


Chapter 15: Security





Chapter 15: Security

- n The Security Problem
- n Program Threats
- n System and Network Threats
- n Cryptography as a Security Tool
- n User Authentication
- n Implementing Security Defenses
- n Firewalling to Protect Systems and Networks
- n Computer-Security Classifications
- n An Example: Windows 7





Objectives

- n To discuss security threats and attacks
- n To explain the fundamentals of encryption, authentication, and hashing
- n To examine the uses of cryptography in computing
- n To describe the various countermeasures to security attacks





The Security Problem

- n System **secure** if resources used and accessed as intended under all circumstances
 - | Unachievable
- n **Intruders** (**crackers**) attempt to breach security
- n **Threat** is potential security violation
- n **Attack** is attempt to breach security
- n Attack can be accidental or malicious
- n Easier to protect against accidental than malicious misuse





Security Violation Categories

- n **Breach of confidentiality**
 - | Unauthorized reading of data
- n **Breach of integrity**
 - | Unauthorized modification of data
- n **Breach of availability**
 - | Unauthorized destruction of data
- n **Theft of service**
 - | Unauthorized use of resources
- n **Denial of service (DOS)**
 - | Prevention of legitimate use








Security Violation Methods


- n **Masquerading** (breach **authentication**)
 - | Pretending to be an authorized user to escalate privileges
- n **Replay attack**
 - | As is or with **message modification**
- n **Man-in-the-middle attack**
 - | Intruder sits in data flow, masquerading as sender to receiver and vice versa
- n **Session hijacking**
 - | Intercept an already-established session to bypass authentication





Standard Security Attacks






Security Measure Levels

- n Impossible to have absolute security, but make cost to perpetrator sufficiently high to deter most intruders
- n Security must occur at four levels to be effective:
 - | **Physical**
 - ▶ Data centers, servers, connected terminals
 - | **Human**
 - ▶ Avoid **social engineering**, **phishing**, **dumpster diving**
 - | **Operating System**
 - ▶ Protection mechanisms, debugging
 - | **Network**
 - ▶ Intercepted communications, interruption, DOS
- n Security is as weak as the weakest link in the chain
- n But can too much security be a problem?





Program Threats

- n Many variations, many names
- n **Trojan Horse**
 - | Code segment that misuses its environment
 - | Exploits mechanisms for allowing programs written by users to be executed by other users
 - | **Spyware, pop-up browser windows, covert channels**
 - | Up to 80% of spam delivered by spyware-infected systems
- n **Trap Door**
 - | Specific user identifier or password that circumvents normal security procedures
 - | Could be included in a compiler
 - | How to detect them?





Program Threats (Cont.)

n Logic Bomb

- | Program that initiates a security incident under certain circumstances

n Stack and Buffer Overflow

- | Exploits a bug in a program (overflow either the stack or memory buffers)
- | Failure to check bounds on inputs, arguments
- | Write past arguments on the stack into the return address on stack
- | When routine returns from call, returns to hacked address
 - ▶ Pointed to code loaded onto stack that executes malicious code
- | Unauthorized user or privilege escalation






C Program with Buffer-overflow Condition

```
#include <stdio.h>
#define BUFFER SIZE 256
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    char buffer[BUFFER SIZE];
    if (argc < 2)
        return -1;
    else {
        strcpy(buffer, argv[1]);
        return 0;
    }
}
```





Layout of Typical Stack Frame





Modified Shell Code


```
#include <stdio.h>

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    execvp(``\bin\sh'', ``\bin \sh'', NULL);
    return 0;
}
```





Hypothetical Stack Frame



Before attack

After attack





Great Programming Required?

- n For the first step of determining the bug, and second step of writing exploit code, yes
- n **Script kiddies** can run pre-written exploit code to attack a given system
- n Attack code can get a shell with the processes' owner's permissions
 - | Or open a network port, delete files, download a program, etc
- n Depending on bug, attack can be executed across a network using allowed connections, bypassing firewalls
- n Buffer overflow can be disabled by disabling stack execution or adding bit to page table to indicate "non-executable" state
 - | Available in SPARC and x86
 - | But still have security exploits





Program Threats (Cont.)

n Viruses

- | Code fragment embedded in legitimate program
- | Self-replicating, designed to infect other computers
- | Very specific to CPU architecture, operating system, applications
- | Usually borne via email or as a macro
- | Visual Basic Macro to reformat hard drive

```
Sub AutoOpen()  
    Dim oFS  
    Set oFS = CreateObject(''Scripting.FileSystemObject'')  
    vs = Shell(''c:command.com /k format c:''',vbHide)  
End Sub
```






Program Threats (Cont.)

- n **Virus dropper** inserts virus onto the system
- n Many categories of viruses, literally many thousands of viruses
 - | File / parasitic
 - | Boot / memory
 - | Macro
 - | Source code
 - | Polymorphic to avoid having a **virus signature**
 - | Encrypted
 - | Stealth
 - | Tunneling
 - | Multipartite
 - | Armored





A Boot-sector Computer Virus





The Threat Continues

- n Attacks still common, still occurring
- n Attacks moved over time from science experiments to tools of organized crime
 - | Targeting specific companies
 - | Creating botnets to use as tool for spam and DDOS delivery
 - | **Keystroke logger** to grab passwords, credit card numbers
- n Why is Windows the target for most attacks?
 - | Most common
 - | Everyone is an administrator
 - ▶ Licensing required?
 - | **Monoculture** considered harmful





System and Network Threats

- n Some systems “open” rather than **secure by default**
 - | Reduce **attack surface**
 - | But harder to use, more knowledge needed to administer
- n Network threats harder to detect, prevent
 - | Protection systems weaker
 - | More difficult to have a shared secret on which to base access
 - | No physical limits once system attached to internet
 - ▶ Or on network with system attached to internet
 - | Even determining location of connecting system difficult
 - ▶ IP address is only knowledge






System and Network Threats (Cont.)

- n **Worms** – use **spawn** mechanism; standalone program
- n Internet worm
 - | Exploited UNIX networking features (remote access) and bugs in *finger* and *sendmail* programs
 - | Exploited trust-relationship mechanism used by *rsh* to access friendly systems without use of password
 - | **Grappling hook** program uploaded main worm program
 - ▶ 99 lines of C code
 - | Hooked system then uploaded main code, tried to attack connected systems
 - | Also tried to break into other users accounts on local system via password guessing
 - | If target system already infected, abort, except for every 7th time





The Morris Internet Worm





System and Network Threats (Cont.)

n Port scanning

- | Automated attempt to connect to a range of ports on one or a range of IP addresses
- | Detection of answering service protocol
- | Detection of OS and version running on system
- | `nmap` scans all ports in a given IP range for a response
- | `nessus` has a database of protocols and bugs (and exploits) to apply against a system
- | Frequently launched from **zombie systems**
 - ▶ To decrease trace-ability





System and Network Threats (Cont.)

n Denial of Service

- | Overload the targeted computer preventing it from doing any useful work
- | **Distributed denial-of-service (DDOS)** come from multiple sites at once
- | Consider the start of the IP-connection handshake (SYN)
 - ▶ How many started-connections can the OS handle?
- | Consider traffic to a web site
 - ▶ How can you tell the difference between being a target and being really popular?
- | Accidental – CS students writing bad `fork()` code
- | Purposeful – extortion, punishment





Sobig.F Worm

- n More modern example
- n Disguised as a photo uploaded to adult newsgroup via account created with stolen credit card
- n Targeted Windows systems
- n Had own SMTP engine to mail itself as attachment to everyone in infect system's address book
- n Disguised with innocuous subject lines, looking like it came from someone known
- n Attachment was executable program that created **WINPPR23.EXE** in default Windows system directory
Plus the Windows Registry
- n

```
[HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run]
"TrayX" = %windir%\winppr32.exe /sinc
[HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run]
"TrayX" = %windir%\winppr32.exe /sinc
```





Cryptography as a Security Tool

- n Broadest security tool available
 - | Internal to a given computer, source and destination of messages can be known and protected
 - ▶ OS creates, manages, protects process IDs, communication ports
 - | Source and destination of messages on network cannot be trusted without cryptography
 - ▶ Local network – IP address?
 - Consider unauthorized host added
 - ▶ WAN / Internet – how to establish authenticity
 - Not via IP address





Cryptography

- n Means to constrain potential senders (*sources*) and / or receivers (*destinations*) of *messages*
 - | Based on secrets (**keys**)
 - | Enables
 - ▶ Confirmation of source
 - ▶ Receipt only by certain destination
 - ▶ Trust relationship between sender and receiver





Encryption

- n Constrains the set of possible receivers of a message
- n **Encryption** algorithm consists of
 - | Set K of keys
 - | Set M of Messages
 - | Set C of ciphertexts (encrypted messages)
 - | A function $E : K \rightarrow (M \rightarrow C)$. That is, for each $k \in K$, E_k is a function for generating ciphertexts from messages
 - ▶ Both E and E_k for any k should be efficiently computable functions
 - | A function $D : K \rightarrow (C \rightarrow M)$. That is, for each $k \in K$, D_k is a function for generating messages from ciphertexts
 - ▶ Both D and D_k for any k should be efficiently computable functions





Encryption (Cont.)

- n An encryption algorithm must provide this essential property: Given a ciphertext $c \in C$, a computer can compute m such that $E_k(m) = c$ only if it possesses k
 - | Thus, a computer holding k can decrypt ciphertexts to the plaintexts used to produce them, but a computer not holding k cannot decrypt ciphertexts
 - | Since ciphertexts are generally exposed (for example, sent on the network), it is important that it be infeasible to derive k from the ciphertexts






Symmetric Encryption

- n Same key used to encrypt and decrypt
 - | Therefore k must be kept secret
- n DES was most commonly used symmetric block-encryption algorithm (created by US Govt)
 - | Encrypts a block of data at a time
 - | Keys too short so now considered insecure
- n Triple-DES considered more secure
 - | Algorithm used 3 times using 2 or 3 keys
 - | For example $c = E_{k3}(D_{k2}(E_{k1}(m)))$
- n 2001 NIST adopted new block cipher - Advanced Encryption Standard (**AES**)
 - | Keys of 128, 192, or 256 bits, works on 128 bit blocks
- n RC4 is most common symmetric stream cipher, but known to have vulnerabilities
 - | Encrypts/decrypts a stream of bytes (i.e., wireless transmission)
 - | Key is a input to pseudo-random-bit generator
 - ▶ Generates an infinite **keystream**





Secure Communication over Insecure Medium





Asymmetric Encryption

- n **Public-key encryption** based on each user having two keys:
 - | **public key** – published key used to encrypt data
 - | **private key** – key known only to individual user used to decrypt data
- n Must be an encryption scheme that can be made public without making it easy to figure out the decryption scheme
 - | Most common is **RSA** block cipher
 - | Efficient algorithm for testing whether or not a number is prime
 - | No efficient algorithm is known for finding the prime factors of a number





Asymmetric Encryption (Cont.)

- n Formally, it is computationally infeasible to derive $k_{d,N}$ from $k_{e,N}$, and so k_e need not be kept secret and can be widely disseminated
 - | k_e is the **public key**
 - | k_d is the **private key**
 - | N is the product of two large, randomly chosen prime numbers p and q (for example, p and q are 512 bits each)
 - | Encryption algorithm is $E_{k_e,N}(m) = m^{k_e} \bmod N$, where k_e satisfies $k_e k_d \bmod (p-1)(q-1) = 1$
 - | The decryption algorithm is then $D_{k_d,N}(c) = c^{k_d} \bmod N$






Asymmetric Encryption Example

- n For example. make $p = 7$ and $q = 13$
- n We then calculate $N = 7 * 13 = 91$ and $(p-1)(q-1) = 72$
- n We next select k_e relatively prime to 72 and < 72 , yielding 5
- n Finally, we calculate k_d such that $k_e k_d \bmod 72 = 1$, yielding 29
- n We now have our keys
 - | Public key, $k_{e,N} = 5, 91$
 - | Private key, $k_{d,N} = 29, 91$
- n Encrypting the message 69 with the public key results in the ciphertext 62
- n Ciphertext can be decoded with the private key
 - | Public key can be distributed in cleartext to anyone who wants to communicate with holder of public key





Encryption using RSA Asymmetric Cryptography





Cryptography (Cont.)

- n Note symmetric cryptography based on transformations, asymmetric based on mathematical functions
 - | Asymmetric much more compute intensive
 - | Typically not used for bulk data encryption





Authentication

- n Constraining set of potential senders of a message
 - | Complementary to encryption
 - | Also can prove message unmodified
- n Algorithm components
 - | A set K of keys
 - | A set M of messages
 - | A set A of authenticators
 - | A function $S : K \rightarrow (M \rightarrow A)$
 - ▶ That is, for each $k \in K$, S_k is a function for generating authenticators from messages
 - ▶ Both S and S_k for any k should be efficiently computable functions
 - | A function $V : K \rightarrow (M \times A \rightarrow \{\text{true}, \text{false}\})$. That is, for each $k \in K$, V_k is a function for verifying authenticators on messages
 - ▶ Both V and V_k for any k should be efficiently computable functions





Authentication (Cont.)

- n For a message m , a computer can generate an authenticator $a \in A$ such that $V_k(m, a) = \text{true}$ only if it possesses k
- n Thus, computer holding k can generate authenticators on messages so that any other computer possessing k can verify them
- n Computer not holding k cannot generate authenticators on messages that can be verified using V_k
- n Since authenticators are generally exposed (for example, they are sent on the network with the messages themselves), it must not be feasible to derive k from the authenticators
- n Practically, if $V_k(m, a) = \text{true}$ then we know m has not been modified and that send of message has k
 - | If we share k with only one entity, know where the message originated





Authentication – Hash Functions

- n Basis of authentication
- n Creates small, fixed-size block of data **message digest** (**hash value**) from m
- n Hash Function H must be collision resistant on m
 - | Must be infeasible to find an $m' \neq m$ such that $H(m) = H(m')$
- n If $H(m) = H(m')$, then $m = m'$
 - | The message has not been modified
- n Common message-digest functions include **MD5**, which produces a 128-bit hash, and **SHA-1**, which outputs a 160-bit hash
- n Not useful as authenticators
 - | For example $H(m)$ can be sent with a message
 - ▶ But if H is known someone could modify m to m' and recompute $H(m')$ and modification not detected
 - ▶ So must authenticate $H(m)$





Authentication - MAC

- n Symmetric encryption used in **message-authentication code (MAC)** authentication algorithm
- n Cryptographic checksum generated from message using secret key
 - | Can securely authenticate short values
- n If used to authenticate $H(m)$ for an H that is collision resistant, then obtain a way to securely authenticate long message by hashing them first
- n Note that k is needed to compute both S_k and V_k , so anyone able to compute one can compute the other





Authentication – Digital Signature

- n Based on asymmetric keys and digital signature algorithm
- n Authenticators produced are **digital signatures**
- n Very useful – **anyone** can verify authenticity of a message
- n In a digital-signature algorithm, computationally infeasible to derive k_s from k_v
 - | V is a one-way function
 - | Thus, k_v is the public key and k_s is the private key
- n Consider the RSA digital-signature algorithm
 - | Similar to the RSA encryption algorithm, but the key use is reversed
 - | Digital signature of message $S_{k_s}(m) = H(m)^{k_s} \bmod N$
 - | The key k_s again is a pair (d, N) , where N is the product of two large, randomly chosen prime numbers p and q
 - | Verification algorithm is $V_{k_v}(m, a) \stackrel{?}{=} (a^{k_v} \bmod N = H(m))$
 - ▶ Where k_v satisfies $k_v k_s \bmod (p-1)(q-1) = 1$





Authentication (Cont.)

- n Why authentication is a subset of encryption?
 - | Fewer computations (except for RSA digital signatures)
 - | Authenticator usually shorter than message
 - | Sometimes want authentication but not confidentiality
 - ▶ Signed patches et al
 - | Can be basis for **non-repudiation**





Key Distribution

- n Delivery of symmetric key is huge challenge
 - | Sometimes done **out-of-band**
- n Asymmetric keys can proliferate – stored on **key ring**
 - | Even asymmetric key distribution needs care – man-in-the-middle attack






Digital Certificates

- n Proof of who or what owns a public key
- n Public key digitally signed a trusted party
- n Trusted party receives proof of identification from entity and certifies that public key belongs to entity
- n **Certificate authority** are trusted party – their public keys included with web browser distributions
 - | They vouch for other authorities via digitally signing their keys, and so on





Man-in-the-middle Attack on Asymmetric Cryptography





Implementation of Cryptography

- n Can be done at various **layers** of ISO Reference Model
 - | SSL at the Transport layer
 - | Network layer is typically **IPSec**
 - ▶ **IKE** for key exchange
 - ▶ Basis of **Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)**
- n Why not just at lowest level?
 - | Sometimes need more knowledge than available at low levels
 - ▶ i.e. User authentication
 - ▶ i.e. e-mail delivery

OSI model	
7. Application Layer	
NNTP · SIP · SSI · DNS · FTP · Gopher · HTTP · NFS · NTP · SMPP · SMTP · SNMP · Telnet · Netconf · (more)	
6. Presentation Layer	
MIME · XDR · TLS · SSL	
5. Session Layer	
Named Pipes · NetBIOS · SAP · L2TP · PPTP · SPDY	
4. Transport Layer	
TCP · UDP · SCTP · DCCP · SPX	
3. Network Layer	
IP (IPv4, IPv6) · ICMP · IPsec · IGMP · IPX · AppleTalk	
2. Data Link Layer	
ATM · SDLC · HDLC · ARP · CSLIP · SLIP · GFP · PLIP · IEEE 802.3 · Frame Relay · ITU-T G.hn DLL · PPP · X.25 · Network Switch · DHCP	
1. Physical Layer	
EIA/TIA-232 · EIA/TIA-449 · ITU-T V-Series · I.430 · I.431 · POTS · PDH · SONET/SDH · PON · OTN · DSL · IEEE 802.3 · IEEE 802.11 · IEEE 802.15 · IEEE 802.16 · IEEE 1394 · ITU-T G.hn PHY · USB · Bluetooth · Hubs	
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OSI Model			
	Data unit	Layer	Function
Host layers	Data	7. Application	Network process to application
		6. Presentation	Data representation, encryption and decryption, convert machine dependent data to machine independent data
		5. Session	Interhost communication
	Segments	4. Transport	End-to-end connections and reliability, flow control
Media layers	Packet/Datagram	3. Network	Path determination and logical addressing
	Frame	2. Data Link	Physical addressing
	Bit	1. Physical	Media, signal and binary transmission

Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OSI_model





Encryption Example - SSL

- n Insertion of cryptography at one layer of the ISO network model (the transport layer)
- n SSL – Secure Socket Layer (also called TLS)
- n Cryptographic protocol that limits two computers to only exchange messages with each other
 - l Very complicated, with many variations
- n Used between web servers and browsers for secure communication (credit card numbers)
- n The server is verified with a **certificate** assuring client is talking to correct server
- n Asymmetric cryptography used to establish a secure **session key** (symmetric encryption) for bulk of communication during session
- n Communication between each computer then uses symmetric key cryptography
- n More details in textbook





User Authentication

- n Crucial to identify user correctly, as protection systems depend on user ID
- n User identity most often established through **passwords**, can be considered a special case of either keys or capabilities
- n Passwords must be kept secret
 - | Frequent change of passwords
 - | History to avoid repeats
 - | Use of “non-guessable” passwords
 - | Log all invalid access attempts (but not the passwords themselves)
 - | Unauthorized transfer
- n Passwords may also either be encrypted or allowed to be used only once
 - | Does encrypting passwords solve the exposure problem?
 - ▶ Might solve **sniffing**
 - ▶ Consider **shoulder surfing**
 - ▶ Consider Trojan horse keystroke logger
 - ▶ How are passwords stored at authenticating site?





Passwords

- n Encrypt to avoid having to keep secret
 - | But keep secret anyway (i.e. Unix uses superuser-only readable file `/etc/shadow`)
 - | Use algorithm easy to compute but difficult to invert
 - | Only encrypted password stored, never decrypted
 - | Add “salt” to avoid the same password being encrypted to the same value
- n One-time passwords
 - | Use a function based on a seed to compute a password, both user and computer
 - | Hardware device / calculator / key fob to generate the password
 - ▶ Changes very frequently
- n Biometrics
 - | Some physical attribute (fingerprint, hand scan)
- n Multi-factor authentication
 - | Need two or more factors for authentication
 - ▶ i.e. USB “dongle”, biometric measure, and password





Implementing Security Defenses

- n **Defense in depth** is most common security theory – multiple layers of security
- n **Security policy** describes what is being secured
- n Vulnerability assessment compares real state of system / network compared to security policy
- n Intrusion detection endeavors to detect attempted or successful intrusions
 - | **Signature-based** detection spots known bad patterns
 - | **Anomaly detection** spots differences from normal behavior
 - ▶ Can detect **zero-day** attacks
 - | **False-positives** and **false-negatives** a problem
- n Virus protection
 - | Searching all programs or programs at execution for known virus patterns
 - | Or run in **sandbox** so can't damage system
- n Auditing, accounting, and logging of all or specific system or network activities
- n Practice **safe computing** – avoid sources of infection, download from only “good” sites, etc






Firewalling to Protect Systems and Networks

- n A network **firewall** is placed between trusted and untrusted hosts
 - | The firewall limits network access between these two **security domains**
- n Can be tunneled or spoofed
 - | Tunneling allows disallowed protocol to travel within allowed protocol (i.e., telnet inside of HTTP)
 - | Firewall rules typically based on host name or IP address which can be spoofed
- n **Personal firewall** is software layer on given host
 - | Can monitor / limit traffic to and from the host
- n **Application proxy firewall** understands application protocol and can control them (i.e., SMTP)
- n **System-call firewall** monitors all important system calls and apply rules to them (i.e., this program can execute that system call)





Network Security Through Domain Separation Via Firewall





Computer Security Classifications

- n U.S. Department of Defense outlines four divisions of computer security: **A**, **B**, **C**, and **D**
- n **D** – Minimal security
- n **C** – Provides discretionary protection through auditing
 - | Divided into **C1** and **C2**
 - ▶ **C1** identifies cooperating users with the same level of protection
 - ▶ **C2** allows user-level access control
- n **B** – All the properties of **C**, however each object may have unique sensitivity labels
 - | Divided into **B1**, **B2**, and **B3**
- n **A** – Uses formal design and verification techniques to ensure security





Example: Windows 7

- n Security is based on **user accounts**
 - | Each user has unique security ID
 - | Login to ID creates **security access token**
 - ▶ Includes security ID for user, for user's groups, and special privileges
 - ▶ Every process gets copy of token
 - ▶ System checks token to determine if access allowed or denied
- n Uses a **subject** model to ensure access security
 - | A subject tracks and manages permissions for each program that a user runs
- n Each object in Windows has a security attribute defined by a security descriptor
 - | For example, a file has a security descriptor that indicates the access permissions for all users





Example: Windows 7 (Cont.)

- n Win added mandatory integrity controls – assigns **integrity label** to each securable object and subject
 - | Subject must have access requested in discretionary access-control list to gain access to object
- n Security attributes described by security descriptor
 - | Owner ID, group security ID, discretionary access-control list, system access-control list



End of Chapter 15

