

## **SMART CONTRACT SECURITY AUDIT OF**



## **Summary**

Audit Firm Solidity Lab

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**Client Firm Raisin Labs** 

Final Report Date Feb 19th 2023

#### **Audit Summary**

RaisinLabs engaged Solidity Lab to review the security of its Smart Contract system. From February 5th to February 17th a team of 3 auditors reviewed the source code in scope. All findings have been recorded in the following report.

Notice that the examined smart contracts are not resistant to external/internal exploit. For a detailed understanding of risk severity, source code vulnerability, and potential attack vectors, refer to the complete audit report below.

Verify the authenticity of this report in <u>Solidity Lab's Portfolio</u>.

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# **Project Overview**

Project Name	RaisinLabs
Language	Solidity
Codebase	https://github.com/crypdoughdoteth/RaisinLabs/blob/main/src/RaisinLsol#L184
Commit	<u>5b29f55</u>

Delivery Date	February 19th 2023
Audit Methodology	Static Analysis, Manual Review

Vulnerability Level	Total	Pending	Declined	Acknowledged	Partially Resolved	Resolved
<ul><li>Critical</li></ul>	0	0	0	0	0	0
• High	0	0	0	0	0	0
<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	6	6	0	0	0	0
• Low	5	5	0	0	0	0

## **Audit Scope & Methodology**

#### **Scope**

ID	File	SHA-1 Checksum
RS	Raisin.sol	26d8c7c46e12024a3cc3358100a0f589ba0f4bef

#### **Methodology**


The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross-referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by aspiring auditors.

## **Vulnerability Classifications**

Vulnerability Level	Classification
Critical	Easily exploitable by anyone, causing loss/manipulation of assets or data.
• High	Arduously exploitable by a subset of addresses, causing loss/manipulation of assets or data.
<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	Inherent risk of future exploits that may or may not impact the smart contract execution.
• Low	Minor deviation from best practices.

# **Protocol Graph**



# **Findings & Resolutions**

ID	Title	Category	Severity	Status
<u>M-1</u>	Tokens that have a "fee on transfer" will break the protocol	Token integration	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	Pending
<u>M-2</u>	Tokens that generate interest will get stuck	Token integration	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	Pending
<u>M-3</u>	A partner cannot have 0 percent feel	Logic error	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	Pending
<u>M-4</u>	Ether can get stuck	Trapped Ether	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	Pending
<u>M-5</u>	Use safeTransfer and safeTransferFrom instead of transfer and transferFrom	Token integration	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	Pending
<u>M-6</u>	Wrong token handling	Token integration	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	Pending
<u>L-1</u>	No event emission to critical functions	Events	• Low	Pending
<u>L-2</u>	No check that parameter token is a contract	Validation	• Low	Pending
<u>L-3</u>	Missing fee bounds could DoS the protocol	DoS	• Low	Pending
<u>L-4</u>	Event will be not emit	Events	• Low	Pending
<u>L-5</u>	Everyone is able to call fundWithdraw()	Access Control	• Low	Pending

# M-1 | Tokens that have a "fee on transfer" will break the protocol

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Token integration	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	Raisin.sol	Pending

#### **Description**

The protocol will break when trying to deal with tokens that has a fee on transfer.

#### **Recommendation**

Before transfer tokens from user track the amount of token in contract, and after transfer check how many tokens the contract has received, thats the amount that should be indeed to the user.

## M-2 | Tokens that generate interest will get stuck

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Token integration	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	Raisin.sol	Pending

## **Description**

If a yield bearing token is whitelisted, the interest that the token will create when it's inside the contract will be not sending to the recipient. It will be stuck inside the contract.

#### **Recommendation**

Consider whether interest bearing tokens should be supported and add logic to transfer interest to the user if they are.

## M-3 | A partner cannot have 0 percent fee

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Centralization / Privilege	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	Raisin.sol: 234-L235	Pending

## **Description**

If the partner has a 0 percent fee pf will be 0, and it will calculate amount with the default fee value

#### **Recommendation**

Use a struct to identify the partnership, use a bool to know if is a active partner and a uint16;

```
struct Partner {
   uint16 fee;
   bool active;
}
mapping (address => Partner) private partnership

function calculateFee(uint amount, adderess raiser) private view returns (uint _fee){
   if(partnership[raiser].active) {
        _fee = (amount * partnership[raiser].fee) / 10000
   } else {
        _fee = (amount * fee) / 10000;
   }
}
```

## M-4 | Ether can get stuck

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Centralization / Privilege	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	Raisin.sol: 150, 170 181	Pending

## **Description**

Some functions are payable but don't use msg.value and the contract has no method to withdraw stuck ether, this means that if someone sends ether by mistake this will get stuck forever.

#### **Recommendation**

Remove payable.

# M-5 | Use safeTransfer and safeTransferFrom instead of transfer and transferFrom

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Token integration	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	Raisin.sol: 215	Pending

## **Description**

Some non standard tokens may not return any value.

#### **Recommendation**

Use safeTransfer lib, you could use OpenZeppelin or Solmate implementations.

## M-6 | Wrong token handling

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Token transfer	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	Raisin.sol: 176-177 188-189	Pending

## **Description**

Currently you are doing and approve to itself, this not necessary and should be avoided.

#### **Recommendation**

```
diff --git a/src/Raisin.sol b/src/Raisin.sol
index 72eca99..1o31675 108644
--- a/src/Raisin.sol
+-- b/src/Raisin.sol
+-- b/src/Raisin.sol
@ -153.8 +153.8 @@ contract RaisinCore is Ownable {
    uint donation = amount - calculateFee(amount, msg.sender);
    donorBal[msg.sender][index] += donation;
    raisins[index]._fundBal += donation;
--- erc20Fransfer(token, msg.sender, vault, (amount - donation));
--- erc20Fransfer(token, msg.sender, address(this), donation);
+-- token.safeFransferForm[msg.sender, address(this), donation);
+-- token.safeFransferForm[msg.sender, address(this), donation);
--- emit TokenDonated (msg.sender, token, donation, index);
}

--- token.safeFransferForm[msg.sender, address(this), donation);
--- emit TokenDonated (msg.sender, token, donation, index);
--- index for i
```

## **LOW-01** | No event emission to critical functions

Category	Severity	Location	Status	
Events	<ul><li>Low</li></ul>	Raisin.sol: 153	Pending	

## **Description**

There is no event emission when updating/setting a variable inside a function with the modifier onlyOwner.

## **Recommendation**

Add event emission to critical functions / onlyOwner

## LOW-02 | No check that parameter token is a contract

Category	Severity	Location	Status	
Validation	<ul><li>Low</li></ul>	Raisin.sol: 246	Pending	

## **Description**

Firstly, there is a manual check to verify that the address is a smart contract. However, there is a possibility of error when submitting an address.

## **Recommendation**

Add a check in order to verify that parameter token is a smart contract.

## LOW-03 | Missing fee bounds could DOS the protocol

Category	Severity	Location	Status	
DoS	<ul><li>Low</li></ul>	Raisin.sol: 242	Pending	

## **Description**

The owner can change the fee to a value that is so high that it can make the line 153 fail.

The admin could set the fee to 1000 and then donation will be always equal to 0.

## **Recommendation**

Add a range/limit in order to not break the protocol by an error.

## LOW-04 | Event will be not emit

Category	Severity	Location	Status	
Events	<ul><li>Low</li></ul>	Raisin.sol: 190	Pending	

## **Description**

If we want an emit event, we need to have a user with 0 donation for the index (line  $\frac{184}{}$ ). This is quite illogical because a user call refund if he did a donation.

```
uint bal = donorBal[msg.sender][index];
```

#### **Recommendation**

Take the same principle as line 143.

```
if (raisins[index]._fundBal== 0){emit FundEnded(index);}
```

## LOW-05 | Everyone is able to call fundWithdraw()

Category	Severity	Location	Status	
Access Control	<ul><li>Low</li></ul>	Raisin.sol: 170	Pending	

## **Description**

It can be more logical that the only one who can call this function is the raiser.

However, even if it's a random who is calling the function. The funds will go to the recipient.

## **Recommendation**

Add a check that the caller is the raiser.

## QA |

#### Users will not be fully refunded

If the raisin failed, the user will not be full refunded (the amount that he gives) but the donation (=amount-fees). Is this your assumption? Maybe take the fees after the raisin period if it is successful? In order that the user is able to be fully refunded.

Use uint256 instead of uint

Uint is alias for uint256 but it is preferable to use uint256

Use constant for static numbers like 10000

https://github.com/crypdoughdoteth/RaisinLabs/blob/main/src/Raisin.sol#L235

- Format BPS, use `100\_00` to represent 100%
- Use natspec

https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/natspec-format.html

- require() / revert() statements should have descriptive reason strings
- Unique case

Some tokens provide airdrop (nft, erc20). Currently raisin has no way of handling these and any airdrop would be stuck. This may be a unique case that should (maybe) not be taken into account.

## QA |

Functions not used internally could be marked external

```
File: Raisin.sol

96: function getAmount(uint index) public view returns (uint){

99: function getFundBal(uint index) public view returns (uint){

102: function getToken(uint index) public view returns (IERC20){

105: function getRaiser(uint index) public view returns (address){

108: function getRecipient(uint index) public view returns (address){

111: function getExpires(uint index) public view returns (uint64){

115: function getLength() public view returns (uint){
```

#### Centralization Risk for trusted owners

Contracts have owners with privileged rights to perform admin tasks and need to be trusted to not perform malicious updates or drain funds.

```
File: Raisin.sol
10: contract RaisinCore is Ownable {
         function manageDiscount (address partnerWallet, uint newFee)
225:
external onlyOwner {
         function changeGlobalExpiry(uint newExpiry) external onlyOwner
236:
returns (uint64){
         function changeFee(uint newFee) external onlyOwner {
240:
         function whitelistToken (IERC20 token) external onlyOwner {
244:
         function removeWhitelist(IERC20 token) external onlyOwner {
249:
         function changeVault(address newAddress) external onlyOwner {
253:
```

## **Gas Optimizations** |

## Set User balance to 0 when refunding. Deducting balance with -= consumes more gas

If the raisin failed, the user will not be full refunded (the amount that he gives) but the donation (=amount-fees). Is this your assumption? Maybe take the fees after the raisin period if it is successful? In order that the user is able to be fully refunded.

#### Add indexed to variables that you want to query

Index event fields make the field more quickly accessible to off-chain tools that parse events. However, note that each index field costs extra gas during emission, so it's not necessarily best to index the maximum allowed per event (three fields). Each event should use three indexed fields if there are three or more fields, and gas usage is not particularly of concern for the events in question. If there are fewer than three fields, all of the fields should be indexed.

```
'''solidity
File: Raisin.sol

29: event TokenDonated (address indexed adr, IERC20 token, uint indexed amount, uint index);
```

#### Some conditionals compare variables to a boolean constant

Boolean constants can be used directly and do not need to be compared to true or false. You can remove the equality to the boolean constant.

## **Gas Optimizations |**

Cache variables to avoid `SLOAD`

When you are reading more than once from the same variable. Without updating it, it is recommended to use a memory variable. Instead of using the opcode SLOAD at each call. Same pattern could be applied on *donateToken*, *fundWithdraw* and *refund*.

```
function endFund (uint index) external {
    if (msg.sender != raisins[index]._raiser){revert notYourRaisin(index);}
    raisins[index]._expires = uint64(block.timestamp);
    if(raisins[index]._fundBal == 0){emit FundEnded(index);}
}

Do

***Solidity
function endFund (uint index) external {
    Raisin memory _raisin = raisins[index]
    if (msg.sender != _raisin._raiser){revert notYourRaisin(index);}
    raisins[index]._expires = uint64(block.timestamp);
    if(_raisin._fundBal == 0){emit FundEnded(index);}
}
```

Functions Can be marked payable if only the owner has access

If only the owner has access to a function it can be marked as payable to save gas. There is no risk of user funds being lost because they won't have access to those functions. All functions with the `OnlyOwner` modifier will benefit from this.

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