

with everyone. ...

email (any internet user was able to take part in the contest).

Part One: Loader

At the first stage, the input file is an ELF file compiled with a cross compiler for the PA-RISC architecture. IDA can work with this architecture, but not as good as with x86. Most requests to stack variables are not identified automatically, and you'll have to do it manually. At least you can see all the library functions (log, printf, memcpy, strlen, fprintf, sscanf, memset, strspn) and even symbolic names for some functions (c32, exk, cry, pad, dec, cen, dde). The program expects two input arguments: an email and key.

lt's

hard to figure out that the key should consist of two parts separated by the "-" character. The first part should consist of seven MIME64 characters (0-9A-Za-z+/), the second part of 32 hex characters that translate to 16 bytes.

.text:002014A0	1do	0x114(%r19), %r25 # .LC10 # "%02x"
.text:002014A4	сору	%r28, %r24
.text:002014A8	call	_sscanf

Further we can see calls to c32 functions that result in:

```
t = c32(-1, argv[1], strlen(argv[1])+1)

k = \sim c32(t, argv[2], strlen(argv[2])+1)
```

Name of the function is a hint: it's a CRC32 function, which is confirmed by the constant 0xEDB88320.

Next, we call the dde function (short for doDecrypt), and it receives the inverted output of the CRC32 function (encryption key) as the first argument, and the address and the size of the encrypted array as the second and third ones.

Decryption is performed by BTEA (block tiny encryption algorithm) based on the code taken from Wikipedia. We can guess that it's BTEA from the use of the constant DELTA==0x9E3779B9. It's also used in other algorithms on which BTEA is based on, but there are not many of them.

The key should be of 128-bit width, but we receive only 32 bits from CRC32. So we get three more DWORDs from the exk function (expand_key) by multiplying the previous value by the same DELTA.

However, the use of BTEA is uncommon. First of all, the algorithm supports a variable-width block size, and we use a block of 12-bytes width (there are processors that have 24-bit width registers and memory, then why should we use only powers of two). And in the second place, we switched encryption and decryption functions.

Since data stream is encrypted, cipher block chaining is applied. Enthropy is calculated for decrypted data in the cen function (calc_enthropy). If its value exceeds 7, the decryption result is considered incorrect and the program will exit.

The encryption key is 32-bit width, so it seems to be easily brute-forced. However, in order to check every key we need to decrypt 80 kilobytes of data, and then calculate enthropy. So brute-forcing the encryption key will take a lot of time.

But after the calculation, we call the pad function (strip_pad), which check and remove PKCS#7 padding. Due to CBC features, we need to decrypt only one block (the last one), extract N byte, check whether its range is between 1 and 12 (inclusive) and each of the last N bytes has value N. This allows reducing the number of operations needed to check one key. But if the last encrypted byte equals 1 (which is true for 1/256 keys), the check should be still performed.

The faster method is to assume that decoded data have a DWORD-aligned length (4 bytes). Then in the last DWORD of the last block there may be only one of three possible values: 0x04040404, 0x08080808 or 0x0C0C0C0C. By using heuristic and brute force methods you can run through all possible keys and find the right one in less than 20 minutes.

If all the checks after the decryption (entropy and the integrity of the padding) are successful, we call the fire_second_proc function, which simulates the launch of the second CPU and the loading of decrypted data of the firmware (modern devices usually have more than one processor—with different architectures).

If the second processor launches, it receives the user's email and 16 bytes with the second part of the key via the function send_auth_data. At this point we made a mistake: there was the size of the string with the email instead of the size of the second part of the key.

Part Two: Firmware

The analysis of the second part is a little bit more complicated. There was no ELF file, only a memory image —without headings, function names, and other metadata. Type of the processor and load address were unknown as well.

iniwate
DO YOU NEED A LOAN!!! Hi, My name
is Mr henry clar
DO YOU NEED A LOAN!!! Hi, My name is Mr Henry Clar
,
140510
LABELS
0-day (2)
0day (2)
29C3 (1)
3g (2)
4g (2)
Address Space Layout Randomization
(1)
advanced persistent threat (1)
analytics (10)
android (2)
apple (1)
apt (1)
arp-poisoning (1)
ASLR (1)
Asterisk (1)
ATM (1)
audit (8)
backhaul network (1)
Best of Positive Research (15)
best reverser (1)
best reversersm write-up (1)
black hat (1)
blackbox (6)
blackmailing (1)
bootkit (1)
browser security (1)
browser vulnerabilities (2)
bsod (1)
centos (2)
Chaos Communication Congress (1)
Chaos Constructions (1)
Cisco (4)
cisco systems (1)
Cisco WLC (1)
citrix (1)
client-side (1)
client-side attacks (1)
code review (2)
Command Execution (2)
Competitive Intelligence (2)
conference (1)
conference (1)
contest (1)
cookie encryption (1)
cookies (1)
crawler (1)
cross-site request forgery (1)
Cross-Site Scripting (3)
csrf (1)
ctf (6)
cve (1)
CVE-2013-1406 (1)
CVSS (2)
cvss v2 (1)
cvss v3 (1)
cybercriminal (1)
db2 luw (1)
db2 udb (1)
DDoS (1)
defeating patchguard (1)

We thought of brute force as the algorithm of determining the processor architecture. Open in IDA, set the following type, and repeat until IDA shows something similar to a code. The brute force should lead to the conclusion that it is big-endian SPARC.

Now we need to determine the load address. The function 0x22E0 is not called, but it contains a lot of code. We can assume that is the entry point of the program, the start function.

In the third instruction of the start function, an unknown library function with one argument == 0x126F0 is called, and the same function is called from the start function four more times, always with arguments with similar values (0x12718, 0x12738, 0x12758, 0x12760). And in the middle of the program, starting from 0x2490, there are five lines with text messages:

```
00002490 .ascii "Firmware loaded, sending ok back."<0>
000024B8 .ascii "Failed to retrieve email."<0>
000024D8 .ascii "Failed to retrieve codes."<0>
000024F8 .ascii "Gratz!"<0>
00002500 .ascii "Sorry may be next time..."<0>
```

Assuming that the load address equals 0x126F0-0x2490 == 0x10260, then all the arguments will indicate the lines when calling the library function, and the unknown function turns out to be the printf function (or puts).

After changing the load base, the code will look something like this:

```
ROM: 00012540
                                       save
                                                 %sp, -0x2F8, %sp
ROM: 00012544
                                                 aFirmwareLoaded, %00 ! "Firmware loaded, sending ok back."
                                       set
ROM: 00012540
                                       call
ROM: 00012550
                                       nop
                                                                                                                                      The
ROM: 00012554
                                                  0xBA0BAB0, %o0
ROM: 0001255C
                                       call
                                                 sub_12194
ROM: 88812568
                                                 %fp, var_108, %g1
%g1, %o0
0, %o1
0x101, %o2
ROM: 00012564
                                       add
ROM: 00012568
ROM: 0001256C
                                       mov
ROM: 00012570
ROM: 00012574
                                       call
                                                 sub 24064
ROM: 00012578
ROM: 0001257C
                                                 %fp, var_210, %g1
%g1, %o0
0, %o1
0x101, %o2
                                       add
ROM: 00012580
ROM: 00012584
                                       mov
ROM: 00012588
ROM: 0001258C
                                                 sub 24864
                                       call
ROM: 00012590
ROM: 00012594
                                                 %fp, var_108, %g1
%g1, %o0
                                       add
ROM: 00012598
ROM: 0001259C
                                       call
                                                 sub_12180
ROM: 000125A0
ROM: 000125A4
                                       nop
                                                 %o0, %g1
                                       mov
ROM: 000125A8
                                       cnp
                                                 %g1, -1
loc_12500
ROM: 000125AC
                                       bne
ROM: 000125B0
                                       пор
                                                 aFailedToRetrie, %00 * "Failed to retrieve email."
ROM: 000125B4
                                       set
ROM: 000125BC
```

value of 0x0BA0BAB0, transmitted to the function sub_12194, can be found in the first part of the task, in the function fire_second_proc, and is compared with what we obtain from read_pipe_u32 (). Thus sub_12194 should be called write_pipe_u32.

Similarly, two calls of the library function sub_24064 are memset (someVar, 0, 0x101) for the email and code, while sub_121BC is read_pipe_str (), reversed write_pipe_str () from the first part.

The first function (at offset 0 or address 0x10260) has typical constants of MD5_Init:

Next to the call to MD5_Init, it is easy to detect the function MD5_Update () and MD5_Final (), preceded by the call to the library strlen ().

denial of service (1)
development (2) digital substation takeover (1)
django (1)
dns flood (1)
DoS (2)
dsniff (1)
DVR (1) dvwa (1)
ebay (1)
electricity (1)
Emerson DeltaV DCS (1)
Encryption (2)
espionage (1)
events (1)
exploits (2)
Facebook (1)
FDCC (1)
fedora (1)
feedburner (1)
Firefox (1)
first (1)
For Dummies (1)
Forensics (1)
fuzzing (2)
Gartner (1)
GGSN (1)
GHOST (1) google (2)
google api (1)
google chrome (2)
GPRS (1)
gprs attach (1)
GRX (1)
GSM (2)
GTP (1)
gtp flood (1)
hack (5) hackers (1)
HackerSIM (1)
hacking (1)
hacking contest (2)
hackquest (3)
hash cracking (1) hash runner (1)
httpd (1)
huawei (1)
ibm db2 (1)
iCloud (1)
icmp timestamp (1)
ie (1)
Industrial control system (1)
information security (12)
Intel VT-x (1)
ios (2)
iOS blocking (1)
iphone (1) Juniper (1)
JunOS (1)
kernel (2)
Kraken (1)
leakages (2)

```
ROM:00010260 MD5 Init:
ROM: 00010260
ROM:00010260 ctx
                                   0x44
ROM: 00010260
ROM: 00010260
                               save
                                        %sp, -0x60, %sp
ROM: 00010264
                               st
                                        %i0, [%fp+ctx]
ROM: 00010268
                               14
                                        [%fp+ctx], %q1
ROM: 0001026C
                                        [%q1+4]
                               clr
ROM: 00010270
                                        [%fp+ctx], %g1
                               14
ROM: 00010274
                               14
                                        [%g1+4], %g2
ROM: 00010278
                                        [%fp+ctx], %g1
                               1d
ROM: 0001027C
                                        %g2, [%g1]
                               st
                                        [%fp+ctx], %g1
ROM: 00010280
                               1d
                                         0x67452301, %g2
ROM: 00010284
                               set
ROM: 0001028C
                               st
                                        %g2, [%g1+8]
ROM: 00010290
                               1d
                                        [%fp+ctx], %q1
                                        0xEFCDAB89, %q2
ROM: 00010294
                               set
ROM: 0001029C
                                        %g2, [%g1+0xC]
                               st
ROM: 000102A0
                               1d
                                        [%fp+ctx], %g1
ROM: 000102A4
                               set
                                        0x98BADCFE, %q2
ROM: 000102AC
                               st
                                        %q2, [%q1+0x10]
ROM: 000102B0
                                        [%fp+ctx], %g1
                               14
ROM: 000102B4
                                        0x10325476, %g2
                               set
ROM: 000102BC
                                        %q2, [%q1+0x14]
                               st
ROM: 000102C0
                               restore
ROM: 000102C4
                               ret1
ROM: 000102C8
                               nop
ROM:000102C8 ! End of function MD5_Init
ROM: 00012604
                                 add
                                          %fp, MD5_CTX, %g1
ROM: 00012608
                                          %q1, %o0
                                 mov
                                                               Not
ROM: 0001260C
                                          MD5_Init
                                 call
                                                               too
ROM: 00012610
                                 nop
                                          %fp, email, %g1
ROM: 00012614
                                 add
ROM: 00012618
                                          %g1, %o0
                                 mov
ROM: 0001261C
                                          strlen
                                 call
ROM: 00012620
                                 nop
                                          %00, %q3
ROM: 00012624
                                 mov
                                          %fp, MD5_CTX, %g2
ROM: 00012628
                                 add
                                          %fp, email, %g1
ROM: 0001262C
                                 add
ROM: 00012630
                                          %g2, %o0
                                 mov
ROM: 00012634
                                 mov
                                          %g1, %o1
                                          %g3, %o2
ROM: 00012638
                                 mov
ROM: 0001263C
                                          MD5_Update
                                 call
ROM: 00012640
                                 nop
ROM: 00012644
                                 add
                                          %fp, MD5 CTX, %q1
ROM: 00012648
                                          %q1, %o0
                                 mov
ROM: 0001264C
                                          MD5_Final
                                 call
```

many unknown functions are left in the start() function.

The sub_12480 function reverses the byte array of specified length. In fact, it's memrev, which receives a code array input of 16 bytes.

Obviously, the sub_24040 function checks whether the code is correct. The arguments transfer the calculated value of MD5(email), the array filled in function sub_12394, and the number 16. It could be a call to memcmp!

The real trick is happening in sub_12394. There is almost no hints there, but the algorithm is described by one phrase—the multiplication of binary matrix of the 128 by the binary vector of 128. The matrix is stored in the firmware at 0x240B8.

Thus, the code is correct if MD5(email) == matrix_mul_vector (matrix, code).

```
leaks (1)
Linux (8)
linux security (1)
LSM (1)
mach (1)
mach interface generator (1)
Magic Ouadrant (1)
man in the middle (1)
maxpatrol (1)
MBR Bootkit (1)
metrics (2)
Microsoft (5)
microsoft file handling component (1)
mig (1)
mitm (1)
MITRE (1)
mobile (1)
mobile data bypass (2)
mobile internet (1)
mobile security (2)
mod rewrite (1)
mod_security (3)
mod wsgi (1)
modems vulnerabilities (1)
Mongo DB (2)
Mozilla (1)
MS12-081 (1)
MSC denial of service (1)
MSC DoS (1)
net (1)
network equipment vulnerabilities (1)
ng tcpip stack (1)
nginx (1)
online banking (1)
online contests (1)
Osmocom (1)
OVAL (2)
OVAL Adopter (1)
password encryption (1)
passwords (2)
patch protection (1)
patchguard bypass (1)
Path Traversal (1)
PCI DSS (8)
pdp context delete (1)
penetration testing (2)
pentest (4)
phd2011 (2)
phdays (22)
PHDays CTF Quals (1)
phdays V (1)
photos (1)
PHP (1)
pirni (1)
Pool Spraying (1)
positive hack days (6)
positive research (5)
positive technologies (6)
Positive Technologies OVAL
Repository (1)
Proof-of-Concept (3)
PT Application Firewall (2)
PT Application Inspector (1)
```

```
ROM: 0001263C
                                                                                            call
                                                                                                                      MD5 Update
ROM: 00012640
                                                                                            nop
ROM: 00012644
                                                                                            add
                                                                                                                      %fp, MD5_CTX, %g1
RUM - 88812478
                                                                                            mov
                                                                                                                      %g1, %o0
MD5 Final
ROM: 0001264C
                                                                                            call.
ROM: 00012650
                                                                                            nop
ROM: 00012654
                                                                                            1dd
                                                                                                                       [%fp+var_220], %g2
                                                                                                                      {\partial code, \partial code, \quad co
ROM: 00012658
                                                                                             std
ROM: 0001265C
                                                                                            1.dd
ROM: 00012660
                                                                                            std
ROM: 00012664
                                                                                            add
ROM: 00012668
                                                                                            mov
                                                                                                                       %g1, %o0
ROM: 0001266C
                                                                                                                       0x10, %o1
                                                                                            mov
ROM: 00012670
                                                                                            cal1
                                                                                                                      sub_12480
ROM: 00012674
                                                                                            nop
                                                                                            add
                                                                                                                      %fp, code, %g2
ROM: 00012678
ROM: 00012670
                                                                                            add
                                                                                                                       %fp, var_298, %g1
                                                                                                                      %g2, %o0
%g1, %o1
ROM: 00012680
                                                                                            mov
ROM-00012684
                                                                                            mou
ROM: 00012688
                                                                                                                      sub 12394
                                                                                            call
ROM: 0001268C
                                                                                            nop
ROM: 00012690
                                                                                            add
                                                                                                                       %fp, var_298, %g2
                                                                                                                      %fp, var_288, %g1
%g2, %o0
ROM: 00012694
                                                                                            add
ROM: 00012698
                                                                                            mov
ROM: 0001269C
                                                                                            mov
                                                                                                                      %g1, %o1
0x10, %o2
ROM: 000126A0
                                                                                            mov
ROM: 000126A4
                                                                                            ca11
                                                                                                                      sub 24040
ROM: 000126A8
                                                                                            nop
ROM: 000126AC
                                                                                            mov.
                                                                                                                      %o0, %g1
ROM: 000126B0
                                                                                            CMD
ROM: 000126B4
                                                                                                                      10c 126D4
                                                                                            bne
ROM: 000126B8
                                                                                            nop
                                                                                            set
ROM: 000126BC
                                                                                                                       aGratz, %o0
                                                                                                                                                                         ! "Gratz!"
ROM: 000126C4
                                                                                            call
                                                                                                                      puts
ROM: 000126C8
                                                                                            nop
ROM: 000126CC
                                                                                                                      1oc_126E4
                                                                                            ba
ROM: 000126D0
                                                                                            nop
ROM: 000126D4
ROM: 000126D4
ROM:000126D4 loc_126D4:
                                                                                                                                                                         ! CODE XREF: start+1741i
ROM: 000126D4
                                                                                            set
                                                                                                                       aSorryMayBeNext, %o0 ! "Sorry may be next time..."
ROM: 000126DC
                                                                                            call
```

Calculating the Key

To find the correct value of the code, you need to solve a system of binary equations described by the matrix, where the right-hand side are the relevant bits of the MD5(email). If you forgot linear algebra: this is easily solved by Gaussian elimination.

If the right-hand side of the key is known (32 hexadecimal characters), we can try to guess the first seven characters so that the CRC32 calculation result was equal to the value found for the key BTEA. There are about 1024 of such values, and they can be quickly obtained by brute-force, or by converting CRC32 and checking valid characters.

Now you need to put everything together and get the key that will pass all the checks and will be recognized as valid by our verifier:)

We were afraid that no one would be able to solve the task from the beginning to the end. Fortunately, Victor Alyushin showed that our fears were groundless. You can find his write-up on the task at http://nightsite.info/blog/16542-phdays-2015-best-reverser.html. This is the second time Victor Alyushin has won the contest (he was the winner in 2013 as well).

A participant who wished to remain anonymous solved a part of the task and took second place.

Thanks to all participants!

```
Автор: Positive Research на 12:42 AM

[Мартира (G+1) +23 Recommend this on Google

Ярлыки: best reverser, phdays, security, write-up
```

7 comments:



Kate Mark August 3, 2015 at 3:57 AM

HACK ATM AND BECOME RICH TODAY

How to hack an ATM MACHINE or BANK ACCOUNT

You can hack and break into a bank's security ATM Machine without carrying guns or any weapon.

How is this possible? First of all we have to learn about the manual hacking of ATM MACHINES and BANKING ACCOUNTS HOW THE ATM MACHINE WORKS. If you have been to the bank you find out that the money in the ATM MACHINE is being filled right inside the house where the machine is built with enough security to hack this machine We have develop the special blank ATM Card which you can use in any ATM Machine around the world. this card is been programmed and can withdraw 2000 USD within 24 hours in any currency your country make use of. The card will make the security camera malfunction at that particular time until you are done with the transaction you can never be trace. getting the card you will forward the company your address details so we can proceed to send the card to you once you agree to the terms and conditions. you can

```
PTResearch (4)
Python (1)
quals (1)
random numbers (3)
random numbers generator (2)
raspberry pi (1)
Red Hat (7)
redhat (3)
registration (1)
Remote Crash (1)
research (15)
reverse engineering (1)
ROP (1)
SAP (3)
sap basis (1)
SAP DIAG (1)
SAP HR (1)
SAP's wall of fame (1)
SCADA (7)
Scada security (1)
SCAP (1)
schneider electric (2)
security (7)
security bounty program (1)
selinux (2)
server-side (7)
server-side attacks (3)
SGSN (1)
SIEM (1)
Siemens (2)
SIM Cards (1)
SIMATIC PC7 (1)
SIP Security (1)
Skybox Security (1)
smartgrid (1)
SMEP (2)
SMEP bypass (2)
sms (2)
SMS-attacks (1)
social engineering (1)
SQL-Injection (7)
SS7 (2)
SS7 denial of service (1)
SS7/SIGTRAN security (2)
statistics (5)
stats (1)
Stuxnet (2)
subscriber location (1)
surfpatrol (1)
surveillance (1)
system programming (1)
tasks (1)
telecom (30)
threats (1)
TIA Portal (1)
tickets (1)
USB (1)
USB Modem Hack (1)
USGCB (1)
video (1)
viruses. (1)
VMWare (1)
VoIP security (1)
vulnerabilities (6)
vulnerability (7)
vulnerability reward program (1)
```

contact us on email now atmmachinehackes@gmail.com

Reply

Replies



Marian Law August 21, 2015 at 7:19 AM

HOW I GET A LEGIT LOAN @ 2% INTEREST RATE

I was not sure of getting a legit loan lender online But when i could not face my Debt any more, my son was on hospital bed for surgery that involve huge money and i also needed some money to refinance and get a good home then i have to seeks for Assistance from friends and when there was no hope any more i decide to go online to seek a loan and i find VICTORIA LAWSON Loan company (marianlawson@outlook.com) with 2% interest Rate and applied immediately with my details as directed. Within seven Days of my application She wired my loan amount with No hidden charges and i could take care of my son medical bills, Renew my rent bill and pay off my debt. I will advice every loan seeker to contact Victoria Lawson Company with marianlawson@outlook.com For easy and safe transaction.

Full Name:
Address:
Tell:
loan amount:
Loan duration:
Country:
Purpose of loan:
Monthly Income:
Occupation
Next of kins :
Email :
Contact her company Via Email: marianlawson@outlook.com



johnson December 1, 2015 at 7:34 PM

Hello everyone, i want to share my testimony on how i got my ATM black magic card which have change my life today. i was once living on the street where by things were so hard for me, even to pay off my bills was very difficult for me i have to park off my apartment and start sleeping on the street of Vegas. i tried all i could do to secure a job but all went in vain because i was from the black side of America, so i decided to browse through on my phone for jobs online where i got an advert on Hackers advertising a Blank ATM card which can be used to hack any ATM Machine all over the world, i never thought this could be real because most advert on the internet are based on fraud, so i decided to give this a try and look where it will lead me to if it can change my life for good. i contacted this hackers and they told me they are from Australia and also they have branch all over the world in which they use in developing there ATM CARDS, this is real and not a scam it have help me out. to cut the story short this men who were geeks and also experts at ATM repairs, programming and execution who taught me various tips and tricks about breaking into an ATM Machine with a Blank ATM card.i applied for the Blank ATM card and it was delivered to me within 3 days and i did as i was told to and today my life have change from a street walker to my house. there is no ATM MACHINES this BLANK ATM CARD CANNOT penetrate into it because it have been programmed with various tools and software before it will be send to you. my life have really change and i want to share this to the world, i know this is illegal but also a smart way of living Big because the government cannot help us so we have to help our self. if you also want this BLANK ATM CARD i want you to contact the Hackers email on johnsonatmblackmagiccreditcard@yahoo.com OR Call +2348104244364 and your life will never remain the same.

Reply



Kathie Roper August 9, 2015 at 11:33 PM

TESTIMONY ON HOW I WAS RESCUED BY A GOD-SENT LENDER..

Hello everyone, am writing this Testimony because am really grateful for what Mason Diego did for me and my family, when I thought there was no hope he came and make my family feel alive again by lending us loan at a very low interest rate of 2%. Well I have been searching for a loan to settle my debts for the past three months all I met scammed and took my money until I finally met a God sent Lender. I never thought that there are still genuine loan lenders on the internet but to my greatest surprise i got my loan without wasting much time so if you are out there looking for a loan of any amount i would advise you to email Mr Diego via: { diegoloancompany@yahoo.com } and be free of internet scams. thanks... Kathie Roper from California, USA.

vulnerability scanner (1)
vulns (7)
waf (7)
waf bypas (1)
wasc (1)
web (1)
Web search (1)
web security (10)
web vulnerabilities (2)
web-vulnerabilities (1)
WinCC (2)
windows (4)
Windows 8 (3)
windows 8.1 (1)
Windows GDI (1)
Windows Kernel (1)
windows patchguard (1)
wireless controllers (1)
Wireshark (1)
workshop (1)
write-up (2)
XCCDF (1)
xenserver (1)
xpc (1)
XSS (4)
cc10 (1)
CONTRIBUTORS
Positive Research
Rublev Sergey
► Andrew Abramov
houseofdabus
e repdet
► TeckLord
Denis Baranov
E Feodor Kulishov
<u> </u>
yunusov
Carri Yuri

Reply



Sai Santosh August 18, 2015 at 1:31 AM

Reverse engineering and re engineering concepts work well with the people who are technically well versed and who can crack any technical issue like a jack. More challenges are in the way of data organization where software like hadoop helps a lot. I came to know about the reverse engineering when I was attending a course at hadoop training in hyderabad

Reply



Leo Meg August 29, 2015 at 12:12 AM

GET RICH IN LESS THAN 3DAYS It all depends on how fast you can be to get the new PROGRAMMED blank ATM card that is capable of hacking into any ATM machine, anywhere in the world. I got to know about this BLANK ATM CARD when I was searching for job online about a month ago..It has really changed my life for good and now I can say I'm rich and I can never be poor again. The least money I get in a day with it is about \$50,000. (fifty thousand USD) Every now and then I keeping pumping money into my account. Though is illegal, there is no risk of being caught ,because it has been programmed in such a way that it is not traceable, it also has a technique that makes it impossible for the CCTV to detect you...For details on how to get yours today, email the hackers on: (oceancardhackers@gmail.com). Tell your loved once too, and start to live large. That's the simple testimony of how my life changed for good...Love you all ...contact them now, the email address again is: oceancardhackers@gmail.com

or call +2348168199202


Reply



chi November 18, 2015 at 2:29 PM

CHI YOUNG TECH of the email address. (chiyoungtechworld@gmail.com) its at it again! Cool way to have financial freedom!!! Are you tired of living a poor life, then here is the opportunity you have been waiting for. Get the new ATM BLANK CARD that can hack any ATM MACHINE and withdraw money from any account. You do not require anybody's account number before you can use it. Although you and I knows that its illegal, there is no risk using it. It has SPECIAL FEATURES, that makes the machine unable to detect this very card, and its transaction is can't be traced . You can use it anywhere in the world. With this card, you can withdraw nothing less than \$50,000 in a day. So to get the card, reach the hackers via email address: chiyoungtechworld@gmail.com.

Reply



2013/12/26	26 Tositive Research Center, Best Reverser white-Op. Analyzing Oncommon Philiwate				
Newer Post	Home	Older Post			
Subscribe to: Post Comments (Atom)					
	Picture Window tem	iplate. Powered by Blogger.			