

Active Directory Attacks and Detection

Part -III

#Whoami

- Working as an Information Security Executive
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Key Takeaways


- Abusing S4U2 service
- Creating Golden Tickets & Silver Tickets
- Loading arbitrary DLL on DNS server

Lab Setup

AJLAB.COM:


- 2 Domain Controller – Win 2008 & Win 2012 r2
- 1 MSSQL Server – Running on Win2012 r2
- 1 Windows 2012 r2 Server
- Win7, Win10 – Workstation Machines
- PFSense used as gateway(Just in Case Internet is required)

Kerberos Ticket Process Overview



S4U2 Pwnage








Kerberos Double Hop

- Constrained Delegation is a way to limit what services a particular machine/account can access while impersonating other users.
- S4U2Self and S4u2Proxy are protocol extensions for Kerberos which will enable protocol transitions.
- S4U2Self extension is intended to be used when the user authenticates to the service in some way other than kerberos.

- S4U2Self extension allows a service to obtain a service ticket to itself on behalf of a user and it can be either obtained by using PA-FOR-USER (contains user data and user realm) or PA_S4U_X509_USER (Contains the Users Certificate).
- S4U2Proxy extension provides a service that obtains a service ticket to another service on behalf of a user.
- S4U2Proxy requires the service ticket to the first service has the Forwardable flag set, This ticket can be obtained through S4U2Self protocol exchange.

S4U2self and S4U2proxy





- Computer account configured with constrained delegation.
- Along with this User Right Assignment setting “Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation” also needs to be configured.

S4U2 Pwnage


- We will first find the machines which has msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo and TrustedToAuthForDelegation(T2A4D):
 - `import-module activedirectory`
 - `get-ADComputer -Filter {(TrustedToAuthForDelegation -eq $True) -AND (PrimaryGroupID -eq 515)} -Properties TrustedToAuthForDelegation,ServicePrincipalName,msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo`
- We will be using computer account for authentication and Kekeo tool will be used for abusing S4U.

Demo Time

S4U2 Pwnage

Blue Team Response

- Use Kerberos Constrained Delegation.
- Limit the exposure of services configured for delegation.
- Configure the user account to “Account is Sensitive and cannot be Delegated”.



- The “protected users” group available starting windows 2012 R2 domain function level also mitigates against this issue, since delegation is not allowed for accounts in this group.

Golden Ticket



- Golden Ticket is forged Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT).
- The KRBtgt account is used to encrypt and sign all kerberos ticket within the domain.
- KRBtgt account password hash can be extracted using DCSync or from the NTDS.DIT file (or any other ways).
- Golden ticket can be used to impersonate any user in the domain.
- The best part of golden ticket is you can create an golden TGT ticket for a user which does not even exist in the domain.
- By default the Golden ticket lifetime using mimikatz module is 10 years (It can be customized using /startoffset, /endin, /renewmax).


KRBTGT HASH =



KEYS TO THE KINGDOM

makeameme.org

- The Microsoft Kerberos validates a TGT's PAC only after the ticket is 20 minutes old.
- Some of the Key Things to Remember:
 - Maximum LifeTime of Service Ticket (TGS): Default is **600 minutes**
 - Maximum LifeTime of User Ticket(TGT): Default is **10 Hours**
 - Maximum LifeTime of User Ticket Renewal (TGT Renewal): Default is **7 Days**
 - Well known RID's :
 - **513**- Domain User, **512** - Domain Admin, **518** - Schema Admin, **519** - Enterprise Admin, **520** - Group Policy Creator Owner, **502** - KRBtgt Account



Demo Time

Golden Ticket

Blue Team Response

- Consider changing KRBTGT account password (2x) once a year.

Detection:

- Microsoft Advanced Threat Analytics(ATA)
- Javelin Networks AD Protect/Assessment

- In your recent engagement, you've dumped the NTDS.DIT file on Friday evening and on Monday morning to your surprise you find the hashes are no more working :(
- The Corporate AD Team had changed user, admin and service account passwords.

So WHAT NEXT ?????



Silver Ticket

- Silver Ticket is Forged Ticket Granting Service (TGS) Ticket.
- A Silver Ticket is encrypted/signed by the service account (Computer Account or Service Account).
- No AS-REQ/AS-REP, TGS-REQ/TGS-REP and no traffic sent to the Domain Controller.
- We will be using the hash of computer account to generate a silver ticket and access the services running on the target machine.
- Some of the Important service Ticket types are:
 - File Share - CIFS
 - Scheduled Tasks - HOST
 - WMI - HOST, RPCSS
 - PS Remoting - HOST, HTTP, WSMAN
 - WinRM - HTTP, WSMAN

Demo Time

Silver Ticket

YAY




**GOT A SILVER
TICKET**

memes.com

Blue Team Response

- If the Attacker has created a schedule task with the silver ticket, Author is the user account from which the attacker had created a silver ticket.



Blue Team Response

- Include computer account password change as a part of domain-wide password change scenario.

Detection:

- ~~Microsoft Advanced Threat Analytics(ATA)~~
- ~~Javelin Networks AD Protect/Assessment~~

DNSAdmin To DC Compromise

- This was an awesome find by Shay Ber, Kudos to him.
- A Windows feature abuse where the user being a member of DNSAdmins group allowing to load arbitrary DLL.
- Domain Controller's are by default DNS Servers and needs to be reachable across the domain.
- We will be using dnscmd.exe to load the DLL.
- To enable the dnscmd.exe command, the feature of DNS Server Tools needs to be enabled. The dnscmd command to load the dll looks like:
 - `dnscmd << DNS Server Name >> /config /serverlevelplugindll << path of dll >>`
- The only caveat is that the DNS service needs a restart.

Demo Time

DNSAdmin To DC Compromise

Blue Team Response

- DNS Server log EventID 550 for Failure log in loading or initialize plug-in dll.
- DNS Server log EventID 770 for Success log in loading or initialize plug-in dll.
- Monitor any changes in the Registry Hive:

HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\DNS\Parameters\ServerLevelPluginDll

References

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- Google.com (everything else)

Thank You