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The Data Engineering Bulletin

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Letter from the Editor-in-Chief

Over the past few years, we have come to realize that a great danger of technology is the unfair bias that AI systems create, reinforce, and propagate. While the source of such bias is usually human, machines' homogeneity and efficiency could easily magnify its damage, a concern further exacerbated by the fact that AI systems are being trusted to make more and more critical decisions in almost every aspect of human experience.

Data is often the channel through which bias transmits from human experience to machines. For example, a training dataset with inherent societal bias, or simply a limited and unrepresentative training dataset, may lead to machine learning models that are unfair and biased towards a specific class. However, detecting and correcting unfair bias in AI systems are much more than just a data management task. In particular, since bias starts with humans and will eventually affect humans, addressing unfair bias requires insights from psychological, societal, and cultural perspectives.

James Foulds and Shimei Pan put together the current issue – Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Fairness and Artificial Intelligence Systems – that consists of six papers from leading researchers in multidisciplinary areas. It is an excellent collection of ideas and best practices on this important topic.

Haixun Wang
Instacart

Letter from the Special Issue Editors

As AI technologies are increasingly been used to make decisions that impact billions of people around the world, it is important that we take a proactive approach to ensure that these technologies are used responsibly and with the protections necessary to ensure that they are safe, trustworthy and consistent with our deepest ethical commitments.

The current AI systems are typically developed by people who have deep technical knowledge in computer science, mathematics, and optimization. They however may lack the expertise in how AI technologies are deployed and used in various social context as well as their potential societal impacts. In contrast, the Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) community has deep knowledge in how humans interact with complex systems and is well positioned to aid the development of responsible AI systems to ensure that they are beneficial to society and they are designed to be transparent, reliable, trustworthy and safe.

In this special issue on **Responsible AI and Human-AI Interaction**, we sought high-quality contributions on human-centered approaches to responsible and trustworthy AI. Leading HCI and AI researchers from both academia and industry work together to address some pressing issues in developing responsible and trustworthy AI systems such as AI ethics, bias/fairness, explainability, and transparency.

Nora McDonald from University of Cincinnati, and *Aaron Massey* and *Foad Hamidi* from University of Maryland, Baltimore County reflect on why and how "Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enhanced Adaptive Assistive Technologies (AATs) need to be designed in collaboration with AAT users belonging to intersecting marginalized groups to ensure that the benefits of AI do not sacrifice privacy for the most vulnerable (e.g., older adults with disabilities).

Alex Okeson from University of Washington and his co-authors from Microsoft Research explore human-centered approaches to Machine Learning (ML) interpretability. They focus on one aspect of interpretability tools, global feature attributions, which are frequently used by ML developers to understand ML model behavior. They conducted an artifact-based interview study intended to investigate whether ML developers would benefit from being able to compare and contrast different global feature attribution methods.

Patrick Gage Kelley and his co-authors from Google and Ipsos present the results of an in-depth survey of public opinion of Artificial Intelligence (AI) conducted with over 17,000 respondents spanning fifteen countries and six continents. Analysis of responses has revealed four emergent themes of sentiment towards AI: exciting, useful, worrying, and futuristic. These sentiments and their relative prevalence may inform how the public influences the development of AI.

John Richards and his colleagues from IBM research explore human-centered methods to address the need for increased transparency in artificial intelligence (AI) for data sets, models, and services. They present a methodology for creating FactSheets, a form of transparent AI documentation. They also share the insights gathered while they creating nearly two dozen FactSheets.

Finally, *Philip Feldman* and *Aaron Dant* from ASRC Federal and *David Rosenbluth* from Lockheed-Martin present a mechanism to harness the narrative output of large language models and produce "Neural Narrative Maps" (NNMs) that are intended to provide insight into intent and belief and how they evolve in an information space. They demonstrate the utility of their methods in understanding rules of engagement (e.g., if a subordinate is following a commander's intent in a high-risk situation).

Shimei Pan and James Foulds
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AI-Enhanced Adaptive Assistive Technologies: Methods for AI Design Justice

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Abstract

The design of artificial intelligent (AI) enhanced adaptive assistive technologies (AATs) presents exciting promise for those with motor or audio/vision impairment. However, these technologies also introduce tremendous privacy risks, particularly for those with compounding identity vulnerabilities. In this paper, we reflect on why and how AATs need to be designed in collaboration with intersectional AAT users to ensure that the benefits of AI do not sacrifice privacy for the most vulnerable. We discuss methods and tools we have developed to meet these challenges, lessons we have learned from studies with them, and future opportunities.

1 Introduction

AI systems can compound discriminations of those with disabilities. Based on individual's social media profiles, smartphones settings, or performance data, one can infer whether individuals are blind [40] or have symptoms of Parkinson's disease [45]. These data could be used by third-parties in ways that may limit opportunities or lead to other harms for these individuals. For instance, what if a system could determine that you had visual impairments by monitoring and analyzing your typing data? What if those same data could be accessed by an employer, or an insurance company, or a bad actor? Yet those in need of AATs are increasingly reliant on systems that leverage existing data and capabilities (e.g., text, pointing data, natural language processing algorithms) used by popular products like Grammarly. And, arguably, the more adaptative and helpful the AI, the greater the possibility for harm. Providing usable, private, and accessible technology is, of course, critical, but the way in which these populations are the target of discrimination by insurance companies and advertisers and the way those discriminations are compounded by identity must be central to design.

For older adults with disabilities, the emphasis on technology innovation has traditionally been on inclusivity [15, 41, 42] but only insofar as we account for differences in ability. HCI is increasingly embracing the way in which technologies must take into account the realities, and the limitations on agency, of diverse users [37, 39, 54]. Yet scholars have noted that, despite this increasing attention on critical and social justice design, efforts to embrace privacy by design often fail to consider critical alternatives or values, contexts, and structural inequalities [57]. Recent work has pointed out the need to consider the complex and overlapping challenges faced by disabled users [17]. However, more needs to be done to take into account the way that culture, context, power, and identity

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Bulletin of the IEEE Computer Society Technical Committee on Data Engineering

interact. We place too much onus on the user to make do with the tools they have, rather than soliciting their input from the beginning, and doing so in a way that allows for them to imagine possible futures. Instead, often designers imagine (or don't) the challenges face by marginalized users; or disabled users are called upon to just consider their disabilities, as if that were the only feature of their experience. The moment requires a broader focus on other harms that could affect these populations.

One of the biggest challenges for AI scholars is that ethical AI cannot be solved *for* merely with technical approaches [23, 56, 61] because problems emerge from dominant social and political systems that require social and political awareness, an understanding of power [61], and data/surveillance capitalism [58, 59] or colonialism [12]—terms which broadly refer to the sociotechnical mechanisms of capitalism that sanction the treatment of user data as commodities to mine, extract, trade, exploit, and sell. The critical need to involve more diverse scholars and marginalized users also coincides with methodological approaches like intersectionality that grapple with power and identity. Intersectionality theorizes that identities, which emerge in intersecting power dynamics (e.g., racism, capitalism, gender identity discrimination, age, ableism, etc.) produce a “matrix” of oppressions [7]. While these oppressions are unique to the context, they can also share in common (across cultures and contexts) an oppressive relationship between identity and mechanisms of power [8].

Against this backdrop, there is growing urgency to consider social justice when designing AI through studies with diverse users and also interventions in the classroom that introduce ethics curriculum to future designers of these systems. However, there are some challenges. For one, AI ethics education still suffers from a lack of attention and coverage in academia [48]. Second, businesses that use and produce AI do not necessarily provide AI ethics training or seem to deeply consider the discriminatory possibilities of the technologies they produce or adopt. Over the last few years, we have seen a number of high profile cases in which technology companies AI are being used for discriminatory practices (e.g., [27])—the examples of discriminatory AI abound in everything from healthcare (e.g., [4, 51]) to gig work (e.g., [33]) to social services (e.g., [18]) to education (e.g., [29, 32]). Third, the AI systems used by AATs are built on existing data and capabilities (e.g., text, pointing data, natural language processing algorithms) that increase the potential for harm.

We take up the argument made by other critical scholars that merely recognizing that those AI systems are fostered by institutions and individuals who occupy a privileged position of power is not enough, and that design that includes marginalized individuals must have the goal of challenging structural inequality [9, 10]. But we also consider that students (and designers) need to be more diverse and educated about these harms and that new methods are needed to do so. In this position paper, we present two studies in which we used a participatory toolkit to understand the privacy perspectives of intersectional older AAT users and intersectional AI technology students. While our first study with intersectional AAT users [24] (only briefly reported on in this paper) attempts to address this first commitment (i.e., including marginalized users), this paper focuses primarily on the second study and second commitment (i.e., designing new methods).

For our second study, we explore a new method of incorporating intersectional inquiry into an AAT user elicitation toolkit we adapt for use with intersectional AI students. To do this, we build on our first study [24] of this tool (and earlier inquiry [25]) with intersectional AAT users to explore how international technology students think about AAT technologies for these populations. We wanted to explore the possibilities (and limitations) of an approach that enabled vulnerable international technology students to consider the perspectives of intersectional AAT users with some overlapping concerns and explore the extent to which they might have a more nuanced view—going beyond the empathy design work that is implicitly and overtly critiqued by design justice.

We consider that being older and having a disability vs being a non-native English speaker on a visa in an American institution with a government that might rescind that status to be separate types of intersectional identities that share in common relationships to heightened surveillance capitalism power and risk, through AI technology. Other issues that overlap for both AAT users and non-native language speakers (the students) are the way in which AI-generated language tools could both normalize speech and writing and reduce credibility when their users are very dependent on them [26]. Both older AAT users and international technology students interact with AATs or AAT-like technology that collect and adapt to personal data and engender a particular dependence

because of different challenges (e.g., vision and mobility vs. language and cultural pressures). That is, both AAT users and non-native language speakers are dependent on AI-generated language tools to normalize speech and writing, and these technologies collect and adapt to personal data with a kind of reliance that falls outside what is normative because of these challenges.

Our position paper primarily focuses on whether these intersectional international AI students' experiences with a similar technological matrix of oppression (the consequence of intersectional identities that leave them dependent on language software) might make them attuned in unique ways to the vulnerabilities in the design of technologies for older adults with Essential Tremors (ET) (our intersectional older adult AAT users). While the importance of developing empathy is considered critical in accessibility education and design research [49] we also wanted to go beyond empathy tools to support design of more private AATS. One of our aims was therefore to support development of design justice methods that could incorporate users and designers in optimal ways.

In the sections that follow, we describe the theoretical frames (AI-enabled capitalism, intersectionality, and design justice) informing our case study. We then describe our case study, reflecting our exploration of this analytical sensibility. We close by reflecting on lessons learned and detail future opportunities.

2 Related Literature

2.1 AI-enabled capitalism

Our digital world is built on an economy of “data futures,” in which data is harvested and extracted by social media and search companies who sell it based on its ability to predict behavior. This world has, of course, been normalized, for it's the principle on which all social media and search operate. Data capitalism [12, 34, 52], surveillance capitalism [59], and data colonialism [11, 12] are all related terms used to characterize this system in which data are extracted, harvested, and bartered for service. All these terms seem to suggest some loss of ourselves, not just as sentient consumer subjects but as citizens, and raise the questions of whether we can remain independent of the “capitalization of life” [11]. Data colonialism may, in fact, represent the extreme in terms of domination and exploitation, where individuals are forced into a new social order, and where to be social or “citizen” or “consumer” is to engage in production for the data economy. Because addressing these nuances in theory is beyond the scope of this paper, we use the term “surveillance capitalism” to encompass the system in which the domination of internet spaces (enabled by AI) relinquishes privacy and exacerbates discrimination and other harms [60].

Under surveillance capitalism, technology companies collect user data to customize their algorithms and they also sell user data. These data are used to profile groups of individuals based on socio-economics, race/ethnicity, and other identity vulnerabilities. According to a US Senate Report, a data broker creates and sells consumer groups based on, for example, financial vulnerability, ethnicity, and age [16]. Our identities, life experiences, financial hardship, or other life events or circumstances are baked into our digital profiles affecting access to financial and other services. While there may be some lingering perception that surveillance data harvested about consumers for data capitalization is largely anonymous and innocuous [44], a growing body of literature argues that it has the potential to do substantial harm to individuals [2, 35]. For example, the use of surveillance data in algorithms to administer social welfare, healthcare, and other services can have devastating effects [18, 19].

In this system, third parties can determine not only that you have a visual or mobility impairments but also other marginalizations, just by monitoring and analyzing your typing data and triangulating it with other data. The discriminatory possibilities, should this data get in the hands of an employer, or government, or other bad actors, are alarming. At the same time, it's not clear the extent to which vulnerable users grasp these risks—or feel capable of mitigating them, even when they do, particularly when it comes to surveillance infrastructures [22] embedded in AAT systems. We need to rethink how we do research and design for privacy, taking into account, in particular, the marginalized positions of data citizens and their entanglement in an extractive system. It is this

lens that seems to create more urgency around the design of systems that take into account structural inequality when considering the impacts of design.

Designing for privacy has historically been focused on individual agency to control boundaries [1, 43, 50] with much research dedicated to how users may not care about their privacy [3, 30] or feel powerless to do anything about it [28, 36]. By contrast, considerations for surveillance capitalism have been more focused on policy and service providers because it is assumed that users can't affect these economic systems. Arguably, privacy affordances meant to appeal to users agency are intricately linked with economic models of surveillance capitalism [38]. The AI tools that use data for predictive services sell speculative data to third parties. Arguably, they cannot be cleaved, leaving the responsibility of privacy by design to encompass both concepts of privacy—individual identity management and surveillance [44].

2.2 Intersectionality

We frame our exploration of design justice methods and tools through the lens of intersectionality. Intersectional theory has its origins in Black feminist thinking and is concerned with accounting for simultaneous identities that together may magnify individuals' susceptibility to systems of discrimination. Intersectional theory allows us to consider the user whose context demands an alternate narrative, distinguished from the "typical" user or personas invoked in design processes [46]. The shared and distinct privacy concerns and risks stemming from overlapping aspects of disabled identities are not well understood by software designers and policy makers whose perceptions may be shaped by "normative" perceptions of vulnerability. Thus, intersectionality offers a non-normative framework through which to consider identity, structures of social inequality, and justice. It expands on feminist approaches to ethics by extending the marginalized view to account for simultaneous identities (and contexts) which exacerbate susceptibility to structural inequality.

Intersectionality gained popularity with Kimberlé Crenshaw's essays in 1989/90 [13, 14], but there are many scholars and activists who have contributed to this analytical framework and theory (e.g., noted here [47]). Crenshaw rendered the compounding and altering nature of identity inequality and her emphasis on the reproduction of unequal structural outcomes when identities and interlocking oppressions are not fully taken into account. A core tenant of intersectionality is the critical importance of thinking about power in relationship to multiple, interconnected social coordinates. What Patricia Collins refers to as the matrix of oppression [7] can manifest as surveillance capitalism, which reifies inequality through advertising models and algorithmic surveillance that discriminates and disproportionately affects and harms certain marginalized groups.

Collins and Bilge articulate how intersectionality grapples with the dynamic complexities of race, class, gender, and systems of normative and discriminatory power in the context of social and political conditions [8]. The way in which coalitions are entangled in certain social inequalities, power, culture, etc. allows Collins and Bilge to explore how intersectionality's critical framework can be applied to a range of circumstances and identities—from Black feminism to football players in the World Cup. That is, intersectionality is not about finding equations or demographics that operate with analytical precision; it's about taking a messy, critical lens to interlocking oppressions operating in an environment that is loaded with complexities. These oppressions sometimes work in lock-step but sometimes in less intelligible ways. We build on this concept that even those who have different identities and contexts (and thus, different matrixes of oppressions) might be able to understand that dynamic, particularly if they have that experience. In our case study, we discuss how we put that idea to work, where we fell short, and how we are moving forward.

2.3 AI-enhanced AATs and design justice

Numerous approaches have been developed for assistive and accessibility technology design development that recognize the importance of including people with disabilities at every stage of the design process. Tools like empathy activities (a mainstay of disability design is going blindfolded or using a wheelchair) are well-intended

but problematic. First, they cause researchers and designers to respond to their own deprivation, subverting empathy by distracting from the experience of those that designers intend to help. Second, because of empathy exercises might have the paradoxical advantage of seeming so real, we may be more inclined to want to turn the experience off—to distance ourselves from the experience of a disability that we have the privilege to walk away from by, for example, getting up from the wheelchair. Thus, scholars like Bennet and Rosner [5] and Edwards et al. [17] argue that while empathy activities may be important, there is a difference between “being like” and trying to help users vs “being with” and trying to support and empower users through collaborative design practice. *Help* (derived from a poignant experience of empathy) solves the problem with little context. *Support* (derived from compassion and appreciation of someone’s whole experience) puts the problem in broader context of solutions. You have to understand the price people are willing to pay to solve the problem. Supporting or “being with” involves thinking through with individuals the larger context of their struggle, the efficacy of a particular solution, the effort it takes to supply that solution, the importance of the problem it’s meant to solve, and people’s willingness to make tradeoffs. Even if empathy exercises confront ergonomic constraints, they are not attuned to the overlapping oppressions of identity and disability in relationship to structural inequality. For instance, what services one disabled user has access to may not be the same for another, and that may very well be a result of structural inequalities.

Other approaches include User-Sensitive Inclusive Design [42], Design for User Empowerment [31], and Ability-based Design [55]. Shinohara et al. developed an approach, Design for Social Accessibility, that recognizes the importance of supporting student awareness of socially usable aspects of a design in addition to its functionality [49]. This approach calls for inclusion of perspectives from users with and without disabilities in the design process, and the use of methods that support consideration of social factors in accessible design [49].

While these more inclusive approaches have called for presence of those with disabilities in the research process, a prevailing theme in the design justice movement is that technologies need to be built with the collaboration of users—not just with them in mind. We contend also that awareness of structural inequalities that take into account the whole person needs to be a central analytical focus. We thus see the call by scholars like Shoshana Costanza-Chock [10] to include users as collaborators and consider their complex identity and oppressions as a necessary step in AAT development, but also want to explore the possibility of educating designers in tandem. We agree with their view that intersectionality is a useful framework from which to consider the ways that multiple identities interact with power that includes history of discrimination, oppression, and activism and want to explore its use as a design tool. It’s no easy task, as it requires embracing the complexities of identity as an ongoing struggle and having an ongoing dialogue with users and designers.

2.4 Our elicitation approach

These areas of emerging focus highlight the importance of several critical questions. How can we develop a process in the study of AI-enhanced AATs that identifies oppressions, rather than superficially connects with similar or limited experience? How can we “be with” as opposed to “be like”? How can we support and not just help? That is, how can we integrate the diverse and multi-faceted struggles of disabled users? At the same time, how can we surface the mechanisms of oppression using intersectionality’s analytic sensibilities—and how can we engender those sensibilities?

To address these questions, we designed an elicitation tool that explores identity management and surveillance harms with disabled users (study 1). We then adapted this tool to be used with AI technology students, whose experience of structural discrimination, while certainly not the same as those experienced by diverse adult users of AATs, provide a basis for mapping out how the use of data in structural oppression could find common ground for exploring possible harms of surveillance AI enabled technology used by AATs (study 2).

We also had another agenda. The challenges with approaches that involve users is that these methods may be hard to realize in an industry setting where investigation with users may be done only by researchers who then deliver insights to designers. We wanted to further explore this problem of how to design private/secure AATs and

to do so by bringing disabled people into the process, while also thinking hard about a way to make this process something that designers could be more involved with, particularly in settings where the research role is separate.

3 Background and Case Study

3.1 Toolkit and methods

We originally developed an elicitation tool (detailed here [24]) to be used with older adult AAT users with essential tremors (ET) (study 1). We then used it with information systems (IS) students studying AI with accompanying intersectional methods (study 2).

The tool was comprised of a set of cards that represent **Data Types** (i.e., Typing Data, Pointing data, Credit Card Data, Contact Data, Health Data, Search Queries, and Cookies); **Third-Parties** (i.e., Family, Friends, Doctors and Medical Professionals, Employers, Insurance Companies, Government, Social Media, Advertisers, Nobody, and Everybody); **Usage Scenarios** (which were verbally described and accompanied by a video demonstration); **Privacy Standards** strips (i.e., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Privacy Policy, Terms of Service, Data Use Agreement, Custom Rules (for the participant to make their own standards), and No Rules); an **Expectations Chart** for users to place third-party cards and indicate which parties they thought would collect their data and which would not); and a **Wheel of Emotions** (which was adapted in our second study with students as a verbal exercise to elicit intersectional reflections about disability and powerful institutions that linked to students own experience of discrimination in the context of surveillance capitalism).

For the **Usage Scenarios**, we first used the popular cloud-based writing assistant, Grammarly [20]. Second, we used the Pointing Interaction Notifications and AdapTations (PINATA) system [25] that helps users who experience difficulty when using pointing devices. It consists of a dynamic bubble cursor [21] that simulates the functionality of dynamically changing size in response to users' pointing performance and the location of the cursor. For PINATA to assist, it must monitor a user's pointing behavior over time. When errors are detected (for instance, a link is missed while it is being clicked) it increases the size of the cursor. For the Usage Scenarios, the verbal descriptions of Grammarly was that "Grammarly is an adaptive Spell Check application that you can use on your home computer. It works by monitoring your typing"; and for PINATA was "PINATA is an application that adapts to your changing pointing abilities. It works by collecting your pointing data." Video demos were also shown of Grammarly (from their website grammarly.com) and PINATA (produced by researchers).

In our second study with students, we included prompts in our interview to encourage them to extrapolate from their experiences with surveillance technology and think about other, intersectional identities, specifically, older adults with mobility or vision impairments and structural discrimination they might face. We sought to learn whether students who are guided to reflect on the chilling surveillance and tracking effects of its use, may be more or less empathetic to the risks that they experience.

In the following sections, we briefly report on our first study with older AAT users and then focus on our second study with IS graduate students.

3.2 Study with older adults using AATs (study 1)

In the first phase of our research, we studied the elicitation tool with 8 older adults who experience pointing difficulties because of ET [24]. We explored what privacy threats users anticipated specifically when using the two systems (Grammarly and PINATA).

While the participants were willing to have their pointing data collected and used to improve system functionality of AATS for themselves and others, they had strong preferences about who should access their data. Specifically, older AAT users were wary of their data being shared with insurance companies and employers but were more accepting of it being used to improve the AAT for others or for research purposes. Most communicated

concern about government (e.g., National Security Agency (NSA) or the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)) having access to their data. Participants were most comfortable sharing data with assistive technology companies and medical professionals. Participants also described how they wanted to have control over who would access their data and under what conditions. This study showed that the tool was effective at eliciting detailed privacy information from non-technical participants and also helped them reflect and elaborate on their choices.

3.3 Intersectional elicitation: study with students (study 2)

For the second study, we asked 7 IS graduate students (who were taking a course in algorithm design at the time of the study) with unique vulnerable intersectional identities of their own to explore these same technologies through the lens of both themselves and older adults using AATs. While these students were not disabled and their intersectional vulnerabilities related to immigration and being part of minorities at a time when their visa was at threat, we wanted to understand what impact their experience of risk with at least one of the technologies (i.e., Grammarly) would have on their ability to think about the privacy vulnerabilities of older AAT users. These students also share in common with older AAT users heightened risk of surveillance through AI technology. That is, both interact with/depend on AATs technology that collect and adapt to personal data and because of different challenges (e.g., vision and mobility vs language and cultural pressures).

Ultimately, we learned that while students were well aware of, and concerned about, the risks for government surveillance of their writing and clicking behaviors (which they almost exclusively attributed their status as students with visas), they didn't imagine these were concerns for AAT users. On the contrary, students imagined these tools would collect data that led to improvements for AAT users, whom they assumed everyone just agreed needed the help. They felt, for instance, that if the systems had access to more data because of their use of AI, that would help advertisers target people with disabilities with products that were more customized and thus would help the AI work better. Similarly, they also felt that having more data would be useful to doctors or governments who wanted to monitor the condition of users with disabilities, and act on those data.

Ultimately, students didn't connect the mechanisms that result in government tracking of themselves (which they worried very much about) with profiling of older adult AAT users; they just thought that any collection would simply go to doctors, government, family members, and teams of developers that wanted to help.

Notably, students did express knowledge of certain power structures that were oppressive to them, what Collins refers to as disciplinary domains of power (what rules apply, to whom and when) [7]. Yet the government rules they spoke of, and which they felt influenced them, were more sinister than the ones that existed for older AAT users and the power imbalance they identified only applied to their own interaction with AI and not AAT users. Students also expressed knowledge of structural domains of power (in this case, how immigration institutions operate and use AI infrastructures) [7], but did not imagine similar structures for older AAT users (e.g., insurances companies and other advertisers profiling to offer different services). That is, students are thinking about the mechanics of surveillance and the way that they relate to power but don't connect those insights with older AAT users. Even those who considered the same surveillance on AAT users assume that these privacy breaches are merely to improve the system for those with disabilities. For instance, they assume that personalization and assistance is an appropriate privacy tradeoff for someone with disabilities. If anything, their empathy and desire to help led them to consider that the problem was not of powerful institutions but, for instance, was the inability of those meaning well to help without fuller access.

4 Lessons Learned

In some sense, our research reiterates core design justice principles: research must include vulnerable users every step of the way. And it also suggests that there are simply no shortcuts to this process. Indeed, students remarked that they would need to speak with disabled users to really understand their challenges. But there are

other lessons as well. We had thought that experience of structural inequality might have provided additional insight for students into the potential harms encountered by (or that could befall) older AAT users. That didn't work out. Yet we were encouraged that our design may have, at the very least, gotten student designers into the practice of thinking about identity in relationship to systems of power (that is, to identify these struggles and their mechanisms)—even if that is not ultimately where they landed.

The next step is to help students engage users to understand the consequences of their technology design choices for others and to do so by learning about the structures at play. While it's clear that AI challenges cannot be solved merely with technical approaches, we need to find a way to address emerging and dynamic tensions stemming from dominant social and political configurations that require social and political awareness and an understanding of power [53] and surveillance capitalism. According to the AI Now Institute, “a more complete definition of AI includes technical approaches, social practices and industrial power” [61]. In our approach, we came close to having students interrogate the role of society, culture, and powerful institutions that undergird the AI systems they use. This knowledge is essential to understanding AI's intersectional vectors when collaborating in design with vulnerable disabled users (or any marginalized user).

4.1 Future opportunities

Our design may have partially fulfilled the first step of getting students and designers into the practice of thinking about identity in relationship to systems of power (that is, to identify struggles and their mechanisms). The next step will be to help them understand the consequences of their technology design choices for others in lock-step with society, culture, and powerful institutions. Below we describe activities that address both steps that we will incorporate into future iterations of this work, our rationale from the lessons learned, and also how we might realize and implement these activities.

Activity 1: Have student use the elicitation tool with AAT users input incorporated into the tool, particularly those with complex identities.

Rationale: Students remarked often at the end of the interviews that they wish they could speak with AAT users.

Thinking it through: We will need to explore ways of incorporating feedback from AAT communities into our elicitation activities—possibly as simple as including quotes. Bennet and Rosner [5] also stipulate that rather than seek complete “understanding” we should be seeking “attunement.” That is, not “filling absences” but considering why they are there and what that means for the capabilities of those for whom we are designing for. Perhaps students should be made aware of blanks and have to fill them in with technical inferences. We expect that those who design systems might also have insight into its capabilities. Additionally, we might consider having students, after reading quotes about realities, challenges or worries, think about how that might occur (or what could occur) technically.

Activity 2: Leverage similarities and differences, while also emphasizing asymmetries.

Rationale: Students struggled to connect their experiences of oppression in similar scenarios with older AAT users and also did not consider how their agency might differ—e.g., the idea that while they rely on Grammarly they could stop using these systems while under visa review.

Thinking it through: We will find ways to continually map similarities and differences between student/designers and AAT users. Bennet and Rosner assert that “reworking design empathy as ‘being with’ could raise asymmetries not as things to be avoided but as things to be ongoingly accountable to” [5]. While activity 1 might help with that, we can also have an exercise that explicitly draws out the similarities students have with AAT users (e.g., dependence on spelling and writing tools) and also elicits asymmetries and experiences they don't know. We did this to an extent in the interviews, asking students to imagine AAT users, but we could have this be an explicit exercise.

Activity 3: Focus more on surfacing links between identity and power and mutual struggle. For example, we could more clearly delineate and elucidate mechanisms and risks in our design and activities. We could encourage

mapping of narratives of struggle to domains of power (e.g., surface contradictions to the idea that all technology is good).

Rationale: Students identified power imbalances but only those that applied to them. Those they considered for AAT users were always for good reason.

Thinking it through: We experimented with intersectionality in our interview methods, but we could do more. In future iterations, we will incorporate exercises that have students elicit vectors of oppression and power dynamics exploited by these technologies and consider how they might affect AAT users. We might, for instance, have exercises for considering how structural domains of power could exist across populations. To an extent, the tool already does this by using the data type cards and third-party cards to create narratives, first for students and then for AAT users. Yet we could emphasize these comparisons by, for example, taking the simple step of preserving the arrangements of the cards for the students and forcing visual comparison. This might, in fact, be an advantage to using a virtual toolkit.

Activity 4: Design fiction/speculative approach to design as a way to explore these narratives without constraint.

Rationale: Students told us that the elicitation tool really made them reflect. Yet they also noted the limits to their ability to reflect.

Thinking it through: Design fictions use elements of existing technology and design metaphors, as well as narrative, to imagine potential futures in provocative ways that foster ethical debate [6]. Design fictions are increasingly popular critical device in academia and the arts. They are particularly effective at exposing, interrogating, and “queering” norms, with the potential to elucidate marginalized concerns and vulnerabilities and better serve the needs of populations who may not share those norms or priorities. We may not be able to include a design fiction exercise in the toolkit, but perhaps creating them could be a subsequent workshop session goal.

5 Conclusions

We took a study of a privacy elicitation toolkit for older adults who experience difficulties with computer pointing and typing tasks and deployed it with IS graduate students, with the goal of understanding how we can iterate on design justice principles with an intersectional approach. The results were mixed. On the one hand, we found that the tool, combined with intersectional methods, succeeded in eliciting reflections about the risks of collecting data for the purposes of enabling AI technologies. But the tool didn’t (at least, not in this current iteration) lead students to reflect on risks to other AAT users. That is, students were often able to associate their own risks with aspects of their identity that leave them vulnerable but did not extrapolate those identities or vulnerabilities to diverse real-world AAT users. Future work will incorporate interview and activity prompts that focus more on identity-based exploration, for instance, incorporating more intersectional interview methods where one’s identity and contexts of power are linked to specific experiences of risk. It will surface power dynamics with scenarios, employ design fictions as well as integrate user populations.

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Summarize with Caution: Comparing Global Feature Attributions

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Abstract

Local interpretability methods are widely used because of their ability to generate explanations tailored to individual data points even for complex black-box models. Although these methods are not designed to provide a global view of a model’s behavior, many common interpretability tools offer makeshift global feature attributions obtained by taking the mean absolute value of each feature’s (local) attribution scores across all training data points and then ranking the features by their average scores. We argue that averaging feature attribution scores may not always be appropriate and explore the ramifications of doing so. We present an artifact-based interview study intended to investigate whether ML developers would benefit from being able to compare and contrast different global feature attributions obtained by ranking features by other summary statistics of their attribution scores. We find that participants are able to use these global feature attributions to achieve different tasks and objectives. Viewing multiple global feature attributions increased participants’ uncertainty in their understanding of the underlying model as they became more aware of the intricacies of the model’s behavior. However, participants expressed concerns about the time it would take to compare and contrast different global feature attributions, echoing observations from prior work about the need to balance the benefits of thinking fast and thinking slow when designing interpretability tools.

1 Introduction

Machine learning (ML) is used in a wide range of domains, including medicine, finance, and education. Applications of ML impact people’s day-to-day lives and livelihoods, yet the behavior of popular models like neural networks is often too complex to fully understand or communicate. In order for stakeholders of systems that rely on ML—including ML developers, domain experts, and those impacted by such systems—to reason about their behavior, the models involved must be interpretable. Interpretability can support knowledge discovery, enable stakeholders to surface problematic model behavior, enhance stakeholders’ abilities to communicate what their models have learned, and provide stakeholders with a way to calibrate their trust in models [11, 28].

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Bulletin of the IEEE Computer Society Technical Committee on Data Engineering

There are two common approaches to achieving model interpretability. The first is to train simple and transparent glass-box models that are intended to be interpretable by design. Common examples include decision trees [22], point systems [30, 12], and generalized additive models [9, 6]. By examining the internals of a glass-box model, it is possible to obtain an accurate global view of that model’s behavior.

In contrast, local interpretability methods provide (generally post-hoc) explanations of a model’s predictions for individual data points. Local explanations can take several different forms. Some explain predictions in terms of the most influential training data points [e.g., 14]. Others provide counterfactual explanations, describing how data points could be modified to obtain different predictions [e.g., 26, 27]. Perhaps most often, local explanations take the form of feature attribution scores, which capture some notion of how “important” each feature is to each prediction, as shown in the left panel of Figure 1. For example, SHAP (Shapley Additive Explanations) divides “credit” for a model’s prediction across all of its features using the concept of Shapley values from cooperative game theory [18]. In contrast, LIME (Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations) generates feature attribution scores by learning a local linear approximation of a model around each data point [23]. Because these explanations are tailored to individual data points, local interpretability methods may be appropriate when stakeholders need, want, or are owed individualized explanations of a model’s predictions, such as in personalized medical contexts (e.g., to explain a patient’s predicted diagnosis or prognosis) or financial contexts (e.g., to explain an applicant’s predicted likelihood of paying back a loan). Although such explanations do not perfectly reflect what the underlying model is doing [25, 29], they have the advantage that they can be generated even for complex black-box models, such as neural networks, random forests, or ensemble methods.

Despite their popularity, local interpretability methods are not designed to provide a global view of a model’s behavior. However, many common interpretability tools, including the SHAP Python package¹ and InterpretML,² offer makeshift global feature attributions obtained by taking the mean absolute value of each feature’s attribution scores across all training data points and then ranking the features by their average scores, as shown in the rightmost panel of Figure 1. Such global feature attributions can give a sense of which features a model uses most “on average” across its training dataset. This kind of concise overview of a model is valued by ML developers—indeed, in a preliminary study that we ran in order to understand the current practices of experienced users of interpretability tools (described in Section 2), we found that ML developers commonly rely on these global feature attributions to get an overall sense of what their models have learned, to communicate this information to other stakeholders, and to perform other tasks in their workflows.

However, simply averaging feature attribution scores may not always be appropriate. Reducing a distribution to a single summary statistic loses information, and it is well known that the (arithmetic) mean is susceptible to outliers. Relying on a single summary statistic to make inferences about individuals can lead to ecological fallacies [24]. Furthermore, it may also obscure potentially harmful behavior exhibited by a model for the data points associated with a particular group of people—for example, in a medical context, older patients or patients with certain preexisting conditions. Indeed, with society’s increased emphasis on mitigating unfairness caused by systems that rely on ML, there has been a push to move away from overreliance on averages and to instead take a more holistic view of model behavior [e.g., 19, 3]. Since interpretability is often framed as a way to promote fairness, overreliance on averages may be especially problematic in this context.

In Section 3, using models trained on the Adult [15] and NHANES [7] datasets as case studies, we explore the ramifications of averaging feature attribution scores. For each model, we compare the global feature attributions obtained using the status quo approach—that is, by taking the mean absolute value of each feature’s attribution scores across all training data points and then ranking the features by their average scores—with a suite of global feature attributions obtained by supplementing the mean absolute value with other summary statistics. We find that the status quo approach can yield overly simplistic global views, as well as overlooking important aspects of model behavior that are present only for a subset of the training data points. We show that using other summary statistics

¹<https://github.com/slundberg/shap>

²<https://interpret.ml>




Figure 1: Explanations provided by the SHAP Python package. Left: A local explanation for a single data point. Each bar represents a single feature’s attribution score for that data point. Middle: A single feature’s attribution scores for all training data points, with each data point represented by a dot. Right: Global feature attributions obtained by taking the mean absolute value of each feature’s absolute attribution scores across all training data points and then ranking the features by their average scores.

in place of the mean absolute value can help derive different, complementary insights into a model’s predictions and may be better suited for different tasks. We therefore propose giving ML developers the opportunity to compare and contrast different global feature attributions obtained by ranking features by other summary statistics of their attribution scores, potentially enabling them to obtain a more nuanced global view of their models’ behavior.

To explore whether ML developers would benefit from being able to compare and contrast different global feature attributions, we ran an artifact-based interview study with seven participants who had experience with interpretability tools. Participants were first shown the usual global feature attributions provided by SHAP and asked some questions about the underlying model. They were then shown a suite of global feature attributions obtained by ranking features by four different summary statistics of their attribution scores—what we refer to as a global feature attribution suite—and asked to reconsider their answers. We note that we do not view the global feature attribution suite itself as a contribution, but rather as an artifact for exploring ML developers’ perceptions, needs, and challenges around global feature attributions. Our study addresses the following research questions:

1. How do ML developers make sense of and use global feature attributions obtained by ranking features by different summary statistics of their attribution scores?
2. Does the ability to compare and contrast different global feature attributions allow ML developers to better understand the nuanced behavior of models?
3. What challenges do ML developers face when comparing and contrasting global feature attributions?

We find that ML developers are able to use different global feature attributions to achieve tasks and objectives including communicating what their models have learned and identifying next steps for debugging their models. Viewing the global feature attribution suite increased participants’ uncertainty in their understanding of the underlying model (compared with viewing the usual global feature attributions alone) as they became more aware of the intricacies of the model’s behavior. However, they expressed a tension between the benefits obtained by using tools like SHAP to quickly get a sense of what a model has learned and the time it would take to compare and contrast different global feature attributions. This tension might limit ML developers’ willingness to use a global feature attribution suite in their own workflows, echoing observations from prior work about the need to balance the benefits of thinking fast and thinking slow when designing interpretability tools [13].

This paper contributes to a recent line of research exploring human-centered approaches to interpretability. Much of this research focuses on how stakeholders use and understand interpretability tools [17, 4, 5, 10, 16, 1, 11, 13, 31, 21, 2, 28]. Within this research, Kaur et al. [13] found that even experienced ML developers tend to misuse and place too much trust in interpretability tools. They therefore suggested designing interpretability tools that explicitly highlight the nuanced behavior of models, as well as methods that counterbalance the bias toward

simple—and potentially misleading—explanations. We see our work as a first exploration of how one might facilitate deeper understanding by enhancing overly simplistic global views of a model.

2 Preliminary Study

To better ground our research, we ran a small preliminary study during the summer of 2020 to help us understand the current practices of experienced users of interpretability tools. We conducted semi-structured interviews with ten ML developers (e.g., data scientists, research scientists, PhD students) across a variety of domains (e.g., medicine, finance, retail). Participants were recruited through a combination of posts to relevant email lists and message boards at our institution, direct emails to individuals who had written blog posts or made contributions to either the SHAP Python package or InterpretML, and snowball sampling. Each participant had experience using at least one common interpretability tool, and nine had experience specifically with SHAP. Table 1 contains additional information about the participants.

During the interviews, we first asked participants about their background and experience with both ML in general and interpretability tools in particular. Next, we asked them to describe the tasks and objectives they use interpretability tools to achieve, both alone and with collaborators. Participants were asked to walk through examples of specific times they had used interpretability tools to accomplish those tasks and objectives, and were led through a series of open-ended questions intended to uncover the strategies they had used, including what had worked well and what had not. Finally, participants were asked if they had any wishes for a potential new interpretability tool or for new functionality for an existing interpretability tool. All interviews were conducted virtually on a video conferencing platform due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Audio from the interviews was recorded and transcribed by a third-party service, after which the audio transcripts were reviewed for accuracy and anonymized. The first author then coded the transcripts using a bottom-up approach and four authors conducted a thematic analysis. The study was approved by our institution’s IRB. Participation was voluntary and participants received up to \$75 in compensation for their participation.³

Participants described using interpretability tools for tasks and objectives including model debugging, improving model performance, communication and collaboration (including building collaborators’ trust in models), and knowledge discovery. These tasks and objectives are very much in line with those identified by Hong et al. [11]. In total, participants mentioned more than forty different strategies for accomplishing these tasks and objectives, such as looking for patterns, outliers, and anomalies in scatter plots of feature attribution scores for all training data points (as in the middle panel of Figure 1); comparing observed patterns with prior knowledge; and turning to domain experts when some aspect of an explanation was unclear.

Strikingly, although our preliminary study was not specifically designed to explore the use of global feature attributions, all ten participants said that they use global feature attributions (obtained using the status quo approach of taking the mean absolute value of each feature’s attribution scores across all training data points and then ranking the features by their average scores) somewhere in their workflow. Participants mentioned using global feature attributions to get an overall sense of what their models have learned (e.g., for debugging or for determining the overall credibility of their models), to check that the “most important” features match their expectations, to determine which features to prioritize for in-depth analysis, and to communicate what their models have learned to other stakeholders.

However, participants also brought up several pain points around their use of global feature attributions. They were aware that using the mean absolute value could be problematic. As P2 said, *“ranking of feature importance is, you know, a very— somewhat arbitrary way to do things. You know, there’s so many different importance measures. But, at least looking at something can tell us if our model has— is relying on reasonable features.”* Some participants mentioned that using the mean absolute value fails to account for relatively rare features that have a large influence when they are present. Participants also brought up the difficulty of communicating about

³Due to institutional requirements, compensation varied based on the relationship between the participant and our institution.

Table 1: Descriptions of the participants in our studies.

ID	Job Description	Years in ML	Types of Data Worked With	Interpretability Tools or Methods Used	Study 2 Dataset
P1	ML PhD Student	2	Medical	SHAP, self-made visualizations	NHANES
P2	ML PhD Student	1	Medical	InterpretML, SHAP, LIME, GAMs, self-made visualizations	NHANES
P3	ML Practitioner	2	Remote Sensing, Retail, Banking	SHAP, self-made visualizations	N/A
P4	Environmental Sci. PhD Student	3	Environmental, Geospatial	SHAP, GAMs, self-made visualizations	N/A
P5	Data Scientist	2	Retail	SHAP	Adult
P6	MD and ML PhD Student	4	Medical	SHAP, GAMs, self-made visualizations	NHANES
P7	Research Scientist	6	Technology, Medical	SHAP, LIME, GAMs, self-made visualizations	Adult
P8	Data Scientist	4	Retail	AzureML, SHAP, LIME	Adult
P9	Data Scientist, Program Manager	7	Retail, Financial, User Behavior	SHAP	N/A
P10	ML Practitioner	3	Medical, Financial	InterpretML, AzureML, LIME, self-made visualizations	Adult

the global behavior of models at a level that is more in-depth than the bar plots that common interpretability tools provide (see the right panel of Figure 1, for example).

Although it wasn’t our original focus when we first set out to conduct this preliminary study, observing participants’ overwhelming use of global feature attributions obtained using the status quo approach in their workflows—despite being aware of some of the pitfalls—motivated us to question whether ML developers would benefit from a more nuanced global view of their models’ behavior. That is the question we address in this paper. Other needs that emerged from the study include ways to explore and address feature correlation and confounding; less time-consuming ways to analyze individual features; ways to aggregate related features to understand their combined influence; ways to determine the reliability of explanations; ways to validate insights found using explanations; more customizable visualizations; and increased documentation for interpretability tools, including documentation aimed at expert users. We leave these directions for future work.

3 Benefits and Drawbacks of Different Summary Statistics

In this section, we review the way in which global feature attributions are most commonly obtained from feature attribution scores, describe some alternative approaches to doing this, and discuss the benefits and drawbacks of each. Although most of this discussion is applicable to any local interpretability method that generates feature attribution scores, we focus both here and in the rest of this paper on SHAP [18] for concreteness. SHAP’s feature attribution scores, which are motivated by Shapley values from cooperative game theory, can be viewed as a way of dividing the “credit” for a model’s prediction across all of its features. The sum of the features’ attribution scores is equal to the expected value of the prediction for the data point in question. SHAP is widely used in practice—as of November 2021, the SHAP Python package had close to 15k stars on GitHub, and nine of the ten participants in our preliminary study had experience with SHAP.

We illustrate the benefits and drawbacks of different approaches to obtaining global feature attributions from

feature attribution scores through case studies using models trained on two widely used open-source datasets: the Adult dataset [15] and the NHANES dataset [7]. The Adult dataset is based on 1994 US Census data and each data point corresponds to a person. The features include age, employment type, education, marital status, occupation, race, and sex, among others. The model that we trained on this dataset predicts whether or not a person makes at least \$50k per year (the equivalent of about \$92.5k in 2021 when adjusted for inflation). The NHANES dataset is a survival dataset from a longitudinal health and wellness study. Again, each data point corresponds to a person. The features include age, race, sex, poverty index, BMI, lab blood test results, and blood pressure measurements. The model that we trained on this dataset is a Cox proportional hazards model that predicts the differential risk of a person dying versus the typical background risk (log hazard).

Although SHAP was designed to offer only local explanations, the SHAP Python package additionally constructs makeshift global feature attributions as follows: First, for each feature, take the mean absolute value of that feature’s attribution scores across all training data points. Next, rank the features by their average scores. The resulting global feature attributions for the models trained on the Adult and NHANES datasets, respectively, can be seen in the top row of Figure 2. For example, according to these global feature attributions, age is the most important feature for both models. This is intuitive since people who are older tend to earn more money and age is highly correlated with how likely someone is to die in the near future. But this does not tell the whole story. For each of these models, does age play an equal role in the model’s predictions for all training data points, or is it more important for some data points than for others? Are there groups of data points for which the model relies on completely different features? Are there outlier data points for which the model relies on features that it should not? If the goal is to debug the model, what should the next step be?

To answer these questions, an ML developer could turn to a visualization of a particular feature’s attribution score across all training data points, such as the type of scatter plot shown in the middle panel of Figure 1 or the beeswarm plots available in the SHAP Python package, both of which provide a more detailed view of a feature’s influence. However, for models with hundreds or even thousands of features, it is too burdensome to explore and compare all such plots—indeed, this is why developers turn to summary statistics in the first place. And even with a small number of features, comparing plots across multiple features is not easy.

Instead, we consider supplementing the mean absolute value with other summary statistics. Using different summary statistics yields different rankings of the features and, as we show below, substantively different takeaways. Although in principle any summary statistic could be used, we propose a few alternatives that capture different aspects of the distribution of a model’s feature attribution scores across all training data points.

We first consider the range of a feature’s attribution scores—that is, the difference between the maximum attribution score for that feature across all training data points and the minimum attribution score for that feature across all training data points (not taking absolute values). Features with a large range of attribution scores are highly influential on at least some data points. Outlier data points can be found by examining scatter plots for features with a large range. This is useful both for understanding a model’s behavior on unusual data points and for identifying bugs. As we can see from the second row of Figure 2, when predicting whether someone makes over \$50k a year using the Adult dataset, capital loss is only the eighth-highest ranked feature when using the mean absolute value, but the second-highest ranked feature in terms of range. This is due to extreme outliers—specifically, atypically high capital loss values—in the training dataset. The prominence of capital loss in this alternative ranking might help draw a developer’s attention to this issue so they can investigate whether it stems from a bug that needs fixing or whether it reflects a true phenomenon in the underlying population.

In some cases, the range may be too susceptible to outliers. Even a single data point with an extreme feature attribution score can boost a feature’s range. This can be problematic if the goal is not to identify individual outlier data points, but to identify larger groups of data points for which a feature is highly influential. As a result, for this task, it may be more appropriate to use a censored version of the range. We define the typical range of a feature’s attribution scores to be the difference between the feature’s ninety-fifth-percentile feature attribution score and




Figure 2: Global feature attributions obtained by ranking features by different summary statistics of their attribution scores. Each row corresponds to a summary statistic: the mean absolute value, the range, the typical range, and the frequency in the top three. The column on the left contains global feature attributions for the model trained on the Adult dataset; the column on the right contains global feature attributions for the model trained on the NHANES dataset.

its fifth percentile feature attribution score across all training data points.⁴ Ranking features by their typical range can reveal features that are influential not just for a handful of data points, but for a more substantial subset of data points. It can therefore be used to identify groups of data points for which the model behaves similarly. Examining the second row of Figure 2, we can see that both red blood cell count and white blood cell count have a large range for the NHANES model. However, examining the third row, we can see that only white blood cell count ranks highly in terms of the typical range. This suggests that white blood cell count is an important feature for a larger subset of the training data points than red blood cell count, for which the large range may be due to outliers.

The final summary statistic that we consider enables us to get a sense of which features are influential for a large proportion of the training data points without worrying about the specific values of their attribution scores. We define the frequency in the top three to be the fraction of the training data points for which the feature in question ranks among the top three in terms of its absolute feature attribution scores. We can think of this as letting every data point vote for its top three most important features and then tallying up the votes across the training dataset.⁵ Compared with the mean absolute value, the frequency in the top three provides a way to control for high variance in the feature attribution scores. When predicting whether someone will make over \$50k a year using the Adult Dataset, the capital gain feature ranks third in terms of the mean absolute value, and one might therefore assume it is important for all data points. However, examining the final row of Figure 2, we can see that capital gain is one of the top three most important features for only 20% of the training data points. In contrast, hours worked per week is in the top three for 34% of the training data points, while its mean absolute feature attribution score is significantly lower (0.43, compared with 0.73 for capital gain).

Different summary statistics will yield different global feature attributions that can be used to derive different—and often complementary—insights. We therefore propose that a more accurate global view of a model’s behavior might be achieved by allowing ML developers to compare and contrast different global feature attributions. In the next section, we describe a study that we designed to explore this idea.

4 Main Study

To explore whether ML developers would benefit from being able to compare and contrast different global feature attributions, we ran a study in which participants were asked to answer questions about a model before and after seeing global feature attributions obtained by ranking features by four different summary statistics of their attribution scores, as described in Section 3. We refer to this as a global feature attribution suite, and use it as an artifact for exploring ML developers’ perceptions, needs, and challenges around global feature attributions.

4.1 Methods

For this study, which we conducted during the summer of 2020, we recruited seven participants, all of whom had participated in our preliminary study (see Section 2) and had agreed to be contacted for follow-up research; the remaining three participants declined to participate. The study was approved by our institution’s IRB. Each interview lasted approximately one hour and participants received a \$50 gift card for their participation.

The study consisted of semi-structured interviews in which participants were shown two different static (HTML file) Jupyter notebooks. Both notebooks contained a model, a textual description of the dataset used to train the model, a beeswarm plot visualizing the distribution of attribution scores for each feature, and a feature dependence scatter plot for each feature (as in the middle panel of Figure 1). In the first notebook, we included a bar plot showing global feature attributions obtained using the status quo approach—that is, by taking the mean absolute value of each feature’s attribution scores across all training data points and then ranking the features

⁴The choice of the ninety-fifth percentile and the fifth percentile is, of course, somewhat arbitrary, and other percentiles could be used; we thought that this choice would balance the ability to identify groups of data points with robustness to extreme outliers.

⁵Again, the choice of three votes per data point is arbitrary and other values could be used.

Table 2: The descriptions of the summary statistics that were shown to participants.

Statistic	How It’s Calculated	Potential Uses
Mean Absolute Value	Mean over all samples in the training data set of the absolute value of each sample’s model attribution score.	Gives a sense of what the model is learning overall. Currently the default global feature importance ranking in SHAP.
Range	Difference between the maximum model attribution score and the minimum model attribution score of the given feature over the training data set.	Identifies features that are heavily influential on at least a small number of samples in the data. Can also help find extreme outliers in the data.
Typical Range (Excluding Outliers)	Difference between the 95th percentile model attribution score and the 5th percentile model attribution score of the given feature over the training data set.	Identifies features that are heavily influential for at least a substantial subset of samples within the data. More robust to outliers than the Range. Can also help find subsets within the data.
Frequency in the Top Three	Fraction of samples in the training data set for which the given feature was ranked in the top three in terms of absolute attribution scores.	Gives a sense of which features most commonly have heavy influence on individual samples’ predictions. Can also help to get an understanding without needing to understand the model attribution score.

by their average scores, as in the top row of Figure 2—as well as a description of how these global feature attributions were obtained and a brief list of potential uses. In the second notebook, we additionally included bar plots showing global feature attributions obtained using other summary statistics (specifically, the range, the typical range, and the frequency in the top three) in addition to the mean absolute value, as shown in Figure 2. We described how these global feature attributions were obtained and listed potential uses for each, using the wording in Table 2. All participants were shown the first notebook before the second notebook. We chose to show the notebooks sequentially, as opposed to using a counterbalanced design, so that we could first observe how participants made use of the usual global feature attributions provided by SHAP, and then see whether and how their perspectives changed when they were shown the global feature attribution suite.

To avoid over-indexing on a single dataset or model, we generated versions of these notebooks for both of the models described in Section 3—that is, the model trained on the Adult dataset and the model trained on the NHANES dataset. We assigned the model trained on the NHANES dataset to the three participants who most regularly work with medical data and would therefore likely be more comfortable with both the task and the features; we assigned the model trained on the Adult dataset to the remaining four participants. These assignments are listed in the rightmost column of Table 1.

All interviews were conducted virtually on a video conferencing platform due to the COVID-19 pandemic. During each interview, the participant and the interviewer viewed the notebooks together, one at a time, via screen sharing. The participant had control of the screen to click, scroll, and explore. Participants were first asked to think aloud while they familiarized themselves with each notebook. They were then asked how they would go about accomplishing three of the tasks and objectives for which participants in our preliminary study had reported using interpretability tools. Specifically, we asked participants to describe 1) what they thought the model had learned overall, 2) how they would explain what the model had learned to someone who wasn’t an ML developer, and 3) what their next steps would be if they were to go about debugging the model. After completing this sequence with the first notebook, and then completing it again with the additional information provided in the second notebook, participants were asked to share their likes and dislikes for each of the different global feature attributions, as well as their critical feedback, the value they gained from using the global feature attribution suite, and whether they would use a global feature attribution suite in their own workflows.

The complete notebooks and the interview protocol can be found at <https://github.com/aokeson/Aggregated-Explainability-Ranking-Alternatives>.

Both audio and video from the interviews was recorded. Audio was transcribed by a third-party service, after which the audio transcripts were reviewed for accuracy and anonymized. The first author then annotated each transcript with information about the visualizations that the participant viewed at different points in time based on the corresponding video recording. The annotated transcripts were coded by the first author in three distinct passes: 1) coding differences in how participants answered our questions when viewing the first notebook compared with the second notebook, 2) coding potential uses mentioned by participants for the different global feature attributions, and finally 3) coding feedback (both positive and negative) on the global feature attribution suite. All authors then participated in a thematic analysis using the three types of codes.

4.2 Results

As we describe in this section, participants found the global feature attribution suite useful for communicating what the model had learned and identifying next steps for debugging the model. They also found that it increased their uncertainty in their understanding the model (compared with viewing the usual global feature attributions alone) and helped them become more aware of the nuances of the model’s behavior. However, they expressed concerns that the time it would take to compare and contrast different global feature attributions might affect the extent to which they would use a global feature attribution suite in their own workflows.

With our small sample size, we did not see clear differences between participants who were shown the model trained on the NHANES dataset and participants who were shown the model trained on the Adult datasets, so we do not attempt to make distinctions between the two.

4.2.1 Strategies for Using Different Global Feature Attributions

Participants used the global feature attributions in a variety of different ways, exploring them individually as well as comparing and contrasting different global feature attributions.

Three participants (P5, P6, P7) checked for agreement between the different global feature attributions in order to pull out specific features that were influential across more than one of them. This gave them more confidence that these features were genuinely influential. For example, P5, who saw the model trained on the Adult dataset, had named age as being important to the model’s predictions when they viewed the usual global feature attributions provided by SHAP in the first notebook. After seeing that age was also highly ranked according to the global feature attributions provided in the second notebook, they were more confident in their assessment of what the model had learned and in how to communicate what the model had learned to other stakeholders, stating *“I would feel rather confident that the clearest learning from the model is [...] around age.”* P6 and P7 both independently described this process as trying to “flatten” the different global feature attributions back to a single list of the most influential features by extracting features that were highly ranked according to all of the global feature attributions. *“Maybe you want to start by listing the features that are sort of robustly important across an array of these different metrics.”* –P6

One of the most common strategies for using the global feature attribution suite was to identify where the different global feature attributions disagreed and to explore the cause of this disagreement. Five of the seven participants (P1, P2, P6, P7, and P8) discussed using this strategy either to uncover new insights into the model’s predictions or as a first step for debugging the model. P7 described going through each feature to check if it was consistently important, unimportant, or both across the different global feature attributions: *“Consistently important variables, great. Consistently not important variables, great. But variables where some trick like that could move you around a lot maybe is indicating something. Exactly what, I don’t know. But that’s why I would have to go explore.”* As P6 described, *“It seems potentially very useful to come up with several different orderings of the features and then try to figure out why those orderings disagree in cases where they disagree. That seems*

like a very potentially fruitful way to find either interesting behavior or problems with your model.” P8, who saw the model trained on the Adult dataset, also used this strategy. When looking at the first notebook, P8 included capital gain in a list of influential features, because it was among the top three features according to the global feature attributions obtained using the status quo approach. However, while exploring the second notebook, P8 found that the different global feature attributions differed in their rankings of capital gain and capital loss, and decided to explore this further. They were able to use this observation to jump start the debugging process by identifying outliers in the training dataset: “I think that probably the [range] or [typical range] here helps to explain why capital gains appears on the [ranking by mean absolute value] but rather not in the [ranking by frequency in top three], probably because [capital gains] has very high variance and there are some outliers in the data, which drags this mean absolute value here. So, the outliers are the main cause that drag this capital gain to be the top three in [ranking by mean], rather than the [ranking by frequency in the top three].”

There was no general consensus among participants about which of the global feature attributions was most appropriate for each of the three tasks and objectives. In general, participants followed the brief guidance that we had provided in the notebooks about potential uses. For example, P2, who saw the model trained on the NHANES dataset, used the global feature attributions obtained by ranking features by their range to identify outliers in the training dataset, saying *“This range of the blood cell value, so I would want to verify that that’s a realistic effect, that we’re not just picking up individuals that have bad values for the white blood cell count.”* In some cases, participants also came up with their own uses for the different global feature attributions, either deliberately or by chance. P2, for example, identified a potential bug in the NHANES dataset after examining the global feature attributions obtained by ranking features by their frequency in the top three and then deciding to dig more deeply into the diastolic blood pressure feature. *“For instance, there is a group of patients here with diastolic blood pressure less than 20. That hardly seems realistic. So this is a group of patients for whom either the value is missing or it was input wrong.”* –P2

4.2.2 Increased Uncertainty about the Model’s Behavior

Our hope was that providing ML developers with different global feature attributions to compare and contrast would lessen their confidence in the overly simplistic global feature attributions usually provided by SHAP and instead enable them to obtain a more nuanced global view of their models’ behavior. When interacting with the first notebook, most participants focused their descriptions of what the model had learned on a few features that were highly ranked according to the usual global feature attributions provided by SHAP. As a result, participants tended to focus their exploration of the model on a few (typically three to five) features. However, when exploring the second notebook, participants began to doubt the simple answers they had given previously. For example, P7 questioned their initial interpretation of what the model had learned, saying *“Now I’m a little hesitant, because I’m not sure. I guess there’s now four plots, and they are kind of equivalent. [...] So now I’m a little confused. I’m not sure which one to trust and to use to answer this question.”* Participants also commented that their confidence had changed: *“I think it’s just sort of broadened my confidence intervals on how important each feature is.”* –P6. As desired, participants felt that the global feature attribution suite provided a more nuanced global view of the model’s behavior than the global feature attributions obtained using the status-quo approach: *“I mean, it takes you from [...] a scalar importance to a distribution of importance. It really helps you get that new understanding of how the importance of a feature can change over the different samples and the mean will not tell you that.”* –P2 Lastly, participants noted that some of the information available in the second notebook could be inferred from other visualizations, such as SHAP’s beeswarm plots, but that the new plots made it easier to digest and interpret the information: *“I mean, that’s similar information for what’s in this summary plot, but it’s condensed in a way that it’s much easier to read.”* –P2 Indeed, although the distribution of attribution scores for each feature was available in other plots, this information was not salient enough to mitigate participants’ overconfidence.

4.2.3 Required time investment and constraints

The most common challenge raised by participants was that it might be too time consuming to compare and contrast different global feature attributions. P7 articulated a tension between the pressures of real-world time constraints and the benefits of rigorously examining multiple global feature attributions: *“And if you are really strapped for time, which in the industry you frequently are, then it might be easy to just not explore these other things. [...] It makes me think that, going forward, I should be a little more vigilant about this stuff, but, honestly, it really depends on time.”* Participants were concerned about whether a global feature attribution suite would help them accomplish their tasks and objectives more quickly or instead be yet another time sink. Participants may have been overly pessimistic about the time it would take to compare and contrast different global feature attributions because they were seeing them for the first time. However, before implementing a global feature attribution suite in common interpretability tools, more research is needed to understand how to present different global feature attributions in the most efficient way possible.

5 Discussion

We presented an artifact-based interview study intended to investigate whether ML developers would benefit from being able to compare and contrast different global feature attributions. This study extends a recent line of research exploring human-centered approaches to interpretability and, in particular, how stakeholders use and understand interpretability tools [17, 4, 5, 10, 16, 1, 11, 13, 31, 21, 2, 28]; however, our focus is on an aspect of interpretability tools that has been overlooked to date—namely, the summary statistics used to generate global feature attributions. Participants were first shown the usual global feature attributions provided by SHAP and asked some questions about the underlying model. They were then shown a suite of global feature attributions obtained by ranking features by four different summary statistics of their attribution scores—what we refer to as a global feature attribution suite—and asked to reconsider their answers. Our hope was that providing ML developers with different global feature attributions to compare and contrast would lessen their confidence in the overly simplistic global feature attributions usually provided by SHAP and instead enable them to obtain a more nuanced global view of their models’ behavior.

We found that participants were able to use the global feature attribution suite to communicate what the model had learned and to identify next steps for debugging the model. As desired, we also found that viewing the global feature attribution suite increased their uncertainty in their understanding of the underlying model as they became more aware of the intricacies of the model’s behavior. However, they also expressed a tension between the benefits obtained by using tools like SHAP to quickly get a sense of what a model has learned and the time it would take to compare and contrast different global feature attributions, noting that this might affect the extent to which they would use a global feature attribution suite in their own workflows. Of course, participants were seeing the global feature attributions for the first time and they only used the global feature attribution suite for less than an hour. It is possible that with adequate training and practice, this tension would be reduced or even overcome. Longitudinal studies may be beneficial for investigating further. More generally, though, this finding echoes observations from prior work about the need to balance the benefits of thinking fast and thinking slow when designing interpretability tools [13].

Like any study, ours has limitations. In addition to the short timescale over which it was conducted, we only recruited seven participants. We wanted to be able to conduct an in-depth interview with each participant about their experiences using the global feature attribution suite, but this necessarily limits the type of conclusions that we are able to draw. Furthermore, we focused only on experienced users of interpretability tools, which further limits the extent to which we can generalize to the broader ML developer community. We also limited our scope to models trained on two datasets, so more research is needed to investigate whether our findings would change if different datasets were used—for example, datasets with orders of magnitude more features.

We see our work as a first step toward designing interpretability tools that explicitly highlight the nuanced

behavior of models, as advocated for by Kaur et al. [13]. Future work should explore ways for ML developers to use a global feature attribution suite to quickly get a sense of what a model has learned without placing undue confidence in the corresponding global feature attributions. This will require carefully balancing the cognitive burden involved in understanding the global feature attributions with the amount of information that they can convey. It will also require investigation into which summary statistics to use and which other information to incorporate. One could imagine, for example, additionally including other notions of global feature importance, such as those obtained by applying the concept of Shapley values directly to global quantities like the variance explained [20] and the loss [8] rather than summarizing (local) feature attribution scores. Doing this well will also require research into how to present different global feature attributions in the most efficient way possible.

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“Mixture of amazement at the potential of this technology and concern about possible pitfalls”: Public sentiment towards AI in 15 countries

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Abstract

Public opinion plays an important role in the development of technology, influencing product adoption, commercial development, research funding, career choices, and regulation. In this paper we present results of an in-depth survey of public opinion of artificial intelligence (AI) conducted with over 17,000 respondents spanning fifteen countries and six continents. Our analysis of open-ended responses regarding sentiment towards AI revealed four key themes (exciting, useful, worrying, and futuristic) which appear to varying degrees in different countries. These sentiments, and their relative prevalence, may inform how the public influences the development of AI.

1 Introduction

Increased understanding of the societal impact of artificial intelligence (AI) has spurred strong interest in responsible development [20, 30, 34, 59]. Researchers, advocates, companies, and others have proposed processes, principles, design toolkits, and other resources to support thoughtful development of AI that carefully considers both benefits and risks [1, 26, 31, 38, 27, 52, 15, 35].

Public opinion is an important force in responsible development, exerting pressure on funding agencies, regulators, companies, educators, and others to address both general attitudes and specific issues [10, 12, 51, 67], such as the impact of automation on the future of work [7, 54, 57], the interaction of AI with human rights issues such as privacy and discrimination [1, 3, 9, 16], the ethics of autonomous weapons [58, 64], and the development and availability of dual-use technologies such as synthetic media that may be used for either benevolent or nefarious purposes [50]. While public opinion may not fully align with expert assessment on these issues, it is nonetheless useful to elucidate the forces in effect.

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Bulletin of the IEEE Computer Society Technical Committee on Data Engineering

While there have been some explorations of public perception of AI, for example, survey research [2, 6, 11, 37, 45, 49, 64, 68], sentiment analysis [18, 25, 29, 51], and narrative analysis [12, 13], much of this work has been done in Western, English-speaking contexts. Even in these better studied contexts, much remains to be learned, as both the technology and the public discussion are evolving rapidly. In this paper, we present a survey of public perception of AI conducted with over 17,000 respondents spanning fifteen countries and six continents (encompassing in total: Germany, Australia, Finland, Singapore, Belgium, Canada, the United States (US), South Korea, Spain, France, Poland, Brazil, China, India, and Nigeria). Using an inductive approach to analyze open-ended responses, we identified four key sentiment groups (exciting, useful, worrying, and futuristic) whose prevalence distinguishes responses to AI in different countries. We previously shared results from eight of these countries [40] and here we extend our analysis to fifteen countries and more fully discuss the sentiments. We then discuss implications of these findings for the development of AI systems.

2 Background

Artificial intelligence (AI) is a broad term with no consensus definition [23, 25, 59], and the scope of our inquiry is intended to be similarly broad. We note that interpretation of the term is further confounded by the “AI effect” (the phenomenon that once AI successfully solves a problem and the solution becomes commonplace, it is no longer considered to be AI) [42], as well as lack of awareness of algorithmic processing in common systems [24, 53, 63]. To aid comparison with survey responses, following [59], we share with the reader the following definition provided by Nils J. Nilsson: “Artificial intelligence is an activity devoted to making machines intelligent, and intelligence is the quality that enables an entity to function appropriately and with foresight in its environment.” [48]

2.1 Empirical Studies

Much of the research on public perception of AI has been survey-based, often conducted in Western, English-speaking countries such as the US and the UK [6, 11, 23, 68, 49] although this has been broadening recently. AI is often viewed as likely to have a significant impact on the future, with a frequent expectation that its effects will be positive. In a 2019 Edelman survey in the US, 9 out of 10 respondents assumed that AI will be life-changing and transformational [23]. A Gallup survey conducted in the US in 2018 found that 76% believed that AI will have a positive impact on their lives [49]; 61% of respondents had a positive view of AI and robots in a large-scale 2017 survey across Europe on the impact of digitization and automation on daily life [60]; and a 2017 consumer research survey conducted across North America, Europe, and Asia revealed a predominant expectation that society will become better (61%) rather than worse (22%) due to increased automation and AI [2]. A recent Pew Research survey conducted across the Americas, Europe, and Asia showed a somewhat narrower margin (possibly due to shifting public opinion, or alternatively, methodological differences), with a median of 53% saying that AI has been mostly good for society (53%) versus mostly bad (33%) [28]. Considering expected impact in the next 20 years, the 2019 World Risk Poll indicated AI would mostly help (41%) versus mostly harm (30%) people in one’s own country, with more favorable impressions in Asia and less favorable impressions in Western countries [41, 47].

At the same time, AI is neither interpreted as exclusively beneficial nor exclusively disadvantageous, and public response often indicates contradictory emotions. Looking at broad reactions, Blumberg reported that US respondents were equally split between feeling optimistic and informed and feeling fearful and uninformed about AI [6], while [2] also revealed both excitement and concern. Relatedly, a 2019 Mozilla survey open to respondents on the Internet gathered continent-level demographic data and revealed varying and mixed emotions at the continent-level [45]. Specific concerns have been expressed regarding social issues, such as AI benefiting the wealthy and harming the poor, fear that AI-enabled deepfakes will erode trust in information, and AI increasing

social isolation and reducing human capability [23]. In line with these concerns, Zhang and Dafoe found that 82% of Americans want AI and robots to be carefully managed [68], with 88% of Europeans expressing similar sentiment [60]. Moreover, 60% of the general population in the Edelman survey expressed the need for more regulation regarding AI development and deployment [23].

Qualitative work has also explored public perception of algorithmic systems, for example, finding that perception of algorithmic systems can vary substantially by individual factors as well as platform [19], and that end users often have fundamental questions or misconceptions about technical details of their operation [8, 24, 53, 62, 63].

2.2 Narratives and Media Sentiment Analysis

AI is not only heavily discussed in academia, but is also a popular topic in public media and entertainment [23]. In fact, Cave et al. provide a history of narratives about intelligent machines dating back to ancient Greece [13]. In modern times, 58% of the respondents in a recent Blumberg survey indicated that they get information about AI from movies, TV, and social media [6]. In a 2016 CBS news survey, only 19% indicated not having seen any of several AI movies such as “The Terminator” or “I, Robot” [14]. Cave et al. argue that prevalent AI narratives in the English-speaking West share “a tendency towards utopian or dystopian extremes,” cautioning that inaccurate narratives could affect technological advancement and regulation [12], with similar points raised in [34, 59, 66]. Cave et al. surveyed UK respondents regarding their responses to eight dominant narratives about AI, reporting that the strong majority elicited more concern than excitement [11].

At the same time, while some researchers have argued that narratives and fiction may be disproportionately frightening, studies have suggested that news reports may be more balanced or appropriately critical. Sentiment analysis of newspaper articles from the New York Times and associated content found that, in general, AI has had consistently more optimistic than pessimistic coverage over time [25], and did not support the hypothesis that news media coverage of AI is negative [29]. Content analysis of coverage of AI in five major American newspapers revealed benefits were discussed more frequently than risks, although risks were discussed with greater specificity [18]. Ouchchy et al. analyzed discussion of AI ethics in English language media sources and concluded that “The issues most frequently covered, along with the mostly balanced/neutral tones, suggest that the media has a fairly realistic and practical focus in its coverage of the ethics of AI.” [51]

2.3 National Considerations

A number of countries have established national strategies to promote the use and development of AI, which vary by country and may influence public perception [22].¹ The importance of studying local context is also illustrated by analysis of country-specific opportunities and challenges for AI, e.g. [39]. Further, researchers have called for better integration of developing country considerations in the discussion and development of AI [56].

2.4 Our Approach

Our work sits within a growing body of research on people’s perceptions of AI, across disciplines including HCI, critical studies, law, marketing, policy, psychology, and more. This topic is highly complex, multi-dimensional, and far from fully understood. Methodologically, this means that techniques such as *triangulation* (studying the same phenomenon from multiple vantage points, in order to cross-check and more fully capture richness and complexity, e.g. using both qualitative and quantitative methods to see if the findings are consistent) [55] and *replication* (the reproduction and extension of prior work) [65] are particularly useful for this topic. Accordingly, we seek to broaden and enrich the understanding of sentiment towards AI by looking for emergent themes in a large number of open-ended responses from a wide range of countries.

¹See also <https://futureoflife.org/national-international-ai-strategies/>

3 Methodology

In order to better understand public perception of AI, we partnered with Ipsos, a global market research firm, to conduct a survey of 17,014 respondents in fifteen countries in July and December 2019.² Methodologically, this work falls in the genre of public opinion polling, as described below.

3.1 Instrument Development and Translation

To develop concepts and questions, we consulted experts at our institutions, reviewed published work, drew on our own previous unpublished research, and conducted an initial pilot survey in June 2018 with 1300 respondents drawn from a panel of the general online population in the US. Many questions in the final instrument were written uniquely for this survey while others were modified from or replicate other questions in the literature or the canon of public opinion surveys. In order to more accurately reflect real-world settings, we did not define AI, and left interpretation of the term to the respondents.³ We included primarily closed-form questions as well as a few open-ended questions for free responses. We also included standard demographic questions such as age, gender, education, income, region, and urbanicity. The final instrument included several dozen questions on a range of topics related to artificial intelligence (for more information, see the Appendix).

After we completed the instrument in English, we engaged cApStAn, a linguistic quality assurance agency with expertise in survey translation. We made several improvements based on their insights to minimize terminology that would be difficult to translate. In consultation with cApStAn, we also developed a translation style guide to ensure consistency and address complexities for particular concepts and/or languages. Our market research partner's in-country translation teams and/or third party vendors then translated the full instrument to all target languages while referring to the style guide. See Table 3 for the languages we offered. After the survey was complete, the responses were provided to the coding team to be coded in-language as described below. Illustrative quotes in this paper are verbatim (in the case of English language responses) or were prepared or reviewed by professional translators (in the case of non-English language responses).

3.2 Deployment

We selected a range of countries with different characteristics, such as stage of technological development, nature of the workforce, and varied development indices. The survey was fielded to online panels (groups of respondents who have agreed to participate in surveys over a period of time) representative of the online population in each country. Consistent with the best panels available for online market research, such panels tend to be broadly representative of the general population in countries with high access to technology, but less representative of the general population in countries with more limited access to technology; for example, in developing countries they tend to skew urban. Respondents were recruited using stratified sampling (a method of recruiting specific numbers of participants within demographic subgroups), with hard quotas on age and gender in each country. A summary of countries and demographics is provided in Table 3.^{4,5}

The median survey length was 21.4 minutes across all completions, including those who said they had never heard of AI in an early screening question and received a much shorter version of the survey. All respondents

²For logistical reasons we split data collection into two rounds: July 2019 (Australia, Canada, US, South Korea, France, Brazil, India, and Nigeria) and December 2019 (Germany, Finland, Singapore, Belgium, Spain, Poland, and China). Based on our experience with similar surveys and our knowledge of world events at the time, we do not expect the time interval between the two rounds had a substantial impact on the results.

³We note that in our pilot, we had two versions of the survey (one that defined AI and one that did not) and responses to subsequent questions were similar regardless of whether a definition had been provided.

⁴For compact layout, in all tables we use standard two-letter country codes, which are shown with full country names in Figure 1.

⁵The alert reader may notice the gender differences in India and Nigeria. Percentages were chosen to match benchmarks of the gender distribution of the online population in each country.

<i>Country</i>	DE	AU	FI	SG	BE	CA	US	KR
HDI Rank	6 th	8 th	11 th	11 th	14 th	16 th	17 th	23 rd
Languages offered	German	English	Finnish	Chinese, English	Dutch, French	English, French	English	Korean
Weighting	age, gender, education, region	age, gender, education, region	age, gender, education, region	age, gender, education	age, gender, education, region	age, gender, education, region	age, gender, education, region, race	age, gender, education, region
Respondents (<i>n</i>) All	1002	1000	1002	1000	1000	1500	1501	1000
Gender	51% men 49% women	49% men 51% women	48% men 52% women	54% men 47% women	54% men 46% women	47% men 53% women	49% men 51% women	52% men 48% women
Age, avg.	44	43	41	40	41	44	44	39
Age, stddev	15.4	15.3	15.2	12.7	15.1	16.0	17.5	12.4

<i>Country</i>	ES	FR	PL	BR	CN	IN	NG
HDI Rank	25 th	26 th	35 th	84 th	85 th	131 st	161 st
Languages offered	Spanish	French	Polish	Brazilian Portuguese	Chinese	English, Hindi	English
Weighting	age, gender, education, region	age, gender, education, region	age, gender, education, region	age, gender, education, region	age, gender, education, region	age, gender, education	age, gender, education
Respondents (<i>n</i>) All	1002	1001	1000	1503	1003	1500	1000
Gender	52% men 48% women	50% men 50% women	50% men 50% women	49% men 51% women	53% men 47% women	70% men 30% women	63% men 37% women
Age, avg.	42	43	41	34	38	30	31
Age, stddev	12.9	15.4	14.1	12.3	12.0	8.9	9.0

Table 3: Country details, respondent summary and demographics. All numbers unweighted.

received incentives in a point system or cash at an industry-standard amount for their market.

3.3 Data Processing and Analysis

3.3.1 Quality Checks

The market research firm conducted quantitative and qualitative checks to remove low quality responses on an ongoing basis until the quota was reached in each country. Example grounds for removal included being identified as a bot, speeding (answering substantially more quickly than the median time), or providing nonsensical or profane responses to open-ended questions.

Overall we removed 6.1% of responses for quality. After data collection was complete, standard procedures were followed to apply a modest weighting adjustment to each respondent so that the samples in each country are

more representative [5]. This weighting is reflected in the data shared in Section 4. The variables considered in weighting appear in Table 3.

3.3.2 Research Objective and Data

In this paper we focus on the following research objective: What sentiment do respondents have towards AI? Specifically, we present emergent themes, descriptive statistics, and illustrative quotes for the following open-ended question about sentiment:

‘What feelings or emotions come to mind when you hear the phrase Artificial Intelligence (AI)?’

When we present illustrative quotes, we also draw on responses from three additional open-ended questions (about description of AI, examples of AI, and any uncomfortable experiences with AI), as relevant responses and similar coding often applied across all of the open-ended questions.⁶

3.3.3 Coding and Analysis of Open-Ended Responses

We reviewed the open-ended responses from the pilot to identify emergent themes [4] and develop an initial codebook for all questions, then iterated as we reviewed responses from all countries to refine it as necessary. The open-ended responses were coded by our market research partner’s dedicated coding team or one of their third party coding vendors. The coding was done in the source language, with the exception of Dutch and Finnish which were coded based on English translations. As described in McDonald et al., a variety of different approaches may be employed to improve the reliability of qualitative analysis [43]. In our case, following best practices in public opinion research for coding against multiple languages, we used professional coders, followed an iterative process to continuously improve the codes, and performed a series of hierarchical quality checks. While coders were specialized by language, they worked together to ensure consistency, sharing notes in specialized coding software. Both we and our market research partner performed multiple levels of quality checks on the resulting coding, randomly sampling from all responses in each country as well as checking all instances of select codes.

We used an inductive approach to explore emerging themes and common patterns in the data [32]. For the open-ended question regarding the feelings or emotions the respondent associated with AI, we began by following the process described above; the resulting codebook for this question encompassed 92 codes (e.g. ‘Useful,’ ‘Skeptical,’ ‘AI takes over’) and specified that multiple codes could be assigned per response. After these codes were assigned and we reviewed the open-ended verbatim responses in detail, four thematic groups of codes emerged from the data as common and semantically distinct: **Exciting**, **Useful**, **Worrying**, and **Futuristic**. For example, the **Useful** group encompassed codes such as ‘Useful,’ ‘Helpful,’ ‘Productivity,’ etc. We assigned each of the 92 codes to exactly one of these four sentiment groups or Other accordingly. Other encompassed answers that were inarticulate, classified as unable to be coded, mentions of technology without any sentiment (e.g. “computer” or “technology”), and a long tail of other opinions on AI (for example “curiosity” or “surprise”). Based on the codes that each response had been assigned, each response was considered to be part of those group(s) – for example, if a response had been assigned the code ‘Helpful’ and the code ‘Concern,’ that response was part of the sentiment groups **Useful** and **Worrying**. A response that received *only* codes labeled Other appears in **None**.

3.3.4 Human Development Index

As the impact and use of AI expands worldwide, how people learn about, interact with, and use AI varies. People from developed countries (i.e. countries that are more industrialized and have higher per capita incomes, for

⁶The first question about sentiment was shown to all respondents, while the remaining three questions were only shown to respondents who reported that they had heard of AI before the survey.

example, Germany, Australia, Finland, or Singapore) have different circumstances than people from developing countries (i.e. countries that are less industrialized and have lower per capita incomes, for example, Brazil, China, India, and Nigeria), and this shapes how AI is perceived, adopted, and normalized globally [61, 56]. Therefore, we anticipated that there might be meaningful differences in AI perceptions associated with development level. We include the Human Development Index (HDI) Rank in Table 3.⁷

3.4 Limitations

We note several limitations of our methodology that should be considered when interpreting this work. First, it carries with it the standard issues attendant with survey methodology, such as the risk of respondents misunderstanding questions, poor quality translation, or respondents satisficing [33] or plagiarizing open-ended responses. We have worked to minimize these risks through piloting, use of open-ended questions in conjunction with closed-form questions, use of a translation style guide and translation review, and data quality checks. We also note that panels in India are well-known in the industry to be disproportionately likely to have a social desirability response bias (as defined in [33]), so optimism in the responses from India should be considered in that context. Second, online panels are not representative of the general population. While we have used a high standard of currently available online panels, we caveat our findings as not representative of the general population, particularly in Brazil, China, India, and Nigeria. Third, while members of the research team and/or market research partner team have experience conducting research in all markets studied, members of the team reside in Western countries. We have worked to minimize the risk of misinterpretation by collaboration and discussion with in-country partner teams but recognize that our interpretations may lack context or nuance that would have been more readily available to local residents.

4 Results

In this section we describe the sentiment groups that emerged from our analysis and present data on the frequency of their occurrence. Responses to the open-ended sentiment question were assigned to groups as described in Section 3.3.3. Many responses were brief and were assigned only one code, for example, responses such as “exciting” or “robot” would be assigned **Exciting** or **Futuristic**, respectively. However, responses were often more lengthy and received multiple codes. For example, a response such as “fear and excited at the same time” (US respondent) would be included in **Worrying** and **Exciting**, but not **Useful** or **Futuristic**.

Figure 1 and Table 4 present the prevalence of sentiment groups in each country. We now discuss each sentiment in turn.

4.1 Exciting

Responses in this group contained positive feelings about AI and often exhibited broad excitement or enthusiasm. These feelings were often direct statements of excitement, but also included other positive feelings such as joy or a sense of feeling blessed to have AI. **Exciting** sentiment was often associated with a sense of newness or expectation of substantial change. Sometimes respondents expressed excitement about improvements in daily life, and sometimes they anticipated broad improvement for humanity.

Excited to see where this tech goes in future, hope to see AI assist with everyday life in the home and in work –*Australia*⁸

⁷We show HDI ranks from the 2020 Human Development Report <http://hdr.undp.org/en/2020-report>, which uses HDI values from 2019, aligning with the dates of our survey deployment.

⁸Throughout the paper, we share complete verbatim responses (in some cases translated) and do not correct typographic or grammatical errors. The only exception is the quote in the title, which is a verbatim excerpt from a response that is shared in full in Section 4.6.




Figure 1: Description of our four sentiment groups, with the complete list of codes that comprises each, and example responses. While we use the responses to illustrate a particular sentiment, some of them fall in multiple sentiment groups, as sometimes occurred in our data set. At the top of the figure, we represent the overlap between the groups with Venn diagrams, using 3-Venn diagrams which exclude Futuristic for readability. The alert reader may wonder why we use oblong circles; these more accurately represent the area in the overlap. We use the method described in [44]. Countries are ordered by HDI.

Country	DE	AU	FI	SG	BE	CA	US	KR	ES	FR	PL	BR	CN	IN	NG
Respondents (n) All	1002	1000	1002	1000	1000	1500	1501	1000	1002	1001	1000	1503	1003	1500	1000
Exciting	9%	17%	14%	22%	12%	14%	15%	6%	14%	10%	25%	23%	28%	36%	25%
Useful	12%	9%	17%	7%	9%	9%	7%	19%	13%	11%	13%	14%	13%	17%	11%
Worrying	23%	31%	25%	20%	27%	33%	30%	14%	23%	31%	30%	21%	7%	9%	11%
Futuristic	17%	22%	24%	21%	15%	21%	19%	38%	28%	20%	22%	34%	24%	24%	19%
None	48%	38%	36%	38%	48%	39%	42%	31%	34%	39%	32%	25%	37%	27%	41%

Table 4: Weighted percentage of respondents from each country whose open-ended sentiment was coded to be in one of our groups. Respondents can appear in multiple sentiment groups. A respondent whose answers received only codes not in these groups appears in **None**.

Happiness, because it means humanity moves forward. –*Spain*

A bit of excitement, fascination, curiosity, but also somewhere deep a feeling of uncertainty, a thrill related to the effect that it may have on my future, however, that is mostly due to the influence of film rather than a result of conscious assessment of the benefits that AI will bring. –*Poland*

Some respondents were also excited about potential economic advantages for their country, and a few mentioned personal career opportunities that AI might provide.

4.2 Useful

Responses in this group expressed the belief that AI will be helpful and assist humans in completing tasks. **Useful** sentiment was generally associated with practical implications of AI. For example, respondents spoke of AI improving productivity in industrial settings. They also spoke of AI providing personal convenience, making people's lives easier and more comfortable, assisting with daily life, enabling smart home technology, and helping people perform mundane tasks.

It is a kind of high technology that brings great convenience to our lives. –*China*

A tool of the future to make everyday life easier –*Finland*

Replaces man in thankless tasks –*Belgium*

Respondents also spoke of AI helping humanity by addressing large societal issues such as healthcare or the environment.

Really interesting. Hopefully it can solve energy issues and other large problems. –*Finland*

Progress, I know it will impact positively especially in the areas of health care. –*Nigeria*

4.3 Worrying

Many respondents shared that AI is **Worrying**, causing them concern, fear, or anxiety. Unlike the previous two groups, which each capture a relatively tight set of responses to AI in our open-ended data, this group comprises a wide range of negative emotional responses.

Do we need that? It scares me! –*Germany*

A dangerous game. –*Finland*

It's progress, but I am not sure that it is so positive for society –*Belgium*

While some respondents spoke of general concerns, many spoke to specific aspects of AI they found **Worrying**. For example, some respondents were concerned that AI might challenge humans and take over society. Sometimes they suggested that popular culture had caused this concern. Correspondingly, they sometimes also spoke to the need for humans to control AI.

A threat to the future of humanity. –*Finland*

regret, it will make work and then the world disappear –*Belgium*

Can improve or end our lives. –*Germany*

A mixture of knowledge and fear. I know that it will help or is already helping in several important areas, but there is always that fear that one of these AIs will become too autonomous and turn against us. –*Brazil*

That was always coming. But because of all those films on TV with the AI, I still have my reservations. I mean you never know, right? –*Belgium*

Does no one watch movies, read, or anything to do with science fiction!!! It ALWAYS ends badly... there is just no good outcome, that I can see (for now at least), to an actual, fully fledged, AI. –*US*

Respondents also saw privacy concerns as a likely downside of AI. Sometimes they mentioned privacy in broad terms, but they often raised specific concerns such as worrying that products constantly listen to them, or concerns about being surveilled in the workplace.

A new frontier. Very exciting and scary at the same time. Lots to gain but will personal privacy be the price? –*Australia*

Could lead to total surveillance –*Germany*

A trending mobile app that undresses people. It violates privacy rules –*Nigeria*

IT DICTATED MY WEIGHT AND HEIGHT IN PUBLIC. –*India*

Installing a monitoring system in the office makes people very uncomfortable –*China*

Ads that show up on computers after visiting websites is one thing, but ads that show up after just talking about something makes me think my phone is listening in on my conversations –*US*

The phone's microphone recognizes speech and this information is used in marketing. Should I dare speak about sensitive matters near the phone at all –*Finland*

Respondents expected that AI would negatively impact the number of jobs available in the future. They perceived that AI may replace humans or make them less necessary in the workforce, and particularly associated robots with job loss due to their ability to perform human tasks. In rare cases, respondents shared personal experiences with automation-related job loss.

I feel that it has taken away jobs –*US*

A highly computerised potentially dangerous job stealing system of machinery operation –*Australia*

New technologies. Convenience in life. Reduction in jobs. –*South Korea*

Am happy about it but am still sceptical about it. This is because it might probably put some persons out of work –*Nigeria*

Unemployment comes to my mind when I hear the phrase Artificial Intelligence(AI). –*India*

Respondents also expressed concern that humans will become over-reliant on AI and become lazy, or that AI will minimize human contact and negatively impact personal relationships in the future.

This is a futuristic innovation that can help people but also make them too lazy –*Nigeria*

fear that during my lifetime I will be interacting more with AI than live humans –*US*

It helps the future by making things easier, but diminishes employment and human contact. –*France*

Country	DE	AU	FI	SG	BE	CA	US	KR	ES	FR	PL	BR	CN	IN	NG
Respondents (n) All	1002	1000	1002	1000	1000	1500	1501	1000	1002	1001	1000	1503	1003	1500	1000
Neutral	31%	24%	9%	24%	28%	26%	27%	14%	25%	25%	21%	11%	28%	9%	9%
I don't know	16%	17%	19%	5%	19%	15%	9%	8%	15%	17%	8%	11%	1%	4%	3%
Other	12%	7%	10%	6%	9%	7%	10%	14%	12%	9%	11%	9%	9%	15%	19%
Inarticulate	15%	5%	12%	10%	12%	7%	6%	4%	6%	19%	8%	4%	7%	7%	4%
Curious	3%	9%	8%	6%	5%	7%	6%	2%	10%	5%	22%	16%	16%	5%	7%
Intelligence	1%	4%	5%	9%	6%	3%	7%	10%	5%	2%	3%	9%	7%	13%	18%
Technology	3%	4%	6%	2%	2%	6%	5%	5%	7%	3%	3%	12%	11%	11%	10%
Fake	1%	3%	4%	3%	4%	4%	7%	3%	2%	1%	4%	2%	0%	6%	17%
Computer	3%	4%	5%	6%	3%	4%	7%	4%	2%	3%	2%	5%	1%	5%	6%
Device	1%	3%	4%	4%	1%	3%	2%	12%	3%	2%	3%	3%	1%	9%	6%

Table 5: The 10 most common codes within the **None** group, which includes all respondents who were assigned none of the codes in our four sentiment groups. Weighted percentages indicate how many respondents within the **None** group were assigned a given code, by country.

4.4 Future

Although **Futuristic** may not traditionally be seen as a sentiment, when we asked respondents to describe their feelings or emotions about AI, they organically responded at very high rates and it was clearly a strong association (15% to 38% across the countries). Responses in this group are not necessarily positive or negative towards AI, but rather are included for any mention of the futuristic nature of AI, whether by simply describing AI as advanced; mentioning robots, aliens, or other science-fiction concepts; or by referencing the future directly.

Some respondents who spoke of the future expressed that AI will be transformative, for example saying that it will usher in a new era and profoundly change society.

Something new. Something that will change the world –*Poland*

AI can change every aspect of human life. –*Singapore*

we are entering a new era. Very modern –*Canada*

AI will revolutionise the way we live in our future. –*India*

The expected future effects of AI were sometimes described as **Exciting**, **Useful**, **Worrying**, or some combination of these. We discuss mixed feelings further below.

A thing of the future that is sure to be of great use! –*Finland*

Better future –*Spain*

A big problem for humanity in the future. –*Poland*

Machines taking over humans!! :) on a serious note, A.I. is making things possible we thought were not possible a few years ago. Computers recognise faces and fingerprints of humans. Machines carry out so many things to assist humans. Everywhere we look there are examples of artificial intelligence around us. –*Australia*

AI is the new trend for technology, I myself being a tech geek i know that AI is soon going to change the whole world with it's endless possibilities. AI is the future of Mankind –*India*

4.5 None

The groups above do not cover all responses. Some responses were assigned only the 49 codes that we did not include in our sentiment groups, in which case they fell into the **None** group described in Section 3.3.3. These

included, for example, broad mentions of technology (responses such as “technology” or “computer”). See Table 5.

4.6 Mixed Feelings

As seen above, a given response sometimes contained multiple sentiments toward AI. In some responses, these were all positive sentiments, for example, excitement that AI would be helpful in daily life. However, a number of responses were more ambivalent. Sometimes such responses contrasted specific positive expectations (e.g. personal convenience or improved healthcare) with specific negative expectations (e.g. reduced privacy or job loss). Additionally, these mixed emotions were sometimes coupled with a sense of resignation or inevitability.

It is a wonderful and terrifying concept that is inevitable. –*Australia*

The future of our world in a way that represents both progress and destruction –*Canada*

optimistic that it will enhance peoples lives and bring about breakthroughs in many fields but also skeptical that people will lose their jobs and there will be an invasion of privacy –*Canada*

Life will be much more enjoyable, but I fear that we’d lost what makes us human. Robots will replace humans in various fields, but there are positive sides as well, a pet robot being one of them. –*South Korea*

I think people are afraid of it and it is the future –*Spain*

Artificial intelligence is something most people will come to depend on in a few decades. It will make life easier at the same time make people lose their jobs. But one I’m certain of is that AI is here to stay for good. –*Nigeria*

Some respondents suggested that the eventual impact of AI is not yet determined, and that multiple outcomes are possible.

Both a threat and an opportunity at the same time. –*Finland*

Mixture of amazement at the potential of this technology and concern about possible pitfalls. Could be the start of something amazing or the beginning of the end (a la Terminator). –*Australia*

Unsure about the net value - has lots of positives but also there are some very legitimate concerns. –*Canada*

It’s exciting to think about the things that could come about with AI that would make our lives easier and safer, but also scary of course, who knows how it will truly effect society –*US*

Some respondents also indicated that the effects of AI depend on how it is used, as well as who is using it.

Artificial intelligence worries me a bit because if it’s not used well it can be dangerous, it has no conscience or ethics, but I acknowledge that it is an amazing tool. –*France*

A bit excited because it makes job quite easy but again its scary if it the technology goes wrong like someone using it for evil purposes. –*Nigeria*

Artificial Intelligence is very useful for whole human world. But don’t use it in a bad way –*India*

Some respondents also spoke directly to responsible development of technology. For example, they emphasized the need to think about potential impacts of technology prior to development, or the need for regulation or ethical evaluation.

Angry that future concerns or negative impacts aren’t ever considered before technology is developed –*Australia*

It’s a positive thing, but it needs to be regulated. –*Belgium*

Unstoppable, but it requires technology ethics –*China*




Figure 2: Scatter plot of weighted sentiment group size for each country, by HDI rank of the country. Trendlines shown for all four sentiment groups, with **Exciting** at $R^2 = 0.552$ and **Worrying** at $R^2 = 0.524$.

4.7 Country-Level Observations

We now turn to country-level observations, where we see strikingly different national patterns in response towards AI across the fifteen countries we studied. We visually represent the character of these differences in Figure 1.

Consistent with our expectation that developed countries (those most-developed, by HDI rank) would share similarities, the dominant sentiment groups in Germany, Australia, Finland, Belgium, Canada, the US, and France were **Worrying** followed by **Futuristic** (see Table 4). Spain had the same two dominant sentiments, although with **Futuristic** followed by **Worrying**. This resonates with claims that popular press and media narratives in Western, English-speaking regions have emphasized potential threats of AI [12, 25, 34].

By contrast, we see respondents in developing countries tend to take a more optimistic view of AI’s future effects. Respondents in China, India, and Nigeria were least likely to describe AI as **Worrying** and more likely to describe it as **Exciting**.

Singapore, Poland, and Brazil followed a different pattern, with more balanced numbers of **Worrying** and **Exciting**.

We can see this relationship more directly in Figure 2 where **Exciting** and **Worrying** show clear trends with HDI rank. **Futuristic** and **Useful** however do not seem to have a relationship with HDI, highlighting that the development of a country is just one factor in how public opinion towards AI is shaped.

South Korea has a unique profile among the countries surveyed, having the largest percentage in the both the **Useful** (19%) and **Futuristic** (38%) sentiment groups. South Korean respondents also had the lowest percentage of **Exciting** (6% versus 9-36% in all other countries). These findings are consistent with South Koreans’ high level of exposure to technology: South Korea boasts the world’s highest robot density [36], is one of the largest global investors in smart buildings [21], and may be “at the vanguard of a revolution in AI and big data healthcare” [46]. Consistent with this, South Korean respondents often mentioned AI assistants and home automation, which may contextualize AI as a more familiar, everyday technology:

AI is everywhere from hospitals to homes and cars. –*South Korea*

Use big data to make daily life more convenient. –*South Korea*

With just the smartphone, I can check the gas, temperature, and the foods in the fridge. –*South Korea*

Self-driving car, automated production, convenient daily life –*South Korea*

5 Discussion and Outlook

We conducted a large-scale investigation of sentiment towards AI across a range of countries. Rather than presupposing particular sentiment, we began with open-ended responses and looked for emergent themes. Our findings revealed sentiment groups as a distinguishing feature, with respondents in different countries finding AI to be **Exciting**, **Useful**, **Worrying**, and **Futuristic** to varying degrees. These groups provide one nuanced alternative to understanding people’s feelings towards AI, rather than considering their orientation to AI as simply positive or negative. While some of these themes have been seen in other literature, here we have documented them occurring unprompted in 15 countries and added richer detail about the sentiment and the mechanisms which inspire this sentiment.

The spontaneously generated open-ended responses reflect a number of key dialogues that have appeared in public discussions and the media [12, 18, 59, 51], for example, that AI offers significant improvements for health; that AI is associated with privacy issues, job loss, and social isolation; and that AI could be either a significant boon or a significant threat to humanity. The data provide some indication of the ways in which these concepts, as well as different sources of information (e.g. fiction, news reports, or personal experience) influence sentiment.

This suggests many fruitful avenues for further exploration. For example, it would be valuable to more formally measure and analyze the relationship between media and pop culture narratives in different countries and the presence of these sentiment groups, as well as tracing the relationship and movement of narratives across countries. Further, it would be useful to explore other factors that likely influence these sentiment groups, such as country culture and economy; institutional trust [17, 67]; presence, awareness, and availability of AI technologies such as customer service chatbots, personal assistants, and more; and personal, formative experiences using AI technology. It would also be worthwhile to explore how sentiment groups affect behavior such as adoption of AI technologies and public opinion on topics such as research funding and regulation.

Public opinion has the potential to shape (and be shaped by) technology development processes and decisions. For example, public opinion can affect whether the public supports research funding for AI. As another example, a negative opinion of a particular technology may discourage consumers from purchasing it. Conversely, new product offerings that rely on AI may influence the public’s opinion of AI.

While public opinion can be a beneficial influence, it has also been argued that in some cases it can have suboptimal effects. For example, public misperception or unrealistic expectations of AI may lead to unfounded fears or disappointment, resulting in unwarranted rejection of technology or a lack of support for public funding [6, 12]. But how might one characterize the “legitimacy” of public opinion, and to what extent is such characterization a meaningful endeavor? Many issues related to AI are complex questions on which even experts can disagree. And even if experts are in alignment with each other, but not with public opinion, the public may be considering perspectives or values not taken into account by experts [67]. It is therefore a complex question how best to interpret or engage with public opinion on a given issue, or whether it might be helpful to influence it. In some cases it may be beneficial to provide the public additional information, while in others it may be more beneficial for researchers and developers to shift the perspectives and values driving the development of AI.

Possible interventions might include educational efforts in areas in which the public may benefit from additional information. Beyond that, however, our findings align with calls to develop technology that supports public values. For example, many respondents were concerned about negative impacts of AI on privacy, reinforcing the value of continued emphasis on designing and developing AI with privacy in mind, concordant with discussion of privacy by design in the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).⁹ The privacy discussion continues to evolve quickly, and best practices for AI technologies continue to be actively explored in the academic, legal, and policy communities, offering many opportunities for advances in this area. Further, our findings also suggest ways in which the design and development of particular technologies may have a favorable impact on public

⁹<https://eugdpr.org/>

opinion. For example, our findings point to the value of emphasizing AI’s application to healthcare in product and research investments as well as communications. As another example, future research could explore the conditions facilitating South Korea’s unusually strong impression of AI as **Useful**, to gain insight into whether or how this sentiment might resonate elsewhere via communications or technological offerings.

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Appendix: Select Questions

Note that some questions were modified from or replicate other questions in the literature or the canon of public opinion surveys. For additional select questions used in the instrument see arXiv:2001.00081

Unaided Sentiment

{Ask All}

What feelings or emotions come to mind when you hear the phrase Artificial Intelligence (AI)?

{Open-end}

Knowledge

{Ask All}

How much do you know about Artificial Intelligence (AI)?

- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- Heard of AI, but know nothing about it
- Never heard of AI

Unaided Description

{Do NOT ask if “Never heard of AI” in Knowledge question}

In your own words, please describe Artificial Intelligence (AI).

{Open-end}

Unaided Examples

{Do NOT ask if “Never heard of AI” in Knowledge question}

Please list some examples of how Artificial Intelligence (AI) is used today.

{Open-end}

Uncomfortable Experience

{Do NOT ask if “Never heard of AI” in Knowledge question}

Have you ever had an experience with AI-related technology that made you feel uncomfortable?

- Yes

- No
- Not sure

Unaided Description of Uncomfortable Experience

{Ask if “Yes” to Uncomfortable Experience}

What happened, and what was the outcome? Please describe your experience with AI that made you feel uncomfortable.

{Open-end}

A Human-Centered Methodology for Creating AI FactSheets

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Abstract

As artificial intelligence (AI) models and services are used in a growing number of high-stakes areas, a consensus is forming around the need for a clearer record of how these models and services are developed to increase trust. Several proposals for higher quality and more consistent AI documentation have emerged to address ethical and legal concerns and general social impacts of such systems. However, there is little published work on how to create this documentation. In this paper we describe a methodology for creating the form of AI documentation we call FactSheets. This paper describes the methodology and shares the insights we have gathered while creating nearly two dozen FactSheets. Within each step of the methodology, we describe the issues to consider and the questions to explore with the relevant people in an organization who will be creating and consuming AI facts. This methodology may help foster the creation of transparent AI documentation.

1 Introduction

Recent work has outlined the need for increased transparency in artificial intelligence (AI) for data sets [7, 2, 9, 3], models [15], and services [1]. Proposals in support of ethical and trusted AI are also emerging [21, 19, 11]. Although the specifics differ, all are motivated by the desire to define a set of attributes that capture essential details of how an AI model or service was developed and tested to better understand technical, ethical, and regulatory concerns.

Despite this work on transparent reporting mechanisms, there is little consideration of how to create this documentation. Determining *what information* to include and *how to collect* that information is not straightforward. To our knowledge this is the first work outlining a methodology for creating this documentation. We believe this methodology can promote the creation of useful AI documentation.

We have proposed a mechanism for AI documentation called FactSheets [1]. FactSheets take a more general approach to AI transparency than previous proposals [7, 2, 9, 15, 21, 4] in several ways:

- FactSheets are tailored to the particular AI model or service being documented, and thus can vary in content
- FactSheets are tailored to the needs of their target audience or consumer, and thus can vary in content and format, even for the same model or service

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- FactSheets capture model or service facts from the entire AI lifecycle
- FactSheets are compiled from information generated by multiple contributors as they perform their actions throughout this lifecycle, thereby increasing the accuracy of these facts

FactSheets can document AI services in addition to individual models. We think this is important for three reasons:

- AI services are the building blocks for many AI applications. Developers call the service API and consume its output. An AI service can be an amalgam of many models trained on many datasets. The models and associated datasets are (direct and indirect) components of an AI service, but they are not themselves the interface to the developer.
- An expertise gap often exists between the producer and consumer of an AI service. The production team leverages the creation of one or more AI models and thus will mostly contain data scientists. The consumers of the API services tend to be developers. When such an expertise gap exists, it becomes more crucial to communicate the attributes of the service in a consumable way.
- Services composed of trusted models may not necessarily be trustworthy, so it is prudent to also consider transparency and accountability of services in addition to datasets and models. In doing so, we take a functional perspective on the overall service and can test for performance, safety, and security aspects that may go beyond what is relevant for a model in isolation.

Our methodology is motivated by user-centered design principles [14], where input from multiple stakeholders is collected to inform design. Although this takes more time than a single person designing the documentation, it is significantly more likely to meet the needs of FactSheet consumers [13]. This paper focuses on a specific form of AI documentation, FactSheets, but the techniques can be applied to other forms of AI (or even non-AI) documentation. Note, also, that our discussion centers on business applications of AI but the techniques can be applied to creating documentation for AI outside of this setting.

Before we describe our methodology in detail, we first highlight a few key concepts. Section 2 describes the AI lifecycle, summarizing the relevant roles and workflow for the construction and deployment of an AI model or service. Section 3 describes the concept of a FactSheet and motivates the need for a FactSheet Template. Section 4 presents our seven-step methodology for constructing useful FactSheets. Section 5 presents further guidance for those organizations planning to create FactSheets. Section 6 discusses how the methodology can help to address the needs of consumers with regards to the potential safety and harm of AI. Finally, Section 7 touches on what we are finding as FactSheets are put into production use.

2 The AI Lifecycle

The AI lifecycle includes a variety of roles, performed by people with different specialized skills and knowledge that collectively produce an AI model or service. Each role contributes in a unique way, using different tools. Figure 1 specifies some common roles.

The canonical process starts with a business owner who requests the construction of an AI model or service. The request includes the purpose of the model or service, how to measure its effectiveness, and any other constraints, such as bias thresholds, appropriate datasets, or the required levels of explainability and robustness.

The data scientist uses this information to construct a candidate model by using, most typically, a machine learning process. This iterative process includes selecting and transforming the dataset, discovering the best machine learning algorithm, tuning algorithm parameters, etc. The goal is to produce a model that best satisfies the requirements set by the business owner.

Before this model is deployed it often must be tested by an independent person, referred to as a model validator




Figure 1: Key roles in a typical AI lifecycle

in Figure 1. This role, often falling within the scope of model risk management [16], third party testing [23, 5], or certification [22, 5], is similar to a testing role in traditional software development. A person in this role may apply a different test dataset to the model and independently measure metrics defined by the business owner. The person may also develop a "challenge" model to see if a simpler, and thus, less risky, solution could solve the same problem. If the validator approves the model, it can be deployed.

The AI operations engineer is responsible for deploying and monitoring the model in production to ensure it operates as expected. This can include monitoring its performance metrics, as defined by the business owner. If some metrics are not meeting expectations, the operations engineer is responsible for taking actions and informing the appropriate roles.

AI lifecycles will include iteration within a role (a data scientist, building many models before passing it to a validator) or between roles (an operations engineer sending a model back to a data scientist because it is performing poorly). More sophisticated lifecycles will likely have additional roles. A common pattern is for a model to be combined with other models or human-written code to form a service. In such a case the validator’s role may be extended to also validate the full service.

A model is not a static object in the lifecycle, and thus, a FactSheet must incorporate the facts and lineage from all phases of the “life of the model”. This will introduce transparency not only into how the model was built and what it does, but also how it was tested, deployed, and used.

3 FactSheets and Templates

FactSheets [1] are a collection of information about how an AI model or service was developed and deployed. FactSheets summarize the key characteristics of a model or service for use by a variety of stakeholders. We have previously summarized the difficulties developers face when creating FactSheets [8]. This paper describes the best practices we have developed in the process of creating FactSheets for nearly two dozen models. These include FactSheets for standalone models as well as services that encapsulate one or more models. They cover a wide range of application areas including text analysis and generation, language translation, object detection, object classification, audio signal classification, weather forecasting, agricultural crop yield prediction, and facility energy optimization.

This work has demonstrated that although FactSheets will contain some common elements, different FactSheets will generally contain different information, at different levels of specificity, depending on domain and model type. They will also contain different information for different industries and the different regulatory




Figure 2: Steps to produce useful FactSheets

schemes within which these industries operate.

Within a particular domain or organization, FactSheets will also take on different forms, and contain different content, for different purposes. Model validators may need detailed information on data selection and cleaning, feature engineering, and accuracy and bias metrics. Business owners may need information on whether a deployed model is meeting business needs. Regulators may need a report detailing how a model complies with established practices and metrics related to safety, bias, and harm. Thus, although there is a strong desire to create a standard template for all FactSheets, we believe this diversity illustrates that for FactSheets, **one size does not fit all**.

We believe that standards will eventually emerge and, like nutrition labels, be useful for some purposes. In the foreseeable future, however, many kinds of FactSheets will be created. We have created the notion of **FactSheet Templates** to manage this diversity. A FactSheet Template can be thought of as specifying the categories or types of information that will be collected and displayed during and after AI development. Any given lifecycle will likely have multiple templates since different people will likely want to see different information, for different purposes, at different points in time. A large part of the job of creating FactSheets is designing the appropriate FactSheet Template(s). This is a prime focus of Section 4.

4 FactSheet Methodology

We now describe our seven-step methodology for the construction of useful FactSheets. For expository purposes, the steps shown in Figure 2 are presented as though they flow in a single stream from beginning to end. The reality is that FactSheet production is highly iterative, especially in the early days of FactSheet adoption within an organization.

Each step lists the key roles involved. In addition to the more typical roles shown in Figure 1, an additional role is identified, namely the “FactSheets Team”. This team is responsible for designing and implementing the FactSheets process within the organization. The first three steps will be driven by this team as they interview potential FactSheet consumers and producers and design the first FactSheet Template. Step 4 will largely be performed by the FactSheets Team but will benefit from the involvement of those with direct knowledge of the model or service being documented. This step may involve several iterations and informal trials with potential

consumers and producers. In Step 5, FactSheet producers will generate an actual FactSheet. In Step 6, FactSheet consumers will assess the quality and usefulness of this FactSheet. The FactSheets Team will be involved in these latter steps as well but will rely heavily on others to produce and attempt to consume actual content. In Step 7, the FactSheets Team repeats the process to increase coverage and value.

To simplify the presentation in the following steps we focus on one fact producer, “Priya”, and one fact consumer “Carmen”. Priya is a data scientist who will generate facts about how she created her model. Carmen is a model validator who will assess the model Priya created on various dimensions including quality, simplicity, and potential risk. Of course, Priya may also be a consumer of facts produced earlier by those who assembled the training data she uses. Similarly, Carmen may be a producer of facts for those who make the final decision on deployment readiness of the model she validates. Although our consumer in this example, Carmen, is part of the AI lifecycle, there are other possible documentation consumers that are outside of the AI lifecycle, such as end users (e.g., a loan officer), affected users (e.g., a loan applicant), or regulators. The same methodology would apply in these cases as well.

This may seem like a lot to think about, especially when there are multiple roles to understand and a desire to sample multiple representative users within each role. But the important thing is to start. Find one person performing each role (some people will be performing more than one role). Spend 30 minutes in conversation with each of them. If needed, find more than one person to explore areas that are still unclear after the first conversation. To speed things up, consider bringing potential producers and consumers together in conversation at any point in this process. They may quickly converge on what information is needed and how it can be produced in a cost-effective way.

4.1 Step 1: Know Your FactSheet Consumers

- Who: FactSheets Team (with potential consumers)
- What: Gather the information needs of potential FactSheet consumers

FactSheets are produced so that they can be consumed. Understanding the information needs of FactSheet consumers is the first and most important task. Here are some of the questions to consider in this first step (with Carmen, a model validator, as the illustrative consumer):

1. What does Carmen currently do when she performs her role?
2. What is Carmen going to be asking for when looking at a FactSheet?
3. What decisions will she be making based on the information presented?
4. How is the FactSheet going to help her do her job more effectively?
5. What are the most important pieces of information that Carmen needs to know?
6. What is Carmen’s level of expertise in general data science?
7. How is Carmen’s expertise going to affect the information presented?
8. Will there need to be additional definitions for terms that Carmen is unfamiliar with?
9. What is Carmen’s level of expertise with respect to the model algorithms being used?
10. What explanations about the model’s algorithm or results is Carmen going to need?
11. What is Carmen’s level of expertise in the problem domain?
12. How is that going to affect the information presented?
13. Will Carmen need help in mapping general knowledge of the problem domain to the particular inputs, outputs, or performance indicators associated with this model?
14. Is Carmen aware of issues related to model risk, potential harm, and regulatory compliance?
15. What information is needed to assess these issues?

4.2 Step 2: Know Your FactSheet Producers

- Who: FactSheets Team (with potential producers)
- What: Gather the kinds of information FactSheet producers might generate

Some facts can be automatically generated by tooling. Some facts can only be produced by a knowledgeable human. Both kinds of facts will be considered during this step. Here are some of the questions we might explore with Priya (a data scientist) about the facts she could usefully generate during the creation of a model:

1. What facts does Priya wish she could conveniently record about the models she develops? It is often helpful to ask about the most recent model, or a model that was particularly important, or a model that was exceptionally difficult to produce, rather than discussing models in general.
2. What did Priya do during the creation of this model that is otherwise unknown to others?
3. Are there general facts about the data, the features, the model algorithm, or the training and testing Priya performs that are important to note? Why?
4. What model-specific knowledge does she have that may not be obvious to others?
5. What domain-specific knowledge does Priya have that may not be obvious to others?
6. Does Priya know who will be consuming the facts she produces? We will assume it is Carmen in this particular case. Does Priya know Carmen? Have they talked about what Carmen needs to know?
7. Is Priya aware of issues related to model risk, potential harm, and regulatory compliance?
8. What information will be needed by others to assess these issues?

4.3 Step 3: Create a FactSheet Template

- Who: FactSheets Team
- What: Define the topics and questions to be included in FactSheets

What is learned in the first two steps leads directly to the most important part of creating FactSheets, namely the creation of a FactSheet Template. As discussed in Section 3, a FactSheet Template will contain questions. Each individual FactSheet will contain the answers to these questions. For example a template may start with the question “What is this model for?”. It may then expand on that question by asking where the model is well-suited and where the model is ill-suited.

The information gathered in the first two steps will inform the creation of this FactSheet Template. You may find that details about how a model is created are much less important in your organization than information about risk assessments and regulatory compliance. Or you may find that detailed questions about robustness against adversarial attacks are needed because of the nature of the models you create or the high-stakes domains within which they are used.

Here are some of the questions to consider in creating the first iteration of a FactSheet Template. Again, this is cast in terms of Carmen’s needs for information and Priya’s ability to produce that information, but similar questions will apply to many of the roles in the AI lifecycle or external consumers of the AI documentation.

1. What are the topics or categories of information needed?
2. Do some of these categories have subcategories?
3. What is a meaningful name for each category or subcategory?
4. What kinds of information should be included in each category? For example, Carmen may want to group all the model performance metrics within a category called “Model Performance”. Information about the representativeness of the training data might be grouped with information on the sensitivity of the model to

drift in a category called, “Potential Sources of Error”.

5. How should each question in a category be worded so as to be both understandable and evocative for Priya? The goal here is to encourage fact producers to answer in ways that are concise, germane, and understandable.
6. Where will the answer to a question come from? Will it be generated automatically by a tool or entered by a knowledgeable human? If the former, will Priya have some control over the frequency of fact generation or the granularity of recorded facts? If the latter, will Priya be given hints or examples of the kind of answer that would be satisfactory?
7. Are there any regulatory, legal, or business concerns that need to be considered when answering the questions in this template?
8. Are there different presentation formats needed for this information (for example, a short tabular summary of just key facts, or a slide format for presentations to review boards)? AI FactSheets 360 [10] shows three different formats that might be useful.
9. In addition to the human-readable content, is there a need for machine-readable content that Priya might generate?

4.4 Step 4: Fill In FactSheet Template

- Who: FactSheets Team
- What: Informally assess FactSheet Template by trying to fill it in

This step is where you will attempt to fill in your FactSheet Template for the first time. As you do this, informally assess the quality of the template itself. While this assessment is not a substitute for further work with Priya and Carmen (to follow), it may quickly highlight where improvements are needed. In doing this assessment, try to reflect on the template and the FactSheets it will generate from Carmen’s and Priya’s points of view. Ask yourself, or other members of your FactSheets Team, the following questions:

1. Knowing what Carmen knows, will she be able to understand the information that filled-in FactSheets will include?
2. Are there details needed by Carmen that will be missing in these FactSheets?
3. Is there specialized language that Carmen will be unfamiliar with?
4. Will the information allow Carmen to make the decisions she needs to make?
5. How are these FactSheets going to help Carmen do her job more effectively?
6. What might we do to encourage Priya to answer questions in ways that provide what Carmen needs?

4.5 Step 5: Have Actual Producers Create a FactSheet

- Who: Business Owner, Data Scientist, Model Validator, AI Operations Engineer (and others as defined within your organization’s AI lifecycle)
- What: Populate a FactSheet Template with actual facts

At this point you have a solid template and a good sense of how it might be used to create FactSheets. The next step is to have actual fact producers fill in the template for their part of the lifecycle. If there is a question in the template about model purpose, find someone who would actually be entering that information and have them answer the question. Ask a data scientist to answer the questions related to the development and testing of an actual model. If this model was validated, ask the model validator to enter information about that process. Similarly, have a person responsible for model deployment answer those questions. If the lifecycle is not that structured, have the person responsible for most of the work create this FactSheet.

We have found this step to be highly iterative. You can expect sections of your template to be expanded, compressed, or eliminated altogether. Individual questions will be refined within these sections. Stay alert for ideas or helpful hints about other fact producers that may surface. Follow these leads later. The goal here is to create a FactSheet that is ready for evaluation by consumers in the next step. Take the time to get this FactSheet to a level of quality and completeness that will make this next evaluation meaningful.

4.6 Step 6: Evaluate Actual FactSheet with Consumers

- Who: Business Owner, Data Scientist, Model Validator, AI Operations Engineer (and others as defined within your organization's AI lifecycle)
- What: Assess FactSheet quality with those who will be consuming FactSheets in production

In this step we conduct an assessment of the quality and completeness of the actual FactSheet produced in the previous step. If the FactSheet is intended to be used by multiple roles (not uncommon), evaluate it separately for each role. To make each evaluation meaningful, ensure you have agreement with respect to the purpose of the FactSheet. Ask the consumer to imagine using this FactSheet to actually perform their work.

Each evaluation consists of two parts. The first focuses on the content in the FactSheet. The second focuses on the way in which information is presented.

Content Evaluation: The goal of this part of the evaluation is to see how well the content of the FactSheet meets the specifically-designed-for information needs of the consumer. Ask your consumer to go through the FactSheet item by item with their information needs in mind and identify the following:

1. What information is missing?
2. Why is that missing information important to include?
3. How would they like this information presented?
4. Can they give an example?
5. What information is extraneous?
6. Why is that information extraneous?
7. What information is confusing or hard to understand?
8. Why is that information hard to understand?
9. How can that information be made more understandable?
10. Can they give an example?
11. Was the organization of information sensible?
12. If not, what would they change?

Have the consumer rank the information presented in this FactSheet from most important to least important. Remember to include the information that was noted as missing in this ranking. If time permits, have them share their views about the FactSheet with your larger group. Encourage discussion and ask questions about any unexpected findings, which can often identify gaps in the underlying lifecycle process or confusion about roles. Addressing these gaps can pay large dividends.

Presentation Evaluation: The goal of this part of the evaluation is to see if the way that information is *presented* meets the specifically-designed-for information needs of the consumer. Since some of the information you collect may be visual, make sure to allow for that type of feedback. Ask each consumer to go through the FactSheet item by item with their information needs in mind and identify these things:

1. Is this information presented in an unexpected way?

2. How can the information be presented differently?
3. Why is this alternative a better way to present this information?
4. Can they draw or describe an example?
5. If the information presentation includes interactive elements, are they useful?
6. How can they be made more useful?
7. Why is that more useful?
8. If they could add or change the way that information is presented, how would they?
9. Why is this addition or change an improvement?
10. Is this, overall, the right format for presenting this information?
11. What format would be more suitable?
12. Why is that format more suitable?

4.7 Step 7: Devise Other Templates and Forms for Other Audiences and Purposes

- Who: FactSheets Team (and others as appropriate)
- What: Evolve existing templates and create new ones

By now you will have created a refined FactSheet Template for use by others. They will be able to create useful and consumable FactSheets with that template. But there is more to do. There may be other consumers that need to be supported. Perhaps it is time to turn from an inward focus to an outer one, crafting templates for FactSheets to be consumed by external review boards or regulators. Or it may be time to support other stakeholders not directly involved in the AI lifecycle, such as sales personnel or the ultimate consumers of an AI service. Other formats for the same content may need to be created as well. The above steps can be followed once again. You will have learned a surprising amount about *how* to create FactSheet Templates and FactSheets from having gone through this process once. It will go faster and more smoothly now.

We encourage an ongoing process of reflecting on how well FactSheets support your AI lifecycle once they are fully incorporated and in routine use. Consider how they might be improved. Perhaps a new business opportunity in a new domain has developed or new types of models are being created that capitalize on new algorithmic research. If so, it may be time to refine existing FactSheet Templates or create new ones.

5 Further Guidance

We have observed [8] that producers of FactSheets have a hard time imagining what consumers of FactSheets need to know and how best to provide that information. Model developers, for example, may have a sophisticated understanding of the algorithmic basis for a model, but may describe the model or its performance in ways that assume far too much knowledge on the part of a FactSheet consumer. Consumers may not really know what information they need to support their work without somewhat structured reflection. Our methodology addresses these gaps by applying a user-centered design process [14] to the task of creating useful AI documentation. This process need not be time consuming and expensive. Even talking with a few potential FactSheet consumers and producers will be helpful.

It should be obvious at this point that following this methodology will not lead to a single FactSheet Template across the vast array of organizations creating AI models and services. The methodology *will*, however lead to FactSheets that fit the needs of a particular organization and provide real value to the corresponding AI development, deployment, and monitoring teams.

To put it a different way, one size will not fit all, at least if you dive below a short nutrition-label-like form to something that provides useful detail to all the lifecycle roles in a real organization. Even FactSheets developed with the same template will differ in interesting ways. For example, some models will have FactSheets with

extensive sections on bias and fairness testing with respect to protected populations. Other models will have FactSheets for which fairness and bias considerations are truly not applicable. Within some regulated industries, FactSheets may run to a hundred or more pages whereas the FactSheet produced by a startup company providing an AI component for visual object detection may be little more than a statement of purpose, inputs, and outputs.

An extension beyond user-centered design is *participatory design*, which invites not only the producers and consumers within the organizations’s AI development team to contribute to the process, but also the communities affected by the deployed model or service, such as applicants or patients [12, 18]. Moreover, by including people with lived experience of marginalization, who have an epistemic advantage in spotting potential harms, you will obtain a more comprehensive FactSheet template than if you did not have their participation [6].

This methodology for creating FactSheets may seem like a lot of work. Following these steps *will* take more time than just having a single person write a FactSheet Template based on a limited understanding of the actions and information needs within your organization. But failing to perform these steps will incur ongoing costs in poor documentation, repeated requests between team members for missing information, insufficient testing based on faulty assumptions about data or model structure, sub-optimal business results, and exposure to unnecessary risk.

We have found that following these steps with even a small number of people, where there is perhaps only one representative for each stage in a lifecycle, will pay dividends. We have also found that iterating quickly, rather than spending substantial time trying to attain perfection within each iteration, will shorten the overall time needed.

6 Harm and Safety

The increasing use of AI systems in high-stakes decision making has underscored the importance of transparent reporting mechanisms. These mechanisms, including FactSheets, can lead to better understanding, and more effective mitigation of any harm or safety issues in the system, such as bias, vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks, or other undesirable societal impacts. For example, a section that describes a detailed analysis of bias in the training dataset can help illuminate if the system is appropriate for a particular use case.

This paper describes a methodology for producing a useful transparent reporting mechanism for AI systems. This methodology can contribute to the identification of potential harm and safety issues. The methodology does this by:

- Explicitly including multiple FactSheet consumers and producers in FactSheet requirements gathering (Steps 1–2)
- Asking questions about their concerns for harm and risk (Steps 1–2)
- Providing a feedback mechanism to allow further input (Step 6)
- Including a broad range of perspectives in the development of FactSheets (Steps 1–7)

This process will increase the likelihood that FactSheets will provide the information needed to understand and mitigate potential harm or safety issues with an AI system.

7 In Practice

We have begun evaluating the FactSheets methodology across three teams within our company and have received strong positive feedback and calls for widespread adoption for both new and existing models and services. One early benefit has become evident from the work carried out by fact producers, who were primarily data scientists. They found that the step of identifying consumers and their documentation-related use cases provided them with a perspective and a sense of purpose that was lacking in their prior documentation efforts. They described

how having a persona (or sometimes a specific person) in mind enabled them to more carefully shape their documentation to meet known needs, a strategy used by data scientists more generally when communicating about their models [17]. By having specific users in mind, data scientists were able to constrain *what* facts to document and *how* to present them, lessening the uncertainty that they reported experiencing in the past.

The benefits of the FactSheet methodology do not come without costs. Our FactSheet creators spent up to 24 working hours crafting a complete FactSheet, with roughly half that time spent gathering feedback from consumers and iterating on content to make it more consumable. These costs can be reduced with better technology to support the creation and curation of facts. But we note that the multidisciplinary nature of AI model development, with each role having their own distinct knowledge, information needs, and preferred tools for accomplishing their work, will continue to require a focus on collaborative activities with their attendant costs and complexities (such as scheduling meetings). Bridging the gap between roles while addressing the back-and-forth, iterative nature of creating FactSheets remains a challenge to be overcome.¹

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¹An earlier version of this paper [20] includes two illustrative FactSheet templates created using this methodology. The templates are for the same model, but for two different consumers, illustrating the generality of the approach.

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Ethics, Rules of Engagement, and AI: Neural Narrative Mapping Using Large Transformer Language Models

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Abstract

The problem of determining if a military unit has correctly understood an order and is properly executing on it is one that has bedeviled military planners throughout history. The advent of advanced language models such as OpenAI's GPT-series offers new possibilities for addressing this problem. This paper presents a mechanism to harness the narrative output of large language models and produce diagrams or "maps" of the relationships that are latent in the weights of such models as the GPT-3. The resulting "Neural Narrative Maps" (NNMs), are intended to provide insight into the organization of information, opinion, and belief in the model, which in turn provide means to understand intent and response in the context of physical distance. This paper discusses the problem of mapping information spaces in general, and then presents a concrete implementation of this concept in the context of OpenAI's GPT-3 language model for determining if a subordinate is following a commander's intent in a high-risk situation. The subordinate's locations within the NNM allow a novel capability to evaluate the intent of the subordinate with respect to the commander. We show that it is possible not only to determine if they are nearby in narrative space, but also how they are oriented, and what "trajectory" they are on. Our results show that our method is able to produce high-quality maps, and demonstrate new ways of evaluating intent more generally.

1 Introduction

In the 1979 motion picture *Apocalypse Now*, Captain Willard (played by Martin Sheen) is sent on a mission to assassinate Colonel Kurtz (played by Marlon Brando), a highly decorated officer who, in the words of the general authorizing the mission, has gone from "one of the most outstanding officers this country has ever produced" to someone "out there operating without any decent restraint, totally beyond the pale of any acceptable human conduct."

The movie explores the paradoxes in war, where some illegal acts are embraced by the command structure, some tolerated, and some are to be terminated, "with extreme prejudice." Willard has to navigate these conflicts as he moves towards Kurtz' compound deep in Cambodia.

Apocalypse Now provides an example of the difficulty that any intent-aware system must face in a military context [1]. Not only does the system need to determine if an order is being followed, it should also determine if the order itself is valid, so that the warriors implementing the order are not placed in ethical dilemmas. This is the goal that we attempt to address in this paper, with the concept of *Neural Narrative Mapping* (NNM). By

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Bulletin of the IEEE Computer Society Technical Committee on Data Engineering




Figure 1: Neural Narrative Mapping Example

placing narrative elements at coordinates in a virtual space, we can determine sophisticated relationships between concepts that go well beyond textual comparison.

An example of this concept, described in detail later in this paper is shown in Figure 1. This map was constructed from narrative sequences developed by the GPT-3 Neural language model [2] with respect to *rules of engagement*. Clustering these texts produces a set of relationships. Central to this example are the concepts of self-protection and care, but there are also relationships with respect to things like ethics and masculinity. By allowing the system to develop relationships between multiple narratives, we can determine the space of possible behaviors of the soldiers such as those in *Apocalypse Now* as they encountered lawful and lawless conditions.

In this paper, we will discuss mapping the relationships of such responses and how they could apply to military scenarios. We will first introduce some background material on how to represent narratives and relationships between them. Secondly, we will show how we can incorporate our mapping method into a decision-making system and demonstrate it on a military scenario.

2 Background

Published research into determining intent generally is quite sparse with respect to determining how subordinate behavior reflects the intent of orders from a superior. Typically, the military relies on legal mechanisms and training to ensure that 1) subordinates follow the orders of their superiors, 2) That superiors issue lawful orders, and 3) that subordinates refuse to obey unlawful orders [3]. This framework has existed as precedent since the Nuremberg Trials, when Nazi officers were convicted of war crimes that they had been ordered to commit [4]. These rules were codified in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and embodied in the Army Field Manual prohibitions against issuing and obeying unlawful orders [5].

However, research has shown that subordinates misunderstand the intent of their superiors 50% - 60% of the time [1]. This means that approaches such as training and legal enforcement are not effective in ensuring that the intent of a legal order is followed by a subordinate. The process of determining intent is made even more difficult by situations where communications are degraded. For example, if a superior's orders can't be understood, then it is impossible to determine whether the subordinate misunderstood the orders or whether they refused to follow them.

As a partial solution to this problem, the military will often do simulations or war games where miscommunication issues can be uncovered and corrected before they occur. Recently, work has been done in automating this process so that the space of possibilities can be explored more thoroughly [1]. Such *computational military tactical planning*, and has largely employed genetic algorithms to explore potential outcomes, including co-evolving friendly/enemy tactics [6].

More recently, the development of human-robot teams has required the development of more explicit forms of communicating and verifying intent. In the case of these hybrid teams “each autonomous system in the team must be able to determine their own individual tactical behaviors based upon inferences made about the human supervisor’s intent, rather than by direct response to specific command inputs.” Work by Evans, et al. Has focused on the development of shared mental models and implicit coordination based on verbal and non-verbal communication [7].

Transformer language models (TLMs) open up new possibilities for examining intent in the context of synthetic narratives. TLMs are trained on massive text datasets, comprising a significant fraction of the high-quality text available on the internet [8]. They implement attention-based deep neural network architectures to allow the model to selectively focus on the segments of the input text that are most useful in predicting adjacent and word tokens. Models are not trained using any hand-crafted language rules and learn to generate natural language purely by observing text data. In doing so, they capture semantic, syntactic, discourse, and even pragmatic regularities in language. A GPT model can be used for generating texts as a function of the model and a sequence of words, or “prompt”, provided by users which is specifically designed to set up the context for GPT to generate text. GPT models have been shown to generate text outputs often indistinguishable from that of humans [9].

The transformer’s ability to integrate across large amounts of data can better support the information-seeking user when using interactive systems like chatbots [10]. Transformers open up novel avenues of research into intent that have not been available before, particularly in understanding and exploiting the ways that information is stored in and retrieved from these models.

Since the introduction of the transformer model in 2017, TLMs have become a field of study in themselves. Among them, BERT [11] and GPT [2] are two of the most well known TLMs used widely in boosting the performance of diverse NLP applications. Transformers are unlike perceptrons and convolutional neural networks in that they use self attention, where the model computes its own representation of its input and output [12]. Most recent research has been in increasing the performance of these models, particularly as these systems scale into the billions of parameters [13].

Understanding how and what kind of knowledge is stored in all those parameters is becoming a sub-field in the study of TLMs. Language models require no human supervision to train, do not have schemas like traditional databases, and can be queried using natural language. These properties make them an attractive mechanism for storing and retrieving information. Examples of information retrieval include TLMs successfully completing “cloze statements”, where the model fills in a blank [14], factual relationships extracted from the Wikipedia [15], and general knowledge [16]. These studies showed that TLMs are often “competitive with non-neural and supervised alternatives.” [14]

The prompt that is used to elicit specific information from these models has also become a field of study in its own right. For example, mining-based and paraphrasing approaches can increase effectiveness in masked BERT prompts over manually created prompts [17]. These studies demonstrated that effective prompts can be produced by mining phrases in the Wikipedia corpus which can be generalized as template questions such as *x was born in y* and *capital of x is y*. These can then be filled in using sets of subject-object pairs. Improvements over manually-developed prompts using this technique can be substantial, with improvements of 60% over manual prompts. Paraphrasing, or the simplification of a prompt using techniques such as back-translation can enhance query results further [17].

Our own research has been focused on understanding how TLMs incorporate domain-specific knowledge. We fine-tuned GPT-2 models on descriptions of chess games showed that models trained on a corpora of approximately

23,000 chess games accurately replicated human gameplay patterns [18]. Statistical analysis comparing the spectral characteristics of human (ground truth) and synthesized games were found to be statistically similar with a $> 97\%$ probability. This work was extended to perform sociological research on different political groups on Twitter by training GPT-2 models on the tweets of right-wing, majority, and science-focused tweets during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic [19].

Using TLMs to evaluate social data is still nascent. A study by [20] used BERT fine tuned on YouTube comments to gain insight into community perception of the 2019 Indian election. They created weekly corpora of comments and constructed a tracking poll based on the prompts “Vote for MASK” and “MASK will win” and then compared the probabilities for the tokens for the parties BJP/CONGRESS and candidates MODI/RAHUL. The results substantially matched traditional polling.

A characteristic of TLMs is that when provided with the correct prompt, they will produce relevant content regardless of the ethical implications of the generated text. OpenAI has shown that the GPT-3 can be “primed” using “few-shot learning” [8]. Using this technique, McGuffie primed the GPT-3 using mass-shooter manifestos, which generated text that maintains the amoral, dangerous context of these texts [21]. This will become particularly important in this research, as we are particularly interested in unethical behavior in response to lawful orders.

3 Narrative Generation using TLMs

Narratives are defined as “a written account of connected events; or a story”. These stories are linear constructs, and are naturally suited to the presentation of a singular point-of-view over time. Narratives can range from fictional stories to detailed travelogues.

Less known is that narratives have been used as the basis of navigation for millennia. Before the 16th century, ship’s pilots collected “navigation stories” into a *rutter* or *pilot book*, that described coastal and open ocean routes in narrative form. Because it is difficult to have explicit spatial relationships between stories, rutters “exhibit an understanding of physical space as delimited rather than panoramic” [22]. To obtain this *panoramic* view, one needs the broader perspective provided by maps.

Even if there were no such things as *objective*, surveyed maps, it is possible to build panoramic maps based on a careful synthesis of a large set of personal, subjective descriptions. These narrative “threads” can be knitted together into a tapestry that portrays the spatial relationships, based on this collection of individual, seemingly unrelated paths. Though these maps do not have the representational rigor that objective maps have, maps based on such *subjective* data still support navigation between the physical places of the world.

The same sorts of maps can be created utilizing narratives about non-physical domains. For example, narratives about philosophy can be combined to produce spatial representations such as those shown in Figure 4. More importantly for our purposes, the same technique can be used to navigate *information spaces* such as those related to military orders as in the map of Figure 1.

A large number of narratives would be needed to define the space through their overlapping tales to generate these maps. Fortunately, TLMs such as the GPT allow the generation of these narratives dynamically and with no limit. The GPT model generates narrative text by starting with a sequence of word tokens, or prompt, provided by the user. A single word token can be thought of as a query into the model. The GPT model then begins to generate text by choosing a set of words that are more likely to follow the prompt which are added to the text. It then considers the words that are most likely to come after the updated text, and repeats the process until it has generated as many tokens as the user desires.

For example, if the model is prompted with the word “cat”, it considers that word to be the initial query. If it has learned to associate cats with fish, then it may generate the sentence “A cat likes to eat fish”. Similarly, if the model is provided with the word “wombat”, it will consider that word to be a query, and could generate the sentence “A wombat is a kind of marsupial”. This process can be extended to have the model evaluate terms that it has never seen before, through the use of a technique called *prompt tuning*.

When presented with the prompt “A floober is a flightless bird that inhabits the barren wastes of Antarctica. Like its cousin the Chinstrap Penguin, the”, the GPT-3 produces the following output about this fictional animal:

A floober is a flightless bird that inhabits the barren wastes of Antarctica. Like its cousin the Chinstrap Penguin, the floober is a ground-dwelling bird that uses its wings primarily for mating displays. The floober’s flightlessness is believed to be an adaptation to the extreme cold of Antarctica, which would make flight inefficient and possibly hazardous. It is believed that floobers lost their ability to fly because of an evolutionary tradeoff between wing size and body size, resulting in the floober having very small wings, but a large body.

In this generated response, we can see one of the truly novel capabilities of these large language models – the ability to articulate internally consistent narratives based on a starting point and orientation. Here, the starting point is a fictional penguin-like bird, and the orientation is the descriptive language that leads the model to continue the description based on the starting conditions.

The same prompt can be used again and again to produce a statistical distribution of what this imaginary bird might be. This allows us to “map out” the expectation of what such an animal might be, based on all the items that the GPT-3 has read as part of its training set.

The GPT creates sequences of words that mimic the patterns of human production. In other words, there is a sense of the causal relationships inherent in the information stored in the model. For example, when prompted with “*Smoking cigarettes causes*”, the GPT consistently responds with “*cancer, heart disease, lung disease*” among other related conditions. This is not an understanding of causality per se, rather it is a reflection of the sequencing of tokens that the GPT is trained and evaluated on. These sequences naturally reflect our stated understandings including subjective bias. As such, a *sequence* of statements has a particular trajectory over the “terrain” of the model. When the GPT writes a sentence, it is more like a ball rolling down a lumpy hill rather than intelligence as we perceive it as humans.

Recursively iterating over multiple prompts that are created by the GPT in response to one or more “seed prompts” results in a sort of quasi-causal *bootstrap conversation* that the model has with itself. This process provides the dynamically produced limitless content that we need to generate maps.

4 Methods

This section describes the development of the technique used to produce maps using data from the GPT-3. This work had two phases. The first was a basic proof of concept, where output from the GPT could be parsed and placed into graphs based on existing ground truth that the output could be validated against (Section 4.1). The second phase describes the development of an interactive map creation tool that incorporates human interaction (Section 4.2). This process allows the development of maps that incorporate more subjective human understandings that are harder to validate against external datasets, such as the exploration of the ethical spaces around legal and emergent military “Rules of Engagement” (ROE).

4.1 Initial GPT-3 Maps

OpenAI has developed an online “playground” for developers to test out prompts. When presented with: “*Here’s a short list of countries that share a border with Italy:*”

The GPT-3 continues the statement with the following text: *France, Switzerland, Austria, Slovenia, San Marino, Vatican City.*

In this example, the response is remarkably accurate. Not only are adjacent countries like France, Switzerland and Austria included, but also countries that are contained within Italy (i.e. San Marino and Vatican City).

Repeated responses vary, but they are consistent enough to produce map-like representations. For example, Figure 3 shows a map of Central America using the same technique. Although there are no explicit positioning instructions in the responses of the GPT, the result compares well to a geographic map, shown in Figure 2:



Figure 2: Central America




Figure 3: Reconstruction

The diagram of Figure 3 was produced by repeatedly querying the GPT-3 with a prompt that incorporates the results of the previous prompt. This is the core of the iterative process used to generate NNM maps and is shown in detail in Algorithm 1.

In Algorithm 1, a text “prompt template” is created that supports the incorporation of seed fragments. In Python, the template used to produce the map in Figure 3 was ‘A short list of countries that are nearest to “{}”, separated by commas:’.format(*seed*). This allows the prompt to run repeatedly as new results are incorporated into L_{seed} . The graph is built out by connecting node with the value of the current *seed* to nodes whose label matches a value in the *response_list*. If there is no node for a *response*, one is created and connected to the current node N_{cur} . This process repeats until *query_count* == *max_queries*.

All the maps in this section can be validated by some kind of “ground truth,” or data that exists independently in another source. In Figures 3 and 4, *response* values were validated by using the Wikipedia API[23] to check if there was an entry for each GPT response. Responses that do not have a Wikipedia entry get caught before they are added to the map. A further benefit of such ground truth is that it is possible to adjust the size of the node based on, as in this case, the number of queries against a particular topic. We can see in the maps that “Mexico” and “Stoicism” get more searches than the other items in the map.

The graphs created using this process were then used to create a GML (Graph Modeling Language) file that can be read by a variety of graphing libraries and packages. The maps shown here were produced using Gephi¹, using the ForceAtlas layout [24].

This approach need not be limited to geography. Figure 4 shows a map created using the prompt “___ is a philosophy that is closely related to several others. Here’s a short list of philosophies that are similar to ___:”, seeded with the values [Utilitarianism, Hedonism].

Here we can see relationships based on *narrative* rather than geography. Because the GPT has an understanding of the relationships inherent in the token sequences it has learned, the prompt produces a list of philosophies that are reasonable continuations of the narrative text. A good example of these relationships is the “cynicism” node in the lower right of the map, which has connections to “atheism”, “pyrrhonism”, “stoicism”, and “skepticism”. These are all philosophies based on the fundamental value of reason and skeptical inquiry. If one goes to the Wikipedia however,² there are no explicit links between the pages that discuss these philosophies.

¹gephi.org

²As of 12 November 2021

```

Set  $max\_queries$  to the number of queries desired
Set  $query\_count = 0$ 
Create empty list nodes  $L_{nodes}$ 
Create an empty list of used seeds  $L_{queried}$ 
Populate initial seed list  $L_{seed}$ 
Set the prompt template  $T$ 
Set current node  $N_{cur} = seed$ 
while  $query\_count < max\_queries$  do
    Append  $N_{cur}$  to  $L_{nodes}$ 
    Set query  $Q$  to the  $T + L_{seed}[0]$ 
    Move  $seed$  from  $L_{seed}$  to  $L_{queried}$ 
     $response\_text = GPT\_fn(Q)$ 
     $L_{responses} = Parse\_fn(response\_tex)$ 
    foreach  $response$  in  $response\_list$  do
        if  $ValidResponse\_fn(response)$  then
            foreach  $N$  in  $L_{nodes}$  do
                if  $N.name == response$  then
                    |  $Connect\_fn(N, N_{cur})$ 
                end
            end
            if  $response$  not in  $L_{queried}$  and  $response$  not in  $L_{seed}$  then
                Append  $response$  to  $L_{seed}$ 
                Create new node  $N_{response}$ 
                Append  $N_{response}$  to  $L_{nodes}$ 
                 $Connect\_fn(N_{response}, N_{cur})$ 
            end
        end
    end
     $query\_count++ = 1$ 
end

```

Algorithm 1: Iterative mapping algorithm




Figure 4: Reconstructed Philosophy Map




Figure 5: Interactive Map Builder

As with the country map, the philosophy map is validated against the Wikipedia as the known ground truth. However, there are many relationships contained in the GPT that cannot be validated this way. To explore more subjective, difficult-to-validate narrative spaces, we developed a tool that gives the responsibility of parsing and validating seeds to the user.

4.2 Interactive Map Builder

To address the more complex relationships within subjective material such as ethics, we developed an interactive application that allowed the user to group responses and additional details together. This thick client application was written using the tkinter library³, which is in the standard Python 3 distribution allowing for easier deployment. Using the design research processes of ideation and iteration [25], we produced a prototype *Map Builder* (Figure 5) that supported creating more subjective maps. The primary goal of this tool was to evaluate the processes that users engaged in when interacting with the GPT-3 in such a way as to produce and store relationships between texts. The Map Builder provides a series of options for creating and organizing source and target node relationships.

Because the GPT is built from a massive corpus of text, it has “spaces” that reflect the writings of individuals that do not align with lawful rules of engagement. These might be actual soldiers writing about their experiences, but also screenplays such as the aforementioned *Apocalypse Now*. The GPT learns these relationships, so that it can use a starting prompt to produce a diverse set of responses that can be analyzed. An example of this, using the context of ethical exploration of rules of engagement is shown in Figure 6.

The prompt in this example is, “*Here’s a short list of military rules of engagement like ‘It is better to overreact than underreact’:*” which has already been placed in the *masculine* node using the “Set Seed Group” combobox and button. When presented with this prompt, the GPT-3 responded with the following:

“*If in doubt, empty your magazine.*”

“*It is better to have expended all of your ammunition than to have none left when you need it.*”⁴

³docs.python.org/3/library/tkinter.html

⁴Note that this sentence makes no conceptual sense, but would be likely to slip through any automated parsing system. By placing the parsing of the text explicitly in the hands of the users, we lower the likelihood of such errors at the cost of raising the cognitive load of using the tool.




Figure 6: Node Topic Matching




Figure 7: SBERT text compare

“The purpose of a battle is to defeat the enemy. There is no other purpose.”
“A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week.”

In the example, the user has selected the text *If in doubt, empty your magazine.* and placed it in the Topic Group *Kill the enemy.* The relationship between the topic group and source node is displayed by a black line. This relationship is shown and emphasized in Figure 8




Figure 8: Connecting Nodes




Figure 9: Lawless - Lawful Axis

As nodes are added, a force-directed layout moves the nodes based on their distance from each other connections [24]. As this process continues, larger-scale patterns emerge. Important for this example is the emergence of a gradient that can be viewed as a progression from more lawful concepts to less lawful ones (Figure 9). On the “Lawful” side are topic labels such as *careful*, *hold fire*, *ethical*, and *duty*. on the other side are nodes with names such as *masculine*, *kill the enemy*, and *fire back*. Between these two extremes are nodes such as *responsible*, *self-protect*, and *proportional*. As we will see in section 5, a script that involves a subordinate disobeying a superior’s orders results in a trajectory along this gradient.

In addition to manually adding topics to nodes, textual similarity can be used to find relationships between topics using AugSBERT text matching [26].⁵ The user can access this feature by clicking on the “Find Closest” button that can be seen in Figure 6. This brings up a popup window where the user is presented with a list of topics sorted by similarity. An example of this using the prompts described above is shown in Figure 7.

⁵This model is now available as the python package `sentence-encoders`

This tool provides users with a flexible platform for building visualizations of potentially difficult to understand concepts using a clearly defined input mechanism. It lets a user iteratively explore concepts using the sequential and relational knowledge contained in the GPT-3. Although this is an early prototype, it validates many of the important concepts behind this approach. In the next section, we will discuss an implementation of this approach.

4.3 Interactive Map Viewer

Once a NNM map is developed using the map builder tool, the user can evaluate statements in the context of the map with the viewer and a *script evaluator*, shown in Figure 10. This tool consists of two components, the *Graph* view that displays the map, and the *Script* view that lets the user play through a sequence of texts that are associated with an agent. In the case of the use case discussed here, there are two agents visualized as larger colored circles. A COMMANDER(CMDR), who is issuing Operational Orders (OPORDs) and a SUBORDINATE (SBRD), who is issuing Fragmented Orders (FRAGOs) to his troops.




Figure 10: Interactive Map Display

Each text (OPORD or FRAGO) is placed in the script with a time, and a location (Node). As the user advances the script, an icon representing the position of the COMMANDER and/or SUBORDINATE move towards the node that contains the topic text with the closest match. Text similarity is calculated using AugSBERT-based text matching. For each node, two distances are calculated. The first is the linear distance between the two node locations. The second is the AugSBERT text similarity measure between the COMMANDER and SUBORDINATE texts at the current point in the script. These relationships over the duration of the script can be displayed immediately in a chart (Figure 12, or saved in an Excel worksheet. Different scripts can be loaded to any stored map. The user can advance, reverse, or reset the script.

5 Results

We will now briefly describe how the system works with a script based on the following fictional scenario, developed for initial evaluation of the system. This scenario was written to portray a trajectory that goes from lawful engagement to war crime:

A forward operating base (FOB) commander is given an operational order (OPORD) from the regional commander. His instructions are to not engage in hostile operations against Enemy operatives during a cease-fire. His FOB is then surrounded by armed Enemy insurgents. Fearing they will fire first, the FOB commander violates the orders to issue a series of fragmented orders (FRAGOs) for his soldiers to engage. Each one of these FRAGOs strays further from the intent of his original OPORD.

The full script consists of the following statements. The role is CAPITALIZED, the node is in (parentheses), and the text is in courier font:

1. **COMMANDER (careful)**: “Base will operate at heightened awareness for the duration of the cease-fire. Double patrols, and report insurgent activity if identified. Do not engage.”
2. **SUBORDINATE (duty)**: “We have explicit orders not to engage Enemy forces. Hold your fire.”
3. **SUBORDINATE (careful)**: “We’ve spotted what appears to be armed Enemy in the process of preparing an attack. Verify targets.”
4. **COMMANDER (careful)**: “Do not under any circumstances break the cease-fire with Enemy forces. If you are fired upon you may return fire. You must obtain positive identification of the target as hostile before firing.”
5. **SUBORDINATE (kill the enemy)**: “Screw it. If these guys look like they are going to attack, take them out. We’re not going to sit here and wait for them to shoot us first.”
6. **SUBORDINATE (self-protect)**: “East gate has engaged insurgents, we have casualties. Weapons free.”
7. **SUBORDINATE (the enemy)**: “All units engage any Enemy targets, take these guys down!”
8. **SUBORDINATE (kill the enemy)**: “Don’t let survivors get away. This isn’t about being right, it’s about getting these bastards.”

At the beginning of the script (items 1 and 2), the location of the **COMMANDER** agent is set to the node “careful”, due to a close *augSBERT* match to the topic text in that node: “You must obtain positive identification of the target as hostile before firing.” The **SUBORDINATE** agent is placed at the node “duty” due to a close match to the topic text in that node: “It is the soldier’s responsibility to disobey an illegal order and not participate in committing a war crime.”

We had discovered that instantly positioning the agents at the target nodes was hard to detect by the users, so instead, the agents are *animated* and move towards their target over the course of a few seconds using linear interpolation. Our approach is shown in Equation 1, Where \hat{v} is the unit vector that points from the agent node (p_{old}) to the target node, s is the speed of the agent in the environment, and Δt is the elapsed time since the last frame.

$$p_{new} = p_{old} + \hat{v}s\Delta t \quad (1)$$

Because the nodes contain clusters of text that reflect different articulations of the same topic as generated by the GPT-3, there is a substantial surface for the text matching algorithm to work on. This allows for the COMMANDER and SUBORDINATE agents to find nodes on the map that reflect the state of the script. For example, the COMMANDER remains at the same node (careful), as the SUBORDINATE moves from nodes in the “lawful” region (duty and careful), to “lawless” nodes (kill the enemy and the enemy). This path can be seen in Figure 11. The bottommost large circle encloses the SUBORDINATE starting position. The one above that is where the COMMANDER spends the entire scenario. The remaining circle encloses the ending node for the SUBORDINATE, while the red arrows indicate the trajectory taken over the course of the scenario.

The ability of this technique when compared to more traditional approaches to orders matching using text analytics [6] can be seen in Figure 12. In this graph, the red line is the textual similarity between the COMMANDER’s orders and the SUBORDINATE’s response at each step in the script, while the blue line indicates the distance between the nodes, or the NNM distance that each script element is associated with. As we can see, there is a level of correlation between the two lines⁶, but there is little evidence of a trajectory in the standalone text similarity. For example, the starting similarity and ending similarity are nearly identical at 58.5% and 59.5%. A detailed comparison is shown in Table 6.




Figure 11: Agent movement




Figure 12: NNM distance vs text similarity

Script ID	Role	Similarity	Node	Node Dist	Text Similarity
1	COMMANDER	0.621	careful	88.63	NA
2	SUBORDINATE	0.758	duty	88.63	0.5856
3	SUBORDINATE	0.711	careful	0.00	0.7165
4	COMMANDER	0.758	careful	0.00	NA
5	SUBORDINATE	0.822	kill the enemy	134.05	0.7365
6	SUBORDINATE	0.636	self-protect	63.78	0.4733
7	SUBORDINATE	0.722	the enemy	142.33	0.4173
8	SUBORDINATE	0.741	kill the enemy	134.05	0.5952

Table 6: Distance vs. Text Similarity

These results strongly indicate that the dynamic use of these and similar maps combined with node text matching is an effective approach for determining alignment with intent. The ability to dynamically update the

⁶Specifically, Pearson’s correlation coefficient is 33.2%.

script as it progresses, and the use of topic maps as a useful representation for the current state of the script allows for a low-latency order matching system. Although we have demonstrated this capability for a situation of military command and control this approach is general, and should be usable for modeling in other domains.

6 Discussion

The current discussions about AI and military generally revolves around the potential of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). There is good reason for this – both for strategic and ethical reasons, it is important to keep a close eye on the development of AI and its potential applications. Artificial intelligence and machine learning promise to fundamentally change the way we interact with whole classes of weapons. When combat is happening at *machine speed*, humans cannot be directly involved with the system. Such systems respond to threats that are beyond the capability of real-time human supervision, and may have to be left in “always on” states in case of surprise attacks [27].

This human/AI partnership is likely to produce emergent behaviors that are not obvious extensions of current military thinking. This creates a tension between two opposing poles. At one end is the need for systems to be trustworthy. They should predictably do what we believe is the right thing in ethically difficult conditions. At the other end is the need to be responsive and capable in unpredictable conditions. This is an important problem, but it ignores other ways that AI/ML can improve the trustworthiness *and* flexibility in *human* systems. After all, humans will still make the decision to use a weapon, even if that means just turning it on.

We believe that the incorporation of AI/ML into the human enterprise must be more than making sophisticated (and hopefully ethical) machines. It must also be about *helping humans behave better*. Models trained on human data contain an understanding of the how we perceive information through the lenses of culture, language, and bias. By presenting these relationships back to us in usable, intuitive ways, we can make more informed decisions and better understand the patterns and biases that affect us. There is ample evidence that humans are not particularly good at making decisions, particularly under pressure [27]. Our natural biases (stereotypes, assumptions, and a lack of critical thinking) often create complex dynamics that lead us to make gross errors in judgment. Our adversaries know this too, and they can design attacks to exploit our weaknesses [28].

Technologies like large language models can provide deep insight into the humans used to generate the data for these models. In the case of our work, we use that insight to provide visual relationships with respect to concepts in the model. Beyond an increased understanding of *context* (why is this happening?), this capability can provide the ability to make nominal *predictions* about future events (what is likely to happen next?). While not a true interpretation of human intent, this is an example of what we believe will be one of the most important applications for AI/ML in military decision making.

An important point to note is that this approach takes advantage of the biases that are inherent in most models developed from public data using machine learning. Here, the bias in the model is essential, because it allows the user to visualize the relationships of nodes and the biases they embody. For example, in the map created and evaluated in this paper, masculinity biases that might affect decision making are visible in the map. It becomes easy to see how the “masculine” node is associated strongly with “kill the enemy” and “lawless” nodes. This approach could be used to explore biases or unethical behavior that is not obvious.

A great deal of the work in the space of AI ethics is focused on reducing or eliminating bias and unethical behaviors from AI systems [29]. AI tools using neural language models such as the GPT are trying to remove or reduce the potential for harmful generated text by applying word filters, and extensive human moderation [30]. In short, in most scenarios where AI systems are being deployed, the goal is to ensure they function as ethically as possible. Our approach operates counter to this intuition. The unethical beliefs captured by advanced language models *is the point*. Our goal is to identify areas of both ethical and unethical behavior to better inform decision making and situational awareness. The maps created from this amoral machine view of human beliefs allows us to identify narrative pathways through ethically and morally complicated decision spaces.

7 Future Work

We have found that the approach of creating graphical spaces, or maps, by grouping multiple responses by the GPT-3 into nodes and arranging them with a force directed layout provides an intuitive way to visualize relationships latent in the GPT-3. Using a physical layout to judge distance between narrative elements can be an effective tool for determining the level of alignment between individuals interacting through online text.

Additionally, this study shows how human interaction with the GPT provides an effective, flexible mechanism for discovering ways to group, filter, and organize information that is extracted during a *dialog* with a language model. As we saw in section 4, humans have a far better ability to detect subtly incoherent statements that these language models can produce.

By recording and examining the processes that humans use in filtering and grouping the information returned by the GPT, we intend to incrementally automate the map making process while maintaining high quality and confidence in the output. This will result in a process that is less *ad-hoc* and more consistent and repeatable.

Once maps can be built more consistently, we can begin to use them to look at sociological behavior at scale. For example, we can build traces of people moving around the map by looking at their social media output. Imaging a Twitter or Reddit thread about a rapidly-changing conspiracy theory such as QAnon. Over time, different topics will become more discussed, while others will have less text associated with them. We can look at texts as locations in the narrative space, and mark a path on the map connecting the points. By merging thousands of these paths, we can start to uncover and visualize the “Social Desire Paths” (SDPs) between regions on these maps. SDPs derive from *desire path*, a term in landscape architecture that describes the dirt paths that develop over time as people bypass formal walkways and leave their mark on the landscape. Using this approach, we can ask questions about how groups of people move through narrative space. If a region of the map is discussed by many different people over time, it might indicate that the region is particularly important to those people and they have enough in common to work together. We can also use these traces to identify and visualize *Hubs* of activity: if a single person or small group of people produces a lot of these pathways, then they might be in a very influential position.

Although the maps created for this work are currently constructed from graphs using a force-directed layout, the connections of the nodes matter less than their relative position. This matters because an agent moves across the map, not between nodes. As such, the best location for an agent to be might not be *within* a node, but rather *between* some number of nodes. For example, an agent text might match one node at 35%, with the next highest at 30%, with low matches for other nodes. It might make more sense for the agent’s position to be on a line between those two nodes. Further, the GPT (or other TLM) could be used to produce a new node with descriptive text at this new coordinate, which would be added to the map. We are currently exploring these and other ways to improve the utility of the maps and to better support agent navigation.

We strongly believe that this approach is generalizable, and can be applied in similar form to the narrative spaces that make up other regions such as philosophy (as we have seen), but also conspiracy theories, game strategies, etc. The potential application of creating graphical representations of the mental maps that exist in these topics is vast, and the methods employed here could be used to explore any complex topic.

Finally, while this technique is generalizable, our example was a military one. While it has become rare for academia to contribute directly to an understanding of military thinking, now that AI is being actively utilized by armed forces, academia must participate vigorously in discussions about the ethical use of such technologies, as they possess a vital perspective into the risks inherent in these emerging technologies.

8 Conclusions

In this paper, we have shown that creating *neural narrative maps* created from the output of a language model can be leveraged to create new meaningful information relationships. This process can be performed automatically

if there is a source of ground truth, or iteratively, using direct human involvement to vet and connect concepts. This hybrid approach is flexible and allows humans to work on a more subjective level, filtering and directing the GPT-3 to articulate narratives that can be used to generate these visualizations. Our results show that we can use this process to create preliminary maps that are designed for human consumption, and we explore how these maps can be used to visualize the mental models of individuals or groups as they interact over time.

By combining topic extraction, machine learning, and human feedback, we can produce outputs that are both useful and understandable. These map-like representations can be used to explore beliefs, strategies, or even just preferences. We hope that this work will help others to visually explore and represent mental models as we work towards maps that can augment and support ethical decision making.

The role of usability is also important. Although a simple implementation, the ability of motion to attract attention the the relevant components on the map was substantial. We believe the incorporation of dynamic elements in these presentations will substantially improve the human comprehension of these maps.

We believe that this research is an important step toward creating automated tools that allows us to see relationships *at scale*, between narrative elements that are otherwise hard to visualize and comprehend. We also demonstrated ways graphical representations of mental maps can be used for understanding how narratives are linked together.

To illustrate how this approach could impact tactical, strategic, and political thinking, we will consider another military scenario. In this case, it's a true story, about the price that can be paid for making ethical decisions.

On the night of July 27 2005, a group of four SEALs led by Lt. Michael Murphy were dropped into Afghanistan's Kunar province to set up an observation post. Around noon on the next day, two Afghan men and a 14-year-old boy with their small flock of goats stumbled on the post. The SEALs argued among themselves as to whether they should kill the civilians to protect their cover, detain them, or let them go and abandon the mission. In the end they decided that the right thing to do was to let the Afghans go and move the observation post.

Before they had time to reposition, a force of nearly 100 Taliban fighters descended on their location from the same direction that the shepherds had fled. In the fierce firefight that followed, three of the four members of the team were killed, along with Lt. Murphy, while calling for support. The sole survivor, Marcus Luttrell, was rescued by local Pashtuns while escaping after being wounded by jumping off a series of cliffs [31].

In this case, Lt. Murphy made the *ethically correct choice*⁷. Tragically, his death may have resulted from that same choice. However, the framing of the entire mission, where a tiny team was placed deep into a high-risk, poorly-understood region plays into the result as well. And at a still higher level, the abandonment of Afghanistan to the Taliban shows that many of the decisions made in that 20-year campaign were deeply flawed.




Figure 13: Size of total United Nations Peacekeeping Force (1980 - 2014)

Human beings have many biases. The more obvious involve gender, ethnicity, and race. But we also have subtle biases that affect how we make decisions on issues such as national security. For example, the USA has a bias towards advanced weapons systems [32]. This is reflected in the decisions to incorporate AI/ML into the

⁷For which he was awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor.

nation’s military. The focus is on intelligent munitions, drones, hypersonic missiles, etc. But since the end of the Cold War, the majority of military operations have been in irregular conflict, such as Kosovo, Libya, and Afghanistan. These conflicts often involve the United Nations in peacekeeping operations, and the presence of UN troops is an excellent proxy for the increase in irregular conflict [33] (Figure 13). An intelligent munition would not have helped Lt. Murphy’s team decide whether to kill, hold, or release the Afghan shepherds that stumbled upon them. But information presented in a way that lets a user clearly visualize the likely outcome of a *trajectory of choices*, may let people consider other paths. After Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, leaders might think twice if that they see they are heading towards the part of a neural narrative map marked “Quagmire”. That would be a true ethical impact of AI in political and military thinking.

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