

Hardening Docker daemon with Rootless mode

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
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Rootless Docker









- Docker is designed to be safe by default
 - Namespaces, capabilities, cgroups, seccomp, AppArmor, SELinux...



root-in-container could break out with an exploit





- CVE-2019-5736: A malicious container could replace the runc binary via /proc/self/exe
- CVE-2019-14271: Running docker cp against a malicious container could result in loading a malicious library onto the host










- "We found 3,822 Docker hosts with the remote API exposed publicly."
 - -- Vitaly Simonovich and Ori Nakar (March 4, 2019)

https://www.imperva.com/blog/hundreds-of-vulnerable-docker-hosts-exploited-by-cryptocurrency-miners/









But it can mitigate attacks





- Even if the host gets compromised, the attacker won't be able to:
 - access files owned by other users
 - modify firmware and kernel (→ undetectable malware)
 - ARP spoofing (→ DNS spoofing)





\$ sudo docker





- \$ sudo docker
- \$ usermod -aG docker <username>





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- \$ usermod -aG docker <username>
- \$ docker run --user <uid>





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All of them run the daemon as the root!





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- \$ dockerd --userns-remap

All of them run the daemon as the root!




\$ docker run -v /:/host











Getting started

```
$ curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com/rootless | sh
$ export DOCKER_HOST=unix://$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/docker.sock
$ docker run hello-world
```





Getting started

- sudo is NOT required
- Binaries are installed under ~/bin
- The daemon can be start/stopped with
 systemctl --user <start|stop> docker.service





Getting started

There are some prerequisites, but the installer shows helpful guide if prerequisites are unsatisfied


- /etc/subuid and /etc/subgid need to configured
 - Typically configured by default
- Debian and CentOS 7 requires adjusting sysctl values





Katacoda scenario available!

https://www.katacoda.com/courses/docker/rootless









```
[user@localhost] $ whoami
user
[user@localhost] $ unshare --user --map-root-user
[root@localhost] # whoami
root
```













```
[user@localhost] $ whoami
user
[user@localhost] $ unshare --user --map-root-user
[root@localhost] # whoami
root
[root@localhost] # touch /evil
touch: cannot touch '/evil': Permission denied
```





- Did I gain the root?
 - \rightarrow No!
- It's just a "fake root" environment for emulating root privileges enough to run containers
 - Create other namespaces (mnt, net, uts, ipc, ...)
 - Change hostname
 - Mount bind-mount and tmpfs





```
[user@localhost] $ whoami
user
[user@localhost] $ unshare --user --map-root-user
[root@localhost] # whoami
root
[root@localhost] # unshare --uts
[root@localhost] # hostname customhost
[root@customhost]# hostname
customhost
```





Snapshotting





 But vanilla kernel doesn't allow non-root users to use OverlayFS





Snapshotting

On Ubuntu kernel and Debian kernel:
 OverlayFS is used

NEW! (Docker 20.0X)

- On other distros w/ kernel >= 4.18:
 FUSE-OverlayFS is used instead (if installed)
- On older kernel:
 files are just duplicated ("vfs" mode; slow and wasteful!)






Unprivileged networking

- Setting vEth interfaces require real root
- User-mode TCP/IP stack is used instead of vEth
 - VPNKit (spun out from MirageOS)
 - Also used by Docker for Mac/Win
 - slirp4netns (spun out from QEMU)
- SETUID helper (lxc-user-nic) is also experimentally supported for the best performance (sacrificing security)







Cgroup (--cpus, --memory, --pids-limit, ...)

NEW! (Docker 20.0X)

- Now rootless mode supports cgroups for limiting resources such as CPU and memory

- Requires cgroup v2 and systemd
 - Fedora: enabled by default since Fedora 31
 - Others: require kernel cmdline systemd.unified_cgroup_hierarchy=1





Caveats

- Unsupported features:
 - AppArmor
 - docker checkpoint create
 - docker run --net=host
 - SCTP ports
 - Overlay network (Swarm-mode)









Q. Is rootless mode still experimental?

NEW! (Docker 20.0X)

No, since the next version







Q. Is rootless mode the panacea?


- No
 -)
- If Docker had a vuln, attackers still might be able to:
 - Mine cryptocurrencies
 - Springboard-attack to other hosts
- Not effective for potential vulns on kernel / VM / HW side







Q. docker run -p 80:80 doesn't work?





Use unprivileged numbers (>= 1024) instead
 e.g. docker run -p <u>8080</u>:80





Q. docker run -p 80:80 doesn't work?

- Or write "0" to /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_unprivileged_port_start
 - Default: 1024
- Or set CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE on rootlesskit binary





Q. Rootless Docker vs Rootless Podman?

- The two projects have been mutually exchanging a lot of codes for supporting rootless since 2018
 - Basis and network: Docker/Moby → Podman
 - FUSE and Cgroup: Docker/Moby ← Podman
- Almost same features
- Almost same performance





Q. Rootless Docker vs Rootless Podman?

- But the life cycles of the NetNS are different
- Rootless Docker lacks: docker run --net=host
- Rootless Podman lacks: docker network create







Recap

 Rootless mode protects the root from vulnerabilities and misconfigurations

NEW! (Docker 20.0X)

 Now out of experimental, with full support for cgroups (--cpus, --memory, ...)

\$ curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com/rootless | sh





Further information

https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/rootless/

https://rootlesscontaine.rs/





