



INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY AND DIGITAL FORENSICS ACADEMY

Assignment Title: Static Malware Analysis-Investigating a suspicious malware

Course Code: ACI803 Malware Analysis for Cybercrime


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Programme: Advance Cybercrime Investigations

Instructor Name: Aminu Idris

Date of Submission: 09/14/2025



AHTISHAM TANVEER

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CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATIONS





Exp Date: **November, 2025**

1. Executive Summary

During this investigation, a suspicious Windows executable was analyzed using static malware analysis techniques inside a controlled FLARE VM environment. The sample was discovered on a workstation involved in a financial fraud case and had initially evaded antivirus detection.

Analysis revealed that the file is a **packed 32-bit Windows Portable Executable (PE)** designed to conceal its functionality. The binary makes use of memory allocation, process manipulation, and networking-related APIs, suggesting capabilities such as process injection and command-and-control (C2) communication. Strings and import table analysis identified possible indicators of compromise (IOCs), including suspicious API calls and references consistent with credential theft or banking malware.

Overall, the evidence supports the assessment that this executable is **malicious**, most likely a banking trojan or loader associated with financial crime campaigns.




Lab Environment – Using FLARE VM:

The virtual machine environment was configured using **FLARE VM**, which leverages **Boxstarter** and **Chocolatey** as automation tools for installing and managing the analysis utilities.

- **Boxstarter** was used to automate initial configuration of the VM.
- **Chocolatey** served as the package manager for installing malware analysis tools such as PESTudio, Detect It Easy, IDA Free, and Strings.

This ensured that the environment was consistent, reproducible, and contained all required analysis tools without manual setup errors.



```
Administrator: Windows PowerShell
Progress: Downloading boxstarter 3.0.3... 100%

Boxstarter v3.0.3 [Approved]
Boxstarter package files install completed. Performing other installation steps.
To load all Boxstarter Modules immediately, just enter 'BoxstarterShell'.
Interested in Windows Azure VM integration? Run CINST Boxstarter.Azure to install Boxstarter's
The install of Boxstarter was successful.
Software install location not explicitly set, it could be in package or
default install location of installer.

Chocolatey installed 6/6 packages.
See the log for details (C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\logs\chocolatey.log).

Installed:
- Boxstarter v3.0.3
- Boxstarter.Bootstrapper v3.0.3
- Boxstarter.Chocolatey v3.0.3
- Boxstarter.Common v3.0.3
- Boxstarter.HyperV v3.0.3
- Boxstarter.WinConfig v3.0.3
Boxstarter Module Installer completed
[+] Attempting to disable updates...
Boxstarter: Microsoft Update is currently enabled.
Boxstarter: Disabling Microsoft Update...
[!] Failed to disable Microsoft Store updates
Chocolatey v2.5.1
Added vm-packages - C:\Users\Ahtisham\Desktop;.https://www.myget.org/F/vm-packages/api/v2;htt
es/api/v2 (Priority 1)
Chocolatey v2.5.1
Enabled allowGlobalConfirmation
Chocolatey v2.5.1
Enabled allowEmptyChecksums
Chocolatey v2.5.1
Updated cacheLocation = C:\Users\Ahtisham\AppData\Local\ChocoCache
PS C:\Users\Ahtisham\Desktop>
```

```

Administrator: Windows PowerShell
Windows PowerShell
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Try the new cross-platform PowerShell https://aka.ms/pscore6

PS C:\Windows\system32> cd desktop
cd : Cannot find path 'C:\Windows\system32\desktop' because it does not exist.
At line:1 char:1
+ cd desktop
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : ObjectNotFound: (C:\Windows\system32\desktop:String) [Set-Location], ItemNotFoundException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : PathNotFound,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.SetLocationCommand

PS C:\Windows\system32> cd $env:USERPROFILE\Desktop
Set-Location : A positional parameter cannot be found that accepts argument '\Desktop'.
At line:1 char:1
+ cd $env:USERPROFILE\Desktop
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : InvalidArgument: (:) [Set-Location], ParameterBindingException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : PositionalParameterNotFound,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.SetLocationCommand

PS C:\Windows\system32> cd $env:USERPROFILE\Desktop
PS C:\Users\Ahtisham\Desktop> Unblock-File .\install.ps1
PS C:\Users\Ahtisham\Desktop> Set-ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -Scope CurrentUser -
Set-ExecutionPolicy : A positional parameter cannot be found that accepts argument '-'.
At line:1 char:1
+ Set-ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -Scope CurrentUser -
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : InvalidArgument: (:) [Set-ExecutionPolicy], ParameterBindingException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : PositionalParameterNotFound,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.SetExecutionPolicyCommand

PS C:\Users\Ahtisham\Desktop> Set-ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -Scope CurrentUser -Force
PS C:\Users\Ahtisham\Desktop> .\install.ps1
[+] Starting GUI to allow user to edit configuration file...
[+] Checking for Internet connectivity (google.com)... (mandatory)
[+] Checking for Internet connectivity (github.com)... (mandatory)
[+] Checking for Internet connectivity (raw.githubusercontent.com)... (mandatory)

```

2. Analysis Section

Countering errors and solutions, while executing a malware:

Defender Exclusion

Microsoft Defender kept deleting the malware sample during analysis. To stop this, we excluded only the analysis folder from Defender scans so the file would stay intact without disabling protection system-wide.

Disabling Real-Time Protection

Even with the exclusion, Defender was still aggressive. We briefly turned off real-time monitoring so tools like PESTudio and Detect It Easy could access the file.

Restoring Security

After finishing the analysis, we turned Defender back on and removed the exclusion. This returned the VM to a safe state and reduced any risk of infection.

```

Administrator: Windows PowerShell

Windows PowerShell
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Try the new cross-platform PowerShell https://aka.ms/pscore6

PS C:\Windows\system32> New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path "C:\malware_lab\Sample"

Directory: C:\malware_lab

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
d-----          9/11/2025   3:43 PM             Sample

PS C:\Windows\system32> Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath "C:\malware_lab\Sample"
PS C:\Windows\system32> Get-MpPreference | Select-Object -Property ExclusionPath


ExclusionPath
-----
{C:\malware_lab\Sample}



PS C:\Windows\system32> Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true
PS C:\Windows\system32>


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Task 1: Basic File Identification


Tools Used: Detect It Easy (DIE), PESTudio










Task 2: Strings Analysis






Task 3: PE Header and Section Review






Task 4: Import Table Analysis






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- Virus Total lookup of the hash showed detection across multiple antivirus engines, flagging the sample as a **banking Trojan/credential stealer**.
- Related samples have been linked to financial crime campaigns targeting online banking credentials.



Task 6: Basic Disassembly Overview



```

.idata:0048F404 ; DWORD (__stdcall *SetNamedSecurityInfoA)(LPSTR pObjectName, SE_OBJECT_TYPE ObjectType, SEC
.idata:0048F404 __imp_SetNamedSecurityInfoA dd offset advapi32_SetNamedSecurityInfoA
.idata:0048F404 ; DATA XREF: SetNamedSecurityInfoAtr
.idata:0048F408 db 0, 0, 0, 0
.idata:0048F40C ;
.idata:0048F40C ; Imports from KERNEL32.dll
.idata:0048F40C ;
.idata:0048F40C ; ATOM (__stdcall *AddAtomA)(LPCSTR lpString)
.idata:0048F40C __imp_AddAtomA dd offset kernel32_AddAtomA
.idata:0048F40C ; DATA XREF: AddAtomAtr
.idata:0048F40C ; .idata:0048F024fo
.idata:0048F410 ; BOOL (__stdcall *CloseHandle)(HANDLE hObject)
.idata:0048F410 __imp_CloseHandle dd offset kernel32_CloseHandle
.idata:0048F410 ; DATA XREF: CloseHandletr
.idata:0048F414 ; BOOL (__stdcall *CopyFileA)(LPCSTR lpExistingFileName, LPCSTR lpNewFileName, BOOL bFailIfE
00030210 0048F410: .idata:__imp_CloseHandle (Synchronized with EIP)

```

3. Conclusion

The file under investigation is confirmed to be **malicious**. Static analysis revealed that it is a packed Windows executable, containing suspicious strings, obfuscated sections, and imports associated with process manipulation, registry modification, and network communication.

The disassembly strongly suggests the malware acts as a **loader/unpacker** for further payloads, with behavior consistent with **banking Trojans or credential-stealing malware** used in financial fraud.

Next Steps / Recommendations:

- Conduct dynamic analysis in a sandbox to observe runtime behavior (network connections, file/registry changes).
- Share IOCs (hashes, suspicious strings, API calls) with threat intelligence teams.
- Alert financial institutions and coordinate with law enforcement for possible linkage to broader fraud campaigns.