

Dynamic Pricing on Online Marketplaces: Strategies and Applications

Demand Probabilities

Dr. Rainer Schlosser

Hasso Plattner Institute (EPIC)

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Project A: Multiple Features (Optimization)

- Estimate sales probabilities

$$\pi(1, \vec{x}(a, \vec{s})) \text{ (sale) and } \pi(0, \vec{x}(a, \vec{s})) = 1 - \pi(1, \vec{x}(a, \vec{s})) \text{ (no sale).}$$

- Use logistic regression: $\pi(1, \vec{x}(a, \vec{s})) = \frac{\exp(\vec{\beta}'\vec{x})}{1 + \exp(\vec{\beta}'\vec{x})} \in (0, 1)$.
- Model: time homogeneous
infinite horizon
single product
real-life data

Project B: Multiple Products

- Assume sales observations for two products, e.g.,

$$y_t^{(1)} \sim \left(25 - 0.4 \cdot (a_t^{(1)})^{1.2} + 0.3 \cdot (a_t^{(2)})^{0.9} + 0.3 \cdot (p_t^{(1)})^{1.1} + 0.1 \cdot (p_t^{(2)})^{0.8} + U(-5, 5) \right)^+$$

$$y_t^{(2)} \sim \left(15 + 0.3 \cdot (a_t^{(1)})^{0.7} - 0.4 \cdot (a_t^{(2)})^{1.1} + 0.2 \cdot (p_t^{(1)})^{0.8} + 0.3 \cdot (p_t^{(2)})^{0.9} + U(-5, 5) \right)^+$$

- The competitors' prices can be defined by $p_1^{(1)} = 45$, $p_1^{(2)} = 35$,

$$p_t^{(i)} = p_{t-1}^{(i)} + 1_{U(0,1) < 0.2} \cdot U(-2, 2), \quad i = 1, 2, \quad \text{for } t = 1, \dots, 100.$$

- Our prices are defined by $a_1^{(1)} = 45$, $a_1^{(2)} = 35$,

$$a_t^{(j)} = \text{if } U(0,1) < 0.5 \text{ then } a_{t-1}^{(j)} \text{ else } \left(p_{t-1}^{(j)} + U(-3, 3) \right), \quad j = 1, 2, \quad \text{for } t = 1, \dots, 100.$$

- Use least squares to estimate the sales rates: $\lambda^{(j)}(\vec{x}^{(j)}(\vec{a}, \vec{s})) = \vec{\beta}^{(j)'} \vec{x}^{(j)}$.
- Use explanatory variables, $j = 1, 2$, $I = J = 2$, $\vec{a} = (a^{(1)}, a^{(2)})$, $\vec{s} = (p^{(1)}, p^{(2)})$,
 - (i) $x_{t,1}^{(j)}(\vec{a}, \vec{s}) = 1$ constant / intercept
 - (ii) $x_{t,2}^{(j)}(\vec{a}, \vec{s}) := a_t^{(j)} - \min_{k=1, \dots, J, k \neq j} \{a_t^{(k)}\}$ price gap between $a_t^{(j)}$ and the best own price
 - (iii) $x_{t,3}^{(j)}(\vec{a}, \vec{s}) := a_t^{(j)} - \min_{i=1, \dots, I} \{p_t^{(i)}\}$ price gap between $a_t^{(j)}$ and the best competitors' price
 - (vi) $x_{t,4}^{(j)}(\vec{a}, \vec{s}) := x_{t,2}^{(j)}(\vec{a}, \vec{s})^2$ squared version of variable $x_{t,2}^{(j)}(\vec{a}, \vec{s})$

- Use sales probabilities (based on the rates $\lambda^{(j)}(\vec{a}, \vec{s}; \vec{\beta}^{(j)*})$, $j=1,2$):

$$P_t^{(j)}(i, \vec{a}, \vec{s}) := \frac{\lambda^{(j)}(\vec{a}, \vec{s}; \vec{\beta}^{(j)*})^i}{i!} \cdot e^{-\lambda^{(j)}(\vec{a}, \vec{s}; \vec{\beta}^{(j)*})}, \quad i = 0, 1, 2, \dots \quad (\text{probability of } y^{(j)} = i)$$

- Sales observations can also be simulated by $\lambda^{(j)}(\vec{x}^{(j)}(\vec{a}, \vec{s})) = \vec{\beta}^{(j)'} \vec{x}^{(j)}$, where

j	$\beta_1^{(j)}$	$\beta_2^{(j)}$	$\beta_3^{(j)}$	$\beta_4^{(j)}$
1	20.43	0.92	-0.73	-0.042
2	7.08	-1.09	-0.49	-0.038

- Alternative (Binary case): Use sales probabilities (sale or no sale), $j=1,2$,

$$\pi^{(j)}(1, \vec{x}^{(j)}(\vec{a}, \vec{s})) = 1 - \exp\left(-\lambda^{(j)}(\vec{x}^{(j)}(\vec{a}, \vec{s}))\right) \quad (\text{probability of } y^{(j)} = 1)$$

Project C: Perishable Products

- Use explanatory variables:

- (i) $x_1^{(i,t)} = 1$ constant / intercept
- (ii) $x_2^{(i,t)} := r^{(i,t)}$ rank of price $a^{(i,t)}$ within the prices $\vec{p}^{(i,t)}$
- (iii) $x_3^{(i,t)} := a^{(i,t)} - \min_{k=1,\dots,K^{(i,t)}} \{p_k^{(i,t)}\}$ price gap between $a^{(i,t)}$ and the best competitors' price
- (iv) $x_4^{(i,t)} := K^{(i,t)}$ total number of competitors for product i in period t
- (v) $x_5^{(i,t)} := (a^{(i,t)} + \sum_k p_k^{(i,t)}) / (1 + K^{(i,t)})$ average price level for product i in period t
- (vi) $x_6^{(i,t)} := t^2$ impact of time/period t

- Consider the sales probability: $\pi_t(\vec{x}(a, \vec{s})) = \frac{\exp(\vec{\beta}'\vec{x})}{1 + \exp(\vec{\beta}'\vec{x})} \in (0,1)$, $\vec{s} = (t, \vec{p})$.

- Use coefficients, e.g., $\vec{\beta}^* = (\beta_1^*, \beta_2^*, \beta_3^*, \beta_4^*, \beta_5^*, \beta_6^*) = (-3.89, -0.56, -0.01, 0.07, -0.02, 0.01)$
- Use sales probabilities (based on $\pi_t(\vec{x}(a, \vec{s}))$):

(i) Poisson probabilities, $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots$

$$P_t(i, a, \vec{s}) := \frac{(10 \cdot \pi_t(\vec{x}(a, \vec{s})))^i}{i!} \cdot e^{-10 \cdot \pi_t(\vec{x}(a, \vec{s}))} \quad (\text{probability of } y = i)$$

or

(ii) Binomial probabilities, $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots, m$, where, e.g., $m = 10$,

$$P_t(i, a, \vec{s}) := \binom{m}{i} \cdot \pi_t(\vec{x}(a, \vec{s}))^i \cdot (1 - \pi_t(\vec{x}(a, \vec{s})))^{m-i} \quad (\text{probability of } y = i)$$

Simulation of observation data

- The competitors' prices can be defined by $p_1^{(1)} = 45$, $p_1^{(2)} = 35$,

$$p_t^{(i)} = p_{t-1}^{(i)} + 1_{U(0,1) < 0.2} \cdot U(-2, 2), \quad i = 1, 2, \text{ for } t = 1, \dots, 100.$$

- Our prices are defined by $a_1^{(1)} = 45$, $a_1^{(2)} = 35$,

$$a_t = \text{if } U(0,1) < 0.5 \text{ then } a_{t-1} \text{ else } (a_{t-1} + U(-3, 3)), \text{ for } t = 1, \dots, 100.$$

- Simulate sales observations according to the sales probabilities above:

$$y_t \sim P_t(i, a, \vec{s})$$

Project D: Response Strategies

- Use explanatory variables:

- | | | |
|-------|---|-----------------------------|
| (i) | $x_1(a, p) = 1$ | constant / intercept |
| (ii) | $x_2(a, p) = r(a, p) := 1 + 0.5 \cdot (1_{\{p < a\}} + 1_{\{p \leq a\}})$ | price rank |
| (iii) | $x_3(a, p) = a - p$ | price gap |
| (iv) | $x_4(a, p) := 1$ | total number of competitors |
| (v) | $x_5(a, p) = (a + p) / 2$ | average price level |

- Consider the sales probability: $\pi(\vec{x}(a, p)) = \frac{\exp(\vec{\beta}'\vec{x})}{1 + \exp(\vec{\beta}'\vec{x})} \in (0, 1)$.

- Use coefficients, e.g., $\vec{\beta}^* = (\beta_1^*, \beta_2^*, \beta_3^*, \beta_4^*, \beta_5^*, \beta_6^*) = (-3.89, -0.56, -0.01, 0.07, -0.02, 0.01)$
- Define sales probabilities (based on $\pi(\vec{x}(a, p))$) using:
 - (i) Poisson probabilities, $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots$

$$P(i, a, p) := \frac{(10 \cdot \pi(\vec{x}(a, p)))^i}{i!} \cdot e^{-10 \cdot \pi(\vec{x}(a, p))} \quad (\text{probability of } y = i)$$

or

- (ii) Binomial probabilities, $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots, m$, where, e.g., $m = 10$,

$$P(i, a, p) := \binom{m}{i} \cdot \pi(\vec{x}(a, p))^i \cdot \pi(\vec{x}(a, p))^{m-i} \quad (\text{probability of } y^{(j)} = i)$$

Simulation of observation data

- The competitors' prices can be defined by $p_1 = 45$,

$$p_t = p_{t-1} + 1_{U(0,1) < 0.2} \cdot U(-2,2), \quad i = 1, 2, \quad \text{for } t = 1, \dots, 100.$$

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- Simulate sales observations according to the sales probabilities above:

$$y \sim P(i, a, p)$$

Overview

2	April 19	Demand Estimation
3	April 26	Optimization Techniques
4	May 3	Extensions / Projects A-D
5	May 10	Assign Projects to Teams
6	May 17	no Meeting
7	May 24	Workshop / Group Meetings
8	May 31	Workshop / Group Meetings
9	June 7	Presentations (First Results) <<<
10	June 14	Workshop / Group Meetings
11	June 21	Workshop / Group Meetings
12	June 28	Workshop / Group Meetings
13	July 5	no Meeting
14	July 12	Presentations (Final Results), Discussions, Feedback