1. Suppose A=(ax) is a matrix game and that all is a saddle point. Show that flow i, (oli) are safety strategies for player 1 and player 2 (aka optimal strategies)

Mounth Principle { Player 2: Find P so that Ming p TAg is the largest p is the safety strategy for safety strategy player 2. Find q so that MaxqPTAg is the smallest q is the safety strategy

Definition of sadlle foint:

ay is the minimum of the reco

Saiddle point occurs when the maximum of row equals the minimum of column, or in other words

(player) Man Min = Min Max, thus, we need (p, a) such that the occur giving us the row and column that are the safety strategies of player I and player 2 respectively

2. Solve the game with matrix [ 0 2 ) for any arbitrary number to. Draw the graph of v(t), the value of the game, as a function of t

min is lowest port of graph

max is highest-pout of graph

 $0 | 12+22 \Rightarrow P^{2} \frac{|t-1|}{|t-1|+|0-2|} | -P = \frac{|0-2|}{|t-1|+|0-2|}$   $\Rightarrow t>2$ 

P = 10-01 10-01 +1a-61

1-p [n-b]

0 +41 No Intersection

Column 2 dominates column 1

Thus you derive row 1, column 2 to be saddle point

3. P. P. aptimal otrategies for row player of matrix game if 05t1, then tp. + (1-t)p2 is also an optimal strategy

This is a similar proof to the tourth question on howework | ne proved that for  $p_1,p_2 \leftarrow C$ ,  $\lambda p + C(-\lambda)p_2 \in C$ ,  $\lambda \in [0,1]$ 


is convex set and BR

If the convex set is a BR, then it can also be known as optimal strategy

co|2 ff co|4

$$29 = 9 + 5(1-9)$$
 $9 = 5 - 39$ 
 $69 = 3$ 
 $9 = \frac{5}{6}$ ,  $1-9 = \frac{1}{6}$ 

Value = 
$$\frac{4}{6} \times 2 + \frac{2}{6} + 1 = \frac{10}{6}$$



$$Row3$$
  $Row4$   $29-1(1-9) = -9+3(1-9)$ 

$$3q-1 = -4q + 3$$
 $7q=4, q=\frac{4}{7}, -q=\frac{4}{7}$ 
 $0 \mid 3 \mid -5$ 
 $0 \mid 1 \mid -4$ 

