


FAT-Pointer based range addresses



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Abstract

The increasing disparity between application workloads and the capacity of Translation Lookaside Buffers (TLB) has prompted researchers to explore innovative solutions to mitigate this gap. One such approach involves leveraging physically contiguous memory to optimize TLB utilization. Concurrently, advancements in hardware-level system security, exemplified by the Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI) architecture, offer additional opportunities for improving memory management and security.

CHERI introduces capability-based addressing, a novel approach that enhances system security by associating capabilities with memory pointers. These capabilities restrict access to memory regions, thereby fortifying the system against various security threats. Importantly, the mechanisms implemented in CHERI for enforcing memory protection can also serve as accelerators for standard user-space memory allocators. By leveraging capability-based addressing, memory allocators can efficiently manage memory resources while ensuring robust security measures are in place.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In the dynamic landscape of computing, the pursuit of optimal performance is a constant endeavor, especially as applications evolve to handle increasingly complex workloads. One critical aspect influencing performance is memory management, where efficient utilization of resources is paramount. Translation Lookaside Buffers (TLBs) play a pivotal role in this regard, expediting memory access by storing recently accessed memory translations. However, as applications grow in size and complexity, the capacity of TLBs often struggles to keep pace, leading to performance bottlenecks. To address this challenge, researchers have turned to innovative solutions, one of which involves harnessing the benefits of huge pages. Huge pages, also known as large pages, allow for the allocation of memory in significantly larger chunks compared to traditional small pages. By reducing the number of TLB entries needed to access a given amount of memory, huge pages offer a potential avenue for optimizing TLB utilization and thereby enhancing overall system performance.

Simultaneously, advancements in hardware-level security, such as the Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI) architecture, present additional opportunities for performance enhancement. CHERI's capability-based addressing approach not only strengthens system security by tightly controlling memory access but also provides avenues for accelerating memory management operations.

In this context, the integration of huge pages into memory management strategies alongside capability-based addressing in architectures like CHERI offers a compelling synergy. By optimizing TLB utilization through the utilization of huge pages and leveraging the security features of capability-based addressing, significant performance improvements can be realized. This approach not only enhances system security but also accelerates memory

access. The following below are research questions we are addressing:

1. Is there faster run times and lesser TLB misses when bounds are used not just for security but also to track memory allocations ?
2. Does using bounds to seek through physically contiguous memory reduce the complexity in standard memory allocators that have features like transparent huge pages ?

1.1 TLB based approaches

Efficient memory management, particularly in the context of Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) optimization, has been a focal point of research and development within computer architecture. Various techniques have been proposed to mitigate TLB-related bottlenecks and improve overall system performance.

1.1.1 Huge Pages:

Increasing TLB reach can be achieved by using larger page sizes, such as huge pages, which are common in modern computer systems. The x86-64 architecture supports huge pages of 2 MB and 1 GB, backed by OS mechanisms like Transparent Huge Pages (THP) and HugeTLBFS in Linux. However, available page sizes in x86-64 are limited, leading to internal fragmentation issues. For instance, allocating 1 MB with 4 KB base pages requires 256 PTEs, but using a 2 MB huge page would waste half of the memory space. Some architectures offer more page size choices, such as Intel Itanium, which allows different areas of the address space to have their own page sizes. Itanium uses a hash page table to organize huge pages, but without significant changes to the conventional page table, it only helps reduce page walk overheads. HP Tunable Base Page Size permits the OS to adjust the base page size, but still faces internal fragmentation problems, with HP recommending a base page size of no more than 16 KB. Shadow Superpage introduces a new translation level in the memory controller to merge non-contiguous physical pages into a huge page in a shadow memory space, extending TLB coverage. However, this approach requires all memory traffic to be translated again in the memory controller, resulting in additional latency for memory accesses.

1.1.2 Segment:

Early processors often used segments to manage virtual memory, where a segment essentially mapped contiguous virtual memory to contiguous physical memory. Unlike pages, which are relatively small, segments can be much larger, offering the potential for more efficient memory management in certain scenarios. This concept of segmentation has seen a resurgence in some modern approaches that aim to enhance translation coverage by designating specific areas in the virtual address space.

dimensionality of nested page walks. In Proceedings of the MICRO'14. 178–189. One such approach is Direct Segment. This method allows programmers to explicitly define a single segment for applications requiring significant memory. It introduces two new registers to the system, which indicate the start and end of this segment. Virtual addresses within this segment are translated by calculating the offset from the virtual start address and applying this offset to the physical start address. This straightforward method simplifies the translation process for large memory areas but requires significant modifications to the source code of applications.

Another approach, Do-it-yourself Virtual Memory Translation (DVMT), similarly introduces two registers to define a special area within the virtual address space. However, DVMT supports more complex translation mechanisms. When an address within this designated area is accessed, DVMT initiates a dedicated thread to handle the translation. This flexibility allows for more sophisticated memory management techniques, but like Direct Segment, it necessitates extensive changes to the application's source code. Additionally, both Direct Segment and DVMT bypass the conventional page table for the special virtual area, operating independently of the standard paging mechanism.

In Figure 1.1, each data memory reference involves presenting the data virtual address V to both the new direct-segment hardware and the Data Translation Lookaside Buffer (D-TLB). If the virtual address V falls within the specified range defined by the direct segment's base and limit register values, the new hardware translates the address to a physical address by calculating $V + \text{OFFSET}$. This translation process bypasses the D-TLB, meaning that addresses handled by the direct-segment hardware do not experience TLB misses. It's important to note that the direct-segment hardware only allows read-write access.




Fig. 1.1 Logical view of address translation with direct segment[Basu et al.].

1.1.3 Range Memory Mapping (RMM):

Redundant Memory Mappings (RMM)[Karakostas et al.] enhance memory management by introducing an additional range table that pre-allocates contiguous physical pages for large memory allocations, creating ranges that are both virtually and physically contiguous. This approach simplifies address translation within these ranges by adding an offset, similar to Direct Segment, but RMM supports multiple ranges and operates transparently to programmers, requiring no source code modifications. The range table, separate from the conventional page table, holds the mappings for these large allocations. To determine which range an address belongs to, RMM compares the address against all range boundaries, a process that is computationally expensive and therefore performed only after an L1 TLB miss. To optimize this, RMM uses a range TLB (RTLb) to quickly identify if an address falls within any pre-allocated range, facilitating efficient translation and reducing overhead. Range mapping works alongside the paging system by generating TLB entries on TLB misses and still performing TLB lookups for each virtual address translation. Unlike traditional segmentation mechanisms, range mapping activates a range lookaside buffer (RTLb) located with the last level TLB upon a miss. The hardware TLB miss handler then searches the RTLb

for the miss address and, if found, generates a new TLB entry with the physical address derived from the base virtual address and range offset, along with permission bits. If the RTLTLB also misses, the system defaults to a standard page walk while a range table walker simultaneously loads the range into the RTLTLB in the background, avoiding delays in memory operations. The RTLTLB, functioning as a fully associative search structure, ensures that most last level TLB misses are handled efficiently by range mapping, reducing the need for costly page table walks.




Fig. 1.2 RMM[Karakostas et al.] hardware support consists primarily of a range TLB that is accessed in parallel with the last-level page TLB.

In Figure 1.2 illustrates the structure and logic of the range TLB, which comprises N entries (e.g., 32). Each entry in the range TLB includes a virtual range and a corresponding translation. The virtual range contains the $BASE_i$ and $LIMIT_i$ values, defining the boundaries of the virtual address range. The translation part holds the $OFFSET_i$, which is the difference between the starting point of the range in physical memory and $BASE_i$, as well as the protection bits (PB). Each range TLB entry is equipped with two comparators to facilitate lookup operations. When accessing the range TLB in parallel with the L2 TLB, after a miss at the L1 TLB, the hardware compares the virtual page number that missed in the L1 TLB against all ranges in the range TLB, checking if $BASE_i \leq \text{virtual page number} < LIMIT_i$. On a hit, the range TLB returns the $OFFSET_i$ and protection bits for the corresponding range translation, and calculates the corresponding page table entry for the L1 TLB. It does this by adding the requested virtual page number to the hit $OFFSET_i$ value to produce the physical page number, and copying the protection bits from the range translation. If there is a miss, the hardware fetches the corresponding range translation if it exists from the range table.

1.1.4 FlexPointer:

FlexPointer[Chen et al.] builds upon the range translation concepts found in RMM and Direct Segment. A range consists of contiguous virtual pages mapped to contiguous physical pages, with uniform protection bits, such as read, write, or execute. Defined by two addresses, BASE and LIMIT, a range is base-page-aligned and can have an arbitrary number of pages. Due to the contiguous nature of these pages, all addresses within a range share a common DELTA, calculated as (physical_address - virtual_address). To translate a virtual address within a range, the processor simply adds DELTA to it.

A system employing range translations has three main components: (i) the creation of memory ranges, (ii) the management of range information, and (iii) the hardware that efficiently utilizes range translations. FlexPointer creates a range and assigns it a unique ID upon receiving a request for a large allocation. To ensure physical contiguity, it uses an eager paging strategy, which allocates physical pages at the time of the allocation request rather than on first access. This involves modifying memory management functions, such as malloc() and mmap(), to support eager allocation. Additionally, a kernel range table is used to record range translations, with mappings also maintained in the page table to ensure compatibility with other memory subsystems.

Similar to RMM, FlexPointer uses a range TLB to facilitate range translations in hardware. It can pass the range ID through the pointer tag, allowing the range TLB to operate in parallel with address generation. During a memory access, the processor uses the pointer tag to determine whether to search the range TLB or the page TLB, and the tag also guides which table to consult in the event of a TLB miss.

In Figure 1.4 FlexPointer utilizes specialized hardware components and a streamlined workflow for efficient memory management. During address generation, the processor determines whether to query the range TLB or the page TLB based on the high-order bits of the address. If these bits are all 0s or 1s, indicating a regular page TLB operation, the address is translated accordingly post-generation. Alternatively, if the high bits suggest a range TLB operation, FlexPointer uses the range ID embedded in the pointer to directly access the range TLB. Each range ID in the TLB corresponds uniquely to a DELTA, simplifying translation. The processor adds this DELTA to the virtual address and performs a boundary check against the BASE and LIMIT of the range. If the address falls within this range, the sum of DELTA and the virtual address yields the correct physical address. Addresses failing the boundary




Fig. 1.3 FlexPointer[Chen et al.] hardware overview.

check are directed to the page TLB for translation.

A range TLB miss occurs under two conditions: either no matching ID exists in the range TLB, or the address fails the boundary check of a dummy entry. In response to a range TLB miss, the processor initiates a range table walk to retrieve the corresponding range translation. To optimize TLB lookup efficiency, FlexPointer maintains unique IDs within the range TLB. If the miss results from a sub-range mismatch, the updated translation replaces the previous sub-range entry rather than adding a new one. During the range table walk, the processor computes the address of the translation entry by adding $(ID \ll 5)$ to the base address of the range table. This base address, akin to storing the page table base in CR3, is part of the program context. If the address to be translated falls within the BASE and LIMIT range of the fetched entry, it is fetched into the range TLB, regardless of whether it is a dummy entry. For a dummy entry, the page table is queried for the correct translation, which is then inserted into the page TLB. If the address falls outside the (BASE, LIMIT) range and the entry is not the last sub-range (determined by the L bit), the processor retrieves the next sub-range entry with the NRID and repeats the process. However, if it is the last sub-range and a violation occurs, it indicates a safety breach.

1.2 Capability machines

A capability is an unforgeable token that names an object and grants the bearer the authority to act upon it. Capabilities can be delegated between principals to both identify an object and grant authority over it, in contrast to other methods that use separate channels for naming and authority sharing. For instance, on UNIX, a file name is shared as a path, and the authority to open it is granted by adjusting permissions separately. In a capability system, a 'path capability' would not just represent a path but also the authority to open it in specific modes.

Every access to an object in a capability system requires authorization by a capability, making it clear which authority should be used for each operation as it is part of the reference. In some systems like the CAP architecture, dynamic capability lookup is performed. The CHERI work introduces the concept of intentional access, where the invoked authority is explicitly stated if a set of authorities is available. Systems that lack explicit identification of which capability to use or do not utilize capabilities at all are vulnerable to confused-deputy attacks, unlike capability systems that follow the intentional access principle, such as CHERI.

Capabilities also separate policy from enforcement, simplifying the parts of the system that need to be trusted. They can be shared in a decentralized manner based on principals, leading to a proliferation of capabilities throughout the system. Revoking a capability involves globally destroying or invalidating it and potentially any derived capabilities. The trade-off between the complexity of use and revocation exists in capability systems, with some schemes using tracking structures for revocation maintenance. CHERI, however, does not require such tracking and opts for a more intricate revocation process to enhance capability usage.

Capability machines implement and enforce capabilities in hardware, offering benefits such as improved performance and a reduced trusted computing base. While currently not as popular, there have been many capability machines in academia and industry. One example is the *Burroughs B5000*[1] stack machine from the 1960s, which featured a descriptor table for each program segment. When accessing an array, an index in the descriptor table was calculated first, followed by an indirect operation through it. Descriptors in the table had bounds, and hardware was responsible for performing access checks. Although predating the modern concept of a capability machine, the *Burroughs B5000* was one of the first to use tagged memory to differentiate segment descriptors (similar to capabilities) from other memory types, enabling entries to be directly loaded onto the stack.

1.2.1 1970 Cambridge CAP compute

The **1970 Cambridge CAP computer**[Wilkes and Needham] was an early register-based capability machine that utilized explicit capability registers. These registers could be loaded and stored from dedicated capability segments, which did not require tags but limited the flexibility in mixing capabilities and data.

1.2.2 IBM's System/38

On the commercial front, **IBM's System/38** and its successor, the AS/400, were successful systems that, like the Burroughs B5000, incorporated tagged memory to distinguish capabilities from data. Intel's iAPX 432 faced challenges due to poor performance, particularly attributed to its inefficient ADA compiler. The architecture supported both hardware- and software-defined capabilities, dividing segments to differentiate between data and capabilities, similar to the CAP computer.

1.2.3 M-Machine

The **M-Machine**[Fillo et al.] utilized guarded pointers for capabilities, with support for power-of-two bounds and alignments. A fat pointer encoded bounds, permissions, and an address for the capabilities. The M-Machine introduced two distinct capability variants: a 'key' capability and an 'entry' capability, both unmodifiable and non-forgable. Entry capabilities could be executed, transforming into executable capabilities, while key capabilities functioned as identifiers. A supervisor mode bit in executable capabilities facilitated secure transitions to privileged code using normal jumps at predefined entry points.

1.2.4 Low-fat pointers

In 2013, **Low-fat pointers**[Kwon et al.] implemented hardware support for bounds checking fat pointers compressed into 64 bits, with non-power-of-two alignment support. While similar to constructs seen in M-Machine and CHERI, these pointers lack some essential capabilities such as authority, unforgeability, and compartmentalization features.

1.3 Capability based operating systems

Capabilities are beneficial not only for controlling access at the hardware level but also have applications in operating systems and software applications.

1.3.1 Hydra system

The **Hydra system**[Wulf et al.], developed on the PDP-11, incorporated capabilities for both system-level and user-defined objects. Due to security concerns, all capability operations necessitated syscalls as only the kernel was deemed trustworthy to handle capabilities reliably. While this approach restricted the frequency of operations and the types of objects that could be effectively represented by capabilities, Hydra successfully showcased the practical implementation of the object-capability model through interprocess communication (IPC).

1.3.2 KeyKOS

KeyKOS[Hardy], originally known as GNOSIS, was an early commercial capability operating system designed for the IBM System/370 that could accommodate a UNIX environment. KeyKOS, similar to other capability-based operating systems mentioned, operated as a message-passing system and utilized capabilities termed as keys to represent various system resources. In KeyKOS, the system was divided into domains, with gate keys enabling message transfer between these domains. The OS featured a single-level persistent store that users could interact with using capabilities, and the kernel could seamlessly swap this store with backing storage. KeyKOS paved the way for subsequent research-oriented systems like Eros and Coyotos.

1.3.3 Mach microkernel

The **Mach microkernel**[Rashid et al.] introduced the concept of tasks, which encompassed collections of threads combined with a virtual address space. In Mach, interprocess communication (IPC) was facilitated through ports, resembling KeyKOS gate keys, where the capability to communicate on a port was represented by a capability. Capabilities could be transmitted over ports for delegation, and messages, dynamically-sized and typed, could be sent synchronously or asynchronously. Similar to Hydra, Mach implemented an object-capability model using IPC, as exemplified by the process of creating a thread, which involved

sending a message on a specific port and delegating authority by transmitting the port capability. Mach aimed to offer a kernel compatible with a UNIX environment while delegating maximum functionality outside of the kernel to a set of servers. Various UNIX variants have emerged from Mach or utilized Mach as a microkernel.

Following the Mach microkernel, the **L4 microkernel** was developed with the aim of reducing complexity and overhead compared to previous microkernels. L4 featured a simplified interface, with an early version supporting only 7 system calls, providing functionality for threads, address spaces, and IPC. The streamlined IPC mechanism in L4 resulted in significantly faster across-address-space message transfers compared to Mach, with the initial L4 implementation being 20 times faster. SeL4, a formally-verified implementation of L4 built from scratch, stores capabilities in a tree structure where each node consists of an array of capabilities. Capabilities serve as fat-pointers to objects in physical memory, starting as untyped and then being retyped to create objects like page-tables. These capabilities can only be modified by the kernel and are accessed from user-space via an index.

1.3.4 Barrelfish

Barrelfish[Baumann et al.] is an operating system developed by ETH Zurich specifically tailored to support large-scale heterogeneous systems. Utilizing capabilities similar to those in seL4, Barrelfish has extensions to manage the increased complexity of operations such as deletion, copying, re-typing, and revoking in a distributed manner. Capabilities in Barrelfish represent physical memory, kernel objects, and communication endpoints, adhering to the principles of capability-based systems.

1.3.5 Capsicumh

Capsicum[19] extends the POSIX API with file capabilities and was initially demonstrated on FreeBSD, where capability operations still require system calls due to the conventional hardware environment of FreeBSD. While files in UNIX systems can encompass various entities, Capsicum does not provide memory capabilities, allowing fabricated pointers to be exchanged between the operating system and user space.

1.3.6 CheriBSD

CheriBSD[5] enhances FreeBSD to utilize CHERI hardware-enforced capabilities for protecting memory accesses in both user space compartments and the kernel. Although CheriBSD operates on a FreeBSD base, many aspects of the system interface remain non-capability based. For instance, basic operations like spawning threads in FreeBSD require syscalls, granting ambient authority to do so, while Mach, in a capability-based system, would utilize a capability for such privileges. In comparison to other capability-based operating systems, CheriBSD's use of memory capabilities is more fine-grained, enabling precise control over memory accesses and operations. Systems like seL4 use memory capabilities for defining privileges like creating page mappings, although the actual use of these mappings during load or store operations may not involve capability checks. Additionally, since enforcement in systems like seL4 relies on the MMU, capabilities in these systems may refer to objects with coarse sizes and alignments.

1.4 CHERI

CHERI[Woodruff et al.] is an instruction set extension that modifies an existing ISA by mandating memory accesses to be conducted via tagged capabilities and introduces instructions for examining and modifying these capabilities. Initially developed as an enhancement to the MIPS ISA, CHERI has gained significant traction within the technology community, with notable implementations such as the Arm's Morello[2] experimental prototype integrating CHERI into a commercial Arm processor.

CHERI enhances pointer protection by incorporating a one-bit out-of-band tag to ensure the integrity of pointers. Each tagged capability in CHERI is required to originate from an initial root capability through a series of permissible operations, with each operation reducing the granted rights in a strictly decreasing manner. This strict provenance of tagged capabilities minimizes the risk of pointer corruption and effectively counters attacks that involve manipulating pointers by substituting them with non-capability data, such as Return-Oriented Programming.

The tags associated with capabilities in CHERI prevent pointer corruption and bolster security by necessitating that every memory access is associated with a quoted tagged capability that encompasses the intended boundaries and permissions. This measure serves to safeguard data from both accidental and malicious tampering, effectively mitigating common attacks like buffer overflows. A report by Microsoft[6] highlighted that approximately 75%

of their security vulnerabilities are related to bounds overflows or temporal safety issues, indicating that CHERI's support for temporal safety could significantly address such issues and provide substantial benefits to the industry and users.

Furthermore, the monotonicity of the CHERI ISA[] has been formally verified[Zaliva et al.], demonstrating that the architecture, if correctly implemented, upholds the intended invariants, offering a high level of security assurance.

The bit pattern[20] of a capability consists of:

- **Capability tag:** A one-bit out-of-band field that records whether the capability is valid, i.e. whether it has been derived only via legal monotonic operations.
- **Cursor:** A field giving the current address referred to by the capability. This is all that is present in a traditional C pointer and the natural integer interpretation of the capability.
- **Bounds information:** The capability only grants access to a single contiguous region of memory, specified by the bounds field. Changes to the capability can only ever grant access to a subset of the bounds without triggering an exception or clearing the tag.
- **Permissions:** Permissions are required to access memory in different ways: most obviously read, write, and execute, but also the permissions to read and write capabilities, and more experimental uses. These can only be modified by a bitwise AND operation, inherently guaranteeing monotonicity.
- **Object type (otype):** CHERI provides a compartmentalisation mechanism for granting protected access to objects, represented as a pair of code and data. Code and data can be sealed with an otype, and primarily only unsealed by the CInvoke instruction, which atomically jumps to the code pointer and installs the unsealed data capability. Sealed capabilities cannot be mutated other than via a legal CInvoke or CUnseal instruction without raising an exception or clearing the tag.

1.4.1 CHERI compression

One of the significant performance challenges of CHERI stems from the larger size of capabilities compared to traditional pointers, leading to increased hardware resource usage and cache pressure. An approach to mitigate this impact is capability compression, as outlined in




Fig. 1.4 CHERI capability[12].

the CHERI-Concentrate paper. This method reduces bounds metadata to as few as 39 bits for a 64-bit pointer, albeit with alignment constraints on representable positions for larger objects. Hardware handles compression and decompression, ensuring minimal software impact.

In capability compression[Woodruff et al.], bounds consist of a base (B) with b bits, a top (T) bits, and an exponent (E) with e bits relative to the cursor of the capability (C). The base is calculated by shifting B left by E and filling remaining upper bits with the corresponding most significant bits of C. The top follows a similar process, with the top two bits of T determined by adding 1 to those of B in the standard case. Bounds are zero-filled in the least significant E bits, enforcing bound-alignment requirements. The internal exponent case stores E only when non-zero, serving as the least significant bits of B and T, thereby allowing more precise representation of smaller objects.

The CSetBounds instruction in CHERI offers two variations: one triggers an exception for unrepresentable bounds, while the other returns the closest larger representable bounds. To ensure spatial safety, software must include padding (up to 0.2% or 12.5% of the object size for 64-bit and 32-bit address spaces, respectively) at the beginning or end of large objects to prevent memory usage conflicts resulting from rounding. Instructions altering a capability

cursor may impact bounds interpretation if they modify cursor bits determining the base and top. Careful design in the ISA and implementations ensures these cases clear the capability tag or raise exceptions where necessary.

Chapter 2

Fat Pointer Based Range Addresses

FAT-Pointers based range addresses, combined with the capabilities of the CHERI (Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions) architecture, introduce robust memory safety and security features by incorporating additional metadata with memory pointers. This enhanced architecture utilizes concepts such as FlexPointer, Range Memory Mapping (RMM) to manage memory effectively.

Range addresses play a pivotal role within this framework, defining memory regions bounded by a starting address (Upper) and an ending address (Lower). These range addresses are encoded within FAT-pointers, allowing for precise control over memory regions.

The functionality of ranges encompasses several key aspects:

- **Creation of Physically Contiguous Memory Ranges:** By defining memory regions that are physically contiguous, systems can achieve optimal memory access patterns, enhancing performance and efficiency.
- **Encoding Ranges as Bounds to the Pointer:** Integrating range bounds directly into FAT-pointers enables the architecture to enforce memory access restrictions at the pointer level thus allowing tracking of memory ranges on a pointer level.
- **Instrumenting Block-Based Allocators with Physically Contiguous Memory:** The integration of range-based memory concepts into memory allocation systems, such as block-based allocators, facilitates the efficient management and utilization of physically contiguous memory blocks, mitigating issues related to memory fragmentation.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the methodology employed to leverage the CHERI 128-bit FAT-pointer scheme for facilitating block-based memory management on physically contiguous memory, which is depicted on the right side of the figure. This technique contrasts with the conventional mmap approach.




Fig. 2.1 High overview architecture

In figure 2.1, the green-highlighted section marks the unused space between the 48th and 64th bits within the FAT-pointer. This area of unused bits presents an opportunity to store additional metadata, potentially enhancing the capabilities of the memory management system. Here we explore how this additional metadata storage could be used to further optimize memory allocation.

2.0.1 Range creation and huge pages

In this implementation, memory ranges are established using bounds encoded within the FAT-pointer, adhering to the CHERI 128-bit bounds compression scheme[Woodruff et al.]. The memory chunk defined by the upper and lower bounds is always physically contiguous. Initially, a huge page of arbitrary size is allocated. Within this huge page, custom-sized memory segments are allocated using a custom-designed mmap function, which overrides the existing block-based mmap function. Once the memory is physically allocated through this custom mmap function, bounds are set to track the memory block, eliminating the need




Fig. 2.2 Range of memory

for traditional TLB usage for this purpose. Traditional TLB usage involves maintaining numerous TLB entries, often supplemented by an L2 TLB and other hierarchical structures, to translate virtual addresses to physical addresses. This approach requires multiple entries to handle various memory segments, leading to increased overhead and complexity in address translation. Conversely, the current approach streamlines this process by using a single TLB entry to translate multiple addresses within a contiguous memory range. This reduces the number of required TLB entries, simplifying the translation process and improving efficiency. By consolidating address translations into a single TLB entry, this method minimizes the overhead associated with managing numerous TLB entries and leverages the bounds encoded within the FAT-pointer for efficient memory tracking and access. This approach allows for precise and efficient memory management within the allocated huge page.

Figure 2.2 illustrates a straightforward use-case in which the dark pink line represents a single, large contiguous memory area, or huge page. Within this huge page, the orange and blue lines indicate two separate memory allocations equivalent to invoking malloc twice to allocate memory in distinct regions. This scenario simulates a block-based memory allocator operating within the confines of the huge page. The allocations leverage the bounds encoded in the FAT-pointer, ensuring tracking and efficient management of the allocated memory regions. By using the FAT-pointer bounds, this method maintains the integrity and contiguity of the allocated blocks within the huge page.

2.0.2 Software Stack




Fig. 2.3 Overview of the software stack

The software stack is based on CHERIBSD[5], selected because ARM officially supports Morello's performance counters[2] on this operating system. As illustrated in the figure 2.3, the setup includes a C program that is linked to the prototype memory allocator or to various memory allocators being benchmarked, as described in section 3 (Link to evaluation section once added). This linkage can occur in two ways: either as a shared object file during compile time for larger allocators, or as a header file for smaller allocators, ensuring flexibility and efficiency in memory management.

This integration ensures that the memory allocation process is optimized for performance, leveraging the contiguity of memory blocks and the capabilities provided by the CHERI architecture and the Morello platform. By using the contigmem driver and the custom mmap function, the system achieves efficient memory allocation and tracking, crucial for the high-performance needs of the application.

Contigmem driver from DPDK

The custom mmap function, tailored to ensure physically contiguous memory allocation, is a key component of this system. This function is linked to the contigmem driver, which has been modified from the DPDK[Bi and Wang] library to meet the specific needs of this implementation. The contigmem driver is essential for managing large contiguous memory blocks and is loaded during the system boot process. It reserves a huge page of arbitrary size, with the size parameter set based on the requirements of the conducted experiments.

Listing 2.1 Contigmem driver

```
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_CONTIGMEM, "contigmem",
"contigmem(4)_allocations");

static int contigmem_modevent(module_t mod,
int type, void *arg)
{
    int error = 0;

    switch (type) {
    case MOD_LOAD:
        error = contigmem_load();
        break;
    case MOD_UNLOAD:
        error = contigmem_unload();
        break;
    default:
        break;
    }

    return error;
}

....

DECLARE_MODULE(contigmem, contigmem_mod,
SI_SUB_DRIVERS, SI_ORDER_ANY);
```

```
MODULE_VERSION(contigmem, 1);
```

```
static struct cdevsw contigmem_ops = {
    .d_name      = "contigmem",
    .d_version    = D_VERSION,
    .d_flags      = D_TRACKCLOSE,
    .d_mmap_single = contigmem_mmap_single,
    .d_open       = contigmem_open,
    .d_close      = contigmem_close,
};

static int
contigmem_load()
{
    ....

    for (i = 0; i < contigmem_num_buffers; i++) {
        addr = contigmalloc(contigmem_buffer_size,
            M_CONTIGMEM, M_ZERO,
            0, BUS_SPACE_MAXADDR,
            contigmem_buffer_size, 0);
        ....
    }

    ....

error:
    for (i = 0; i < contigmem_num_buffers; i++) {
        if (contigmem_buffers[i].addr != NULL) {
            contigfree(contigmem_buffers[i].addr,
                contigmem_buffer_size, M_CONTIGMEM);
            contigmem_buffers[i].addr = NULL;
        }
        ....
    }
}
```

```

        return error;
    }

```

When the `contigmem_load` 2.1 function is called, either during boot or when the Kernel module is loaded, it pre-allocates a segment of physically contiguous memory. This approach differs from FlexPointer[Chen et al.], which allocates physically contiguous memory eagerly. The `contigmem_load` function allocates memory using `contigmalloc`, which allocates physically contiguous memory initialized to zero. The `cdevsw` struct refers to function calls which would be overwritten on loading the driver. In the code snippet 2.1 above the `mmap` function would be overwritten with `contigmem_mmap_single` if the following driver is opened and truncated as shown in Code snippet 2.3.

In the code snippet 2.2 the `cdev_pager_ops` refers to the operations which will be overwritten when called with `mmap` such as overwriting page faults.

Listing 2.2 Contigmem driver mmap

```

static struct cdev_pager_ops contigmem_cdev_pager_ops = {
    .cdev_pg_ctor = contigmem_cdev_pager_ctor,
    .cdev_pg_dtor = contigmem_cdev_pager_dtor,
    .cdev_pg_fault = contigmem_cdev_pager_fault,
};

static int
contigmem_mmap_single(struct cdev *cdev, vm_ooffset_t
*offset, vm_size_t size, struct vm_object **obj, int nprot)
{
    ....
    *obj = cdev_pager_allocate(vmh, OBJT_DEVICE,
        &contigmem_cdev_pager_ops, size, nprot,
        *offset, curthread->td_ucred);

    return 0;
}

```

Sample memory allocator design

Listing 2.3 Contigmem driver mmap

```
#define FILENAME "/dev/contigmem"
void *ptr;
int MallocCounter;

size_t sizeUsed;

...

INITAlloc(void) {

    size_t sz;
    sz = 100000000;

    int fd = open(FILENAME, O_RDWR, 0600);

    if (fd < 0) {
        perror("open");
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

    off_t offset = 0; // offset to seek to.

    if (ftruncate(fd, sz) < 0) {
        perror("ftruncate");
        close(fd);
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

    ptr = mmap(NULL, sz,
    PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);

    // Added error handling
    if (ptr == MAP_FAILED)
    {
        perror("mmap");
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }
}
```

```

    }
    MallocCounter = (int)sz;
    }

    void* malloc(size_t sz)
    {
        sz = __builtin_align_up(sz, _Alignof(max_align_t));

        // printf("%d \n", sz);
        // printf("%d Malloc counter\n", MallocCounter);

        MallocCounter -= sz;
        void *ptrLink = &ptr[MallocCounter];
        ptrLink = cheri_setbounds(ptrLink, sz);

        return ptrLink;
    }

    void FREECHERI(void *ptr) {

        // get length of free from bounds
        // in the pointer
        int len = cheri_getlen(ptr);

        munmap(ptr, len);
    }

```

The code snippet 2.3 below shows a sample memory allocator which is a really simple implementation that initially in the example allocates 1GB of memory using the mmap call which calls the mmap function from /dev/contigmem driver. This ensures memory allocated to the physically contiguous memory allocated in the contigmem_load() function using the contigmem_mmap_single() function call in the kernel module, uses malloc and free to allocate within this memory chunk. The consideration of this is to ensure that a C program needs minor changes to use the benefit using physically contiguous memory with bounds within a segment of memory.

Chapter 3

Evaluation

To evaluate the performance of FAT-Pointer based range addresses a sample implementation we used the morello board with CheriBSD's Benchmark ABI[3] compilation mode for accurate performance recordings. The evaluation is to identify CheriBSD's default memory allocator SnMalloc against the prototype memory allocator using the contribution of this paper in terms of: To assess the performance of FAT-Pointer-based range addressing in the sample implementation, we utilized the Morello board running CheriBSD in Benchmark ABI compilation mode to ensure precise performance measurements. The evaluation focuses on comparing CheriBSD's default memory allocator, SnMalloc, against the prototype memory allocator developed in this study, with particular attention to the following aspects:

Metric name	type of graph	tool used	x axis	y axis
DTLB L1 read	line graph	Pmcstat	Time	DTLB L1 reads (each second)
DTLB L2 read	line graph	Pmcstat	Time	DTLB L2 reads (each second)
DTLB walk	line graph	Pmcstat	Time	DTLB Walks (each second)
L1 cache miss	line graph	Pmcstat	Time	L1 cache miss (each second)
Wall clock run time	bar graph	time	Benchmarks	Time

3.0.1 Benchmarks used

: To conduct the evaluations, we utilized the COZ[Curtsinger and Berger] benchmark suite, a well-regarded tool specifically designed to measure and analyze performance improvements in concurrent programs. The COZ benchmark suite provides a robust framework for identifying bottlenecks and evaluating the performance impact of various optimization techniques. By leveraging COZ, developers can gain precise insights into the efficiency and scalability of their concurrent code, making it an ideal choice for rigorous performance analysis.

From the extensive set of benchmarks provided by COZ, we selected four representative C programs. These programs were chosen based on their relevance to common concurrent programming patterns and their ability to effectively demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of different optimization strategies. The selected programs cover a range of concurrency scenarios, ensuring a comprehensive evaluation of performance improvements.

By implementing these modifications, we ensured that the selected C programs not only adhered to CHERI's security model but also maintained their functional and performance characteristics. This allowed us to effectively use the COZ benchmark suite to analyze the performance in a CHERI-enhanced environment.


Benchmark name	Benchmark metrics extracted	Sizes tried against	Comparators
Kmeans (Coz)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - L1 DTLB reads - L2 DTLB reads - DTLB walks - L1 cache misses - Wall clock run time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 3 Dimensions - 6 Dimension - 40 Dimensions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Physically contiguous allocator with bounds - System allocator
Histogram (Coz)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - L1 DTLB reads - L2 DTLB reads - DTLB walks - L1 cache misses 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Small - Medium - Large 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Physically contiguous allocator with bounds - System allocator
Matrix multiply (Coz)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - L1 DTLB reads - L2 DTLB reads - DTLB walks - L1 cache misses 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 200 - 1000 - 5000 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Physically contiguous allocator with bounds - System allocator

3.0.2 DTLB L1 reads:


The Graphs above represent the DTLB L1 reads which is a Performance counter from the ARM specs. The counter increments for every Memory-read or Memory-write operation that necessitates an access to the Level 1 data or unified Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB). Each access to a TLB entry is counted including multiple accesses caused by single instructions.

3.0.3 DTLB L2 reads:


Similar to how L1 TLB reads are counted, DTLB L2 counts every read operation that accesses the Level 2 data or unified TLB. Each time there is a read to an entry in the Level 2 TLB, it is counted by the DTLB L2.



(a) Kmeans DTLB L1 reads




(a) Matrix Multiply DTLB L1 reads




(a)


Fig. 3.3 Histogram DTLB L1 reads



(a) Kmeans DTLB L2 reads




(a) Matrix Multiply DTLB L2 reads



(a)

Fig. 3.6 Histogram DTLB L2 reads




(a) Kmeans DTLB Walks

3.0.4 DTLB walks:


The DTLB walk counter counts each Memory-read operation or Memory-write operation that causes a TLB access to at least the Level 2 data or unified TLB. Each access to a TLB entry is counted including refills of Level 1 TLBs.

3.0.5 L1 cache miss:

L1 cache miss counter counts each Memory-read operation to the Level 1 data or unified cache counted by L1 cache miss counter that incurs additional latency because it returns data from outside of the Level 1 data or unified cache of this PE. The event indicates to software that the access missed in the Level 1 data or unified cache and might have a significant performance impact due to the additional latency compared to the latency of an access that hits in the Level 1 data or unified cache.




(a) Matrix Multiply DTLB Walks




(a)


Fig. 3.9 Histogram DTLB Walks



(a) Kmeans L1 cache miss



(a) Matrix Multiply L1 cache miss



(a)

Fig. 3.12 Histogram L1 cache miss

Chapter 4

Future work

The current experimental setup on the ARM Morello board is constrained by the requirement that all memory reads must pass through the Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) for address translation. This necessitates frequent TLB lookups, potentially leading to performance bottlenecks. The planned future work aims to address this by leveraging CHERI (Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions) extensions on the RISC-V architecture, specifically using the Tooba implementation[4].

Storing Offsets Directly on Pointers

In the current ARM Morello setup, address translations rely on the TLB. The future approach on RISC-V Tooba involves storing the offset directly within the pointer. This is possible due to CHERI's capability model, which supports fine-grained memory protection and can encode bounds within pointers. Utilizing Bounds in CHERI for Block-Based Allocation:

CHERI capabilities allow pointers to carry metadata about memory bounds, providing hardware-enforced memory safety. By encoding the offset and bounds within the pointer, the system can directly access memory without needing intermediate translations via the TLB. This enables the implementation of a block-based allocator that can efficiently manage memory allocations and deallocations within defined bounds. Bypassing the TLB in RISC-V Tooba.

Hardware Modifications:

The Bluespec design of the RISC-V processor will be modified to allow certain memory operations to bypass the TLB. This means that when a pointer with encoded offset and bounds is used, the system can directly compute the physical address from the capability information. This modification reduces the dependency on the TLB, decreasing latency

and improving performance, especially for frequent memory operations. Transition to a Single-Address-Space Operating System (SASOS)[13].

Concept of SASOS:

In traditional operating systems, there is a clear separation between user space and kernel space. This separation is enforced by memory protection mechanisms and address translation through the TLB. In a Single-Address-Space Operating System, this distinction is removed. Both user applications and the kernel share the same contiguous address space.

Advantages of SASOS with CHERI:

- **Simplified Memory Management :** Without the need to switch between user and kernel spaces, memory management becomes simpler and more efficient. The kernel allocator can be the same as the user space allocator, operating on a single, contiguous chunk of memory.
- **Unified Allocator:** The unified memory allocator can efficiently manage memory for both kernel and user applications, leveraging CHERI's capability-based protection to prevent unauthorized access. This reduces overhead and potential fragmentation issues associated with maintaining separate memory spaces.

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