# Google Gruyere Pentesting Report

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## **Penetration Testing Report**

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### 1. Introduction

This report document hereby describes the proceedings and results of a Black Box security assessment conducted against **Google Gruyere**. The report hereby lists the findings and corresponding best practice mitigation actions and recommendations.

### 2. Objective

The objective of the assessment was to assess the state of security and uncover vulnerabilities in **Home of Google Gruyere** and provide with a final security assessment report comprising vulnerabilities, remediation strategy and recommendation guidelines to help mitigate the identified vulnerabilities and risks during the activity.

### 3. Scope

This section defines the scope and boundaries of the project.

Application Name	Home of Google Gruyere Web Application
URL	https://google-gruyere.appspot.com/

### 3.1. Assessment Attribute(s)

Parameter	Value
Starting Vector	External
Target Criticality	Critical
Assessment Nature	Cautious & Calculated
Assessment Conspicuity	Clear
Proof of Concept(s)	Attached wherever possible and applicable.

### 4. Risk Calculation and Classification

Following is the risk classification:

Info	Low	Medium	High	Critical
No direct	Vulnerabilities may	Vulnerabilities	Vulnerabilities	Vulnerabilities
threat to	not have public	may not have	which can be	which can be
host/	exploit (code)	public exploit	exploited	exploited
individual	available or cannot	(code) available	publicly,	publicly,
user account.	be exploited in the	or cannot be	workaround or	workaround or
Sensitive	wild. Vulnerability	exploited in the	fix/ patch	fix/ patch may
information	observed may not	wild. Patch/	available by	not be available
can be	have high rate of	workaround not	vendor.	by vendor.
revealed to	occurrence. Patch	yet released by		
the	workaround released	vendor.		
adversary.	by vendor.			

Table 1: Risk Rating

### **Summary**

Outlined is a Black Box Application Security assessment for **Home of Acunetix Art Web Application**.

https://google-gruyere.appspot.com/


Following section illustrates **Detailed** Technical information about identified vulnerabilities.

### **Total: 20 Vulnerabilities**

High	Medium	Low
12	8	2

### 5. XSS:

Finding the vulnerability through PwnXss:



### **5.1.** Reflected XSS in the application.

Reference No:	Risk Rating:
WEB_XSS(r)	Medium

#### **Tools Used:**

Browser,PwnXss

### **Vulnerability Description:**

It was observed that in the search bar instead of search query if we inject JavaScript code then the JS code executes hence results into XSS

### Vulnerability Identified by / How It Was Discovered

Manual Analysis

### **Vulnerable URLs / IP Address**

https://google-gruyere.appspot.com/

### Implications / Consequences of not Fixing the Issue

An adversary having knowledge of JavaScript will be able to steal the user's credentials, hijack user's account, exfiltrate sensitive data and can access the client's computer.

### **Suggested Countermeasures**

It is recommended to:

- Filter input on arrival
- Encode data on output
- Use appropriate response headers
- Use Content Security Policy (CSP) to reduce the severity of any existing XSS vulnerabilities

#### References

https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting

### **Proof of concept:**






Fig 3: And hence we get to see the execution of our payload

### URL #2 getting the user cookies:



Fig 1: Open the URL <a href="https://google-gruyere.appspot.com/580361733734719729108781736398253698074/<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>




Fig 2: User ID and Cookie Fetched

### **5.2.** Stored XSS in the Your Profile section.

Reference No:	Risk Rating:
WEB_Xss(s)	High

### **Tools Used:**

Browser

### **Vulnerability Description:**

It was observed that in the your profile area instead of normal input if we execute JS code, then it gets stored in the server and hence it results into Stored XSS

### Vulnerability Identified by / How It Was Discovered

**Manual Analysis** 

### **Vulnerable URLs / IP Address**

https://google-gruyere.appspot.com/

### Implications / Consequences of not Fixing the Issue

An adversary having knowledge of JavaScript will be able to steal the user's credentials, hijack user's account, exfiltrate sensitive data, can access the client's computer and even can redirect into other pages created by the adversary. And the impact will be faced by all users visiting the compromised page.

### **Suggested Countermeasures**

It is recommended to:

- Filter input on arrival
- Encode data on output
- Use appropriate response headers
- Use Content Security Policy (CSP) to reduce the severity of any existing XSS vulnerabilities
- Using an Auto-Escaping Template System
- Using HTML Encoding

#### References

https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting
https://blog.sqreen.com/stored-xss-explained/

**Proof of concept:** 




Fig 1: Visit the URL after Signing Up, Now the Script is stored in the Web Application



Fig 2: Type the Javascript code to all the field as any of them could be vulnerable to stored XSS and then click on the Update button



Fig 3: Hence the code gets executed and it's permanently stored in the server. Also it is found that the name field is vulnerable to stored XSS.




When Ever the My Site button is clicked the script in executed.

### **Stored XSS via HTML Attribute:**

Edit your profi	le.
User id:	go
User name:	go
OLD Password:	••••
NEW Password:	WARNING: Gruyere is not secure. Do not use a password that you use for any real service.
Icon:	<img onerror="alert('Stored XSS!')" src="x" x"=""/>
Profile Color:	<img onerror="alert('Stored XSS!')" src="x" x"=""/>

Whenever the page loads the it will allert




## Changing the website layout through following payload

User id: User name: OLD Password: NEW Password:	shark shark WARNING: Gruyere is not secure. Do not use a password that you use for any real service.	(
Icon: Homepage: Profile Color:	<pre><script> document.body.style.backgroundColor = "red"; <script> document.body.style.backgroundColor = "red";</pre></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Private Snippet:</td><td><pre><script>   document.body.style.backgroundColor = "red"; let hackedHeader = document.createElement("h1");   hackedHeader.textContent = "Site I hacked"; hackedHeader.style.color = "white"; hackedHeader.style.textAlign = "center"; document.body.prepend(hackedHeader); </script></pre>	

+	→ C 25 google-gruyere.appspc	ot.com/5860306530236166552	259346802222434922531/ <script>%20%2</th><th>0%20%20%20document.b</th><th>☆</th><th>C.</th><th>E</th><th></th><th><u>.</u> ف</th><th>H</th><th></th></tr><tr><th>88</th><th>Introduction to Cyb CompTIA S</th><th>ecurity+ 🔼 YouTube 😥 V</th><th>WhatsApp 🐧 Migadu Webmail</th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>1 0</th><th>All Book</th><th>kmarks</th></tr><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>Site I hacked</th><th>1</th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></tr><tr><th></th><th>Home   My Snippets   New S</th><th>Snippet   <u>Upload</u></th><th></th><th></th><th>shar</th><th>k <sha</th><th>ark>   <u>[</u></th><th>Profile</th><th>  <u>Sign</u></th><th>out</th><th></th></tr><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>Invalid request: /</th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></tr><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></tr><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></tr><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></tr></tbody></table></script>
---	------------------------------	----------------------------	---

### File Upload Xss:

Html file was uploaded and the accessed on the link:



#### The Site cookies are leaked 1

Cookies: GRUYERE=100416652|1||author; GRUYERE\_ID=580361733734719729108781736398253698074

### 5.3. AJAX:

Reference No:	Risk Rating:				
Ajax-Dos	low				
Tools Used:					
Browser,Brupsuit					
Vulnerability Description:					
It was observed that in the your profile area inst	tead of normal input if we execute JS code, then				
it gets stored in the server and hence it results	into Stored XSS				
Vulnerability Identified by / How It Was Discovered	d				
Manual Analysis					
Vulnerable URLs / IP Address					
https://google-gruyere.appspot.com/					
Implications / Consequences of not Fixing the Issue	e				

#### iniplications / consequences of not rixing the issue

An adversary having knowledge of JavaScript will be able to steal the user's credentials, hijack user's account, exfiltrate sensitive data, can access the client's computer and even can redirect into other pages created by the adversary. And the impact will be faced by all users visiting the compromised page.

### **Suggested Countermeasures**

It is recommended to:

- Filter input on arrival
- Encode data on output
- Use appropriate response headers
- Use Content Security Policy (CSP) to reduce the severity of any existing XSS vulnerabilities
- Using an Auto-Escaping Template System

### Using HTML Encoding

#### References

https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting https://blog.sqreen.com/stored-xss-explained/

#### DoS via AJAX

### Most recent snippets:

**Cheddar** Gruyere is the cheesiest application on the web.

Mac All snippets Homepage

Forensicxs I can hack this!

All snippets Homepage

Brie is the queen of the cheeses!!!

All snippets Homepage

First of all, let's sign in using my Gruyere account "Forensicxs"

#### **Forensicxs**

We can see the snippets. Clicking on "refresh", we see the response corresponding to the snippets content

### Forensicxs

Then, let's create a user "private\_snippet", and create several snippets

```
1 HTTP/2 200 OK
2 Cache-Control: no-cache
3 Content-Type: text/html
4 Pragma: no-cache
5 X-Xss-Protection: 0
X-Cloud-Trace-Context: ba216539a16d1e407d25b52ef7508802
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 2021 15:45:38 GMT
Server: Google Frontend
Content-Length: 230
Alt-Svc: h3="1443"; ma=2592000, h3-Q046=":443"; ma=2592000, h3-Q050=":443"; ma=2592000, h3-Q046=":443"; ma=2592000, quic=":443"; ma=2592000, quic=":443"; ma=2592000; v="46,43"

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
(
"private snippet":
""
22
23
24
25
, "cheddar":
"Gruyere is the cheesiest application on the web."
, "Forensicxs":
"
I can hack this !"
, "brie":
"Brie is the queen of the cheeses<span style=color:red>!!!</span>"
3
3
3
4
5
]
```

#### All snippets:

- 1 Again another DoS via AJAX
- 2 Another DoS via AJAX
- 3 DoS via AJAX

private\_snippet's site

Here is the response. The snippets of the other users have been deleted

```
1 HTTP/2 200 OK
 2 Cache-Control: no-cache
 3 Content-Type: text/html
 4 Pragma: no-cache
 5 X-Xss-Protection: 0
 6 X-Cloud-Trace-Context: 99671b53c46df4230c5a3e3dcf66961d
 7 Vary: Accept-Encoding
 8 Date: Sat, 18 Sep 2021 15:16:27 GMT
 9 Server: Google Frontend
10 Content-Length: 119
11 Alt-Svc: h3=":443"; ma=2592000,h3-29=":443"; ma=2592000,h3-T051=":443"; ma=2592000,h3-Q050=":443"; ma=2592000,h3-Q046=":443"; ma=2592000,h3-Q043=":443";
   ma=2592000,quic=":443"; ma=2592000; v="46,43"
12
13
14 _feed((
15
16
17 [
18 "private_snippet"
19
20 ,"
21 Again another DoS via AJAX"
22
23 ,"
24 Another DoS via AJAX"
25
27 DoS via AJAX"
28
29]
30
31
32
33 ))
34
```


private\_snippet

The flaw here is the structure of the response. We see the construction here

```
45 Private Snippet:
46 
47 <input type='text' name='private_snippet'
48 value='{{_profile.private_snippet:text}}'>
49
```

### 6. Cross Site Script Inclusion (XSSI)

XSSI is a client-side attack similar to Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) but has a different purpose. Where CSRF uses the authenticated user context to execute certain state-changing actions inside a victim's page (reset password, etc.), XSSI instead uses JavaScript on the client side to leak sensitive data from authenticated sessions



**Principles of an XSSI** 

Let's follow the example provided by Google. Here is my private snippet on my home page. This is the "sensitive information" that we are going to leak

Forensicxs Ethical hacking is fun!

All snippets Homepage

Following JavaScript code for XSSI



\_feed(( { "private\_snippet": "" ,"cheddar": "Gruyere is the cheesiest application on the web." ,"brie": "Brie is the queen of the cheeses!!!" } ))

### 7. Path traversal

			_
Path traversal	High		
Tools Used:			
curl			
Vulnerability Description:			
A web application vulnerability that allows an a the web root folder	nttacker to ac	cess files and directories out	side of
Vulnerability Identified by / How It Was Discovere	Ч		

Vulnerability Identified by / How It Was Discover

Manual Analysis & Automated Analysis

Implications / Consequences of not Fixing the Issue

attacker can steal our critical information from files or directories

### **Suggested Countermeasures**

• we need to prevent access to files outside the resources directory. Validating file paths is a bit tricky as there are various ways to hide path elements like "../" or "~" that allow escaping out of the resources folder. The best protection is to only serve specific resource files.

### **Proof of concept:**

### 1. Path Traversal

Information disclosure via path traversal

### 7.1.

```
(ahsan⊕ ahsan)-[~]

$ gobuster dir -u https://google-gruyere.appspot.com/672663281473221539320555625206295738053/ \
Gobuster v3.6
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
                                  https://google-gruyere.appspot.com/672663281473221539320555625206295738053/
[+] Url:
    Method:
                                  GET
    Threads:
                                  10
                                  txtfiles
    Wordlist:
    Negative Status codes:
                                  404
    Exclude Length:
                                  2262
                                  gobuster/3.6
    User Agent:
[+] Timeout:
                                  105
Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
/error_log.txt
                                           [Size: 2239]
/credentials.txt
                                           [Size: 2241]
/secret.txt
                                           [Size: 2236]
                                           [Size: 2236]
[Size: 2238]
[Size: 2239]
[Size: 2234]
[Size: 2236]
/config.txt
/api_keys.txt
/passwords.txt
                         (Status: 200)
(Status: 200)
/keys.txt
/backup.txt
                                           [Size: 2240]
[Size: 2235]
[Size: 2238]
/access_log.txt
/debug.txt
/database.txt
                                           [Size: 2238]
/settings.txt
                                           [Size: 2233]
```

After finding a secret.txt file then try a path traversal attack to retrieve the content of a file . in this scenario, I used an encoding technique to bypass server


```
curl tool

—(ahsan⊕ahsan)-[~]

—$ curl -X GET https://google-gruyere.appspot.com/672663281473221539320555625206295738053/..%2fsecret.txt

Cookie!
```

### 7.2. URL snap




### 8. Data tampering via path traversal


First I create a new user named .. and create the same file secret.txt I put some new information into a file that I will show later ) upload new secret.txt file .

I log in as a user .. and upload a file secret.txt.



After navigating to the file path now the data of file secret.txt has been tampered successfully





### 8.1.1. DoS - Quit the Server

The simplest form of denial of service is shutting down a service.

mostly server protects against non-administrators accessing certain URLs but the list includes /quit instead of the actual URL /quitserver.

### **Gruyere System Alert**

```
Server is restarting ... please wait ...
Done.
```

Please hit refresh.




### 8.1.2. DoS - Overloading the Server

Every page includes the menubar.gtl template.

So I create a file named menubar.gtl containing: [[include:menubar.gtl]]DoS[[/include:menubar.gtl]]and upload it to the resources directory using a path traversal attack

after signing in as user ../resources and uploading file menubar.gtlserver is crashed



## **Gruyere System Alert**

Server has crashed: Stack overflow.

Server will be automatically restarted.

### 9. Configuration Vulnerabilities

**Suggested Countermeasures** 

Configuration Vulnerabilities	High	
_		
Tools Used:		
none		
Vulnerability Description:		
This is particularly an issue with third party software where an attacker has easy access to a		
copy of the same application or framework you are running. Hackers know the default account		
names and passwords. For example, looking at the contents of <a href="mailto:data.py">data.py</a> you know that there's		
a default administrator account named 'admin' with the password 'secret'.		
Vulnerability Identified by / How It Was Discovere	d	
Manual Analysis		
Implications / Consequences of not Fixing the Issue		
Exposure of sensitive data such as server conficode. Enables attackers to craft targeted attacks	gurations, API keys, database details, or source s or exploit known vulnerabilities	

- Restrict access to sensitive files (e.g., .env, config.php).
- Remove unnecessary comments or sensitive data in code or configurations.
- Harden configurations based on best practices (e.g., OWASP guidelines).

### 10. Information Disclosure


After looking at all the files installed with Gruyere. I found a file <a href="mailto:dump.gtl">dump.gtl</a> this file expose the information of all users along with passwords further this file exposes the data of database

```
> C @
                                ♦ https://google-gruyere.appspot.com/672663281473221539320555625206295738053/dump.gtl
 ኳ Kali Linux 👔 Kali Tools 💆 Kali Docs 🐹 Kali Forums  Kali NetHunter 🧆 Exploit-DB 🝬 Google Hacking DB 🥼 OffSec
_cookie: {'is_admin': False, 'is_author': False, 'uid': None}
_profile: None
         {'administrator': {'is_admin': True,
'is_author': False,
'name': 'Admin',
                           'private_snippet': 'My password is secret. Get it?',
                           'pw': 'secret',
'web_site': 'https://www.google.com/contact/'},
          'brie': {'color': 'red; text-decoration:underline',
'is_admin': False,
'is_author': True,
                   'name': 'Brie'
                   'private_snippet': 'I use the same password for all my accounts.',
                   'pw': 'briebrie'
          'name': 'Cheddar Mac',
'private_snippet': 'My SSN is <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=078-05-1120">078-05-1120</a>..',
         'pw': 'odras',
'snippets': [],
'web_site': 'https://www.google.com/search?q="pecorino+sardo"'}}
```

Gruyere allows the user to upload files of any type, including .gtl files. So the attacker can simply upload their own copy of  $\underline{\text{dump}}.\underline{\text{gtl}}$  or a similar file i



Here I create a file with the same gtl extension and add this code for retreiving the data from the database .



### 11. Client-State Manipulation

### 11.1. Privilege Escalation

Reference No:	Risk Rating:	
WEB_VUL_01	High	
Tools Used:		

**Browser** 

### **Vulnerability Description:**

Privilege escalation is the act of exploiting a bug, a design flaw, or a configuration oversight in an operating system or software application to gain elevated access to resources that are normally protected from an application or user. The result is that an application or user with more privileges than intended by the application developer or system administrator can perform unauthorized actions.

### Vulnerability Identified by / How It Was Discovered

Manual Analysis

### **Vulnerable URLs / IP Address**

 $https://googlegruyere.appspot.com/saveprofile?action=new\&uid=Usman+Khaliq\&pw=1122\&is\_author=True$ 

### Implications / Consequences of not Fixing the Issue

An adversary having knowledge about Privilege escalation could easily become admin from normal user.

### **Suggested Countermeasures**

It is recommended to implement below control for mitigating the Privilege escalation:

- Input Validation
- Url Encryption

#### References

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege escalation

https://www.eccouncil.org/cybersecurity-exchange/penetration-testing/privilege-escalations-attacks/

### **Proof of concept:**

### **Manual Analysis:**

### Create a new user with default privileges.



### Now User has Created Successfuly



This is the file that is visible we can see that its checking with if statement that If cookies are present are not in request.

```
</head>
   [[include:menubar.gtl]][[/include:menubar.gtl]]
   <div>
   <h2>Gruyere: Profile</h2>
   </div>
15 <div class='content'>
16 [[if:_cookie.is_admin]]
     <h3>Add a new account or edit an existing account.</h3>
18 [[/if:_cookie.is_admin]]
19 [[if:!_cookie.is_admin]]
     <h3>Edit your profile.</h3>
21 [[/if:!_cookie.is_admin]]
22 [[if:_message]]
23 <div class='message'>{{_message}}</div>
24 [[/if:_message]]
26 <form method='get' action='/{{_unique_id}}/saveprofile'>
   <input type='hidden' name='action' value='update'>
28 
     User id:
     >
32 [[if:_cookie.is_admin]]
     [[if:uid]]
       <input type='hidden' name='uid' value='{{uid.0}}'>
{{uid.0}}
     [[/if:uid]]
        <input type='hidden' name='uid' value='{{_cookie.uid}}'>
     {{_cookie.uid}}
[[/if:!uid]]
41 [[/if:_cookie.is_admin]]
   [[if:!_cookie.is_admin]]
    [[if:_cookie.uid]]
     {{_cookie.uid}}
[[/if:_cookie.uid]]
[[if:!_cookie.uid]]
         <not logged in&gt;
     [[/if:!_cookie.uid]]
49 [[/if:!_cookie.is_admin]]
     User name:
     <input type='text'</pre>
         riput type= text
value='[[if:uid]]{{_db.*uid.name:text}}[[/if:uid]][[if:!uid]]{{_profile.name:text}}[[/if:!uid]]'
name='name' maxlength='16'>
```

← C			
Server reset to default values			

### 11.2. Cookie Manipilation

Reference No:	Risk Rating:		
WEB_VUL_02	High		
Tools Used:			

**Browser** 

### **Vulnerability Description:**

This vulnerability allows attackers to alter the cookie's content and impersonate other users by encoding their modified data back into the cookie. This attack involves stealing a user's cookie to gain unauthorized access to their account within an application.

### Vulnerability Identified by / How It Was Discovered

Manual Analysis

### **Vulnerable URLs / IP Address**

https://googlegruyere.appspot.com/saveprofile

### Implications / Consequences of not Fixing the Issue

This attack involves stealing a user's cookie to gain unauthorized access to their account within an application.

### **Suggested Countermeasures**

**Use Secure Flags** 

Validate and Sanitize Inputs

Implement SameSite Attribute

**Encrypt Cookie Data** 

### References

<u>PortSwigger Web Security Academy - DOM-based Cookie Manipulation</u>

Improving Web Application Security: Threats and Countermeasures


TuringSecure - Cookie Manipulation (DOM-Based)

### **Proof of concept:**

### **Manual Analysis:**

We can simple map the new administrator user with the existing user to user their cookies and and created a new admin user we can utilize the given command.

### https://google -groyereappspot.com/saveprofile?action=new&uid=administrator|admin|author&pw=1122





$\leftarrow$	C https://google-gruyere.appspot.com/466337280651577415253218160287004418906/quitserver
Server	r quit.

### 11.3. XSRF Cross-site Request Forgery.

Reference No:	Risk Rating:	Risk Rating:	
WEB_VUL_03	Medium		
Tools Used:			
Browser			

### **Vulnerability Description:**

When a browser makes requests to a site, it always sends along any cookies it has for that site, regardless of where the request comes from. Additionally, web servers generally cannot distinguish between a request initiated by a deliberate user action (e.g., user clicking on "Submit" button) versus a request made by the browser without user action (e.g., request for an embedded image in a page). Therefore, if a site receives a request to perform some action (like deleting a mail, changing contact address), it cannot know whether this action was knowingly initiated by the user — even if the request contains authentication cookies. An attacker can use this fact to fool the server into performing actions the user did not intend to perform.

### Vulnerability Identified by / How It Was Discovered

Manual Analysis

#### **Vulnerable URLs / IP Address**

https://googlegruyere.appspot.com/466337280651577415253218160287004418906/deletes nippet?index=1

### Implications / Consequences of not Fixing the Issue

An attacker can use this fact to fool the server into performing actions the user did not intend to perform.

### **Suggested Countermeasures**

It is recommended to:


- Use CSRF Tokens
- Synchronizer Token Pattern
- Double Submit Cookies
- SameSite Cookie Attribute
- Custom Request Headers

### References

https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/csrf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site\_request\_forgery

### **Proof of concept:**



### 11.4. Remote Code Execution.

Reference No:	Risk Rating:	
WEB_VUL_04	High	
Tools Used:		
Browser, Python		
Viole analytiku Dagovinskian.		

#### **Vulnerability Description:**

If an attacker can execute arbitrary code remotely on your server, it's usually game over. They may be able to take control over the running program or potentially break out the process to open a new shell on the computer. From here, it's usually not hard to compromise the entire machine the server is running on.

### Vulnerability Identified by / How It Was Discovered

Manual Analysis

### **Vulnerable URLs / IP Address**

https://google-

gruyere.appspot.com/466337280651577415253218160287004418906/upload2

### Implications / Consequences of not Fixing the Issue

An adversary having knowledge of JavaScript will be able to steal the user's credentials, hijack user's account, exfiltrate sensitive data, can access the client's computer and even can redirect into other pages created by the adversary. And the impact will be faced by all users visiting the compromised page.

### **Suggested Countermeasures**

It is recommended to:

- Least Privilege:
- Application Level Checks:
- Bounds Checks:

#### References

https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/remote-code-execution/

https://www.lakera.ai/blog/remote-code-execution

https://medium.com/@anandrishav2228/remote-code-execution-rce-an-in-depth-guide-with-practical-7082a7e17e97

### 12. Proof of concept:

There is no Filtering of the file you can upload any file to the server after that execute that file and then code is executed on the server.

