after a great lapse of time?

For this reason he says :—‘And they are of the nature of the residua of actions.’ As the new residuum brought about by momentary action is permanent, so also is the potency generated by momentary experience. There must always be some difference in similarity. If it were otherwise and there were no difference, there would be no similarity. The rest is easy.—9.

Sûtra 10.

तासामनादित्वं चाशिषो नित्यत्वात् ॥ १० ॥

तासाम् Tâsâm, for them. अनादित्वम् Anâditvam, no beginning. च Cha, and. आशिषः Aśisah, of the desire to live. नित्यत्वात् Nityatvât, owing to the eternity.

10. And there is no-beginning for them, the desire-to-live being eternal.—170.

तासामनादित्वं चाशिषो नित्यत्वात् । तासां वासनानामाशिषो नित्यत्वादनादि-
त्वम् । येयमात्माशीर्णानभूवं भूयासमिति सर्वस्य हश्यते सा न स्वाभाविकी । कस्मात् ।
जातमात्रस्याननुभूतप्रणाल्यर्थकस्य द्वेषो दुःखानुसृतिनिमित्तो सरण्यवासः कथं मवेत् ।
न च स्वाभाविकं वस्तु निमित्तमुपादत्ते । तस्मादनादिवासनानुविद्धुमिदं चित्तं निमित्तव-
शात्काश्चिद्रैव वासनाः प्रतिलभ्य पुरुषस्य भेगायोपावर्तत इति । धट्प्रासादप्रदीपकल्पं
संकोचविकासि चित्तं शरीरपरिमाणाकारमात्रमित्यपरे प्रतिपन्नाः । तथा चान्तराभावः
संसारश्च युक्त इति । वृत्तिरेवास्य विभुनश्चित्तस्य संकोचविकासिनीत्याचार्यः । तच्च
धर्मादिनिमित्तापेक्षम् । निमित्तं च द्विविधम् । बाह्यमाध्यात्मिकं च । शरीरादिसाधनापेक्षं
बाह्यं स्तुतिदानाभिवादनादिचित्तमात्राधीनं श्रद्धाद्याध्यात्मकम् । तथा चौक्तम् ये चैते मैत्र्या-
दयोध्यायिनां विहारस्ते बाह्यसाधननिरनुग्रहात्मानः प्रकृष्टं धर्ममभिनिर्वर्तयन्ति तयोर्मानसं
बलीयः कथं ज्ञानवैराग्ये केनातिशययेते दण्डकारण्यं च चित्तबलव्यतिरेकेण शरीरेण कर्मणा
शून्यं कः कर्तुं मुत्सहेत समुद्रमगस्त्यवद्वा पिवेत् ॥ १० ॥

VYÂSA.

There is no beginning for them, “the residua, inasmuch as the desire are ever present. The desire, ‘Would that I may not cease to be,’ ‘Would that I may live on,’ is found in everybody. This self-benediction is not inherent. Why not? How could there be fear of death and desire to avoid pain, in any being who has only been born, if he has had no experience of liability to death, it being understood that desire to avoid anything is only caused by remembrance suffered in consequence thereof; and that nothing which is inherent in anything stands in need of a cause. The mind, therefore, possessed as it is of residua from eternity, brings into activity by the operation of exciting causes, certain residua only, for the purpose of giving experience to the Purusa.

Some philosophers say that the mind has only a form which is commensurate with the body with which it may, for the time, be connected;

it contracts or expands like light placed in a jar or a house as the case might be. And thus they say that non-interruption and repeated are proper. The author holds that it is the manifestation alone of the self-existing mind that expands or contracts, and that it is this which has the necessity of the operation of the exciting causes of virtue, &c.

These exciting causes are two-fold, external and internal. The external are those that stand in need of body, &c., as instrument, such as praising, giving of charity, and the performance of obeisances. The internal are those that stand in need of the mind alone, such as faith, &c. And so it has been said :—‘ These acts of friendliness, &c., are the sports of the thinkers ; they do not from their very nature depend upon external causes, and cause the expression of the highest virtue.’

Of these two means the mental ones are more powerful. How ? What can excel knowledge and desirelessness ? Who can without the power of the mind render the Dandaka forest empty, or drink the ocean like Agastya, by the mere action of the mind alone ?—170.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

It may be so. The residua laid by in a former and yet again in a former life may manifest themselves, if there be authority for the existence of previous and further previous lives. But there is no authority for such a proposition. Merely the pleasure and pain felt by a creature just born cannot be accepted as authority, because that can be explained by taking it to be natural, like the budding and opening of a lotus flower.

For this reason he says :—‘ And there is no beginning for them, the desire to live being eternal.’

The meaning of ‘and’ is that the residua are not only un-interrupted in their fruition, but they are eternal as well, because self-benediction, the desire to live is ever-present. Self-benediction does not fall short of eternity, on account of the residua being eternal.

But inasmuch as this is established by taking them to be inherent, the eternity of self-benediction is not established.

For this reason he says :—‘ The self-benediction, &c.’

The unbeliever asks :—‘ Why ? ’ The answer is :—‘ Of the creature who is just born, &c.’ For this very reason, how should it be that a child who has not experienced his liability to death in the present life, who does not know, that is to say, from the experience of the present life that death also is a characteristic of his, should, as he may be falling away from the mother's lap, begin to tremble and hold with his hands tightly the necklace hanging on her breast, marked with the suspicious discus, &c ? And how is it that such a child should experience the fear of death, which can only be caused by the memory of the pain consequent upon aversion to death, whose existence is inferred by the trembling of the child.

Well, has it not been said that this is inherent and natural ?

For this reason he says :—‘ Anything that is inherent, does not stand in need of an operating cause for its birth.’ This is the meaning. Such a trembling as becomes visible in the child must be due to fear, just like our own trembling of the same description. The fear of the child must be taken to have been caused by the memory of aversion and

pain, for the reason that it is fear just like our own, and the fear due to expected losses that might be coming, is not brought about by the mere memory of pain. Further, from whatever one is afraid, he infers to be the cause of some loss, and then expects that loss would even now cause pain. For this reason pain is caused by the aversion brought about by the memory of pain. Remembering that he infers the cause of pain, which is of the same class which is being felt at the time. The child, however, has not in the present life experienced the pain of falling in any other place. Nor has that sort of pain been felt. Thence the experience of a former life only remains as the explanation, by the canon of residues.

And this is thus applied. The memory of the child just born is due to the experience of former lives, because otherwise it would not be memory. It acts just like our own memory. Even the budding and opening of a lotus is not inherent, because what is inherent in anything, does not stand in need of any other cause for its manifestation. Even fire stands in need of other causes for the manifestation of its heat. In the same way, the cause of the opening of a lotus flower is the contact from outside of the rays of the rising sun : and the cause of the shutting up of the petals is the residual potency, which maintains the inactivity. Similarly the happiness of a baby which is inferred from smiles, etc., should also be considered a proof of a previous life.

An 'exciting cause' is action just in point at the time of fruition. 'Bringing into operation,' means manifestation.

As the context demands, he mentions the opposite theory of the mind having a measure, with the object of refuting it :—'The mind contracts and expands like light in a jar or a place, etc.'

Seeing that action takes place only where the body is found to be, there is no authority for the existence of the mind at any place outside the body. The mind further is not atomic in size, because in that case it would mean the simultaneous non-production of the five sorts of sensation when the large cake is devoured. Further there is no justification for adopting the theory that there is a succession in the case of these sensations, and that they are not being felt simultaneously. No such thing is seen. One atomic mind cannot be competent to come into relationship with the sensations located in more places than one. Hence the only theory that remains is that, the mind is of the dimensions of the body it inhabits, like the light of lamp which is confined either to a jar or a palace. Contraction and expansion of the mind in the bodies of an ant and an elephant manifest themselves therein. The opposite theorists thus say that the form, i.e., the dimensions of the mind are the same as those of the body.

The question arises that if it be so, how can it come into contact with the seed and the field? It does not certainly go out of the dead body without any support, to come into contact with the germ and sperm cells in the bodies of the parents, being dependent as it is for its actions upon others. The shadow of a pillar and such other things does not move if the things themselves do not move. Nor do the pictures disappear, when the picture cloth comes in. This being so, there would not be evolution of souls through births and deaths (*Samsâra*).

For this reason he says :—'For this reason the absence of interruption and for that reason *Samsâra* is proper.'

And further, if there were a measure for it like that of the body, then the leaving of the former body and the taking up of the other body would be secured for it, by taking in the interval another body which would serve for it as a vehicle for the intermediate space. It is of course along with this vehicle that it moves in the other body. So also says the *Purâna* :—'The Yama drew out of the body with force the Purusa of the size of

the thumb.' This then is the meaning of the absence of interval (Antara). And for this reason evolution by repeated birth is proper.

Not agreeing with this view, the author states his own theory :—'It is the manifestation alone of the self-existing mind that contracts and expands.' The Āchārya (author) here is the Svayambhu.

The doubt here is that if the mind cannot move into another body without some vehicle to support it on its way, how is it that it enters the intermediate vehicle itself? If another body is posited for that purpose also, then there would be no stopping anywhere. Nor is it possible that the mind should go out of the body along with the intermediary vehicle, because it is understood to take up the intermediary vehicle after it has left the previous body.

In that case let us posit a subtle body, existing permanently from the beginning of creation up to the Great Latency. It would then be that this subtle body would remain in the physical body, and it is along with this that the mind would enter the bodies appropriate to the different regions from the Satyaloka down to the Avichi. It would further be proper to speak of this body as being drawn out, because that being permanent, the difficulty of providing for an interval would also disappear.

But then there is no authority for such a proposition, that a subtle body of this description exists. It is certainly not visible to the senses. Nor can it be inferred as a necessity of evolution by passing from one body to another, because that can be explained even on the theory of the author. As to the verbal authority cited, the texts speak of the being drawn out of the Puruṣa, not of the mind, nor of a subtle body, but of the self. The self, however, the power of consciousness is non-transferable from one place to another. This drawing out, therefore, is to be described as being spoken of in a metaphorical sense. And thus the drawing out of the mind or of consciousness means wherever it may be, the absence of manifestation. It does not mean anything else.

We allow what has been said in the Purāṇas, the Itihāsas and the Smritis about the mind coming after death possess the body of a Preta (departed spirit) and also the release from that Preta body by the performance of the ceremonies of Sapiṇḍikarana, etc. But we do not submit to that body being the intermediary vehicle. There is no authority in the Vedas for the existence of such an intermediary vehicle. What happens is that the mind takes up the body of a Preta, and is therein taken away by the men of Yama; not that this body serves as the intermediary vehicle. For this reason, the mind being of the nature of the principle of individuality, and that principle like Akāśa in all the three worlds, the mental principle is all-pervading.

If this be so, then its functioning also must be all-pervading, and this would mean that the mind is omniscient. For this reason, has it been said, that the manifestation alone of this all-pervading principle is liable to contract or expand.

Let us grant that, but then how is it that the contraction and expansion of the manifestation of the mind take place only now and then. For this reason he says :—'And the mind has need of virtue and vice.'

Divides the cause of the manifestation :—'And the cause is two-fold.'

By the, 'etc.,' in body, &c., the senses and wealth, &c., are meant.

'Faith, &c.' :—Here too energy, memory, &c., are to be understood.

Mentions the consensus of opinion of the Āchāryas, on the question of intermediation :—'As has been said.'

Vihāra means activity (Vyāpāra).

The 'highest virtue' means the white Karma.

'Of the two' :—Out of the internal and external.

Knowledge and desirelessness : —The Dharma born of these is understood here.

By what? This means by what Dharma brought about by external means. It is knowledge and desirelessness alone that overpower these, i.e., destroy their seed-power. This is the meaning.

He mentions in this case the well-known illustration.—‘The Dandaka forest empty.’—10.

Sûtra 11.

हेतुफलाश्रयालम्बनैः संगृहीतत्वादेषामभावे तदभावः ॥ ११ ॥

हेतु Hetu, cause. फल Phala, motive. आश्रय Âśraya, substratum. आलम्बन Âlambana, object by all these four. संगृहीतत्वात् Samgrihîtatvât, being held together. एषाम् Esâm, of these. अभावे Abhâve, on the disappearance. तद् Tad, of them. अभावः Abhâvah, disappearance.

11. Being held together by Cause, Motive, Substratum and Object they disappear on-the-disappearance of these.—171.

**हेतुफलाश्रयालम्बनैः संगृहीतत्वादेषामभावे तदभावः । हेतुर्धर्मात्सुखमधर्माद्दुःखम् । सुखाद्रागो दुःखाद् द्वेषस्ततश्च प्रथक्षस्तैन मनसा वाचा कायेन वा परिस्पन्दमानः परम-
नुगृह्णात्युपहन्ति वा ततः पुनर्धर्माधर्मौ सुखदुःखे रागद्वेषाविति । प्रवृत्तमिदं षडक्षरं
संसारचक्रमस्य च प्रतिक्षणमावर्तमानस्याविद्या नेत्री मूलं सर्वक्षेत्रानामित्येष हेतुः ।
फलं तु यमाश्रित्य यस्य प्रत्युत्पन्नता धर्मादेः । नह्यपूर्वोपजनः । मनस्तु साधिकारमाश्रयो
वासनानाम् । नह्यवसिताधिकारे मनसि निराश्रया वासनाः स्थातुमुत्सहन्ते । यदभिमुखी-
भूतं वस्तु यां वासनां व्यनक्ति तस्यास्तदालम्बनम् । एवं हेतुफलाश्रयालम्बनैरेतैः संगृ-
हीताः सर्वा वासनाः । एषामभावे तत्संश्रयाणामपि वासनानामभावः ॥ ११ ॥**

VYÂSA.

The cause :—By virtue comes pleasure, by vice pain. From pleasure comes attachment; from pain aversion. Thence comes effort. Thereby, acting by mind, body and speech, one either favours or injures others. Thence come again virtue and vice, pleasure and pain, attachment and aversion. Thus it is that revolves the six-spoked wheel of the world. And the driver of this wheel is Nescience, the root of the afflictions. This is the Cause.

Motive or Fruit is that with a view to which appropriate virtue, &c., is brought about. There is no non-sequential manifestation.

The Substratum is the mind which has yet a duty to perform. It is there that the residua live. They no longer care to live in a mind which has already performed its duty; their substratum is gone.

The Object (âlambana) of the residua is the substance which when placed in contact calls them forth.

Thus are all the residua held together by Cause, Fruit, Substratum and Object.

When these exist not, the residua which depend upon them for existence, disappear too.—171.

VACHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now if these mental modifications and the residua are without beginning, how can they be destroyed? The power of consciousness which is eternal is not destroyed. For this reason he says:—‘Being held together by Cause, Fruit, Substratum and Object, they disappear in the absence of these.’

It is observed that those that have no beginning are also destroyed. Take, for example, the case of futurity. The proposition, therefore, fails and is no proof. The power of consciousness is not destroyed, because there is cause which might cause its destruction, not because it has no beginning. And the aphorism too mentions the causes of the destruction of the residua although they are without a beginning. Kindness and injury too point to the causes of virtue and vice, &c. By this the use of spirituous liquors, &c., is also understood.

He mentions the reason thereof:—‘The root of the afflictions, &c.’

‘Is brought about’ means that it is present. It does not mean that the substance virtue is produced.

Mention reason thereof:—‘There is no, &c.’

‘With a view to which’ means the substance which is in front, contact with the beloved, &c. The meaning of the aphorism is that, in the absence of the pervader the pervaded is absent.—11.

Sûtra 12.

अतीतानागतं स्वरूपतोऽस्त्यध्वभेदाद्वर्मणाम् ॥ १२ ॥

अतीत Atîta, the past. अनागतं Anâgatam, the future. स्वरूपतः Svarûpataḥ, in reality. अस्ति Asti, exist. अध्व Adhva, of the paths of being. भेदात् Bhedât, there being difference. वर्मणम् Dharmâṇam, of the characteristics.

12. The past and the future exist in-reality, there being difference of the paths of being of the characteristics.—172.

नास्त्यसतः सम्भवः । न चात्पत्ति सतो विनाशा इति द्रव्यत्वेन सम्भवन्त्यः कथं निवर्त्तिष्यन्ते वासना इति । अतीतानागतं स्वरूपतोऽस्त्यध्वभेदाद्वर्मणाम् । भविष्यद्वयक्तिकमनागतमनुभूतव्यक्तिकमतीतं स्वव्यापारोपारुदं वर्तमानं त्रयं चैतद्वस्तु ज्ञानस्य ज्ञेयम् । यदि चैतत्स्वरूपतो नाभविष्यन्तेदं निविष्यन्तं ज्ञानमुदपत्स्यत तस्मादतीतानागतं स्वरूपतोऽस्तीति । किंच भेदागमागीयस्य वा पर्वग्नभागीयस्य वा कर्मणः फलमुत्पित्सु यदि निरूपात्यमिति तदुद्देशेन तेन निमित्तेन कुशलानुष्ठानं न युज्येत । सतश्च फलस्य निमित्तं वर्तमानीकरणे समर्थं नापूर्वोपजनने सिद्धं निमित्तं नैमित्तिकस्य विशेषानुग्रहं कुरुते नापूर्वमुत्पादयतीति । धर्मी चानेकधर्मस्वभावतस्य चाध्वभेदेन धर्मा प्रत्यवस्थिताः । न च यथावर्तमानं व्यक्तिविशेषपञ्चं द्रव्यतोऽस्त्येवमतीतमनागतं च । कथं तर्हि स्वेनैव व्यज्ञयेन स्वरूपेणानागतमस्ति स्वेन चानुभूतव्यक्तिकेन स्वरूपेणातीतमिति । वर्तमानस्यैवाध्वनः स्वरूपव्यक्तिरिति । न सा भवत्यतीतानागतयोरध्वनोरेकस्य चाध्वनः समये द्वावध्वानौ धर्मसमन्वाग्नै भवत एवेति नाभूत्वा भावस्थायाणामस्वानामिति ॥ १२ ॥

VYÂSA.

There is no existence for that which exists not, and no destruction for what exists. How then can residua which exist as substances be destroyed? 'The past and the present exist in reality, there being difference of the paths of being of the characteristics.'

The future is the manifestation which is to be. The past is the appearance which has been experienced. The present is that which is in active operation. It is this three-fold substance which is the object of knowledge. If they did not exist in reality, there would not exist the knowledge thereof. How could there be knowledge in the absence of anything that might be known. For this reason the past and the present exist in reality. Further, if the fruit of either the actions which cause experience, or those which cause absolute freedom were impossible of being defined for the aspirer, the actions of the wise with that aim and object would not be proper. And the means has the power of only bringing into the present state the actually existing though as yet unmanifested fruit, not of creating it anew. The means when in full manifestation specifically favours the sequential manifestation of its object; it does not create it anew.

Besides, the substratum exists as characterized by more characteristics than one; and its characteristics have a distinct order of existence in consequence of the distinctions of the paths of being.

It is not that the past and the future states of the object exist in substance in the same sense in which the specific appearance of the present exists. How then? The future exists as an appearance in itself to be manifested. The past exists by an appearance of its own which has been experienced. The present path of being alone is that which shows its own appearance as such. The same does not happen with reference to the past and the future paths of being. Of course at the time of one of these paths of being, the others remain conjoined with the substratum. Hence the existence of the three paths of being does not come out of non-existence.—172.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

With the object of introducing the next aphorism the Commentator expresses a doubt:—'There is no existence for the non-existing, &c.'

There is no existence for the non-existent:—This may either be taken as a necessary sequence of the preceding, or, it may be taken as having been introduced anew as an illustration.

'The past and the future really exist, there being difference of the paths of being of the characteristics.'

The non-existent is not born and the existent is not destroyed. The meaning of the aphorism is that the change of the path of being of the existing characteristics alone

means the rise and disappearance of the characteristics. The appearance which has been experienced, means the appearance which it has taken up already, or in other words, that of which there is no manifestation in the present. Thus the characteristic is existent in all three times.

He says this :—‘ If they did not exist in reality, &c. The non-existent does not become the object of knowledge : it is therefore indefinable.

Knowledge is but the shining out of its object in consciousness. It cannot exist in the absence of the object. Whether it be the knowledge of the Yogî which has all the three times for its sphere of operation, or the knowledge of men like ourselves, it cannot be born in the absence of the object. But the knowledge is born. For this reason, the knowledge of him who feels that the past and the future ordinarily exist along with the present, is said to be a reason for the existence of the object itself.

Now he says that even on account of its being the aim (the object of action) the yet unmanifested exists :—‘ Further, the fruit of either the action which causes experience, &c.’

The wise are those who can distinguish. And even in the case of what is to be done, whatever may be the cause of whatever, becomes specialized in case of the existence of the object alone. As is the case with the farmer and the student of the Veda, so is the case here. They do not certainly create non-existing things. Similarly, the potter, &c., are the causes of the coming into present existence of the jar which already exists. He says this :—‘ And the means has only the power of bringing the future into present existence, &c.’ If, however, the past and the future do not exist because they do not exist in the present, why then, the present also does not exist, because it does not exist in the past and the future. The existence of all the three, however, is unqualified, on account of there being no specialization of the substratum, and the paths of being. With this object he says :—‘ Besides a substratum exists, &c.’

Have a distinct order of existence :—This means that each exists established in itself.

In reality : means the real object, the substratum.

If the past and the future did not exist as such in the past and the future, they would not exist even in the present, because then, they would be nothing in reality. For this reason he says :—‘ Of course at the time of one of these paths of being, &c.’

He summarizes the subject :—‘ Hence the existence of the three paths of being, &c.’—12.

Sûtra 13.

ते व्यक्तसूक्ष्मा गुणात्मानः ॥ १३ ॥

ते Te, they. व्यक्त Vyakta, manifested. सूक्ष्मा: Sûkṣmâḥ, and subtle. गुणात्मानः Gunâ-Âtmânah, and of the nature of the (आत्मन्) qualities (गुण).

13. They are manifested and subtle, and of the nature of the qualities.—173.

ते व्यक्तसूक्ष्मा गुणात्मानः । ते खल्वर्मी व्यध्वानो धर्मा वर्तमाना व्यक्तात्मानोऽती-
तानागताः सूक्ष्मात्मानः पडविशेषरूपाः । सर्वमिदं गुणानां सन्निवेशविशेषमात्रमिति ।
परमार्थतो गुणात्मानस्तथा च शास्त्रानुशासनम् । गुणानां परमं रूपं न हृषिपथमृच्छति ।
यत्तु हृषिपथं प्राप्तं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकमिति ॥ १३ ॥

VYÂSA

They, i.e., these characteristics which are possessed of the three paths of being, are of the nature of the manifested, when they exist in

the present, and are of the nature of the subtle when they passed into the past or are yet unmanifested. They are the six unspecialized appearances. All this is but the specific arrangement of the 'qualities.' In truth, therefore, they are of the nature of the 'qualities.' So teaches the Sâstra :—'The real appearance of the qualities does not come within the line of vision. That, however, which comes within the line, is but paltry delusion.'—173.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Let that be. This detail, however, of the differences of the world which puts forth the appearance of the changes of the characterized, the characteristic, the secondary quality and condition in many ways, is not capable of appearance from one Mûlaprakṛiti. For this reason says :—They are manifested and subtle and of the nature of the 'qualities.' They, the characteristics possessed of the three paths of being, are both manifested and subtle, and they are of the nature of the qualities. There is nothing beyond the three qualities. The variety of manifestation is due to the variety which comes in sequence of the eternal miseries and their residua which they have given birth to.

As has been said in the Vâyu Purâna :—This change of the Pradhâna is wonderful on account of showing forth all appearances. It is the six unspecialized manifestations, which in such a way as it may be, constitute the past, the present and the future of the manifested Prithvî, &c., and of the eleven instruments of action, sensation and thought.

Now describes the eternal appearance of the universe, with the object of dividing the appearances thereof into the eternal and the non-eternal : All this is but the specific appearance of the 'qualities.' The meaning is that evolutionary changes which are visible, consist of different arrangements and forms. On this subject is the teaching of the Sâstra possessed of sixty Tantras.

'Is but paltry delusion':—This means that it is paltry as if it were delusion, not that it is delusion and nothing else. Paltry means destructible. As delusion changes even in a day, so also the modifications possessing the characteristics of manifestation and disappearance assume other appearances every second. The Prakṛiti is possessed of the characteristic of eternity, and in this way is different from the Mâyâ, it is so far real.—13.

Sûtra 14.

परिणामैकत्वाद्वस्तुतत्त्वम् ॥ १४ ॥

परिणामं Pariṇâma, of modification. एकत्वात् Ekatvât, on account of the unity. वस्तु Vastu, of the object. तत्त्वम् Tattvam, the reality.

14. The reality of the object on account of the unity of modification.—174.

यदा तु सर्वे गुणाः कथमेकः शब्द एकमिन्द्रियमिति । परिणामैकत्वाद्वस्तुतत्त्वम् । प्रस्थाक्रियास्थितिशीलानां गुणानां ग्रहणात्मकानां करणभावेनैकः परिणामः । श्रोत्रमिन्द्रियं ग्राह्यात्मकानां शब्दतन्मात्रभावेनैकः परिणामः शब्दो विषय इति । शब्दादीनां मूर्ति-समानज्ञातीयानामेकः परिणामः पृथिवीपरमाङ्गुस्तन्मात्रावयवस्तेषां चैकः परिणामः पृथिवीगौवृक्षः पर्वत इत्येवमादिभूतान्तरेष्वपि स्नेहैष्वाग्रलाभित्वाद्वकाशदानान्युपादाय सामा-

न्यमेकविकारारम्भः समाधेयः । नास्त्यर्थो विज्ञानविसहचरः । अस्ति तु ज्ञानमर्थविसहचरं स्वप्रादौ कल्पितमित्यनया दिशा ये वस्तुस्वरूपमपहृते ज्ञानपरिकल्पनामात्रं वस्तु । स्वप्रविषयोपमं तु न परमार्थतोऽस्तीति ये आहुस्ते तथैति । प्रत्युपस्थितमिदं स्वमाहात्म्येन वस्तु कथमप्रमाणात्मकेन विकल्पज्ञानबलेन वस्तुस्वरूपमुत्सृज्य तदेवापलपत्तः श्रद्धेयवचनाः स्युः ॥ १४ ॥

VYÂSA.

When all are 'qualities,' how is it that one modification is sound and the other the sense? 'The reality of the object on account of unity of modification.' One modification of the qualities possessed of the nature of illumination, activity and inertia, and being of the nature of an instrument, appears in the shape of organs. This is the sense of hearing. Another modification of the 'qualities' appears in the objective state as the soniferous ultimate atom (*Sabda Tanmâtra*). This is the object sound.

The atom of *Prithvî* is a modification of sound, &c., existing along with the generic quality of form (*mûrti*). It is a portion of the *Tanmâtra*. Single modifications of these atoms are the earth, the cow, the tree, the hill and so forth. In the case of other elements also, taking up the generic qualities of smoothness, temperature, impulsion and space, single modifications are to be understood by meditation.

There is no object not co-existent with ideas. There are, however, ideas, which are not co-existent with objects, such as those that are fancied in dreams.

There are people who try to do away with the reality of objects by this reasoning, saying that objects are but the fabrications of the mind, like the fancies of a dream, and that they are nothing real. The objective world is present by its own power. How is it that they give up the objective world on the strength of imaginative cognition, and even then go on talking nonsense about it? How is it possible to have faith in them? —174.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Well there may be this sort of variety of modification of the three qualities. But how is a single modification brought about in the shape of any one element, say the *Prithvî* or the *Apas*. This unity is contradicted by its nature. With this doubt the author introduces the aphorism :—'The reality of the object on account of the unity of modification.' A single modification of more than one is also observed. That as follows :—The cow, the horse, the buffalo, the elephant, all of them modify into a single substance, the salt, when they are thrown into a mine of salt. Wick, oil and fire change into a lamp. In this way, although the qualities are more than one, a single modification does take place. For this reason, the *Tanmâtra*, the elements and the objects made of the elements have each a real unity.

In the case of instrumental appearances, being as they are the effects of the principle of individuality, and possessed as they are of the nature of illumination on account of the preponderance of the quality of essentiality (*Sattva*), the modification is a single one in

the shape of an organ, such as the organ of hearing. Of the same qualities, another single modification in the shape of Tanmâtra is sound, the object, when they appear as objective phenomena, in the shape of non-intelligent appearances with the quality of Tamas preponderating.

Sound, the object :—Sound here means the soniferous ether (tanmâtra). The word 'object' (viśaya) signifies non-intelligence, because the tanmâtra cannot possibly become the object of sensation. The rest is easy.

Now brings in the Vaisesika with his idealistic theory :—'There is no object which is not co-existent with an idea.'

If the elements and physical objects be something different from mere ideation, then it may be that such a Prakṛiti be put up as the cause of their production. They are not, however, different from ideas in reality. How is it then that the Pradhâna is put up as a cause? How is it again that the instrumental appearances are fancied to exist as the modifications of the principle of individuality? Thus seeing that a non-intelligent object is not self-illuminative, it does not exist unless it co-exist with the idea. Co-existence means relation. The denial of co-existence means its absence. The meaning is that without coming into relationship with the idea it is of no use in practice. The idea, however, exists without being co-existent with the object, because it is self-illuminative. It can exist as its own field of knowledge. It does not stand in need of a non-intelligent object in practice. These are the two rules that are brought to notice by idealistic philosophers as going along with knowability. They are applied thus :—That which is known by any act of knowledge, does not differ therefrom, in the same way as knowledge does not differ from the Self. And the elements and the physical phenomena thereof are known by an act of knowledge. This leads to a knowledge of the pervaded which contradicts it. Knowability as it is seen, is pervaded by similarity, which contradicts the difference to be denied, bringing into consciousness the similarity which pervades itself, it does away with the difference which contradicts it. Thus :—That which is perceived with something else always invariably, does not differ from it. Just as one moon does not differ from another moon. And an object is invariably perceived together with the idea. This knowledge is perceived as being contradictory of the pervader. It contradicts the rule of the pervader consisting of the difference to be denied. This rule does away with arbitrariness, and brings into consciousness the difference which consists in the pervaded.

Let it be. If the object is not different from the idea, how is it that it looks as if it were different. For this reason he says :—' Fancied &c.' As say the Vainasikas :—There is no difference on account of the rule of coincident perception. The difference between the yellow and the blue, &c., and their ideas, is brought about by delusive cognitions.

Explains the nature of the fancy :—' An object is merely an ideation,' &c. Refutes :—' How is it possible, &c.' This is connected with the words ' have faith in them.'

' Is present as contradictory knowledge' :—How is it present? ' In the way, &c.' In whatever way it shines as being the meaning of the word ' this,' in the same way it is present by its own power.

Now he shows that the object is the cause of the idea :—' Inasmuch as the object has given birth to the idea thereof by the power of its own perceptibility, it is not for this reason the perceiver of the object. Such a real object cannot be done away with by the unauthoritative force of imaginative cognitions. Inasmuch as imagination is unauthoritative, its power also is unauthoritative, because the power is of the same nature with it.'

' The giving up of the objective world thereby' means ignoring it as if it were removed from sight.

In some places the reading is 'Upagrihyate' in place of 'Utsriyate.' The meaning is the same in either case. They ignore the existence of the outside world, and yet go on talking about it. How can there be faith in them? The meaning here is this. The causes which have been mentioned, i. e., invariable coincident perception and knowability, are not final, because application to the canon of difference is doubtful. Further the externality and the grossness which are perceived to exist in the elements and the physical phenomena thereof, which possess the forms of the ideas, are not possible of existence in the case of ideas themselves. Because externality means being related to separate space. Grossness means the pervading of more portions of space than one. It is not possible that one idea may exist in more places than one, and also exist in a place separated from itself. When a certain thing exists in a certain place, there cannot exist in the same place, something else characterized by a quality opposite to the characteristic of being present in the same place. If it were possible the three worlds themselves would become but one.

It may be said, let then there be difference of ideas. If this be so, whence does this consciousness of grossness come in the case of notions, whose sphere of operations is very subtle, and which do not know of the existence and operation of each other, and which are only in relation to their own sphere of operation only. There should be no high talk about its being the sphere of imagination only because there is in that case no contact and because the reflection is very clear. Further the gross has never been made the object of thought, so that the idea qualified thereby may be clearly perceived, even though at the back of it there may exist imaginative cognition. Further imagination is not confined to the knowledge of the thing itself as it exists in its own sphere, in the same way as knowledge free from the taint of imagination is. Further as imagination is not gross, it is not proper that it should be acting in the sphere of the gross. Therefore it is not possible that in the external cause there should be perceived grossness and externality, and hence it should be considered to be false. And the false is not inseparable from the idea, because if it were, the idea itself would become contemptible like the false, on account of its not comprehending everything. Further knowability being not pervaded by identity, how can it be the opposite of difference (bheda). As to the rule of coincidence of perception of the idea and of grossness, it is capable of explanation like that of the Sat and the Asat (the existent and the non-existent) either by their nature or by obstruction from some cause, even though both of them exist independently. Hence these two arguments are not complete, and are therefore merely false similitudes of arguments, and they merely give rise to an imaginary conception of the non-existence of the external. Further the power of perception cannot be done away with by mere imagination. It is therefore well said, 'How do they give up the objective world on the strength of imaginative cognitions?'

By this also stands refuted the assertion that notions may be generated without there being any actual basis for them, as in the case of dream cognitions.

The imaginative creation of the thing to be known, has been refuted by establishing the existence of the substratum, the whole as being independent of the parts. Details will be found in the Nyâya-Kanika. More details need not be entered into here.—14.

Sûtra 15.

वस्तुसाम्ये चित्तभेदात्तयोर्विभक्तः पन्थाः ॥ १५ ॥

वस्तु Vastu, in the case of the external object. **साम्ये** Sâmye, in the being the same. **चित्त** Chitta, of mentality. **भेदात्** Bhedât, there being difference. **तयोः** Tayoh, their. **विभक्तः** Vibhaktah, different. **पन्थाः** Panthâḥ, ways of being.

15. There being difference of mentality in the case of the external-object being the same, their ways-of-being are different.—175.

कुतद्वैतदन्यायम् । वस्तुसाम्ये चित्तभेदात्तयोर्विभक्तः पन्थाः । बहुचित्तालम्ब-
नीभूतमेकं वस्तु साधारणं तत्खलु नैकचित्परिकल्पितं नाप्यनेकचित्परिकल्पितं किंतु
स्वप्रतिष्ठम् । कथं वस्तुसाम्ये चित्तभेदाद्वर्मपेक्षं चित्तस्य वस्तुसाम्येऽपि सुखज्ञानं भव-
त्यधर्मपेक्षं तत एव दुःखज्ञानमविद्यापेक्षं तत एव मूढज्ञानं सम्यग्दर्शनापेक्षं तत एव
माध्यस्थ्यज्ञानमिति । कस्य तच्चित्तेन परिकल्पितम् । न चान्यकल्पितेन चित्तेनार्थेनान्यस्य
चित्तोपरागो युक्तस्तस्माद्वस्तुज्ञानयोर्ग्राह्यग्रहणभेदभिन्नयोर्विभक्तः पन्थाः । नानयोः सङ्क-
रणन्धोऽप्यस्तीति । साङ्कृत्यपक्षे वस्तु पुनर्खिगुणं चलं च गुणवृत्तमिति । धर्मादिनि-
मित्तापेक्षं चित्तैरभिसम्बन्धते निमित्तानुरूपस्य च प्रत्ययस्योत्पद्यमानस्य तेन तेनात्मना
हेतुर्भवति । केचिदाहुः । ज्ञानसहभूरेवार्थो भोग्यत्वात्सुखादिवदिति । त एतया द्वारा
साधारणत्वं बाधमानाः पूर्वोत्तरक्षणेषु वस्तुस्वरूपमेवापहृवते ॥ १५ ॥

VYÂSA.

And how otherwise is it untrue? ‘There being difference of mentality in the case of the external object being the same, their ways of being are different.’

One thing coming within the sphere of many minds is common to them all. It has certainly not been imagined by one mind. Nor yet has it been imagined by more minds than one. It is established in itself. How is this? There being difference of mentality when the external object is the same. Even though the external object be the same the mind feels pleasure on account of virtue. The same object excites a feeling of pain on account of vice. The same causes forgetfulness on account of Nescience. The same causes the feeling of indifference on account of right knowledge. Now by whose mind has all that been imagined? Further it is not proper that another mind be coloured by an object which has been imagined by another. For this reason the lines of existence of the external objects and the ideas are different, as they exist as objective and instrumental appearances. There is not even the least suspicion of confusion between them.

Further in the Sâṅkhya philosophy, an object is made of the three qualities, and the functioning of the qualities is ever changeful. The object comes into relationship with the minds on account of the exciting causes of virtue, &c.; and it becomes the cause of the notions as they are produced, each as such, in accordance with the exciting causes.

Some say that the object is co-existent with the idea, inasmuch as it is to be enjoyed thereby like the feelings of pleasure and pain. They

do away by means of this conception, the common nature of the object with reference to minds, and this but do away with the being of the object in previous and subsequent moments.—175.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Having now mentioned the reasons for believing that the object is different from and independent of the idea, the Commentator now introduces another reason given in the aphorism to establish the same:—And how otherwise is it untrue?

'There being difference of mentality, even though the external object remains the same, their paths of existence are different.' When a certain thing remains the same although the other changes into many states, they both differ from each other altogether. As the one idea of Chaitra differs from the different ideas of Devadatta, Viṣṇumitra and Maitra, and although the ideas are different the object remains the same, the object must be different from the idea. And the identity of the object even in the case of the difference of ideas, is ascertained by the knowers by comparison of notes. If one woman is beloved, hated, ignored and approached with indifference by many different people, they can always compare notes that the object of all these varying feelings is the same. For this reason, there being difference of mentality, i. e. of feeling, the paths of being of the two, i. e., of the object and the idea, are different. The path of being means that by which one thing differs from another in nature. The lover feels pleasure in the society of the beloved. The co-wife feels pain. Chaitra who has not been able to possess her, feels disappointed and forgets himself.

Let it be so. But wherever an object in the shape of a beautiful woman has been fancied by the mind of one man, the minds of others also admit of being coloured by the same fancied object, and it is for this reason that the object even though fancied, becomes the common object of all the minds.

For this reason says:—'It is not proper that the object fancied by one mind, &c.' If that were so, then in case one of them possessed the knowledge of blue, all would come to possess the knowledge of the blue.

The question arises that inasmuch as there is but one object in the opinion of those, who believe in the independent existence of objects, how is it that one object becomes the cause of different feelings of pleasure and pain, &c. It is not proper that the cause remaining the same, the effects should be different. For this reason says:—'In the case of the Sâṅkhya philosophy, &c.' Even a single external object changing according to the three qualities, admits of three-fold appearance. But in this way too, all without distinction would have the three-fold knowledge of pleasure, pain and forgetfulness with reference to the same object. For this reason says:—'Depends upon the operative causes of virtue, &c.' The Sattva together with the Rajas gives birth to the feeling of pleasure which depends upon virtue. The same Sattva when free of the Rajas, creates the feeling of indifference which depends upon knowledge. And these virtues, &c., do not exist, all of them, in all the Puruṣas everywhere. It is only any one of them that exist anywhere at any time. Therefore the difference is proper.

Some talkers say on this subject:—'The object certainly co-exists with the idea, because it is enjoyable by the Puruṣa like pleasure and pain. The meaning is this. Let an object be different from the idea. Still it being non-intelligent, does not admit of being known without the idea. The idea it is that illuminates it. Similarly it exists at the time of being known only. It cannot be said to be existing at any other time, because there is no authority for its existence at a time when it is not the object of immediate knowledge.'

This the Commentator refutes without the help of the aphorism :—‘They by this, &c., An object is certainly common to all minds. It keeps on being cognized for a succession of more moments than one as possessed of the characteristic of change. If that co-exists with the idea, it will be thus, it is such. Now what check is there upon the portion ‘It, that this may not disappear too ?—15.

Sûtra 16.

न चैकचित्ततन्त्रं चेद्वस्तु तत्प्रमाणकं तदा किं स्यात् ॥ १६ ॥

न Na, not. च Cha, and. एकचित्त Eka-chitta, on one mind. तन्त्र Tantram, dependent. चेद् Ched, if. वस्तु Vastu, an object. तत् Tat, by that. प्रमाणकम् Pramâṇakam, to be cognized by that. तदा Tadâ, then. किम् Kim, what (only to denote the question). स्यात् Syât, would it exist.

16. And if an object dependent upon one mind were not cognized by that, would it then exist ?—176.

न चैकचित्ततन्त्रं चेद्वस्तु तत्प्रमाणकं तदा किं स्यात् । एकचित्ततन्त्रं चेद्वस्तु स्यात्तदा चित्ते व्यग्रे निरुद्धे वा स्वरूपमेव तेनापरामृष्टमन्यस्याविषयीभूतमप्रमाणकमगृहीतस्य भावकं केनचित्तदानां किं न स्यात् । सम्बद्धमानं वा पुनश्चित्तेन कुत उत्पद्येत ये चास्यानुपस्थिता भागास्ते चास्य न स्युरेवं नात्ति पृष्ठमित्युदरमपि न गृह्णेत तस्मात्स्वतन्त्रोऽर्थः सर्वपुरुषसाधारणः स्वतन्त्राणि च चित्तानि प्रतिपुरुषः प्रवर्तन्ते तयाः सम्बन्धादुपलब्धिः पुरुषस्य भेदं इति ॥ १६ ॥

VYÂSA.

If an object were dependent upon the mind, then in case the mind were restrained, or attending to some other object, the object would not be touched thereby, nor would it come into objective relationship with any other mind. It would not be cognized, i. e., its nature would not be taken in, by any mind. Will it cease to exist at the time ? Or, coming into relationship again with the mind, whence would it come back to life ?

Further the parts of an object which are not in contact with the mind, would not exist. Thus there would be no back, and how could then there be the front itself ? For this reason, the object is self-dependent, and common to all the Purusas. Minds also are self-dependent. They come into relationship with the Purusas. By their relationship is secured perception, which is enjoyment (bhoga).—176.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Or, there may not be this disappearance of a portion ; let the object be co-existent with the idea. On this also says :—‘And if an object dependent upon one mind were not cognized by that, would it then exist ? If the mind which cognizes a jar, does not at any time turn towards it on account of attention being directed towards a cloth, or if an object having been the object of discrimination the mind thereby becomes restrained, then the idea of the jar and the knowledge of discrimination would not be in existence at the time.

and the jar and the knowledge being dependent for their existence upon the co-existence of the idea thereof in the mind, would no doubt cease to exist. Says this :—‘ One mind, &c.’

‘ Would it then exist ? :’—Means it would not exist.

Further coming into relationship with the mind, how would the jar or the discrimination be born again. Effects have constant causes and lead to them invariably by both the canons of agreement and difference. Effects cannot be born from causes other than their own appropriate causes. In the absence of the cause there would be no occasion for their existence. For, is it proper that an object being the cause of the knowledge thereof, it should also be the cause of itself ? If this were so, then the sweets which one might be expecting to get, and the sweets which one might be really using, would be equally placed with reference to taste, strength and digestion. It has therefore been well said :—‘ If it come into relationship with the mind, &c.’

Further the front portion of any object is always pervaded by the middle and posterior parts, i. e., it cannot exist without the simultaneous existence of the middle and posterior parts. If the existence of an object depended upon being perceived, then the middle and posterior parts would not exist, and thus on account of the cessation of pervasion the front part also would cease to exist. The object itself would not thus be in existence, how then would it be in existence along with the idea itself ? Says this :—‘ The portions thereof which are in contact, &c.’ Not in contact means not known. Concludes :—‘ For this reason, &c.’ The rest is easy.—16.

Sûtra 17.

तदुपरागापेक्षित्वाच्चित्तस्य वस्तु ज्ञाताज्ञातम् ॥ १७ ॥

तदुपरागा Tad, thereby. उपरागा Uparâga, colouring. अपेक्षित्वात् Apeksitvât, because of the needing. चित्तस्य Chittasya, for the mind, by the mind. वस्तु Vastu, an object. ज्ञात Jñâta, known. अज्ञातम् Ajñâtam, or unknown.

17. The mind needing to be coloured thereby an object may be known or unknown.—177.

VYÂSA.

**तदुपरागापेक्षित्वाच्चित्तस्य वस्तु ज्ञाताज्ञातम् । अयस्कान्तमणिकल्पा विषयाः ।
अयः सधर्मकं चित्तमभिसम्बन्ध्योपरञ्ज्यन्ति येन च विषयेणापरकं चित्तं स विषयो ज्ञात-
स्ततोऽन्यः पुरुषोऽज्ञातः । वस्तुनो ज्ञाताज्ञातस्वरूपत्वात्परिणामि चित्तम् ॥ १७ ॥**

‘ The mind standing in need of being coloured thereby, an object may be known or unknown.’ Objects are in nature similar to that of loadstone ; the mind is similar in characteristic to iron. Objects coming into contact with the mind colour it. Whatever object colours the mind, that object becomes known. That which becomes known is an object. That which is not thus known is the Puruṣa and is unknown. The mind is changeful, because it assumes the natures of known and unknown objects.—77.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Let that be. If the object were self-dependent and also unintelligent, it would never be illuminated. If now it were to become illuminated, its non-intelligence too would disappear. No existence can remain as such when it gives up its nature. Nor is it proper

that the nature of an unintelligent object should receive the illumination of its characteristic by being the receptacle of the action of the senses. Because if it became the characteristic of the object then it would, like the qualities of blueness, &c., be the common attribute of all the Purûshas. This being so, if one man became learned, all would become learned. No one would remain ignorant. Nor is it proper that the present should be characteristic of the past and the yet unmanifested. Hence to say that an object is self-dependent and that it is the sphere for the act of perception is but a wish of the mind. For this reason says :—‘The mind needing to be coloured by contact therewith, an object may be known or unknown.’ Even though an object is by nature non-intelligent, it colours the mind by coming into contact therewith through the passage of the senses, because such is the mirror of the mind, the power of consciousness being reflected into it, enlivens the mind with the colour of the object therein, and thus knows it. It does not however produce any sort of clearness, &c., in the object. Nor is it that the power of consciousness is unrelated to the mind, because it has been said that its reflection passes into it. Although the mind being all-pervading, and the senses being of the nature of the principle of individuality, cannot come into relationship with the object, still the relationship of the object is with the mind which functions in the body. It is for this reason that they have been said to be of the nature of the loadstone, and that the mind possesses a characteristic similar to iron and that they colour it by having come into contact with it through the passage of the senses. Says that it is for this reason that the mind is changeful : ‘On account of the object being known, &c.’—17.

Sûtra 18.

सदा ज्ञाताश्चित्तवृत्तयस्तत्प्रभोः पुरुषस्यापरिणामात् ॥ १८ ॥

सदा Sadâ, always. ज्ञाताः Jñâtâḥ, are known. चित्तवृत्तयः Chitta-vrittayah, the modifications of the mind. तत्प्रभोः Tat-prabhoh, to its lord. पुरुषस्य Purusasya, the Puruṣa. अपरिणामात् Aparinâmât, on account of the unchangeability.

18. To its lord, the Puruṣa, the modifications of the mind are always known on-account-of-unchangeability.—178.

यस्य तु तदेव चित्तं विषयस्तस्य सदा ज्ञाताश्चित्तवृत्तयस्तत्प्रभोः पुरुषस्यापरिणामित्वात् । यदि चित्तवृत्तप्रभुरपि पुरुषः परिणामेतत्स्तद्विषयाश्चित्तवृत्तयः रादादिविषयवज्ञाताज्ञाताः स्युः सदा ज्ञातृत्वं तु मनस्तत्प्रभोः पुरुषस्यापरिणामित्वमनुमापयति ॥ १८ ॥

VYÂSA.

To its lord, the Puruṣa, whose sphere of functioning the mind itself is, mental modifications are ever known, because he is unchangeable. If the lord, Puruṣa, too changes like the mind, the mental modifications too in which it functions would be both known and unknown, like the objects of sound, &c. The mind however is always known to its lord the Puruṣa. By this is inferred its unchangeability.—178.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Having thus established the mind and the object to be separate from each other, the author now reads the aphorism, filling up the omissions, with the object of showing that

the self is different from those changeful objects and that the characteristic of the Puruṣa is unchangeability, which is the opposite of the characteristic of the objects and the mind. 'To the lord, Puruṣa, whose sphere of functioning the mind itself is, &c.' The modifications of the mind are always known to the Puruṣa, because he is unchangeable. The mind with its modifications is always followed by the Puruṣa in all its modifications of the wandering, the distracted, the one-pointed, up to the state of inhibition. By what reason then is the Puruṣa, unchangeable? 'If the Puruṣa were unchangeable, it would both be known and unknown like the mind (chitta). It is however always known. It is therefore unchangeable and for this reason differs from other changeable objects. Says this:—'If the lord Puruṣa changed, &c.' The lord who is the enjoyer of the mind knows it constantly along with its modifications. This fact establishes by inference the unchangeability of the Puruṣa. Thus the meaning is that this unchangeable Puruṣa is different from the changing mind.—18.

Sūtra 19.

न तत्स्वाभासं हृश्यत्वात् ॥ १६ ॥

न Na, is not. तत् Tat, it. स्वाभासम् Svâbhâsam, self-illuminating. हृश्यत्वात् Driśyatvât, because of its knowability; because it is the knowable.

19. It is not self-illuminating, being the knowable.—179.

स्यादाशङ्का चित्तमेव स्वाभासं विषयाभासं च वैनाशिकाणां चित्तात्मवादिनां च भविष्यतीत्यग्निवत् । न तत्स्वाभासं हृश्यत्वात् । यथेतराणीन्द्रियाणि शब्दादयश्च हृश्यत्वान्न स्वाभासानि तथा मनोऽपि प्रत्येतव्यम् । न चाग्निरत्र हृष्टान्तः । न ह्यग्निरात्म-स्वरूपमप्रकाशं प्रकाशयति । प्रकाशश्चायं प्रकाश्यप्रकाशकसंयोगे हृष्टो न च स्वरूपमात्रेऽस्ति संयोगः । किंच स्वाभासं चित्तमित्यग्राह्यमेव कस्यचिदितिशब्दार्थः । तद्यथा स्वात्मप्रतिष्ठमाकाशमित्यप्रतिष्ठमेवेत्यर्थः । स्वबुद्धिप्रचारप्रतिसंवेदनात्सत्त्वानां प्रवृत्तिर्हृश्यते । क्रुद्धोहं भीतोऽहममुत्र मे रागोऽमुत्र मे क्रोध इत्येतत्स्वबुद्धेरग्रहणेन युक्तमिति ॥१६॥

VYÂSA.

A doubt may arise that the mind itself may be self-illuminating as well as the illuminator of the objects, as in fact it is believed by the Vaiñâśikas to be like fire, which illuminates itself as well as other objects. Therefore says:—'It is not self-illuminating being the knowable.' As the other organs and the object of sound, &c., are not self-illuminative on account of their being knowable, so also should the mind be understood to be. Fire is no analogy here. Fire does not illuminate any form of itself which might have been non-luminous before.' The illumination spoken of here is meant to be the illumination which is brought about by the contact of the luminous and the dark, not of the self-luminous. There can be no contact of anything with its own nature. Further, the statement that the mind is self-illuminating means that it is not perceivable by any other entity. This is in the same way as when it is said that the Ākâsa is self-supporting, it is meant that it has no support at all. Living beings

are seen acting in accordance with the consciousness of the movements of their Will-to-be. 'I am angry,' 'I am afraid,' 'I am attached here,' 'I am repelled there,' these notions are proper only on account of the knowledge of self-identification not being taken in.—179.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Mentions the Vainâsikas :—'A doubt may arise, &c.' This is the meaning. It may be so if the mind be the sphere for the functioning of the Self. The mind however is self-illuminative and it illuminates other objects also as it illuminates itself. How then can it be the sphere for the constant knowledge of the Puruṣa ? How moreover does it in its unchangeability differ from the changeable mind. Therefore, 'It is not self-illuminating, being knowable.' It might be so if the mind were self-illuminating, (self-knowing), but it is not. Being changeable, the mind is pervaded by perceptibility, like the colours of blue, &c. Whatever is pervaded by perceptibility, is not capable of becoming self-illuminative, because the modification contradicts itself. The act and the object cannot both be the same. The cooking is not cooked: the cutting is not cut. The Puruṣa, however, being unchangeable as he is, is not the object of the act of consciousness. In him therefore self-illumination is not improper. His illuminativeness does not depend upon any other, he is self-illuminative and is not the object of the act of consciousness. Hence the mind is the object of the act of knowing on account of its being the knowable ; it is not self-illuminative. The meaning is that because the mind is seized of the reflection of the self the object of its modifications are illuminated.

But the fire is both the knowable and the self-illuminous as a jar, &c., are brought to light by fire not so fire is brought to light by another fire. For this reason says :—Fire is no analogy here. Why not ? 'The fire does not illuminate, &c.' The meaning is that fire may not be brought to light by other fire, but it is illuminated by consciousness. It is thus not illuminated by itself, and for this reason there is no over-lapping (Vyabhichâra). 'The illumination spoken of here, &c.' The words 'spoken of here' differentiate from the illumination which is of the nature of the Puruṣa, the illumination, that is to say, which is of the form of the action. This is intended to be said : Whatever action there may be, it is seen in relation to the subject, the instrument and the object. As cooking is seen in relation to Chaitra, fire and rice, so also illumination. Illumination also is action. This also must therefore be like that. Relation lives in different objects ; it is not possible in the absence of distinction. Further the assertion that the mind is self-illuminating, means that the mind is not perceivable by any other entity.

Let that be. Let the mind be not perceivable by any other entity. The mind would not cease to be if the act of knowing, which is neither its cause, nor its pervade, ceased to be. For this reason he says : 'By the consciousness of the movements of his own Will-to-be.' The Will-to-be is the mind. Its movements are its functionings. Living beings are creatures. The various mental modifications of anger, greed, &c., are felt by each mind for itself, together with their substratum the mind, and also together with their objects. They in this way establish the objectivity of the mind. Renders the consciousness of the movements of the Will to-be plainer :—'I am angry, &c.'—19.

Sûtra 20.

एकसमये चोभयानवधारणम् ॥२०॥

एकसमये Eka-samaye, at the same time. च Cha, and. उभये Ubhaye, of both. अनवधारणम् Anavadhâraṇam, impossibility of being cognised.

20. Nor can both be cognized at the same time.—
180.

एकसमये चाभयानवधारणम् । न चैकसिन्धर्मे स्वपररूपावधारणं युक्तं क्षणिक-
वादिनो यद्भवनं सैव क्रिया तदेव च कारकमित्यभ्युपगमः ॥ २० ॥

VYĀSA.

And it is not proper that in one moment both one's own nature and the nature of other objects may be ascertained. The conception of the advocates of momentary existence however is that acting is the same as being ; and the subject, object, instrument, &c., are the same too.—180.

'And both cannot be cognized at the same time.' To him who says that the mind is both self-illuminating and the illuminator of objects, it cannot of course be possible that the object may be understood at the same time as the self of the mind, and by the same act. An act which is not different from any other is not competent to bring about an effect which is not different. Therefore a difference of function must be recognized. And to the Vaināśikas there is no separation of operation for difference of effects. And it is not possible that there should be a difference of effects brought about by a single birth which is common to all and does not differ from itself.' For this reason the knowledge of the object and the act of knowledge cannot be ascertained in one moment of time. This is what the Commentary renders clear:—'And in one moment of time, &c.' And so the Vaināśikas say:—Whatever is the being of a thing the same is their action and the same the subject object. 'Instrument, &c.' Hence the knowability of the mind is for ever ; and this removes the idea of its being self-illuminating. This also shows that the secr is unchangeable. Thus all is proved.—20.

Sûtra 21.

चित्तान्तरदृश्ये बुद्धिबुद्धेरतिप्रसङ्गः स्मृतिसङ्करश्च ॥२१॥

चित्तान्तरदृश्ये Chittântara-dṛisye, in case of being knowable by another mind. बुद्धि-बुद्धे: Buddhi-Buddheḥ, of the wills to know, the wills to know. अतिप्रसङ्गः Atiprasaṅgah, too many, abundance, superfluity. स्मृति-सङ्करः Smṛiti-Saṅkaraḥ, confusion of memories. च Cha, and.

21. In case of being knowable by another mind, there will be too many wills-to-know the Wills-to-know ; and there will be confusion of memories.—181.

स्यान्मतिः स्वरसनिरुद्धं चित्तं चित्तान्तरेण समनन्तरेण गृह्यत इति । चित्तान्तरे
दृश्ये बुद्धिबुद्धेरतिप्रसङ्गः स्मृतिसङ्करश्च । अथ चित्तं चेद्बुद्धित्तान्तरेण गृह्येत बुद्धि बुद्धिः
केन गृह्यते साप्यन्यया साप्यन्ययेत्यतिप्रसङ्गः स्मृतिसङ्करश्च । यावन्तो बुद्धिबुद्धिनाम-
नुभावास्त्रावत्यः स्मृतयः प्राप्तुवन्ति तत्सङ्कराचैकस्मृत्यनवधारणं च स्यादित्येवं बुद्धि-
प्रतिसंवेदिनं पुरुषमपलपश्चिर्वैनाशिकैः सर्वमेवाकुलीकृतं ते तु भोक्तुस्वरूपं यत्र कवचन
कल्पयन्तो न न्यायेन सङ्कृच्छन्ते । केचित्तु सत्त्वमात्रमपि परिकल्प्यास्ति सस्त्वो य
एतान्पञ्चस्कन्धान्विक्षिप्यान्यांश्च प्रतिसन्दधातीत्युक्त्वा तत एव पुनस्तप्यति तथा स्क-

न्धानं महमिर्वेदाय विरागायानुत्पादाय प्रशान्तये गुरोरन्तिके ब्रह्मचर्यं चरिष्या मीत्युक्त्वा
सत्त्वस्य पुनः सत्त्वमेवापहु वते । साङ्घृत्ययोगादयस्तु प्रवादाः स्वशब्देन पुरुषमेव स्वा-
मिनं चित्तस्य भोक्तारमुपयन्तीति ॥ २१ ॥

VYÂSA.

There may be an opinion that the mind restrained in its own being may be known by another mind just in contact with it. 'In case of being known by another mind there will be too many wills-to-know the Wills-to-know; and there will be confusion of memories.' If the mind be cognized by another mind, by what may the wills-to-know the Wills-to-know be cognized. Even that by another; and that again by another. There will thus be too many of such Wills-to-know. And there will be confusion of memories. As many will be the cognitions of the various Wills-to-be, so many will be the memories. One memory will not be capable of determination on account of their confusion. Thus the Vainâśikas have confused everything by denying the existence of the Puruṣa who knows by reflex action the Will-to-know. Further, they are not logical in imagining as they do, the existence of the Puruṣa in some places. Some there are who say that there does exist a pure being, and that that being throws away the existing five Skandhas and takes up others. Having asserted so much they fight shy again of the same.

Further they say that for the purpose of entirely doing away with the Skandhas, and for securing desirelessness, non-production and calmness, they would go to a teacher and with him live the life of a student. And having said this they begin again to conceal the very existence of that being.

As to the Sâṅkhyayoga theories, they declare by the word SVA (on one's own) applied to the mind that there does exist the lord in the shape of the enjoyer of the mind.—181.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Introduces the Vainâśikas again :—There may be a theory that although the mind may not know itself by its own life, on account of its being objective by nature, yet even that fact does not prove the existence of the self-restrained moment of the mind which generates the next may well be taken in by the last mental moment of its own succession. This is the meaning. 'Another mind just in contact therewith. This other mind is equal in knowledge, and between the two there is nothing else intervening.' Therefore, 'In case of being knowable by another mind, &c.' The Will-to-be stands here for the mind. If the last act of mentality is not itself perceived, it cannot have the power of perceiving the previous act of mentality. It is not proper that the previous Will-to-know should be known without coming into contact with the present Will-to-know itself. No one who does not take hold of the connecting rod can reach the holder of the rod himself. Hence there is a *regrussus ad infinitum*.

The Skandhas are five :—Vijñâna, Vedanâ, Samjñâ, Rûpa and Samskâra.

'The theories of the Sâṅkhyâ yoga, &c.' This means the theories of the Sâṅkhyas and the Yogas and of the Vaiśeśikas, &c., which are preceded by the Sâṅkhyas and the Yogas. The rest is easy.—21.

Sûtra 22.

चित्तेरप्रतिसङ्क्रमायास्तदाकारापत्तौ स्वबुद्धिसंवेदनम् ॥ २२ ॥

चित्तः Chittâḥ, of the consciousness. अप्रतिसंक्रमायाः Apratisamkramâyâḥ, of such as is notable to transform from place to place. तद् Tad, its. आकारापत्तौ Âkârâpattau, by transforming appearance. स्वबुद्धि-संवेदनम् Sva-Buddhi Samvedanam, knowing of. संवेदनम्, its own. स्व, will to be. बुद्धि.

22. Consciousness knows its own Will-to-be by transforming its appearance, though not-itself moving-from place-to-place.—182.

कथम् । चित्तेरप्रतिसङ्क्रमायास्तदाकारापत्तौ स्वबुद्धिसंवेदनम् । अपरिणामिनी हि भेक्तशक्तिरप्रतिसङ्क्रमा च परिणामिन्यर्थं प्रतिसङ्क्रान्तेव तद्वृत्तिमनुपतति तस्याश्च प्राप्तचैतन्योपग्रहस्वरूपाया बुद्धिवृत्तेनुकारमात्रतया बुद्धिवृत्त्यविशिष्टा हि ज्ञानवृत्तिराख्यायते । तथा चैक्तम् । न पातालं न च विवरं गिरीणां नैवान्धकारं कुक्षयो नोदधीनां गुहा यस्यां निहितं ब्रह्म शाश्वतं बुद्धिवृत्तिमविशिष्टां कवयो वेदयन्त इति ॥ २२ ॥

VYĀSA.

How ? 'Consciousness knows its own Will-to-be by transforming its own appearance, though not itself moving from place to place. The power of enjoyment is of course unchanging. It does not also go from place to place. In the changing object it looks as though transferred thereto ; and there it follows its manifestations. And it imitates, as it were, the modifications of the Will-to-be whose form is now enlivened by the consciousness which has entered therein. By that imitation it is called a manifestation or modification of consciousness, without being actually qualified by the modifications of the Will-to-be. This means that it does not at all appear to be different from the modifications thereof.'

And so it has been said :—

Nor nether worlds, nor mountain caves, nor darkness, nor seas, nor ravines are the hollows in which is placed the Eternal Brahma. The wise points out to the modification of the Will-to-be which does not look different from him.—182.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Let that be. If however the mind is not self-illuminative nor knowable by another mind, how should it be enjoyed by the Self himself? For although the Self is no doubt self-illuminating, it does not put forth any action anywhere. Without putting forth any

action he cannot be the actor. Nor can he be the enjoyer of the mind without coming into relationship with the mind through action. That would be going beyond the ordinary rule.

With this in mind puts the question :—‘How?’

Gives the answer by the aphorism :—‘Consciousness knows its own Will-to-be by transforming into its own shape, although not itself moving from place to place.’

What was said before, ‘Identification with modifications elsewhere’ (P. I. 4) has its origin here. The knowing by the Puruṣa of his Will-to-be is achieved when the Will-to-be takes the form of the Puruṣa, i.e., when it takes on the appearance thereof by receiving into itself the reflection of the Puruṣa. Similarly is the case with the moon, when reflected in pure water. Although the moon is not in motion, yet she appears to be in motion on account of the movements of the water, without any action of her own. In the same way without any sort of action on the part of consciousness, the mind in which the reflection of consciousness has taken its place, shows the power of consciousness to be active by its own movements, and makes it appear to be following itself, although in reality it does not follow it. It is by acting in this way that the mind brings about the experience of the Puruṣa and gives him the nature of the enjoyer. This is the meaning of the aphorism. The commentary does not explain the meaning here, because it has explained the same in many places already here and there. The Commentary here describes the meaning of the modifications of consciousness as not being independent of the modifications of the Will-to-be. As has been said :—‘Neither the nether worlds, &c.’ They say that the mental modification in which the reflection of consciousness has made its place is on account of that very reflection, the cave of Brahma, who is pure in nature, eternal and auspicious. It is in that cave alone that the hidden Brahma is to be found. When that is removed, he shines by his own light, there being no obstruction and no defect. This is the case with the revered one who has reached his last body.—22.

Sûtra 23.

द्रष्टुदृश्योपरक्तं चित्तं सर्वार्थम् ॥ २३ ॥

द्रष्टुदृश्योपरक्तम् Draṣṭri-Dṛiśya-Uparaktam, being coloured by उपरक्तम्, the knower (द्रष्टु), and the knowable. दृश्य, चित्तम् Chittam, the mind. सर्वार्थम् Sarvārtham, omni-objective.

23. The mind being coloured by the knower and the knowable is omni-objective (sarvârtha).—183.

अतश्चैतदुपगम्यते । द्रष्टुदृश्योपरक्तं चित्तं सर्वार्थम् । मनो हि मन्तव्येनार्थेनोपरक्तं तत्स्वयं विषयत्वाद्विषयिणा पुरुषेणात्मीयया वृत्त्याभिसम्बद्धं तदेतच्चित्तमेव द्रष्टुदृश्योपरक्तं विषयविषयिनिर्भासं चेतनाचेतनस्वरूपापन्नं विषयात्मकमप्यविषयात्मकमिवाचेतनं चेतनमिव स्फटिकमणिकल्पं सर्वार्थमित्युच्यते । तदनेन चित्तसारूप्येण भ्रान्ताः केचित्तदेव चेतनमित्याहुः । अपरे चित्तमात्रमेवेदं सर्वं नात्ति खल्वयं गवादिर्घटादिश्च सकारणा लोक इति । अनुकम्पनीयास्ते कस्मादस्ति हि तेषां भ्रान्तिबीजं सर्वरूपाकारनिर्भासं चित्तमिति । समाधीप्रज्ञायां प्रज्ञेयोऽर्थः प्रतिबिम्बी भूतस्तस्यालम्बनीभूतत्वादन्यः स चेदर्थश्चित्तमात्रं स्थात्कथं प्रज्ञैव प्रज्ञारूपमवधार्येत तस्मात्प्रतिबिम्बीभूतोऽर्थः प्रज्ञायां येनावधार्यते स पुरुष इति । एवं प्रहीतप्रहणमाहस्वरूपचित्तमेदाश्रयमप्येतज्ज्ञातितः प्रविभजास्ते सम्यग्दर्शिनस्तैरधिगतः पुरुषः ॥ २३ ॥

VYÂSA.

And it is known in this way :—‘The mind being coloured by the knower and the known, is omni-objective.’ The mind is of course coloured by the objects of thought. The mind being itself an object comes into relationship with the subjective Puruṣa through its modification as Self. Thus it is that the mind is coloured by both subjectivity and objectivity, the knower and the knowable ; it assumes the nature of both the conscious and unconscious. Although it is of the very nature of the objective, it appears as if it were of the nature of the subjective. Although it is devoid of consciousness by its nature, it appears as if it were consciousness. Being of the nature of the crystal, it is termed omni-objective.

It is by this similarity of mental appearance that some people are deceived into saying that the mind itself is the conscious agent. There are others again who say that all this is but the mind only and that there is nothing in existence of the objective world, such as the cow or jar, all of which are governed by the law of causation. They are to be pitied. For what reason ? Because they are possessed of a mind which is the cause of confusion, shining forth as it does in the shape of all appearances.

In the case of the trance cognition, the cognizable object is reflected into the mind, and it is different from the trance cognition, because it is the object upon which the act of cognition rests. If that object were the mind alone, how could it be that the phenomenon of cognition would be taken in by the cognition itself. For this reason, he who takes in the object reflected in the mind, is the Puruṣa. Thus those who teach that the knower, the knowable and the means of knowledge are the three modifications of the mind, and thus divide the phenomena into three classes are the only true philosophers. It is to them that the Puruṣa is known.—183.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Thus has been established the existence of the Puruṣa, the unchangeable as a separate entity from the mind which is by nature changeable, being as it is by nature the knowable. Now he gives also the authority of the perceptions of the world to prove the same, ‘And it is known in this way.’ The meaning is that it must be so. ‘The mind coloured by both the knower and the knowable is omni-objective.’ As the mind coloured by the blue and other objects establishes their existence by perception itself, so also coloured by the reflection of the knower into itself, the mind establishes the existence of the knower too by perception. A notion is evidently made up of two percepts ‘I know the blue object.’ Therefore the subject also is of a nature similar to that of the object. Although proved by perception, it is not shown thereby as existing separately from the mind, like the reflection of the moon which is perceived to be quite distinct from the water into which it is reflected. The mental perception of the Self does not cease to be perception merely by this much.

Further inasmuch as the reflection in the water does not exist in reality as a moon it cannot be said that because the reflection is only a reflection and not the substance itself, that therefore the moon herself does not exist. In the same way, although consciousness becomes the objective in its state of mental reflection, it does not so become in its own nature. This is what is meant by the mind being omni-objective. Says this :—‘The mind coloured by the object of thought, &c.’ It is not by the external object alone that the mind is coloured by assuming its shape ; it is coloured by the Puruṣa too. The reflection of the Puruṣa is his, the Self’s manifestation (vritti). This reflection of the Puruṣa is to be accepted by the Vainâśikas also. How ? If this be not so they must fasten the consciousness upon the mind, saying that there is consciousness in the mind. Says so :—‘ Misled by this similarity of the mind, &c.’ There are some Vainâśikas who speak of the existence of an eternal object. There are others who speak of the existence of an idea. The question now is that, if the mind shines forth both as a subject and an object, there must certainly be a difference between the knower and the knowable. As they say :—Although the Self of the Will-to-be is not different, yet those who are given to seeing things separated from each other, see it as possessed of the differences of the concepts of the subjective and the objective. This being the case, how are they to be pitied ? Says for this reason :—‘ In the case of the trance cognition, &c.’ They must be brought round by first convincing them by the above reasoning that the Puruṣa must be something different from the mind, and then bringing them into touch with the trance cognition, which has the self as the sphere of its operation by teaching them the eight branches of Yoga. That is to be done in this way. In the trance cognition the object of knowledge is the Self reflected into the mind. It is different from the real Self, because it becomes the support to that Self (Âtmâ). If he begin to say notwithstanding that he is given the reasons, that the support may be the mind itself, it is said :—If the object which appears as the Self, be the mind itself and nothing different from it, then how is it possible that the mind may be known by the mind itself (the act of knowing that is to say, by the act of knowing itself). It is self-contradictory to speak of the action of a mental modification upon itself. Concludes :—‘ Therefore, &c.’ They are to be pitied and taught the truth. Says this :—‘ In this way, &c.’ Class means nature.

Sûtra 24.

तदसङ्ख्येयवासनाभिश्चित्तमपि परार्थं संहत्यकारित्वात् ॥२४॥

तद् Tad, that. असंख्येय-वासनाभिः Asaṅkheya-Vâsanâbhîḥ, (variegated) by innumerable. (असंख्येय) residua (वासनाभिः). चित्तम् Chittam, mind. अपि Api, also. परार्थम् Parârtham, exists for another. संहत्य-कारित्वात् Sam̄hatya-Kâritvât, because it acts by combination.

24. And the mind exists-for-another, also because it is variegated by innumerable residua, inasmuch as it acts by combination.—184.

कुतश्चैतत् । तदसङ्ख्येयवासनाभिश्चित्तमपि परार्थं संहत्यकारित्वात् । तदेतच्चित्तमसङ्ख्येयाभिर्वासनाभिरेव चित्रीकृतमपि परार्थं परस्य भेगापवर्गार्थं न स्वार्थं संहत्यकारित्वाद् गृहवत्संहत्यकारिणा चित्तेन न स्वार्थेन भवितव्यं न सुखं चित्तं सुखार्थं न ज्ञानं ज्ञानार्थमुभयमप्येत्परार्थं यश्च भेगेनापवर्गेण चार्थोनार्थवादपुरुषः स एव परो न परः सामान्यमात्रम् । यत्तु किंचित्परं सामान्यमात्रं स्वरूपेणादाहरेद्वैनाशिकस्तत्सर्वं संहत्यकारित्वात्परार्थमेव स्यात् । यस्त्वसौ परो विशेषः स न संहत्यकारी पुरुष इति ॥ २४ ॥

VYĀSA.

And for what other reason is this the case? 'And it exists for another, also because it is variegated by innumerable residua, inasmuch as it acts by combination.' This mind is variegated by innumerable residua. It must therefore exist for another, *i.e.*, for achieving the enjoyment and emancipation of another, not for the achievement of its own object. Because it acts by combination. As a house which has assumed its shape as such, by various materials being brought together, cannot come into existence for itself, so also the mind which assumes a particular shape by more things than one coming together. The mental phenomenon of pleasure does not exist for its own sake; nor does knowledge exist for itself. On the contrary both these exist for the sake of another. That other is the Puruṣa who has objects to achieve in the shape of enjoyment and emancipation. It cannot be another of the same class. Whatever else the Vaināsika speaks of beyond this as being of the same class, all that must be of the same class, acting as that also would do by combination. The other however is peculiar to itself and differs from the others in not acting by combination. That is the Puruṣa.—184.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Introduces another reason for believing that the mind is different from the Self:— And for what other reason? 'And it exists for another, also because it is variegated by innumerable residua, inasmuch as it acts by combination.' The meaning of the aphorism is this. Although innumerable residua of action and affliction live in the mind and not in the Puruṣa, and although further, the fruitions depending upon the residua also live in the mind and this fact seems to establish the contention that the mind itself is both the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment existing for the enjoyer, and that everything therefore exists for the mind, still that mind, notwithstanding its being variegated by innumerable residua exists for another. Why? Because it acts by combination. This is the meaning of the aphorism. Explains:—'The mind, &c.'

Some one may say that although it may be granted that the mind acts by combination, yet notwithstanding this, why should it not be conceived as existing and acting for the sake of itself? Where is the contradiction in this theory? Says to him:—'Because it acts by combination.'

'The mental phenomenon of pleasure.' These words indicate the experience side of nature and the painful mind is also understood thereby. The knowledge indicates the emancipation side. This is the meaning. The pleasurable and painful minds consisting as they do of similar and opposite impressions are not possible of the Self, because the manifestations in that case would contradict themselves. Nor can anything else acting by combination either directly or indirectly and thus causing pleasure or pain, be either favoured or disfavoured by them. Therefore he alone who does not operate as pleasure and pain directly or indirectly can either be favoured or disfavoured by them. This can only be the Puruṣa who is always indifferent and who can thus be emancipated. His knowledge too being dependent upon the object of knowledge, and being thus contradictory in its own manifestation, it cannot be said that the knowledge is its own object. For this reason emancipation from external objects becomes impossible, in the same way

as emancipation is not possible in the case of the Videhas and the Prakṛitilayas. Therefore knowledge also exists for the sake of the Puruṣa, not for the sake of the mind itself.

Nor is the mind in existence for the sake of another of the same kind, because that would mean infinite regression. He therefore for whose sake the mind exists must be the Puruṣa Who does not act by conjunction.—24.

Sûtra 25.

विशेषदर्शिन आत्मभावभावनाविनिवृत्तिः ॥ २५ ॥

विशेष Viśeṣadarśinah (दर्शनः), for the seer (दर्शन) of the distinction (विशेष). आत्म Ātma, of the self. भाव Bhāva, of the nature and relation of. भावना Bhāvanā, of the curiosity. विनिवृत्तिः Vinivṛittih, the cessation. आत्म विनिवृत्तिः ceases the curiosity as to the nature and relations of the Self.

25. For the seer of the distinction, ceases the curiosity as to the nature-and-relations of the Self.—185.

विशेषदर्शिन आत्मभावभावनाविनिवृत्तिः । यथा प्रावृषि तृणाङ्करस्योद्देन तद्वीज-सत्ता नुमीयते तथा मोक्षमार्गश्रवणेन यस्य रोमहर्षश्रुपातौ हृश्येते तत्रात्यस्ति विशेषदर्शन-बीजमपवर्गभागीयं कर्माभिनिवर्तितमित्यनुमीयते तस्यात्मभावभावना स्वाभाविकीप्रवर्तते यस्याभावादिदमुक्तं स्वभावं मुक्त्वा दोषाद्येषां पूर्वपक्षे रुचिर्भवत्यरुचिश्च निर्णये भवति तत्रात्मभावभावनाकोऽहमासं कथमहमासं किंस्वदिदं कथंस्वदिदं के वा भविष्यामः कथं भविष्याम इति । सा तु विशेषदर्शिनो निवर्तते । कुतः । चित्तस्यैवैष विचित्रपरिणामः पुरुषस्त्वसत्यामविद्यायां शुद्धश्चित्तधर्मंपरामृष्ट इति । ततोऽप्यस्यात्मभाव भावनाकु-शलस्य विनिवर्तत इति ॥ २५ ॥

VYĀSA.

As the existence of seeds is inferred from blades of grass shooting forth in the rainy season, so it is inferred that he whose tears flow and whose hair stand on end when he hears of the path of liberation, has a store of Karma tending to liberation as the seed of the recognition of the distinction (between the Puruṣa and the Sattva). The curiosity as to the nature for the Self is naturally manifested in him. In the absence thereof, however, he gives up the nature thus described; and by the defect he loves the antithesis and dislikes the thesis.

Here the curiosity as to the nature of the Self appears as—

‘Who was I?’ ‘How was I?’ ‘What is this?’ ‘How is this?’

‘What shall we become?’ ‘How shall we become? This however ceases in the case of him who sees the distinction (between the Puruṣa and the mind). Why? This varied change is of the mind alone. The curiosity however in the absence of Nescience is pure, that is, not touched by the characteristics of the mind. For this reason too the curiosity as to the nature and relations of Self ceases for the wise.—185,

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Having thus described the reasoned philosophy of the Self, which is the very seed of absolute independence, he now shows that the Puruṣa who has reached that stage of fitness is different from any other Puruṣa, who has not reached that stage of fitness. 'For the seer of the distinction, ceases the curiosity as to the nature and relations of the Self.'

The curiosity as to the nature of the Self ceases in the case of him who possesses that curiosity, when he sees the distinction between the Subjective Puruṣa and the Objective Existence, by the practice and effective achievement of the means of the Yoga. As to the nihilist who does not possess this curiosity, he is not fit to be taught. There can be teaching in the case of him who has not first ascertained the fact of the existence of the Self in the world outside the present body. He cannot, therefore, come to know the distinction between the two and hence in the case of him there cannot be the possibility of any curiosity ceasing to be.

But the question is. How is the curiosity to know the nature of the Self known to be existing in any mind? Says he for this reason:—'As in the rainy season, &c.' It is inferred that there exists some Karma done in the previous birth in the shape of the practice of the eight accessories of Yoga or of some portion thereof. Which is the seed out of which is to grow the knowledge of the reality, and which tends towards emancipation. And in the case of such one, the curiosity to know the nature of the Self must necessarily exist without even the necessity of practice.

Shows who has not the capacity, by the authority of the Âgamis. 'In the absence, &c.' The antithesis is that there is no fruit of action, there being no entity existing in another sphere of existence, or say there being no other world beyond this. The nihilist is he who likes this view, but does not like the thesis, which has the determination of the twenty-five tattvas in view. The curiosity as to the nature of the Self has been described before. Speaks of the thought of him who sees the distinction:—'This varied change, &c.' The meaning is that the curiosity as to the nature of the Self ceases in the case of him who is wise enough to know the distinction.—25.

Sûtra 26.

तदा विवेकनिम्नं कैवल्यप्राग्भारं चित्तम् ॥ २६ ॥

तदा Tadâ, then. विवेक-निम्नम् Viveka-nimnam, inclining towards discrimination. (निम्नम् विवेक) कैवल्य Kaivalya, absolute independence. प्राग्भारम् Prâgabhâram, gravitating towards. चित्तम् Chittam, the mind.

26. Then the mind inclines towards discrimination and gravitates towards absolute-independence (kaivalya).—186.

**तदा विवेकनिम्नं कैवल्यप्राग्भारं चित्तम् । तदानीं यदस्य चित्तं विषयप्राग्भारमज्ञान-
निम्नमासीत्तदस्यान्यथा भवति कैवल्यप्राग्भारं विवेकज्ञाननिम्नमिति ॥ २६ ॥**

VYÂSA.

The mind which ere now was heavy with sensuous enjoyment and tended towards ignorance, takes now the reverse course.

It is now heavy with independence and tends towards discriminative knowledge.—186.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now describes the nature of the mind of him who sees the distinction :—‘The mind’ is then inclined towards discrimination and gravitates towards absolute independence. ‘This has been explained.’—126.

Sûtra 27.

तच्छ्रद्रेषु प्रत्ययान्तराणि संस्कारेभ्यः ॥ २७ ॥

तच्छ्रद्रेषु Tachchhidreṣu, in the breaks in it. प्रत्ययान्तराणि Pratyayântarâṇi, arise other thoughts (प्रत्यय). संस्कारेभ्यः Samśkârebhyah, from residua.

27. In the breaks arise other thoughts from residua.—187.

तच्छ्रद्रेषु प्रत्ययान्तराणि संस्कारेभ्यः । प्रत्ययविवेकनिम्नस्य सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिमात्रप्रवाहारंहिंश्चित्स्य तच्छ्रद्रेषु प्रत्ययान्तराण्यस्मीति वा ममेति वा जानार्दिति वा कुतः क्षीयमाणबीजेभ्य पूर्वसंस्कारेभ्य इति ॥ २७ ॥

VYÂSA.

In the mind inclining towards discriminative knowledge of the notions, and which has just entered the stream of the distinctive knowledge of the Puruṣa and Objective Existence, other thoughts appear in the intervals such as ‘I am,’ ‘This is mine,’ ‘I know,’ &c. Whence? From previous residua, whose seeds are being destroyed.—187.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

It may be so if discriminative knowledge is established in discrimination and never inclines towards outward activity. It is, however, seen in the case of one who is begging his food, that is, inclined towards outward activity. For this reason says :—‘In the breaks arise other thoughts from residua.’

Thoughts (Pratyaya) are those by which something is known, the essence of the mind. By that arises the discrimination of consciousness. It is of him that are shown the notions, ‘I know,’ when absolute freedom is directly shown as separated from anything else. Or the forgetfulness that I do not know. As also the egoism with reference to that, ‘I am,’ or ‘This is mine.’ By previous residua means the residua of outgoing activities.—27.

Sûtra 28.

हानमेषां क्लेशवदुक्तम् ॥ २८ ॥

हानम् Hânam, removal. एषाम् Esâm, their. क्लेशवद् Kleśavat, like that of the afflictions. उक्तम् Uktam, has been described.

28. Their removal has been described like that of the afflictions.—188.

हानमेषां क्लेशवदुक्तम् । यथा क्लेशा दग्धबीजभावा न प्ररोहसमर्था भवन्ति तथा ज्ञानाग्निना दग्धबीजभावः पूर्वसंस्कारो न प्रत्ययप्रसूभेवति । ज्ञानसंस्कारास्तु वित्ताधिकारिसमाप्तिमनुशोरत इति च विस्तरते ॥ २८ ॥

VYĀSA.

As the afflictions are no longer capable of budding forth when their seed-power has been singed; so also does not the conserved energy of previous residua give birth to notions when its seed-power has been singed by the fire of knowledge. The residua of knowledge, however, live on until the duty of the mind has been fulfilled. They are, therefore, not considered.—188.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Let that be. But if in the face of the existence of discriminative knowledge too, other thoughts arise, what is the cause of their utter removal so that these other thoughts may not rise again at all? For this reason says :—‘Their removal has been described like the afflictions.’ The outgoing activities in their potential state are not altogether destroyed as long as the discriminative knowledge is not firmly established. In the case however of discriminative knowledge being firmly established the other thoughts are utterly destroyed and are no longer fit to be born again.

By what cause does it come about that the afflictions born in the intervals of discrimination even cease to give birth to other potentialities? The cause is that the seed-power of the afflictions is burnt up by the fire of discriminative knowledge. In the same way the residua of the outgoing activities are burnt up.

But the residua of outgoing activities are to be restrained by the residua of discriminative knowledge, and the residua of discrimination are to be restrained by the potencies of restraint. And it has been shown that the potencies of restraint have not the external objects for their sphere of operation. The means of restraint are, therefore, to be considered. For this reason says :—‘The residua of knowledge, however, &c.’ The residua of knowledge are the potencies of higher desirelessness.—28.

Sûtra 29.

**प्रसङ्ग्यानेऽप्यकुसीदस्य सर्वथा विवेकख्यातेर्धर्ममेघः
समाधिः ॥२६॥**

प्रसङ्ग्याने Prasankhyâne, in the highest intellections. अपि Api, even. अकुसीदस्य Akusîdasya, having no interest left. सर्वथा Sarvathâ, constant. विवेक-ख्याते: Viveka-khyâteḥ, from discrimination. धर्म-मेघः Dharma meghah, the cloud of virtue. समाधिः Samâdhiḥ, the trance.

29. Having no-interest left even in the Highest-Intellection there comes from constant discrimination, the trance known as the Cloud-of-Virtue.—189.

प्रसङ्ग्यानेऽप्यकुसीदस्य सर्वथा विवेकख्यातेर्धर्ममेघः समाधिः । यदायं ब्राह्मणः प्रसङ्ग्यानेऽप्यकुसीदस्ततोऽपि न किंचित्प्रार्थयते तत्रापि विरक्तस्य सर्वथा विवेकख्याति-रेव भवतीति संस्कारबीजक्षयान्नास्य प्रत्ययान्तराण्युत्पद्यन्ते तदास्य धर्ममेघो नाम समाधिभवति ॥ २९ ॥

VYĀSA.

When this Brâhmaṇa has no interest left in the Highest Intellection, i.e., desires nothing even from that, then unattached even to that, he

has discriminative knowledge ever present, and thus by destruction of the seed-power of potencies, other thoughts are not born. Then does he attain the trance known as the Cloud-of-Virtue.—189.

-VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Thus the author of the Aphorism having described the Highest Intellection to be the means of the restraint of outgoing activities, now speaks of the means of restraining even the Highest Intellection :—‘Having no interest left even in the Highest Intellection there comes from constant discrimination the trance known as the Cloud of Virtue.’ By that Highest Intellection, he does not desire the possession of anything, even of the power of becoming the master of all existence. Nay he begins to feel pain even there. Having become desireless even there by seeing the defect of change, he comes to the possession of constant discriminative knowledge (undisturbed). Explains the same :—‘Thus unattached even to that, &c.’ As long as the notions of outgoing activities exist, the Brâhmaṇa does not come to possess the constant manifestation of discriminative knowledge. When however he arrives at the stage when all other thoughts cease to exist, then he becomes possessed of constant discriminative knowledge. Then comes to him the trance known as the Cloud of Virtue (dharma-megha). This is the meaning. Dissatisfied with the Highest Intellection and desiring restraint of that even, let him practise the trance known as the Cloud of Virtue. By the practice of that he becomes constantly possessed of discriminative knowledge.—29.

Sûtra 30.

ततः क्लेशकर्मनिवृत्तिः ॥३०॥

ततः Tataḥ, thence. क्लेश-कर्म Klesa-karma, of action and afflictions. निवृत्तिः Nivrittih, the removal.

30. Thence the removal of actions and afflictions —190.

ततः क्लेशकर्मनिवृत्तिः । तद्वाभादविद्यादयः क्लेशाः समूलकाषं कषिता भवन्ति । कुशलाकुशलाद्वच कर्मशयाः समूलघातं हता भवन्ति । क्लेशकर्मनिवृत्तौ जीवन्नेव विद्वान्विमुक्तो भवति । कस्मात् । यस्माद्विपर्ययो भवस्य कारणम् । नहि क्षोणक्लेशविपर्ययः कदिच्चत्केनचित्कवचिज्ञाता हृश्यत इति ॥ ३० ॥

VYĀSA.

By the attainment thereof, the affliction of Nescience, etc., are removed, even to the very root. And the good and bad vehicles of action are utterly uprooted. On the afflictions and the actions being removed, the wise man becomes free even while alive (the Jîvanmukta). How? Because Unreal Cognitions are the cause of existence. No one being free from the affliction of Unreal Cognitions is seen being born by anybody anywhere.—190.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Thus does he become capable of restraining that. And now describes the object thereof :—‘Thence the removal of actions and afflictions.’ But then how does it come to

pass that the wise become free while yet in the bonds of life? Gives the answer:—'Because, &c.' It is the vehicle of action grown strong by the residua of afflictions and actions that surely becomes the cause of life-state, &c.' And when there is no root, the shoots thereof cannot exist. As says on this subject the revered Aksapâda:—'By not seeing the birth of one who has no desires.'—30.

Sûtra 31.

तदा सर्वावरणमलापेतस्य ज्ञानस्यानन्त्याज्ज्ञेयमल्पम् ॥ ३१ ॥

तदा Tadâ, then. सर्वावरणमलापेतस्य Sarva-âvaraṇa, mala, apetasya, from which is removed (अपेत) all (सर्वे) obscuring (आवरण) impurities (मल). ज्ञानस्य Jñâna-sya, of knowledge. आनन्त्यात् Ânantyât, because of the infinity of. ज्ञेयम् Jñeyam, the knowable. अल्पम् Alpam, but little.

31. The knowable is but little then, because of knowledge having-become-infinite, on account of the removal of all obscuring impurities.—191.

तदा सर्वावरणमलापेतस्य ज्ञानस्यानन्त्याज्ज्ञेयमल्पम् । सर्वैः क्लेशकर्मावरणैर्विमुक्तस्य ज्ञानस्यानन्त्यं भवति । तमसाभिभूतमावृतमनन्तं ज्ञानसत्त्वं क्वचिदेव रजसा प्रवर्तितमुद्घाटितं ग्रहणसमर्थं भवति । तत्र यदा सर्वैरावरणमलैरपगतं भवति तदा भवत्यस्यानन्त्यम् । ज्ञानस्यानन्त्याज्ज्ञेयमल्पं सम्पद्यते । यथाकाशे खद्योतः । यत्रेदमुक्तम् । अन्धो मणिमविध्यत्तमनङ्गुलिरावयत् । अग्रीवस्तं प्रत्यमुञ्चत्तमजिह्वोऽभ्यपूजयदिति ॥ ३१ ॥

VYÂSA.

Knowledge when rid of all the impurities of affliction and action, becomes infinite. The essence of knowledge covered by the veil of Tamas, is but seldom shown forth and becomes capable of recognition by the activity of Rajas. Here, when all the impurities have been removed, then knowledge becomes infinite. When knowledge becomes infinite, but little remains to know, like the shining insect in space. On this it has been said:—'The blind man pierced the pearl; the fingerless put a thread into it; the neckless wore it and the tongueless praised it.'—191.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now describes the state of the mind at the time when the Cloud of Virtue has been reached:—'The knowable is but little then because of knowledge having become infinite on account of their removal of obscuring impurities. The impurities which cover up the essence of the mind, are spoken of as the obscuring impurities. These are the afflictions and actions. When the mental essence is freed from alloy these obscuring impurities, knowledge, i. e., the power of knowing becomes infinite, i.e., immeasurable, and therefore the knowable remains but little. As in the season after the rains, the sun being freed of the clouds shines brightly all round and his light becomes infinitely strong, and for this reason, the jar and other such things that are to be lighted remain but little, so also the light of the essence of the mind, when freed from the Rajas and Tamas, becomes infinite, and but little remains to be lighted up. Says the same:—'When that becomes freed from all the impurities &c. Renders the same plainer by means of the canon of

difference :—‘When overpowered, &c.’ The meaning is that the Tamas is put into motion by the active Rajas and is for this very reason carried away from the place. For this very reason it is called the Cloud of Virtue, inasmuch as it pours forth showers of light upon all the virtues of things to be known.

Well, this trance, the Cloud of Virtue, may be the cause of the calming down of the vehicle of actions along with the afflictions and the residua; but then how is it that when the Cloud of Virtue makes its appearance, the man is not born again? For this reason says :—‘As has been said on the subject.’

If an effect can be brought into existence even when the cause no longer exists, then the acts of piercing the pearl, &c., may well be performed by blind people, &c. Or, it may well be that whatever nonsense an ignorant world may talk about improper things, may be considered as very proper.—31.

Sûtra 32.

ततः कृतार्थानां परिणामक्रमसमाप्तिर्गुणानाम् ॥ ३२ ॥

ततः Tataḥ, by that. कृतार्थानाम् Kṛitārthānām, having fulfilled their object. परिणाम Parināma, of the changes. क्रम Krama, of the succession. समाप्तिः Samāptih, end. गुणानाम् Guṇānām, of the qualities.

32. By that, the qualities having fulfilled their object, the succession of their changes ends.—192.

ततः कृतार्थानां परिणामक्रमसमाप्तिर्गुणानाम् । तस्य धर्ममेघस्योदयात्कृतार्थानां गुणानां परिणामक्रमः परिसमाप्तते । नहि कृतभेगापवर्गाः परिसमाप्तक्रमाः क्षणमप्यवस्थातुमुत्सहन्ते ॥ ३२ ॥

VYĀSA.

By that, i.e., by the rise of the Cloud of Virtue, the succession of the changes of the qualities is over, inasmuch as they have fulfilled their object, by having achieved experience and emancipation, and their succession having ended, they no longer care to stay even for a moment.—192.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Well, the highest culmination of the Cloud of Virtue being the purity of the light of knowledge, which is the same as the Higher desirelessness, it may well uproot the potencies of the vehicles of outgoing activities and of trance together with the vehicles of afflictions and actions. But the qualities are of the nature of things which go on performing their actions of their own power. How is it then that they do not go on making the same sort of a body for such Yogis as they do for all men? For this reason says :—‘By that, qualities having fulfilled their object, the succession of their changes ends.’ The meaning is that the nature of the qualities, that they do not function with respect to him for whom they have already achieved their object.—32.

Sûtra 33.

क्षणप्रतियोगी परिणामापरान्तनिर्ग्राह्यः क्रमः ॥ ३३ ॥

क्षण Kṣaṇa, of moments. प्रतियोगी Pratiyogī, the uninterrupted sequence. परिणाम Parināma, of evolutionary change. अपरान्त Aparānta, on the cessation. निर्ग्राह्यः Nigrāhyah, to be cognised as distinct. क्रमः Kramah, succession.

33. Succession is the uninterrupted sequence of moments, cognised as distinct on the cessation of evolutionary change.—193.

अथ कोऽयं क्रमे नामेति । क्षणप्रतियोगी परिणामापरान्तनिर्ग्रह्यः क्रमः । क्षण-
नन्तर्यात्मा परिणामस्यापरान्तेनावसनेन गृह्णते क्रमः । नह्यननुभूतक्रमक्षणान्वपुराणता
वस्थस्यान्ते भवति । नित्येषु च क्रमे हृष्टः । द्वयी चेयं नित्यता कूटस्थनित्यता परिणा-
मिनित्यता च । तत्र कूटस्थनित्यता पुरुषस्य । परिणामिनित्यता गुणानाम् । यस्मिन्यरि-
णाममाने तत्त्वं न विहन्यते तन्नित्यम् । उभयस्य च तत्त्वाभिघातान्नित्यत्वं तत्र गुणध-
र्मेषु बुध्यादिषु परिणामापरान्तनिर्ग्रह्यः क्रमे लब्धपर्यवसाने नित्येषु धर्मिषु गुणेष्वल-
धपर्यवसानः । कूटस्थनित्येषु स्वरूपमात्रप्रतिष्ठेषु मुक्तपुरुषेषु स्वरूपास्तिता क्रमेणैवा-
तुभूयत इति तत्राप्यलब्धपर्यवसानः शब्दपृष्ठेन अस्तिक्रियामुपादाय कल्पयत इति ।
अथास्य संसारस्य स्थित्या गत्या च गुणेषु वर्तमानस्यास्ति क्रमसमाप्तिर्न वेति । अव-
चनीयमेतत् । कथम् । अस्ति प्रश्न एकान्तवचनीयः सर्वो जातो मरिष्यति मृत्वा जनि-
ष्यत इति । अं भो इत्यथ सर्वो जातो मरिष्यतीति मृत्वा जनिष्यत इति विभज्य वचनीय-
मेतत्प्रत्युदितख्यातिः क्षीणतृष्णः कुशलो न जनिष्यत इतरस्तु जनिष्यते । तथा
मनुष्यज्ञातिः श्रेयसी न वा श्रेयसीत्येवं परिपृष्ठे विभज्य वचनीयः प्रश्नः पशुनधिकृत्य
श्रेयसी देवानृषोऽश्चाधिकृत्य नेति । अयं त्ववचनीयः प्रश्नः संसारोऽयमन्तवाननन्तवान्वा
थानन्त इति । कुशलस्यास्ति संसारक्रमपरिसमाप्तिर्नेतरस्येति । अन्यतरावधारणे दोष-
स्तसाद्व्याकरणीयं एवायं प्रश्न इति ॥ ३३ ॥

VYĀSA.

Well, but what is this succession? ‘Succession is the uninterrupted flow of moments; it is taken in by last end, the cessation of changes. A cloth which has not undergone the succession of moments, does not give up its newness and become old all at once in the end.

Further, succession is found in the permanent also. This permanence is two-fold, the Eternal in Perfection; and the Eternal in Evolution. Of these, the perfect eternity belongs to the Puruṣa. The evolutionary eternity belongs to the qualities. The Permanent or Eternal is that in which the substance is not destroyed by changing appearances. Both are permanent because their substance is never destroyed.

Now with regard to the appearances of the qualities, the Will-to-be and others, succession has an end which is cognized by the cessation of the changes. In the eternal qualities however, whose appearances these are, it has no end. In the case of the Permanent ones, the existence of the released Puruṣas who are established in their own natures, is also known by succession. In their case too, therefore, it has no end. It is however conceived there, with reference to the necessary conception of the act of being attached to the word.

But then is there or is there not an end to the succession of evolutionary changes of the universe, which is ever present in the qualities, by motion or by cessation of motion? This cannot be answered as such. How?

There is a question to which only a one-sided answer may be given:—'All that is born must die and having been dead be born again.' Well, but if the question is put in this form—

Is it that all that is born must die, and having been dead be born again?

The answer that can be given to this is not a single one but must be divided in two.

He in whom the light of knowledge has appeared, and whose desires have been destroyed, that wise man is not born; the rest are born. Similarly the question is, Is mankind good or not? The answer is again to be divided in two. The humankind is better in comparison with the animals, but is inferior in comparison with gods and seers (Riśis).

As to the question, Has the universe an end or has it not? Why this question cannot be answered as such? For the wise there is cessation of the successions of the universe. Not for the others. There is defect in formulating any other theory. Hence the question must necessarily be divided into two.—193.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Puts a question in the context about the succession of changes (krama):—'Well but what is this succession?' The answer is:—'Succession is the uninterrupted sequence of moments cognized as distinct on the cessation of evolutionary change.'

That to which is mutually related the moment relating backward and forward to the moment of the succession of changes is so called. The meaning is that succession is that which is the support of a group of moments. There can of course be no succession ascertained without the existence of that of which it is the succession. Nor can there be a succession of one moment only. The inference by residue therefore points only to the dependence thereof upon a group of moments. Says this:—'Succession is the uninterrupted flow, &c.' Mentions authority for the existence of the succession of changes:—It is taken in by the last end, the cessation of changes.

Even in new cloth preserved with care, oldness becomes visible after a long time. This is the last end of change, otherwise called its cessation. It is for this very reason that a succession of change exists. And before that too is inferred the smallness, the greater smallness and the greatest smallness as well as the grossness, the greater smallness and the greatest smallness of oldness in regular sequence of one after the other.

Shows the same by the canon of difference:—'A cloth which has not undergone, &c.' That which has not been subjected to the succession of moments, is spoken of as not having undergone that.

Well, but this succession cannot be posited of the Pradhāna, because that is eternal. For this reason says:—'Succession is seen in those that are permanent. By using the plural number shows that succession pervades all permanent objects.'

Now shows the modes of permanence and then establishes how succession pervades the eternal :—‘Permanence is two-fold, &c.’

Well, the constantly eternal may be eternal, because it never gives up its nature such as it is. As to the changing substances, they are constantly giving up their appearances; how can they be called permanent? For this reason says :—‘The Permanent or Eternal is that, &c.’ Characteristic, secondary quality and condition possess the qualities of appearance and disappearance; the characterized however remains the same in substance.

Well, are all successions known by the cessation of changes? Says, No :—‘Now with regard to the appearances of the qualities, the Will-to-be, etc.’ Because the succession of the characteristics ends on account of their being destructible. Not so however the succession of the Pradhâna ends.

Well, the Pradhâna might be said to be possessed of the succession of changes, because of the change of its characteristics. But the Puruṣa never changes. How then can there be a change of succession in the case of the unchanging Puruṣa? For this reason says :—‘In those that are constantly permanent, &c.’

There in the case of those that are bound, they have the notion of non-separation from the mind; there is therefore a fastening of the change on them on account of the changes of the mind. In the case of those however that have been released, the existence of an unreal change has been fancied by ignorance with reference to the action of the word to be. Because the word precedes, fancy comes thereafter and puts on the appearance of the action of the word to be.

It has been said that the succession of changes does not find an end in the qualities. Not suffering that assertion puts the question, ‘Is there an end to succession, &c.’?

Cessation of motion means the Great Latency, the Mahâpralaya. Motion signifies creation. This is the meaning.

If there were no end of the change of the universe (Samsâra) on account of eternity, how then should it be in the Great Latency, that all the Puruṣas should all at once have an end of the succession of changes in their case, and again should the same succession of changes come into being all at once at the beginning of a manifestation? For this reason it would follow that one Puruṣa alone being released, the universe of evolution would cease to exist for all, and thus all the Puruṣas would become released. In this way would come the end of the succession of the changes of the Pradhâna, and the Pradhâna also would thus come to be impermanent.

Further it is not allowed that the manifestation of existence which did not exist before is possible, and this assertion cannot therefore be taken to prove its infinity. When this becomes the case, it can no longer be said that the Pradhâna is beginningless. All the teachings of the Sâstras thus come to be futile. This is the meaning.

Gives the answer :—It cannot be answered; the question does not deserve to be answered. With the object of showing that this question cannot be answered, shows a question which admits of a one-sided answer. ‘There is a question, &c.’ The answer to the question, Will all those that are born die? is Yes. This is true. Now speaks of a question which admits of an answer after being divided into two :—Are all those that are born bound to die and dying be born again? The answer that can be given to this is only possible after a division.

In order to make the matter clear, mentions another question which admits of an answer only after being divided :—‘Similarly the question, &c.’ This question does not admit of a one-sided answer. It is impossible to say that the evolution of the wise and unwise is in general indefinite or finite. There can be no community between them.

This is similar to the impossibility of ascertaining the goodness or otherwise of every living being all at once. The same is the case with the death of one who is just born. This can, however, be ascertained after a division. Says this:—The wise man is not born, &c. This is the meaning.

The inference is that there being emancipation of all in the case of the freedom of one only from succession, the world must come to end. And this depends upon the emancipation proved to exist by the authority of the Sâstras. Thus here is the authority of the means of knowledge known as verbal authority, which establishes the emancipation understood. How can it be that the same Sâstras should, by a certain teaching of theirs, stultify another authority of the Sâstras establishing the eternity of the modifications of the Pradhâna? Therefore, the inference which militates against the authority of the Âgama cannot be considered an authority. It is of course in the Veda, the Smriti and the Purânas that the succession of creation after creation is without beginning and without end. Further it is not possible that all the souls should cease to be born and die all at once. Even in the case of learned men who have been practising and working for more lives than one to achieve discriminative knowledge, this knowledge does not become well established. How is it then possible that in the case of all living beings, whether they belong to the class of the moving or the unmoving creatures, it should manifest all at once by some chance?

Further it is not proper that the effects should manifest at one and the same time although the causes are not in existence at one and the same time. In the case of the manifestation of discriminative knowledge by succession, innumerable souls may be released by succession, but the destruction of the universe will not follow, because creatures are infinite and innumerable. Thus all is plain.—33.

Sûtra 34.

**पुरुषार्थशून्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसवः कैवल्यं स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा
वा चितिशक्तिरिति ॥३४॥**

पुरुषार्थ-शून्यानाम् Puruṣârtha-Śûnyânâm, of those that are devoid of the object of the Puruṣa. गुणानाम् Guṇânâm, of the qualities. प्रतिप्रसवः Pratiprasavaḥ, becoming latent. कैवल्यम् Kaivalyam, absolute freedom. स्वरूप-प्रतिष्ठा Svarûpa-pratiṣṭhâ, established in its own nature. वा Vâ, or. चितिशक्तिः Chiti-Sâktih, the power of consciousness. इति Iti, so, thus.

34. Absolute freedom comes when the qualities, becoming devoid of the object of the Puruṣa, become latent; or the power of consciousness becomes established in its own nature.—194.

VYÂSA.

गुणाधिकारकमपरिसमाप्तौ कैवल्यमुक्तं तत्स्वरूपभवधार्यते । पुरुषार्थशून्यानां
गुणानां प्रतिप्रसवः कैवल्यं स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तिरिति । हृतभोगापवगाणां पुरु-
षार्थशून्यानां यः प्रतिप्रसवः कार्यकारणात्मकानां गुणानां तत्कैवल्यं स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा
पुनर्बुद्धिस्त्वानभिसम्बन्धात्पुरुषस्य चितिशक्तिरेव केवला तस्याः सदा तथैवावस्थां
कैवल्यमिति ॥ ३४ ॥

It has been said that absolute freedom comes when the succession of the functioning of the qualities in the performance of their duties is over. Its nature is now ascertained. Absolute freedom is the latency of the qualities on becoming devoid of the object of the Puruṣa, or it is the power of consciousness established in its own nature. Absolute freedom is the becoming latent by inverse process, of the qualities, when they are devoid of the object of the Puruṣa, after having achieved the experience and emancipation of the soul.

The power of consciousness is absolute when it is not again limited.—194.

Thus ends the Commentary of Vyāsa, the Sāṅkhya-pravachana, the Fourth Chapter on Absolute Freedom. THE BOOK IS FINISHED.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Describes the connection of the aphorism defining the nature of absolute freedom (kaivalya) with the previous aphorism :—‘It has been said, &c.’ Absolute freedom is the becoming latent of the qualities when they become devoid of the objects of the Puruṣa.’

The becoming latent of the qualities in their cause, the Pradhâna, when they are devoid of the objects of the Puruṣa, having achieved them :—The out-going and the trance and the inhibitive potencies of the qualities which appear both as the causes and the effects, become latent in the mind. The mind becomes latent in the principle of egoism. The principle of egoism becomes latent in the undifferentiated phenomenal, and the undifferentiative phenomenal into the noumenal.

This backward disappearance of the qualities which appear as both the causes and the effects, is called absolute freedom of the Puruṣa, in relation to the Pradhâna from which he is released. Or, freedom is the establishment of the Puruṣa in his own nature. Says this, ‘Or, it is the power, &c.’ Inasmuch as in the Mahâpralaya, too, the power of consciousness is established in its own nature, but that is not Mokṣa, he says :—‘Does not come into relationship again, &c.’ The word ‘ITI’ in the aphorism means the end of the book.

In this Chapter have been described the mind fit for freedom, and the trance known as the Cloud of Virtue, for establishing the Puruṣa, as he appears in the other world; also two descriptions of Mukti have been described and other things also by context.

The root of the afflictions has been described, as also the afflictions ; both the Yogas are described together with the eight accessories. The way of Mokṣa in the shape of the knowledge of the distinction between the Puruṣa and the qualities has been rendered plainer. Absolute freedom has been ascertained to be the power of consciousness free from the afflictions.

Thus ends the Fourth Chapter of Absolute Freedom in the Gloss of Vâchaspati Miśra on the Commentary of Vyâsa.—34.

OM TAT SAT.

For the service of Brahma.

Alphabetical Index of the Sutras.

	PAGE.
अतीतानागतं स्वरूपतोऽस्त्याध्वभेदाद्धर्माणाम् IV, 12 ...	283
अथ योगानुशासनम् I, 1	1
अनित्याशुचिदुःखानात्मसु नित्यशुद्धिसुखात्मव्यातिरिच्छा II, 5 ...	95
अनुभूतविषयासंप्रभेषः स्मृतिः I, 11	24
अपरिग्रहस्थैर्यं जन्मकथंतासंबोधः II, 39	165
अभावप्रत्ययालम्बनावृत्तिर्निद्रा I, 10	22
अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां तन्निरोधः I, 12	26
अविद्यासितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्लेशाः II, 3	91
अथविद्याक्षेत्रमुक्तरेषां प्रसुप्ततनुविच्छिन्नोदाराणाम् II, 4 ...	92
अस्तेयप्रतिष्ठायां सर्वरत्नोपस्थानम् II, 37	164
अहिंसाप्रतिष्ठायां तत्सन्निधौ वैरत्यागः II, 35	164
ईश्वरप्रणिधानाद्वा I, 23	40
उदानजयाज्जलपङ्कटकादिष्वसङ्कुउत्क्रान्तिश्च III, 38 ...	238
ऋतंभरा तत्र प्रश्ना I, 48	81
एकसमये चाभयानवधारणाम् IV, 20	296
एतद्यैव सविचारा निर्विचारा च सूक्ष्मविषया व्याख्याता I, 44	76
पतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा व्याख्याताः III, 13	188
कण्ठकृपे क्षुत्पिपासानिवृत्तिः III, 29	231
कर्मशुद्धाकृष्णं योगिनस्त्रिविधमितरेषाम् IV, 7	274
क्रमान्यत्वं परिणामान्यत्वे हेतुः III, 15	203
कायरूपसंयमात्तद् ग्राहशक्तिस्तम्भे चक्षुःप्रकाशासंप्रयोगेऽन्तर्धानम् III, 20 ...	220
कायाकाशयोः संबन्धसंयमालघुतूलसमापत्तेश्चाकाशगमनम् III, 41 ...	242
कायेन्द्रियसिद्धिरशुद्धिक्षयात्तपसः II, 43	168
कूर्मनाडां स्थैर्यम् III, 30	231
कृतार्थं प्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यस्ताधारणत्वात् II, 22	138
क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः I, 24	40
क्लेशमूलः कर्मशयो हृष्टाहृजन्मवेदनीयः II, 12	104
ग्रहणस्वरूपासितान्वयार्थवर्थत्वसंयमादिन्द्रियजयः III, 43	251
चन्द्रे ताराव्यहर्षानम् III, 26	230
चित्तान्तरहर्ष्ये बुद्धिबुद्धेरतिप्रसङ्गः स्मृतिसंकरश्च IV, 21	297
चित्तेरप्रतिसङ्क्रमायास्तदाकारापत्तौ स्वबुद्धिसंवेदनम् IV, 22	299

जन्मौषधिमन्त्रतपः समाधिजाः सिद्धयः IV, 1	268
जातिदेशकालव्यवहितानामप्यानन्तर्यं स्मृतिसंस्कारयोरेकरूपत्वात् IV, 9	...	276
जातिदेशकालसमयानवच्छिन्नाः सर्वभौमा महाब्रतम् II, 31	158
जातिलक्षणदेशैरन्यतानवच्छेदात्तुल्ययोस्ततः प्रतिपत्तिः III, 52...	...	261
आत्यस्तरपरिणामः प्रकृत्यापूरात् IV, 2	...	269
तच्छिद्रेषु प्रत्ययान्तराणि संस्कारेभ्यः IV, 27	306
तज्जपस्तदर्थभावनम् I, 28	...	50
तज्जयात्प्रश्नालोकः III, 5	...	182
तज्जः संस्कारोऽन्यसंस्कारप्रतिबन्धी I, 50	...	83
ततः कृतार्थानां परिणामक्रमसमाप्तिर्गुणानाम् IV, 32	310
ततः कूर्मशक्तिविद्वत्तिः IV, 30	308
ततः परमावश्यतेन्द्रियाणाम् II, 55	...	177
ततः पुनः शान्तोदितौ तुल्यप्रत्ययौ चित्तस्यैकाग्रतापरिणामः III, 12	...	188
ततः प्रत्यक्षेतनाधिगमोऽप्यन्तरायाभावश्च I, 29	...	51
ततः प्रातिभश्रावणवेदनादर्शास्वादवार्ता जायन्ते III, 35	...	236
ततस्तद्विपाकानुगुणानामेवाभिव्यक्तिर्वासनानाम् IV, 8	...	275
ततः क्षीयते प्रकाशावरणम् II, 52	...	174
ततोऽण्मादिप्रादुर्भावः कायसम्पत्तद्वर्मनभिधातश्च III, 44	...	248
ततो द्वन्द्वानभिधातः II, 48	...	171
ततो मनोजवित्वं विकरणभावः प्रधानज्ञयश्च III, 47	...	253
तत्परं पुरुषख्यातेगुणवैतृष्ण्यम् I, 16	...	30
तत्प्रतिषेधार्थमेकतत्त्वाभ्यासः I, 32	...	55
तत्र प्रत्ययैकतानता ध्यानम् III, 2	...	180
तत्र स्थितौ यत्तोऽभ्यासः I, 13	27
तत्र ध्यानज्ञमनाशयम् IV, 6	...	273
तत्र निरतिशायं-सर्वज्ञबीजम् I, 25	...	46
तत्र शब्दार्थज्ञानविकल्पैः संकीर्णसवितर्का समाप्तिः I, 42	...	69
तत्राहिंसास्त्यास्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहाः यमाः II, 30	...	155
तदर्थं एव हृश्यस्यात्मा II, 21	...	136
तदपि बहिरङ्गं निर्बीजस्य III, 8	184
तदभावात्संयोगाभावो हानं तद्वशोः कैवल्यम् II, 25	...	146
तदसंख्येयवासनाभिश्चत्तमपि परार्थं संहत्यकारित्वात् IV, 24...	...	302
तदा द्रष्टुः स्वरूपेऽवस्थानम् I, 3	...	9
तदा विवेकनिम्नं कैवल्यप्राप्तारं चित्तम् IV, 26	...	305
तदा सर्वावरणमलापेतस्य ज्ञानस्यानंत्याज्ञ्ञेयमल्पम् IV, 31	...	309
तदुपरागापेक्षित्वादस्य वस्तु ज्ञाताज्ञातम् IV, 17	...	293

	PAGE.
तदैवार्थमात्रनिर्भासं स्वरूपशून्यमिव समाधिः III, 3	... 180
तद्वैराग्यादपि दोषबीजक्षये कैवल्यम् III, 49 255
तपः स्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि क्रियायोगः II, 1...	... 88
तस्मिन्लक्ष्ये श्वासप्रश्वासयोर्गतिविच्छेदः प्राणायामः II, 49	... 171
तस्य प्रशान्तवाहिता संस्कारात् III, 10	... 186
तस्य भूमिषु विनियोगः III, 6 182
तस्य वाचकः प्रणवः I, 27 49
तस्य सप्तधा प्रान्तभूमिः प्रश्ना II, 27	... 148
तस्य हेतुरविद्या II, 24 144
तस्यापि निरोधे सर्वनिरोधान्विर्बीजः समाधिः I, 51	... 85
ता एव सबीजः समाधिः I, 46 79
तारकं सर्वविषयं सर्वथाविषयमक्रमं चेति विवेकज्ञानम् III, 53	... 264
तासामनादित्वं चाशिषो नित्यत्वात् IV, 10 278
तीव्रसंवेगनामासन्नः I, 21 38
ते प्रतिप्रसवहेयाः सूक्ष्माः II, 10	... 102
ते ह्यादपरितापफलाः पुण्यापुण्यहेतुत्वात् II, 14...	... 113
ते व्यक्तसूक्ष्मा गुणात्मानः IV, 13,	... 285
ते समाधावुपसर्गा व्युत्थाने सिद्धयः III, 36	... 236
त्रयमन्तरङ्गं पूर्वेभ्यः III, 7 183
त्रयमेकत्र संयमः III, 4 181
द्रष्टा हृशिमात्रः शुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययानुपश्यः II, 20 133
द्रष्टव्ययोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः II, 17	... 121
द्रष्टव्ययोपरक्तं चित्तं सर्वार्थम् IV, 23	... 300
दुःखदैर्मनस्याङ्गमेजयत्वश्वासप्रश्वासा विक्षेपसहभुवः I, 31	... 54
दुःखानुशायी द्वेषः II, 8 100
दृग्दर्शनशक्त्योरेकात्मतेवास्मिता II, 6	... 98
दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यम् I, 15	... 28
देशबन्धचित्तस्य धारणा III, 1 179
धारणासु च योग्यता मनसः II, 53	... 175
ध्यानहेयास्तद्वृत्तयः II, 11 103
ध्रुवे तदुगतिज्ञानम् III, 27	... 230
न चैकचित्ततन्त्रं चेद्वस्तु तत्प्रमाणकं तदा किं स्यात् IV, 16	... 292
न तत्स्वाभासं दृश्यत्वात् IV, 19	... 295
नाभिचक्रे कायब्यूहज्ञानम् III, 28	... 231
निमित्तमप्रयोजकं प्रकृतीनां वरणमेदस्तु ततः क्षेत्रिकवत् IV, 3...	... 270
निर्माणचित्तान्यस्मितामात्रात् IV, 4	... 272

	PAGE.
निर्विचारवैशारद्येऽध्यात्मप्रसादः I, 47	80
परमाणुपरममहत्वान्तोऽस्य वशीकारः I, 40	65
परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैगुणवृत्तविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः II, 15 ...	114
परिणामश्वयसंयमादतीतानागतश्वानम् III, 16	207
परिणामैकत्वाद्वस्तुतत्त्वम् IV, 14	286
पुरुषार्थशून्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसवः कैवल्यं स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तिरिति IV, 34	314
प्रकाशक्रियास्थितिशीलं भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं भेगापवर्गार्थं हृश्यम् II, 18 ...	124
प्रच्छर्दनविधारणाभ्यां वा प्राणस्य I, 34	60
प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाः प्रमाणानि I, 7	14
प्रत्ययस्य परचित्तश्वानम् III, 19	219
प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रास्मृतयः I, 6	14
प्रयत्नशैथिल्यानन्तसमाप्तिभ्याम् II, 47	170
प्रवृत्तिभेदे प्रयोजकं चित्तमेकमनेकेषाम् IV, 5	272
प्रवृत्त्यालोकन्यासात्सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टश्वानम् III, 24 ...	224
प्रसंख्यानेऽप्यकुसीदस्य सर्वथा विवेकस्यातिर्धर्ममेघः समाधिः IV, 29 ...	307
प्रातिभाष्ट्रा सर्वम् III, 32	232
बन्धकारणशैथिल्यात्मचारसंवेदनाच्च चित्तस्य परशरीरावेशः III, 37 ...	237
ब्रह्मचर्यप्रतिष्ठायां वीर्यलाभः II, 38	165
बलेषु हस्तिबलादीनि III, 23	224
बहिरकल्पितावृत्तिर्महाविदेहा ततः प्रकाशावरणक्षयः III, 42 ...	242
बाह्याभ्यन्तरस्तम्भवृत्तिदेशकालसंख्याभिः परिहृष्टो दीर्घसूक्ष्मः II, 50 ...	172
बाह्याभ्यन्तरविषयाक्षेपी चतुर्थः II, 51	173
भवप्रत्ययो विदेहप्रकृतिलयानाम् I, 19	35
भुवनश्वानं सूर्ये संयमात् III, 25	225
मूर्धज्योतिषि सिद्धदर्शनम् III, 31	232
मृदुमध्याधिमात्रत्वाच्चतोर्जपि विशेषः II, 22	39
मैत्रीकरुणामुदितोपेक्षाणां सुखदुःखपुण्यापुण्यविषयाणां भावनातश्चित्त- प्रसादनम् I, 33	59
मैत्रयादिषु बलानि III, 22	223
यथाभिमतध्यानाद्वा I, 39	65
यमनियमास्तनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोऽष्टान्वङ्गानि II, 29 ...	154
योगशिच्चत्तवृत्तिनिरोधः I, 2	5
योगाङ्गानुष्टानादशुद्धिक्षये ज्ञानदीप्तिराविवेकस्यातेः II, 28	150
रूपलावण्यबलवज्रसंहननत्वानि कायसम्पत् III, 45	250
वस्तुसाम्ये चित्तभेदाच्चतयोर्विभक्तः पन्थाः IV, 15	289
वितर्कबाधने प्रतिपक्षभावनम् II, 33	160

	PAGE.
वितर्कविचारानन्दास्मितारुपानुगमात् संप्रश्नातः I, 17 ...	32
वितर्का हिंसादयः कृतकारितानुमोदिता लोभकोधमोहपूर्वका मृदुमध्या-	
धिमात्रा दुःखाशानानन्तफला इति प्रतिपक्षभावनम् II, 34... ...	161
विपर्ययो मिथ्याहानमतदूषप्रतिष्ठम् I, 8 ...	18
विरामप्रत्ययाभ्यासपूर्वः संस्कारशेषोऽन्यः I, 18... ...	34
विवेकरूपातिरविपूला हानोपायः II, 26 ...	147
विशेषदर्शिन आत्मभावभावनाविनिवृत्तिः IV, 25 ...	304
विशेषाविशेषलिङ्गमात्रालिङ्गानि गुणपर्वाणि II, 19 ...	129
विशेषका वा ज्योतिष्मती I, 36 ...	62
विषयवती वा प्रवृत्तिरूपमा मनसः स्थितिनिबन्धनी I, 35 ...	61
वीतरागविषयं वा चित्तम् I, 37 ...	64
वृत्तयः पञ्चतयः क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः I, 5 ...	12
वृत्तिसारूप्यमितरत्र I, 4 ...	10
व्याधिस्त्यानसंशयप्रमादालस्याविरतिभ्रान्तिदर्शनालब्धभूमिकत्वानवस्थि-	
तत्त्वानि चित्तविक्षेपास्तेऽन्तरायाः I, 30 ...	52
व्युत्थाननिरोधसंस्कारयोरभिभवप्रादुर्भावौ निरोधक्षणचित्तान्वयो निरोध-	
परिणामः III, 9 ...	185
शब्दशानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः I, 9 ...	20
शब्दार्थप्रत्ययानामितरेतराभ्यासात्संकरस्तत्प्रविभागसंयमात्सर्वभूतरूप-	
शानम् III, 17 ...	207
शान्तोदिताव्यपदेश्यधर्मानुपाती धर्मी III, 14 ...	199
शौचसंतोषतपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि नियमाः II, 32 ...	159
शौचात्स्वाङ्गजुगुप्ता परेरसंसर्गः II, 40 ...	166
श्रद्धावीर्यस्मृतिसमाधिप्रश्नापूर्वक इतरेषाम् I, 20 ...	37
श्रुतानुमानप्रश्नाभ्यामन्यविषया विशेषार्थत्वात् I, 49 ...	81
श्रोत्राकाशयोः सम्बन्धसंयमाद्विव्यं श्रोत्रम् III, 40 ...	240
स पष पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात् I, 26 ...	48
सति मूले तद्विपाको जात्यायुर्भोगाः II, 13 ...	106
सतु दीर्घकालनैरन्तर्यस्त्वकारासेवितो हृषभूमिः I, 14 ...	28
सत्यप्रतिष्ठायां क्रियाफलाश्रयत्वम् II, 36 ...	164
सत्यपुरुषयोरत्यन्ता सङ्कोर्ययोः प्रत्ययाविशेषो भेगः परार्थत्वात्स्वार्थ-	
संयमात्पुरुषशानम् III, 34 ...	233
सत्यपुरुषयोः शुद्धिसाम्ये कैवल्यम् III, 54 ...	265
सत्यपुरुषान्यतार्थातिमात्रस्य सर्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वं सर्वशातृत्वं च III, 48 ...	254
सत्यपुरुषौ सौमनस्यैकाश्रयेन्द्रियजयात्मदर्शनयोग्यत्वानि च II, 41 ...	166
सदा ज्ञाताश्चिच्चत्तवृत्तयस्तत्प्रभेः पुरुषस्यापरिणामात् IV, 18 ...	294
समाधिभावनार्थः क्लेशतनूकरणार्थश्च II, 2 ...	90

	PAGE.
समाधिसिद्धिरीश्वरप्रणिधानात् II, 45 168
समानजयाज्ज्वलनम् III, 39 239
संतोषादनुत्तमः सुखलाभः II, 42 167
संस्कारसाक्षात्करणात्पूर्वज्ञातिज्ञानम् III, 18 217
सर्वार्थतैकाग्रतयोः क्षयोदयै चित्तस्य समाधिपरिणामः III, 11 187
सुखानुशयी रागः II, 7 100
सूक्ष्मविषयत्वं चालिङ्गपर्यवसानम् I, 45 78
सोपकमं निरुपकमं च कर्म सत्संयमादपरान्तज्ञानमरिष्टेभ्यो वा III, 21 221
स्थान्युपनिमन्त्रणे सङ्क्लसयाकरणं पुनरनिष्टप्रसङ्गात् III, 50 256
स्थिरसुखमासनम् II, 46 169
स्थूलस्वरूपसूक्ष्मान्वयार्थवत्त्वसंयमाद् भूतजयः III, 43 244
स्मृतिपरिशुद्धौ स्वरूपशून्येवार्थमात्रनिर्भासा निर्वितका I, 43 71
स्वप्रनिद्राज्ञानालम्बनं वा I, 38 64
स्वरसवाही विदुषोऽपि तथारुदोऽभिनिवेशः II, 9 101
स्वविषयासंप्रयोगे चित्तस्य स्वरूपानुकार इवेन्द्रियाणां प्रत्याहारः II, 54 176
स्वस्वामिशक्त्योः स्वरूपोपलब्धिहेतुः संयोगः II, 23 139
स्वाध्यायादिष्टदेवतासंप्रयोगः II, 44 168
हानमेषां क्लेशवदुक्तम् IV, 28 306
हृदये चित्तसंवित् III, 33 233
हेतुफलाश्रयालम्बनैः संगृहीतत्वादेषामभावे तदभावाः IV, 11 282
हेयं दुःखमनागतम् II, 16 120
क्षणतत्क्रमयोः संयमाद्विवेकजं ज्ञानम् III, 51 259
क्षणप्रतियोगी परिणामापरान्तनिर्वाह्यः क्रमः IV, 33 310
क्षीणवृत्तेरभिजातस्येव मण्डर्ग्रहीतृग्रहणाह्येषु तत्स्थितदञ्जनतासमापत्तिः I, 41 ...	66